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War and Peace in Somalia
Israel Nyaburi Nyadera1,2,
Mohamed Salah Ahmed2 and
Michael Otieno Kisaka3
1
University of Macau, Macau, China
2
Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara,
Turkey
3
Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey
Synonyms
Civil war; Conflict resolution; Counterterrorism;
Organized crime; Peacebuilding; Traditional
peace approaches; Transformation of conflict;
Violence; Xeer
Definition/Description
This chapter examines how and why peace has
remained elusive in the Somali crisis following
the events that marked the collapse of Siad Barre’s
regime in 1991. Although several studies have
been undertaken on this case and a number of
recommendations suggested, limited attention
has been placed on the transformation of the conflict and the need to modify some of the
peacebuilding strategies to cope with the changes.
This study discusses how the conflict in Somalia
has evolved, weaknesses in the previous peace
efforts, and provides recommendations. It looks
at the traditional Xeer practices in Somalia and its
relevance in solving contemporary conflict.
Introduction
In 1960, Somalia (Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliyeed)
joined the category of the first African countries to
gain independence following the unification of the
previous State of Somaliland (Controlled by the
British) and the Trust Territory of Somaliland
(previously under the Italians) (Reyner 1960, p.
247; Lewis et al. 2008). The new state experienced a blowing wind of hope for new dawn
after approximately seven decades of European
imperialism. The early years after independence
were marked by blossoming political, economic,
and social growth. However, this would be shortlived as the impact of uniting the previously
divided regions, colonial legacies, and the emerging economic challenges facing the new state
combined with other political and social factors
laid the foundations for preceding disasters. In
1969, a successful military coup was orchestrated
by General Mohammed Siyad Barre, who took
control of the country and plunged it to further
crisis (Ingiriis 2016; Ghalib 1995; Mazrui 1997, p.
6; Knight 1998). During his rule, Siad Barre made
enemies both at home and abroad. He did not only
emerge as a ruthless dictator known for fiercely
dealing with anyone threatening his grip on power
but also, Siyad Barre thrust Somalia into three
major conflicts (Greenfield 1987, p. 65; Clark
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
O. Richmond, G. Visoka (eds.), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11795-5_107-1
2
1992, p. 110). These include the Ogaden war
(1977-78) with Ethiopia, the Somali national government forces against Somali National Movement in 1988, and intense conflicts between
several liberation movements composed of different clans and the Somalian national government
between 1978 and 1991. Internationally, Barre’s
government was conspicuously involved in the
Cold War rivalry between the Soviets and the
United States. By 1991, a civil war erupted leading to his overthrow and the subsequent collapse
of the Somalia government. Some scholars
believe that Barre played a significant role in the
events that followed his removal from power and
the civil war (Ingiriis 2016; Doornbos and
Markakis 1994).
Since 1991, the conflict in Somalia has evolved
in nature, actors, strategies, and even objectives
(World Bank 2005; Lewis 2008, p. 72). Such
transformations have hindered peacebuilding
efforts and continue to elevate the suffering of
millions inside the country and across the Horn
of Africa (Menkhaus 1996, pp. 43–45; Menkhaus
2009; Nyadera and Bincof 2019; Bowd and
Chikwanha 2010). From the onset, militia groups
from various clans have been engaged in the conflict, foremost against the government, and later
after the disintegration of state institutions, civilian violence has been witnessed between clans
with very severe impacts on the majority of the
civilians.
The scramble for the limited state resources left
behind after the collapse of the government in
1991 has created an environment whereby only
the strongest can survive. Consequently, this
paved the way for the rapid expansion of organized crime with new areas continuously being
explored (Shortland and Varese 2016, p. 811).
Over the last two decades, Somalia has been on
the spotlight for being a hub for terrorism, piracy,
kidnappings, smuggling, child soldiers, and assassinations. Various local and foreign-based groups
continue to profit from the instability. Territorial
control, hijacking relief products, and illegal taxation have characterized the contemporary Somali
society and became an important source of projecting one’s power among the nonstate actors
(Møller 2009, p. 12). While economic, political,
War and Peace in Somalia
and material stakes are high in the Somali crisis,
clan alignment is still visible in the way the war is
being perpetuated today. The chart below indicates that over 11,000 acts of violence carried
out by different actors between 1995 and 2019.
