The paper discusses ecological grief as a particular affective phenomenon. First, it offers an ov... more The paper discusses ecological grief as a particular affective phenomenon. First, it offers an overview of several philosophical accounts of grief, acknowledging the heterogeneity and complexity of the experience that responds to particular personal points of importance, concern and one’s identity; the loss triggering grief represents a blow to these. I then argue that ecological grief is equally varied and personal: responding to what the grieving person understands as a loss severe enough to present intelligibly a degradation of her life and the world, to their meaningfulness or even sustainability. More specifically, both personal and ecological grief may manifest in an eroded sense of the future as a space in which one would invest oneself with plans, projects, ideas, desires, and endeavours. On the other hand, personal grief is, in some cases, conceptualised as having embedded the inherent possibility to come to closure or “move on” (e.g., by marrying again), while with ecological grief, the intelligibility of overcoming (replacing) the loss may be, depending on its scale, severely limited. I argue that this erosion of the future need not take the shape of paralysing sadness but rather of a disruption of taking some options of projecting oneself into the future seriously or as real.
The paper is a discussion of film expressions of environmental emotions, in particular of ecoange... more The paper is a discussion of film expressions of environmental emotions, in particular of ecoanger. It discusses several distinctions within the notion of anger (in particular that of honourrelated vs. justice-related anger) and argues that eco-anger can take accordingly varied forms. As an expression of honour-related eco-anger, the film Don't Look Up and its cinematic tools are analysed. This film is contrasted with justice-related forms of eco-anger (as embodied in the movement of Fridays for Future), and, further, with Lars von Trier's Melancholia. While Melancholia has (probably) no authorial environmentalist intention, its plot (strongly reminding that of Don't Look Up) invites environmentalist readings: as a lucidly pessimist film, fully free of any condescension or a tendency to take artistic vengeance on the deniers of the upcoming catastrophe.
In his postwar writings, Wittgenstein makes several comments about particularly "fitting" (treffe... more In his postwar writings, Wittgenstein makes several comments about particularly "fitting" (treffende) words. However, the nature of this quality remains unclear and elusive. In this paper, I present some suggestions about what one might learn from Wittgenstein's comments, though my purpose is not primarily exegetical but rather simply to reflect upon when or under what circumstances a word strikes us as "fitting". I discuss several options; first, I proceed by asking what it is that makes a word fitting, and discuss whether it can be its context, then whether it is an "imponderable" quality that it or the fitted object has. Finding no convincing answer to these questions (essentially the first person's reflective questions), I proceed towards a more indirect, perspective of describing what our encounters with fitting words are like, especially in conversational interactions, to a (third person) observer's eyes. I consider the importance of the enthusiastic feeling to which the word can give rise. This feeling should not be construed as a mental event of a private kind, though; rather, we can describe in these terms the dynamics of conversational situations that feature "fitting" words. In such cases, this feeling is something that commonly unfolds as a joint experience. The fitting word. How do we find it? Describe this! In contrast to this: I find the right term for a curve, after I have made particular measurements of it. (RPP I, § 72) [T]he [misleading] comparison of searching for the fitting expression to the efforts of someone who is trying to make an exact copy of a line that only he can see. (§ 580
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2022
The article discusses Iris Murdoch's philosophical relationship to Buddhism. First, we argue that... more The article discusses Iris Murdoch's philosophical relationship to Buddhism. First, we argue that Murdoch was not, and did not identify herself as, a Buddhist. Then we suggest caution regarding Murdoch's interpretations of Buddhism. On the one hand, she applies the limited viewpoint of her era. On the other hand, her approach is motivated by insights tracing affinities between Buddhism and Husserl's and Sartre's analyses of consciousness, as well as Platonic ideas of unselfing and self-purification. Murdoch's reflections on Buddhism serve primarily a complex argument about the role of religion in our moral lives, as these reflect the rapidly changing Western cultural environment. She envisages the possibility for Christianity to learn from Buddhism and move closer towards demythologisation and a radical, loving commitment to the others here and now. While Murdoch's observations may not be accurate as a 'diagnosis of our times', they serve as a valuable opening for reflecting on our lives in the suggested terms. They are also inspiring in their profound optimism that there is the possibility to learn from others (other cultures, other religions) for the better. The 'muddled' nature of our reality does not thwart this possibility of learning; it only makes its particular steps unpredictable.
