My philosophical interests are mainly in moral and political philosophy, and I'm particularly interested in questions about the demandingness of morality, individual obligations of justice, the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory, global justice, ethical issues arising with regard to climate change, and the ethics of self-defense, war, and terrorism. I am also interested in the notion of collective obligations, and the connection between such obligations and individual obligations, as well as in methodological issues in ethics, particularly the appropriate role of appeals to intuitions. Phone: 215-898-3445 Address: 664 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics
Wharton School
3730 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
In recent years, there has been increased interest in a variety of ways that private actors, and ... more In recent years, there has been increased interest in a variety of ways that private actors, and in particular actors in the business world, broadly understood, can contribute to addressing important social problems and persistent injustices. In this paper, I aim to articulate and begin to answer what seem to me to be some of the most important and challenging normative questions arising with regard to social entrepreneurship as a mode of economic activity aimed at addressing social problems or promoting justice. I focus in particular on questions about the relationship between the pursuit of social entrepreneurial activity, the satisfaction of obligations to promote justice, and claims to income and wealth produced by successful social entrepreneurial ventures. I argue that there are reasons to think that social entrepreneurial activity can be a way that individuals (attempt to) satisfy at least some of their obligations of justice, but note that there are moral risks involved in attempting to satisfy these obligations in this way. And I suggest that there are at least some reasons, including recognition of the grounds on which we might sometimes prefer that people in a position to take these risks do so, to think that only those who accept broader moral views that are very demanding can consistently deny that social entrepreneurs who successfully generate substantial profits are morally entitled to retain them.
Christian Barry and Garrett Cullity argue that there is a morally important distinction between o... more Christian Barry and Garrett Cullity argue that there is a morally important distinction between offsetting by “sequestering” and offsetting by “forestalling.” They further claim that offsetting by sequestering will often make risk-imposing actions permissible, while offsetting by forestalling typically will not. In this paper, I highlight some reasons to be skeptical about their view, and suggest an alternative account of the conditions in which offsetting can make a risk-imposing action permissible. In addition, I note a significant implication of my argument for the ethics of greenhouse gas offsetting.
Exploitation: Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, May 2024
This chapter argues that in some cases of wrongful exploitation, individuals who are not parties ... more This chapter argues that in some cases of wrongful exploitation, individuals who are not parties to the relevant transactions are as seriously and as directly wronged as the exploited parties to those transactions. Section I presents two cases that provide intuitive support for this claim, and offers an initial explanation for it that relies on considerations that are similar to those that motivate the Nonworseness Claim. Section 2 describes some central components of an account of the wrong-making features of wrongful exploitation that is suggested by the argument in section 1, and suggests some reasons to find this type of account plausible. Section 3 notes what the arguments in sections 1 and 2 seem to imply with regard to the remedial duties of wrongful exploiters, contrasts this view with one that has recently been defended by Malmqvist and Szigeti, and argues that there are important reasons to prefer the former.
In this paper, we argue that if a set of plausible conditions obtain, then driving a standard veh... more In this paper, we argue that if a set of plausible conditions obtain, then driving a standard vehicle rather than riding in an autonomous vehicle (AV) will become analogous to driving drunk rather than driving sober, and therefore impermissible. In addition, we argue that a ban on the production, sale, and purchase of new standard vehicles would also become justified. We make this case in part by highlighting that the central reasons typically offered in support of state-mandated vaccination will also support mandating AV use. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of our argument for the obligations of vehicle-producing firms.
In this paper, I raise some doubts about Nicole Hassoun's account of the obligations of states, p... more In this paper, I raise some doubts about Nicole Hassoun's account of the obligations of states, pharmaceutical firms, and consumers with regard to global health, presented in Global Health Impact. I argue that it is not necessarily the case, as Hassoun claims, that if states are just, and therefore satisfy all of their obligations, then consumers will not have strong moral reasons, and perhaps obligations, to make consumption choices that are informed by principles and requirements of justice. This is because there may be justicebased limits on what states can permissibly and feasibly do both to promote access to existing drugs for all of those who need them, and to promote research and development for new drugs that could treat diseases that primarily affect the global poor. One important upshot of my argument is that there can be reasons for organizations like the Global Health Impact Organization to exist, and to do the kind of work that Hassoun argues is potentially valuable in our deeply unjust world, even in much less unjust worlds in which states and firms largely, or even entirely, comply with their obligations.
