In a conflict as massive as the Second World War, no theatre can claim absolute centrality to the... more In a conflict as massive as the Second World War, no theatre can claim absolute centrality to the war’s outcome. If any campaign comes close, however, it is the Soviet-German struggle on the Eastern Front. From the time German troops crossed the Soviet border on 22 June 1941 in Operation BARBAROSSA, until Adolf Hitler’s suicide in his Berlin bunker, the Eastern Front consumed the bulk of German manpower and resources. More German soldiers died on the Eastern Front than on all other fronts com- bined – though precise figures are still in dispute and will never be satisfa- ctorily reconciled, a figure of 3 million German soldiers killed, missing or dying in captivity on the Eastern Front seems approximately correct. Soviet military losses were far greater: 9 million soldiers killed, missing or dead in prisoner-of-war camps.1 These figures, in turn, are dwarfed by Soviet civilian dead: an additional 20 million. In addition to its incalculable impact on human lives, the outcome of the Soviet-German war shaped the destinies of the eastern half of Europe for fifty years to come, and was fundamental to Soviet politics and society until and beyond the end of the Soviet Union itself.
Authoritarian regimes have pursued a variety of approaches to conscription and military education... more Authoritarian regimes have pursued a variety of approaches to conscription and military education over the course of the twentieth century
In August 1924, a Soviet-sponsored raid on the Polish town of Stolpce to free two imprisoned comm... more In August 1924, a Soviet-sponsored raid on the Polish town of Stolpce to free two imprisoned communist activists went badly wrong. Though the ruling Politburo had not authorized this raid, the public embarrassment and diplomatic consequences led the Soviet government to overhaul its program of ‘active intelligence’, halting peacetime attacks on neighboring states in favor of quieter preparations for wartime sabotage and diversion under the authority of the Red Army’s Intelligence Directorate. At the same time, the Politburo organized stay-behind groups in Soviet border regions to prepare for the possibility of enemy occupation.
Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin is often misperceived as an advocate of strategies of ... more Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin is often misperceived as an advocate of strategies of attrition over destruction or annihilation. In fact, Svechin was an historicist, who saw the precise balance between attri- tion and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances. A close examination of his theoretical and historical works reveals the depth of his thinking, while his response to Russia’s 1916 Brusilov Offensive shows his support for ambitious strategies of annihilation under the proper circumstances.
In the 1920s, the Soviet Union employed arms exports as a means of attempting to exert influence ... more In the 1920s, the Soviet Union employed arms exports as a means of attempting to exert influence on its less-developed Asian neighbors, either by intervening in internal struggles or encouraging pro-Soviet and anti-capitalist foreign policy. In Turkey and Iran, Soviet arms aimed to promote friendly governments and head off potential intervention. In Afghanistan, the Soviets attempted unsuccessfully to prop up the regime of Amanullah Khan. In China, the Soviets pursued an unfocused policy of providing weapons to a wide range of factions and warlords in an effort to win favor, only to find their efforts collapsing with Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. This led the Soviets to overhaul their management of arms exports, handing authority to Wostwag, a front company for Soviet intelligence.
In 1971 the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created the Internati... more In 1971 the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created the International Investment Bank (IIB). The IIB was part of a broader effort to adopt market-based reforms in all the East-bloc economies. The bank was designed to promote competition for loans and rigorous vetting of projects, ostensibly resulting in greater CMEA integration and production that met world standards of quality. But this scenario ultimately did not pan out. Instead, the IIB became a mere conduit for Western finance, focusing not on high technology but on natural resource extraction, particularly the construction of the Soyuz natural gas pipeline. More fundamentally, the IIB could not function properly without market-determined prices and convertible currencies. Although economic authorities in the Soviet bloc fully recognized the constraints on the IIB, they were unwilling to abandon fundamental principles of the Soviet economic system.
In a conflict as massive as the Second World War, no theatre can claim absolute centrality to the... more In a conflict as massive as the Second World War, no theatre can claim absolute centrality to the war’s outcome. If any campaign comes close, however, it is the Soviet-German struggle on the Eastern Front. From the time German troops crossed the Soviet border on 22 June 1941 in Operation BARBAROSSA, until Adolf Hitler’s suicide in his Berlin bunker, the Eastern Front consumed the bulk of German manpower and resources. More German soldiers died on the Eastern Front than on all other fronts com- bined – though precise figures are still in dispute and will never be satisfa- ctorily reconciled, a figure of 3 million German soldiers killed, missing or dying in captivity on the Eastern Front seems approximately correct. Soviet military losses were far greater: 9 million soldiers killed, missing or dead in prisoner-of-war camps.1 These figures, in turn, are dwarfed by Soviet civilian dead: an additional 20 million. In addition to its incalculable impact on human lives, the outcome of the Soviet-German war shaped the destinies of the eastern half of Europe for fifty years to come, and was fundamental to Soviet politics and society until and beyond the end of the Soviet Union itself.
Authoritarian regimes have pursued a variety of approaches to conscription and military education... more Authoritarian regimes have pursued a variety of approaches to conscription and military education over the course of the twentieth century
In August 1924, a Soviet-sponsored raid on the Polish town of Stolpce to free two imprisoned comm... more In August 1924, a Soviet-sponsored raid on the Polish town of Stolpce to free two imprisoned communist activists went badly wrong. Though the ruling Politburo had not authorized this raid, the public embarrassment and diplomatic consequences led the Soviet government to overhaul its program of ‘active intelligence’, halting peacetime attacks on neighboring states in favor of quieter preparations for wartime sabotage and diversion under the authority of the Red Army’s Intelligence Directorate. At the same time, the Politburo organized stay-behind groups in Soviet border regions to prepare for the possibility of enemy occupation.
Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin is often misperceived as an advocate of strategies of ... more Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin is often misperceived as an advocate of strategies of attrition over destruction or annihilation. In fact, Svechin was an historicist, who saw the precise balance between attri- tion and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances. A close examination of his theoretical and historical works reveals the depth of his thinking, while his response to Russia’s 1916 Brusilov Offensive shows his support for ambitious strategies of annihilation under the proper circumstances.
In the 1920s, the Soviet Union employed arms exports as a means of attempting to exert influence ... more In the 1920s, the Soviet Union employed arms exports as a means of attempting to exert influence on its less-developed Asian neighbors, either by intervening in internal struggles or encouraging pro-Soviet and anti-capitalist foreign policy. In Turkey and Iran, Soviet arms aimed to promote friendly governments and head off potential intervention. In Afghanistan, the Soviets attempted unsuccessfully to prop up the regime of Amanullah Khan. In China, the Soviets pursued an unfocused policy of providing weapons to a wide range of factions and warlords in an effort to win favor, only to find their efforts collapsing with Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. This led the Soviets to overhaul their management of arms exports, handing authority to Wostwag, a front company for Soviet intelligence.
In 1971 the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created the Internati... more In 1971 the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created the International Investment Bank (IIB). The IIB was part of a broader effort to adopt market-based reforms in all the East-bloc economies. The bank was designed to promote competition for loans and rigorous vetting of projects, ostensibly resulting in greater CMEA integration and production that met world standards of quality. But this scenario ultimately did not pan out. Instead, the IIB became a mere conduit for Western finance, focusing not on high technology but on natural resource extraction, particularly the construction of the Soyuz natural gas pipeline. More fundamentally, the IIB could not function properly without market-determined prices and convertible currencies. Although economic authorities in the Soviet bloc fully recognized the constraints on the IIB, they were unwilling to abandon fundamental principles of the Soviet economic system.
First things first. The film <cite>Enemy at the Gates</cite> is a good thing for the study of the... more First things first. The film <cite>Enemy at the Gates</cite> is a good thing for the study of the Eastern Front during World War II. If even one in one hundred of those who see the film is inspired to pick up William Craig's book <cite>Enemy at the Gates</cite> or any other book on the war in the east, then director and co-writer Jean-Jacques Annaud has done a great service to those who research and teach Soviet history. If it helps even a little to bring the scale and importance of the Soviet-German clash home to Western audiences, the film will right a great historical wrong: the terrible ignorance within the Western public of how central the Eastern Front was to the outcome of World War II. <p> That said, I found <cite>Enemy at the Gates</cite> terribly disappointing. As both entertainment and a historical portrayal of the Battle of Stalingrad, the film fell far short of its potential. After beginning with a visually spectacular sequence depicting young Soviet soldier Vassili [<cite>sic</cite>] Zaitsev's arrival in Stalingrad, the remainder of the film never lives up to the level promised by its opening. <p> This especially hurts because the elements to make a profoundly interesting film were certainly present. The battle of Stalingrad offers all the human drama and pathos one could ask. The filmmakers spared no expense in sets and effects to recreate the look of a devastated Stalingrad, down to Russian-language obscenities scrawled on the walls. The cast is topnotch: Jude Law is remarkably good as Zaitsev; Rachel Weisz and Joseph Fiennes do the best they can with underwritten parts as sniper Tania Chernova and political officer Danilov. Bob Hoskins is superb as a profane and warty Nikita Khrushchev; likewise Ed Harris as the German master sniper Konig. <p> Despite all this, the film wastes these resources in an attempt to recreate the strategy that James Cameron employed in <cite>Titanic</cite>: given an historical moment of great emotional resonance, focus instead on a love triangle worthy of teenagers and presumably aimed at appealing to teenagers. The plot follows Zaitsev as he arrives in Stalingrad as a naive and innocent soldier, only to be immediately plunged into the horrors of battle. In a fortuitous encounter, Zaitsev demonstrates his exceptional marksmanship by picking off five Germans in front of Danilov. Danilov then turns Zaitsev into a sniper-hero to inspire the Soviet soldiers at Stalingrad. They both encounter Tania Chernova, a beautiful young intellectual turned soldier, and compete for her love with heroism and gifts of sturgeon. As Zaitsev's renown and kills grow, the German army calls in Konig, their top sniper, to hunt him down. <p> Strictly as entertainment, I found the film remarkably slow-moving. Others may appreciate the deliberate pace. More serious, from my point of view, were the historical inaccuracies and oversights that mar the film. <p> William Craig's <cite>Enemy at the Gates</cite> (New York, 1973) provides the basic elements of the plot, and the main characters appear in it: Zaitsev, Chernova, Danilov, even the young boy spy Sacha Fillipov [<cite>sic</cite>]. Therein lies the problem. While a compelling writer with an eye for detail, Craig is not particularly skeptical of his sources. In his account of the sniper duel, Craig takes Stalinist propaganda at face value. There is no source outside of Soviet propaganda for even the existence of the German supersniper (Konings in Craig's book; Thorwald in others). Craig took the propaganda built up around Zaitsev's 242 kills as a sniper and presented it as truth, from where it made its way onto the screen as an ostensibly true
Review of Boris Gorbachevsky, Generalissimo Stalin: The Myth of Stalin as a Great Military Strate... more Review of Boris Gorbachevsky, Generalissimo Stalin: The Myth of Stalin as a Great Military Strategist
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