Lloyd P. Gerson is professor of philosophy in the University of Toronto. He specializes in ancient philosophy, with additional interests in medieval philosophy, metaphysics, and political philosophy. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.
The Enneads by Plotinus is a work which is central to the history of philosophy in late antiquity... more The Enneads by Plotinus is a work which is central to the history of philosophy in late antiquity. This volume is the first complete edition of the Enneads in English for over seventy-five years, and also includes Porphyry's Life of Plotinus. Led by Lloyd P. Gerson, a team of experts present up-to-date translations which are based on the best available text, the editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer and its corrections. The translations are consistent in their vocabulary, making the volume ideal for the study of Plotinus' philosophical arguments. They also offer extensive annotation to assist the reader, together with cross-references and citations which will enable users more easily to navigate the texts. This monumental edition will be invaluable for scholars of Plotinus with or without ancient Greek, as well as for students of the Platonic tradition.
... 1X Page 16. x PREFACE The translations of Plotinus were the primary responsibility of LloydGe... more ... 1X Page 16. x PREFACE The translations of Plotinus were the primary responsibility of LloydGerson. The translations of the other Neoplatonists were the primary re-sponsibility of John Dillon. Some of the latter were excerpted from al-ready published works. ...
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2022
In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ... more In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ultra of cognition, namely, intuition (nous or noēsis). This is the paradigm of cognition, meaning that all forms of human (and even animal) cognition are inferior manifestations of this. Intuition is mental seeing, analogous to physical seeing. Among embodied souls, it is seeing a unity of some sort manifested in some diversity or plurality. Thus, someone who sees that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, or that S at t1 is identical with S at t2, or that f=ma, etc., sees the unity “behind” the diversity. The disembodied intellect that is the Demiurge (or, for Aristotle, the Unmoved Mover) sees paradigmatically the diversity of all intelligible being as a unity. Because mental seeing or intuition is paradigmatic for all cognition, cognition is essentially a unificatory process. Plato’s method of collection and division displays both this process and its reverse. In the light of this core doctrine, I examine some of the insights that Platonists, especially Plotinus and Proclus, arrived at regarding a host of issues, including the nature of the first principle of all and the nature of normativity.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023
In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ... more In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ultra of cognition, namely, intuition (nous or noēsis). This is the paradigm of cognition, meaning that all forms of human (and even animal) cognition are inferior manifestations of this. Intuition is mental seeing, analogous to physical seeing. Among embodied souls, it is seeing a unity of some sort manifested in some diversity or plurality. Thus, someone who sees that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, or that S at t1 is identical with S at t2, or that f=ma, etc., sees the unity “behind” the diversity. The disembodied intellect that is the Demiurge (or, for Aristotle, the Unmoved Mover) sees paradigmatically the diversity of all intelligible being as a unity. Because mental seeing or intuition is paradigmatic for all cognition, cognition is essentially a unificatory process. Plato’s method of collection and division displays both this process and its reverse. In the light of this core doctrine, I examine some of the insights that Platonists, especially Plotinus and Proclus, arrived at regarding a host of issues, including the nature of the first principle of all and the nature of normativity.
Hylomorphism is almost universally claimed to be a staple doctrine of Aristotle. In this paper, I... more Hylomorphism is almost universally claimed to be a staple doctrine of Aristotle. In this paper, I discuss a wide range of texts from the dialogues of Plato that straightforwardly display hylomorphism. Both Plato and Aristotle rest their cognitive realism on their hylomorphism. The crucial difference between Aristotle’s hylomorphism and Plato’s is that Aristotle believes that hylomorphism supports and is supported by essentialism whereas Plato does not. Plotinus presents arguments against Aristotle’s essentialism at the same time as he defends Platonic hylomorphism and his cognitive realism.