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Poverty, Jan 2024
This chapter provides an overview of the most prominent debates about the moral significance and ... more This chapter provides an overview of the most prominent debates about the moral significance and implications of poverty among those who accept a broadly utilitarian account of poverty’s most morally important dimensions. The first section outlines the central features of utilitarian moral theory and describes the basic features of a broadly utilitarian account of poverty’s moral significance. The next section examines the various accounts of the moral obligations of the affluent to contribute to alleviating poverty that have been defended by those who accept broadly utilitarian accounts. The central issue in these discussions is how demanding the obligations of the affluent are, and in particular how much of their wealth they are obligated to sacrifice in order to aid those in poverty. The third section focuses on the recent debate about whether obligations to donate more rather than less effectively – that is, in ways that produce more rather than less good – can plausibly be understood as merely conditional obligations. The central issue in these discussions is whether the broadly utilitarian requirement to do more good rather than less for those in poverty with a given set of resources can be defended independent of a commitment to potentially demanding unconditional obligations to provide aid. A brief conclusion ends the chapter.
Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Dec 2023
On at least most accounts of what global justice requires, those living in severe poverty around ... more On at least most accounts of what global justice requires, those living in severe poverty around the world are unjustly disadvantaged. Remedying this unjust disadvantage requires (perhaps among other things) that resources currently possessed by well off people are deployed in ways that will improve the lives of the poor. In this article, I argue that, contrary to the claims of some critics, effective altruist giving is at least among the appropriate responses to global injustice for well off people. In addition, I suggest some reasons to think that effective altruist giving will often be among the best ways for such people to satisfy obligations that they have in virtue of being beneficiaries of global injustice. The argument that I offer for this conclusion has at least two important implications. First, critics of effective altruism who claim that it is incompatible with taking global injustice sufficiently seriously are mistaken. And second, effective altruists have reason to reject the non-normative accounts of the movement's core commitments that have been advocated by some prominent proponents.
Working as Equals: Relational Egalitarianism and the Workplace, May 2023
According to relational egalitarians, the fundamental value that grounds requirements of justice ... more According to relational egalitarians, the fundamental value that grounds requirements of justice is egalitarian social relationships. Hierarchical authority relations appear to be a threat to relational equality. Such relations, however, are pervasive in our working lives. Contemporary workplaces, then, seem to be potential sites of substantial injustice for relational egalitarians. This presents us with a challenge: the view that justice requires that individuals relate as equals appears difficult to reconcile with the view that it is permissible for firms to be organized with hierarchical authority structures, and yet both claims seem independently plausible. In this chapter I argue that these claims can be reconciled, but only if we reject the widely accepted Rawlsian “institutionalist” view that principles of justice apply to the institutions of the basic structure of society, but do not apply directly to the conduct of agents within those institutions.
In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complet... more In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complete account of distributive justice looks like, it should include a Limitarian requirement. The core Limitarian claim is that there is a ceiling-a limit-to the amount of resources that it is permissible for any individual to possess. While this core claim is plausible, there are a number of important questions about precisely how the requirement should be understood, and what its implications are regarding the obligations of various agents, that have not been adequately addressed in the discussions thus far. In this paper, I focus on questions about the relationship between the grounds for the Limitarian requirement and its role in generating obligations of justice for different agents. I argue that the plausible grounds for the requirement are incompatible with the widely accepted view, deriving from John Rawls, that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what Rawls calls the "basic structure of society," but do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals and other possible agents (e.g. corporations) acting within that structure. If my argument succeeds, then Limitarians must accept that if the grounds that they have offered in defense of Limitarian policy interventions are compelling, then individuals are obligated to voluntarily direct any resources that they possess above the threshold in ways that will promote the same goals that justify Limitarian policies.
