Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2023
In current discussions on the problem of the metaphysical nature of the word, four factions – eli... more In current discussions on the problem of the metaphysical nature of the word, four factions – eliminativism, nominalism, originalism, and the type-token theory – take an active part. For eliminativism, words as separate entities do not exist; they are only a useful cognitive illusion. In the process of communication, competent speakers make sounds and inscriptions through which they are able to infer certain intentional contents of each other’s cognitive states. However, these sounds and inscriptions cannot be regarded as instances of words since they do not possess the phonological and orthographic properties constitutive of words. For nominalism, by contrast, the streams of sounds and ink patterns produced by competent speakers serve as relevant instances of a particular word, or its tokens. What we usually call “words” are collections of such tokens, composed on the basis of similarity relations (phono- logical, orthographic or semantic). For originalism, the streams of sounds and ink patterns created by competent speakers are stages of words, understood as continuants, concrete objects preserving identity over time, individualized by the causal history of their origin. Words are created by competent speakers through the practice of naming and spread through chains of interpersonal contact. The phonological, orthographic and semantic properties possessed by different stages of the same word are generally useless for a proper description of objects such as words. At different times of their existence, words can change any of their properties (pronunciation, spelling, and even reference) while preserving their identity in time. For the type-token theory, words are types, or abstract objects encoding a particular phonographic pattern, which in the process of communication must be instantiated by a competent native speaker by uttering or writing the appropriate token. The type-token theory has several advantages over the views of eliminativism, nominalism and originalism. Firstly, it offers a unified ontology of linguistic structures (since the division into tokens and types extends here to the whole range of linguistic units, including sentences and letters). Secondly, unlike most of its competitors, it is able to present a clear operational criterion for word identity, while being consistent with most of our intuitive notions of intra- and cross-linguistic phenomena (homonymy, synonymy, etc.).
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2023
This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purport... more This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purports to describe, explain, and justify the mechanism by which moral and legal responsibility can be attributed to exact and complete duplicates of persons. However, Walker’s defence of the view of persons as abstract entities is met with several metaphysical objections. Alternatively, a new approach to moral and legal responsibility is developed based on principles of agency law, in which the conception of a guilty person does not require identity with the person who committed the culpable act.
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2022
The article contains a critical analysis of the skeptical solution to the rulefollowing problem. ... more The article contains a critical analysis of the skeptical solution to the rulefollowing problem. The skeptical solution denies the existence of “superlative” R-facts that would make statements of the form “P means R by ‘+’ ” true. The role of the sources for the meaning of ‘+’ here is played by the patterns of solidarity behavior of members of some community to which P belongs. The correct use of ‘+’ would be one that is approved by the competent majority of this community, and there can be no other sense in which it would be correct or wrong. Boyd’s hypothesis denies the communal character of the ‘+’ meaning. While there are no “superlative” R-facts, there should be C-facts not about the R as the standard that P or its community follows in their practice of using ‘+’, but about whether they do it correctly. The proof of the Boyd hypothesis is based on the example of an imaginary Ω-community, whose agents use a finite set of simple symbols for the needs of their arithmetic: ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘J’. Each symbol denotes a subset of identical, from the Ω-community point of view, numerical values. The symbol ‘A’ is used, for example, for a subset of the natural numbers 1, 10, 19, 28, 37, 46, etc.; ‘B’ for 2, 11, 20, 29, 38, 47, etc.; ‘C’ for 3, 12, 21, 30, 39, 48, etc. The Ω-community’s arithmetic uses the only local function ⊕ whose range of values forms a finite set of mathematical propositions {α} that are true. The Ω-community’s arithmetic, like our own, is open to many skeptical challenges. Is there a fact that determines the meaning of ‘⊕’? What do agents do when they calculate with ‘⊕’ (say, solve examples ‘A⊕B = ?’, ‘C⊕E=?’, etc.)? Do they Add, Badd or Dadd? To answer them would require a “superlative” R-fact. For the calculation practice with ‘⊕’, it could be a certain R-fact that determines the only possible order for the sequence of numerals ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘J’ such that {α} is true. An analysis of the calculation practice using the local arithmetic function ⊕ shows that for it there are no such R-facts that would determine the only correct standard R – even if the agents in the Ω-community were trained in such calculations on a full set of cases for the application of that function. However, for such practice there are C-facts (independent in their existence from R-facts) that make it possible to distinguish between what seems to be right and what is right. The solitary agent P and the Ω-community are in the same position regarding the knowledge of C-facts. The Ω-community’s point of view has no advantage in matters of C-facts knowledge over the solitary agent P’s point of view. The Ω-community arithmetic shows that if a solitary agent P had the suitable knowledge of C-facts about the practice of calculations with ‘⊕’, it would allow him/her to disagree with the not correct answers of other members of the community even when they would constitute an absolute majority.