The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition
In this paper, I explore the centrality of διάνοια in Plotinus’ philosophy. Plotinus says that th... more In this paper, I explore the centrality of διάνοια in Plotinus’ philosophy. Plotinus says that the real “we” is found to be the subject of διάνοια and “upwards.” This fundamental definition elicits several pressing questions. First, how is the subject of discursive reasoning related to the subject of appetitive and affective states? Second, how does the subject of discursive reasoning come to recognize its ultimate destiny as an undescended and disembodied intellect? Finally, why should we think that, as Plotinus says, there is “no falsity” in discursive thinking? The answers to these questions begins with Plotinus’ reflections on Plato’s Divided Line and the sharp distinction between διάνοια and δόξα. I argue that διάνοια is the embodied expression of disembodied νοῦς. It is the focus of our ambiguous and conflicted personal identity.
The Enneads by Plotinus is a work which is central to the history of philosophy in late antiquity... more The Enneads by Plotinus is a work which is central to the history of philosophy in late antiquity. This volume is the first complete edition of the Enneads in English for over seventy-five years, and also includes Porphyry's Life of Plotinus. Led by Lloyd P. Gerson, a team of experts present up-to-date translations which are based on the best available text, the editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer and its corrections. The translations are consistent in their vocabulary, making the volume ideal for the study of Plotinus' philosophical arguments. They also offer extensive annotation to assist the reader, together with cross-references and citations which will enable users more easily to navigate the texts. This monumental edition will be invaluable for scholars of Plotinus with or without ancient Greek, as well as for students of the Platonic tradition.
... 1X Page 16. x PREFACE The translations of Plotinus were the primary responsibility of LloydGe... more ... 1X Page 16. x PREFACE The translations of Plotinus were the primary responsibility of LloydGerson. The translations of the other Neoplatonists were the primary re-sponsibility of John Dillon. Some of the latter were excerpted from al-ready published works. ...
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2022
In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ... more In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ultra of cognition, namely, intuition (nous or noēsis). This is the paradigm of cognition, meaning that all forms of human (and even animal) cognition are inferior manifestations of this. Intuition is mental seeing, analogous to physical seeing. Among embodied souls, it is seeing a unity of some sort manifested in some diversity or plurality. Thus, someone who sees that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, or that S at t1 is identical with S at t2, or that f=ma, etc., sees the unity “behind” the diversity. The disembodied intellect that is the Demiurge (or, for Aristotle, the Unmoved Mover) sees paradigmatically the diversity of all intelligible being as a unity. Because mental seeing or intuition is paradigmatic for all cognition, cognition is essentially a unificatory process. Plato’s method of collection and division displays both this process and its reverse. In the light of this core doctrine, I examine some of the insights that Platonists, especially Plotinus and Proclus, arrived at regarding a host of issues, including the nature of the first principle of all and the nature of normativity.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023
In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ... more In this paper, I examine what is for Plato and all those who follow in his footsteps the ne plus ultra of cognition, namely, intuition (nous or noēsis). This is the paradigm of cognition, meaning that all forms of human (and even animal) cognition are inferior manifestations of this. Intuition is mental seeing, analogous to physical seeing. Among embodied souls, it is seeing a unity of some sort manifested in some diversity or plurality. Thus, someone who sees that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, or that S at t1 is identical with S at t2, or that f=ma, etc., sees the unity “behind” the diversity. The disembodied intellect that is the Demiurge (or, for Aristotle, the Unmoved Mover) sees paradigmatically the diversity of all intelligible being as a unity. Because mental seeing or intuition is paradigmatic for all cognition, cognition is essentially a unificatory process. Plato’s method of collection and division displays both this process and its reverse. In the light of this core doctrine, I examine some of the insights that Platonists, especially Plotinus and Proclus, arrived at regarding a host of issues, including the nature of the first principle of all and the nature of normativity.
Hylomorphism is almost universally claimed to be a staple doctrine of Aristotle. In this paper, I... more Hylomorphism is almost universally claimed to be a staple doctrine of Aristotle. In this paper, I discuss a wide range of texts from the dialogues of Plato that straightforwardly display hylomorphism. Both Plato and Aristotle rest their cognitive realism on their hylomorphism. The crucial difference between Aristotle’s hylomorphism and Plato’s is that Aristotle believes that hylomorphism supports and is supported by essentialism whereas Plato does not. Plotinus presents arguments against Aristotle’s essentialism at the same time as he defends Platonic hylomorphism and his cognitive realism.
