Is it possible and desirable to translate the basic principles underlying cosmopolitanism as a mo... more Is it possible and desirable to translate the basic principles underlying cosmopolitanism as a moral standard into eff ective global institutions? Will the ideals of inclusiveness and equal moral concern for all survive the marriage between cosmopolitanism and institutional power? What are the eff ects of such bureaucratization of cosmopolitan ideals? Th is book examines the strained relationship between cosmopolitanism as a moral standard and the legal institutions in which cosmopolitan norms and principles are to be implemented. Five areas of global concern are analyzed: environmental protection; economic regulation; peace and security; the fight against international crimes; and migration.
OUP description: "This collection gathers a set of seminal papers from the emerging area of ethic... more OUP description: "This collection gathers a set of seminal papers from the emerging area of ethics and climate change. Topics covered include human rights, international justice, intergenerational ethics, individual responsibility, climate economics, and the ethics of geoengineering. Climate Ethics is intended to serve as a source book for general reference, and for university courses that include a focus on the human dimensions of climate change. It should be of broad interest to all those concerned with global justice, environmental science and policy, and the future of humanity."
Carbon emissions—and hence fossil fuel combustion—must decline rapidly if warming is to be held b... more Carbon emissions—and hence fossil fuel combustion—must decline rapidly if warming is to be held below 1.5 or 2 °C. Yet fossil fuels are so deeply entrenched in the broader economy that a rapid transition poses the challenge of significant transitional disruption. Fossil fuels must be phased out even as access to energy services for basic needs and for economic development expands, particularly in developing countries. Nations, communities, and workers that are economically dependent on fossil fuel extraction will need to find a new foundation for livelihoods and revenue. These challenges are surmountable. In principle, societies could undertake a decarbonization transition in which they anticipate the transitional disruption, and cooperate and contribute fairly to minimize and alleviate it. Indeed, if societies do not work to avoid that disruption, a decarbonization transition may not be possible at all. Too many people may conclude they will suffer undue hardship, and thus undermin...
It is a commonplace that in many societies people adhere to profoundly different conceptions of t... more It is a commonplace that in many societies people adhere to profoundly different conceptions of the good. Given this we need to know what political principles are appropriate. How can we treat people who are committed to different accounts of the good with fairness? One recent answer to this pressing question is given by Brian Barry in his important workJustice as Impartiality. This book, of course, contains much more than this. It includes a powerful and incisive discussion of several accounts of distributive justice (‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’), a critique of other attempts to defend liberal neutrality and a rebuttal of those who are critical of the ideal of impartiality. In this paper I wish, however, to focus on Barry's defence of liberal neutrality. The paper falls into three parts. Section I outlines the thesis that Barry wants to defend and gives a brief sketch of the argument he employs to defend it. Barry's argument makes two claims –...
Political life is dominated by 'presentism' and a focus on the short-term. This political myopia ... more Political life is dominated by 'presentism' and a focus on the short-term. This political myopia is harmful in two important ways. First, it leads governments to fail to discharge their duty to protect the long-term interests of current generations. Second, it results in governments' failing to honour their responsibilities to future generations. Members of current and future generations are entitled to live in ecologically sustainable societies which realise their equal right to flourish. At present our political system is not well-designed to realise these ideals. In this Essay for CUSP, Simon Caney explores the nature of what he terms 'Harmful Short-Termism', and shows that it is pervasive in political life-contributing to environmental destruction and a failure to invest in the social, economic and structural preconditions of well-functioning societies. He argues that this short-termism stems from four separate factors (what he terms "the four images of inter-temporal politics"). Together they result in a deep mismatch between, on the one hand, the timespan of many problems (such as climate change) and, on the other hand, the temporal horizons of citizens and politicians. He concludes by exploring what can be done to address these problems. Drawing on insights from Aristotle, de Tocqueville and Dewey, he outlines ways in which we can rethink and re-invigorate our political life so that we are better able to address Harmful Short-Termism.