In this paper, I discuss some moral dilemmas related to the COVID-19 crisis and their framing (ma... more In this paper, I discuss some moral dilemmas related to the COVID-19 crisis and their framing (mainly) in the public debate. The key assumption to engage with is this: that we need primarily to take into account the long-term economic consequences of the proposed safety measures of social distancing. I argue that the long-term economic concerns, though legitimate, cannot suspend the irreducibly moral nature of the demand placed on the decision-makers by those who are vulnerable, at risk, or in need of medical treatment. This is discussed in relation to two points: 1) The political endeavour and rhetoric of “flattening the curve” is not necessarily short-sighted, but expresses the acknowledgment of a legitimate expectation placed on elected representatives. 2) Not being able to prevent harm (to those who are in real need, or otherwise vulnerable) may lead to a genuine moral distress, even if it is not clear whether it was in one’s, or anybody’s, powers to prevent the situation, or even if the best possible outcome has been otherwise reached. The second point may be understood as a part of the broader context of the established criticisms of utilitarianism.
Text usiluje o kritický přehled některých prací sociálního psychologa Jonathana Haidta, s ohledem... more Text usiluje o kritický přehled některých prací sociálního psychologa Jonathana Haidta, s ohledem na to, jaké důsledky z Haidtových tvrzení vyplývají pro pojem morálky a možnosti filosofické diskuse o morálních problémech. Budu tvrdit, že jakkoli jsou Haidtova zjištění a jejich interpretace pozoruhodná a přínosná, některé aspekty lidské morálky a morálního života zkreslují. V první části se dotknu nejasností spjatých s Haidtovým pojmem morální intuice. Vodítkem bude způsob, jakým Haidt zavádí tento pojem a pracuje s ním ve svém příkladu sourozenců Marka a Julie. Ve druhé části naznačím, jaký dopad mají tyto nejasnosti pro Haidtovy politicko-psychologické analýzy. V poslední části poukážu na význam Haidtem přehlížené rozmanitosti filosofických teorií toho, co je to morálka. Společným jmenovatelem více mých kritických poznámek je jednak vágnost Haidtova pojmu „intuice“, jednak to, že i když Haidt označuje svá zkoumání za čistě deskriptivní a pluralistická, implicitně předpokládá zhruba utilitaristické pojetí morálky, včetně jeho normativních aspektů.
My aim is to discuss the rhetoric of expertise as objective, and ideology-and value-free, on the ... more My aim is to discuss the rhetoric of expertise as objective, and ideology-and value-free, on the example of environmental policy. The first section introduces examples of the common rhetorical figure of expert, ideology-free environmental protection and points at its presuppositions. The second introduces objects of comparison-the cartoonish proposals of wiping out humanity-with the aim being to show that the two groups of proposals assume analogous rhetoric. The third discusses some prominent features of various proposals of "population control", along with the links to the current surge of so-called eco-fascism. The aim is to show that all these phenomena represent a scale of the idea of ideology-free environmentalism. The concluding section discuss the distorted understanding of expertise, ideology and politics, central to examples discussed in sections 1-3, as leading to deplorable ignorance or callous cynicism, therefore, in effect, a moral failure.
