This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate... more This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.
While mechanistic explanatory models are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a new reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops the neurophenomenological approach in the direction of dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that neurophenomenology can deliver dynamical constraints on mechanistic models and thus inform the search for an underlying mechanism.
Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences.
According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed ... more According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations.
This study aims to investigate how daily activities affect mood in the context of social distanci... more This study aims to investigate how daily activities affect mood in the context of social distancing guidelines enforced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) administered four times a day during a 2-week period, we asked participants (N = 91) about their mood and the activities they engaged in. Seven individuals were selected for a follow-up, open-ended questionnaire. Results show that a stable routine, including physical exercise, hobbies, regular sleep hours, and minimal time spent in front of the computer, helps maintain a good mood. Coping strategies such as planning and scheduling help keep routines and circadian rhythms stable. Face-to-face contact is associated with a more positive mood, while similar interaction through electronic communication has a less positive effect. We observe an effect related to the infodemic phenomenon: Daily reports on COVID-19 cases and deaths affect mood fluctuations. This is an important consideration in shaping public information policies.
In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one... more In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl's phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl's works and Husserl's idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences.
In this article, I consider the possibility of a theoretical integration of phenomenology and a m... more In this article, I consider the possibility of a theoretical integration of phenomenology and a mechanistic framework. First, I discuss the mechanistic model of explanation and the idea of theoretical integration in science as opposed to unification. I argue that the mechanistic model of explanation is preferable for integrating the cognitive sciences, although it is limited and in the case of consciousness studies should be complemented with phenomenology. Second, I examine three possible approaches to the integration of phenomenology and the mechanistic model of explanation. First, I discuss Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and propose a new argument against IIT's axiomatic method-namely, I argue that IIT misuses the notion of axiom. Next, I discuss two different proposals for the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology and neurophenomenology. I argue that these proposals cannot be integrated with a mechanistic framework unless requisite modifications are made.
In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition
relates to time... more In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition
relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl’s account of
intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation
with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of
the other’s harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective
(passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in
the field of social cognition. I argue that these levels of empathy are related with
different levels of intersubjective temporality. By the intersubjective temporality I do
not understand being in the same moment of objective time (so called clock time) but
rather the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of actions. In the
final part, I gather my considerations together and propose a general three-level
framework of intersubjective temporality.
Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presen... more Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is immersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications
W artykule omawiamy na podstawie prac Edmunda Husserla oraz korespondencji z jego uczniem Arnolde... more W artykule omawiamy na podstawie prac Edmunda Husserla oraz korespondencji z jego uczniem Arnoldem Metzgerem wybrane idee fenomenologii, pokazując, jak bardzo radykalny i maksymalistyczny był to projekt, który w skrócie można scharakteryzować jako próbę rozpoczęcia filozofii od nowa. Wychodząc od skrajnie pesymistycznej oceny filozofii i nauki, Husserl opisuje kryzys racjonalności, który dotknął Europę. Rozwiązaniem ma być stworzenie nowej, ściśle naukowej filozofii, czyli fenomenologii. Wedle zamysłów Husserla, miała ona stanowić całkiem nową fundamentalną dyscyplinę naukową dającą podstawę innym naukom, w tym m.in. psychologii. Zadanie, jakie sobie Husserl postawił, wymagało radykalnych środków, dlatego dużą część swoich rozważań poświęcił na opracowanie nowej metody filozoficznej, której celem było m.in. zawieszenie całej uprzednio nabytej wiedzy. Maksymalistyczny projekt Husserla zmagał się z wewnętrznymi ograniczeniami i sprzecznościami, doprowadził jednak do przełomu teoretycznego w filozofii XIX i XX wieku. Cel tak pomyślanej nowej filozofii nie był wyłącznie naukowy, lecz również cywilizacyjny. Fenomenologia miała doprowadzić do odnowy duchowej ludzkości poprzez transformację nauki i odkrycie nieskończonej idei racjonalności leżącej u podstaw kultury europejskiej.
In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental... more In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve this position.
The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein – philosopher and psycholog... more The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein – philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career he developed an original philosophy taken from both phenomenology and Twardowski's analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl's early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein's biography and some general features of his philosophy. The second part provides an overview of Blaustein's dissertation concerning Husserl's early phenomenology. In the third and final part I summarise Blaustein's research including the critical remarks of Roman Ingarden.
In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness a... more In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness and embodiment. However, I do not discuss the Husserlian account of consciousness of time in its full scope. I focus on the
main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily
feelings.
In the first part, I outline the main ideas of Husserl’s early phenomenology of consciousness of time. In the second part, I introduce the phenomenological account of bodily feelings and describe how it evolved in Husserl’s philosophy.
Next, I discuss the idea of bodily self-affection and the affective-kinaesthetic origin of consciousness’ temporal flow. In order to better understand this “pre-phenomenal temporality”, I analyse the dynamics of non-intentional, prereflective bodily self-affection. In the third part, I try to complement Husserl’s account by describing the specific dynamics of bodily experience. In order to do so, I appeal to Daniel Stern’s psychological account of dynamic bodily experience, which he calls the “vitality affect”. I argue that the best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is in terms of the notion of rhythm.