From the second half of the 1990s to date, there
have been changes in nature of the conflict in the
form of a shift from the sporadic attacks between
different clans and subclans, to a state of lawlessness and disorder. This has been facilitated by the
infiltration by criminal groups who use the less
governed territories to launch local and regional
attacks (Shortland and Varese 2016, pp. 811–814;
Menkhaus 2003, p. 406). During certain periods,
regions such as south-central part of Somalia
witnessed prolonged stability with the introduction of the Sharia courts which had been founded
on Islamic teachings and principles as alternative
to the mainstream judicial system (Møller 2009, p.
13; Barnes and Hassan 2007, p. 152; Murphy
2011). However, with time, the same Islamic
Courts and its leaders became leading actors in
the country’s struggle for power (Lewis 2008, p.
85; ICG 2008, p. 2; Shay 2017). By the year 2010,
a vast part of Somalia became subjected to the
sphere of influence of radical militia wings previously affiliated with the Islamic Courts such as the
Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab but who opted to
use force in implementing the Sharia Law (Dersso
2009, p. 6; Floudiotis 2010).
During the 2000s, increased efforts by regional
and international actors saw the establishment of a
Somali government referred to as the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) with the hope that a
central authority which had been lacking since
1991 would help restore stability to the war-torn
state. The mandate of the TFG was envisioned to
extend through 2012 to establish some fundamental institutions such as the Federal Parliament, an
Executive, Public Service Commission, and
others. The federal government was not however
able to impose its authority in the whole country
as the Islamic Courts which controlled the Southern parts of the country were reluctant to surrender
power to the central government. In fact, it was the
attempt by the TFG with the support of the United
States, Ethiopia, and African Union troops to
forcefully overrule the sharia law-controlled
War and Peace in Somalia
parts of Somalia that saw militia groups such as
the al-Shabab emerge (Shay 2017, pp. 21–26;
Mwangi 2010, pp. 88–90).
In 2008, there was a coalition government
formed after a peace talk was brokered by former
UN envoy, Ahmedou Abdallah. This agreement
saw representatives of the moderate Islamist
group; Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
and the government representatives agree to
expand parliament to 550 members and provide
room for ARS representatives and allow for the
appointment of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as the president and the appointment of Abdirashid Ali, as
Prime minister. In 2009 an announcement was
made by the government regarding its intention
to reintroduce Sharia law as the basis upon which
the official Judiciary would be founded. Despite
this announcement, the violence did not stop in
the Southern part of Somalia, which was under the
control of radical militia groups that were in support of Sharia law. The government lost 80% of
the territory; it was previously controlling in
South-Central Somalia to different warlords and
militias (Nyadera and Salah 2019).
As a provision in the “Roadmap for the End of
Transition,” the transitional government paved the
way for institutionalization of the Federal Government together with permanent institutions of
governance (Bryden 2013; Hesse 2010, pp. 245–
248; Cornwell 2006). The parliament was given
the mandate to elect the president, and since 2012,
two presidential elections have been conducted.
Despite the impressive efforts that have seen
Somalia establish a government today, attempts
to end the conflict have not been very successful
as the country continues to be involved in an
intense intrastate cycle of conflict (Nyadera et al.
2019). Between 2011 and 2018, there have been
two presidential elections, efforts to reconstruct
the national army ongoing, significant loss of
territory by al-Shabab as well as other institutional
reconstructions. Nonetheless, despite these
efforts, attacks on key state installations have continued, calls for independence by some starts have
persisted, civilians continue to be attacked in
major cities, and governments operations are yet
be fully felt.
3
Key Peacemaking Efforts in Somalia
The conflict in Somalia has not gone unnoticed
and has attracted the attention of both local,
regional, and international actors who have
embarked on several efforts to broker peace
among the warring parties. However, these efforts
have largely been unsuccessful as a result of several reasons some of which include the top-down
approach that does not include the people, the
failure of these agreements to address the root
causes of the conflict as well as their inability to
provide deals that all clans feel satisfied. Similarly, the peace efforts were marred by mistrust
and lack of compromise among the different clan
representatives. Below are some of the efforts
made to bring the warring factions on the chart
to discuss peace.
Djibouti Peace Conference (1991)
When delegates representing different groups sat
on 1991 in Djibouti, marking the first peace
efforts, many were optimistic that peace was on
the horizon. The Djibouti Peace Conference was
convened by the Djiboutian government to mitigate on militia activities in Mogadishu between
the factions of General Aideed and Ali Mahdi.
