Assoc. Prof. (International Studies) at the Department of Asian Studies at Palacký University (Czech Republic), head of the EU-funded project "The EU in the volatile Indo-Pacific region" (https://www.euvip-project.com), President of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEAS; https://ceias.eu), Senior Advisor Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES), and Adjunct Prof. and lecturer at University of Vienna. Specialized on the Indo-Pacific, notably Southeast Asia, South China Sea, Belt and Road Initiative and hedging strategies.
Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but also ASEAN, are hedgi... more Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but also ASEAN, are hedging toward both China and the United States. However, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea may cause some countries, notably the Philippines, to reconsider their hedging strategy. Undermining the hedging behavior of Southeast Asian countries, however, will not improve the security and influence of China – or the United States – but would rather make the region less safe and stable.
At the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15) in December 2009, the Association of Southeas... more At the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15) in December 2009, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emphasized the different responsibilities of First and Third World countries in tackling climate change. Once again, ASEAN refused to commit to greenhouse gas emission targets. The Association and its members acknowledge that climate change poses complex and comprehensive threats to the state, the economy, and individuals. Yet it views climate change through the lens of a depoliticized and “ASEANized” notion of human security and a narrow interpretation of energy security. Focusing more on state- and regime-security than individual security, ASEAN’s fragmented version of human security emphasizes socioeconomic and human development rather than democracy and human rights. This chapter demonstrates that due to the complex nature of climate change and its novel character, as well as due to ASEAN’s specific view of climate change, regional cooperation remains limited or is conducted by a subgroup of members, e.g., with regard to haze problems. Yet there remains hope for a more robust approach – due to pressures from the international community and the Southeast Asian civil society as well as from Indonesia which has assumed a double leadership role as advocate for human security and adaptation.
Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung (ed.): Indien: Regionaler Akteur oder doch Global Player? (second edition; Schriftenreihe der Theresianischen Militärakademie, Vol. 1/2023). Indien: Regionaler Akteur oder doch Global Player? Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung: Wien, pp. 243–257. , 2023
Indien hat zweifellos großes ökonomisches und militärisches Potenzial, dazu verfügt es über ein g... more Indien hat zweifellos großes ökonomisches und militärisches Potenzial, dazu verfügt es über ein großes Reservoir an "soft power", die es weltweit zu einem geschätzten Partner machen. Dennoch dürfte die Hoffnung vieler PolitikerInnen im Westen, dass sich Indien im Indo-Pazifik als glaubwürdiges und attraktives demokratisches und ökonomisches Gegenmodell zum autoritären China entwickelt, übertrieben sein. Nicht nur hat Indien in den letzten Jahrzehnten seine strategischen Möglichkeiten nie vollständig ausgeschöpft. Zudem kämpft es mit zu vielen hausgemachten Problemen, die von der populistischen und Hindu-nationalistischen Regierung Modi noch verschärft werden, und dazu beitragen, dass Indien einen eigenwilligen, nicht immer berechenbaren außenpolitischen Kurs steuert. Trotz aller Ambitionen und seines Potenzials: Indien hat seinen Platz und seine Rolle im Indo-Pazifik noch nicht gefunden.
Mixed Reactions to the Russian war against Ukraine in the Indo-Pacific. Views of governments and civil society , Mar 24, 2023
Responses of Indo-Pacific governments to Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked, and unlawful invasion ... more Responses of Indo-Pacific governments to Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked, and unlawful invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, range from unequivocal condemnation and the imposition of sanctions against Russia (Japan, Singapore, Taiwan) to a cautious middle position of countries leaning either towards Russia or Ukraine (ASEAN, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Vietnam) and diplomatic support for Moscow (Myanmar, North Korea).
Beyond the Dumping Alliance: Tracking Taiwan's Relations with Central and Eastern Europe, Mar 12, 2023
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are key drivers of developments in EU-Taiwan relatio... more Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are key drivers of developments in EU-Taiwan relations. They were responsible for almost 60% of all 2022 interactions between Taiwan and EU actors (member states and EU institutions). There is a need to differentiate between different types of CEE actors. Regional states have differing views of Taiwan and China, which in turn influences their willingness to engage with Taiwan on political and even economic levels. “Vanguards” are the CEE members of the so-called “Dumpling Alliance” — Czechia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Poland — which have greater levels of political and economic relations with Taiwan. All four countries have representations in Taiwan, and vice versa. Whilst Czechia and Lithuania are more vocal in their support for Taiwan, Poland and Slovakia pursue a practicality-driven approach.“Pragmatists” are the CEE countries with strong economic but weak political links to Taiwan. Only Austria and Hungary are in this category, with the latter being an interesting example of having significant trade and investment relations but a rather unwelcoming political climate. The rest of CEE belongs to the category of “Laggards”, which have weak political and economic links to Taiwan.
