Since August 2018, I am an Assistant Professor with Tenure-Track at the philosophisches Seminar at the University of Zurich. I was awarded my PhD at the University of Geneva, in 2009 (title: “The Metaethics of Beliefs”) and obtained my Habilitation at the University of Fribourg, in 2015 (title: “Epistemic justification”; topic of the public lecture: “Values”). My research specialisation lies at the crossroad between epistemology and ethics/metaethics. I am also the head of ZEGRa, the Zurich Epistemology Research Group on Rationality. https://www.zegra-meylan.com Address: Philosophisches Seminar Zürichbergstrasse 43 8044 Zürich
This paper investigates the relation (if any) between my ignoring a fact and my ignorance of it. ... more This paper investigates the relation (if any) between my ignoring a fact and my ignorance of it. Does my ignoring, say, that my remarks are hurting her feelings hold any tight, necessary, relation with my being ignorant of this fact? This question has some interesting repercussion for a recent discussion between El Kassar (2018) and Peels (2019) regarding how to accommodate two apparently incompatible conceptions of "ignorance"-the stative and the agential conception of ignorance-that are both present in the philosophical literature.
In L. Oliveira and P. Silva (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification, New York, Routledge. , 2021
Philosophers traditionally distinguish between having justification for believing a certain propo... more Philosophers traditionally distinguish between having justification for believing a certain proposition and believing this proposition with justification (Silva and Oliveira, forthcoming). They call the former propositional justification and the latter doxastic justification. The relevance of this distinction is beyond doubt. The difficulty arises when we attempt to describe how these two notions are related. This paper suggests a new way of understanding this relation.
To appear in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are comm... more Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the practically right belief in, at least, some cases of doxastic divergence. Unlike many defences of pragmatism, this paper does not aim to overcome exclusivism (briefly, the view that only epistemic, but not practical, considerations have an influence on what a subject ought to believe). Another major challenge that pragmatism faces is to show that the epistemic and the practical ought to believe are comparable. This article makes a case for their comparability.
It is commonly accepted-not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life-that ign... more It is commonly accepted-not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life-that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This paper shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance-the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account-do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, I suggest an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls "epistemic insouciance".
To appear in: Brill Studies of Scepticism, Special Issue on “Non-Evidentialist Epistemology”, 2019
That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are co... more That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pragmatist stance on scepticism is not necessarily as easily brushed off as some philosophers think.
In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic resp... more In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject's belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
In: Epistemic Pluralism, Coliva A. and Pedersen N. (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2017
This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary ep... more This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?”. Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of section 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways. As we shall see, the careful vindication of the latter claim turns out to be a complex matter.
In: "Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain", McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018
While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly ... more While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative spheres, either providing further support for the approach or highlighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. This paper aims at partially filling this gap.
We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to... more We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes the advantage of preserving, as the consequential conception does, the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm, i.e. with the realm of actions and their consequences. Second, this paper regiments the most important objections to the consequential conception and answers them. The upshot is that there are no serious drawbacks to the consequential conception. There is, therefore, no reason not to favour it over accounts of doxastic responsibility that do not preserve the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm (e.g. Hieronymi 2008, 2009; McHugh 2014, 2015).
In: Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Battaly H. (ed.), New York, Routledge, 2018
This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist’s answer to the classical value p... more This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist’s answer to the classical value problems of knowledge. According to this solution, knowledge is a better cognitive state than what falls short of it —viz. mere true and true+Gettierized beliefs—because when a subject knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the “new” value problem, that is to say, the problem of explaining why some higher form of knowledge —what Sosa calls full knowledge— is better than some lower form of knowledge, viz. Sosa’s animal knowledge. The basic problem for Sosa is that, when a subject fully knows, it is not necessarily the case that she deserves more credit than when she has animal knowledge.
In: "Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind", Carter A., Gordon E., Jarvis B. (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2017
The New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) is probably the most serious objection that the upholders of a ... more The New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) is probably the most serious objection that the upholders of a knowledge-first epistemology face. The general format of the solution that several of them (Littlejohn 2009, forthcoming; Weatherson 2008; Williamson forthcoming) have given to this problem is as follows: only the good-case beliefs are justified. The norm satisfied by the bad-case beliefs is not the norm of justification. The purpose of this contribution is to buttress this reply by showing that it is in fact supported by the ordinary concept of justification.