This article concerns the critique of the Husserlian concept of intentionality formulated by Mich... more This article concerns the critique of the Husserlian concept of intentionality formulated by Michel Henry. In the first part author presents phenomenological concept of intentionality and its evolution in Husserl’s thought. The author argues that intentionality is not a simple concept and has many forms. Furthermore Husserl acknowledged non-intentional states of consciousness, especially in affective and emotional phenomena. Second part of the article is devoted to Henry’s critique of the concept of intentionality and its dominance in Husserl’s phenomenology. At the end the author defends Husserl position and argues that Henry didn’t notice variety of Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Moreover these two phenomenological projects, intentional and material (non-intentional) phenomenology are in fact complementary.
This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate... more This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.
While mechanistic explanatory models are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a new reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops the neurophenomenological approach in the direction of dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that neurophenomenology can deliver dynamical constraints on mechanistic models and thus inform the search for an underlying mechanism.
Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences.
According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed ... more According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations.
This study aims to investigate how daily activities affect mood in the context of social distanci... more This study aims to investigate how daily activities affect mood in the context of social distancing guidelines enforced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) administered four times a day during a 2-week period, we asked participants (N = 91) about their mood and the activities they engaged in. Seven individuals were selected for a follow-up, open-ended questionnaire. Results show that a stable routine, including physical exercise, hobbies, regular sleep hours, and minimal time spent in front of the computer, helps maintain a good mood. Coping strategies such as planning and scheduling help keep routines and circadian rhythms stable. Face-to-face contact is associated with a more positive mood, while similar interaction through electronic communication has a less positive effect. We observe an effect related to the infodemic phenomenon: Daily reports on COVID-19 cases and deaths affect mood fluctuations. This is an important consideration in shaping public information policies.
In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one... more In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl's phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl's works and Husserl's idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences.
In this article, I consider the possibility of a theoretical integration of phenomenology and a m... more In this article, I consider the possibility of a theoretical integration of phenomenology and a mechanistic framework. First, I discuss the mechanistic model of explanation and the idea of theoretical integration in science as opposed to unification. I argue that the mechanistic model of explanation is preferable for integrating the cognitive sciences, although it is limited and in the case of consciousness studies should be complemented with phenomenology. Second, I examine three possible approaches to the integration of phenomenology and the mechanistic model of explanation. First, I discuss Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and propose a new argument against IIT's axiomatic method-namely, I argue that IIT misuses the notion of axiom. Next, I discuss two different proposals for the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology and neurophenomenology. I argue that these proposals cannot be integrated with a mechanistic framework unless requisite modifications are made.
In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition
relates to time... more In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition
relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl’s account of
intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation
with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of
the other’s harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective
(passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in
the field of social cognition. I argue that these levels of empathy are related with
different levels of intersubjective temporality. By the intersubjective temporality I do
not understand being in the same moment of objective time (so called clock time) but
rather the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of actions. In the
final part, I gather my considerations together and propose a general three-level
framework of intersubjective temporality.
Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presen... more Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is immersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications
W artykule omawiamy na podstawie prac Edmunda Husserla oraz korespondencji z jego uczniem Arnolde... more W artykule omawiamy na podstawie prac Edmunda Husserla oraz korespondencji z jego uczniem Arnoldem Metzgerem wybrane idee fenomenologii, pokazując, jak bardzo radykalny i maksymalistyczny był to projekt, który w skrócie można scharakteryzować jako próbę rozpoczęcia filozofii od nowa. Wychodząc od skrajnie pesymistycznej oceny filozofii i nauki, Husserl opisuje kryzys racjonalności, który dotknął Europę. Rozwiązaniem ma być stworzenie nowej, ściśle naukowej filozofii, czyli fenomenologii. Wedle zamysłów Husserla, miała ona stanowić całkiem nową fundamentalną dyscyplinę naukową dającą podstawę innym naukom, w tym m.in. psychologii. Zadanie, jakie sobie Husserl postawił, wymagało radykalnych środków, dlatego dużą część swoich rozważań poświęcił na opracowanie nowej metody filozoficznej, której celem było m.in. zawieszenie całej uprzednio nabytej wiedzy. Maksymalistyczny projekt Husserla zmagał się z wewnętrznymi ograniczeniami i sprzecznościami, doprowadził jednak do przełomu teoretycznego w filozofii XIX i XX wieku. Cel tak pomyślanej nowej filozofii nie był wyłącznie naukowy, lecz również cywilizacyjny. Fenomenologia miała doprowadzić do odnowy duchowej ludzkości poprzez transformację nauki i odkrycie nieskończonej idei racjonalności leżącej u podstaw kultury europejskiej.
In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental... more In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve this position.