Introducing a re-conceptualized comprehensive hedging framework, this book analyses the relations... more Introducing a re-conceptualized comprehensive hedging framework, this book analyses the relations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with China in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the South China Sea dispute.
The author argues that ASEAN and the three Southeast Asian governments pursue a hedging strategy towards the rising China. Hedging expands the strategic options of smaller powers which are in Neorealism often restricted to bandwagoning and balancing. A hedging strategy, however, can simultaneously contain both elements of bandwagoning (e.g., in economics) and balancing (e.g., in security affairs). Even though the four hedging strategies and their implementation vary, in principle they all seek closer economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining strong security relations with Washington. A major innovation of the new hedging concept is the inclusion of the perceptions of the hedger on the risks and opportunities stemming from the relations with the hedging target and of the strategic value of potential hedging partners.
The comprehensive hedging concept and the important empirical findings will be of interest to researchers in the fields of International Relations, Security, Political Geography, Economics, History, and Asian Studies.
The Twelfth International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS 12), 2022
Hedging is an attractive strategy for governments, especially in Southeast Asia, as well as a pop... more Hedging is an attractive strategy for governments, especially in Southeast Asia, as well as a popular academic lens for analyzing the foreign policy strategies of small and middle powers. The Philippines and Vietnam are among the countries which apply a hedging strategy towards the rising China. Both countries seek gains from their close political-diplomatic and economic engagement with Beijing, conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. At the same time, they follow omnidirectional political-diplomatic, economic and security relations to insure themselves from negative impacts stemming from their relations with China. Despite these fundamental similarities, the hedging strategies of the Philippines and Vietnam also vary considerably: Hanoi's hedging strategy has been in the last decade very consistent and much more robust due to strong China-critical perceptions of the leadership, whereas Manila responded under the initially China-friendly President Duterte in a less planned, more ad hoc manner to Beijing's policies and actions. Since mid-2019, though, the Philippines apply more confrontational measures towards China. This was a reaction to the lower than expected returns from the collaboration under the frame of the Belt and Road Initiative and China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. However, neither the more confrontational Vietnamese policies nor the initially more cooperative Philippine policies resulted in an improvement of the security in the South China Sea.
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 the discussions and literature on ... more Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 the discussions and literature on this initiative have grown substantially. However, there exists no consensus about core issues, notably whether the BRI is a deliberate Chinese masterplan to strive for regional hegemony or a loose bundle of different Chinese national interests, policies, and implementation tools. A key reason for this is that various disciplines – be it Political Science, International Relations, Economics, Sociology, or Chinese Studies – follow their specific research interests, using specific theoretical and methodological frames. This introductory chapter makes a strong plea for trans-disciplinary cooperation and eclecticism in ascertaining the scope, nature, and strategic and economic impacts of the New Silk Road(s) on the participant and non-participant countries alike. It also argues that, despite justified criticisms on China’s opaque BRI rationales and certain negative economic and political impacts on the participant countries, the New Silk Road offers new avenues for cooperation – if internationally acknowledged governance principles are maintained. Last but not least, this chapter provides an overview of the 11 contributions of this edited volume.
Under President Rodrigo Duterte, in office since 2016, the Philippines’ traditional hedging strat... more Under President Rodrigo Duterte, in office since 2016, the Philippines’ traditional hedging strategy towards China gradually softens. Due to Chinese investments as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) the relations have become closer, while security relations with the United States remain strained. The ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea and the negative perceptions of the Philippine citizens on China, however, serve as a corrective for strong bandwagoning with China.