We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of thei... more We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of their having investigated some matter thoroughly, or, in the case of blame, for having failed to investigate it or, for carelessly or insufficiently investigating. For instance, physicists who, after years of toil, uncover some unknown fact about our universe, are praised for what they come to know, Sometimes, in contrast, we blame and may even despise our friends for being ignorant of certain ecological facts as a result of their refusing to countenance the evidence. The purpose of this paper is to explore what underlies the legitimacy of this practice – the praise or blame of people for what they know or fail to know as a result of investigation or otherwise – namely, the ability to exercise control over one’s doxastic states, and, in particular, as I will argue, one’s ability to exercise indirect generic control over one’s doxastic states.
This article raises a worry concerning Sosa’s way of solving the problem of epistemic circularity... more This article raises a worry concerning Sosa’s way of solving the problem of epistemic circularity. Sosa’s solution to the problem of epistemic circularity relies on the following claim of sufficiency: for S to deserve to be credited for his true belief, it is sufficient that his belief is, in a sense to be made clear, ‘apt’. I argue that this solution undersells the notion of credit. I present three kinds of cases in which the attribution of credit to a believer requires more than the possession of apt beliefs and I defend these cases against possible misinterpretations.
The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of kn... more The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the credit solution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowl- edge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the al- ready existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most im- portant conclusion is that credit value is not—contrary to what the upholders of the credit solution have frequently claimed—final value.
The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phe- nomena – feelings l... more The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phe- nomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epis- temic emotions” in fact constitute a uni ed kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, rst, as an emotion, and, second, as an epistemic one. The paper is structured accordingly. The rst part is devoted to the question whether the aforementioned affective phenomena really are emotions, while the second part bears on their hypothetical common epistemicity.
This paper investigates the relation (if any) between my ignoring a fact and my ignorance of it. ... more This paper investigates the relation (if any) between my ignoring a fact and my ignorance of it. Does my ignoring, say, that my remarks are hurting her feelings hold any tight, necessary, relation with my being ignorant of this fact? This question has some interesting repercussion for a recent discussion between El Kassar (2018) and Peels (2019) regarding how to accommodate two apparently incompatible conceptions of "ignorance"-the stative and the agential conception of ignorance-that are both present in the philosophical literature.
In L. Oliveira and P. Silva (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification, New York, Routledge. , 2021
Philosophers traditionally distinguish between having justification for believing a certain propo... more Philosophers traditionally distinguish between having justification for believing a certain proposition and believing this proposition with justification (Silva and Oliveira, forthcoming). They call the former propositional justification and the latter doxastic justification. The relevance of this distinction is beyond doubt. The difficulty arises when we attempt to describe how these two notions are related. This paper suggests a new way of understanding this relation.
To appear in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are comm... more Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the practically right belief in, at least, some cases of doxastic divergence. Unlike many defences of pragmatism, this paper does not aim to overcome exclusivism (briefly, the view that only epistemic, but not practical, considerations have an influence on what a subject ought to believe). Another major challenge that pragmatism faces is to show that the epistemic and the practical ought to believe are comparable. This article makes a case for their comparability.
It is commonly accepted-not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life-that ign... more It is commonly accepted-not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life-that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This paper shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance-the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account-do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, I suggest an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls "epistemic insouciance".
To appear in: Brill Studies of Scepticism, Special Issue on “Non-Evidentialist Epistemology”, 2019
That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are co... more That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pragmatist stance on scepticism is not necessarily as easily brushed off as some philosophers think.
In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic resp... more In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject's belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
In: Epistemic Pluralism, Coliva A. and Pedersen N. (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2017
This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary ep... more This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?”. Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of section 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways. As we shall see, the careful vindication of the latter claim turns out to be a complex matter.
In: "Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain", McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018
While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly ... more While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative spheres, either providing further support for the approach or highlighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. This paper aims at partially filling this gap.
We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to... more We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes the advantage of preserving, as the consequential conception does, the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm, i.e. with the realm of actions and their consequences. Second, this paper regiments the most important objections to the consequential conception and answers them. The upshot is that there are no serious drawbacks to the consequential conception. There is, therefore, no reason not to favour it over accounts of doxastic responsibility that do not preserve the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm (e.g. Hieronymi 2008, 2009; McHugh 2014, 2015).
In: Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Battaly H. (ed.), New York, Routledge, 2018
This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist’s answer to the classical value p... more This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist’s answer to the classical value problems of knowledge. According to this solution, knowledge is a better cognitive state than what falls short of it —viz. mere true and true+Gettierized beliefs—because when a subject knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the “new” value problem, that is to say, the problem of explaining why some higher form of knowledge —what Sosa calls full knowledge— is better than some lower form of knowledge, viz. Sosa’s animal knowledge. The basic problem for Sosa is that, when a subject fully knows, it is not necessarily the case that she deserves more credit than when she has animal knowledge.