In 1908, by German logicians K. Grelling and L. Nelson there was proposed an original semantic pa... more In 1908, by German logicians K. Grelling and L. Nelson there was proposed an original semantic paradox based on the wordproperty “heterological”. The Russell—Tarski hierarchical approach, traditionally used to solve various semantic paradoxes (Liar, Berry, Richard, etc.), allows us to offer pair different solutions to the heterological paradox. The first solution considers this paradox as an analogue of the Russell settheoretic antinomy, for which the difference in properties “to denote heterological” and “to express heterological (does exemplify it)” is of fundamental importance. The nonexistence of a set consisting only of members applied to members of that set which do not apply to themselves, suggests that there are predicate words in our languages that do not express any properties. The second solution contains a metalinguistic analysis of this paradox, which demonstrates his deducibility even in the strictly hierarchical syntax of type theory. It suggests the existence of properties that cannot be expressed by the appropriate predicate words in our languages.
The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Plato... more The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Platonism, he offers a new understanding of the relationship between sense and reference. However, his account faces three strong objections: against non-causal ways of accessing abstract Platonic entities (Benacerraf–Field–Cheyne), against intuition as the faculty to a priori knowledge of grammar facts (Horwich–Cheyne–Oliver), and against the medial status of finite intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language.
The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According... more The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According to an influential interpretation, Wittgenstein presented in the Tractatus a new method of solving paradoxes. This method seems a simple and effective alternative to Russell’s type theory. Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is based on the requirement of clear notation and the context principle: the type of a symbol only “shows” itself in the way we use the signs of our language. The function sign φ(φx) does not express any paradox, because the syntactic rules for its use, written in clear notation, should “show” us that φ(φx) = ψ(φx). Many researchers (Davant, Ishiguro, Mounce, Ruffino, Friedlander, Jolley, Livingston, Ladov, et al.) follow this interpretation. However, the difficulty of such a view on Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is that there hides the fallacy of petitio principii. Indeed, in examples of a functional sign of the form φ(φx), we are interested not only in the question of whether the functions φ are different symbols, but also in how this functional sign φ(φx) itself excludes the symbolization of the same object by different ways. This interpretation is contrasted with the idea that Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is in fact a modified analogue of Russell’s simple theory of types. The reciprocality principle becomes the core of Wittgenstein’s theory: the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of a functional sign is identical to the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of an argument. According to Wittgenstein, only describing the combinatorial potential of linguistic expressions (symbols) can vanish the illusion of paradoxes. The function cannot be its argument, because the function sign φ(φx) already contains the “prototype” of its argument, “showing” us that φ(φx) = φx. The correctness of this interpretation does not exclude the possibility that the differences between Russell and Wittgenstein are in fact nothing more than façon de parler.
George Edward Moore is the brightest philosopher of British neo-realism. During the first half of... more George Edward Moore is the brightest philosopher of British neo-realism. During the first half of XX century he remained the undisputed leader of this philosophical movement, which organically and fruitfully combinedele-ments of classical British empiricism with new original tools for the conceptual analysis of ordinary language expressions. By the example of innovative ideas in moral philosophy, outlined by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica, there is analyzed the intellectual context of the formation of philosophical metaethics in the XX century.
In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the class... more In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the classical ≪Liar≫ paradox. It questioned the traditional notion of self-reference as the basic structure for semantic paradoxes. The article considers the arguments underlying two different approaches to analysis of proposals of the ≪Infinite Liar≫ and understanding of the genuine sources for semantic paradoxes. The first approach (V. Valpola, G.-H. von Wright, T. Bolander, etc.) imposes responsibility for the emergence of semantic paradoxes on the negation of the truth predicate. It deprives the ≪Infinite Liar≫ sentences of consistent truth values. The second approach is based on a modified version of anaphoric prosententialism (D. Grover, R. Brandom, etc.). The concepts of truth and falsehood are treated as special anaphoric operators. Logical constructs similar to the ≪Infinite Liar≫ do not attribute any definite truth values to sentences from which they are composed, but only state certain...
