Konrad Zasztowt is a researcher specializing in analysis of Turkey, the South Caucasus and Central Asia regions. Previously, he worked at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (2012 - 2016) and the Polish National Security Bureau (2008 – 2010), where he monitored international security issues in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. He received his doctoral degree from the Faculty of Oriental Studies at the University of Warsaw (2012) and is a graduate of the University’s Institute of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology and East European Studies. From 2003 to 2005, he studied at Yeditepe University in Istanbul. His areas of interest include international relations and energy security issues in the Black Sea region and Central Asia, ethnic and religious minorities as well as Islam in the former Soviet Union.
The implementation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Georgia... more The implementation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Georgia after the planned signature in June may create attractive conditions for Polish exports and investments in Georgia. For its part, Georgia needs to enhance its economic cooperation with European countries in order to strengthen its still fragile economy. Even if Poland is now not a significant economic partner of Georgia’s, both countries may still benefit from the DCFTA. The Polish and Georgian governments should encourage Polish entrepreneurs to enter the Georgian market and provide them with the necessary support and information.
ABSTRACT After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to contin... more ABSTRACT After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to continue difficult internal reforms, face a resilient critique from opposition parties and manage the complex relationship with Russia. This paper analyzes the challenges which the Georgian government will have to overcome on its way towards the Association Agreement with the EU. The investigations in this paper refer to the Georgian authorities’ statements and actions as well as their economic and social contexts. The conclusion is that Georgia’s closer rapprochement with Russia will be blocked due to the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, Georgia’s integration with the EU will be a difficult process because of internal and external impediments, including Russian pressure.
The governing Republican Party of Armenia’s victory in recent parliamentary elections means that ... more The governing Republican Party of Armenia’s victory in recent parliamentary elections means that the development of relations with the EU will remain a priority of Armenian foreign policy. This is evident in the progress in negotiations of an Association Agreement with the Union. However, the current ruling elite has not undertaken serious political reforms. This will slow Armenia’s further rapprochement with the EU. The priority of EU policy towards the government in Yerevan should be to support democratisation and the modernisation of the country. Another test for Armenian democracy will be the presidential election in 2013.
After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to continue diffic... more After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to continue difficult internal reforms, face a resilient critique from opposition parties and manage the complex relationship with Russia. This paper analyzes the challenges which the Georgian government will have to overcome on its way towards the Association Agreement with the EU. The investigations in this paper refer to the Georgian authorities’ statements and actions as well as their economic and social contexts. The conclusion is that Georgia’s closer rapprochement with Russia will be blocked due to the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, Georgia’s integration with the EU will be a difficult process because of internal and external impediments, including Russian pressure.
The aim of this article is the description of the religious, cultural, social, and political situ... more The aim of this article is the description of the religious, cultural, social, and political situation of the Crimean Tatar Muslims both living in Crimea and outside of the Russia-annexed territory of Crimea in mainland Ukraine.1 The Crimean Tatar Muslims in mainland Ukraine may be divided into two categories, those who lived there before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and those who settled there after – internally displaced persons from Crimea. In the case of the latter, one significant reason behind their migrations is persecution against them on religious grounds. Members of the Islamic communities related to the Salafi version of Islam as well as followers of Hizb utTahrir either fled from the annexed peninsula or were harshly repressed by Russian law enforcement authorities. The mainstream group of the Crimean Tatar Muslims are adherents of Sunni Islam and Hanafi Madhab. The latter is also the main Islamic religious community in Russia, which is recognized as a legitimate form of Islam by the Russian government. However, the Hanafi Crimean Muslims are also being pressured by the authorities in occupied Crimea. The leader of their religious organisation, the Crimean Muftiat, Mufti Emirali Ablayev had to declare his loyalty to the Russian state.
