Mersin University
Journal of Maritime Faculty
Mersin University Journal of Maritime Faculty (MEUJMAF)
Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 01-06, June 2023
e-ISSN 2687-6612, Türkiye
DOI: 10.47512/meujmaf.1230643
Research Article
MARITIME BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN
Yusuf Ali MOHAMMED*1
1
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Department of Public Law, Eskişehir, Türkiye
ORCID ID 0000-0002-7667-5288
yusufkud@gmail.com / yusufalimohammed@anadolu.edu.tr
* Corresponding Author
Received: 06/01/2023
Accepted: 10/05/2023
ABSTRACT
Among the recent cases adjudicated before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the maritime dispute between Kenya
and Somalia exhibited in the Indian Ocean is among the forefront one. Though there are several studies dealing with the
case at hand, the decision of the aforenamed court has not been comprehensively reviewed. Therefore, having the ICJ’s
decision, which was rendered on 12 October 2021, this Article exhaustively reviews – not only Somalia’s claim and
Kenya’s submission, – but also ICJ’s ruling and decision on major disputed issues. Moreover, the Article provides some
scholars critiques attributed to the latter ICJ’s decision.
Keywords: Indian Ocean, International Court of Justice, Law of the sea, Maritime Dispute.
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Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 01-06, June 2023
1. INTRODUCTION
absence of agreement, Kenya, with its unilateral action on
the disputed Indian maritime area, notably on exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf, acted not only in
violation of its sovereign rights but also in contradiction
with the principles enshrined in the UNCLOS (ICJ, 2021,
para. 199).
Accordingly, per international laws, Somalia
requested the ICJ: 1) to determine the full course of the
single maritime border separating the whole designated
maritime extent of the Indian Ocean to Kenya and
Somalia, including in the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles; 2) to ascertain the exact topographical
location of the single maritime boundary; 3) to adjudge
that Kenya acted in violation international laws,
particularly sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Somalia,
thus, obligated to make full reparation (ICJ, 2021, para.
25).
The Republic of Kenya (Kenya) and the Federal
Republic of Somalia (Somalia) are the two neighboring
countries located in eastern Africa, sharing extends 681
Kilometers (i.e., 423 miles), among which the maritime
border that intersects the Indian Ocean to the south-east
is the one (Loannides & Yiallourides, 2021; Sovereign
Limits, n.d.). During the colonial period, though Italy and
Britain, the occupying power of ‘Jubaland’, located in the
present-day Somalia, and Kenya, agreed to land border
delimitation via the 1927 agreement and exchange of
notes in 1933, maritime border delimitation has not been
set. This scenario has not changed even after both
Somalia and Kenya got their independence in 1960 and
1963, respectively. Consequently, the contested coastline
area has been a source of conflict between the two
countries for many years due to the economic significance
of petroleum, marine resources, and maritime
transportation services (Gunawan et al, 2021; Sabala,
2021).
Both Kenya and Somalia signed the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on 10
December 1982, while they ratified it on 2 March 1989
and 24 July 1989, respectively (ICJ, 2021, para 33).
According to part 15 section 1 of the UNCLOS, there
were several moments when both Kenya and Somalia
attempted to settle their maritime dispute through
negotiation, in which the 2009 Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), which was brokered by the United
Nations (UN), deserves to be mentioned (Sharmarke,
2009). According to the latter MoU, the two coastal states
had agreed to settle their maritime dispute per
international laws. Accordingly, as per Article 76
paragraph 8 of the UNCLOS, both states have submitted
their matter to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) and requested a
recommendation on the areas that are subject to dispute,
particularly on ‘the outer limits of their continental
shelves beyond 200 nautical miles,’ though they later
have acted otherwise and withdrawn their request in the
course of time (ICJ, 2021, para. 34).
On top of the above, their MoU, unfortunately, could
not bear fruit and, as such, was rejected by the Somalia
Parliament (Loannides & Yiallourides, 2021).
Consequently, the maritime dispute over the shared
Indian coastal area continued.
