Flemish Peace Institute

End-use is a crucial element in the assessment of applications for the export of military equipment. This is evident from the international, European and national legal export control frameworks. Questions such as ‘Where does Flemish military equipment actually end up?’ and ‘For what purpose is this material used?’ take centre stage in the current debate on Flemish export policy. In 2008, the problem of determining the actual end-use of military equipment became painfully clear following the extensive export of partially assembled military vehicles whose final reported user was the British defence industry, although it was known that the vehicles were ultimately destined for Saudi Arabia. This led to a debate in the Flemish Parliament concerning the question of whether the final end-user must be taken into account when issuing export licences.

The Peace Institute’s starting premise in the current report is that effective control of the trade in military equipment is essential. Control of the proliferation of arms is one of the important preconditions for world peace and stability. Policy that controls the trade in military equipment should be transparent to permit democratic monitoring and oversight of how policy is implemented.
The expediency of exports is assessed on a case-by-case basis by referring to internationally agreed directives. Not only where but also by whom the materials are used is crucial in this assessment. In this regard, Flanders is in a specific situation. Research has demonstrated that the Flemish defence-related industry consists mainly of high-tech companies that develop components for larger weapon systems, for instance, manufacturers of screens, night vision equipment, aircraft components or electronic equipment. The export of these goods is largely destined for foreign defence companies, which are obviously just an intermediary stage: they incorporate the components into for example a tank or combat aircraft. It is self-evident that the industry is not the actual end-user of the military equipment and that the ultimate end-user of these weapon systems is the armed forces of a foreign country. The Flemish authorities expect
the governments of the initial recipient countries to control further transactions and end-use.

Prior analyses by the Peace Institute have shown that, as a result of the specific characteristics of the local defence-related industry, a majority of Flemish export licences are issued without including the ultimate end-user in the decision-making process. In 2010, only 6 percent of Flemish arms exports were intended for foreign armed forces, while 93 percent of arms exports in the first instance were intended for foreign (defence-related) industry. The ultimate end-user
is considered in the decision-making process in only a fraction of these exports to foreign industry. The analysis of data for this report shows that the share of Flemish arms exports in which the
foreign industry is reported by the government to be the final user when issuing an export licence fluctuates annually between 60 and 78 percent.

To this point, a crucial element has been lacking in the current debate concerning Flemish arms exports: there is no factual evidence available that provides a clear picture of the final destination of exported Flemish military equipment. The purpose of the present research report is to outline a profile of the actual end-use of military equipment exported from Flanders in the period 2006–10 and, by contributing more information to the overall picture of the Flemish arms trade, also contribute to greater transparency and democratic oversight. It is expressly not the intention of this report to ‘name and shame’, but to describe objectively the actual end-use of military
equipment produced in and exported from Flanders.

The information in this report is based primarily on public sources, including reports from the Flemish Government, parliamentary documents, company documentation and information, domestic and foreign media news coverage, specialized websites, etc. These public sources are complemented with information gathered from interviews with Flemish companies in the period April-November 2011 – mainly telephone interviews, but also on-site visits and written communication. All the Flemish companies concerned were presented the text about their activities for verification.

In the first section of this report we analyse the end-use of Flemish military equipment on the basis of publicly available reports from the Strategic Goods Monitoring Unit of the Flemish authorities. We present a general picture exports and delve deeper into the specifically reported end-use of the most important types of military equipment exported from Flanders. In the second section we describe the nature of the Flemish defence-related industry and we draw up a profile of the most important companies involved. In the third section we analyse 15 actual export cases and the end-use of the Flemish military equipment. These cases were selected on the basis of observations from the first and second sections of the report, an analysis of the available public sources and interviews with the companies concerned. To outline the contours of the current debate about end-use, we begin with a brief overview of the importance of end-use in the current legal and political framework of arms export control in Flanders.

Arms acquisition is a crucial venture for armed insurgency groups for carrying out their militant activities. I argue that the specific manner in which these groups obtain weapons may have important consequences for the dynamics of violent intrastate conflict. While most previous studies of the relationship between arms acquisition and armed conflict have focused solely on the impact of arms availability, in this article I analyze the impact of two specific aspects of arms acquisition patterns—the methods and the degree of leadership control—on the dynamics and nature of armed conflict in a qualitative case study of the armed conflict in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) between 1995 and 2005. I conclude that the specific arms acquisition method and the degree of leadership control over this process have strongly affected the dynamics of the conflict.

Within the EU, arms export policy is fundamentally a competence of the Member States; but in recent decades the EU has attempted to stimulate cooperation and harmonization of these policies in order to prevent European exports of military equipment that might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or might contribute to regional instability. In this report we examine whether the events of the Arab Spring have had an impact on European policies for arms exports to Arab states. Using a wide range of data sources, we focus on two specific questions: “Have the events of the Arab Spring led to more restrictive policies by EU Member States on arms exports to Arab States?” and “Have the events of the Arab Spring led to a deepening of the process of harmonization of national arms export policies?”