Celem artykułu jest ocena czterech lat rządów koalicji Gruzińskiego Marzenia (GM). Szczególny nac... more Celem artykułu jest ocena czterech lat rządów koalicji Gruzińskiego Marzenia (GM). Szczególny nacisk położony jest na politykę zagraniczną i związane z nią aspekty polityki wewnętrznej. Motorem reform koalicji GM były zachęty ze strony UE i NATO, m.in. podpisanie umowy stowarzyszeniowej z UE, obietnica wprowadzenia ruchu bezwizowego dla Gruzinów podróżujących do Unii oraz dalsze wsparcie modernizacji armii gruzińskiej przez Sojusz Północnoatlantycki. Jednoczenie jednak na relacje Gruzji z UE i NATO negatywny wpływ miał wewnętrzny konflikt polityczny między rządem GM a opozycją. Pomimo pojednawczej polityki władz w Tbilisi, nie zdołano naprawić relacji z Rosją. Ich poprawa uzależniana jest przez Kreml od bezwarunkowego przywrócenia rosyjsko-gruzińskich stosunków dyplomatycznych zerwanych po wojnie pięciodniowej w 2008 roku. Było to warunkiem nie do przyjęcia dla Gruzji, gdy oznaczałoby akceptację rosyjskiej okupacji i pełzającej aneksji regionów Abchazji i Cchinwali.
Azerbaijan recently had to face a wave of criticism from the European institutions (the OSCE and ... more Azerbaijan recently had to face a wave of criticism from the European institutions (the OSCE and the European Parliament) due to its government's undemocratic practices. In response, Baku accused its European partners of Islamophobia and declared the suspension of parliamentary cooperation in the framework of the EU's Euronest. The Azerbaijani ruling elite also blames the West of supporting a " fifth column " in Azerbaijan (meaning civil society organisations) as well as of giving political support to its arch-enemy Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same time authorities in Baku are displaying their developing political partnership with Russia. This paper examines the consequences of the crisis in relations between the EU and Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani-Russian rapprochement for the prospects for EU-Azerbaijan energy projects and regional security in the South Caucasus.
With financial and political crisis looming over Ukraine, the region of the Eastern Partnership i... more With financial and political crisis looming over Ukraine, the region of the Eastern Partnership is facing a period of increasing uncertainty. How effective is EU aid on reforms as a tool for easing and encouraging the transformation process in those countries? Does aid translate into real changes in the lives of ordinary people, or are reforms on paper merely a façade for corrupt and disengaged governments? And what lessons for the future can be learnt from the EU’s seven-year experience of aid delivery in the East? These are the principle issues tackled by PISM report written by Elżbieta Kaca, Anita Sobják and Konrad Zasztowt.
On 18 March 2014 Russian Federation annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine, after illegally taking milit... more On 18 March 2014 Russian Federation annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine, after illegally taking military control of its territory and organising an unrecognized referendum on independence of the region. This article’s goal is to analyse how the annexation and following Russification of the political, social and legal system affected the minority of Crimean Tatars and its relations with Russia. Crimean Tatars, in their majority opposing the annexation and Russian policy, have faced political repressions, civil rights abuses and intimidation. Russian policy towards the minority aims at forcing them to accept the ‘new reality’ without granting them freedom of political activities and right to cultivate their cultural heritage, when it’s inconsistent with Russian policy and ideology. The question of Crimea as de facto part of Russia is treated briefly in this article, while its primary goal is to show the developments and complexity of Crimean Tatar-Russian relations.
The implementation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Georgia... more The implementation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Georgia after the planned signature in June may create attractive conditions for Polish exports and investments in Georgia. For its part, Georgia needs to enhance its economic cooperation with European countries in order to strengthen its still fragile economy. Even if Poland is now not a significant economic partner of Georgia’s, both countries may still benefit from the DCFTA. The Polish and Georgian governments should encourage Polish entrepreneurs to enter the Georgian market and provide them with the necessary support and information.