The conflict between these factions is estimated
to have claimed 14,000 lives at the time, and
42,000 people were maimed (Lewis (2002, p.
264). Egypt, Italy, and other states in the Horn of
Africa provided support in different capacities to
the Djiboutian government (Lyons and Samatar
1995, p. 29). However, diplomacy reached hiatus
when the peace conference was held, and this was
attributed to the militia war between General
Aideed and Ali Mahdi and an absence of a strategic framework addressing the conflict between the
two Hawiye militia leaders in Mogadishu.
Moreover, Mogadishu was thrown to the abyss
due to the full-scale civil war driven by the militia
leader who did circumvent the law because he was
not accountable to any government institution.
Indeed, the absence of government structures
was a haven for impunity among the third-generation civil militia groups. Due to the nonexistent
of a social contract between the state and its citizens, the Somali state disintegrated and
4
completely collapsed, and a banana republic is
sprouting.
Djibouti Peace Conference did abort because
of the failed framework and principles of mediation. The mediation process did breach the elementary rule of mediation, which clearly states
that mediation should not quest to promote one
person or group’s interests at the expense of
another (Mayer 2004, p. 85). Fundamentally, the
conflict had not reached Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) where actors involved in the conflict
see no chance of victory, yet the current situation
is causing pain for both parties (Zartman and
Berman 1982; Zartman 1983; Touval and
Zartman 1985). General Aideed was still hoping
to win the war, thus making it difficult for the
process to achieve sustainable peace (Bercovitch
et al. 2008, p. 54). The timing of the peace conference was not the best given that some actors
(General Aideed) were still hopeful of a military
victory against Ali Mahdi and forces loyal to Siad
Barre. General Aideed had no incentives to attend
a peace conference that could reduce his political,
military, and economic influence in the civil militia conflict (Zartman 2000, p. 291).
Mogadishu was at that stage Balkanized into
political and military fiefdoms of Third Generation Militia Groups, with General Aideed controlling a large part of the capital city. The Djibouti
Peace Conference lacked credibility both within
Somalia and internationally. Djibouti process did
not have the aegis from Somalis who were polarized along with clan militia affiliations; some
militia groups saw it as a plateau before initiating
the next stage of the conflict. The international
community was not ready to underwrite the
peace process politically as reflected in Sahnoun’s
(1994, p. 10) argument that when the government
of Djibouti requested UN’s support for the peace
process, it was refused with no explanation except
that the matter of Somalia was too complicated.
The Addis Ababa Peace Conference (1993)
The Addis Ababa Conference (1993) on National
Reconciliation was convened by the UN based on
what Bradbury (1994, p. 22) contends was an
analysis of the ORH dramatic changes in Somalia
brought about by the US Military presence. Lewis
War and Peace in Somalia
(2005, p. 270; 2010, p. 129) goes further and
suggests that the UN Secretary-General at that
time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, took advantage of
the relative lull in fighting which the US presence
had produced and pressed ahead with the socalled “reconciliation” process. This analysis presumes that the Addis Ababa peace conference did
not emanate from rational diagnostics of the conflict because the decision was informed by UN
expediency. The failure of this peace initiative
could have been sowed from the beginning.
First, the arbitrary manner in which delegates to
the conference were selected, which resulted in a
dominant representation of the Mudug region,
there was disagreement between the UN and the
militia on the selection of delegates. This isolated
General Aideed from the peace process, although
his group controlled a larger part of Somalia. The
remaining 15 militia groups signed a peace agreement that saw the creation of the Transitional
National Authority.
The Transitional National Authority did not
last long as the Addis Ababa process failure to
place the root causes of the conflict on the negotiation table with issues, such as the fight over
grazing land in the Mudug region, were not
taken into consideration in favor of political expediency owing to the establishment of a central
government. Conversely, an agreement on a
ceasefire without a clear structural framework for
the implementation was a shortcoming of the process; the peace process should have developed
concise modalities for the cantonment of militia
groups. A strategy of the cantonment and eventual
disarmament should have been negotiated with all
the militia leaders, taking into account the security
dilemma among the clan affiliated militia groups,
and clan elders would have played a pivotal role in
this regard. The approach ought to have been
different from the tactics of isolating and marginalizing General Aideed’s militia group (Lewis
2010, p. 132; Adam 2008, p. 99; Rutherford
2008, p. 146).