Albeit absence of agreement, “in 2012, Kenya
awarded exploration licenses for eight offshore blocks in
the Indian Ocean to foreign oil companies, including
Italy-based Eni, France-based Total, and US-based
Anadarko Petroleum” (Loannides & Yiallourides, 2021).
Being alarmed by the action of Kenya, on 28 August
2014, Somalia, finally, filed its maritime case against
Kenya before the ICJ, on the subject of establishing a
single maritime boundary between the two coastal states
in the Indian Ocean.
2.2. Kenya’s Defence and Counter Claims
In its counter Memorial, Kenya raised preliminary
objections against the case of Somalia, claiming the
existence of an accustomed acquiescent line between
them that has been put into practice for a long time, as
such affirmed the existence of an equitable delimitation
(ICJ, 2021, para. 35).
On top of the above, Kenya further argued the
inexistence of dispute let alone any form of a challenge
until 2014, thus, its activities over the Indian sea were
made in good faith and lawful (ICJ, 2021, para. 83).
Accordingly, Kenya requested the ICJ to dismiss all of
Somalia’s claims and affirm the already agreed maritime
boundary and long maritime practices between the two
coastal states.
3. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
3.1. Kenya’s Preliminary Objection
As provided above, Kenya asserted its preliminary
objection arguing that there is an accustomed maritime
line already in place, amplifying the existence long
practiced maritime boundary in the Indian Ocean. Per
Kenya’s submission, though Somalia knew about
Kenya’s conduct in the shared coast maritime sea, the
former failed to react and respond to the latter state’s
conduct within a reasonable time (ICJ, 2021, para. 37).
Kenya added that Somalia’s first objection was recorded
on the 4th of February 2014 when it submitted its letter to
the UN, which shows the consistent practice exhibited in
the Indian Ocean. Thus, Kenya claimed that Somalia’s
request to negotiate on the maritime delimitation should
not create a wrong impression, as if an acquiesced
maritime boundary did not exist, underlining its
otherwise argument (ICJ, 2021, para. 38).
3.2. Somalia’s Counter-Defence
2. MATERIAL FACTS – BENCHMARK
Somalia submitted its counter-defense against
Kenya’s preliminary objection. Accordingly, per Articles
15, 74, and 83 of the UNCLOS, Somalia argued the
primary condition of an express agreement, written or
unwritten, to assume the existence of a maritime
boundary delimitation between coastal states. Somalia
refuted Kenya’s assumption of acquiescence arguing that
2.1. Somalia’s Application and Claims
In its application, Somalia stated that no maritime
boundary exists between the two coastal states (ICJ, 2021,
para. 35). Moreover, Somalia submitted that, in the
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Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 01-06, June 2023
4.1. Somalia’s Claim
failing to object to Kenya’s unilateral act doesn’t
constitute affirmation, negating silence amounts to
acceptance (ICJ, 2021, para. 44). Somalia also added the
timing when the unilateral act of Kenya took place, in
which Somalia was at war with itself and no effective
government that could actively oversight the situation of
maritime boundaries of Indian Ocean, thus, was not in a
position to assert its objection (ICJ, 2021, para. 47).
In demarcating the territorial maritime sea, Somalia
argued a ‘median line’ need to be considered between the
two coastal states (ICJ, 2021, para. 101).
4.2. Kenya’s Claim
On the other hand, Kenya asserted its stand arguing
the territorial sea should go after the ‘parallel of latitude’,
as it has already remained in place between the Parties
(ICJ, 2021, para. 105).
3.3. ICJ’s Ruling
Upon evaluating Articles 15, 74, and 83 of the
UNCLOS, the ICJ highlighted the usual track of
expressing agreement is in a written format. Though the
court didn’t rule out the possibility of having an unwritten
agreement, it underlined the crucial elements of having a
‘shared understanding,’ which shall be ascertained
through ‘acquiescence or tacit agreement’ (ICJ, 2021,
para. 50, 52).
