I am currently exploring how enactivist models of embodied cognition can inform aesthetics understood as a critical engagement with artworks and forms of life, especially those associated with music and motion pictures.
We really begin to think when we do not know what to think. When we know what to think, we are ce... more We really begin to think when we do not know what to think. When we know what to think, we are certainly thinking, but it is distinctly different from what and how we think when we do not know what to think. It is not rare that we do not know what to think. At any time, we can be taken aback by something that is unfamiliar, maybe only momentarily so, and while this can lead us quickly to the comfort of what we know, to what we know to think, the experience can also linger, leading us to think without knowing what to think. In the latter case, especially when what we experience is not just unfamiliar or new to us but quite captivating or strange, what we think and how we think, because we do not know what to think, is colored by uncertainty: we do not know what to think or whether we will ever know what to think. When we know what to think, thinking is more like following a rule.1 This is true even where we are only momentarily at a loss for what to think. In those cases, comparable to cases where we know what to think, we search for the rule that applies to situations like it which we have confronted before. Perhaps we consult another rule that measures the similarity of the unfamiliar with what we know we know. Having found it, we apply the rule, and the result is ordinarily the hoped for resolution of the perceived difficulty and a return to the certainty of knowing what to think. When we do not know what to think, it appears that there is no rule that will resolve the difficulty we confront. Perhaps it happens, as in cases like those just described, that we just need to learn a rule we do not already know. Having learned the new rule and applying it to the situation in front of us, we have the impression that we know what to think; it is another case of following a rule. It may also turn out that we already know the rule but its application is not immediately obvious to us. When we realize the relevance of the rule we know, and apply it, we know what to think, and we are, once again, following a rule. When we do not know what to think, it is not always a matter of learning the rule or of ascertaining the relevance of the appropriate rule. Sometimes it is the case that there just is no rule, and because there is no rule, we are made to think, really think about the situation we confront. This situation is the one we may face in encounters with certain works of art, specific artworks for the appreciation of which no rule applies or for which the application of a rule seems not entirely appropriate. In fact, encounters with artworks are often valued precisely for the challenge they present to our rule-bound ways of thinking.2 What I have in mind is nothing like what Martin Heidegger may have been after when he asked " Was heisst Denken, " what is called or calls for thinking?3 What and how we think when we do not know what to think is not the essence of thinking, what thinking really is. It is a kind of thinking we do when we confront situations or engage certain objects, especially certain artworks, which make us think
This book advances an enactivist aesthetics through the study of inscrutable artworks that challe... more This book advances an enactivist aesthetics through the study of inscrutable artworks that challenge us to think because we do not know what to think about them. John M. Carvalho presents detailed analyses a four artworks that share this unique characteristic: Francis Bacon’s Study After Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1953), the photographs of Duane Michals, based on a retrospective of his work, Storyteller, at the Carnegie Museum of Art (2014), Étant donnés (1968) by Marcel Duchamp, and Jean-Luc Godard’s 1963 film Le Mépris (released in the United States as Contempt). Carvalho argues against the application of theory to derive appreciation or meaning from these artistic works. Rather, each study enacts an embodied cognitive engagement with the specific artworks intended to demonstrate the value of thinking about artworks that might be extended to our engagement with the world in general. This thinking happens, as these studies show, when we trust our embodied skills and their guide to what artworks and the world around us afford for the activation and refinement of those skills. Thinking with Images will be of interest to scholars working in the philosophy of art and philosophical aesthetics, as well as art historians concerned with the meaning and value of contemporary art.
In this essay, I account for what we mean by old, what it means to grow old, and what we might me... more In this essay, I account for what we mean by old, what it means to grow old, and what we might mean by a shared achievement in the case of growing old together. I turn to the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz for some early insights on the shared time embodied in growing older together and how a ‘werelationship’ shored up by this temporal structure is the foundation for constituting the social world. I follow Schutz’s attempt to use this temporality to describe the case of making music together and conclude that what Schutz calls growing older together is not the same as growing old together which is necessarily embodied in a way his account of making music together is not. I give an embodied, enactivist account of making music together as a performance and, drawing on recent work by Shaun Gallagher, offer an aesthetics of growing old together as a performance enacted by individuals whose intimate engagements in that performance accomplish the shared achievement of growing old together.