The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition
In this paper, I explore the centrality of διάνοια in Plotinus’ philosophy. Plotinus says that th... more In this paper, I explore the centrality of διάνοια in Plotinus’ philosophy. Plotinus says that the real “we” is found to be the subject of διάνοια and “upwards.” This fundamental definition elicits several pressing questions. First, how is the subject of discursive reasoning related to the subject of appetitive and affective states? Second, how does the subject of discursive reasoning come to recognize its ultimate destiny as an undescended and disembodied intellect? Finally, why should we think that, as Plotinus says, there is “no falsity” in discursive thinking? The answers to these questions begins with Plotinus’ reflections on Plato’s Divided Line and the sharp distinction between διάνοια and δόξα. I argue that διάνοια is the embodied expression of disembodied νοῦς. It is the focus of our ambiguous and conflicted personal identity.
Platonism and Naturalism. The Possibility of Philosophy, 2020
This book examines the historical conflict between Platonism and its polar opposite, Naturalism. ... more This book examines the historical conflict between Platonism and its polar opposite, Naturalism. It aims to show the instability of any sort of compromise between the two. It argues that the opposition between Platonism and Naturalism continues today in various forms.
Platonism and Naturalism. The Possibility of Philosophy, 2019
In his third and concluding volume, Lloyd P. Gerson presents an innovative account of Platonism, ... more In his third and concluding volume, Lloyd P. Gerson presents an innovative account of Platonism, the central tradition in the history of philosophy, in conjunction with Naturalism, the "anti-Platonism" in antiquity and contemporary philosophy. In this broad and sweeping argument, Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy. Thus, the possibility of philosophy depends on the truth of Platonism. From Aristotle to Plotinus to Proclus, Gerson clearly links the construction of the Platonic system well beyond simply Plato's dialogues, providing strong evidence of the vast impact of Platonism on philosophy throughout history. Platonism and Naturalism concludes that attempts to seek rapprochement between Platonism and Naturalism are unstable and likely indefensible.
In Phaedo 95A4-102A9, we find the famous account by Socrates of his own intellectual history. Ou... more In Phaedo 95A4-102A9, we find the famous account by Socrates of his own intellectual history. Our best evidence, including Aristotle's testimony, leads us to suppose that this is Plato's own autobiography on display. It contains, as I shall argue, the most concise and complete statement of the nature of Platonism, both its distinction and separation from the philosophies of Plato's predecessors and the outline of its positive construct. In this autobiography, Socrates rejects the explanations of the natural philosophers given for scientific problems. Instead, he posits separate Forms as the source of true explanation. The naturalism of Plato's predecessors, explicitly here that of Anaxagoras, presumes materialism and mechanism as the matrix for scientific explanation. The positing of the explanatory role of Forms entails the rejection of those presumptions. In addition, these Forms as participatable οὐσίαι can only fulfill their explanatory roles if nominalism is false, that is, if it is false that the only things that exist are unique individuals. So, Plato announces in this passage his rejection of materialism, mechanism, and nominalism. In addition, the focus on Forms as explanatory entities is preceded by the argument that we already know these Forms prior to embodiment. So, the claim of Pre-Socratic skeptics that knowledge of the ultimate explanation of things is not available to us, particularly if these explanations are non-sensible, is rejected, too. Finally, insofar as the Forms fulfill an explanatory role, both the epistemological and ethical relativism of Sophists like Protagoras is rejected. This is owing to the objectivity of Forms as well as their universality. The rejection of materialism, mechanism, nominalism, skepticism, and relativism is the matrix for Plato's positive metaphysical construct. The autobiography 'hypothesizes' Forms as explanations, adding that any hypothesis is provisional until one comes to 'something adequate' (τι ἱκανόν). I argue here, on the basis of an analysis of the meaning of 'hypothesis' in Republic and elsewhere, that what would be 'adequate' cannot be another hypothetical entity, but rather the unhypothetical entity that the Idea