In: "Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind", Carter A., Gordon E., Jarvis B. (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2017
The New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) is probably the most serious objection that the upholders of a ... more The New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) is probably the most serious objection that the upholders of a knowledge-first epistemology face. The general format of the solution that several of them (Littlejohn 2009, forthcoming; Weatherson 2008; Williamson forthcoming) have given to this problem is as follows: only the good-case beliefs are justified. The norm satisfied by the bad-case beliefs is not the norm of justification. The purpose of this contribution is to buttress this reply by showing that it is in fact supported by the ordinary concept of justification.
We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of thei... more We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of their having investigated some matter thoroughly, or, in the case of blame, for having failed to investigate it or, for carelessly or insufficiently investigating. For instance, physicists who, after years of toil, uncover some unknown fact about our universe, are praised for what they come to know, Sometimes, in contrast, we blame and may even despise our friends for being ignorant of certain ecological facts as a result of their refusing to countenance the evidence. The purpose of this paper is to explore what underlies the legitimacy of this practice – the praise or blame of people for what they know or fail to know as a result of investigation or otherwise – namely, the ability to exercise control over one’s doxastic states, and, in particular, as I will argue, one’s ability to exercise indirect generic control over one’s doxastic states.
This article raises a worry concerning Sosa’s way of solving the problem of epistemic circularity... more This article raises a worry concerning Sosa’s way of solving the problem of epistemic circularity. Sosa’s solution to the problem of epistemic circularity relies on the following claim of sufficiency: for S to deserve to be credited for his true belief, it is sufficient that his belief is, in a sense to be made clear, ‘apt’. I argue that this solution undersells the notion of credit. I present three kinds of cases in which the attribution of credit to a believer requires more than the possession of apt beliefs and I defend these cases against possible misinterpretations.
The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of kn... more The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the credit solution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowl- edge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the al- ready existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most im- portant conclusion is that credit value is not—contrary to what the upholders of the credit solution have frequently claimed—final value.
The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phe- nomena – feelings l... more The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phe- nomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epis- temic emotions” in fact constitute a uni ed kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, rst, as an emotion, and, second, as an epistemic one. The paper is structured accordingly. The rst part is devoted to the question whether the aforementioned affective phenomena really are emotions, while the second part bears on their hypothetical common epistemicity.
Proceedings of the Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy, CEUR-WS Proceedings, 2007
A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true b... more A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation (ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer (ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives birth to ERA +, a better formulation of ERA. Then, I raise two objections against ERA+. The first objection shows that the truth of the reliabilist answer requires the conception of a specific theory of instrumental value. In the second objection, I present an example in order to show that ERA+ actually fails to explain why it is better to possess knowledge than a mere true belief.
Philosophiques, special issue devoted to Ch. Tappolet’s book : Emotions, Values, and Agency, Oxford University Press, 2018
A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons... more A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons, des textures, etc. les émotions nous présentent des propriétés évaluatives. Ainsi, les émotions constituent un type d’expérience perceptuelle spécifique, un type qui nous donne accès à des valeurs (plutôt qu’à des propriétés non axiologiques). Cette théorie d’origine meinongienne doit beaucoup Christine Tappolet qui y consacre un second livre Emotions, Values and Agency que tous les amoureux des choses vraiment bien faites ne pourront qu’apprécier. Cet article est consacré à deux problèmes auxquels est confronté le partisan de la théorie perceptuelle des émotions, c’est-à-dire, de la théorie selon laquelle les émotions constituent un type spécifique d’expériences perceptuelles. Ce sont les problèmes de la justification et de la rationalité des émotions. Loin d’ignorer ces difficultés, Tappolet y consacre une partie de son premier chapitre (pages 31-45). Cette contribution a plus précisément deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer pourquoi la justification ne pose pas un problème aussi sérieux que la rationalité à la théorie perceptuelle des émotions. Son second but est d’expliquer pourquoi je doute que la solution de Tappolet au problème de la rationalité fonctionne.