We all know "love at first sight," but few of us have experienced it. It is a rare thing, and hig... more We all know "love at first sight," but few of us have experienced it. It is a rare thing, and highly prized, in part, because it is so rare. "Love at first sight" deserves its prize because, when it works, when it is true, when it is more than a fleeting fascination or, later, a glorified memory of something that might have been, it lasts a lifetime and, in that lifetime, it intensifies and grows. That something so lasting could be sparked in an instant is remarkable, all the more so because the resources available for igniting the intensity and nurturing the growth of the love we have at first sight are themselves rare, random coincidences of multiple, fortuitous embodiments of heretofore unknown feelings emerging in special, unprecedented and lasting ways. Love at first sight, on this telling, is truly rare and the "true love" embodied in it, nothing like the tired cliché. But does "true love" only flourish in a unique confluence of causes that in rare cases leads to love at first sight? If that were true, interest in these happy accidents would be esoteric and of no value to anyone: we will not find true love by modeling our own lives on these exceptions. Something might be gained, however, by considering cases of "falling in love," more common but not at all routine, a falling, decidedly not on first sight, that takes time and makes it worth the time. We might find that the truly rare cases of "love at first sight" are highly concentrated instances of the more common but not yet regular cases of "falling in love" comparable to the way, say, John Dewey thought artworks were highly refined enactments of the generally aesthetic quality of everyday experience. In the spirit of Dewey, I offer an aesthetics of the everyday experience of falling in love that alone can capture the rich texture of affects that spark and fuel the enactment of the true love in that falling. Only an aesthetics of the experience of falling in love can capture its general affectivity. Only an aesthetics can interpret the signs of the falling and anticipate the goal of that falling, namely, the enactment of true love. An aesthetics can also evaluate the achievement of that goal and measure the commitments pledged to accomplish the goal. An aesthetics of falling in love, finally, will temper the tendency to take love romantically as most prescient in its immediacy. It will give us a thick picture of love mediated by bodies and circumstances and by the skills bodies use to navigate those circumstances in the course of falling in love.
I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comme... more I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comments and challenging observations about it. I especially want to thank Deborah Knight for suggesting a panel to discuss the book and for doing so much to realize it. There is so much to say about the intelligent and generous commentary offered by Ivan Gaskell, Deborah Knight, and Sonia Sedivy. Put briefly, in the short space below, I say my book thinks mostly about how and that artworks mean rather than what they mean, as Gaskell recommends. Knight's remarks prompt me to clarify how, in a world of cinema set on the Mediterranean Sea populated by Fritz Lang and Brigitte Bardot, Le Mépris is the enactment of Jean-Luc Godard's moviemaking skills refined in the course of making that motion picture. Responding to Sedivy's criticism, I give a fuller account of the enactivism guiding the treatment of artworks in my book. Overall, my critics have urged me to draw a more complete picture of what was, for them, only sketched in Thinking with Images.
I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comme... more I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comments and challenging observations about it. I especially want to thank Deborah Knight for suggesting a panel to discuss the book and for doing so much to realize it. There is so much to say about the intelligent and generous commentary offered by Ivan Gaskell, Deborah Knight, and Sonia Sedivy. Put briefly, in the short space below, I say my book thinks mostly about how and that artworks mean rather than what they mean, as Gaskell recommends. Knight's remarks prompt me to clarify how, in a world of cinema set on the Mediterranean Sea populated by Fritz Lang and Brigitte Bardot, Le Mépris is the enactment of Jean-Luc Godard's moviemaking skills refined in the course of making that motion picture. Responding to Sedivy's criticism, I give a fuller account of the enactivism guiding the treatment of artworks in my book. Overall, my critics have urged me to draw a more complete picture of what was, for them, only sketched in Thinking with Images.