of the Good is explicitly said to be and that, as Aristotle tells us, is identical with the One. That which is 'adequate' cannot be anything that is complex, that is, anything that exists and has an οὐσία. That is why the unhypothetical first principle of all must be ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. Further, the claim that there must be a unique first principle of all reveals a great deal about the entire explanatory framework of Platonism. First, it tells us that no explanation can be ultimate or adequate if it does not end in the adduction of the first principle. Thus, Socrates’ ‘simple hypothesis’ to the effect that something has a property f owing to the causal operation of Fness is, indeed, too simple; it is only provisional. The ‘clever hypothesis’ that adduces relations among Forms to explain the original phenomena must also be provisional. The reason why this is so, I argue, is every Form, regardless of its relations to other Forms, is essentially complex. It is ‘composed’ of its existence and its nature or essence. To claim that x is g because x is g and G always accompanies F may be true, but it leaves entirely unexplained how an eternal and immutable and apparently simple entity can implicate the nature of another entity. For example, participation in a Form of Hot may be provisionally explained by participation in a Form of Fire and an assertion that a Form of Fire and a Form of Hot are necessarily connected. But the putative necessary connectedness of Fire and Hot is problematic, particularly if we insist that Fire itself is not really hot. Without the explanation for this necessary connectedness, there is no adequate explanation for the initial phenomenon. Or, to put it in a slightly different way, without such an explanation, both the simple and the cleverer hypothesis do not really explain anything at all. They are equivalent to maintaining that x is f because just because it is f. Every adequate must conclude with a principle that is self-explanatory, that in which existence and essence are identical. The 'adequate' explanation for all natural phenomena unifies the elements of the matrix of Plato's negative assessment of the natural philosophy of his predecessors. Thus, the unhypothetical first principle of all shows why anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-skepticism, and anti-relativism are all necessarily connected. Accordingly, 'Platonism' does not name a smorgasbord of philosophical theories or positions from which one can pick and choose, variously making qualified accommodations for the polar opposite of Platonism, namely, naturalism. The intellectual autobiography in Phaedo is, in short, an epitome of Platonism. All of the dialogues written after this likely early work are attempts to apply the principles of Platonism to the full range of philosophical problems left to Plato by his predecessors and still current in the 4th century. Finally, this dialogue provides good philosophical evidence that Plato thinking is at least well along the trajectory which ends in the doctrine to which Aristotle’s testimony testifies, namely, the identification of the Idea of the Good with the One.
With the ascension of Julian to the imperial throne 361, Saturninius Salutius Secundus (Salustios... more With the ascension of Julian to the imperial throne 361, Saturninius Salutius Secundus (Salustios) was appointed by Julian praefectus praetorio orientis, a bureaucratic title that cast him in the role of the highest political and juridical representative of the emperor. Salustios continued in this role after Julian was killed in 363 under the reigns of Jovian and Valentinian. He was sufficiently respected, at least by the military, to be offered the imperial crown himself after Julian's death. He declined the honor, citing his advanced age. Apart from his apparent administrative competence, his appointment was owing to the fact that he shared with Julian a dedication to the continuation and renewal of the Hellenic culture whose decline was accelerated by the conversion to Christianity of Julian's uncle, Constantine the Great, in 312. Probably in 363, and shortly before the death of Julian, Salustios wrote a short book titled (On the Gods). It is to this book that the present work is dedicated. It contains an introduction (Detlef Melsbach: "Einführung in die Schrift", pp. 3-19), a text based largely on the texts of Arthur D. Nock (1926) and Gabriel Rochefort (1960), 1 and a translation (Detlef Melsbach/Jan Opsomer: "Text, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen", pp. 21-65), and four substantial essays situating this work in its historical, philosophical, and literary context.