ABSTRACT After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to contin... more ABSTRACT After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to continue difficult internal reforms, face a resilient critique from opposition parties and manage the complex relationship with Russia. This paper analyzes the challenges which the Georgian government will have to overcome on its way towards the Association Agreement with the EU. The investigations in this paper refer to the Georgian authorities’ statements and actions as well as their economic and social contexts. The conclusion is that Georgia’s closer rapprochement with Russia will be blocked due to the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, Georgia’s integration with the EU will be a difficult process because of internal and external impediments, including Russian pressure.
The governing Republican Party of Armenia’s victory in recent parliamentary elections means that ... more The governing Republican Party of Armenia’s victory in recent parliamentary elections means that the development of relations with the EU will remain a priority of Armenian foreign policy. This is evident in the progress in negotiations of an Association Agreement with the Union. However, the current ruling elite has not undertaken serious political reforms. This will slow Armenia’s further rapprochement with the EU. The priority of EU policy towards the government in Yerevan should be to support democratisation and the modernisation of the country. Another test for Armenian democracy will be the presidential election in 2013.
After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to continue diffic... more After the presidential election, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition will have to continue difficult internal reforms, face a resilient critique from opposition parties and manage the complex relationship with Russia. This paper analyzes the challenges which the Georgian government will have to overcome on its way towards the Association Agreement with the EU. The investigations in this paper refer to the Georgian authorities’ statements and actions as well as their economic and social contexts. The conclusion is that Georgia’s closer rapprochement with Russia will be blocked due to the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, Georgia’s integration with the EU will be a difficult process because of internal and external impediments, including Russian pressure.
The aim of this article is the description of the religious, cultural, social, and political situ... more The aim of this article is the description of the religious, cultural, social, and political situation of the Crimean Tatar Muslims both living in Crimea and outside of the Russia-annexed territory of Crimea in mainland Ukraine.1 The Crimean Tatar Muslims in mainland Ukraine may be divided into two categories, those who lived there before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and those who settled there after – internally displaced persons from Crimea. In the case of the latter, one significant reason behind their migrations is persecution against them on religious grounds. Members of the Islamic communities related to the Salafi version of Islam as well as followers of Hizb utTahrir either fled from the annexed peninsula or were harshly repressed by Russian law enforcement authorities. The mainstream group of the Crimean Tatar Muslims are adherents of Sunni Islam and Hanafi Madhab. The latter is also the main Islamic religious community in Russia, which is recognized as a legitimate form of Islam by the Russian government. However, the Hanafi Crimean Muslims are also being pressured by the authorities in occupied Crimea. The leader of their religious organisation, the Crimean Muftiat, Mufti Emirali Ablayev had to declare his loyalty to the Russian state.
Celem artykułu jest ocena czterech lat rządów koalicji Gruzińskiego Marzenia (GM). Szczególny nac... more Celem artykułu jest ocena czterech lat rządów koalicji Gruzińskiego Marzenia (GM). Szczególny nacisk położony jest na politykę zagraniczną i związane z nią aspekty polityki wewnętrznej. Motorem reform koalicji GM były zachęty ze strony UE i NATO, m.in. podpisanie umowy stowarzyszeniowej z UE, obietnica wprowadzenia ruchu bezwizowego dla Gruzinów podróżujących do Unii oraz dalsze wsparcie modernizacji armii gruzińskiej przez Sojusz Północnoatlantycki. Jednoczenie jednak na relacje Gruzji z UE i NATO negatywny wpływ miał wewnętrzny konflikt polityczny między rządem GM a opozycją. Pomimo pojednawczej polityki władz w Tbilisi, nie zdołano naprawić relacji z Rosją. Ich poprawa uzależniana jest przez Kreml od bezwarunkowego przywrócenia rosyjsko-gruzińskich stosunków dyplomatycznych zerwanych po wojnie pięciodniowej w 2008 roku. Było to warunkiem nie do przyjęcia dla Gruzji, gdy oznaczałoby akceptację rosyjskiej okupacji i pełzającej aneksji regionów Abchazji i Cchinwali.