In July 2007, Study from Innocent X (1962) sold at Sotheby's to an anonymous bidder for over $52 ... more In July 2007, Study from Innocent X (1962) sold at Sotheby's to an anonymous bidder for over $52 million. The painting, held in a private collection for over thirty years, had never appeared as auction before. It was a record sale for the artist, Francis Bacon, who dies thirty years after completing the work.1 The painting was thought to be valuable because, of all the popes Bacon painted, it most resembled the inspiration for the long series of paintings Bacon executed on this theme, Diego Velázquez's haunting Painting of Innocent X (1650). Bacon would not have thought the success of his Study should depend on its resembling the Velázquez. In fact, he counted all of his paintings of popes failures, and not only or obviously because they failed to resemble their inspiration.2 Bacon painted at least forty-five popes (there is no exact count of how many he destroyed), mostly modeled on the Velázquez portrait, beginning with Head VI (1949) and culminating in Study for Red Pope (1971), a painting said to follow closely the Study from 1962. What was Bacon trying to accomplish in all of these images? What problem or question or challenge did Portrait of Innocent X pose for him? Was it, in fact, a problem he never expected to solve, a question he hoped never to answer, a challenge set not by Velázquez's painting but by painting itself, a problem he transferred to other subjects, continuing to produce solutions that would never completely satisfy him? It is not controversial to say painting poses a problem, for the artist and the viewer. It is the exact nature of the problem for Bacon that we want to explore here, the way these images of popes pose the problem for Bacon but also fix it in a fast and ready form. We are especially interested to know how Innocent X, the portrait and its subject, figure in the setting of this challenge. To this end, we will look carefully at the series of popes, seventeen paintings in all, that Bacon painted between 1950 and 1953 of which Study After Velázquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1953), the so-called Des Moines Pope, in the most well-known.3 We will delineate, in this most concentrated series of paintings on this theme, the elements brought together in them and Bacon's manner of plying these elements onto one another to make a complete work. With the details in front of us, we will work out or unfold the problem Bacon set for himself and the significance of this problem for him and for painting in general. We will find that a uniquely Baroque strategy was used by this distinctly bohemian artist to remake an image of Velázquez's Portrait of Innocent X for purposes that were, to his satisfaction, never realized. We will not the special role photography plays in anchoring the image for Bacon and setting the conditions for the possibility of a distinctly Baroque remaking of an image of Velázquez's portrait. " This is the obsession, " Bacon says: " how like can I make this thing in the most irrational way? " 4 We will find in a special conception of the
In this essay, we explore how Duane Michals makes the invisible visible is his photographs. We wi... more In this essay, we explore how Duane Michals makes the invisible visible is his photographs. We will consider his portraits, his sequences and his practice of writing on photographs to complicate the relations between word and image as in A Failed Attempt to Photograph Reality (1976) which consists of hand writing applied to the gelatin silver paper ordinarily used to print a photograph. Where we expect to find an image, we find words, instead, presented as an image, the image of something very profound to say.
How does time figure in our appreciation of Duchamp's Étant donnés? It figures in the affect felt... more How does time figure in our appreciation of Duchamp's Étant donnés? It figures in the affect felt in the face of the spectacle and in being a spectacle for those waiting behind you to see the work. It figures in the cognitive achievement of perceiving the work through the peep holes. It figures in our thinking about the work and in the materiality of the studio which limits our thinking about art. It figures, finally, in the givens which demand an attention to what is sensible in our appreciation of art. At bottom, we will give an account of Étant donnés that returns us to the time of thought, to a case of being forced to think because we don’t know what to think about what Jasper Johns called “the strangest work of art any museum has ever had in it.”