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2021
The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According... more The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According to an influential interpretation, Wittgenstein presented in the Tractatus a new method of solving paradoxes. This method seems a simple and effective alternative to Russell’s type theory. Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is based on the requirement of clear notation and the context principle: the type of a symbol only “shows” itself in the way we use the signs of our language. The function sign φ(φx) does not express any paradox, because the syntactic rules for its use, written in clear notation, should “show” us that φ(φx) = ψ(φx). Many researchers (Davant, Ishiguro, Mounce, Ruffino, Friedlander, Jolley, Livingston, Ladov, et al.) follow this interpretation. However, the difficulty of such a view on Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is that there hides the fallacy of petitio principii. Indeed, in examples of a functional sign of the form φ(φx), we are interested not only in the question of whether the functions φ are different symbols, but also in how this functional sign φ(φx) itself excludes the symbolization of the same object by different ways. This interpretation is contrasted with the idea that Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is in fact a modified analogue of Russell’s simple theory of types. The reciprocality principle becomes the core of Wittgenstein’s theory: the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of a functional sign is identical to the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of an argument. According to Wittgenstein, only describing the combinatorial potential of linguistic expressions (symbols) can vanish the illusion of paradoxes. The function cannot be its argument, because the function sign φ(φx) already contains the “prototype” of its argument, “showing” us that φ(φx) = φx. The correctness of this interpretation does not exclude the possibility that the differences between Russell and Wittgenstein are in fact nothing more than façon de parler.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2021
According to animalism we are identical with human animals. Our death coincides with the cessatio... more According to animalism we are identical with human animals. Our death coincides with the cessation of the functioning of an organism. Biological approach to personal identity seems to imply that the corpse causally connected to me (as an organism) is not me. In other words, there is no such an entity as a human animal that later becomes a corpse. It is so-called «the corpse problem». However, there are various views compatible with animalism, for instance the thesis that after death we can survive as corpses or souls. The main task of the article provides a critical analysis of these views.
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science., 2020
The article critically examines the heuristic capacity and methods of using separate tools of Wit... more The article critically examines the heuristic capacity and methods of using separate tools of Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar to treat various semantic pathologies (paradoxes of Liar, Truth-Teller, etc.). According to Wittgenstein, philosophical confusion associated with the analysis of such semantic pathologies arises on the grounds of our intuitive faith that we are able to express in language any property that interests us. For instance, we believe that the property “to have a length of exactly one metre” can be meaningfully attributed to any extended object. However, such a faith is fundamen-tally wrong, since an object like a standard metre, which plays an exclusive role as the criterion of length in our measuring practices based on the metric system, is an example of an extended object about which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long. A correct understanding of the language-game concept shows that the criterion by which we form a set of objects that meet the standards established by the criterion cannot be described in the same way as objects of this set. Language-games using predicates of truth and falsehood are similar to our practice of measur-ing length using the metric system. In cases of Liar and Truth-Teller sentences, we encounter resem-bling examples of philosophical confusion. Beyond the context of their usage, “This sentence is false” and “This sentence is true” sentences seem to us paradoxes. But, according to Wittgenstein’s philo-sophical grammar, a correct method of treating such “paradoxical” sentences demands to find the lack-ing context for their usage, i.e. pay attention to the language-game in which they are emplloyed. Like in the case of the standard metre, we can claim that the sentence “This sentence is false” (“This sen-tence is true”) is neither false (true), nor not false (true). In an analogous way, Liar and Truth-Teller sentences should be interpreted as peculiar standards of falsehood and truth that we use in our lan-guage-games to judge about the truth value of other sentences.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series: Society. History. Modernity., 2020
The article contains a reconstruction of the rapid psychological change argument by Scott Campbel... more The article contains a reconstruction of the rapid psychological change argument by Scott Campbell. According to the standard psychological approach, the identity of a person is tied to persistence one’s memories, beliefs, wants and intentions. A person stays the same person if one holds strongly psychologically connected and continuous over time. The structure of rapid psychological change argument is compared with the argument of incredibly long-lasting psychological change by David Lewis. It is concluded that the main goals of critical attacks of these arguments are the temporal mismatch of psychological connectedness and continuity as well as the reductionist claim that all the facts what matters for survival can be described in an impersonal way.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2019
The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and moralit... more The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and morality. A new classification of contemporary legal philosophy theories based on a distinction between «dietary» and «calorie» views on the question of the extent that the substantive content of law needs to be consistent with the moral requirements for it to be legal is proposed and justified. It offers a critical analysis of «dietary» views based on the assertion that the law can have any content, including absolutely immoral content (the so-called «separability thesis»).