The Cairo Peace Conference (1997)
The governments of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen did
co-sponsor the Cairo peace conference and was
attended by 28 warlords and factional leaders.
War and Peace in Somalia
Elmi and Barise (2006, p. 40) observe that at the
time, Somalia’s warlords and factional leaders
were separated into two groups: The Ethiopiansupported Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA),
which consisted of 15 factions and the Somali
National Alliance (SNA), which consisted of 13
factions and received limited support from Libya
(Elmi and Barise 2006, pp. 42–46).
Ali Mahdi and Hussein Mohammed Aideed
led the SSA and the SNA, respectively. The
main objective of the Cairo peace process was to
re-establish the nonexistent central government.
The form and type of a future Somali government
was a bone of contestation space by the international community, and no due consideration was
given to Somalis. Elmi and Barise (2006, p. 40)
allege that the act of walking out of the conference
and rejecting its outcomes by Abdullahi Yusuf
Ahmed and General Adam Abdullahi Nur was
motivated by Ethiopia. These two militia leaders
were deemed to be critical role-players at the
conference. These actions led to the collapse of
the conference.
The Arta Peace Conference (2000)
The Arta Peace Conference was held against the
background of the successive failures of the Addis
Ababa and Cairo peace processes, and the hacking
of the Somali state by a plethora of militia groups
often supported by their clansmen. Ismail Omar
Guelle, President of Djibouti, in January 2000
embarked on what Lewis (2002, p. 291) describes
as a more ambitious, new and in many respects
novel Somali peace plan. It was well received by
the IGAD countries and was endorsed by the
USA, Italy, Egypt, and Libya. The peace process
was named Arta, after a city in Djibouti.
It is estimated that 60% of the 245 members of
the Transitional National Assembly came from
Siad Barre’s former members of parliament
(Lewis (2008, p. 82). The legitimacy of the Arta
process was questioned before its implementation
began owing to several dynamics. Both the TNG
and TNA did lack the support of the Somalis,
recalcitrant warlords, such as Mohammed
Qanyere Afrah, Musa Saudi, Ali Osman Atto,
Hussein Aideed, Mohammed Dhere, and
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The parochial clan
5
political focus of the TNG had been attested to
be a phenomenon in its failure and reinforced by
the perception that the TNG serves the interests of
the subclan that gave it political backing (Dagne
2009, pp. 95–98).
The crumble of the Arta peace process lay in its
lack of focus on conflict resolution and failure to
create a mechanism to ensure that the underlying
causes of the conflict were addressed systematically and coherently. The conference’s central
government creation before the resolution phase
of the conflict was a short-sighted approach to the
resolution of an intractable conflict which had
shown resistance to military resolution. The conceptual framework for creating a government
before making peace has become a defining feature of international diplomacy in the resolution of
the conflict since the Arta Peace Conference,
despite its shortcomings and failures in the Somali
context.
The Mbagathi Peace Conference (2004)
The Mbagathi Peace Process sponsored by the
IGAD was convened due to the failure of the
Arta Peace Conference (2000). Lewis (2008, p.
91) observes that the Mbagathi process had
repeated all the major mistakes made during similar and unproductive Somali peace processes.
The most critical mistake was the unavailability
of a roadmap for tranquility and reconciliations
before the establishment of a central government.
The Mbagathi process took place in a period of
challenging international security threats posed by
global terror groups, characterized by the 11th
September 2011 attacks on the USA. The fact
that Somalia terrorist groups had begun taking
advantage of the instability in Somalia to set up
bases meant the US government would have an
interest in the direction of the peace process was
going, mainly due to the Bush Administration’s
global strategy and the war on terror.
Menkhaus (2003, p. 19) argues that for external actors, conventional wisdom holds that a
responsible and effective state is an essential prerequisite for development and peace, a reasonable
position enshrined in virtually all World Bank and
UN strategies on development. For Somalis, the
state is an instrument for accumulation and
6
domination, enriching and empowering those
who control it, while exploiting and harassing
the rest of the population (Menkhaus 2003).