In autumn 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Centra... more In autumn 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe play an important role in this ambitious infrastructure and connectivity project. The analysis of the 16+1 cooperation format, established by Beijing in 2012, shows that Beijing is able to establish new regional groupings that have the potential to undermine the unity of a larger regional bloc. Yet, it also demonstrates that China lacks a coherent BRI master plan. Rather, it pragmatically adapts its strategies to challenges and external criticism. The European Union (EU), notably the European Parliament (EP), became since 2015 more critical of the strategic impacts of BRI on Europe. Austria, which recognised the economic opportunities offered by BRI only recently, supports a common EU position. While Austria plays a strong-if not a leading-role in two Central and Eastern European cooperation mechanisms that may in the future also address BRI, that is, ...
Since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperation has increased both in Southeast Asia and betw... more Since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperation has increased both in Southeast Asia and between Southeast and Northeast Asia, with ASEAN playing a leadership role. Today, regional collaboration is a reaction to two major external challenges: China´s rise and the broad variety of new non-traditional threats. However, the degree of cooperation is still much deeper in the realm of economic security than in military, societal or environmental security. As the analysis of the fragmented notion of human security in East Asia demonstrates, a main reason for this is that many governments promote regime over individual human security. Keywords: International Relations – East Asia – ASEAN – Human Security – Climate Change
Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but also ASEAN, are hedgi... more Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but also ASEAN, are hedging toward both China and the United States. However, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea may cause some countries, notably the Philippines, to reconsider their hedging strategy. Undermining the hedging behavior of Southeast Asian countries, however, will not improve the security and influence of China – or the United States – but would rather make the region less safe and stable.
At the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15) in December 2009, the Association of Southeas... more At the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15) in December 2009, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emphasized the different responsibilities of First and Third World countries in tackling climate change. Once again, ASEAN refused to commit to greenhouse gas emission targets. The Association and its members acknowledge that climate change poses complex and comprehensive threats to the state, the economy, and individuals. Yet it views climate change through the lens of a depoliticized and “ASEANized” notion of human security and a narrow interpretation of energy security. Focusing more on state- and regime-security than individual security, ASEAN’s fragmented version of human security emphasizes socioeconomic and human development rather than democracy and human rights. This chapter demonstrates that due to the complex nature of climate change and its novel character, as well as due to ASEAN’s specific view of climate change, regional cooperation remains limited or is conducted by a subgroup of members, e.g., with regard to haze problems. Yet there remains hope for a more robust approach – due to pressures from the international community and the Southeast Asian civil society as well as from Indonesia which has assumed a double leadership role as advocate for human security and adaptation.
Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung (ed.): Indien: Regionaler Akteur oder doch Global Player? (second edition; Schriftenreihe der Theresianischen Militärakademie, Vol. 1/2023). Indien: Regionaler Akteur oder doch Global Player? Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung: Wien, pp. 243–257. , 2023
Indien hat zweifellos großes ökonomisches und militärisches Potenzial, dazu verfügt es über ein g... more Indien hat zweifellos großes ökonomisches und militärisches Potenzial, dazu verfügt es über ein großes Reservoir an "soft power", die es weltweit zu einem geschätzten Partner machen. Dennoch dürfte die Hoffnung vieler PolitikerInnen im Westen, dass sich Indien im Indo-Pazifik als glaubwürdiges und attraktives demokratisches und ökonomisches Gegenmodell zum autoritären China entwickelt, übertrieben sein. Nicht nur hat Indien in den letzten Jahrzehnten seine strategischen Möglichkeiten nie vollständig ausgeschöpft. Zudem kämpft es mit zu vielen hausgemachten Problemen, die von der populistischen und Hindu-nationalistischen Regierung Modi noch verschärft werden, und dazu beitragen, dass Indien einen eigenwilligen, nicht immer berechenbaren außenpolitischen Kurs steuert. Trotz aller Ambitionen und seines Potenzials: Indien hat seinen Platz und seine Rolle im Indo-Pazifik noch nicht gefunden.
Mixed Reactions to the Russian war against Ukraine in the Indo-Pacific. Views of governments and civil society , Mar 24, 2023
Responses of Indo-Pacific governments to Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked, and unlawful invasion ... more Responses of Indo-Pacific governments to Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked, and unlawful invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, range from unequivocal condemnation and the imposition of sanctions against Russia (Japan, Singapore, Taiwan) to a cautious middle position of countries leaning either towards Russia or Ukraine (ASEAN, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Vietnam) and diplomatic support for Moscow (Myanmar, North Korea).