Cette contribution a deux objectifs principaux. Le premier est de montrer que les intuitions sont... more Cette contribution a deux objectifs principaux. Le premier est de montrer que les intuitions sont caractérisées par, ce que j’appellerai «une capacité rationnelle», c’est-à-dire, qu’elles sont susceptibles d’être évaluées sur le plan de leur rationalité et de leur irrationalité. Le second objectif de cet article est d’étayer l’hypothèse selon laquelle les intuitions seraient des états affectifs proches des émotions —et non pas des états doxastiques ou des expériences perceptuelles— en montrant qu’une telle conception affective des intuitions est seule capable de rendre compte de (i) la spécificité phénoménologique, de (ii) la modularité et de (iii) la capacité rationnelle des intuitions.
In: "Croit-on comme on veut? Histoire d'une controverse", Jaffro L. (éd.), 2013
Sommes-nous, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de nos croyances ? Une chose est sûre, en p... more Sommes-nous, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de nos croyances ? Une chose est sûre, en pratique, nous considérons souvent que tel est le cas. Mais l’attribution d’une telle responsabilité est problématique dans la mesure où les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous contrôlons comme nous contrôlons, par exemple, nos actions. Cet article est consacré à préciser, à expliquer et à défendre l’affirmation selon laquelle les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous pouvons acquérir « à volonté » . Dans un deuxième temps, nous expliquons brièvement pourquoi la vérité de cette affirmation n’empêche pas que nous soyons, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de ce que nous croyons.
In: "Connaître. Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine", Chevalier J.M. et Gaultier B. (eds.), 2014
Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justifica... more Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’une part de présenter ces deux réponses, d’autre part, d’expliquer pourquoi ce prétendu antagonisme n’en est pas un. Le plan est le suivant. La première partie de ce chapitre est consacrée à distinguer les croyances testimoniales des croyances perceptuelles (section 1. et 1.1). Dans la seconde partie (section 2 à 2.3), nous présentons la réponse réductionniste et la réponse non-réductionniste ainsi que quelques-unes des objections les plus importantes adressées à chacune d’elles. La troisième partie explique pourquoi le prétendu antagonisme entre le réductionnisme et le non-réductionnisme n’en est pas un en exploitant ce que nous appelons « la thèse du malentendu » (3 à 3.2).
L’objectif de cet article est de clarifier les relations qu’entretiennent trois théories de la ju... more L’objectif de cet article est de clarifier les relations qu’entretiennent trois théories de la justification des croyances, toutes considérées comme des théories internalistes 1 : la conception déontique (le déontologisme), la conception accessibiliste (l’accessibilisme) et la conception mentaliste (le mentalisme). Nous expliquerons qu’en dépit de ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue l’adoption de l’accessibilisme n’implique pas celle du mentalisme. Dans un second temps, nous montrerons pourquoi on ne peut être un défenseur de la conception déontique de la justification sans être également un partisan de l’accessibilisme.2 L’intérêt de ces démonstrations réside principalement dans le fait qu’elles nous permettent de délier —ou, au contraire d’unir— le sort de ces différentes conceptions de la justification vis- à-vis des objections qui leur sont adressées. Faire la preuve de l’autonomie du mentalisme vis- à-vis de l’accessibilisme, par exemple, c’est établir l’immunité du premier vis-à-vis des objections que l’on peut faire au second. L’examen proprement dit des relations qui rattachent ces trois conceptions internalistes de la justification occupe les sections 4 et 5. Les sections 1, 2 et 3 sont des sections introductives. Elles sont, pour leur part, consacrées à la description de ces conceptions.
Il existe plusieurs façons de mettre en doute ce que nous tenons pour vrai, c’est-à-dire ce que n... more Il existe plusieurs façons de mettre en doute ce que nous tenons pour vrai, c’est-à-dire ce que nous croyons. Tout d’abord, nous pouvons, évidemment, nous demander si ces croyances sont vraies. Une autre manière cruciale d’évaluer le mérite de nos croyances consiste à nous interroger sur leur justification. Autrement dit, quelle que soit leur vérité ou leur fausseté, sommes-nous justifiés à entretenir les croyances en question? Et, plus fondamentalement, qu’est-ce qu’être justifié à croire? Dans Qu’est-ce que la justification?, je tente de répondre à cette question philosophique primordiale en insistant, entre autres, sur le lien essentiel qui rattache le concept de justification à la notion de raison.
In the course of our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving ab... more In the course of our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand too that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The same is true in the case of certain beliefs. Sometimes we blame people for what they believe falsely or irrationally. On occasion, we praise them for their intellectual discoveries. The goal of the present study is to describe the foundations which allow for these kinds of judgments. If you think that people are not always forgivable for what they believe, you will find in this book the resources to defend this thought.