Examining the case at hand per the forgoing baseline,
the court uncovered the absence of ‘shared understanding’
between the two Parties. Moreover, the court also
observed Kenya’s affirmation as to the inexistence of
indorsed agreement in its preliminary objection hearing
and ‘Note Verbales’ to the UN (ICJ, 2021, para. 70).
Aside from the above, the ICJ took into consideration
the situation of Somalia’s internal civil war, where there
was no effective governance structure in place, which
Kenya did not deny. Thus, considering Somalia’s
inability to protest in the year between 1979 to 2014, the
court ruled out the scenario of entailing Somalia’s action
as an acquiescence, reasoning the absence of ‘clear and
consistence’ adherence to the maritime practice (ICJ,
2021, para. 80).
Finally, the ICJ adjudged the absence of compelling
evidence as to the existence of acquiesced practice in the
Indian Ocean, therefore, dismiss Kenya’s preliminary
objection (ICJ, 2021, para. 89).
4.3. ICJ’s Ruling
However, the ICJ has already concluded, in its
preliminary adjudication, that no maritime boundary with
‘shared understanding’ exists between the two coastal
states, thus, it disregarded Kenya’s argument from the
get-go. Consequently, per Article 15 of the UNCLOS, the
Court stick with Somalia’s claim and ruled the viability
of following the ‘median line’ of the coastal line and
underlined the 1927 and 1933 UK-Italy land border treaty
regime to objectively draw a line that run into the
territorial maritime sea (ICJ, 2021, para. 118).
5. DELIMITATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC
ZONE
AND
THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF WITHIN 200
NAUTICAL MILES
5.1. Maritime Delimitation Methodology
To have a clear take-off, it is crucial to set the pattern
of ICJ in demarcating an exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. As provided in the case of Romania vs.
Ukraine Maritime Delimitation, since the UNCLOS was
enforced, the court, to ease its task of maintaining
equitable delimitation, has developed three stages of
maritime territorial demarcation methodology in its
jurisprudence (ICJ, 2021, para. 122, 128).
In its first stage, having a ‘strict geometrical’
qualification on the basis of objective data derived from
the coasts of the Parties, the ICJ intends to create a
‘provisional equidistance line from the most appropriate
base points’ (ICJ, 2021, para. 123).
In its next stage, to attain equitable maritime
demarcation, the ICJ articulates if there are compelling
circumstances, like geographical and other relevant
factors, which need to be considered to modify or alter the
‘provisional equidistance’ established in the first stage
(ICJ, 2021, para. 124).
Finally, to delimit a maritime boundary equitably, the
ICJ, in its third stage, proceeds with the ‘equidistance’ or
‘adjusted line’, and, accordingly, demarcates a disputed
territorial sea area (ICJ, 2021, para. 125).
4. MARITIME DELIMITATION ISSUES
After deciding the inexistence of maritime boundary
accords, considering Somalia’s request to ascertain the
respective states’ equitable maritime boundary, the ICJ
proceeded to delimit the maritime demarcation of
Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean (ICJ, 2021, para.
90-91).
Recalling the adherence of the two coastal states to
the UNCLOS, the ICJ maintained the application of the
provisions of the aforesaid Convention in demarcating the
equitable maritime line between Somalia and Kenya (ICJ,
2021, para. 92).
The ICJ noted the starting point which both Kenya
and Somalis have already agreed on, which was deduced
‘by connecting PB 29 to a point on the low-water line by
a straight line that runs in a south-easterly direction and
that is perpendicular to the general trend of the coastline
at Dar Es Salam’ per the 1927 and 1933 UK-Italy land
border treaty arrangement (ICJ, 2021, para. 95).
However, unlike the starting point, both Kenya and
Somalia submitted different stands on the demarcation of
the territorial maritime sea (ICJ, 2021, para. 99).
5.1.1. Somalia’s Claim
Somalia, maintaining its argument in line with the
above ICJ pattern, asserted the appropriateness of
employing the three-stage methodology and requested the
court to follow its usual track in delimiting the maritime
boundaries between the coastal states (ICJ, 2021, para.