Møller (2009, p. 14) observes that the relentless
quest for state-building in the Somali conflict resolution process is predicated on the entire international system constructed around states to such an
extent that it cannot handle stateless territories
inhabited by people who cannot be classified as
citizens of any state. Somali’s case can be solved
from a bottom-up approach where the unity needs
to be forged among the people before embarking
on state building. Somalia has relevant historical
structures such as the diya – paying system that
can be useful towards this course.
The
Mbagathi
peace
process
was
compromised by a relentless emphasis on clan
formula representation in the process. Innocuous
clan identity became a cornerstone of instrumentalist politicians in their quest to occupy positions
with the perceived proximate to wealth accumulation because ethnic conflict is all about political,
economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues
between two or more ethnic communities
(Brown 2001, p. 211).
Several Scholars have attributed a number of
factors as having led to the failed peace efforts.
Nyadera et al. (2019) identify clan interest as a big
obstacle to peace in Somalia. They opine that as
long as clans continue to exercise the narrative of,
we against they with no room for consensus then
peace will remain elusive. Menkhaus (2010)
argues that the Transitional Federal Government
failure to take advantage of local structures
established between 2002 and 2006 also weakened the peace process as those institutions
(including the Sharia courts) played an important
role in enforcing peace at the local level. Other
scholars have argued that the lack of funding to
implement peace agreements in Somalia is also a
serious challenge to the successful peacebuilding.
Emphasis on top -down approach to peace is also
poses a challenge in the Somali peace process as
most view the efforts as externally imposed and
not homegrown. This makes the locals less committed to the peace efforts.
War and Peace in Somalia
The Promise of Traditional Peacemaking
Approaches in Somalia
In several societies, the role of the tribal socioeconomic, political, and cultural systems or community elders has been very critical and instrumental in solving and mediating a variety of social
problems and disputes between local communities (Avruch 1998; Holt and DeVore 2005;
Deutsch et al. 2011). The role of clan elders has
been identified as a human source and a great
advantage throughout history (Brock-Utne
2001). Equally, Tadesse et al. (2010) and Jama
(2010) suggest that other members of society,
particularly women, can also play a vital role in
conflict resolution.
Indeed, the traditional Somali approach to mediation and conflict resolution, known as Xeer (customary law), has a long history and existed before
the modern laws were introduced to Somalia during
the colonial era. Since then, the traditional model of
mediation (Xeer) has been identified by many
scholars and within the Somali communities as
the paramount justice system suitable for Somalia
given the current orientations whereby the clan has
become the main political organization unit, and
the authority of the state has been lost. Xeer is an
unwritten law which focuses on creating a longlasting relationship among the communities by
providing alternatives solutions to conflicts (Aden
2011; Prunier 2015). It is a unique yet very effective
way of conflict resolution dating back several thousand years (Loubser and Solomon 2014; Hofmann
2002). However, the traditional approach of mediation is one option for stateless societies due to the
absence of formal law to address specific circumstances (Abdile 2012; 88). Given the complexity of
the current circumstances in Somalia, customary
law may able to offer some critical contributions
to solve and mediate the conflict, for instance, the
case of Somaliland which unilaterally declared it is
independence from the rest of Somalia and
Puntland an autonomous administration but claims
to be a member of federal state (Aden 2011; 3;
Nyadera 2018).
In this section, the role of traditional or clan
elders, their effectiveness in solving socio-economic and legal conflicts, as well as the
War and Peace in Somalia
mechanisms employed by the traditional elders to
deal with these dispute processes will be examined. Sorts of conflicts and how (traditional
elders) interpret and construe these unwritten
laws will be extensively analyzed. Nevertheless,
as the topic of this chapter highlights, we will also
examine how this traditional approach helps to
overcome the current conflict and their role in
reestablishing such key norms such as trust and
cooperation which are very fundamental in the
establishment of an inclusive and more comprehensive Somali state.
The Configuration of Somali Traditional
Structure
Existing literature on Somali society considers
Somali people as one of the most homogenous
societies in Africa characterized by one ethnicity,
culture, common language (Somali), history, and
the Sunni-Islam religious orientation (Aden 2011,
p. 5). For this reason, many scholars and writers
who studied Somalia during the period of trusteeship from the 1950s to 1960s argue and ostensibly
believe that Somalis had a golden opportunity to
establish one of the strongest and stout nationstates in Africa (Davidson 1975). Unfortunately,
this has not come to pass. Since the collapse of
state institutions, the indigenous instruments and
mechanisms of conflict resolution and management have been in place and have saved the lives
of many people. However, why these methods
have been effective and did not collapse in conjunction with state institutions seems to be a legitimate question that needs to be addressed
profoundly. Understanding the traditional Somali
societal structures, therefore, might help us find an
answer to a part of the question.