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2023
In current discussions on the problem of the metaphysical nature of the word, four factions – eli... more In current discussions on the problem of the metaphysical nature of the word, four factions – eliminativism, nominalism, originalism, and the type-token theory – take an active part. For eliminativism, words as separate entities do not exist; they are only a useful cognitive illusion. In the process of communication, competent speakers make sounds and inscriptions through which they are able to infer certain intentional contents of each other’s cognitive states. However, these sounds and inscriptions cannot be regarded as instances of words since they do not possess the phonological and orthographic properties constitutive of words. For nominalism, by contrast, the streams of sounds and ink patterns produced by competent speakers serve as relevant instances of a particular word, or its tokens. What we usually call “words” are collections of such tokens, composed on the basis of similarity relations (phono- logical, orthographic or semantic). For originalism, the streams of sounds and ink patterns created by competent speakers are stages of words, understood as continuants, concrete objects preserving identity over time, individualized by the causal history of their origin. Words are created by competent speakers through the practice of naming and spread through chains of interpersonal contact. The phonological, orthographic and semantic properties possessed by different stages of the same word are generally useless for a proper description of objects such as words. At different times of their existence, words can change any of their properties (pronunciation, spelling, and even reference) while preserving their identity in time. For the type-token theory, words are types, or abstract objects encoding a particular phonographic pattern, which in the process of communication must be instantiated by a competent native speaker by uttering or writing the appropriate token. The type-token theory has several advantages over the views of eliminativism, nominalism and originalism. Firstly, it offers a unified ontology of linguistic structures (since the division into tokens and types extends here to the whole range of linguistic units, including sentences and letters). Secondly, unlike most of its competitors, it is able to present a clear operational criterion for word identity, while being consistent with most of our intuitive notions of intra- and cross-linguistic phenomena (homonymy, synonymy, etc.).
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2023
This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purport... more This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purports to describe, explain, and justify the mechanism by which moral and legal responsibility can be attributed to exact and complete duplicates of persons. However, Walker’s defence of the view of persons as abstract entities is met with several metaphysical objections. Alternatively, a new approach to moral and legal responsibility is developed based on principles of agency law, in which the conception of a guilty person does not require identity with the person who committed the culpable act.
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2022
The article contains a critical analysis of the skeptical solution to the rulefollowing problem. ... more The article contains a critical analysis of the skeptical solution to the rulefollowing problem. The skeptical solution denies the existence of “superlative” R-facts that would make statements of the form “P means R by ‘+’ ” true. The role of the sources for the meaning of ‘+’ here is played by the patterns of solidarity behavior of members of some community to which P belongs. The correct use of ‘+’ would be one that is approved by the competent majority of this community, and there can be no other sense in which it would be correct or wrong. Boyd’s hypothesis denies the communal character of the ‘+’ meaning. While there are no “superlative” R-facts, there should be C-facts not about the R as the standard that P or its community follows in their practice of using ‘+’, but about whether they do it correctly. The proof of the Boyd hypothesis is based on the example of an imaginary Ω-community, whose agents use a finite set of simple symbols for the needs of their arithmetic: ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘J’. Each symbol denotes a subset of identical, from the Ω-community point of view, numerical values. The symbol ‘A’ is used, for example, for a subset of the natural numbers 1, 10, 19, 28, 37, 46, etc.; ‘B’ for 2, 11, 20, 29, 38, 47, etc.; ‘C’ for 3, 12, 21, 30, 39, 48, etc. The Ω-community’s arithmetic uses the only local function ⊕ whose range of values forms a finite set of mathematical propositions {α} that are true. The Ω-community’s arithmetic, like our own, is open to many skeptical challenges. Is there a fact that determines the meaning of ‘⊕’? What do agents do when they calculate with ‘⊕’ (say, solve examples ‘A⊕B = ?’, ‘C⊕E=?’, etc.)? Do they Add, Badd or Dadd? To answer them would require a “superlative” R-fact. For the calculation practice with ‘⊕’, it could be a certain R-fact that determines the only possible order for the sequence of numerals ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘J’ such that {α} is true. An analysis of the calculation practice using the local arithmetic function ⊕ shows that for it there are no such R-facts that would determine the only correct standard R – even if the agents in the Ω-community were trained in such calculations on a full set of cases for the application of that function. However, for such practice there are C-facts (independent in their existence from R-facts) that make it possible to distinguish between what seems to be right and what is right. The solitary agent P and the Ω-community are in the same position regarding the knowledge of C-facts. The Ω-community’s point of view has no advantage in matters of C-facts knowledge over the solitary agent P’s point of view. The Ω-community arithmetic shows that if a solitary agent P had the suitable knowledge of C-facts about the practice of calculations with ‘⊕’, it would allow him/her to disagree with the not correct answers of other members of the community even when they would constitute an absolute majority.