Autonomous Vehicle Ethics: The Trolley Problem and Beyond, Sep 2022
In this chapter, I argue that in addition to the generally accepted aim of reducing traffic-relat... more In this chapter, I argue that in addition to the generally accepted aim of reducing traffic-related injuries and deaths as much as possible, a principle of fairness in the distribution of risk should inform our thinking about how firms that produce autonomous vehicles ought to program them to respond in conflict situations involving human-driven vehicles. This principle, I claim, rules out programming autonomous vehicles to systematically prioritize the interests of their occupants over those of the occupants of other vehicles, including human-driven vehicles. Because there is reason to think that most consumers would prefer to purchase autonomous vehicles that do systematically prioritize the interests of occupants over those of others, if my argument is correct it generates a substantial ethical restriction on firms’ efforts to gain market share in the initial stages of the introduction of autonomous vehicles onto the road.
Philosophy and Business Ethics: Organizations, CSR, and Moral Practice, Jun 2022
Few would deny that some central questions in business ethics are normative. But there has been, ... more Few would deny that some central questions in business ethics are normative. But there has been, and remains, much skepticism about the value of traditional philosophical approaches to answering these questions. I have three central aims in this chapter. The first is to defend traditional philosophical approaches to business ethics against the criticism that they are insufficiently practical. The second is to defend the view that the appropriate methodology for pursuing work in business ethics is largely continuous with the appropriate methodology in moral and political philosophy more broadly. And the third is to offer a brief characterization of how we should think about the substance of business ethics, in light of my arguments about its proper aims and methodology.
In On Trade Justice, Risse and Wollner defend an account of trade justice on which the central re... more In On Trade Justice, Risse and Wollner defend an account of trade justice on which the central requirement, applying to both states and firms, is a requirement of non-exploitation. On their view, in the context of trade exploitation consists in 'power-induced failure of reciprocity', which generates an unfair distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with trade relationships. In this paper, I argue that while there are many appealing features of Risse and Wollner's account, their discussion does not articulate and develop the unified picture of states' and firms' obligations that they aim to provide as clearly as it might have. In particular, it is, I claim, unclear exactly how they understand the relationship between the fairness-based requirements that apply to states and those that apply to firms. I argue that there are two types of accounts that they might accept: a transactional account and a structural account. I offer reasons to think that there are reasons to prefer a structural account. In addition, I note some of the key implications of accepting such an account, and suggest that if Risse and Wollner accept these implications and revise other aspects of their view accordingly, the result is a plausible and unified account of what trade justice requires.
Despite the increased attention that has been paid in recent years to the significance of animal ... more Despite the increased attention that has been paid in recent years to the significance of animal interests within moral and political philosophy, there has been virtually no discussion of the significance of animal interests within business ethics. This is rather troubling, since a great deal of the treatment of animals that will seem especially problematic to many people occurs in the context of business, broadly construed. In this chapter, I aim to extend the growing concern that our normative theories should be animal-friendly to business ethics. I consider whether several popular theoretical approaches in business ethics are consistent with taking animal interests to bear on the decisions that business managers are obligated to make. I do not argue for the claim that we should reject any theory in business ethics that cannot count animal interests as providing reasons that are relevant to the moral status of managerial conduct (though I think that this is true). Instead, I proceed on the assumption that many will find this claim plausible, and argue that those who do have reason to doubt that many of the prominent theoretical approaches defended in the business ethics literature are acceptable. My main aim, then, is to show that those who believe that the correct theory in business ethics must be animal-friendly, at least in the limited sense of counting animal interests as relevant to the moral status of managerial conduct in a plausible way, will need to look beyond the main competing theories that occupy present discussions.