This chapter sets out the main normative dimensions that should be used in assessing whether soci... more This chapter sets out the main normative dimensions that should be used in assessing whether societies have made social progress and whether a given set of proposals is likely to bring progress. Some of these dimensions are values, bearing in the first instance on the evaluation of states of affairs; others are action- guiding principles. Values can inspire and in that sense also guide actions. Principles aim to offer more specific guidance on how to rank, distribute, and realize values. Recognizing a multiplicity of values and principles is important not only to being respectful of the variety of reasonable views about what matters but also because it is difficult to reduce the list of dimensions that ultimately matter to a shorter one in a way that reflects all aspects of the phenomena in question. Many of the chapters that follow will explicitly address only a subset of these values and principles: the ones most salient for their issues or areas; but in principle, all remain relevant. This chapter’s principal contributions are its listing of basic values and principles (set out in Table 2.1), its interpretation of each of them, and its defense, so far as space permitted, of the suggestion that each of these has basic or nonderivative importance. Any use of these basic values and principles in guiding or assessing social progress should be guided by respect for the equal dignity of all persons (Section 2.2). The values of well- being and freedom are each of pervasive importance; each has also been interpreted in importantly different ways, which the chapter distinguishes (Section 2.3). Other basic values relevant to social progress include values directly important in individuals’ lives – nonalienation, esteem, solidarity, and security – and values embodied in the environment and in human culture.
Recently many environmental ethicists have argued that tackling climate change requires addressin... more Recently many environmental ethicists have argued that tackling climate change requires addressing the growth in the world's population. This paper critically examines two different versions of this argument. One which I term Restrictivism argues that there should be limits on people's procreative choice. Sarah Conly, for example, maintains that each couple has a right to one child, no more, and that this limit can be coercively enforced. I argue that such Restrictivist accounts suffer from three serious problems. First, in order to determine how many children people could permissibly limit Restrictivists like Conly would need to provide an account of intra- and inter-generational justice and they would then need to show empirically that realizing this requires that people have a right to one child and no more. Since, however, they do not provide the normative or empirical analysis the numbers they give are arbitrary. Second, Restrictivist accounts are objectionably monocausal and fail to take into account the role of other determinants of ecological sustainability (notably the levels of consumption and the kind of technology available). Third, their imposition of equal procreative limits is unfair. They penalize the poor for the high-emissions lifestyles of the rich.
A second strategy adopts what I term the Byproduct Approach. This maintains that realizing human rights to reproductive choice, education, employment and to a decent standard of living would reduce population growth and, indeed, are sufficient to establish ecological sustainability. I argue that this is a more attractive approach and that such measures are necessary. However, I argue, we lack any reason to think that they are sufficient. For to know whether they would be sufficient we would need to know what we owe future generations, what limits on ecological impacts this would in practice require, and whether the net effects of such human rights policies would result in the necessary limits on ecological impacts. In the absence of this we have no reason to think that the Byproduct Approach would be enough.
In the final part of the paper I outline a third more promising approach. This holds that humanity must live within certain ecological limits - where these limits are derived from (i) an understanding of our responsibilities to current and future generations and (ii) an empirical analysis of what is needed to comply with these responsibilities. Together (i) and (ii) define what I term the Sustainability Frontier. I then draw on the observation that humanity's environmental impact is a function of three kinds of factor (people's levels of consumption, the technology available and the number of people alive) to argue that there is a plurality of different ways in which people can comply with their responsibility to live within the Sustainability Frontier. They can choose different combinations of procreation, consumption and technological investment and diffusion. This ecological liberalism thus combines a commitment to ecological sustainability with a commitment to individual liberty.
In short: Those who emphasize the role of demographic change as a causal factor in climate change are right to do so. However, it is important that we do not treat population in isolation, but rather treat it together with levels of consumption, global inequalities, the role of the built environment in determining energy use, the political economy of energy, and the unequal access to, and control of, clean technology.
This chapter analyses the extent to which an analysis of what principles of distributive justice,... more This chapter analyses the extent to which an analysis of what principles of distributive justice, if any, apply at the global level requires empirical research. Is empirical knowledge and the findings of the social sciences needed for this kind of enquiry? And if so, how? In this chapter I examine seven different ways in which facts about national, regional and global politics (and hence empirical research into global politics) might inform accounts of global distributive justice. I begin by examining two widely shared normative claims, both of which would require the use of empirical data if they were to be endorsed. However, I raise questions about both of these views (and thus call into question the case for the role of empirical evidence that is grounded in these two views). I then outline five ways in which, I claim, empirical evidence is crucial. A deep understanding of the nature of global politics and the world economy (and thus empirical research on it) is, I submit, needed: to grasp the 'implications' of principles of global distributive justice; to evaluate such principles for their 'attainability' and 'political feasibility'; to assess their 'desirability'; and, at a prior level, 'to conceptualize the subject-matter of global distributive justice' and 'to formulate the questions that accounts of global distributive justice need to answer'.