Azerbaijan recently had to face a wave of criticism from the European institutions (the OSCE and ... more Azerbaijan recently had to face a wave of criticism from the European institutions (the OSCE and the European Parliament) due to its government's undemocratic practices. In response, Baku accused its European partners of Islamophobia and declared the suspension of parliamentary cooperation in the framework of the EU's Euronest. The Azerbaijani ruling elite also blames the West of supporting a " fifth column " in Azerbaijan (meaning civil society organisations) as well as of giving political support to its arch-enemy Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same time authorities in Baku are displaying their developing political partnership with Russia. This paper examines the consequences of the crisis in relations between the EU and Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani-Russian rapprochement for the prospects for EU-Azerbaijan energy projects and regional security in the South Caucasus.
With financial and political crisis looming over Ukraine, the region of the Eastern Partnership i... more With financial and political crisis looming over Ukraine, the region of the Eastern Partnership is facing a period of increasing uncertainty. How effective is EU aid on reforms as a tool for easing and encouraging the transformation process in those countries? Does aid translate into real changes in the lives of ordinary people, or are reforms on paper merely a façade for corrupt and disengaged governments? And what lessons for the future can be learnt from the EU’s seven-year experience of aid delivery in the East? These are the principle issues tackled by PISM report written by Elżbieta Kaca, Anita Sobják and Konrad Zasztowt.
On 18 March 2014 Russian Federation annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine, after illegally taking milit... more On 18 March 2014 Russian Federation annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine, after illegally taking military control of its territory and organising an unrecognized referendum on independence of the region. This article’s goal is to analyse how the annexation and following Russification of the political, social and legal system affected the minority of Crimean Tatars and its relations with Russia. Crimean Tatars, in their majority opposing the annexation and Russian policy, have faced political repressions, civil rights abuses and intimidation. Russian policy towards the minority aims at forcing them to accept the ‘new reality’ without granting them freedom of political activities and right to cultivate their cultural heritage, when it’s inconsistent with Russian policy and ideology. The question of Crimea as de facto part of Russia is treated briefly in this article, while its primary goal is to show the developments and complexity of Crimean Tatar-Russian relations.
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Papers by Konrad Zasztowt
the Crimean Tatar Muslims both living in Crimea and outside of the Russia-annexed territory
of Crimea in mainland Ukraine.1
The Crimean Tatar Muslims in mainland Ukraine may be divided
into two categories, those who lived there before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and those
who settled there after – internally displaced persons from Crimea. In the case of the latter, one significant reason behind their migrations is persecution against them on religious grounds. Members
of the Islamic communities related to the Salafi version of Islam as well as followers of Hizb utTahrir either fled from the annexed peninsula or were harshly repressed by Russian law enforcement authorities. The mainstream group of the Crimean Tatar Muslims are adherents of Sunni Islam
and Hanafi Madhab. The latter is also the main Islamic religious community in Russia, which is
recognized as a legitimate form of Islam by the Russian government. However, the Hanafi Crimean
Muslims are also being pressured by the authorities in occupied Crimea. The leader of their religious organisation, the Crimean Muftiat, Mufti Emirali Ablayev had to declare his loyalty to the
Russian state.
the Crimean Tatar Muslims both living in Crimea and outside of the Russia-annexed territory
of Crimea in mainland Ukraine.1
The Crimean Tatar Muslims in mainland Ukraine may be divided
into two categories, those who lived there before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and those
who settled there after – internally displaced persons from Crimea. In the case of the latter, one significant reason behind their migrations is persecution against them on religious grounds. Members
of the Islamic communities related to the Salafi version of Islam as well as followers of Hizb utTahrir either fled from the annexed peninsula or were harshly repressed by Russian law enforcement authorities. The mainstream group of the Crimean Tatar Muslims are adherents of Sunni Islam
and Hanafi Madhab. The latter is also the main Islamic religious community in Russia, which is
recognized as a legitimate form of Islam by the Russian government. However, the Hanafi Crimean
Muslims are also being pressured by the authorities in occupied Crimea. The leader of their religious organisation, the Crimean Muftiat, Mufti Emirali Ablayev had to declare his loyalty to the
Russian state.