Papers by Jasmina Nedevska
Handbook of Philosophy of Climate Change, 2023
Access whole chapter here: https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-031-07002-0... more Access whole chapter here: https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-031-07002-0_132
While political philosophy is concerned with institutions for future generations, climate litigation has so far enjoyed little attention. However, legal scholarship on climate litigation and available data on recent cases show that these cases expound relevant future-beneficial and future-focused practices. Climate litigation should therefore be critically examined as an institution for future generations, including whether it is normatively legitimate as such an institution. With a view to the future-focused practices, the present chapter identifies the most contentious issues of legitimacy, using examples from recent climate litigation.
Three dimensions of legitimacy are discussed: source-based, process-based, and outcome-based concerns. Relevant source-based questions are whether the future-focused practices are compatible with democratic decision-making or a concept of rights. Related process-based questions concern who, if anyone, should get to speak on behalf of future generations in litigation and whether contemporary and future persons with competing interests can and should enjoy equal access to courts. Outcome-based questions include under what conditions future generations benefit from being included in climate litigation and whether these benefits conflict with requirements of a just transition to a fossil-free society.
Sustainability, 2021
Climate change litigation has emerged as a powerful tool as societies steer towards sustainable d... more Climate change litigation has emerged as a powerful tool as societies steer towards sustainable development. Although the litigation mainly takes place in domestic courts, the implications can be seen as global as specific climate rulings influence courts across national borders. However, while the phenomenon of judicialization is well-known in the social sciences, relatively few have studied issues of legitimacy that arise as climate politics move into courts. A comparatively large part of climate cases have appeared in the United States. This article presents a research plan for a study of judges’ opinions and dissents in the United States, regarding the justiciability of strategic climate cases. The purpose is to empirically study how judges navigate a perceived normative conflict—between the litigation and an overarching ideal of separation of powers—in a system marked by checks and balances.
Intergenerational Justice Review, 2019
This article justifies and restates the non-identity problem (NIP) in relation to climate change.... more This article justifies and restates the non-identity problem (NIP) in relation to climate change. First and briefly, I argue that while there is often good reason to set the NIP aside in practical politics, there can be areas where a climate NIP will have practical implications. An instructive example concerns climate change litigation. Second, I argue that there are three particular circumstances of a climate NIP that may set it apart from the more established NIP in bioethics. These differences regard interaction, numbers, and agency respectively. Third, I discuss the premises and conclusion of a climate NIP, modifying an account in bioethics by David Boonin (2014).
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
This article deals with the "is" - "ought" question in the Thomist natural law tradition. The 20t... more This article deals with the "is" - "ought" question in the Thomist natural law tradition. The 20th century revival of natural law theory, in jurisprudence and political theory, has placed its foundations under scrutiny. Do principles of natural law depend on conceptions of human nature? If so - how?
Two central claims are made in this article. First, I put forth that there is no obvious position on human nature among contemporary natural law theorists. Some thinkers argue that a natural law doctrine must not rely on accounts of human nature at all. Such is the view of John Finnis, who has been particularly influential in shaping a present understanding of natural law. Several theorists of the tradition, however, find a certain kind of dependence necessary and vehemently argue against Finnis' interpretation.
I suggest, secondly, using a distinction made by David Miller, that the disagreement on human nature is not substantial, but rests on whether one speaks of "dependence" as a matter of logical entailment, as Finnis does, or as presuppositional grounding, which seems to be the concept employed by his critics. I argue that one may safely deny that normative principles are derived from accounts of human nature (rejecting the former kind of dependence), while also presupposing that human nature conditions those principles (assuming dependence of the latter kind).
Lastly, I put forth two questions that arise for natural law theorists, if they wish to maintain this position.
Books by Jasmina Nedevska
This dissertation analyses the capacity of contractualism and natural law to justify environmenta... more This dissertation analyses the capacity of contractualism and natural law to justify environmental intergenerational duties.
For three decades, climate change has been a major political concern. As a fundamental threat to environmental sustainability, climate change is believed to threaten the long-term welfare of humankind. It thus seems imperative to affirm long-term duties regarding future people’s environment. Furthermore, contractualism and natural law are two important moral theories in contemporary political life. While the former seems influential among political liberals, natural law seems more appealing to political conservatives. It is thus of interest how both of these theories can be used to argue for environmental intergenerational duties. Yet, natural law has been particularly understudied in this regard.
The point of departure of the study is the so-called non-identity problem, formulated by Derek Parfit. As concerns future generations, what we do not only affects the quality of people’s lives, but also who will come to exist. If future people come to exist as a consequence of how we live our lives, including the choice of living unsustainably, a degraded environment will be worse for no one. For so-called person-affecting theory, such as contractualism, non-identity seems to imply that there is nothing morally objectionable about leaving future people with an unsustainable environment.
First, the dissertation demonstrates recent attempts in contractualism, in the vein of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon, to solve the non-identity problem on person-affecting terms. It is shown that these attempts either fail to affirm environmental intergenerational duties or implicitly abandon a person-affecting view.