This is a report on the equity issues surrounding the extraction of fossil fuels. It was commiss... more This is a report on the equity issues surrounding the extraction of fossil fuels. It was commissioned by Oxfam America and published by them as a Research Backgrounder. Its starting point is the recognition that a large proportion of the remaining fossil fuel reserves must stay in the ground if humanity is to have a reasonable chance of avoiding dangerous climate change. For example, Christopher McGlade and Paul Ekins find that "globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2C" (“The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2°C.” Nature 517 (7533): 187–190 at p.190). This raises questions of justice: Whose fossil fuel assets should be left in the ground? According to what criteria? What is the fairest policy towards the stranding of fossil fuel assets? Furthermore, should those who do not extract the fossil fuels in their possession receive compensation? This report explores those questions.
Many agents have failed to comply with their responsibilities to take the action needed to avoid ... more Many agents have failed to comply with their responsibilities to take the action needed to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. This pervasive noncompliance raises two questions of nonideal political theory.
First, it raises the question of what agents should do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities. (the Responsibility Question) In this paper I put forward four principles that we need to employ to answer the Responsibility Question (Sections II-V). I then illustrate my account, by outlining four kinds of action that should be undertaken (Section VI).
Pervasive noncompliance also raises a second question: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? (the Governance Question). The paper briefly outlines a methodology for addressing this question and outlines what a nonideal response to the existing institutional structures would be (Section VII). It does so with reference to the Paris Agreement, and in particular the creation of a "global stocktake" (Article 14, Paris Agreement) and the "facilitative dialogue" (paragraph 20 of the ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’).
The aim, then, is to set out an account of a nonideal theory of climate justice.
Is it possible and desirable to translate the basic principles underlying cosmopolitanism as a mo... more Is it possible and desirable to translate the basic principles underlying cosmopolitanism as a moral standard into eff ective global institutions? Will the ideals of inclusiveness and equal moral concern for all survive the marriage between cosmopolitanism and institutional power? What are the eff ects of such bureaucratization of cosmopolitan ideals? Th is book examines the strained relationship between cosmopolitanism as a moral standard and the legal institutions in which cosmopolitan norms and principles are to be implemented. Five areas of global concern are analyzed: environmental protection; economic regulation; peace and security; the fight against international crimes; and migration.
OUP description: "This collection gathers a set of seminal papers from the emerging area of ethic... more OUP description: "This collection gathers a set of seminal papers from the emerging area of ethics and climate change. Topics covered include human rights, international justice, intergenerational ethics, individual responsibility, climate economics, and the ethics of geoengineering. Climate Ethics is intended to serve as a source book for general reference, and for university courses that include a focus on the human dimensions of climate change. It should be of broad interest to all those concerned with global justice, environmental science and policy, and the future of humanity."
Carbon emissions—and hence fossil fuel combustion—must decline rapidly if warming is to be held b... more Carbon emissions—and hence fossil fuel combustion—must decline rapidly if warming is to be held below 1.5 or 2 °C. Yet fossil fuels are so deeply entrenched in the broader economy that a rapid transition poses the challenge of significant transitional disruption. Fossil fuels must be phased out even as access to energy services for basic needs and for economic development expands, particularly in developing countries. Nations, communities, and workers that are economically dependent on fossil fuel extraction will need to find a new foundation for livelihoods and revenue. These challenges are surmountable. In principle, societies could undertake a decarbonization transition in which they anticipate the transitional disruption, and cooperate and contribute fairly to minimize and alleviate it. Indeed, if societies do not work to avoid that disruption, a decarbonization transition may not be possible at all. Too many people may conclude they will suffer undue hardship, and thus undermin...