Over fifty years after its initial release, Le Mépris still stands out among Godard’s many films.... more Over fifty years after its initial release, Le Mépris still stands out among Godard’s many films. We discuss the way Le Mépris adapts literature to film, the way it preserves sensations in color and sound, the way it tells a story about something indeterminate, an affect, le mépris, as it emerges out of the concrete realities of the Mediterranean Sea, its environs and the people who inhabit them. We also discuss how Godard, who once said, “To me, thinking about film and making them is no different,” thinks with images and implores us to think with those images, to think because we do not know what to think.
Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary i... more Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is figured as unimpressed by Gabriel's proposal, she is upholding a masculinist ideal of female virtue. Where she is figured as delighted by the news, she represents an alternative feminine ideal that continues to be attractive to women and feminists, today. Inspired by the writings of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, I figure Mary in Renaissance representations of the Annunciation as contesting an ideal of feminine virtue that would deny her sexual difference and deny her pleasure in fulfilling her role as the bride and mother of God.
Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is... more Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is figured as unimpressed by Gabriel's proposal, she is upholding a masculinist ideal of female virtue. Where she is figured as delighted by the news, she represents an alternative feminine ideal that continues to be attractive to women and feminists, today. Inspired by the writings of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, I figure Mary in Renaissance representations of the Annunciation as contesting an ideal of feminine virtue that would deny her sexual difference and deny her pleasure in fulfilling her role as the bride and mother of God.
Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is... more Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is figured as unimpressed by Gabriel's proposal, she is upholding a masculinist ideal of female virtue. Where she is figured as delighted by the news, she represents an alternative feminine ideal that continues to be attractive to women and feminists, today. Inspired by the writings of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, I figure Mary in Renaissance representations of the Annunciation as contesting an ideal of feminine virtue that would deny her sexual difference and deny her pleasure in fulfilling her role as the bride and mother of God.
We really begin to think when we do not know what to think. When we know what to think, we are ce... more We really begin to think when we do not know what to think. When we know what to think, we are certainly thinking, but it is distinctly different from what and how we think when we do not know what to think. It is not rare that we do not know what to think. At any time, we can be taken aback by something that is unfamiliar, maybe only momentarily so, and while this can lead us quickly to the comfort of what we know, to what we know to think, the experience can also linger, leading us to think without knowing what to think. In the latter case, especially when what we experience is not just unfamiliar or new to us but quite captivating or strange, what we think and how we think, because we do not know what to think, is colored by uncertainty: we do not know what to think or whether we will ever know what to think. When we know what to think, thinking is more like following a rule.1 This is true even where we are only momentarily at a loss for what to think. In those cases, comparable to cases where we know what to think, we search for the rule that applies to situations like it which we have confronted before. Perhaps we consult another rule that measures the similarity of the unfamiliar with what we know we know. Having found it, we apply the rule, and the result is ordinarily the hoped for resolution of the perceived difficulty and a return to the certainty of knowing what to think. When we do not know what to think, it appears that there is no rule that will resolve the difficulty we confront. Perhaps it happens, as in cases like those just described, that we just need to learn a rule we do not already know. Having learned the new rule and applying it to the situation in front of us, we have the impression that we know what to think; it is another case of following a rule. It may also turn out that we already know the rule but its application is not immediately obvious to us. When we realize the relevance of the rule we know, and apply it, we know what to think, and we are, once again, following a rule. When we do not know what to think, it is not always a matter of learning the rule or of ascertaining the relevance of the appropriate rule. Sometimes it is the case that there just is no rule, and because there is no rule, we are made to think, really think about the situation we confront. This situation is the one we may face in encounters with certain works of art, specific artworks for the appreciation of which no rule applies or for which the application of a rule seems not entirely appropriate. In fact, encounters with artworks are often valued precisely for the challenge they present to our rule-bound ways of thinking.2 What I have in mind is nothing like what Martin Heidegger may have been after when he asked " Was heisst Denken, " what is called or calls for thinking?3 What and how we think when we do not know what to think is not the essence of thinking, what thinking really is. It is a kind of thinking we do when we confront situations or engage certain objects, especially certain artworks, which make us think
This book advances an enactivist aesthetics through the study of inscrutable artworks that challe... more This book advances an enactivist aesthetics through the study of inscrutable artworks that challenge us to think because we do not know what to think about them. John M. Carvalho presents detailed analyses a four artworks that share this unique characteristic: Francis Bacon’s Study After Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1953), the photographs of Duane Michals, based on a retrospective of his work, Storyteller, at the Carnegie Museum of Art (2014), Étant donnés (1968) by Marcel Duchamp, and Jean-Luc Godard’s 1963 film Le Mépris (released in the United States as Contempt). Carvalho argues against the application of theory to derive appreciation or meaning from these artistic works. Rather, each study enacts an embodied cognitive engagement with the specific artworks intended to demonstrate the value of thinking about artworks that might be extended to our engagement with the world in general. This thinking happens, as these studies show, when we trust our embodied skills and their guide to what artworks and the world around us afford for the activation and refinement of those skills. Thinking with Images will be of interest to scholars working in the philosophy of art and philosophical aesthetics, as well as art historians concerned with the meaning and value of contemporary art.
