Papers by Krystyna Bielecka
Etyka
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AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
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AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
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In this paper, I introduce the concept of narrow content (Section 2.1)
to discuss an account of n... more In this paper, I introduce the concept of narrow content (Section 2.1)
to discuss an account of narrow content by analyzing Fodor's
methodological solipsism (2.2). I point out that Fodor's formalism, that
is, the position according to which the content is reduced to formal
properties of mental representation, eliminates (at least - as I show in
Section 2.2.4 - in Stich's interpretation) semantic properties in favor of
the syntactic ones. In addition, it leads to the conceptual problems
indicated by J. Searle, S. Harnad (Section 2.3), and T. Burge (Section 2.4).
In a nutshell, semantic internalism, as reviewed in this paper, does not
offer an account of content that would be properly contentful, because
it provides no grounds to ascribe truth or other semantic properties to
representations. In particular, it is either unsatisfactory, because it
reduces content to formal properties or inconsistent, because it appeals
to innate contents that itself has not been properly explicated;
moreover, innate factors, as I argue, are not merely individual.
Consequently, I reject semantic internalism in favor of externalism.
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In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopa... more In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopathology. Mentally-ill non-human minds, in particular in delusions, obsessive-compulsive disorders and similar cognitive states, are traditionally understood in purely behavioral terms. In contrast, we argue that non-human mental psy-chopathology should be at least sometimes not only ascribed contentful mental representation but also understood as really having these states. To defend this view, we appeal to the interactivist account of mental representation, which is a kind of a constructive approach to meaning. We follow Mark Bickhard in assuming that only an organism – either human or non-human – capable of detecting its own misrepre-sentations is representational. However, under his autonomy-based account of biological function these minds are incapable of misrepresentations because these minds are, ex hypothesi, unable to detect error in such representations. To solve this problem, we argue that adding a historical dimension – as in Millikan's view on mental representations – to Bickhard's account of function makes mental misrepresentation of mentally-ill minds possible. Using Bickhard's dynamic account of function, it is possible to explain why delusions and other mental disorders can be seen as locally functional. However, an etiological dimension can further explain why misrepresenta-tions seem to be globally dysfunctional. Even if representational or biosemiotic hypotheses about non-human psychopathology are difficult to confirm empirically, we defend the view that they can enrich our understanding of the causes and development of such pathologies, and may constitute a new progressive research programme.
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Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2014
ABSTRACT
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In this paper, I juxtapose the Symbol Grounding Problem and causal theories of reference. In the ... more In this paper, I juxtapose the Symbol Grounding Problem and causal theories of reference. In the first part of the paper, I show some basic assumptions they share in order to show, in the second part, some difficulties implied by these assumptions. These difficulties are: the meaning determination problem, the easy and hard disjunction problem, and the trivialization problem. My diagnosis is that both the easy and hard disjunction problem result from a more general difficulty with causal theories and the SGP solution, which is the possibility of misrepresenting, and in particular of accounting for system-detectable error. I emphasize some implications they have for the notion of representation. Finally, I enumerate some theoretical desiderata for a satisfactory account of naturalized semantics (and solutions to SGP) that would be free of the problems mentioned above.
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In this paper, I analyze a type of externalist enactivism defended by Riccardo Manzotti. Such rad... more In this paper, I analyze a type of externalist enactivism defended by Riccardo Manzotti. Such radical versions of enactivism are gaining more attention, especially in cognitive science and cognitive robotics. They are radical in that their notion of representation is purely referential, and content is conflated with reference. Manzotti follows in the footsteps of early causal theories of reference that had long been shown to be inadequate. It is commonly known that radical versions of externalism may lead to difficulties with the notion of representation, especially if they cannot help themselves with the notion of syntax. I argue that a type of externalism present in Manzotti’s enactivism may well lead to anti-representationalism.
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The paper seeks to analyze the elucidation of the nature of misrepresentation in terms of ‘teleos... more The paper seeks to analyze the elucidation of the nature of misrepresentation in terms of ‘teleosemantic’ functions as offered by Dretske and Millikan. In two first parts of the paper, Dretske’s teleosemantics and the role his account of function plays in his teleosemantics are investigated. In a third part, Dretske’s concept of function is compared to Ruth Millikan’s account (although her theory of representation is not taken under consideration here). On the one hand, Millikan’s theory is similar to Dretske’s, on the other hand, it is much better worked out and, as a consequence, it is less controversial than Dretske’s proposal. In the fourth part, my analysis is summarized. Finally, the critical conclusions concerning Dretske’s teleosemantics as well as the use of the concept of function in naturalizing representation are presented.
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The Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP), which remains difficult for AI and philosophy of information,... more The Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP), which remains difficult for AI and philosophy of information, was recently scrutinized by M. Taddeo and L. Floridi (2005, 2007). However, their own solution to SGP, underwritten by Action-based Semantics, although different from other solutions, does not seem to be satisfactory. Moreover, it does not satisfy the authors’ principle, which they dub ‘Zero Semantic Commitment Condition’. In this paper, Taddeo and Floridi’s solution is criticized in particular because of the excessively liberal relationship between symbols and internal states of agents, which is conceived in terms of levels of abstraction. Also, the notion of action seems to be seriously defective in their theory. Due to the lack of the possibility of symbols to misrepresent, the grounded symbols remain useless for the cognitive system itself, and it is unclear why they should be grounded in the first place, as the role of grounded symbols is not specified by the proposed solution. At the same time, it is probably one of the best developed attempts to solve SGP and shows that naturalized semantics can benefit from taking artificial intelligence seriously.
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Talks by Krystyna Bielecka
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Papers by Krystyna Bielecka
to discuss an account of narrow content by analyzing Fodor's
methodological solipsism (2.2). I point out that Fodor's formalism, that
is, the position according to which the content is reduced to formal
properties of mental representation, eliminates (at least - as I show in
Section 2.2.4 - in Stich's interpretation) semantic properties in favor of
the syntactic ones. In addition, it leads to the conceptual problems
indicated by J. Searle, S. Harnad (Section 2.3), and T. Burge (Section 2.4).
In a nutshell, semantic internalism, as reviewed in this paper, does not
offer an account of content that would be properly contentful, because
it provides no grounds to ascribe truth or other semantic properties to
representations. In particular, it is either unsatisfactory, because it
reduces content to formal properties or inconsistent, because it appeals
to innate contents that itself has not been properly explicated;
moreover, innate factors, as I argue, are not merely individual.
Consequently, I reject semantic internalism in favor of externalism.
Talks by Krystyna Bielecka
to discuss an account of narrow content by analyzing Fodor's
methodological solipsism (2.2). I point out that Fodor's formalism, that
is, the position according to which the content is reduced to formal
properties of mental representation, eliminates (at least - as I show in
Section 2.2.4 - in Stich's interpretation) semantic properties in favor of
the syntactic ones. In addition, it leads to the conceptual problems
indicated by J. Searle, S. Harnad (Section 2.3), and T. Burge (Section 2.4).
In a nutshell, semantic internalism, as reviewed in this paper, does not
offer an account of content that would be properly contentful, because
it provides no grounds to ascribe truth or other semantic properties to
representations. In particular, it is either unsatisfactory, because it
reduces content to formal properties or inconsistent, because it appeals
to innate contents that itself has not been properly explicated;
moreover, innate factors, as I argue, are not merely individual.
Consequently, I reject semantic internalism in favor of externalism.