Second, the dissertation explores a natural law approach to the non-identity problem, employing a recent account of natural law suggested by John Finnis. While natural law can be considered of import in contemporary political decision-making, it has hardly ever been used to ground environmental intergenerational duties. This dissertation shows how an impersonal application of natural law could be used in attempts to circumvent the non-identity problem, i.e. to affirm environmental intergenerational duties, and treats possible objections to such an account. It is argued that the requirement to consider so-called basic values, also in cases when no individual would be worse off by one’s act, should render it at least morally objectionable to leave future generations with an unsustainable environment.
Third, a new kind of objection to environmental intergenerational duties is discussed in depth. The objection applies to theories that, although they may accept an impersonal view in morals, subscribe to a person-affecting restriction in politics. On some interpretations, this limited restriction can be ascribed to both contractualism and natural law. This may imply a specifically institutional non-identity problem. It conveys the possibly paralysing conclusion that, even if there are environmental intergenerational duties in a moral sense, we are not permitted to use political institutions to enforce them.
Again, contractualism is used to demonstrate the possible difficulties in overcoming this kind of problem. With regard to natural law, the dissertation explores how the use of institutions could be justified impersonally by reference to the common good and the idea of intergenerational community. In this view, experiences that link us to previous generations justify institutional responsibility for the future.
Book Reviews by Jasmina Nedevska
Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi, 2019
Talks by Jasmina Nedevska
Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 2020
Uploads
Papers by Jasmina Nedevska
While political philosophy is concerned with institutions for future generations, climate litigation has so far enjoyed little attention. However, legal scholarship on climate litigation and available data on recent cases show that these cases expound relevant future-beneficial and future-focused practices. Climate litigation should therefore be critically examined as an institution for future generations, including whether it is normatively legitimate as such an institution. With a view to the future-focused practices, the present chapter identifies the most contentious issues of legitimacy, using examples from recent climate litigation.
Three dimensions of legitimacy are discussed: source-based, process-based, and outcome-based concerns. Relevant source-based questions are whether the future-focused practices are compatible with democratic decision-making or a concept of rights. Related process-based questions concern who, if anyone, should get to speak on behalf of future generations in litigation and whether contemporary and future persons with competing interests can and should enjoy equal access to courts. Outcome-based questions include under what conditions future generations benefit from being included in climate litigation and whether these benefits conflict with requirements of a just transition to a fossil-free society.
Two central claims are made in this article. First, I put forth that there is no obvious position on human nature among contemporary natural law theorists. Some thinkers argue that a natural law doctrine must not rely on accounts of human nature at all. Such is the view of John Finnis, who has been particularly influential in shaping a present understanding of natural law. Several theorists of the tradition, however, find a certain kind of dependence necessary and vehemently argue against Finnis' interpretation.
I suggest, secondly, using a distinction made by David Miller, that the disagreement on human nature is not substantial, but rests on whether one speaks of "dependence" as a matter of logical entailment, as Finnis does, or as presuppositional grounding, which seems to be the concept employed by his critics. I argue that one may safely deny that normative principles are derived from accounts of human nature (rejecting the former kind of dependence), while also presupposing that human nature conditions those principles (assuming dependence of the latter kind).
Lastly, I put forth two questions that arise for natural law theorists, if they wish to maintain this position.
Books by Jasmina Nedevska
For three decades, climate change has been a major political concern. As a fundamental threat to environmental sustainability, climate change is believed to threaten the long-term welfare of humankind. It thus seems imperative to affirm long-term duties regarding future people’s environment. Furthermore, contractualism and natural law are two important moral theories in contemporary political life. While the former seems influential among political liberals, natural law seems more appealing to political conservatives. It is thus of interest how both of these theories can be used to argue for environmental intergenerational duties. Yet, natural law has been particularly understudied in this regard.
The point of departure of the study is the so-called non-identity problem, formulated by Derek Parfit. As concerns future generations, what we do not only affects the quality of people’s lives, but also who will come to exist. If future people come to exist as a consequence of how we live our lives, including the choice of living unsustainably, a degraded environment will be worse for no one. For so-called person-affecting theory, such as contractualism, non-identity seems to imply that there is nothing morally objectionable about leaving future people with an unsustainable environment.
First, the dissertation demonstrates recent attempts in contractualism, in the vein of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon, to solve the non-identity problem on person-affecting terms. It is shown that these attempts either fail to affirm environmental intergenerational duties or implicitly abandon a person-affecting view.
Second, the dissertation explores a natural law approach to the non-identity problem, employing a recent account of natural law suggested by John Finnis. While natural law can be considered of import in contemporary political decision-making, it has hardly ever been used to ground environmental intergenerational duties. This dissertation shows how an impersonal application of natural law could be used in attempts to circumvent the non-identity problem, i.e. to affirm environmental intergenerational duties, and treats possible objections to such an account. It is argued that the requirement to consider so-called basic values, also in cases when no individual would be worse off by one’s act, should render it at least morally objectionable to leave future generations with an unsustainable environment.