Beyond the Dumping Alliance: Tracking Taiwan's Relations with Central and Eastern Europe, Mar 12, 2023
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are key drivers of developments in EU-Taiwan relatio... more Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are key drivers of developments in EU-Taiwan relations. They were responsible for almost 60% of all 2022 interactions between Taiwan and EU actors (member states and EU institutions). There is a need to differentiate between different types of CEE actors. Regional states have differing views of Taiwan and China, which in turn influences their willingness to engage with Taiwan on political and even economic levels. “Vanguards” are the CEE members of the so-called “Dumpling Alliance” — Czechia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Poland — which have greater levels of political and economic relations with Taiwan. All four countries have representations in Taiwan, and vice versa. Whilst Czechia and Lithuania are more vocal in their support for Taiwan, Poland and Slovakia pursue a practicality-driven approach.“Pragmatists” are the CEE countries with strong economic but weak political links to Taiwan. Only Austria and Hungary are in this category, with the latter being an interesting example of having significant trade and investment relations but a rather unwelcoming political climate. The rest of CEE belongs to the category of “Laggards”, which have weak political and economic links to Taiwan.
Introducing a re-conceptualized comprehensive hedging framework, this book analyses the relations... more Introducing a re-conceptualized comprehensive hedging framework, this book analyses the relations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with China in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the South China Sea dispute.
The author argues that ASEAN and the three Southeast Asian governments pursue a hedging strategy towards the rising China. Hedging expands the strategic options of smaller powers which are in Neorealism often restricted to bandwagoning and balancing. A hedging strategy, however, can simultaneously contain both elements of bandwagoning (e.g., in economics) and balancing (e.g., in security affairs). Even though the four hedging strategies and their implementation vary, in principle they all seek closer economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining strong security relations with Washington. A major innovation of the new hedging concept is the inclusion of the perceptions of the hedger on the risks and opportunities stemming from the relations with the hedging target and of the strategic value of potential hedging partners.
The comprehensive hedging concept and the important empirical findings will be of interest to researchers in the fields of International Relations, Security, Political Geography, Economics, History, and Asian Studies.
The Twelfth International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS 12), 2022
Hedging is an attractive strategy for governments, especially in Southeast Asia, as well as a pop... more Hedging is an attractive strategy for governments, especially in Southeast Asia, as well as a popular academic lens for analyzing the foreign policy strategies of small and middle powers. The Philippines and Vietnam are among the countries which apply a hedging strategy towards the rising China. Both countries seek gains from their close political-diplomatic and economic engagement with Beijing, conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. At the same time, they follow omnidirectional political-diplomatic, economic and security relations to insure themselves from negative impacts stemming from their relations with China. Despite these fundamental similarities, the hedging strategies of the Philippines and Vietnam also vary considerably: Hanoi's hedging strategy has been in the last decade very consistent and much more robust due to strong China-critical perceptions of the leadership, whereas Manila responded under the initially China-friendly President Duterte in a less planned, more ad hoc manner to Beijing's policies and actions. Since mid-2019, though, the Philippines apply more confrontational measures towards China. This was a reaction to the lower than expected returns from the collaboration under the frame of the Belt and Road Initiative and China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. However, neither the more confrontational Vietnamese policies nor the initially more cooperative Philippine policies resulted in an improvement of the security in the South China Sea.
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 the discussions and literature on ... more Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 the discussions and literature on this initiative have grown substantially. However, there exists no consensus about core issues, notably whether the BRI is a deliberate Chinese masterplan to strive for regional hegemony or a loose bundle of different Chinese national interests, policies, and implementation tools. A key reason for this is that various disciplines – be it Political Science, International Relations, Economics, Sociology, or Chinese Studies – follow their specific research interests, using specific theoretical and methodological frames. This introductory chapter makes a strong plea for trans-disciplinary cooperation and eclecticism in ascertaining the scope, nature, and strategic and economic impacts of the New Silk Road(s) on the participant and non-participant countries alike. It also argues that, despite justified criticisms on China’s opaque BRI rationales and certain negative economic and political impacts on the participant countries, the New Silk Road offers new avenues for cooperation – if internationally acknowledged governance principles are maintained. Last but not least, this chapter provides an overview of the 11 contributions of this edited volume.