It is widely believed that just societies would be characterized by some combination of democrati... more It is widely believed that just societies would be characterized by some combination of democratic political institutions and market-based economic institutions. Underlying the commitment to the combination of democracy and markets is the view that certain normatively significant outcomes in a society ought to be determined by democratic processes, while others ought to be determined by market processes. On this view, we have reason to object when market processes are employed in ways that circumvent democratic processes and affect outcomes that ought to be determined democratically. In this paper, I argue that Waheed Hussain’s recent account of the conditions that must be met in order for the use of market power in pursuit of social change to avoid conflict with democratic values is objectionably narrow, and offer an alternative account that avoids the problems that undermine his account without abandoning the requirement that democratic values be properly respected. The central feature of my account that makes this possible is a broader conception of democratic processes that includes public deliberation and debate aimed at shaping informal social norms and practices.
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Jul 2021
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic hardships for millions of people around the... more The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic hardships for millions of people around the world. Meanwhile, many of the world's richest people have seen their wealth increase substantially during the pandemic, despite the significant economic disruptions that it has caused on the whole. It is uncontroversial that these effects, which have exacerbated already unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality, call for robust policy responses from governments. In this paper, I argue that the disparate economic effects of the pandemic also generate direct obligations of justice for those who have benefitted from pandemic windfalls. Specifically, I argue that even if we accept that those who benefit from distributive injustice in the ordinary, predictable course of life within unjust institutions do not have direct obligations to redirect their unjust benefits to those who are unjustly disadvantaged, there are powerful reasons to hold that benefitting from pandemic windfalls does ground such an obligation.
In this article, I aim to clarify some key issues in the ongoing debate about the relationship be... more In this article, I aim to clarify some key issues in the ongoing debate about the relationship between Rawlsian political philosophy and business ethics. First, I discuss precisely what we ought to be asking when we consider whether corporations are part of the “basic structure of society.” I suggest that the relevant questions have been mischaracterized in much of the existing debate, and that some key distinctions have been overlooked. I then argue that although Rawlsian theory’s potential implications for business ethics are more extensive than some have suggested, the nature of the concern that we ought to have about the effects of corporate behavior on individuals’ economic and social conditions should lead us to reject the view that corporations are bound by principles of justice only if, and insofar as, they are part of the basic structure.
In recent years, there has been increased interest in a variety of ways that private actors, and ... more In recent years, there has been increased interest in a variety of ways that private actors, and in particular actors in the business world, broadly understood, can contribute to addressing important social problems and persistent injustices. In this paper, I aim to articulate and begin to answer what seem to me to be some of the most important and challenging normative questions arising with regard to social entrepreneurship as a mode of economic activity aimed at addressing social problems or promoting justice. I focus in particular on questions about the relationship between the pursuit of social entrepreneurial activity, the satisfaction of obligations to promote justice, and claims to income and wealth produced by successful social entrepreneurial ventures. I argue that there are reasons to think that social entrepreneurial activity can be a way that individuals (attempt to) satisfy at least some of their obligations of justice, but note that there are moral risks involved in attempting to satisfy these obligations in this way. And I suggest that there are at least some reasons, including recognition of the grounds on which we might sometimes prefer that people in a position to take these risks do so, to think that only those who accept broader moral views that are very demanding can consistently deny that social entrepreneurs who successfully generate substantial profits are morally entitled to retain them.
Christian Barry and Garrett Cullity argue that there is a morally important distinction between o... more Christian Barry and Garrett Cullity argue that there is a morally important distinction between offsetting by “sequestering” and offsetting by “forestalling.” They further claim that offsetting by sequestering will often make risk-imposing actions permissible, while offsetting by forestalling typically will not. In this paper, I highlight some reasons to be skeptical about their view, and suggest an alternative account of the conditions in which offsetting can make a risk-imposing action permissible. In addition, I note a significant implication of my argument for the ethics of greenhouse gas offsetting.