A volume of more than fifty papers on various topics edited on the occasion of Pascal Engel's six... more A volume of more than fifty papers on various topics edited on the occasion of Pascal Engel's sixtieth birthday.
Certain beliefs or judgements are indisputably irrational. When a victim of the Capgras delusion ... more Certain beliefs or judgements are indisputably irrational. When a victim of the Capgras delusion “believes” that her husband has been replaced by an impostor, her belief is definitely irrational. But irrationality is not confined to mental illness. Self-deception, wishful thinking, and denial are widespread, non-pathological cognitive phenomena that are also irrational. People in perfect mental health deceive themselves about their chances of winning the lottery, the intellectual talents of their kids, the fidelity of their husbands/wives, the probability that they receive a salary increase, etc. In short, mentally healthy people hold irrational beliefs in diverse kinds of circumstance. Do these various irrational beliefs have something in common? Is there anything that makes them all irrational? As its name suggests, the general purpose of the project “Irrationality” is to answer these questions and to offer, thereby, a philosophical account of cognitive irrationality.
Various affective phenomena —e.g. intellectual courage, astonishment, curiosity, interest, wonder... more Various affective phenomena —e.g. intellectual courage, astonishment, curiosity, interest, wonder, surprise, the feeling of certainty, the feeling of doubt, the fear of the unknown, misology, the joy of verification, the feeling of knowing— have been labelled “epistemic emotions or feelings”. As indicated by its title, the general purpose of this project is to consider the nature and the roles of the so-called “epistemic emotions or feelings”. It is, accordingly, divided into main parts that are further subdivided into four research modules. The first part is dedicated to investigating the affective (module 1) and the epistemic (module 2) nature of the so-called “epistemic emotions” and “epistemic feelings”. The second part looks at the causal (module 3) and justificatory (module 4) roles that the now accurately delineated epistemic emotions could play in our epistemic activities. The intended research would rely on studies into particular epistemic emotions or feelings already carried out by psychologists and cognitive scientists and by philosophers writing on emotions general
The thesis defended is that at a certain arbitrary level of granularity, mountains have sharp, bo... more The thesis defended is that at a certain arbitrary level of granularity, mountains have sharp, bona fide boundaries. In reply to arguments advanced by Varzi (2001), Smith & Mark (2001, 2003) I argue that the lower limit of a mountain is neither vague nor fiat. Relying on early works by Cayley (1859), Maxwell (1870) and Jordan (1872), this lower limit consists in the lines of watercourse which are defined as the lines of slope starting at passes. Such lines are metaphysically sharply delineated although they are not always easy to get at when facing a mountain. Hence, the indetermination is only epistemic. In the second part of the paper, I try to combine this claim about the lower limit of a mountain with more recent claims advanced by alpinists on the right way to measure the height of a mountain, so as to capture its topographic prominence. I argue following them that the proper height of a mountain is the difference of altitude between its summit and its key-saddle, defined as the highest saddle one needs to cross in order to reach the closest higher summit. Combining this two plausible views about the lower limit and height of a mountain leads to the surprising result that the key-saddle needed to measure the height of a mountain is not necessarily located on the lower-boundary of that mountain
COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be... more COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be the best way to get us out of the COVID-19 pandemic. And yet many people believe that they should not be vaccinated even though they are dissatisfied with the current situation. In this paper, we analyse COVID-19 vaccine refusal with the tools of contemporary philosophical theories of responsibility and rationality. The main outcome of this analysis is that many vaccine-refusers are responsible for the belief that they should not be vaccinated and epistemically rational in holding it. This is an important result because it provides insights into the legitimacy of certain public health policies. In particular, this result shows that a public health policy that would abandon the project of convincing certain vaccine-refusers with reasonse.g., by simply making vaccination compulsoryis prima facie illegitimate.
The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. ... more The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.
Philosophers traditionally distinguish between having justification for believing a certain propo... more Philosophers traditionally distinguish between having justification for believing a certain proposition and believing this proposition with justification (Silva and Oliveira, forthcoming). They call the former propositional justification and the latter doxastic justification. The relevance of this distinction is beyond doubt. The difficulty arises when we attempt to describe how these two notions are related. This paper suggests a new way of understanding this relation.
While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly ... more While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative spheres, either providing further support for the approach or highlighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. This chapter aims at partially filling this gap.
