I am a Serra Húnter associate professor of Philosophy at Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona. Before that I was Juan de la Cierva postdoctoral researcher at the University of the Basque Country. My main areas of specialization are philosophy of mind and psychology, phenomenology and feminist theory.
Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to support subjec... more Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to support subjects in the completion of cognitively effortful tasks, especially those involving executive functions (EF). In this paper we focus on two populations who notoriously encounter difficulties in performing EF tasks, namely, people diagnosed with schizophrenia who experience auditory verbal hallucinations (Sz-AVH) and people with Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC). We focus on these two populations because they represent two different ways in which IS can fail to help in EF tasks, which can be illustrative for other mental conditions. First, we review the main components of EF (Section 1). Then we explain the functions that IS is taken to perform in the domain of EF (Section 2) and review the evidence concerning problems about EF in the two populations of our study: Sz-AVH (Section 3) and ASC (Section 4). After this we further detail our account about what a properly functioning IS can do for both populations and how different IS profiles may impact EF performance: in the case of Sz-AVH, the uncontrolled and intrusive character of IS negatively affects EF performance, whereas in ASC, EF is not sufficiently supported by IS, given the tendency in this population to present a diminished use of IS (Section 5). We finally briefly discuss Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Developmental Language Disorders (DLD) (Section 6)
Whereas intersectionality presents a fruitful framework for theoretical and empirical research, s... more Whereas intersectionality presents a fruitful framework for theoretical and empirical research, some of its fundamental features present great confusion. The term 'intersectionality' and its metaphor of the crossroads seem to reproduce what it aims to avoid: conceiving categories as separate. Despite the attempts for developing new metaphors that illustrate for the mutual constitution relation among categories, gender, race or class keep being imagined as discrete units that intersect, mix or combine. Here we identify two main problems in metaphors: the lack of differentiation between positions and effects and the problem of reification. We then present a new metaphor that overcomes these two problems: a basket of apples. We argue that considering social positions as the diverse properties of different apples avoids reification by considering categories as properties and not as objects themselves, and at the same time it allows us to think about the effects dimension from a plural and contextual approach. With this shift, we propose a reframing of the discussion in debates on intersectionality theory on the relation among categories, their in/separability and fragmentation.
According to Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experienc... more According to Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experience. However, its characterisation beyond perceptual experience has not been explored yet. This paper aims, first, to fill this gap by arguing that there is a viable notion of cognitive horizon that presents features that are analogous to features of the perceptual horizon. Secondly, it proposes to characterise a specific structure of the cognitive horizon-that which presents possibilities for action-as a cognitive affordance. Cognitive affordances present cognitive elements as opportunities for mental action (i.e., a problem affording trying to solve it, a thought affording calculating, an idea affording reflection). Thirdly, it argues that postulating cognitive affordances helps to unfold a rational dimension of thinking by conceiving of them as motivating reasons for action, something that in turn provides an argument for the experienced character of cognitive affordances.
Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain me... more Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) experience, that certain contents are represented in experience and that kinds of sui generis phenomenologies such as cognitive phenomenology exist. In this paper we examine a neglected aspect of such arguments, i.e., the kind of mental episodes involved in them, and argue that this happens to be a crucial feature of the arguments. We use linguistic tools to determine the lexical aspect of verbs and verb phrases – the tests for a/telicity and for duration. We then suggest that all PCAs can show is the presence of a generic achievement-like phenomenology, especially in the cognitive domain, which contrasts with the role that PCAs are given in the literature.
Signs. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2019
Within feminist theory and a wide range of social sciences, intersectionality has emerged as a ke... more Within feminist theory and a wide range of social sciences, intersectionality has emerged as a key analytic framework, challenging paradigms that consider gender, race, class, sexuality, and other categories as separate and instead conceptualizing them as interconnected. This has led most authors to assume mutual constitution as the pertinent model, often without much scrutiny. In this essay we critically review the main senses of mutual constitution in the literature and challenge what we take to be a problematic assumption: the problem of reification, here understood as the conceptualization of social categories as entities or objects. We then present the properties framework, together with the emergent experience view, which conceptualizes categories and social systems in a way that maintains their ontological specificity while allowing for their being deeply affected by each other.