The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein – philosopher and psycholog... more The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein – philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career he developed an original philosophy taken from both phenomenology and Twardowski's analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl's early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein's biography and some general features of his philosophy. The second part provides an overview of Blaustein's dissertation concerning Husserl's early phenomenology. In the third and final part I summarise Blaustein's research including the critical remarks of Roman Ingarden.
In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness a... more In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness and embodiment. However, I do not discuss the Husserlian account of consciousness of time in its full scope. I focus on the
main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily
feelings.
In the first part, I outline the main ideas of Husserl’s early phenomenology of consciousness of time. In the second part, I introduce the phenomenological account of bodily feelings and describe how it evolved in Husserl’s philosophy.
Next, I discuss the idea of bodily self-affection and the affective-kinaesthetic origin of consciousness’ temporal flow. In order to better understand this “pre-phenomenal temporality”, I analyse the dynamics of non-intentional, prereflective bodily self-affection. In the third part, I try to complement Husserl’s account by describing the specific dynamics of bodily experience. In order to do so, I appeal to Daniel Stern’s psychological account of dynamic bodily experience, which he calls the “vitality affect”. I argue that the best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is in terms of the notion of rhythm.
This article concerns the critique of the Husserlian concept of intentionality formulated by Mich... more This article concerns the critique of the Husserlian concept of intentionality formulated by Michel Henry. In the first part author presents phenomenological concept of intentionality and its evolution in Husserl’s thought. The author argues that intentionality is not a simple concept and has many forms. Furthermore Husserl acknowledged non-intentional states of consciousness, especially in affective and emotional phenomena. Second part of the article is devoted to Henry’s critique of the concept of intentionality and its dominance in Husserl’s phenomenology. At the end the author defends Husserl position and argues that Henry didn’t notice variety of Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Moreover these two phenomenological projects, intentional and material (non-intentional) phenomenology are in fact complementary.
Thinking in Dialogue with Humanities. Paths into the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, ed. K. Novotny, S. Hammer, A. Gleonec, P. Specian, ZetaBooks., 2011
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Books by Marek Pokropski
While mechanistic explanatory models are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a new reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops the neurophenomenological approach in the direction of dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that neurophenomenology can deliver dynamical constraints on mechanistic models and thus inform the search for an underlying mechanism.
Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences.
Papers by Marek Pokropski
relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl’s account of
intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation
with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of
the other’s harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective
(passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in
the field of social cognition. I argue that these levels of empathy are related with
different levels of intersubjective temporality. By the intersubjective temporality I do
not understand being in the same moment of objective time (so called clock time) but
rather the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of actions. In the
final part, I gather my considerations together and propose a general three-level
framework of intersubjective temporality.
Fenomenologia miała doprowadzić do odnowy duchowej ludzkości
poprzez transformację nauki i odkrycie nieskończonej idei racjonalności
leżącej u podstaw kultury europejskiej.
main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily
feelings.
In the first part, I outline the main ideas of Husserl’s early phenomenology of consciousness of time. In the second part, I introduce the phenomenological account of bodily feelings and describe how it evolved in Husserl’s philosophy.
Next, I discuss the idea of bodily self-affection and the affective-kinaesthetic origin of consciousness’ temporal flow. In order to better understand this “pre-phenomenal temporality”, I analyse the dynamics of non-intentional, prereflective bodily self-affection. In the third part, I try to complement Husserl’s account by describing the specific dynamics of bodily experience. In order to do so, I appeal to Daniel Stern’s psychological account of dynamic bodily experience, which he calls the “vitality affect”. I argue that the best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is in terms of the notion of rhythm.
While mechanistic explanatory models are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a new reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops the neurophenomenological approach in the direction of dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that neurophenomenology can deliver dynamical constraints on mechanistic models and thus inform the search for an underlying mechanism.
Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences.
relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl’s account of
intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation
with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of
the other’s harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective
(passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in
the field of social cognition. I argue that these levels of empathy are related with
different levels of intersubjective temporality. By the intersubjective temporality I do
not understand being in the same moment of objective time (so called clock time) but
rather the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of actions. In the
final part, I gather my considerations together and propose a general three-level
framework of intersubjective temporality.
Fenomenologia miała doprowadzić do odnowy duchowej ludzkości
poprzez transformację nauki i odkrycie nieskończonej idei racjonalności
leżącej u podstaw kultury europejskiej.
main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily
feelings.
In the first part, I outline the main ideas of Husserl’s early phenomenology of consciousness of time. In the second part, I introduce the phenomenological account of bodily feelings and describe how it evolved in Husserl’s philosophy.
Next, I discuss the idea of bodily self-affection and the affective-kinaesthetic origin of consciousness’ temporal flow. In order to better understand this “pre-phenomenal temporality”, I analyse the dynamics of non-intentional, prereflective bodily self-affection. In the third part, I try to complement Husserl’s account by describing the specific dynamics of bodily experience. In order to do so, I appeal to Daniel Stern’s psychological account of dynamic bodily experience, which he calls the “vitality affect”. I argue that the best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is in terms of the notion of rhythm.