It is a commonplace that in many societies people adhere to profoundly different conceptions of t... more It is a commonplace that in many societies people adhere to profoundly different conceptions of the good. Given this we need to know what political principles are appropriate. How can we treat people who are committed to different accounts of the good with fairness? One recent answer to this pressing question is given by Brian Barry in his important workJustice as Impartiality. This book, of course, contains much more than this. It includes a powerful and incisive discussion of several accounts of distributive justice (‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’), a critique of other attempts to defend liberal neutrality and a rebuttal of those who are critical of the ideal of impartiality. In this paper I wish, however, to focus on Barry's defence of liberal neutrality. The paper falls into three parts. Section I outlines the thesis that Barry wants to defend and gives a brief sketch of the argument he employs to defend it. Barry's argument makes two claims –...
Political life is dominated by 'presentism' and a focus on the short-term. This political myopia ... more Political life is dominated by 'presentism' and a focus on the short-term. This political myopia is harmful in two important ways. First, it leads governments to fail to discharge their duty to protect the long-term interests of current generations. Second, it results in governments' failing to honour their responsibilities to future generations. Members of current and future generations are entitled to live in ecologically sustainable societies which realise their equal right to flourish. At present our political system is not well-designed to realise these ideals. In this Essay for CUSP, Simon Caney explores the nature of what he terms 'Harmful Short-Termism', and shows that it is pervasive in political life-contributing to environmental destruction and a failure to invest in the social, economic and structural preconditions of well-functioning societies. He argues that this short-termism stems from four separate factors (what he terms "the four images of inter-temporal politics"). Together they result in a deep mismatch between, on the one hand, the timespan of many problems (such as climate change) and, on the other hand, the temporal horizons of citizens and politicians. He concludes by exploring what can be done to address these problems. Drawing on insights from Aristotle, de Tocqueville and Dewey, he outlines ways in which we can rethink and re-invigorate our political life so that we are better able to address Harmful Short-Termism.
This chapter sets out the main normative dimensions that should be used in assessing whether soci... more This chapter sets out the main normative dimensions that should be used in assessing whether societies have made social progress and whether a given set of proposals is likely to bring progress. Some of these dimensions are values, bearing in the first instance on the evaluation of states of affairs; others are action- guiding principles. Values can inspire and in that sense also guide actions. Principles aim to offer more specific guidance on how to rank, distribute, and realize values. Recognizing a multiplicity of values and principles is important not only to being respectful of the variety of reasonable views about what matters but also because it is difficult to reduce the list of dimensions that ultimately matter to a shorter one in a way that reflects all aspects of the phenomena in question. Many of the chapters that follow will explicitly address only a subset of these values and principles: the ones most salient for their issues or areas; but in principle, all remain relevant. This chapter’s principal contributions are its listing of basic values and principles (set out in Table 2.1), its interpretation of each of them, and its defense, so far as space permitted, of the suggestion that each of these has basic or nonderivative importance. Any use of these basic values and principles in guiding or assessing social progress should be guided by respect for the equal dignity of all persons (Section 2.2). The values of well- being and freedom are each of pervasive importance; each has also been interpreted in importantly different ways, which the chapter distinguishes (Section 2.3). Other basic values relevant to social progress include values directly important in individuals’ lives – nonalienation, esteem, solidarity, and security – and values embodied in the environment and in human culture.
Recently many environmental ethicists have argued that tackling climate change requires addressin... more Recently many environmental ethicists have argued that tackling climate change requires addressing the growth in the world's population. This paper critically examines two different versions of this argument. One which I term Restrictivism argues that there should be limits on people's procreative choice. Sarah Conly, for example, maintains that each couple has a right to one child, no more, and that this limit can be coercively enforced. I argue that such Restrictivist accounts suffer from three serious problems. First, in order to determine how many children people could permissibly limit Restrictivists like Conly would need to provide an account of intra- and inter-generational justice and they would then need to show empirically that realizing this requires that people have a right to one child and no more. Since, however, they do not provide the normative or empirical analysis the numbers they give are arbitrary. Second, Restrictivist accounts are objectionably monocausal and fail to take into account the role of other determinants of ecological sustainability (notably the levels of consumption and the kind of technology available). Third, their imposition of equal procreative limits is unfair. They penalize the poor for the high-emissions lifestyles of the rich.