According to British anthropologist, Lewis
(1999), his studies on the Somali culture and
history pointed out that the traditional structure
of Somalis is systematically divided into three
core features: clan (traditional social structure),
customary law (Xeer), and clan elders (traditional
authorities). These three are interconnected and
interrelated with each other. Clans are the main
source traditional authority, which means each
clan has its traditional elders or authority, while
customary law stands as the common law which
7
these elders or traditional authority use to solve
disputes and conflict among the clans. However, it
is important to point out that this three-fold traditional justice system existed before the arrival of
the Europeans and has endured since then primarily because of their critical role in the lives of
ordinary people. Before the introduction of colonialism, Somalis were a nomadic society in nature
and with a simple life. Every person and family
belonged to a certain clan, which was ensured
survival in nomadic atmosphere and culture.
Clannism, therefore, stands as the definitive
source of both identity and security. It is important
and essential to many Somalis for security and
social welfare. Hence, it is compulsory and obligatory to the member of the clan to safeguard and
protect the dignity and honor of the clan (Putman
and Noor 1993).
The clan unit has remained the most important
bond and basis for identity among Somalis living
in the rural and urban areas. Gundel (2009, p. 21)
argues that the nomadic way of life creates a
strong conscious and sense of attachment to kinship as they see this as a prerequisite to overcome
existing and unforeseen challenges. It is this same
way of life that also necessitate constant movement in search for grazing fields, pastures, and
water, increasing the possibility of conflict
between different clans. In order to ensure that
such potential for conflict is regulated, traditional
conflict prevention and resolution strategies were
put in place. These traditional mechanisms are
based on traditional authorities and unwritten
laws that ensured not only prevention of conflict
but also punishment and justice for perpetuates
and victims of violence respectively. Additionally,
traditional approaches to peace in Somalia allowed for the formation of coalitions
(gaanshaabuur) between weak or minority clans
or the protection of minority clans by the dominant ones in exchange for loyalty (Gundel 2009,
p. 22). Some scholars have also argued that clans
facilitate not only one’s sense of identity but also
enable people to trace their decedent and primary
lineage. In Somalia, this is done by following the
male line from their father’s name. The clan structure in Somalia is illustrated below;
8
Among these categories, the Mag-paying
group is the most relevant to the ordinary individual’s social and political life. This category stands
as the organizational basis of lineage members
that provides and ensures economic viability,
social security, and physical protection. Additionally, it is the most stable and permanent unit in the
traditional social system with the existence of an
informal and unwritten contractual understanding
among its members regarding payments such as
fines and compensations. They tend to support
each other in these sorts of payments, usually in
the form of camels without conversing with
whomsoever it is levied. The general principles
and rules of mag-paying are known and fixed
throughout clans and aim at maintaining and guiding the conduct of the members of the clan. For
instance, the fine or payment for killing a man is a
hundred camels, and that for killing a woman is 50
camels. Every member of the clan is obligated to
obey the mag-paying system. It is a collective
action, and compensations are paid collectively.
The customary law (Xeer), carried out by traditional authorities or elders, is the main source and
reference of this mag-paying system that governs
and guides the norms, conducts, and interactions
within and beyond the mag-paying community.
The Xeer System
The Xeer is defined as socially constructed norms
aimed at safeguarding the social justice and security of Somalis including those in the diaspora
(Fox 1999, p. 13) and essentially has commonly
recognized principles that emphasize on protecting individual rights and requirements to family and clan (Notten 2005, p. 375). The Xeer is
mainly instigated as a mechanism to control and
manage social relations and has two main units:
xeer guud (generally accepted laws that has
nation-wide applicability) and xeer sokeye (kin
law that is employed and adopted by individuals
or members of certain clans or subclans). Nevertheless, Xeer aims to provide law and order, to
manage issues related to marriage, to establish
reasons for war and peace, and most importantly,
to establish agreements between families and
clans that can facilitate the distribution and allocation of resources peacefully.