In this essay, I account for what we mean by old, what it means to grow old, and what we might me... more In this essay, I account for what we mean by old, what it means to grow old, and what we might mean by a shared achievement in the case of growing old together. I turn to the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz for some early insights on the shared time embodied in growing older together and how a ‘werelationship’ shored up by this temporal structure is the foundation for constituting the social world. I follow Schutz’s attempt to use this temporality to describe the case of making music together and conclude that what Schutz calls growing older together is not the same as growing old together which is necessarily embodied in a way his account of making music together is not. I give an embodied, enactivist account of making music together as a performance and, drawing on recent work by Shaun Gallagher, offer an aesthetics of growing old together as a performance enacted by individuals whose intimate engagements in that performance accomplish the shared achievement of growing old together.
We all know "love at first sight," but few of us have experienced it. It is a rare thing, and hig... more We all know "love at first sight," but few of us have experienced it. It is a rare thing, and highly prized, in part, because it is so rare. "Love at first sight" deserves its prize because, when it works, when it is true, when it is more than a fleeting fascination or, later, a glorified memory of something that might have been, it lasts a lifetime and, in that lifetime, it intensifies and grows. That something so lasting could be sparked in an instant is remarkable, all the more so because the resources available for igniting the intensity and nurturing the growth of the love we have at first sight are themselves rare, random coincidences of multiple, fortuitous embodiments of heretofore unknown feelings emerging in special, unprecedented and lasting ways. Love at first sight, on this telling, is truly rare and the "true love" embodied in it, nothing like the tired cliché. But does "true love" only flourish in a unique confluence of causes that in rare cases leads to love at first sight? If that were true, interest in these happy accidents would be esoteric and of no value to anyone: we will not find true love by modeling our own lives on these exceptions. Something might be gained, however, by considering cases of "falling in love," more common but not at all routine, a falling, decidedly not on first sight, that takes time and makes it worth the time. We might find that the truly rare cases of "love at first sight" are highly concentrated instances of the more common but not yet regular cases of "falling in love" comparable to the way, say, John Dewey thought artworks were highly refined enactments of the generally aesthetic quality of everyday experience. In the spirit of Dewey, I offer an aesthetics of the everyday experience of falling in love that alone can capture the rich texture of affects that spark and fuel the enactment of the true love in that falling. Only an aesthetics of the experience of falling in love can capture its general affectivity. Only an aesthetics can interpret the signs of the falling and anticipate the goal of that falling, namely, the enactment of true love. An aesthetics can also evaluate the achievement of that goal and measure the commitments pledged to accomplish the goal. An aesthetics of falling in love, finally, will temper the tendency to take love romantically as most prescient in its immediacy. It will give us a thick picture of love mediated by bodies and circumstances and by the skills bodies use to navigate those circumstances in the course of falling in love.