Dennett’s From bacteria to Bach and back develops a fascinating story as to how we sapiens became... more Dennett’s From bacteria to Bach and back develops a fascinating story as to how we sapiens became creatures that not only act for reasons but can comprehend such reasons. According to Dennett, this ability of representing our reasons to ourselves, depends mostly on our ability to internalize linguistic exchanges in the form of self-talk or inner speech. On the other hand, Dennett holds that self-knowledge is illusory. We argue that Dennett’s view about the role of inner speech ultimately entails that there is a limit to the deceiving powers of user-friendly apps. In particular, both the force and the content of a thought event are directly knowable, whether or not the thought comes in the clothes of auditory imagery. In (at least) such a case, we submit, there is no user-illusion. The app gets things right.
In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of... more In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought-content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.
Resum: La naturalesa i les característiques del pensament conscient han ocupat la filosofia i alt... more Resum: La naturalesa i les característiques del pensament conscient han ocupat la filosofia i altres ciències al llarg de la història. Darrerament, però, ha sorgit la pregun-ta per les propietats fenomèniques del pensament, això és, pel caràcter qualitatiu de les experiències del pensar o el que s'ha anomenat 'fenomenologia cognitiva'. L'existència d'aquest tipus de consciència fenomènica té un estatut controvertit i trobem diverses posicions en la filosofia de la ment contemporània. En aquest article s'introdueix la qüestió, s'explica quina és la importància del tema, quines visions i arguments principals trobem en la literatura i quins són els elements que juguen un paper rellevant en el debat. Finalment es conclou apuntant possibles desenvolu-pament futurs en aquest àmbit de recerca. Abstract: The nature and characterization of conscious thought has occupied philosophy and the sciences across history. Lately, though, several authors have raised the question of the phenomenal properties of thought, that is, of the qualitative character of experiences of thinking or what has been called 'cognitive phenom-enology'. The existence of this kind of phenomenal consciousness has a controversial status and we find several views within contemporary philosophy of mind. In this article I introduce the question and present the importance of the topic, together with the main views and arguments we find in the literature and the elements that play a central role in the debate. I conclude with possible future developments for this research area.
This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenolog... more This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenology and its relation to the nature of conscious thinking more generally. We firstly introduce the question of cognitive phenomenology, the motivation for the debate, and situate the discussion within the fields of philosophy (analytic and phenomenological traditions), cognitive psychology and consciousness studies. Secondly, we review the main research on the question, which we argue has so far situated the cognitive phenomenology debate around the following topics and arguments: phenomenal contrast, epistemic arguments and challenges, introspection, ontology and temporal character, intentionality, inner speech, agency, holistic perspective, categorical perception, value, and phenomenological description. Thirdly, we suggest future developments by pointing to four questions that can be explored in relation to the cognitive phenomenology discussion: the self and self-awareness, attention, emotions and general theories of consciousness. We finalise by briefly presenting the six articles of this Special Issue, which engage with some of the topics mentioned and contribute to enlarge the discussion by connecting it to different areas of philosophical investigation.
In this paper I focus on what we can call " the obvious assumption " in the debate between defend... more In this paper I focus on what we can call " the obvious assumption " in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if 'conscious' and 'phenomenal' are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the " obvious assumption " can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend.
This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an on... more This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this view, I reconstruct the ontological argument and argue that it succeeds in establishing that some mental episodes like judging, understanding and occurrent states of thought do not enter into the stream but fails to exclude episodes like entertaining. Contrary to what it might seem, this conclusion fits well with cognitive phenomenology views, given that, as I show, there is a way for non-processive mental episodes to be fundamentally related to processive ones, such that they cannot be excluded from the phenomenal domain. This paper sheds light on the nature of different kinds of thoughts and questions a fundamental asymmetry between the perceptual and the cognitive domain when it comes to their ontology and temporal character.
How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought?In the last few years, a rat... more How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought?In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mentalepisodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenologyviews through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents.Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed byRestrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying states. On the one hand, I problematize the role of attention adopted by sensory restrictivism and I present and discuss in detail an argument that defends thelimitation of sensory phenomenology so as to explain the distinction between visualand cognitive mental episodes on the basis of immediate experience. On the otherhand, I address accompanying states views by discussing the empirical studies of Hurlburt et al. (2006, 2008) that defend the existence of “unsymbolized thinking”. I present how they can be construed as evidence for cognitive phenomenology views and I dispel some problems that have been raised against its acceptance. I thus conclude that cognitive phenomenology views hold up well against the restrictivist positions considered.