War and Peace in Somalia
However, Xeer is supplementary with blood
compensation (diya), and as such, both provide
rules and regulations of punishment for misconduct (Leeson 2007). In the meantime, these principles and rules are obeyed by all Somali families
and clans as a mechanism to overcome and end
traditional disputes and conflicts between clans
and for blood compensation (Kusow and
Mohamud 2006). However, it is indisputable
that Xeer has been and yet remains a core principle in forming social norms, obligation, and most
importantly, expectations of the Somalis before
and during the processes of state formation. Nevertheless, Xeer, along with Islamic laws, has
remained the only legal structure in place for a
long time in Somalia (Zartman 2000, p. 186;
Notten 2005, p. 375). It is believed that previously, Xeer was secular, but has greatly been
influenced by the arrival of Islam over time and
now included various Islamic legal codes, principles, values, and norms.
Considering the maturity of Xeer and how it
has been practiced, as well as its main principles
and values, its origin can be traced to the Somali
history or custom locally known as (dhaqan),
cultural habits and behavior, and Islam. Furthermore, since its formation, Xeer has succeeded to
maintain its two primary enactors: traditional
authority (odayaal) and wise man (waxgarad).
For a long time, these two institutions have had
the responsibility and power of enacting Xeer
laws (Abdile 2012, p. 88). In the first epoch of
the nineteenth century, Xeer institution came
under threat and begun weakening for three reasons; first, the arrival of the European
colonialization as they introduced western laws
and rules meant to replace Xeer which also
impacted the status and power of the institution.
Secondly, the formation of the modern state in
Somalia, particularly the creation of modern
courts which have taken over the powers and
duties of all customary institutions, including
Xeer. The odayaal and waxgarad were replaced
by contemporary judges. Thirdly, the continuing
competition between Xeer and Sharia laws have
also significantly challenged Xeer legitimacy and
debilitated its lawfulness within the Somali society. However, the collapse of military state and
War and Peace in Somalia
government institutions such as the legal system
in 1991 has brought about the rebirth and revitalization of the customary institution once again to
fill the power vacuum and replace the modern
laws.
Henceforth, the Xeer system has been
regaining its power and status and has become
the central tenet for law and order in some parts
of Somalia. This revitalization marked a transition
of the Somali social and political structure from
modern systems of law to traditional version
anchored in the Xeer system. For that reason,
Xeer is the only source of justice that all Somalis
agree upon, therefore, can be significantly influential and decisive when dealing with the current
conflicts in Somalia (Zuin 2008, p. 94).
Xeer as an institution of conflict management
and resolution offers three models to deal with any
encounter: negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Often, traditional meetings meant to solve
customary disputes take place under the tree, and
all the male adults in the clan can attend as the
audience. However, negotiations involve straight
communications or direct talks between the disputing groups without any interference from the
third party and are intended to avoid further traditional conflict resolution meetings (Farah and
Lewis 1997). If this fails, the Xeer system allows
the involvement of a third party to mediate an end
to the dispute and prevent further conflicts (Moore
1996, p. 15). Should there be any further need to
break the deadlock in conflict resolution, then the
parties can move to an arbitrary model of solving
their dispute, and together, decide a tribunal which
commences the arbitration from scratch. New
terms of engagement in the dispute, the mechanism for choosing the arbitrators, and the procedure of the arbitral tribunal are outlined before a
new commencement for dispute arbitration
(Zartman 2007, p. 199). Nevertheless, arbitration
seems to be the most widely used in Somalia to
deal with disputes and conflicts between families
and communities, yet this has not received enough
scholarly attention within the Somali studies
(Abdile 2012, p. 90).
Conceptually speaking, these three traditional
conflict resolutions mechanisms have both similarities and differences. In terms of similarities,
9
foremost, they are voluntary (Moore 1996), negations and meditation share the same outcome
which is nonbinding (Wall and Lynn 1993), and
all three mechanisms share similarities regarding
producers, responsibilities, and duties of the arbitrators and mediators. More comprehensively,
these mechanisms, therefore, allow parties to
enter into solutions and agreements freely, as
well as implement compensations and fines voluntarily. Despite these similarities, there are also
some distinctive differences. Arbitration is distinct from the other two models (negotiation and
mediation) both which require that discussions be
conducted smoothly and simply. On the contrary,
arbitrators are tasked with establishing solutions
to the conflict, which makes their job harder and
difficult.