Text polemizuje s pojetími povahy morálky, která na základě zkoumání evolučního původu morálky v... more Text polemizuje s pojetími povahy morálky, která na základě zkoumání evolučního původu morálky vidí smysl morálky v kooperaci společenství za účelem sdíleného úspěchu, podpořené pravidly. Navrhuji několik protipříkladů (příklady „supererogace“, morální jednání vůči zvířatům), na jejichž základě se pokouším ukázat, jaký význam může mít, budeme-li o morálce uvažovat nezávisle na 1) požadavku prosociality a 2) objektivním (externím) účelu, který má morálka naplňovat.
This text presents an analysis of some aspects of the phenomenon of so-called incels. It focuses ... more This text presents an analysis of some aspects of the phenomenon of so-called incels. It focuses on the sexist and male supremacist ideology inherent to the incels' narrative. It also follows a link between this ideology and assumptions made by some commentators on the incels' problem, who have been relying on a mixture of conservative views on society and reductionist naturalism. I present a critique of these background assumptions, relating to concepts that feature centrally in them. First, I criticise the characterisation of a particular (simplistic and anachronistic) concept of "monogamy" as natural and its possible construal as normative. Then I explore the rhetoric of sex as a "basic need", pointing out the tendency to mistake what one wants for a "need". I conclude by criticising the particular kind of the idea of the science of human nature, underpinning the reductionist accounts of sex-related violence.
Certain components of the concept of wisdom represent an alternative to the major theories of wis... more Certain components of the concept of wisdom represent an alternative to the major theories of wisdom as having and using knowledge to build one's own good life. The major theories draw on links to Aristotle and/or Confucius, while the alternative components of the concept of wisdom echo some respects in which the non-self-directed and non-constructive suggestions of Socratic ethics and Daoism represent an alternative to Aristotle and Confucius. I propose a reading of Dream of the Red Chamber as an example of a wise insight that is in no sense directed towards improving the seer's life and instead consisting in a non-judgemental and compassionate understanding of the complexity of life. Relying on the ideas of Wittgensteinian ethicists (Rhees, Phillips, Beardsmore), I suggest that wisdom in this sense is encouraged by, and located in, encounters with examples (of particular persons and their stories). This paper discusses an alternative perspective to some contemporary framings of wisdom, which intersect in characterising wisdom as a cognitive capacity leading, centrally, towards the (wise person's) good life. I am interested in the way these accounts of wisdom are at times explored, or argued for, in relation to Aristotelian and (with some interpretive liberty) Confucian notions of wisdom and virtue. The notion of wisdom as being about one's good life appears widespread1 and has its merits; by offering an alternative, I do not aim to refute it.
The paper discusses equivocations involved in the concept of addiction and suggests its understan... more The paper discusses equivocations involved in the concept of addiction and suggests its understanding in terms of one's (degraded) way of leading one's whole life. I argue against common conceptions of addiction identifying its core either in a physiological condition (substance-induced) of craving or in weakness of will as insufficient. Using Fingarette's notion of "central activity", I explore addiction as a peculiar kind of such a central interest, pervading and predating on one's other interests, and characterised by a corrosion of a sense of temporality and responsibility. Since addiction is a response to events in the addict's life (a personally specific lack of healthy sources of positive reinforcement), therapy-consisting in reestablishment of the capacity of navigating responsibly one's activities and interests-must proceed in a way taking the particular aspects of each case into account.
The paper discusses ecological grief as a particular affective phenomenon. First, it offers an ov... more The paper discusses ecological grief as a particular affective phenomenon. First, it offers an overview of several philosophical accounts of grief, acknowledging the heterogeneity and complexity of the experience that responds to particular personal points of importance, concern and one’s identity; the loss triggering grief represents a blow to these. I then argue that ecological grief is equally varied and personal: responding to what the grieving person understands as a loss severe enough to present intelligibly a degradation of her life and the world, to their meaningfulness or even sustainability. More specifically, both personal and ecological grief may manifest in an eroded sense of the future as a space in which one would invest oneself with plans, projects, ideas, desires, and endeavours. On the other hand, personal grief is, in some cases, conceptualised as having embedded the inherent possibility to come to closure or “move on” (e.g., by marrying again), while with ecological grief, the intelligibility of overcoming (replacing) the loss may be, depending on its scale, severely limited. I argue that this erosion of the future need not take the shape of paralysing sadness but rather of a disruption of taking some options of projecting oneself into the future seriously or as real.