Under President Rodrigo Duterte, in office since 2016, the Philippines’ traditional hedging strat... more Under President Rodrigo Duterte, in office since 2016, the Philippines’ traditional hedging strategy towards China gradually softens. Due to Chinese investments as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) the relations have become closer, while security relations with the United States remain strained. The ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea and the negative perceptions of the Philippine citizens on China, however, serve as a corrective for strong bandwagoning with China.
In autumn 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Centra... more In autumn 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe play an important role in this ambitious infrastructure and connectivity project. The analysis of the 16+1 cooperation format, established by Beijing in 2012, shows that Beijing is able to establish new regional groupings that have the potential to undermine the unity of a larger regional bloc. Yet, it also demonstrates that China lacks a coherent BRI master plan. Rather, it pragmatically adapts its strategies to challenges and external criticism. The European Union (EU), notably the European Parliament (EP), became since 2015 more critical of the strategic impacts of BRI on Europe. Austria, which recognised the economic opportunities offered by BRI only recently, supports a common EU position. While Austria plays a strong-if not a leading-role in two Central and Eastern European cooperation mechanisms that may in the future also address BRI, that is, ...
Since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperation has increased both in Southeast Asia and betw... more Since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperation has increased both in Southeast Asia and between Southeast and Northeast Asia, with ASEAN playing a leadership role. Today, regional collaboration is a reaction to two major external challenges: China´s rise and the broad variety of new non-traditional threats. However, the degree of cooperation is still much deeper in the realm of economic security than in military, societal or environmental security. As the analysis of the fragmented notion of human security in East Asia demonstrates, a main reason for this is that many governments promote regime over individual human security. Keywords: International Relations – East Asia – ASEAN – Human Security – Climate Change
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic and Economic Impacts on Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Eastern Europe, 2021
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 the discussions and literature on ... more Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 the discussions and literature on this initiative have grown substantially. However, there exists no consensus about core issues, notably whether the BRI is a deliberate Chinese masterplan to strive for regional hegemony or a loose bundle of different Chinese national interests, policies, and implementation tools. A key reason for this is that various disciplines – be it Political Science, International Relations, Economics, Sociology, or Chinese Studies – follow their specific research interests, using specific theoretical and methodological frames. This introductory chapter makes a strong plea for trans-disciplinary cooperation and eclecticism in ascertaining the scope, nature, and strategic and economic impacts of the New Silk Road(s) on the participant and non-participant countries alike. It also argues that, despite justified criticisms on China’s opaque BRI rationales and certain negative economic and political impacts on the participant countries, the New Silk Road offers new avenues for cooperation – if internationally acknowledged governance principles are maintained. Last but not least, this chapter provides an overview of the 11 contributions of this edited volume.
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Papers by Alfred Gerstl
The author argues that ASEAN and the three Southeast Asian governments pursue a hedging strategy towards the rising China. Hedging expands the strategic options of smaller powers which are in Neorealism often restricted to bandwagoning and balancing. A hedging strategy, however, can simultaneously contain both elements of bandwagoning (e.g., in economics) and balancing (e.g., in security affairs). Even though the four hedging strategies and their implementation vary, in principle they all seek closer economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining strong security relations with Washington. A major innovation of the new hedging concept is the inclusion of the perceptions of the hedger on the risks and opportunities stemming from the relations with the hedging target and of the strategic value of potential hedging partners.
The comprehensive hedging concept and the important empirical findings will be of interest to researchers in the fields of International Relations, Security, Political Geography, Economics, History, and Asian Studies.
The author argues that ASEAN and the three Southeast Asian governments pursue a hedging strategy towards the rising China. Hedging expands the strategic options of smaller powers which are in Neorealism often restricted to bandwagoning and balancing. A hedging strategy, however, can simultaneously contain both elements of bandwagoning (e.g., in economics) and balancing (e.g., in security affairs). Even though the four hedging strategies and their implementation vary, in principle they all seek closer economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining strong security relations with Washington. A major innovation of the new hedging concept is the inclusion of the perceptions of the hedger on the risks and opportunities stemming from the relations with the hedging target and of the strategic value of potential hedging partners.
The comprehensive hedging concept and the important empirical findings will be of interest to researchers in the fields of International Relations, Security, Political Geography, Economics, History, and Asian Studies.