In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, w... more In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects of explanation for both sides of the debate and argue that cognitive phenomenology defenders are in an overall advantageous position. We also propose an account of inner speech that differs from other influential explanations in some interesting respects.
X Boletín de estudios de filosofía y cultura Manuel Mindán, Jul 2015
En esta comunicación presentaremos un marco general que incluye distintas aproximaciones fenomeno... more En esta comunicación presentaremos un marco general que incluye distintas aproximaciones fenomenológicas a la cognición. Partiendo de la distinción entre ‘cognición’ en sentido amplio y estrecho, y de varios senti- dos de ‘fenomenología’, mostraremos distintas maneras en que la fenomenología puede aportar herramientas para el estudio de la cognición y del pensamiento en concreto. Finalmente, delinearemos los primeros pasos para una fenomenología del pensamiento, aportando algunos elementos estructurales básicos y tipos de actos sobre los cuales poder cons- truir este proyecto, a su vez útil para la discusión con las ciencias cognitivas y otros estudios sobre cognición y conciencia.
Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to support subjec... more Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to support subjects in the completion of cognitively effortful tasks, especially those involving executive functions (EF). In this paper we focus on two populations who notoriously encounter difficulties in performing EF tasks, namely, people diagnosed with schizophrenia who experience auditory verbal hallucinations (Sz-AVH) and people with Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC). We focus on these two populations because they represent two different ways in which IS can fail to help in EF tasks, which can be illustrative for other mental conditions. First, we review the main components of EF (Section 1). Then we explain the functions that IS is taken to perform in the domain of EF (Section 2) and review the evidence concerning problems about EF in the two populations of our study: Sz-AVH (Section 3) and ASC (Section 4). After this we further detail our account about what a properly functioning IS can do for both populations and how different IS profiles may impact EF performance: in the case of Sz-AVH, the uncontrolled and intrusive character of IS negatively affects EF performance, whereas in ASC, EF is not sufficiently supported by IS, given the tendency in this population to present a diminished use of IS (Section 5). We finally briefly discuss Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Developmental Language Disorders (DLD) (Section 6)
Whereas intersectionality presents a fruitful framework for theoretical and empirical research, s... more Whereas intersectionality presents a fruitful framework for theoretical and empirical research, some of its fundamental features present great confusion. The term 'intersectionality' and its metaphor of the crossroads seem to reproduce what it aims to avoid: conceiving categories as separate. Despite the attempts for developing new metaphors that illustrate for the mutual constitution relation among categories, gender, race or class keep being imagined as discrete units that intersect, mix or combine. Here we identify two main problems in metaphors: the lack of differentiation between positions and effects and the problem of reification. We then present a new metaphor that overcomes these two problems: a basket of apples. We argue that considering social positions as the diverse properties of different apples avoids reification by considering categories as properties and not as objects themselves, and at the same time it allows us to think about the effects dimension from a plural and contextual approach. With this shift, we propose a reframing of the discussion in debates on intersectionality theory on the relation among categories, their in/separability and fragmentation.
According to Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experienc... more According to Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experience. However, its characterisation beyond perceptual experience has not been explored yet. This paper aims, first, to fill this gap by arguing that there is a viable notion of cognitive horizon that presents features that are analogous to features of the perceptual horizon. Secondly, it proposes to characterise a specific structure of the cognitive horizon-that which presents possibilities for action-as a cognitive affordance. Cognitive affordances present cognitive elements as opportunities for mental action (i.e., a problem affording trying to solve it, a thought affording calculating, an idea affording reflection). Thirdly, it argues that postulating cognitive affordances helps to unfold a rational dimension of thinking by conceiving of them as motivating reasons for action, something that in turn provides an argument for the experienced character of cognitive affordances.
Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain me... more Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) experience, that certain contents are represented in experience and that kinds of sui generis phenomenologies such as cognitive phenomenology exist. In this paper we examine a neglected aspect of such arguments, i.e., the kind of mental episodes involved in them, and argue that this happens to be a crucial feature of the arguments. We use linguistic tools to determine the lexical aspect of verbs and verb phrases – the tests for a/telicity and for duration. We then suggest that all PCAs can show is the presence of a generic achievement-like phenomenology, especially in the cognitive domain, which contrasts with the role that PCAs are given in the literature.