In 1908, by German logicians K. Grelling and L. Nelson there was proposed an original semantic pa... more In 1908, by German logicians K. Grelling and L. Nelson there was proposed an original semantic paradox based on the wordproperty “heterological”. The Russell—Tarski hierarchical approach, traditionally used to solve various semantic paradoxes (Liar, Berry, Richard, etc.), allows us to offer pair different solutions to the heterological paradox. The first solution considers this paradox as an analogue of the Russell settheoretic antinomy, for which the difference in properties “to denote heterological” and “to express heterological (does exemplify it)” is of fundamental importance. The nonexistence of a set consisting only of members applied to members of that set which do not apply to themselves, suggests that there are predicate words in our languages that do not express any properties. The second solution contains a metalinguistic analysis of this paradox, which demonstrates his deducibility even in the strictly hierarchical syntax of type theory. It suggests the existence of properties that cannot be expressed by the appropriate predicate words in our languages.
The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Plato... more The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Platonism, he offers a new understanding of the relationship between sense and reference. However, his account faces three strong objections: against non-causal ways of accessing abstract Platonic entities (Benacerraf–Field–Cheyne), against intuition as the faculty to a priori knowledge of grammar facts (Horwich–Cheyne–Oliver), and against the medial status of finite intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language.
The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According... more The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According to an influential interpretation, Wittgenstein presented in the Tractatus a new method of solving paradoxes. This method seems a simple and effective alternative to Russell’s type theory. Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is based on the requirement of clear notation and the context principle: the type of a symbol only “shows” itself in the way we use the signs of our language. The function sign φ(φx) does not express any paradox, because the syntactic rules for its use, written in clear notation, should “show” us that φ(φx) = ψ(φx). Many researchers (Davant, Ishiguro, Mounce, Ruffino, Friedlander, Jolley, Livingston, Ladov, et al.) follow this interpretation. However, the difficulty of such a view on Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is that there hides the fallacy of petitio principii. Indeed, in examples of a functional sign of the form φ(φx), we are interested not only in the question of whether the functions φ are different symbols, but also in how this functional sign φ(φx) itself excludes the symbolization of the same object by different ways. This interpretation is contrasted with the idea that Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is in fact a modified analogue of Russell’s simple theory of types. The reciprocality principle becomes the core of Wittgenstein’s theory: the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of a functional sign is identical to the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of an argument. According to Wittgenstein, only describing the combinatorial potential of linguistic expressions (symbols) can vanish the illusion of paradoxes. The function cannot be its argument, because the function sign φ(φx) already contains the “prototype” of its argument, “showing” us that φ(φx) = φx. The correctness of this interpretation does not exclude the possibility that the differences between Russell and Wittgenstein are in fact nothing more than façon de parler.
George Edward Moore is the brightest philosopher of British neo-realism. During the first half of... more George Edward Moore is the brightest philosopher of British neo-realism. During the first half of XX century he remained the undisputed leader of this philosophical movement, which organically and fruitfully combinedele-ments of classical British empiricism with new original tools for the conceptual analysis of ordinary language expressions. By the example of innovative ideas in moral philosophy, outlined by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica, there is analyzed the intellectual context of the formation of philosophical metaethics in the XX century.