Exploitation: Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, May 2024
This chapter argues that in some cases of wrongful exploitation, individuals who are not parties ... more This chapter argues that in some cases of wrongful exploitation, individuals who are not parties to the relevant transactions are as seriously and as directly wronged as the exploited parties to those transactions. Section I presents two cases that provide intuitive support for this claim, and offers an initial explanation for it that relies on considerations that are similar to those that motivate the Nonworseness Claim. Section 2 describes some central components of an account of the wrong-making features of wrongful exploitation that is suggested by the argument in section 1, and suggests some reasons to find this type of account plausible. Section 3 notes what the arguments in sections 1 and 2 seem to imply with regard to the remedial duties of wrongful exploiters, contrasts this view with one that has recently been defended by Malmqvist and Szigeti, and argues that there are important reasons to prefer the former.
In this paper, we argue that if a set of plausible conditions obtain, then driving a standard veh... more In this paper, we argue that if a set of plausible conditions obtain, then driving a standard vehicle rather than riding in an autonomous vehicle (AV) will become analogous to driving drunk rather than driving sober, and therefore impermissible. In addition, we argue that a ban on the production, sale, and purchase of new standard vehicles would also become justified. We make this case in part by highlighting that the central reasons typically offered in support of state-mandated vaccination will also support mandating AV use. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of our argument for the obligations of vehicle-producing firms.
In this paper, I raise some doubts about Nicole Hassoun's account of the obligations of states, p... more In this paper, I raise some doubts about Nicole Hassoun's account of the obligations of states, pharmaceutical firms, and consumers with regard to global health, presented in Global Health Impact. I argue that it is not necessarily the case, as Hassoun claims, that if states are just, and therefore satisfy all of their obligations, then consumers will not have strong moral reasons, and perhaps obligations, to make consumption choices that are informed by principles and requirements of justice. This is because there may be justicebased limits on what states can permissibly and feasibly do both to promote access to existing drugs for all of those who need them, and to promote research and development for new drugs that could treat diseases that primarily affect the global poor. One important upshot of my argument is that there can be reasons for organizations like the Global Health Impact Organization to exist, and to do the kind of work that Hassoun argues is potentially valuable in our deeply unjust world, even in much less unjust worlds in which states and firms largely, or even entirely, comply with their obligations.
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Poverty, Jan 2024
This chapter provides an overview of the most prominent debates about the moral significance and ... more This chapter provides an overview of the most prominent debates about the moral significance and implications of poverty among those who accept a broadly utilitarian account of poverty’s most morally important dimensions. The first section outlines the central features of utilitarian moral theory and describes the basic features of a broadly utilitarian account of poverty’s moral significance. The next section examines the various accounts of the moral obligations of the affluent to contribute to alleviating poverty that have been defended by those who accept broadly utilitarian accounts. The central issue in these discussions is how demanding the obligations of the affluent are, and in particular how much of their wealth they are obligated to sacrifice in order to aid those in poverty. The third section focuses on the recent debate about whether obligations to donate more rather than less effectively – that is, in ways that produce more rather than less good – can plausibly be understood as merely conditional obligations. The central issue in these discussions is whether the broadly utilitarian requirement to do more good rather than less for those in poverty with a given set of resources can be defended independent of a commitment to potentially demanding unconditional obligations to provide aid. A brief conclusion ends the chapter.
Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Dec 2023
On at least most accounts of what global justice requires, those living in severe poverty around ... more On at least most accounts of what global justice requires, those living in severe poverty around the world are unjustly disadvantaged. Remedying this unjust disadvantage requires (perhaps among other things) that resources currently possessed by well off people are deployed in ways that will improve the lives of the poor. In this article, I argue that, contrary to the claims of some critics, effective altruist giving is at least among the appropriate responses to global injustice for well off people. In addition, I suggest some reasons to think that effective altruist giving will often be among the best ways for such people to satisfy obligations that they have in virtue of being beneficiaries of global injustice. The argument that I offer for this conclusion has at least two important implications. First, critics of effective altruism who claim that it is incompatible with taking global injustice sufficiently seriously are mistaken. And second, effective altruists have reason to reject the non-normative accounts of the movement's core commitments that have been advocated by some prominent proponents.
