Adverse selection problems and moral hazard situations are commonly seen as organizational or beh... more Adverse selection problems and moral hazard situations are commonly seen as organizational or behavioral limitations that impede institutions from attempting to reach the frontiers of their productive capacity. These agency costs are generated by informational asymmetries, high monitoring costs, and different preferences between the employer and employees. Universities have been criticized for such pathologies. This study explores explicit (hiring, promotion, and salary policies) and implicit (organizational climate) labor contracts across two public and two private universities in Argentina in order to evaluate whether or not they are, and if so, then to what degree, attentive to mitigating agency costs. It analyzes faculty handbooks and written material in each institution where faculty regimes are described. Interviews with key administrators and a faculty survey complement the data. The sample has been controlled according to the full or part-time status of academics, in order to see if the mitigation strategies for agency costs depend on the type of contract. A major conclusion drawn here shows us that sampled universities are attentive to adverse selection problems while the mitigation of moral hazard situations presents a variety of solutions, where economic rationale is not always present.
Program for Research on Private Higher Education, Jan 1, 2010
Private higher education literature recognizes large public-private differentiation in terms of f... more Private higher education literature recognizes large public-private differentiation in terms of field of study. Relative to public counterparts, private universities tend to offer their services in fields that require low initial investments and present at least relatively attractive internal private ...
ABSTRACT The neoliberal reform arrived at the market of higher education with the intention of in... more ABSTRACT The neoliberal reform arrived at the market of higher education with the intention of introducing private dynamics into public organizations. Through this strategy, the objective was to improve efficiency by promoting intra-and intersectoral competition. The ...
Higher Education Management and Policy, Jan 1, 2011
Downloadable (with restrictions)! The literature on private higher education has identified strik... more Downloadable (with restrictions)! The literature on private higher education has identified striking differences between the public and private sectors in terms of fields of study. For example, unlike their public counterparts, private universities have traditionally specialised in the social ...
UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dis... more UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dissertations and theses. Learn more... ProQuest, Agency costs and labor contract design in the university market: Public and private cases in Argentina. ...
Adverse selection problems and moral hazard situations are commonly seen as organizational or beh... more Adverse selection problems and moral hazard situations are commonly seen as organizational or behavioral limitations that impede institutions from attempting to reach the frontiers of their productive capacity. These agency costs are generated by informational asymmetries, high monitoring costs, and different preferences between the employer and employees. Universities have been criticized for such pathologies. This study explores explicit (hiring, promotion, and salary policies) and implicit (organizational climate) labor contracts across two public and two private universities in Argentina in order to evaluate whether or not they are, and if so, then to what degree, attentive to mitigating agency costs. It analyzes faculty handbooks and written material in each institution where faculty regimes are described. Interviews with key administrators and a faculty survey complement the data. The sample has been controlled according to the full or part-time status of academics, in order to see if the mitigation strategies for agency costs depend on the type of contract. A major conclusion drawn here shows us that sampled universities are attentive to adverse selection problems while the mitigation of moral hazard situations presents a variety of solutions, where economic rationale is not always present.
Program for Research on Private Higher Education, Jan 1, 2010
Private higher education literature recognizes large public-private differentiation in terms of f... more Private higher education literature recognizes large public-private differentiation in terms of field of study. Relative to public counterparts, private universities tend to offer their services in fields that require low initial investments and present at least relatively attractive internal private ...
ABSTRACT The neoliberal reform arrived at the market of higher education with the intention of in... more ABSTRACT The neoliberal reform arrived at the market of higher education with the intention of introducing private dynamics into public organizations. Through this strategy, the objective was to improve efficiency by promoting intra-and intersectoral competition. The ...
Higher Education Management and Policy, Jan 1, 2011
Downloadable (with restrictions)! The literature on private higher education has identified strik... more Downloadable (with restrictions)! The literature on private higher education has identified striking differences between the public and private sectors in terms of fields of study. For example, unlike their public counterparts, private universities have traditionally specialised in the social ...
UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dis... more UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection of dissertations and theses. Learn more... ProQuest, Agency costs and labor contract design in the university market: Public and private cases in Argentina. ...
Uploads
Papers by Marcelo Rabossi
informational asymmetries, high monitoring costs, and different preferences between the employer and employees. Universities have been criticized for such pathologies. This study explores explicit (hiring, promotion, and salary policies) and implicit (organizational climate) labor contracts across two public and two private universities in Argentina in order to evaluate whether or not they are, and if so, then to what degree, attentive to mitigating agency costs. It analyzes faculty handbooks and written material in each institution where faculty regimes are described. Interviews with key administrators and a faculty survey complement the data. The sample has been controlled according to the full or part-time status of academics, in order to see if the mitigation strategies for agency costs depend on the type of contract. A major
conclusion drawn here shows us that sampled universities are attentive to adverse selection problems while the mitigation of moral hazard situations presents a variety of solutions, where economic rationale is not always present.
informational asymmetries, high monitoring costs, and different preferences between the employer and employees. Universities have been criticized for such pathologies. This study explores explicit (hiring, promotion, and salary policies) and implicit (organizational climate) labor contracts across two public and two private universities in Argentina in order to evaluate whether or not they are, and if so, then to what degree, attentive to mitigating agency costs. It analyzes faculty handbooks and written material in each institution where faculty regimes are described. Interviews with key administrators and a faculty survey complement the data. The sample has been controlled according to the full or part-time status of academics, in order to see if the mitigation strategies for agency costs depend on the type of contract. A major
conclusion drawn here shows us that sampled universities are attentive to adverse selection problems while the mitigation of moral hazard situations presents a variety of solutions, where economic rationale is not always present.