The uniqueness of the Xeer system is that it is
guided by clan agreements, an oral agreement
memorized and passed on from one generation
to the other through different ways such as
poems (maanso), songs (gabayo), proverbs
(mahmahyo), and storytelling (sheekoyin). Consequently, the Xeer mechanism remains very significant in conflict management and resolution
method in Somalia. The survival and endurance
of the Xeer system is founded on several reasons.
Foremost, the conservative nature of Somali society and societal structure which makes family and
kinship ties the basis of building sustained relationships, alliance, and friendship. Secondly,
there is a lack of confidence for modern secular
laws and the modern state’s failure to govern
society and ensure justice, which depends on
compensation and reconciliation. Thirdly, is the
previous failure of the colonial powers to adopt
modern laws in large parts of Somalia, specifically
in rural and remote areas in which the Xeer institution was the only recognized system of providing justice. Fourth, there is a belief among
Somalis that their culture is superior to the white
Christian culture. The term “white Christian”
itself is a deliberate sign of resistance against the
modern laws and portrays Xeer system as being
under attack from western culture. More significantly, it promotes the institutionalization of cultural differences and portrays what can be Somali
and what cannot be. Despite Xeer’s survival in
10
contemporary Somalia, it encounters several challenges and limitations among these: the lack of
central power or authority; it diminishes individual rights and an overemphasis on societal order
and lacks adequate and effective conflict prevention and enforcement methods and mechanisms
(Abdile 2012, p. 107).
Summary
This entry sought to revisit a conflict in the Horn
of Africa that has overstayed its time even in the
standards of a region vulnerable to conflict. The
Somali conflict is now nearly three decades old,
with very little progress in terms of sustainable
peace. The chapter examined why and what can
be done to achieve peace and stability in the
violent ridden nation. It examined the background
of the conflict, how it has transformed over time,
and some of the previous peace efforts. It establishes that the crisis in Somalia in 2019 has very
little semblance to what it was in 1991 in terms of
actors, objectives, and strategies. However, what
remains constant in the two periods is that they
both have inflicted huge suffering and misery on
the people of Somalia. The legacy of this conflict
has left thousands killed, millions displaced, and
economic instabilities and hopelessness, especially among the young people, have left them
with little choice than to join criminal gangs.
The chapter also establishes that the previous
peace efforts have fallen short of bringing peace in
the country because of failing to address some
pertinent issues such as legitimacy, unity, inclusivity in the process and focusing more on a topdown state-building approach without ensuring
the people on the ground are well consulted and
deep-rooted grievances addressed. In other words,
the previous peace efforts appear to have
rewarded only top-ranking members of the groups
involved in the conflict with government positions
without a clear blueprint on how justice, economic equality, good governance practices, as
well as organized crime will be tackled. The result
has been continued violence, destruction, and suffering. That is why this chapter suggests that
where the crisis in Somalia has reached,
War and Peace in Somalia
peacebuilding efforts will need to be robust,
address broader aspects of the situation, and
adopt multidimensional strategies to address the
root causes of the conflict as well as the emerging
criminal activities.
One of these strategies is to reflect on traditional conflict resolution strategies and modify
them to fit into the contemporary setting. Xeer is
one of the most promising approaches that we
recommend because it tackles microchallenges
that other resolution strategies have not addressed.
Secondly, in the spirit of Xeer, a conducive environment from which other conflict resolution
strategies can be implemented will be created.
Some of the current problems facing Somalia
today emanate from clan settings. Xeer has the
required tools to reach deeper into the society and
act as a catalyst in solving the crisis. More specifically are the attributes of consensus building,
transformational aspects, and forgiveness that
Xeer brings forth will play an important role in
the peacebuilding process. Xeer will also influence other factors such as the success of a potential truth and reconciliation process, new
constitution writing, and the construction of a
Somalia national identity. This chapter, therefore,
hopes to encourage stakeholders to look at multiple sources for a solution to the crisis. This
approach, we believe will take more time, will
need more commitment from the citizens and
actors involved in the peace process but will
have a significant impact over time.
Cross-References
▶ Assessment of Peace Operations
▶ Negotiation
▶ Peacebuilding and Spatial Transformation
▶ Search for Peace
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