I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comme... more I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comments and challenging observations about it. I especially want to thank Deborah Knight for suggesting a panel to discuss the book and for doing so much to realize it. There is so much to say about the intelligent and generous commentary offered by Ivan Gaskell, Deborah Knight, and Sonia Sedivy. Put briefly, in the short space below, I say my book thinks mostly about how and that artworks mean rather than what they mean, as Gaskell recommends. Knight's remarks prompt me to clarify how, in a world of cinema set on the Mediterranean Sea populated by Fritz Lang and Brigitte Bardot, Le Mépris is the enactment of Jean-Luc Godard's moviemaking skills refined in the course of making that motion picture. Responding to Sedivy's criticism, I give a fuller account of the enactivism guiding the treatment of artworks in my book. Overall, my critics have urged me to draw a more complete picture of what was, for them, only sketched in Thinking with Images.
I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comme... more I want to start by thanking my critics for reading my book and coming to so many insightful comments and challenging observations about it. I especially want to thank Deborah Knight for suggesting a panel to discuss the book and for doing so much to realize it. There is so much to say about the intelligent and generous commentary offered by Ivan Gaskell, Deborah Knight, and Sonia Sedivy. Put briefly, in the short space below, I say my book thinks mostly about how and that artworks mean rather than what they mean, as Gaskell recommends. Knight's remarks prompt me to clarify how, in a world of cinema set on the Mediterranean Sea populated by Fritz Lang and Brigitte Bardot, Le Mépris is the enactment of Jean-Luc Godard's moviemaking skills refined in the course of making that motion picture. Responding to Sedivy's criticism, I give a fuller account of the enactivism guiding the treatment of artworks in my book. Overall, my critics have urged me to draw a more complete picture of what was, for them, only sketched in Thinking with Images.
In July 2007, Study from Innocent X (1962) sold at Sotheby's to an anonymous bidder for over $52 ... more In July 2007, Study from Innocent X (1962) sold at Sotheby's to an anonymous bidder for over $52 million. The painting, held in a private collection for over thirty years, had never appeared as auction before. It was a record sale for the artist, Francis Bacon, who dies thirty years after completing the work.1 The painting was thought to be valuable because, of all the popes Bacon painted, it most resembled the inspiration for the long series of paintings Bacon executed on this theme, Diego Velázquez's haunting Painting of Innocent X (1650). Bacon would not have thought the success of his Study should depend on its resembling the Velázquez. In fact, he counted all of his paintings of popes failures, and not only or obviously because they failed to resemble their inspiration.2 Bacon painted at least forty-five popes (there is no exact count of how many he destroyed), mostly modeled on the Velázquez portrait, beginning with Head VI (1949) and culminating in Study for Red Pope (1971), a painting said to follow closely the Study from 1962. What was Bacon trying to accomplish in all of these images? What problem or question or challenge did Portrait of Innocent X pose for him? Was it, in fact, a problem he never expected to solve, a question he hoped never to answer, a challenge set not by Velázquez's painting but by painting itself, a problem he transferred to other subjects, continuing to produce solutions that would never completely satisfy him? It is not controversial to say painting poses a problem, for the artist and the viewer. It is the exact nature of the problem for Bacon that we want to explore here, the way these images of popes pose the problem for Bacon but also fix it in a fast and ready form. We are especially interested to know how Innocent X, the portrait and its subject, figure in the setting of this challenge. To this end, we will look carefully at the series of popes, seventeen paintings in all, that Bacon painted between 1950 and 1953 of which Study After Velázquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1953), the so-called Des Moines Pope, in the most well-known.3 We will delineate, in this most concentrated series of paintings on this theme, the elements brought together in them and Bacon's manner of plying these elements onto one another to make a complete work. With the details in front of us, we will work out or unfold the problem Bacon set for himself and the significance of this problem for him and for painting in general. We will find that a uniquely Baroque strategy was used by this distinctly bohemian artist to remake an image of Velázquez's Portrait of Innocent X for purposes that were, to his satisfaction, never realized. We will not the special role photography plays in anchoring the image for Bacon and setting the conditions for the possibility of a distinctly Baroque remaking of an image of Velázquez's portrait. " This is the obsession, " Bacon says: " how like can I make this thing in the most irrational way? " 4 We will find in a special conception of the
In this essay, we explore how Duane Michals makes the invisible visible is his photographs. We wi... more In this essay, we explore how Duane Michals makes the invisible visible is his photographs. We will consider his portraits, his sequences and his practice of writing on photographs to complicate the relations between word and image as in A Failed Attempt to Photograph Reality (1976) which consists of hand writing applied to the gelatin silver paper ordinarily used to print a photograph. Where we expect to find an image, we find words, instead, presented as an image, the image of something very profound to say.