A second strategy adopts what I term the Byproduct Approach. This maintains that realizing human rights to reproductive choice, education, employment and to a decent standard of living would reduce population growth and, indeed, are sufficient to establish ecological sustainability. I argue that this is a more attractive approach and that such measures are necessary. However, I argue, we lack any reason to think that they are sufficient. For to know whether they would be sufficient we would need to know what we owe future generations, what limits on ecological impacts this would in practice require, and whether the net effects of such human rights policies would result in the necessary limits on ecological impacts. In the absence of this we have no reason to think that the Byproduct Approach would be enough.
In the final part of the paper I outline a third more promising approach. This holds that humanity must live within certain ecological limits - where these limits are derived from (i) an understanding of our responsibilities to current and future generations and (ii) an empirical analysis of what is needed to comply with these responsibilities. Together (i) and (ii) define what I term the Sustainability Frontier. I then draw on the observation that humanity's environmental impact is a function of three kinds of factor (people's levels of consumption, the technology available and the number of people alive) to argue that there is a plurality of different ways in which people can comply with their responsibility to live within the Sustainability Frontier. They can choose different combinations of procreation, consumption and technological investment and diffusion. This ecological liberalism thus combines a commitment to ecological sustainability with a commitment to individual liberty.
In short: Those who emphasize the role of demographic change as a causal factor in climate change are right to do so. However, it is important that we do not treat population in isolation, but rather treat it together with levels of consumption, global inequalities, the role of the built environment in determining energy use, the political economy of energy, and the unequal access to, and control of, clean technology.
This chapter analyses the extent to which an analysis of what principles of distributive justice,... more This chapter analyses the extent to which an analysis of what principles of distributive justice, if any, apply at the global level requires empirical research. Is empirical knowledge and the findings of the social sciences needed for this kind of enquiry? And if so, how? In this chapter I examine seven different ways in which facts about national, regional and global politics (and hence empirical research into global politics) might inform accounts of global distributive justice. I begin by examining two widely shared normative claims, both of which would require the use of empirical data if they were to be endorsed. However, I raise questions about both of these views (and thus call into question the case for the role of empirical evidence that is grounded in these two views). I then outline five ways in which, I claim, empirical evidence is crucial. A deep understanding of the nature of global politics and the world economy (and thus empirical research on it) is, I submit, needed: to grasp the 'implications' of principles of global distributive justice; to evaluate such principles for their 'attainability' and 'political feasibility'; to assess their 'desirability'; and, at a prior level, 'to conceptualize the subject-matter of global distributive justice' and 'to formulate the questions that accounts of global distributive justice need to answer'.
This is a report on the equity issues surrounding the extraction of fossil fuels. It was commiss... more This is a report on the equity issues surrounding the extraction of fossil fuels. It was commissioned by Oxfam America and published by them as a Research Backgrounder. Its starting point is the recognition that a large proportion of the remaining fossil fuel reserves must stay in the ground if humanity is to have a reasonable chance of avoiding dangerous climate change. For example, Christopher McGlade and Paul Ekins find that "globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2C" (“The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2°C.” Nature 517 (7533): 187–190 at p.190). This raises questions of justice: Whose fossil fuel assets should be left in the ground? According to what criteria? What is the fairest policy towards the stranding of fossil fuel assets? Furthermore, should those who do not extract the fossil fuels in their possession receive compensation? This report explores those questions.
Many agents have failed to comply with their responsibilities to take the action needed to avoid ... more Many agents have failed to comply with their responsibilities to take the action needed to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. This pervasive noncompliance raises two questions of nonideal political theory.
First, it raises the question of what agents should do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities. (the Responsibility Question) In this paper I put forward four principles that we need to employ to answer the Responsibility Question (Sections II-V). I then illustrate my account, by outlining four kinds of action that should be undertaken (Section VI).
Pervasive noncompliance also raises a second question: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? (the Governance Question). The paper briefly outlines a methodology for addressing this question and outlines what a nonideal response to the existing institutional structures would be (Section VII). It does so with reference to the Paris Agreement, and in particular the creation of a "global stocktake" (Article 14, Paris Agreement) and the "facilitative dialogue" (paragraph 20 of the ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’).
The aim, then, is to set out an account of a nonideal theory of climate justice.