Working as Equals: Relational Egalitarianism and the Workplace, May 2023
According to relational egalitarians, the fundamental value that grounds requirements of justice ... more According to relational egalitarians, the fundamental value that grounds requirements of justice is egalitarian social relationships. Hierarchical authority relations appear to be a threat to relational equality. Such relations, however, are pervasive in our working lives. Contemporary workplaces, then, seem to be potential sites of substantial injustice for relational egalitarians. This presents us with a challenge: the view that justice requires that individuals relate as equals appears difficult to reconcile with the view that it is permissible for firms to be organized with hierarchical authority structures, and yet both claims seem independently plausible. In this chapter I argue that these claims can be reconciled, but only if we reject the widely accepted Rawlsian “institutionalist” view that principles of justice apply to the institutions of the basic structure of society, but do not apply directly to the conduct of agents within those institutions.
In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complet... more In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complete account of distributive justice looks like, it should include a Limitarian requirement. The core Limitarian claim is that there is a ceiling-a limit-to the amount of resources that it is permissible for any individual to possess. While this core claim is plausible, there are a number of important questions about precisely how the requirement should be understood, and what its implications are regarding the obligations of various agents, that have not been adequately addressed in the discussions thus far. In this paper, I focus on questions about the relationship between the grounds for the Limitarian requirement and its role in generating obligations of justice for different agents. I argue that the plausible grounds for the requirement are incompatible with the widely accepted view, deriving from John Rawls, that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what Rawls calls the "basic structure of society," but do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals and other possible agents (e.g. corporations) acting within that structure. If my argument succeeds, then Limitarians must accept that if the grounds that they have offered in defense of Limitarian policy interventions are compelling, then individuals are obligated to voluntarily direct any resources that they possess above the threshold in ways that will promote the same goals that justify Limitarian policies.
Autonomous Vehicle Ethics: The Trolley Problem and Beyond, Sep 2022
In this chapter, I argue that in addition to the generally accepted aim of reducing traffic-relat... more In this chapter, I argue that in addition to the generally accepted aim of reducing traffic-related injuries and deaths as much as possible, a principle of fairness in the distribution of risk should inform our thinking about how firms that produce autonomous vehicles ought to program them to respond in conflict situations involving human-driven vehicles. This principle, I claim, rules out programming autonomous vehicles to systematically prioritize the interests of their occupants over those of the occupants of other vehicles, including human-driven vehicles. Because there is reason to think that most consumers would prefer to purchase autonomous vehicles that do systematically prioritize the interests of occupants over those of others, if my argument is correct it generates a substantial ethical restriction on firms’ efforts to gain market share in the initial stages of the introduction of autonomous vehicles onto the road.
Philosophy and Business Ethics: Organizations, CSR, and Moral Practice, Jun 2022
Few would deny that some central questions in business ethics are normative. But there has been, ... more Few would deny that some central questions in business ethics are normative. But there has been, and remains, much skepticism about the value of traditional philosophical approaches to answering these questions. I have three central aims in this chapter. The first is to defend traditional philosophical approaches to business ethics against the criticism that they are insufficiently practical. The second is to defend the view that the appropriate methodology for pursuing work in business ethics is largely continuous with the appropriate methodology in moral and political philosophy more broadly. And the third is to offer a brief characterization of how we should think about the substance of business ethics, in light of my arguments about its proper aims and methodology.
