Most of my research concerns connections between ethics and epistemology. One of my ongoing projects defends the view that there is moral encroachment in epistemology. A second looks into the ethics and epistemology of disagreement.
In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to h... more In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to be friendly to my view; it can help them explain why it can be unfitting to hold on to hope and worry in the face of overwhelming evidence, and it can also help them explain the sense in which knowledge that p and hope that –p are in tension with one another.
Most agree that, in some special scenarios, prudence can speak against feeling a fitting emotion.... more Most agree that, in some special scenarios, prudence can speak against feeling a fitting emotion. Some go further, arguing that the tension between fittingness and prudence afflicts some emotions in a fairly general way. (Perhaps, for instance, it’s best for human well-being that we generally grieve much less than is fitting.) This paper goes even further: it argues that, when it comes to anxiety, the tension between fittingness and prudence is nearly inescapable. On any plausible theory, an enormous array of possible outcomes are both bad and epistemically uncertain in the right way to ground fitting anxiety. What’s more, the fittingness of an emotion is a demanding, not a permissive, normative status. So the norms of fitting emotion demand a great deal of anxiety. For almost any realistic agent, it would be deeply imprudent to feel anxiety in a way that meets the demands set by norms of fitting emotion.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2021
This paper provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant facto... more This paper provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain 'high-stakes' cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and on the nature of the normative judgments involved therein, impurists gain a powerful new way to frame a core challenge for purism. They also gain insight about the way in which impurism is true: my argument motivates the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology.
Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some mor... more Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to epistemic rationality. To date, almost all proponents of radical moral encroachment hold to an asymmetry thesis: the moral encroaches on rational belief, but not on rational credence. In this paper, we argue against the asymmetry thesis; we show that, insofar as one accepts the most prominent arguments for radical moral encroachment on belief, one should likewise accept radical moral encroachment on credence. We outline and reject potential attempts to establish a basis for asymmetry between the attitude types. Then, we explore the merits and demerits of the two available responses to our symmetry claim: (i) embracing moral encroachment on credence and (ii) denying moral encroachment on belief.
Moral considerations have recently been creeping into epistemology. According to the view that th... more Moral considerations have recently been creeping into epistemology. According to the view that there is moral encroachment in epistemology, whether a person has knowledge of p sometimes depends on moral considerations, including even ones that do not bear on the truth or likelihood of p. Defenders of moral encroachment face a central challenge: they must explain why they moral considerations they cite, unlike moral bribes for belief, are reasons of the right kind for belief (or withheld belief). This paper distinguishes between a moderate and a radical version of moral encroachment. It shows that, while defenders of moderate moral encroachment are well-placed to meet the central challenge, defenders of radical moral encroachment are not. The core problem for radical moral encroachment is that it cannot, without taking on unacceptable costs, forge the right sort of connection between the moral badness of a belief and that belief's chance of being false.
This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as
epistemically hopeless. To regard a per... more This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up this stance, I argue, depends on a number of factors—perhaps most interestingly, it depends on the choices that one faces (or is likely to face). I close the paper by arguing against the view that there are standing moral reasons against regarding others as epistemically hopeless.
On an impurist approach to epistemology, whether a person knows that p can vary with normative fa... more On an impurist approach to epistemology, whether a person knows that p can vary with normative facts about her actions-including facts that do not bear on whether p is true. This paper presents a challenge to impurists: they must specify which of the many norms on action are distinctively connected to knowledge, and they must explain why. To the extent that contemporary impurists address this challenge, they do so by citing norms of 'practical rationality.' I show that, on any theory of practical rationality, this approach leads to unacceptable results. Contemporary impurists, then, are in trouble. I conclude the paper by sketching three ways that the impurist might attempt to get out of trouble. The most promising of these approaches appeals to the social role played by certain norms on action.
This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliati... more This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents' moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial questions about how to think about the subject matter of a dispute. Second, conciliationists can individuate disputes widely. This allows them to argue that we lack dispute-independent reason to trust our opponents' moral judgment. But such arguments fail; our background of generally shared moral beliefs gives us good reason to trust the moral judgment of our opponents, even after we set quite a bit of our reasoning aside. On either approach, then, conciliationists should acknowledge that we have dispute-independent reason to trust the judgment of those who reject our moral beliefs. Given a conciliationist view of disagreement's epistemic role, this has the unattractive result that we are epistemically required to revise some of our most intuitively secure moral beliefs.
Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustain... more Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others' moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement.
Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and fea... more Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This paper argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.
In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to h... more In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to be friendly to my view; it can help them explain why it can be unfitting to hold on to hope and worry in the face of overwhelming evidence, and it can also help them explain the sense in which knowledge that p and hope that –p are in tension with one another.