Climate change raises a number of questions of intergenerational equity. One – and the one that a... more Climate change raises a number of questions of intergenerational equity. One – and the one that attracts the most attention – is the question of what obligations people have to future generations not to engage in activities that will trigger dangerous climate change, and thereby impose harms on people in the near and distant future. The question of what we owe to future people is of critical importance when determining mitigation policy for it bears on when any generation should mitigate and by how much. The economic literature on this issue has tended to approach these questions by drawing on the idea of a 'social discount rate'. My aim in this paper is to examine the normative force of the considerations that are employed to determine the social discount rate. To do so, I will distinguish between three kinds of consideration invoked in analyses of discounting, assessing in each case their plausibility and their implications for climate change policy. The three kinds are, respectively, Pure Time Discounting, Growth Discounting and Opportunity Cost Discounting. I shall defend the following three claims: A. Pure Time Discounting gives us no reason to delay taking action to mitigate climate change (or for adopting a more gradual approach when implementing mitigation policies). B. Growth Discounting and Opportunity Cost Discounting can only justify very limited justification for delaying action to mitigate climate change. However, C. Growth Discounting-might (subject to two conditions), give us reason to pass on some of the costs of mitigating climate change (and adapting to climate change) to future generations.
There is a strong sense of malaise surrounding climate politics today. This has been created at l... more There is a strong sense of malaise surrounding climate politics today. This has been created at least in part by factors such as the chasm between the scale of action required and the adequacy of current political commitments, stalemate in global negotiations, the low price of carbon, and a growing sense of indifference among the publics of some developed countries about the threat posed by climate change. Within the policy community these issues are generally treated as different problems each to be overcome on their own terms. Yet, we argue, suggested solutions to these problems hold much in common—namely a focus on identifying agency, whether the capacity of institutions to act or the behavior of individuals. What is often missing from such accounts of climate politics is a recognition that the problems of how agency is attributed, what we might term governance traps, are structural in nature. Governing climate change therefore requires that we study the conditions through which these challenges arise and which in turn serve to frame agency in particular ways. We suggest that examining the ways in which notions of responsibilities and rights are currently being framed within climate politics provides one way into these dynamics. This opens up the critical questions that need to be addressed ahead of the critical Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris in November 2015. WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:535–540. doi: 10.1002/wcc.356
Many governments focus on the short-term and they neglect the interests of people in the long-ter... more Many governments focus on the short-term and they neglect the interests of people in the long-term. By doing so they can both (1) harm the interests of current generations and (2) lead current generations to fail to honour their responsibilities to future generations. What causes this? And, what can be done to overcome such harmful short-termism?
There seems today a strong sense of malaise surrounding climate politics, created by the gap betw... more There seems today a strong sense of malaise surrounding climate politics, created by the gap between the scale of required action identified by climate science and the adequacy of societal and political commitments. It is important to consider anew how rights, risks and responsibilities are framed in climate change debates because of the ways in which they are exacerbating a situation of stalemate.
Uploads
Books by simon caney
Papers by simon caney
This chapter’s principal contributions are its listing of basic values and principles (set out in Table 2.1), its interpretation of each of them, and its defense, so far as space permitted, of the suggestion that each of these has basic or nonderivative importance.
Any use of these basic values and principles in guiding or assessing social progress should be guided by respect for the equal dignity of all persons (Section 2.2). The values of well- being and freedom are each of pervasive importance; each has also been interpreted in importantly different ways, which the chapter distinguishes (Section 2.3). Other basic values relevant to social progress include values directly important in individuals’ lives – nonalienation, esteem, solidarity, and security – and values embodied in the environment and in human culture.
A second strategy adopts what I term the Byproduct Approach. This maintains that realizing human rights to reproductive choice, education, employment and to a decent standard of living would reduce population growth and, indeed, are sufficient to establish ecological sustainability. I argue that this is a more attractive approach and that such measures are necessary. However, I argue, we lack any reason to think that they are sufficient. For to know whether they would be sufficient we would need to know what we owe future generations, what limits on ecological impacts this would in practice require, and whether the net effects of such human rights policies would result in the necessary limits on ecological impacts. In the absence of this we have no reason to think that the Byproduct Approach would be enough.