Signs. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2019
Within feminist theory and a wide range of social sciences, intersectionality has emerged as a ke... more Within feminist theory and a wide range of social sciences, intersectionality has emerged as a key analytic framework, challenging paradigms that consider gender, race, class, sexuality, and other categories as separate and instead conceptualizing them as interconnected. This has led most authors to assume mutual constitution as the pertinent model, often without much scrutiny. In this essay we critically review the main senses of mutual constitution in the literature and challenge what we take to be a problematic assumption: the problem of reification, here understood as the conceptualization of social categories as entities or objects. We then present the properties framework, together with the emergent experience view, which conceptualizes categories and social systems in a way that maintains their ontological specificity while allowing for their being deeply affected by each other.
Dennett’s From bacteria to Bach and back develops a fascinating story as to how we sapiens became... more Dennett’s From bacteria to Bach and back develops a fascinating story as to how we sapiens became creatures that not only act for reasons but can comprehend such reasons. According to Dennett, this ability of representing our reasons to ourselves, depends mostly on our ability to internalize linguistic exchanges in the form of self-talk or inner speech. On the other hand, Dennett holds that self-knowledge is illusory. We argue that Dennett’s view about the role of inner speech ultimately entails that there is a limit to the deceiving powers of user-friendly apps. In particular, both the force and the content of a thought event are directly knowable, whether or not the thought comes in the clothes of auditory imagery. In (at least) such a case, we submit, there is no user-illusion. The app gets things right.
In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of... more In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought-content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.
Resum: La naturalesa i les característiques del pensament conscient han ocupat la filosofia i alt... more Resum: La naturalesa i les característiques del pensament conscient han ocupat la filosofia i altres ciències al llarg de la història. Darrerament, però, ha sorgit la pregun-ta per les propietats fenomèniques del pensament, això és, pel caràcter qualitatiu de les experiències del pensar o el que s'ha anomenat 'fenomenologia cognitiva'. L'existència d'aquest tipus de consciència fenomènica té un estatut controvertit i trobem diverses posicions en la filosofia de la ment contemporània. En aquest article s'introdueix la qüestió, s'explica quina és la importància del tema, quines visions i arguments principals trobem en la literatura i quins són els elements que juguen un paper rellevant en el debat. Finalment es conclou apuntant possibles desenvolu-pament futurs en aquest àmbit de recerca. Abstract: The nature and characterization of conscious thought has occupied philosophy and the sciences across history. Lately, though, several authors have raised the question of the phenomenal properties of thought, that is, of the qualitative character of experiences of thinking or what has been called 'cognitive phenom-enology'. The existence of this kind of phenomenal consciousness has a controversial status and we find several views within contemporary philosophy of mind. In this article I introduce the question and present the importance of the topic, together with the main views and arguments we find in the literature and the elements that play a central role in the debate. I conclude with possible future developments for this research area.
This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenolog... more This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenology and its relation to the nature of conscious thinking more generally. We firstly introduce the question of cognitive phenomenology, the motivation for the debate, and situate the discussion within the fields of philosophy (analytic and phenomenological traditions), cognitive psychology and consciousness studies. Secondly, we review the main research on the question, which we argue has so far situated the cognitive phenomenology debate around the following topics and arguments: phenomenal contrast, epistemic arguments and challenges, introspection, ontology and temporal character, intentionality, inner speech, agency, holistic perspective, categorical perception, value, and phenomenological description. Thirdly, we suggest future developments by pointing to four questions that can be explored in relation to the cognitive phenomenology discussion: the self and self-awareness, attention, emotions and general theories of consciousness. We finalise by briefly presenting the six articles of this Special Issue, which engage with some of the topics mentioned and contribute to enlarge the discussion by connecting it to different areas of philosophical investigation.
In this paper I focus on what we can call " the obvious assumption " in the debate between defend... more In this paper I focus on what we can call " the obvious assumption " in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if 'conscious' and 'phenomenal' are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the " obvious assumption " can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend.