In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the class... more In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the classical ≪Liar≫ paradox. It questioned the traditional notion of self-reference as the basic structure for semantic paradoxes. The article considers the arguments underlying two different approaches to analysis of proposals of the ≪Infinite Liar≫ and understanding of the genuine sources for semantic paradoxes. The first approach (V. Valpola, G.-H. von Wright, T. Bolander, etc.) imposes responsibility for the emergence of semantic paradoxes on the negation of the truth predicate. It deprives the ≪Infinite Liar≫ sentences of consistent truth values. The second approach is based on a modified version of anaphoric prosententialism (D. Grover, R. Brandom, etc.). The concepts of truth and falsehood are treated as special anaphoric operators. Logical constructs similar to the ≪Infinite Liar≫ do not attribute any definite truth values to sentences from which they are composed, but only state certain...
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2021
The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According... more The article contains a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism. According to an influential interpretation, Wittgenstein presented in the Tractatus a new method of solving paradoxes. This method seems a simple and effective alternative to Russell’s type theory. Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is based on the requirement of clear notation and the context principle: the type of a symbol only “shows” itself in the way we use the signs of our language. The function sign φ(φx) does not express any paradox, because the syntactic rules for its use, written in clear notation, should “show” us that φ(φx) = ψ(φx). Many researchers (Davant, Ishiguro, Mounce, Ruffino, Friedlander, Jolley, Livingston, Ladov, et al.) follow this interpretation. However, the difficulty of such a view on Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is that there hides the fallacy of petitio principii. Indeed, in examples of a functional sign of the form φ(φx), we are interested not only in the question of whether the functions φ are different symbols, but also in how this functional sign φ(φx) itself excludes the symbolization of the same object by different ways. This interpretation is contrasted with the idea that Wittgenstein’s theory of logical symbolism is in fact a modified analogue of Russell’s simple theory of types. The reciprocality principle becomes the core of Wittgenstein’s theory: the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of a functional sign is identical to the combinatorial potential of the “prototype” of an argument. According to Wittgenstein, only describing the combinatorial potential of linguistic expressions (symbols) can vanish the illusion of paradoxes. The function cannot be its argument, because the function sign φ(φx) already contains the “prototype” of its argument, “showing” us that φ(φx) = φx. The correctness of this interpretation does not exclude the possibility that the differences between Russell and Wittgenstein are in fact nothing more than façon de parler.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2021
According to animalism we are identical with human animals. Our death coincides with the cessatio... more According to animalism we are identical with human animals. Our death coincides with the cessation of the functioning of an organism. Biological approach to personal identity seems to imply that the corpse causally connected to me (as an organism) is not me. In other words, there is no such an entity as a human animal that later becomes a corpse. It is so-called «the corpse problem». However, there are various views compatible with animalism, for instance the thesis that after death we can survive as corpses or souls. The main task of the article provides a critical analysis of these views.
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science., 2020
The article critically examines the heuristic capacity and methods of using separate tools of Wit... more The article critically examines the heuristic capacity and methods of using separate tools of Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar to treat various semantic pathologies (paradoxes of Liar, Truth-Teller, etc.). According to Wittgenstein, philosophical confusion associated with the analysis of such semantic pathologies arises on the grounds of our intuitive faith that we are able to express in language any property that interests us. For instance, we believe that the property “to have a length of exactly one metre” can be meaningfully attributed to any extended object. However, such a faith is fundamen-tally wrong, since an object like a standard metre, which plays an exclusive role as the criterion of length in our measuring practices based on the metric system, is an example of an extended object about which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long. A correct understanding of the language-game concept shows that the criterion by which we form a set of objects that meet the standards established by the criterion cannot be described in the same way as objects of this set. Language-games using predicates of truth and falsehood are similar to our practice of measur-ing length using the metric system. In cases of Liar and Truth-Teller sentences, we encounter resem-bling examples of philosophical confusion. Beyond the context of their usage, “This sentence is false” and “This sentence is true” sentences seem to us paradoxes. But, according to Wittgenstein’s philo-sophical grammar, a correct method of treating such “paradoxical” sentences demands to find the lack-ing context for their usage, i.e. pay attention to the language-game in which they are emplloyed. Like in the case of the standard metre, we can claim that the sentence “This sentence is false” (“This sen-tence is true”) is neither false (true), nor not false (true). In an analogous way, Liar and Truth-Teller sentences should be interpreted as peculiar standards of falsehood and truth that we use in our lan-guage-games to judge about the truth value of other sentences.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series: Society. History. Modernity., 2020
The article contains a reconstruction of the rapid psychological change argument by Scott Campbel... more The article contains a reconstruction of the rapid psychological change argument by Scott Campbell. According to the standard psychological approach, the identity of a person is tied to persistence one’s memories, beliefs, wants and intentions. A person stays the same person if one holds strongly psychologically connected and continuous over time. The structure of rapid psychological change argument is compared with the argument of incredibly long-lasting psychological change by David Lewis. It is concluded that the main goals of critical attacks of these arguments are the temporal mismatch of psychological connectedness and continuity as well as the reductionist claim that all the facts what matters for survival can be described in an impersonal way.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2019
The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and moralit... more The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and morality. A new classification of contemporary legal philosophy theories based on a distinction between «dietary» and «calorie» views on the question of the extent that the substantive content of law needs to be consistent with the moral requirements for it to be legal is proposed and justified. It offers a critical analysis of «dietary» views based on the assertion that the law can have any content, including absolutely immoral content (the so-called «separability thesis»).
Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2022
The article contains a critical analysis of the skeptical solution to the rule-following problem.... more The article contains a critical analysis of the skeptical solution to the rule-following problem. The skeptical solution denies the existence of ‘superlative’ R-facts that would make statements of the form «P means R by ‘+’ » true. The role of the sources for the meaning of ‘+’ here is played by the patterns of solidarity behavior of members of some community to which P belongs. The correct use of ‘+’ would be one that is approved by the competent majority of this community, and there can be no other sense in which it would be correct or wrong. Boyd’s hypothesis denies the communal character of the ‘+’ meaning. While there are no ‘superlative’ R-facts, there should be C-facts not about the R as the standard that P or its community follows in their practice of using ‘+’, but about whether they do it correctly. The proof of the Boyd hypothesis is based on the example of an imaginary Ω-community, whose agents use a finite set of simple symbols for the needs of their arithmetic: ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘J’. Each symbol denotes a subset of identical, from the Ω-community point of view, numerical values. The symbol ‘A’ is used, for example, for a subset of the natural numbers 1, 10, 19, 28, 37, 46, etc.; character 'B' - 2, 11, 20, 29, 38, 47, etc.; 'C' - 3, 12, 21, 30, 39, 48, etc. The Ω-community’s arithmetic uses the only local function @ whose range of values forms a finite set of mathematical propositions {α} that are true. The Ω-community’s arithmetic, like our own, is open to many skeptical challenges. Is there a fact that determines the meaning of ‘@’? What do agents do when they calculate with ‘@’ (say, solve examples ‘A@B=?’, ‘C@E=?’, etc.)? Do they adds, badds or dadds? To answer them would require a ‘superlative’ R-fact. For the calculation practice with ‘@’, it could be certain R-fact that determines the only possible order for the sequence of numerals ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘J’ such that {α} is true. An analysis of the calculation practice using the local arithmetic function @ shows that for it there are no such R-facts that would determine the only correct standard R – even if the agents in the Ω-community were trained in such calculations on a full set of cases for the application of that function. However, for such practice there are C-facts (independent in their existence from R-facts) that make it possible to distinguish between what seems to be right and what is right. The solitary agent P and the Ω-community are in the same position regarding the knowledge of C-facts. The Ω-community point of view has no advantage in matters of C-facts knowledge over the solitary agent P’s point of view. The Ω-community arithmetic shows that if a solitary agent P had the suitable knowledge of C-facts about the practice of calculations with ‘@’, it would allow him to disagree with the not correct answers of other members of the community even when they would constitute an absolute majority.