In the final part of the paper I outline a third more promising approach. This holds that humanity must live within certain ecological limits - where these limits are derived from (i) an understanding of our responsibilities to current and future generations and (ii) an empirical analysis of what is needed to comply with these responsibilities. Together (i) and (ii) define what I term the Sustainability Frontier. I then draw on the observation that humanity's environmental impact is a function of three kinds of factor (people's levels of consumption, the technology available and the number of people alive) to argue that there is a plurality of different ways in which people can comply with their responsibility to live within the Sustainability Frontier. They can choose different combinations of procreation, consumption and technological investment and diffusion. This ecological liberalism thus combines a commitment to ecological sustainability with a commitment to individual liberty.
In short: Those who emphasize the role of demographic change as a causal factor in climate change are right to do so. However, it is important that we do not treat population in isolation, but rather treat it together with levels of consumption, global inequalities, the role of the built environment in determining energy use, the political economy of energy, and the unequal access to, and control of, clean technology.
First, it raises the question of what agents should do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities. (the Responsibility Question) In this paper I put forward four principles that we need to employ to answer the Responsibility Question (Sections II-V). I then illustrate my account, by outlining four kinds of action that should be undertaken (Section VI).
Pervasive noncompliance also raises a second question: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? (the Governance Question). The paper briefly outlines a methodology for addressing this question and outlines what a nonideal response to the existing institutional structures would be (Section VII). It does so with reference to the Paris Agreement, and in particular the creation of a "global stocktake" (Article 14, Paris Agreement) and the "facilitative dialogue" (paragraph 20 of the ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’).
The aim, then, is to set out an account of a nonideal theory of climate justice.
This chapter’s principal contributions are its listing of basic values and principles (set out in Table 2.1), its interpretation of each of them, and its defense, so far as space permitted, of the suggestion that each of these has basic or nonderivative importance.
Any use of these basic values and principles in guiding or assessing social progress should be guided by respect for the equal dignity of all persons (Section 2.2). The values of well- being and freedom are each of pervasive importance; each has also been interpreted in importantly different ways, which the chapter distinguishes (Section 2.3). Other basic values relevant to social progress include values directly important in individuals’ lives – nonalienation, esteem, solidarity, and security – and values embodied in the environment and in human culture.
A second strategy adopts what I term the Byproduct Approach. This maintains that realizing human rights to reproductive choice, education, employment and to a decent standard of living would reduce population growth and, indeed, are sufficient to establish ecological sustainability. I argue that this is a more attractive approach and that such measures are necessary. However, I argue, we lack any reason to think that they are sufficient. For to know whether they would be sufficient we would need to know what we owe future generations, what limits on ecological impacts this would in practice require, and whether the net effects of such human rights policies would result in the necessary limits on ecological impacts. In the absence of this we have no reason to think that the Byproduct Approach would be enough.
In the final part of the paper I outline a third more promising approach. This holds that humanity must live within certain ecological limits - where these limits are derived from (i) an understanding of our responsibilities to current and future generations and (ii) an empirical analysis of what is needed to comply with these responsibilities. Together (i) and (ii) define what I term the Sustainability Frontier. I then draw on the observation that humanity's environmental impact is a function of three kinds of factor (people's levels of consumption, the technology available and the number of people alive) to argue that there is a plurality of different ways in which people can comply with their responsibility to live within the Sustainability Frontier. They can choose different combinations of procreation, consumption and technological investment and diffusion. This ecological liberalism thus combines a commitment to ecological sustainability with a commitment to individual liberty.
In short: Those who emphasize the role of demographic change as a causal factor in climate change are right to do so. However, it is important that we do not treat population in isolation, but rather treat it together with levels of consumption, global inequalities, the role of the built environment in determining energy use, the political economy of energy, and the unequal access to, and control of, clean technology.
First, it raises the question of what agents should do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities. (the Responsibility Question) In this paper I put forward four principles that we need to employ to answer the Responsibility Question (Sections II-V). I then illustrate my account, by outlining four kinds of action that should be undertaken (Section VI).
Pervasive noncompliance also raises a second question: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? (the Governance Question). The paper briefly outlines a methodology for addressing this question and outlines what a nonideal response to the existing institutional structures would be (Section VII). It does so with reference to the Paris Agreement, and in particular the creation of a "global stocktake" (Article 14, Paris Agreement) and the "facilitative dialogue" (paragraph 20 of the ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’).
The aim, then, is to set out an account of a nonideal theory of climate justice.
to consider anew how rights, risks and responsibilities are framed in climate change debates because of the ways in which they are exacerbating a situation of stalemate.