Author Is there a philosopher in the history of philosophy whose achievement even comes close to ... more Author Is there a philosopher in the history of philosophy whose achievement even comes close to the breadth and depth of the work of Aristotle? Leibniz is perhaps a very distant second. And this is so despite the fact that we possess considerably less than half of Aristotle's writings. For this reason alone, the task of producing a 'handbook' of Aristotle presents a considerable challenge. The editor, Christopher Shields, has largely met the challenge with a collection of twenty-six substantial articles, ranging from those that would serve as introductions to particular subjects for advanced undergraduates to those that would fit fairly comfortably in
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Papers by Lloyd Gerson
In this autobiography, Socrates rejects the explanations of the natural philosophers given for scientific problems. Instead, he posits separate Forms as the source of true explanation. The naturalism of Plato's predecessors, explicitly here that of Anaxagoras, presumes materialism and mechanism as the matrix for scientific explanation. The positing of the explanatory role of Forms entails the rejection of those presumptions. In addition, these Forms as participatable οὐσίαι can only fulfill their explanatory roles if nominalism is false, that is, if it is false that the only things that exist are unique individuals. So, Plato announces in this passage his rejection of materialism, mechanism, and nominalism. In addition, the focus on Forms as explanatory entities is preceded by the argument that we already know these Forms prior to embodiment. So, the claim of Pre-Socratic skeptics that knowledge of the ultimate explanation of things is not available to us, particularly if these explanations are non-sensible, is rejected, too. Finally, insofar as the Forms fulfill an explanatory role, both the epistemological and ethical relativism of Sophists like Protagoras is rejected. This is owing to the objectivity of Forms as well as their universality.
The rejection of materialism, mechanism, nominalism, skepticism, and relativism is the matrix for Plato's positive metaphysical construct. The autobiography 'hypothesizes' Forms as explanations, adding that any hypothesis is provisional until one comes to 'something adequate' (τι ἱκανόν). I argue here, on the basis of an analysis of the meaning of 'hypothesis' in Republic and elsewhere, that what would be 'adequate' cannot be another hypothetical entity, but rather the unhypothetical entity that the Idea of the Good is explicitly said to be and that, as Aristotle tells us, is identical with the One. That which is 'adequate' cannot be anything that is complex, that is, anything that exists and has an οὐσία. That is why the unhypothetical first principle of all must be ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.
Further, the claim that there must be a unique first principle of all reveals a great deal about the entire explanatory framework of Platonism. First, it tells us that no explanation can be ultimate or adequate if it does not end in the adduction of the first principle. Thus, Socrates’ ‘simple hypothesis’ to the effect that something has a property f owing to the causal operation of Fness is, indeed, too simple; it is only provisional. The ‘clever hypothesis’ that adduces relations among Forms to explain the original phenomena must also be provisional. The reason why this is so, I argue, is every Form, regardless of its relations to other Forms, is essentially complex. It is ‘composed’ of its existence and its nature or essence. To claim that x is g because x is g and G always accompanies F may be true, but it leaves entirely unexplained how an eternal and immutable and apparently simple entity can implicate the nature of another entity. For example, participation in a Form of Hot may be provisionally explained by participation in a Form of Fire and an assertion that a Form of Fire and a Form of Hot are necessarily connected. But the putative necessary connectedness of Fire and Hot is problematic, particularly if we insist that Fire itself is not really hot. Without the explanation for this necessary connectedness, there is no adequate explanation for the initial phenomenon. Or, to put it in a slightly different way, without such an explanation, both the simple and the cleverer hypothesis do not really explain anything at all. They are equivalent to maintaining that x is f because just because it is f. Every adequate must conclude with a principle that is self-explanatory, that in which existence and essence are identical.
The 'adequate' explanation for all natural phenomena unifies the elements of the matrix of Plato's negative assessment of the natural philosophy of his predecessors. Thus, the unhypothetical first principle of all shows why anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-skepticism, and anti-relativism are all necessarily connected. Accordingly, 'Platonism' does not name a smorgasbord of philosophical theories or positions from which one can pick and choose, variously making qualified accommodations for the polar opposite of Platonism, namely, naturalism. The intellectual autobiography in Phaedo is, in short, an epitome of Platonism. All of the dialogues written after this likely early work are attempts to apply the principles of Platonism to the full range of philosophical problems left to Plato by his predecessors and still current in the 4th century. Finally, this dialogue provides good philosophical evidence that Plato thinking is at least well along the trajectory which ends in the doctrine to which Aristotle’s testimony testifies, namely, the identification of the Idea of the Good with the One.