This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an on... more This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this view, I reconstruct the ontological argument and argue that it succeeds in establishing that some mental episodes like judging, understanding and occurrent states of thought do not enter into the stream but fails to exclude episodes like entertaining. Contrary to what it might seem, this conclusion fits well with cognitive phenomenology views, given that, as I show, there is a way for non-processive mental episodes to be fundamentally related to processive ones, such that they cannot be excluded from the phenomenal domain. This paper sheds light on the nature of different kinds of thoughts and questions a fundamental asymmetry between the perceptual and the cognitive domain when it comes to their ontology and temporal character.
How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought?In the last few years, a rat... more How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought?In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mentalepisodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenologyviews through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents.Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed byRestrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying states. On the one hand, I problematize the role of attention adopted by sensory restrictivism and I present and discuss in detail an argument that defends thelimitation of sensory phenomenology so as to explain the distinction between visualand cognitive mental episodes on the basis of immediate experience. On the otherhand, I address accompanying states views by discussing the empirical studies of Hurlburt et al. (2006, 2008) that defend the existence of “unsymbolized thinking”. I present how they can be construed as evidence for cognitive phenomenology views and I dispel some problems that have been raised against its acceptance. I thus conclude that cognitive phenomenology views hold up well against the restrictivist positions considered.
In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, w... more In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects of explanation for both sides of the debate and argue that cognitive phenomenology defenders are in an overall advantageous position. We also propose an account of inner speech that differs from other influential explanations in some interesting respects.
X Boletín de estudios de filosofía y cultura Manuel Mindán, Jul 2015
En esta comunicación presentaremos un marco general que incluye distintas aproximaciones fenomeno... more En esta comunicación presentaremos un marco general que incluye distintas aproximaciones fenomenológicas a la cognición. Partiendo de la distinción entre ‘cognición’ en sentido amplio y estrecho, y de varios senti- dos de ‘fenomenología’, mostraremos distintas maneras en que la fenomenología puede aportar herramientas para el estudio de la cognición y del pensamiento en concreto. Finalmente, delinearemos los primeros pasos para una fenomenología del pensamiento, aportando algunos elementos estructurales básicos y tipos de actos sobre los cuales poder cons- truir este proyecto, a su vez útil para la discusión con las ciencias cognitivas y otros estudios sobre cognición y conciencia.
A good way to present a philosophical book is to reconstruct the inner logic that explains and ju... more A good way to present a philosophical book is to reconstruct the inner logic that explains and justifies the tasks developed in it. I will begin saying that the book departs from Heidegger's work examination on ''ordinary time.'' The relation the author establishes with Heidegger is manifold, as we will see, and its description will help the reader to have an idea of the parts of the book and their connections. The first two parts develop the genesis of time measurement, which is the way Joan González deals with the task that Heidegger had already indicated but left out in his main work. In Heidegger (1972), talks about the possibility of a more ''originary inmersion'' (''ursprüngliches Aufgehen'') of the primitive Dasein into the phenomena, and introduces the task in § 80 to carry out a ''further investigation'' (''weitergehende Untersuchung'') about the relation between the number in the historic becoming, the world's astronomically calculated time and the temporality and historicity of the Dasein. These two possibilities of investigation are not developed in Heidegger's thought, and we should mention that the question of the relation between the elements of the second task is not a secondary question at all in his work, as he himself says in § 80, but a central one. It is in this sense that the first two parts of the book can be seen as a complement to Heidegger's work with respect to the theory of ''ordinary time.'' Heidegger and the Watches has a third part that deals with Heidegger's interpretation of the ordinary understanding of time and criticizes it on the base of the achievements gained in the first two parts. The theory of time measurement developed in the book has two main topics: the calendar and the watch. The first part is devoted to the genesis of the sense of calendar in its different forms and the second part describes the genesis of the sense
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speech. On the other hand, Dennett holds that self-knowledge is illusory. We argue that Dennett’s view about the role of inner speech ultimately entails that there is a limit to the deceiving powers of user-friendly apps. In particular, both the force and the content of a thought event are directly knowable, whether or not the thought comes in the clothes of auditory imagery. In (at least) such a case, we submit, there is no user-illusion. The app gets things right.
speech. On the other hand, Dennett holds that self-knowledge is illusory. We argue that Dennett’s view about the role of inner speech ultimately entails that there is a limit to the deceiving powers of user-friendly apps. In particular, both the force and the content of a thought event are directly knowable, whether or not the thought comes in the clothes of auditory imagery. In (at least) such a case, we submit, there is no user-illusion. The app gets things right.