How does time figure in our appreciation of Duchamp's Étant donnés? It figures in the affect felt... more How does time figure in our appreciation of Duchamp's Étant donnés? It figures in the affect felt in the face of the spectacle and in being a spectacle for those waiting behind you to see the work. It figures in the cognitive achievement of perceiving the work through the peep holes. It figures in our thinking about the work and in the materiality of the studio which limits our thinking about art. It figures, finally, in the givens which demand an attention to what is sensible in our appreciation of art. At bottom, we will give an account of Étant donnés that returns us to the time of thought, to a case of being forced to think because we don’t know what to think about what Jasper Johns called “the strangest work of art any museum has ever had in it.”
Over fifty years after its initial release, Le Mépris still stands out among Godard’s many films.... more Over fifty years after its initial release, Le Mépris still stands out among Godard’s many films. We discuss the way Le Mépris adapts literature to film, the way it preserves sensations in color and sound, the way it tells a story about something indeterminate, an affect, le mépris, as it emerges out of the concrete realities of the Mediterranean Sea, its environs and the people who inhabit them. We also discuss how Godard, who once said, “To me, thinking about film and making them is no different,” thinks with images and implores us to think with those images, to think because we do not know what to think.
Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary i... more Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is figured as unimpressed by Gabriel's proposal, she is upholding a masculinist ideal of female virtue. Where she is figured as delighted by the news, she represents an alternative feminine ideal that continues to be attractive to women and feminists, today. Inspired by the writings of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, I figure Mary in Renaissance representations of the Annunciation as contesting an ideal of feminine virtue that would deny her sexual difference and deny her pleasure in fulfilling her role as the bride and mother of God.
Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is... more Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is figured as unimpressed by Gabriel's proposal, she is upholding a masculinist ideal of female virtue. Where she is figured as delighted by the news, she represents an alternative feminine ideal that continues to be attractive to women and feminists, today. Inspired by the writings of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, I figure Mary in Renaissance representations of the Annunciation as contesting an ideal of feminine virtue that would deny her sexual difference and deny her pleasure in fulfilling her role as the bride and mother of God.
Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is... more Viewers of Renaissance representations of the Annunciation miss an important irony. Where Mary is figured as unimpressed by Gabriel's proposal, she is upholding a masculinist ideal of female virtue. Where she is figured as delighted by the news, she represents an alternative feminine ideal that continues to be attractive to women and feminists, today. Inspired by the writings of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, I figure Mary in Renaissance representations of the Annunciation as contesting an ideal of feminine virtue that would deny her sexual difference and deny her pleasure in fulfilling her role as the bride and mother of God.