The paper is a discussion of film expressions of environmental emotions, in particular of ecoange... more The paper is a discussion of film expressions of environmental emotions, in particular of ecoanger. It discusses several distinctions within the notion of anger (in particular that of honourrelated vs. justice-related anger) and argues that eco-anger can take accordingly varied forms. As an expression of honour-related eco-anger, the film Don't Look Up and its cinematic tools are analysed. This film is contrasted with justice-related forms of eco-anger (as embodied in the movement of Fridays for Future), and, further, with Lars von Trier's Melancholia. While Melancholia has (probably) no authorial environmentalist intention, its plot (strongly reminding that of Don't Look Up) invites environmentalist readings: as a lucidly pessimist film, fully free of any condescension or a tendency to take artistic vengeance on the deniers of the upcoming catastrophe.
In his postwar writings, Wittgenstein makes several comments about particularly "fitting" (treffe... more In his postwar writings, Wittgenstein makes several comments about particularly "fitting" (treffende) words. However, the nature of this quality remains unclear and elusive. In this paper, I present some suggestions about what one might learn from Wittgenstein's comments, though my purpose is not primarily exegetical but rather simply to reflect upon when or under what circumstances a word strikes us as "fitting". I discuss several options; first, I proceed by asking what it is that makes a word fitting, and discuss whether it can be its context, then whether it is an "imponderable" quality that it or the fitted object has. Finding no convincing answer to these questions (essentially the first person's reflective questions), I proceed towards a more indirect, perspective of describing what our encounters with fitting words are like, especially in conversational interactions, to a (third person) observer's eyes. I consider the importance of the enthusiastic feeling to which the word can give rise. This feeling should not be construed as a mental event of a private kind, though; rather, we can describe in these terms the dynamics of conversational situations that feature "fitting" words. In such cases, this feeling is something that commonly unfolds as a joint experience. The fitting word. How do we find it? Describe this! In contrast to this: I find the right term for a curve, after I have made particular measurements of it. (RPP I, § 72) [T]he [misleading] comparison of searching for the fitting expression to the efforts of someone who is trying to make an exact copy of a line that only he can see. (§ 580
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2022
The article discusses Iris Murdoch's philosophical relationship to Buddhism. First, we argue that... more The article discusses Iris Murdoch's philosophical relationship to Buddhism. First, we argue that Murdoch was not, and did not identify herself as, a Buddhist. Then we suggest caution regarding Murdoch's interpretations of Buddhism. On the one hand, she applies the limited viewpoint of her era. On the other hand, her approach is motivated by insights tracing affinities between Buddhism and Husserl's and Sartre's analyses of consciousness, as well as Platonic ideas of unselfing and self-purification. Murdoch's reflections on Buddhism serve primarily a complex argument about the role of religion in our moral lives, as these reflect the rapidly changing Western cultural environment. She envisages the possibility for Christianity to learn from Buddhism and move closer towards demythologisation and a radical, loving commitment to the others here and now. While Murdoch's observations may not be accurate as a 'diagnosis of our times', they serve as a valuable opening for reflecting on our lives in the suggested terms. They are also inspiring in their profound optimism that there is the possibility to learn from others (other cultures, other religions) for the better. The 'muddled' nature of our reality does not thwart this possibility of learning; it only makes its particular steps unpredictable.