Third, a new kind of objection to environmental intergenerational duties is discussed in depth. The objection applies to theories that, although they may accept an impersonal view in morals, subscribe to a person-affecting restriction in politics. On some interpretations, this limited restriction can be ascribed to both contractualism and natural law. This may imply a specifically institutional non-identity problem. It conveys the possibly paralysing conclusion that, even if there are environmental intergenerational duties in a moral sense, we are not permitted to use political institutions to enforce them.
Again, contractualism is used to demonstrate the possible difficulties in overcoming this kind of problem. With regard to natural law, the dissertation explores how the use of institutions could be justified impersonally by reference to the common good and the idea of intergenerational community. In this view, experiences that link us to previous generations justify institutional responsibility for the future.
Book Reviews by Jasmina Nedevska
Talks by Jasmina Nedevska
While political philosophy is concerned with institutions for future generations, climate litigation has so far enjoyed little attention. However, legal scholarship on climate litigation and available data on recent cases show that these cases expound relevant future-beneficial and future-focused practices. Climate litigation should therefore be critically examined as an institution for future generations, including whether it is normatively legitimate as such an institution. With a view to the future-focused practices, the present chapter identifies the most contentious issues of legitimacy, using examples from recent climate litigation.
Three dimensions of legitimacy are discussed: source-based, process-based, and outcome-based concerns. Relevant source-based questions are whether the future-focused practices are compatible with democratic decision-making or a concept of rights. Related process-based questions concern who, if anyone, should get to speak on behalf of future generations in litigation and whether contemporary and future persons with competing interests can and should enjoy equal access to courts. Outcome-based questions include under what conditions future generations benefit from being included in climate litigation and whether these benefits conflict with requirements of a just transition to a fossil-free society.
Two central claims are made in this article. First, I put forth that there is no obvious position on human nature among contemporary natural law theorists. Some thinkers argue that a natural law doctrine must not rely on accounts of human nature at all. Such is the view of John Finnis, who has been particularly influential in shaping a present understanding of natural law. Several theorists of the tradition, however, find a certain kind of dependence necessary and vehemently argue against Finnis' interpretation.
I suggest, secondly, using a distinction made by David Miller, that the disagreement on human nature is not substantial, but rests on whether one speaks of "dependence" as a matter of logical entailment, as Finnis does, or as presuppositional grounding, which seems to be the concept employed by his critics. I argue that one may safely deny that normative principles are derived from accounts of human nature (rejecting the former kind of dependence), while also presupposing that human nature conditions those principles (assuming dependence of the latter kind).
Lastly, I put forth two questions that arise for natural law theorists, if they wish to maintain this position.
For three decades, climate change has been a major political concern. As a fundamental threat to environmental sustainability, climate change is believed to threaten the long-term welfare of humankind. It thus seems imperative to affirm long-term duties regarding future people’s environment. Furthermore, contractualism and natural law are two important moral theories in contemporary political life. While the former seems influential among political liberals, natural law seems more appealing to political conservatives. It is thus of interest how both of these theories can be used to argue for environmental intergenerational duties. Yet, natural law has been particularly understudied in this regard.
The point of departure of the study is the so-called non-identity problem, formulated by Derek Parfit. As concerns future generations, what we do not only affects the quality of people’s lives, but also who will come to exist. If future people come to exist as a consequence of how we live our lives, including the choice of living unsustainably, a degraded environment will be worse for no one. For so-called person-affecting theory, such as contractualism, non-identity seems to imply that there is nothing morally objectionable about leaving future people with an unsustainable environment.
First, the dissertation demonstrates recent attempts in contractualism, in the vein of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon, to solve the non-identity problem on person-affecting terms. It is shown that these attempts either fail to affirm environmental intergenerational duties or implicitly abandon a person-affecting view.
Second, the dissertation explores a natural law approach to the non-identity problem, employing a recent account of natural law suggested by John Finnis. While natural law can be considered of import in contemporary political decision-making, it has hardly ever been used to ground environmental intergenerational duties. This dissertation shows how an impersonal application of natural law could be used in attempts to circumvent the non-identity problem, i.e. to affirm environmental intergenerational duties, and treats possible objections to such an account. It is argued that the requirement to consider so-called basic values, also in cases when no individual would be worse off by one’s act, should render it at least morally objectionable to leave future generations with an unsustainable environment.
Third, a new kind of objection to environmental intergenerational duties is discussed in depth. The objection applies to theories that, although they may accept an impersonal view in morals, subscribe to a person-affecting restriction in politics. On some interpretations, this limited restriction can be ascribed to both contractualism and natural law. This may imply a specifically institutional non-identity problem. It conveys the possibly paralysing conclusion that, even if there are environmental intergenerational duties in a moral sense, we are not permitted to use political institutions to enforce them.
Again, contractualism is used to demonstrate the possible difficulties in overcoming this kind of problem. With regard to natural law, the dissertation explores how the use of institutions could be justified impersonally by reference to the common good and the idea of intergenerational community. In this view, experiences that link us to previous generations justify institutional responsibility for the future.