The article presents a critique of aesthetic realism. The core of this theory contains three thes... more The article presents a critique of aesthetic realism. The core of this theory contains three theses: (AR) aesthetic properties are the causes of aesthetic experience; (PA) perceptual acquaintance with the objects of aesthetic evaluation is a sine qua non condition for making an judgment; (DM) aesthetic properties are describable. Arguments of faultless disagreement, esse est percipi, and zombie art cast doubt on theses (AR) and (DM). Based on this critique, an alternative nominalist theory of aesthetic experience is proposed, in which the perceptual properties of the object are considered as sufficient causes of aesthetic experience.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series: Society. History. Modernity, 2021
According to animalism we are identical with human animals. Our death coincides with the cessatio... more According to animalism we are identical with human animals. Our death coincides with the cessation of the functioning of an organism. Biological approach to personal identity seems to imply that the corpse causally connected to me (as an organism) is not me. In other words, there is no such an entity as a human animal that later becomes a corpse. It is so-called «the corpse problem». However, there are various views compatible with animalism, for instance the thesis that after death we can survive as corpses or souls. The main task of the article provides a critical analysis of these views.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2020
The article contains a reconstruction of the rapid psychological change argument by Scott Campbel... more The article contains a reconstruction of the rapid psychological change argument by Scott Campbell. According to the standard psychological approach, the identity of a person is tied to persistence one’s memories, beliefs, wants and intentions. A person stays the same person if one holds strongly psychologically connected and continuous over time. The structure of rapid psychological change argument is compared with the argument of incredibly long-lasting psychological change by David Lewis. It is concluded that the main goals of critical attacks of these arguments are the temporal mismatch of psychological connectedness and continuity as well as the reductionist claim that all the facts what matters for survival can be described in an impersonal way.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 2019
The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and moralit... more The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and morality. A new classification of contemporary legal philosophy theories based on a distinction between «dietary» and «calorie» views on the question of the extent that the substantive content of law needs to be consistent with the moral requirements for it to be legal is proposed and justified. It offers a critical analysis of «dietary» views based on the assertion that the law can have any content, including absolutely immoral content (the so-called «separability thesis»).
The Journal Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series: Society. History. Modernity., 2019
The article presents a critical analysis of views on the problem of personal identity which are p... more The article presents a critical analysis of views on the problem of personal identity which are proposed by two great English philosophers – John Locke and Derek Parfit. Lockean person is considered as a basic metaphysical structure, subject to moral responsibility for all actions performed on its behalf. Parfitian person, in contrast, denies any identical essence through time as an extremely improbable metaphysical structure, instead it is assuming an existential chain of one life’s stages with psychological continuity. As an alternative to these views, a several of additional arguments are considered to support the physicist view of human nature.
Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity., 2018
The article discusses the personality and legacy of Derek Parfit. He entered the history of moder... more The article discusses the personality and legacy of Derek Parfit. He entered the history of modern metaphysics and moral philosophy as a proponent of radical Neo-Lockean view on the issues of personal identity. Denying our basic metaphysical and moral intuitions (identity for the person and moral responsibility), the so-called «Oxford Buddhist» was a tireless preacher of hyper-rational altruism. His original ideas and admirable arguments outlined only in few works were and remain at the center of philosophical discussions.
The article presents a critique of logical foundations for formal realism. Formal realism is not ... more The article presents a critique of logical foundations for formal realism. Formal realism is not satisfied with the ban on groundlessness by Hans Herzrberger and the ban on self-references by Bertrand Russell and Alfred Tarski which were taken by logicians as a means of effectively preventing alethic paradoxes. According formal realism, a source for arise alethic paradoxes is so-called “essentially negativity”. All of the examples of those paradoxes (like sentences of the Liar family) are directly linked with cases of using negative alethic predicate (‘to be false’). However, that approach to prevent paradoxes completely ignores any example of epistemic paradoxes, in particular the so-called “Buridan’s sophisms” (like sentences of the Truthteller family or the No-No family). In cases with Buridan’s sophisms (in contrary to Liar-like sentences), there are gluts of consistent pairs of truth-values for their sentences. The study of these sophisms allows to recognizing the actual difference between two different types of truth-value assignment – the unique truth-values (‘to be true’ or ‘to be false’) and the criteria truth-values (‘to have the same truth-value’ or ‘to have the opposite truth-value’). In cases with assignment of criteria truth-values we should talk about characteristics for logical relations between truth-values of sentences which constitute alethic and epistemic paradoxes. Thus, in cases with Buridan’s sophisms, sentences of the Truthteller family (‘S1: S2 is true’ and ‘S2: S1 is true’) indicate that any of them has the same truth-value as another (no matter what exactly it is), and sentences of the No-No family (‘S1: S2 is false’ and ‘S2: S1 is false’) have reported that each of them has the opposite truth-value to another. The facility for using of criteria truth-values is not limited to a group of epistemic paradoxes only. For example, in cases of athletic paradoxes (like sentences of the Liar family), criteria truth-values also allow to find a solution with consistent truth-values not only for sentences of the classic Liar (‘S1: S2 is false’ and ‘S2: S1 is true’), but for sentences to the infinite Liar (‘S1: For all k>1, Sk is untrue’, ‘S2: For all k>2, Sk is untrue’, ‘S3: For all k>3, Sk is untrue’, etc.).
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Papers by Andrey Nekhaev
intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language.
intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language.