126).
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Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 01-06, June 2023
region; 4) the accustomed longstanding coastal states
economic activities, such as oil concessions, naval patrols,
and fishing among others; 5) the access route for
fisherfolk and/or other natural resources (ICJ, 2021, para.
149-153).
5.1.2. Kenya’s Claim
On the other hand, Kenya, although affirmed the
relevance of the three-stage methodology in maintaining
equitable delimitation in several instances, argued
otherwise in the present case. Instead, basing itself on
regional practice and geographical context, it stated that
the parallel of latitude is the appropriate methodology in
order to establish equitable maritime demarcation (ICJ,
2021, para. 127).
5.2.3. ICJ’s Ruling
Taking into account the relevant provisions of the
UNCLOS, Articles 74 and 83 in particular, the ICJ
evaluated the viability of those factors asserted by Kenya
as follows (ICJ, 2021, para. 157).
With respect to Kenya’s argument in terms of
substantial ‘cut-off’ due to territorial sea demarcation
between Kenya and Tanzania, the ICJ ruled out its
significance reasoning that any cut-off effect due to the
aforesaid bilateral inter alios acta maritime accord is
irrelevant, thus, cannot impact the contemporary
maritime delimitation case of the two coastal states (ICJ,
2021, para. 163).
Concerning Kenya’s claim of using ‘parallel latitude’
as the regional modus operandi, the ICJ, while affirming
Somalia’s geographical consideration, opt to consider the
concavity of the broader geographical context of the
coastline, which is congruous with its precedent and other
international tribunal/s, like Arbitral Tribunal in the
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case (ICJ, 2021, para. 165, 167).
In relation to Kenya’s security threat assertion, the
ICJ, underlining its awareness about how serious
terrorism and/or piracy menace is, negated its relevance
in the present case, reasoning that the sway over the
maritime sea is not typically related to security situations,
thus, doesn’t impact the coastal state/s right of navigation
(ICJ, 2021, para. 158).
As to Kenya’s submission in the context of the
longstanding accustomed coastal states’ economic
activities, the ICJ automatically rejected the claim, as the
decision had already been made as to the non-existence
of territorial maritime accord between Kenya and
Somalia (ICJ, 2021, para. 160).
Concerning Kenya’s claim to access route for
fisherfolk and/or other natural resources, the ICJ remarks
the probability of considering it as an important factor
exceptionally, only if the equidistance line would
probably result in ‘catastrophic repercussions for the
livelihood and economic well-being of the population’ of
a given coastal state/s. Within the foregoing context, the
court, however, is not satisfied with Kenya’s claim,
providing its weak premises as to the actual implication
and repercussion of the equidistance line on its wider
population, thus, rejected it (ICJ, 2021, para. 159).
At the backdrop of the above, the ICJ, after evaluating
the significance of geographical configuration in the
coastal area of Kenya and Somalia in the Indian Ocean,
has underlined and ruled on the need to adjust a
provisional equidistance line to attain the ultimate
objective of equitable maritime delimitation (ICJ, 2021,
para. 172-173).
As a result, considering the geographical
configuration of the coastal area, the ICJ technically
pursued to adjust the provisional equidistance line toward
the north, which go after ‘a geodetic line with an initial
azimuth of 114º’ (ICJ, 2021, para. 174).
According to the above adjustment, Somalia and
Kenya are awarded 733 km and 511 km coastline long
respectively, which favour the former state with its 1:1.43
5.1.3. ICJ’s Ruling
Though the ICJ normally adopts a three-stage
delimitation methodology, it normally won’t consider
using those abovenamed methodologies – if parallel of
latitude, as suggested by Kenya, is a relevant
methodology to establish equitable delimitation, and – if
there are other appropriate factors entailing the
equidistance methodology irrelevant (ICJ, 2021, para.
129-130).
However, the ICJ didn’t find any compelling
reason to deviate from its usual jurisprudence, thus, ruled
the application of the three-stage methodology in
determining the territorial maritime border of the two
coastal states (ICJ, 2021, para. 131).