We conclude that there is little evidence to suggest that the events of the Arab Spring have led to fundamentally more restrictive arms export policies (with the exception of Libya) or to a significant deepening of harmonization of arms export control policies of the EU Member States vis-à-vis Arab customers. While the process of arms export harmonization initiated in the 1990s, aimed to achieve high standards for arms export control, this ambition no longer seems to be the driving force of the current harmonization process. The informal harmonization of arms export control policies that can be observed vis-à-vis the Arab States least affected by the events of Arab Spring indicates the de facto existence of a level playing-field within the EU, but it is a level playing-field of the lowest common denominator. Instead of a more restrictive approach to arms exports, several Member States have continued their relaxed arms export policy vis-à-vis the Arab region, or have further eroded their traditionally restrictive arms export policy for this region. One of the most visible impacts of the Arab Spring on national arms export policies seems to be increased parliamentary pressure on the government resulting in more transparency. In addition, the Arab Spring has also had an impact on the legal framework in some Member States.

While the Member States clearly learned some important lessons for their arms export policies from the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the events of the Arab Spring have not led to a similar wake-up call. Instead of strengthening the impetus for more harmonized and restrictive arms export policies, the current developments seem to be heading into the opposite direction. The lack of a more uniform interpretation and implementation of the EU Common Position for arms exports to the most sensitive destination countries, and the lack of more restrictive arms export policies for arms exports to the other Arab states, undermine the development of a credible EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Greater caution is needed when considering arms exports to countries in the Arab region if the EU does not want to lose part of its credibility, and put at risk the legitimacy of its CFSP in general and its human rights policy in particular.

Trade in 'strategic goods' is subject to controls in order to combat illegal trade and to avoid undesirable use . Historically, national control regimes focused on controlling exports by their
own arms producers, so as to prevent the goods from being delivered to (from a national security perspective) undesirable destinations. Because national control regimes by definition
are jurisdictionally limited to their own territory, initiatives have also been taken at international level. These international control regimes mainly focus on the need for export controls, while more attention has been paid lately to brokering. Much less has been done in the field of transit and import controls. The importance of a good transit control regime became clear quite recently, in early 2012, when - despite the EU arms embargo on Syria - a Russian ship loaded with military equipment sailed to Syria through the national waters of various European countries to deliver this equipment to the regime.

The limited attention devoted to transit is striking, given that national control regimes exclusively regulating exports can only be effective if all countries worldwide would impose, apply and enforce uniform export conditions. Uniformity is of prime importance since any variation in terms of the personal and material scope of control, or in the conditions for permitting trade in arms and their interpretation and application, or in the capability of prosecution and imposition of penalties, creates lacunae that dishonest dealers can exploit.

Since control measures are not only aimed at private actors, but certain regimes are also among the forbidden destinations, any such complete and effective global network of national control regimes is utopic. This makes it important to look at the whole cycle of arms trade activities and consider what combination of control measures, for each of the separate activities, will enable the best possible control. Every chain is as strong as its weakest link, and the fact that the chain for foreign arms trade runs across different jurisdictions creates specific risks. In effect, national authorities lose their control over goods once these leave their own territory, they thus rely on information from elsewhere to check whether the requirements they have imposed are respected also after export. In these conditions, it is clear that control of transit is a vital link in achieving a sound and effective export control regime for strategic goods.

As transit is by definition a cross-border issue, it is worthwhile comparing the transit control regimes in different EU Member States. Despite progressive harmonization of EU Member States’ export control policy, policy on transit - mainly for military equipment - is still far from being harmonized. In this report we analyse transit policies in Europe concerning strategic goods. The report focuses on the transit of strategic goods and is thus not limited to transit regulations and policy practice on conventional military goods (such as combat vehicles, military vessels or firearms) and their components. Alongside conventional arms and weapons systems, we also analyse regulatory and policy practice on the transit of a wide range of dual use items. These are civil items that are not specifically designed, intended or as such suitable for military use, but which still have strategic importance due to their potential military
applicationi. The decision to explicitly address the control regimes for both categories of strategic goods in this report is in line with the current international, regional and national
control regimes which, generally speaking, cover approximately the same categories of strategic goods.

This publication contains a detailed description of regulations and administrative practices for controlling the transit of strategic goods in the Flemish Region of Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.ii For the five national regimes investigated, the description of the legal framework at national level is supplemented in each case with relevant aspects of administrative practice. Not all countries, in fact, take an equally formal legal approach. As will be shown in this report, the transit of strategic goods is a complex matter.
Some countries have completely separate systems with distinct competent authorities depending on whether military equipment or dual-use items are involved; in other countries there is a single legal framework and a single competent body.

