A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were... more
A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were ...
A familiar objection to coherentist theories of epistemic justification is that they seem to have the following implication: No matter to what extent a person is justified in holding a belief, there may always be another person who is... more
A familiar objection to coherentist theories of epistemic justification is that they seem to have the following implication: No matter to what extent a person is justified in holding a belief, there may always be another person who is equally justified in holding the negation of that ...
IN AN ENTERTAINING PASSAGE in The Language of Morals, Richard Hare has us imagine a missionary who lands on a 'cannibal island'. The mis-sionary finds that the natives use the term 'good', just as he, as 'the most... more
IN AN ENTERTAINING PASSAGE in The Language of Morals, Richard Hare has us imagine a missionary who lands on a 'cannibal island'. The mis-sionary finds that the natives use the term 'good', just as he, as 'the most general adjective of commendation'. But he also finds ...
WV Quine has expressed a fairly conventional form of non-cognitivism in those of his writings that concern the status of moral judgments. For instance, in Quine (1981), he argues that ethics, as compared with science, is... more
WV Quine has expressed a fairly conventional form of non-cognitivism in those of his writings that concern the status of moral judgments. For instance, in Quine (1981), he argues that ethics, as compared with science, is 'methodologically infirm'. The reason is that, while ...