Therefore, the Court, while ascertaining its
appropriateness, proceed with the three-stage
methodology to delimit the territorial maritime
demarcation between the two coastal states.
5.2. Provisional Equidistance Line
Though Somalia at first suggested CARIS-LOTS
software of US NGA Nautical Chart 61220, later
compromised its stand and hesitantly accepted Kenya’s
suggestion of British Admiralty Chart 3362, and signaled
the ICJ to choose an appropriate and reliable one.
Accordingly, the court ruled to use the British Admiralty
Chart 3362 and pursued drawing a provisional
equidistance line (ICJ, 2021, para. 143-146).
While setting the equidistance line per the British
Admiralty Chart 3362, the ICJ evaluated the existence of
pushing factors compelling the adjustment or shifting of
the provisional equidistance line. In this regard, the Court
observed that Kenya and Somalia have an opposing stand
(ICJ, 2021, para. 147).
5.2.1. Somalia’s Claim
Somalia argued the inexistence of compelling factors
requiring the adjustment or shifting of the provisional
equidistance line, other than geographical factors (ICJ,
2021, para. 148).
5.2.2. Kenya’s Claim
On the other hand, Kenya submitted five factors as
compelling circumstances, requiring the shift/adjustment
of the provisional equidistance line. These circumstances
are: 1) the substantial ‘cut-off’ due to territorial sea
demarcation between Kenya and Tanzania; 2) the usage
of ‘parallel latitude’ as the regional modus operandi in
determining the maritime delimitation of East Africa 3)
the security issues, notably terrorism and piracy, of the
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Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 01-06, June 2023
change’; 2) claiming paragraph 3 of both Article 74 and
83 of the UNCLOS is not relevant to their case at hand,
arguing its ‘activities commenced prior to a dispute.’
Therefore, Kenya underlined Somalia’s inability to
substantiate its claim, in terms of sanctioning its illicit
economic activities in the contested coastal area, thus,
requested the court to reject Somalia’s asserted claim (ICJ,
2021, para. 201-202).
ratio. In the case of a territorial sea demarcation, about
120,455 sq. km. and 92,387 sq. km. were assigned to
Kenya and Somalia respectively, which favour the former
state with its 1:1.30 ratio. Comparatively, the court
underscored the aforenamed two ratios don’t entail ‘any
significant or marked disproportionality’ (ICJ, 2021, para.
176).
Therefore, per paragraph 1 of Article 74 and 83 of the
UNCLOS qualification in maintaining equitability, the
ICJ remained satisfied with the above territorial maritime
seacoast and its outskirt delimitation for the exclusive
economic zones and continental shelves of the two coastal
states (ICJ, 2021, para. 177).
7.3. ICJ’s Ruling
After evaluating the abovementioned issues, the ICJ
marked that Kenya exercised its economic activities
assuming its maritime boundary but suspended its
activities in 2016 until an agreement is reached between
the two coastal states, thus, learned Kenya was acting in
good faith. Moreover, the Court was not convinced that
Kenya's economic activities would hinder the process of
attaining a final accord on the territorial sea delimitation
between the two coastal states. Consequently, the Court
was unable to draw a conclusion as to whether Kenya’s
action amounted to violating paragraph 3 of Articles 74
and 83 of the UNCLOS (ICJ, 2021, para. 210-211).
Therefore, the ICJ ruled against Somalia,
underscoring that Kenya, while conducting its maritime
economic activities in the contested coastal area, has not
acted against its international duty, thus, rejected
Somalia’s full reparation claim (ICJ, 2021, para. 212).
6. DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES
With respect to the limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles, though both Kenya and
Somalia had made submissions to the Commission per
Article 76 of the UNCLOS in May 2009 and July 2015
respectively, both coastal states still requested the ICJ to
delimitate it. As a result, the court considered the matter
from two aspects and concluded that – the territorial
maritime sea ‘beyond 200 nautical miles continues along
the same geodetic line as the adjusted line within 200
nautical miles until it reaches the outer limits of the
coastal states’ continental shelves,’ – while the remaining
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles should be delineated based on the recommendations
to be made by the Commission (ICJ, 2021, para. 178-181).