The objective of this study is to compare these five transit control regimes at national level with a view to drawing lessons about their effectiveness . Only the general control regime for
transit of strategic goods falls within the scope of this investigation. Specific rules of control that apply beyond the general framework are not addressed, such as arms embargoes and other sanctions (for instance, directed against Iran), exceptional measures for transit of NATO forces’ military equipment, or weapons held by armed forces.

This study is based on information obtained on the basis of a literature review, legislation and administrative documents, and of a survey carried out among officials responsible for export control and customs employees. For the survey of competent authorities we worked in three phases corresponding to the Delphi method: an initial survey by telephone or in writing; a
second set of questions during an interview; and feedback to all respondents about the most important findings of the analysis

Every year in Europe around 1,150 people are shot dead with firearms. These deaths occur in various contexts, including the relational and criminal spheres. The little available research into the weapons used during these fatal crimes suggests that different types of firearms are used in different contexts. In this report we focus on the weapons that were used for one specific form of deadly firearms incidents, namely “public mass shootings”. These are shooting incidents in the (semi-)public space in which the perpetrator(s) use one or more firearms and during which several
people are killed and injured. Under this umbrella term we find numerous types of shooting incidents, ranging from school shootings in which a frustrated pupil murders a number of classmates and/or teachers to terrorist attacks in which groups of perpetrators attempt to spread terror in coordinated attacks. A look at recent mass shootings shows that significant differences can be observed in terms of, for example, the locations where these shootings were carried out,
the number of perpetrators, the motives of the perpetrator(s), the selection of the victims and the firearms used. This report analyses one specific aspect of such shooting incidents, namely the firearms that were used.

Previous studies have demonstrated that public mass shootings are a global phenomenon, but a significant share of such shootings occur in the United States. Recent research comparing public mass shooting rates across 171 countries indicates that 31% of the global public mass shootings between 1966 and 2012 occurred in the United States. Such shootings are not very common in Europe, and mass shootings figures generally represent a limited proportion of the total homicide figures and deaths from firearms in any given country. However, the impact of these deadly shooting incidents is usually considerable. Whereas incidents of criminal score settling generally occur at a distance from everyday life (that is, within the criminal underworld), the violence of these mass shootings in the (semi-)public space occurs extremely close to home. It is also the effect of such incidents on the broad public that leads to societal debate on the role of firearms in society, and consequently these incidents are an important for changes to be made to legislative
frameworks or firearms policies. For example, we can observe that deadly shootings in the public sphere of several European countries have already led to amendments to the national legislative framework dealing with firearms or the development of new policy initiatives in this regard: we only have to consider the new legislation adopted in the immediate aftermath of deadly shooting incidents in, for example, the United Kingdom in 1996 (Dunblane), Belgium in 2006 (Antwerp) and Germany in 2009 (Winnenden). The European Union (EU) has also explicitly referred to such deadly shootings in recent years to motivate new policy initiatives. Moreover, the series of terror attacks
in Europe in which terrorists used firearms have recently led to sharply increased attention being
focused on this problem. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris
in November 2015 the European Commission proposed new measures to amend the EU’s
legislative framework around firearms possession to harmonize it further and significantly
strengthen it.

A lack of basic information and thorough analyses of the European firearms issue is a considerable
stumbling block in the development of effective firearms legislation and policy. The bulk of the
research into the relationship between firearms and violence relates to the situation in the United
States.5 This is also the case for research into public mass shootings: the United States has a long
tradition of researching these violent incidents. In Europe, however, significantly less research has
historically been available on the weapons used in mass shootings. For example, very few studies provide an in-depth examination of the types of firearms used in these deadly shootings, the legal status of these weapons and the ways in which the perpetrators got hold of them. Yet these are important focal points in the societal debate surrounding the role of firearms in general in European society, and the various aspects of firearms legislation and policy in particular. A more
substantial understanding of the problem is crucial, with the aim of developing legislation and policy to prevent these tragic shooting incidents as much as possible.

The aim of this report, therefore, through an analysis of the weapons used in public mass shootings in Europe, is to stimulate the societal and policy-oriented debate around violent shooting incidents in Europe. Specifically, we have approached this issue by analysing the firearms used in a selection of eight recent public mass shootings in Europe. After a brief explanation in the first chapter of the methodological framework used, we analyse the selected shooting incidents in the second chapter. Each case study begins with a concise description of the shooting incident itself, followed by an analysis of which types of firearms were used, and especially how the perpetrator(s) was/were able to obtain these weapons. In the final chapter we will analyse and discuss the findings from the case studies. Using this qualitative approach, we intend to go in search of the stories behind the statistics. By analysing in detail the ways in which the perpetrators of these shooting incidents acquired their firearms we intend to draw lessons for current and future European initiatives to
improve firearms legislation and policy. To this end we should emphasize that, as a result of the observed gaps in European research into weapons use in public mass shootings, this report is intended as an exploratory analysis that, it is hoped, will foster the current European debate around firearms legislation and policy, lead to more research into this issue, and ultimately result in concrete steps being taken to deal with the issues that the report raises.