The knowledge-first solution to the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) goes hand in hand with a partic... more The knowledge-first solution to the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) goes hand in hand with a particular conception of the normativity of justification, one according to which a justified belief is one that satisfies some sort of “ought” or “should” This claim is incompatible with another, well-accepted view regarding the normativity of justification. According to this established view, a justified belief is rather something that is neither obligatory, nor forbidden. This chapter attempts to settle the debate between these two irreconcilable conceptions of the normativity of justification. The main upshot is that the knowledge-first conception of the normativity of justification—the one on which the knowledge-first solution to the NEDP relies—seems in fact superior.
This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary ep... more This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?” Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of Sect. 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways.
The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phenomena – feelings lik... more The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phenomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epistemic emotions” in fact constitute a unified kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, first, as an emotion, and, second, as an epistemic one. The paper is structured accordingly. The first part is devoted to the question whether the aforementioned affective phenomena really are emotions, while the second part bears on their hypothetical common epistemicity.
It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ... more It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.
Cette contribution a deux objectifs principaux. Le premier est de montrer que les intuitions sont... more Cette contribution a deux objectifs principaux. Le premier est de montrer que les intuitions sont caractérisées par ce que j’appellerai « une capacité rationnelle », c’est-à-dire, qu’elles sont susceptibles d’être évaluées quant à leur rationalité ou leur irrationalité. Le second objectif de cet article est d’étayer l’hypothèse selon laquelle les intuitions seraient des états affectifs proches des émotions — et non pas des états doxastiques ou des expériences perceptuelles —, en montrant qu’une telle conception affective des intuitions est seule capable de rendre compte de (i) la spécificité phénoménologique, (ii) la modularité, et (iii) la capacité rationnelle des intuitions.
We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to... more We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes the advantage of preserving, as the consequential conception does, the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm, i.e. with the realm of actions and their consequences. Second, this paper regiments the most important objections to the consequential conception and answers them. The upshot is that there are no serious drawbacks to the consequential conception. There is, therefore, no reason not to favour it over accounts of doxastic responsibility that do not preserve the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm (e.g. Hieronymi 2008, 2009; McHugh 2014, 2015).
We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of thei... more We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of their having investigated some matter thoroughly, or, in the case of blame, for having failed to investigate it, or for carelessly or insufficiently investigating. For instance, physicists who, after years of toil, uncover some unknown fact about our universe are praised for what they come to know. Sometimes, in contrast, we blame and may even despise our friends for being ignorant of certain ecological facts as a result of their refusing to countenance the evidence. The purpose of this paper is to explore what underlies the legitimacy of this practice—the praise or blame of people for what they know or fail to know as a result of investigation or otherwise—namely, the ability to exercise control over one’s doxastic states, and, in particular, as I will argue, one’s ability to exercise indirect generic control over one’s doxastic states
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Papers in English by Anne Meylan
Cet article est consacré à deux problèmes auxquels est confronté le partisan de la théorie perceptuelle des émotions, c’est-à-dire, de la théorie selon laquelle les émotions constituent un type spécifique d’expériences perceptuelles. Ce sont les problèmes de la justification et de la rationalité des émotions. Loin d’ignorer ces difficultés, Tappolet y consacre une partie de son premier chapitre (pages 31-45).
Cette contribution a plus précisément deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer pourquoi la justification ne pose pas un problème aussi sérieux que la rationalité à la théorie perceptuelle des émotions. Son second but est d’expliquer pourquoi je doute que la solution de Tappolet au problème de la rationalité fonctionne.
Le plan est le suivant. La première partie de ce chapitre est consacrée à distinguer les croyances testimoniales des croyances perceptuelles (section 1. et 1.1). Dans la seconde partie (section 2 à 2.3), nous présentons la réponse réductionniste et la réponse non-réductionniste ainsi que quelques-unes des objections les plus importantes adressées à chacune d’elles. La troisième partie explique pourquoi le prétendu antagonisme entre le réductionnisme et le non-réductionnisme n’en est pas un en exploitant ce que nous appelons « la thèse du malentendu » (3 à 3.2).
L’examen proprement dit des relations qui rattachent ces trois conceptions internalistes de la justification occupe les sections 4 et 5. Les sections 1, 2 et 3 sont des sections introductives. Elles sont, pour leur part, consacrées à la description de ces conceptions.
The first part is dedicated to investigating the affective (module 1) and the epistemic (module 2) nature of the so-called “epistemic emotions” and “epistemic feelings”.
The second part looks at the causal (module 3) and justificatory (module 4) roles that the now accurately delineated epistemic emotions could play in our epistemic activities.
The intended research would rely on studies into particular epistemic emotions or feelings already carried out by psychologists and cognitive scientists and by philosophers writing on emotions general