Most agree that, in some special scenarios, prudence can speak against feeling a fitting emotion.... more Most agree that, in some special scenarios, prudence can speak against feeling a fitting emotion. Some go further, arguing that the tension between fittingness and prudence afflicts some emotions in a fairly general way. (Perhaps, for instance, it’s best for human well-being that we generally grieve much less than is fitting.) This paper goes even further: it argues that, when it comes to anxiety, the tension between fittingness and prudence is nearly inescapable. On any plausible theory, an enormous array of possible outcomes are both bad and epistemically uncertain in the right way to ground fitting anxiety. What’s more, the fittingness of an emotion is a demanding, not a permissive, normative status. So the norms of fitting emotion demand a great deal of anxiety. For almost any realistic agent, it would be deeply imprudent to feel anxiety in a way that meets the demands set by norms of fitting emotion.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2021
This paper provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant facto... more This paper provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain 'high-stakes' cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and on the nature of the normative judgments involved therein, impurists gain a powerful new way to frame a core challenge for purism. They also gain insight about the way in which impurism is true: my argument motivates the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology.
Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some mor... more Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to epistemic rationality. To date, almost all proponents of radical moral encroachment hold to an asymmetry thesis: the moral encroaches on rational belief, but not on rational credence. In this paper, we argue against the asymmetry thesis; we show that, insofar as one accepts the most prominent arguments for radical moral encroachment on belief, one should likewise accept radical moral encroachment on credence. We outline and reject potential attempts to establish a basis for asymmetry between the attitude types. Then, we explore the merits and demerits of the two available responses to our symmetry claim: (i) embracing moral encroachment on credence and (ii) denying moral encroachment on belief.
Moral considerations have recently been creeping into epistemology. According to the view that th... more Moral considerations have recently been creeping into epistemology. According to the view that there is moral encroachment in epistemology, whether a person has knowledge of p sometimes depends on moral considerations, including even ones that do not bear on the truth or likelihood of p. Defenders of moral encroachment face a central challenge: they must explain why they moral considerations they cite, unlike moral bribes for belief, are reasons of the right kind for belief (or withheld belief). This paper distinguishes between a moderate and a radical version of moral encroachment. It shows that, while defenders of moderate moral encroachment are well-placed to meet the central challenge, defenders of radical moral encroachment are not. The core problem for radical moral encroachment is that it cannot, without taking on unacceptable costs, forge the right sort of connection between the moral badness of a belief and that belief's chance of being false.
This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as
epistemically hopeless. To regard a per... more This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up this stance, I argue, depends on a number of factors—perhaps most interestingly, it depends on the choices that one faces (or is likely to face). I close the paper by arguing against the view that there are standing moral reasons against regarding others as epistemically hopeless.
On an impurist approach to epistemology, whether a person knows that p can vary with normative fa... more On an impurist approach to epistemology, whether a person knows that p can vary with normative facts about her actions-including facts that do not bear on whether p is true. This paper presents a challenge to impurists: they must specify which of the many norms on action are distinctively connected to knowledge, and they must explain why. To the extent that contemporary impurists address this challenge, they do so by citing norms of 'practical rationality.' I show that, on any theory of practical rationality, this approach leads to unacceptable results. Contemporary impurists, then, are in trouble. I conclude the paper by sketching three ways that the impurist might attempt to get out of trouble. The most promising of these approaches appeals to the social role played by certain norms on action.
This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliati... more This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents' moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial questions about how to think about the subject matter of a dispute. Second, conciliationists can individuate disputes widely. This allows them to argue that we lack dispute-independent reason to trust our opponents' moral judgment. But such arguments fail; our background of generally shared moral beliefs gives us good reason to trust the moral judgment of our opponents, even after we set quite a bit of our reasoning aside. On either approach, then, conciliationists should acknowledge that we have dispute-independent reason to trust the judgment of those who reject our moral beliefs. Given a conciliationist view of disagreement's epistemic role, this has the unattractive result that we are epistemically required to revise some of our most intuitively secure moral beliefs.
Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustain... more Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others' moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement.
Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and fea... more Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This paper argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.
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Journal Articles by James Fritz
epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless
with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth
of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically
hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral
implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of
giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up
this stance, I argue, depends on a number of factors—perhaps most
interestingly, it depends on the choices that one faces (or is likely to
face). I close the paper by arguing against the view that there are
standing moral reasons against regarding others as epistemically
hopeless.
epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless
with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth
of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically
hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral
implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of
giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up
this stance, I argue, depends on a number of factors—perhaps most
interestingly, it depends on the choices that one faces (or is likely to
face). I close the paper by arguing against the view that there are
standing moral reasons against regarding others as epistemically
hopeless.