In July 2007, Study from Innocent X (1962) sold at Sotheby's to an anonymous bidder for o... more In July 2007, Study from Innocent X (1962) sold at Sotheby's to an anonymous bidder for over $52 million. The painting, held in a private collection for over thirty years, had never appeared as auction before. It was a record sale for the artist, Francis Bacon, who dies thirty years after completing the work.1 The painting was thought to be valuable because, of all the popes Bacon painted, it most resembled the inspiration for the long series of paintings Bacon executed on this theme, Diego Velázquez's haunting Painting of Innocent X (1650). Bacon would not have thought the success of his Study should depend on its resembling the Velázquez. In fact, he counted all of his paintings of popes failures, and not only or obviously because they failed to resemble their inspiration.2 Bacon painted at least forty-five popes (there is no exact count of how many he destroyed), mostly modeled on the Velázquez portrait, beginning with Head VI (1949) and culminating in Study for Red Pope (1971), a painting said to follow closely the Study from 1962. What was Bacon trying to accomplish in all of these images? What problem or question or challenge did Portrait of Innocent X pose for him? Was it, in fact, a problem he never expected to solve, a question he hoped never to answer, a challenge set not by Velázquez's painting but by painting itself, a problem he transferred to other subjects, continuing to produce solutions that would never completely satisfy him? It is not controversial to say painting poses a problem, for the artist and the viewer. It is the exact nature of the problem for Bacon that we want to explore here, the way these images of popes pose the problem for Bacon but also fix it in a fast and ready form. We are especially interested to know how Innocent X, the portrait and its subject, figure in the setting of this challenge. To this end, we will look carefully at the series of popes, seventeen paintings in all, that Bacon painted between 1950 and 1953 of which Study After Velázquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1953), the so-called Des Moines Pope, in the most well-known.3 We will delineate, in this most concentrated series of paintings on this theme, the elements brought together in them and Bacon's manner of plying these elements onto one another to make a complete work. With the details in front of us, we will work out or unfold the problem Bacon set for himself and the significance of this problem for him and for painting in general. We will find that a uniquely Baroque strategy was used by this distinctly bohemian artist to remake an image of Velázquez's Portrait of Innocent X for purposes that were, to his satisfaction, never realized. We will not the special role photography plays in anchoring the image for Bacon and setting the conditions for the possibility of a distinctly Baroque remaking of an image of Velázquez's portrait. " This is the obsession, " Bacon says: " how like can I make this thing in the most irrational way? " 4 We will find in a special conception of the
Remarks presented at the American Society for Aesthetics Feminist Caucus Workshop on Feminist ped... more Remarks presented at the American Society for Aesthetics Feminist Caucus Workshop on Feminist pedagogy.
Roland Barthes says there are three different ways of listening. Listening as to an alert, listen... more Roland Barthes says there are three different ways of listening. Listening as to an alert, listening as a deciphering, and listening that develops an inter-subjective space where what we listen to “is a general ‘signifying’ no longer conceivable without the determination of the unconscious.” Barthes does not spell out the implications of this observation for listening to music. I do.
GREATER PHILADELPHIA PHILOSOPHY CONSORTIUM – COLLOQUIUM
The New Materialisms: Emergence or Panps... more GREATER PHILADELPHIA PHILOSOPHY CONSORTIUM – COLLOQUIUM
The New Materialisms: Emergence or Panpsychism?
March 25, 2017 1:00 - 5:00 Bartley Hall, Room 1011 Villanova University Open to the Public - Reception to follow
Speakers: Jane Bennett (Political Science, Johns Hopkins University) "Life, Intensities, and Outside Influence"
Evan Thompson (Philosophy, University of British Columbia) "The Nature of Nature"
Commentator: Georg Theiner (Philosophy, Villanova University)
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The New Materialisms: Emergence or Panpsychism?
March 25, 2017
1:00 - 5:00
Bartley Hall, Room 1011
Villanova University
Open to the Public - Reception to follow
Speakers:
Jane Bennett (Political Science, Johns Hopkins University)
"Life, Intensities, and Outside Influence"
Evan Thompson (Philosophy, University of British Columbia)
"The Nature of Nature"
Commentator:
Georg Theiner (Philosophy, Villanova University)
For more information, contact:
John Carvalho (Philosophy, Villanova University): john.carvalho@villanova.edu
Georg Theiner (Philosophy, Villanova University): georg.theiner@villanova.edu