In On Trade Justice, Risse and Wollner defend an account of trade justice on which the central re... more In On Trade Justice, Risse and Wollner defend an account of trade justice on which the central requirement, applying to both states and firms, is a requirement of non-exploitation. On their view, in the context of trade exploitation consists in 'power-induced failure of reciprocity', which generates an unfair distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with trade relationships. In this paper, I argue that while there are many appealing features of Risse and Wollner's account, their discussion does not articulate and develop the unified picture of states' and firms' obligations that they aim to provide as clearly as it might have. In particular, it is, I claim, unclear exactly how they understand the relationship between the fairness-based requirements that apply to states and those that apply to firms. I argue that there are two types of accounts that they might accept: a transactional account and a structural account. I offer reasons to think that there are reasons to prefer a structural account. In addition, I note some of the key implications of accepting such an account, and suggest that if Risse and Wollner accept these implications and revise other aspects of their view accordingly, the result is a plausible and unified account of what trade justice requires.
Despite the increased attention that has been paid in recent years to the significance of animal ... more Despite the increased attention that has been paid in recent years to the significance of animal interests within moral and political philosophy, there has been virtually no discussion of the significance of animal interests within business ethics. This is rather troubling, since a great deal of the treatment of animals that will seem especially problematic to many people occurs in the context of business, broadly construed. In this chapter, I aim to extend the growing concern that our normative theories should be animal-friendly to business ethics. I consider whether several popular theoretical approaches in business ethics are consistent with taking animal interests to bear on the decisions that business managers are obligated to make. I do not argue for the claim that we should reject any theory in business ethics that cannot count animal interests as providing reasons that are relevant to the moral status of managerial conduct (though I think that this is true). Instead, I proceed on the assumption that many will find this claim plausible, and argue that those who do have reason to doubt that many of the prominent theoretical approaches defended in the business ethics literature are acceptable. My main aim, then, is to show that those who believe that the correct theory in business ethics must be animal-friendly, at least in the limited sense of counting animal interests as relevant to the moral status of managerial conduct in a plausible way, will need to look beyond the main competing theories that occupy present discussions.
It is widely believed that just societies would be characterized by some combination of democrati... more It is widely believed that just societies would be characterized by some combination of democratic political institutions and market-based economic institutions. Underlying the commitment to the combination of democracy and markets is the view that certain normatively significant outcomes in a society ought to be determined by democratic processes, while others ought to be determined by market processes. On this view, we have reason to object when market processes are employed in ways that circumvent democratic processes and affect outcomes that ought to be determined democratically. In this paper, I argue that Waheed Hussain’s recent account of the conditions that must be met in order for the use of market power in pursuit of social change to avoid conflict with democratic values is objectionably narrow, and offer an alternative account that avoids the problems that undermine his account without abandoning the requirement that democratic values be properly respected. The central feature of my account that makes this possible is a broader conception of democratic processes that includes public deliberation and debate aimed at shaping informal social norms and practices.
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Jul 2021
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic hardships for millions of people around the... more The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic hardships for millions of people around the world. Meanwhile, many of the world's richest people have seen their wealth increase substantially during the pandemic, despite the significant economic disruptions that it has caused on the whole. It is uncontroversial that these effects, which have exacerbated already unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality, call for robust policy responses from governments. In this paper, I argue that the disparate economic effects of the pandemic also generate direct obligations of justice for those who have benefitted from pandemic windfalls. Specifically, I argue that even if we accept that those who benefit from distributive injustice in the ordinary, predictable course of life within unjust institutions do not have direct obligations to redirect their unjust benefits to those who are unjustly disadvantaged, there are powerful reasons to hold that benefitting from pandemic windfalls does ground such an obligation.
In this article, I aim to clarify some key issues in the ongoing debate about the relationship be... more In this article, I aim to clarify some key issues in the ongoing debate about the relationship between Rawlsian political philosophy and business ethics. First, I discuss precisely what we ought to be asking when we consider whether corporations are part of the “basic structure of society.” I suggest that the relevant questions have been mischaracterized in much of the existing debate, and that some key distinctions have been overlooked. I then argue that although Rawlsian theory’s potential implications for business ethics are more extensive than some have suggested, the nature of the concern that we ought to have about the effects of corporate behavior on individuals’ economic and social conditions should lead us to reject the view that corporations are bound by principles of justice only if, and insofar as, they are part of the basic structure.
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Papers by Brian Berkey