In this paper, I discuss some moral dilemmas related to the COVID-19 crisis and their framing (ma... more In this paper, I discuss some moral dilemmas related to the COVID-19 crisis and their framing (mainly) in the public debate. The key assumption to engage with is this: that we need primarily to take into account the long-term economic consequences of the proposed safety measures of social distancing. I argue that the long-term economic concerns, though legitimate, cannot suspend the irreducibly moral nature of the demand placed on the decision-makers by those who are vulnerable, at risk, or in need of medical treatment. This is discussed in relation to two points: 1) The political endeavour and rhetoric of “flattening the curve” is not necessarily short-sighted, but expresses the acknowledgment of a legitimate expectation placed on elected representatives. 2) Not being able to prevent harm (to those who are in real need, or otherwise vulnerable) may lead to a genuine moral distress, even if it is not clear whether it was in one’s, or anybody’s, powers to prevent the situation, or even if the best possible outcome has been otherwise reached. The second point may be understood as a part of the broader context of the established criticisms of utilitarianism.
Text usiluje o kritický přehled některých prací sociálního psychologa Jonathana Haidta, s ohledem... more Text usiluje o kritický přehled některých prací sociálního psychologa Jonathana Haidta, s ohledem na to, jaké důsledky z Haidtových tvrzení vyplývají pro pojem morálky a možnosti filosofické diskuse o morálních problémech. Budu tvrdit, že jakkoli jsou Haidtova zjištění a jejich interpretace pozoruhodná a přínosná, některé aspekty lidské morálky a morálního života zkreslují. V první části se dotknu nejasností spjatých s Haidtovým pojmem morální intuice. Vodítkem bude způsob, jakým Haidt zavádí tento pojem a pracuje s ním ve svém příkladu sourozenců Marka a Julie. Ve druhé části naznačím, jaký dopad mají tyto nejasnosti pro Haidtovy politicko-psychologické analýzy. V poslední části poukážu na význam Haidtem přehlížené rozmanitosti filosofických teorií toho, co je to morálka. Společným jmenovatelem více mých kritických poznámek je jednak vágnost Haidtova pojmu „intuice“, jednak to, že i když Haidt označuje svá zkoumání za čistě deskriptivní a pluralistická, implicitně předpokládá zhruba utilitaristické pojetí morálky, včetně jeho normativních aspektů.
My aim is to discuss the rhetoric of expertise as objective, and ideology-and value-free, on the ... more My aim is to discuss the rhetoric of expertise as objective, and ideology-and value-free, on the example of environmental policy. The first section introduces examples of the common rhetorical figure of expert, ideology-free environmental protection and points at its presuppositions. The second introduces objects of comparison-the cartoonish proposals of wiping out humanity-with the aim being to show that the two groups of proposals assume analogous rhetoric. The third discusses some prominent features of various proposals of "population control", along with the links to the current surge of so-called eco-fascism. The aim is to show that all these phenomena represent a scale of the idea of ideology-free environmentalism. The concluding section discuss the distorted understanding of expertise, ideology and politics, central to examples discussed in sections 1-3, as leading to deplorable ignorance or callous cynicism, therefore, in effect, a moral failure.
Text polemizuje s pojetími povahy morálky, která na základě zkoumání evolučního původu morálky v... more Text polemizuje s pojetími povahy morálky, která na základě zkoumání evolučního původu morálky vidí smysl morálky v kooperaci společenství za účelem sdíleného úspěchu, podpořené pravidly. Navrhuji několik protipříkladů (příklady „supererogace“, morální jednání vůči zvířatům), na jejichž základě se pokouším ukázat, jaký význam může mít, budeme-li o morálce uvažovat nezávisle na 1) požadavku prosociality a 2) objektivním (externím) účelu, který má morálka naplňovat.
