Justin Massie
Phone: (514) 987-3000, poste 5282
Address: Département de science politique
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succ. Centre-ville
Pavillon Hubert-Aquin, A-3465
Montréal (Québec) H3C 3P8
Page web : http://goo.gl/T9obau
Address: Département de science politique
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succ. Centre-ville
Pavillon Hubert-Aquin, A-3465
Montréal (Québec) H3C 3P8
Page web : http://goo.gl/T9obau
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where partisanship plays a crucial role. Prior to military intervention, political
parties usually make their ideologically distinctive preferences clear and seek
to implement them once in power. What remains unclear, however, is how
ideology affects the decision to use military force. This article contends that
alliance and electoral calculations constrain the ability of political parties to
implement their ideological preferences with regards to the use of force. It
examines a “most likely” case for the partisan theory of military intervention,
namely Canada’s refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq and its decision to
commit forces to the war against the Islamic State. It finds that only in
combination with alliance and electoral calculations does executive ideology
offer valuable insights into Canada’s military support to U.S.-led coalition
operations, which contributes to our understanding of allied decision-making.
where partisanship plays a crucial role. Prior to military intervention, political
parties usually make their ideologically distinctive preferences clear and seek
to implement them once in power. What remains unclear, however, is how
ideology affects the decision to use military force. This article contends that
alliance and electoral calculations constrain the ability of political parties to
implement their ideological preferences with regards to the use of force. It
examines a “most likely” case for the partisan theory of military intervention,
namely Canada’s refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq and its decision to
commit forces to the war against the Islamic State. It finds that only in
combination with alliance and electoral calculations does executive ideology
offer valuable insights into Canada’s military support to U.S.-led coalition
operations, which contributes to our understanding of allied decision-making.