This text presents an analysis of some aspects of the phenomenon of so-called incels. It focuses ... more This text presents an analysis of some aspects of the phenomenon of so-called incels. It focuses on the sexist and male supremacist ideology inherent to the incels' narrative. It also follows a link between this ideology and assumptions made by some commentators on the incels' problem, who have been relying on a mixture of conservative views on society and reductionist naturalism. I present a critique of these background assumptions, relating to concepts that feature centrally in them. First, I criticise the characterisation of a particular (simplistic and anachronistic) concept of "monogamy" as natural and its possible construal as normative. Then I explore the rhetoric of sex as a "basic need", pointing out the tendency to mistake what one wants for a "need". I conclude by criticising the particular kind of the idea of the science of human nature, underpinning the reductionist accounts of sex-related violence.
Certain components of the concept of wisdom represent an alternative to the major theories of wis... more Certain components of the concept of wisdom represent an alternative to the major theories of wisdom as having and using knowledge to build one's own good life. The major theories draw on links to Aristotle and/or Confucius, while the alternative components of the concept of wisdom echo some respects in which the non-self-directed and non-constructive suggestions of Socratic ethics and Daoism represent an alternative to Aristotle and Confucius. I propose a reading of Dream of the Red Chamber as an example of a wise insight that is in no sense directed towards improving the seer's life and instead consisting in a non-judgemental and compassionate understanding of the complexity of life. Relying on the ideas of Wittgensteinian ethicists (Rhees, Phillips, Beardsmore), I suggest that wisdom in this sense is encouraged by, and located in, encounters with examples (of particular persons and their stories). This paper discusses an alternative perspective to some contemporary framings of wisdom, which intersect in characterising wisdom as a cognitive capacity leading, centrally, towards the (wise person's) good life. I am interested in the way these accounts of wisdom are at times explored, or argued for, in relation to Aristotelian and (with some interpretive liberty) Confucian notions of wisdom and virtue. The notion of wisdom as being about one's good life appears widespread1 and has its merits; by offering an alternative, I do not aim to refute it.
The paper discusses equivocations involved in the concept of addiction and suggests its understan... more The paper discusses equivocations involved in the concept of addiction and suggests its understanding in terms of one's (degraded) way of leading one's whole life. I argue against common conceptions of addiction identifying its core either in a physiological condition (substance-induced) of craving or in weakness of will as insufficient. Using Fingarette's notion of "central activity", I explore addiction as a peculiar kind of such a central interest, pervading and predating on one's other interests, and characterised by a corrosion of a sense of temporality and responsibility. Since addiction is a response to events in the addict's life (a personally specific lack of healthy sources of positive reinforcement), therapy-consisting in reestablishment of the capacity of navigating responsibly one's activities and interests-must proceed in a way taking the particular aspects of each case into account.
Inferentialism is a philosophical approach premised on the claim that an item of language (or tho... more Inferentialism is a philosophical approach premised on the claim that an item of language (or thought) acquires meaning (or content) in virtue of being embedded in an intricate set of social practices normatively governed by a special sort of rules—inferential rules. Over the last two decades, inferentialism has established itself as one of the leading research programs in the philosophy of language and also, increasingly, in the philosophy of logic. Though it has grown into a vigorous and ramified branch of philosophical thinking, contemporary inferentialism is only rarely presented in a more systematic and comprehensive manner that explores its diversity. The book fills this lacuna by bringing together new essays on inferentialism that develop, compare, and assess, but also critically react to some of the most pertinent recent trends that would appeal to a wider philosophical readership. Its core chapters have been written by distinguished philosophers contributing to the research in the field.
Uploads
Books by Ondřej Beran
Papers by Ondřej Beran
disruption of taking some options of projecting oneself into the future seriously or as real.
disruption of taking some options of projecting oneself into the future seriously or as real.
in the philosophy of logic. Though it has grown into a vigorous and ramified branch of philosophical thinking, contemporary inferentialism is only rarely presented in a more systematic and comprehensive manner that explores its diversity. The book fills this lacuna by bringing together new essays on inferentialism that develop, compare, and assess, but also critically react to some of the most pertinent recent trends that would appeal to a wider philosophical readership. Its core chapters have been written by distinguished philosophers contributing to the research in the field.