8. CONCLUSION
All in one, the International Court of Justice, after
examining both Kenya and Somalia’s claim and
counterclaim: decided there is no agreed maritime
boundary
between
Somalia
and
Kenya that follows the parallel of latitude; delimited
single maritime boundary which follows the geodetic line
between Kenya and Somalia in the Indian Ocean; Kenya
has not violated its international obligations through its
maritime economic activities in the disputed area.
Aside from the aforementioned, in this maritime
dispute adjudication between Kenya and Somalia, there
are criticisms attributed to the ICJ decision.
The first criticism stems from an equal participation
perspective. According to Article 287 (1) (b) of UNCLOS
and Article 35 (2) of the ICJ Statute, all disputing parties
need to be duly represented and have the same access to
all information and be allowed to refute as well as
produce their side of arguments so that they all have
confidence in the overall proceedings and final
adjudication of the case. Although Kenya participated in
the preliminary hearing, it did not participate in the merit
hearing phase due to – the Covid-19 pandemic, –
unwillingness to participate via online video trial
proceedings, and – other trust issues with the court itself
(Bryant, 2021; ICJ, 2021, para. 16, 28). Bearing in mind
these aforesaid arguments, the impartiality of the court
decision has been criticized (Africanews, 2021; Anna &
Barise, 2021; Wasike & Mukami, 2021). Here, it has to
be recalled that the court decided the case believing that
it has all it needs to give judgment on the case (ICJ, 2021,
para. 29).
The other criticism arises from the technical content
of the ruling that the Court had some access to technical
input. According to scholars like Bekker et al. (2022) and
Schofield et al. (2021), it is unclear precisely who
7. SOMALIA’S ALLEGED VIOLATIONS BY
KENYA
OF
ITS
INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME OBLIGATIONS
7.1. Somalia’s Claim
According to Somalia, Kenya unilaterally engaged in
various economic activities, such as exploration and
exploitation, in a contested coastal maritime area, which
is contrary to the UNCLOS principles and Article 77 in
particular. Somalia added that Kenya’s activity not only
amounts to its territorial sea violation but also against its
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
jurisdiction. Moreover, Somalia claims that the moment
it became aware of Kenya’s activity, it protested against
them (ICJ, 2021, para. 199).
Therefore, Somalia demanded the ICJ to pronounce
Kenya’s action as contrary to its international obligations
and adjudge the latter state to be liable to ‘make full
reparation’ to the former state per international law (ICJ,
2021, para. 198).
7.2. Kenya’s Claim
Kenya, on the other hand, denied the existence of
antagonism over the practice of using maritime activities,
thus, argued otherwise that it had been freely engaging in
economic activities within its maritime boundary where
it had assumed and held its undisputed territorial seacoast.
Kenya also asserted that, even though the provided
coastal areas had been subjected to dispute, its activities
cannot be said to be unlawful for two main arguments: 1)
arguing its activities did not ‘lead to permanent physical
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Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 01-06, June 2023
provides such technical expert support, as such question
the impartiality of the court in its non-legal, but technical,
decision.
Apart from the above, the Author has observed many
scholars attest to the legality of the ICJ’s decision,
affirming that it is in line with the principle of the
UNCLOS and its precedents. Moreover, even those
scholars that criticize the decision do not rule out the
validity of the overall court’s adjudication, signaling its
legitimacy in a general context. Saving the
abovementioned concerns, this Author also believes the
ICJ’s decision on the territorial sea dispute between
Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean is legitimate per
international laws.
https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/12/icj-rules-infavour-of-somalia-in-kenya-border-dispute/ [Accessed
on 08 April 2023].
Loannides, N. A., & Yiallourides, C. (2021). “A
Commentary on the Dispute Concerning the Maritime
Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v Kenya),”
EJIL: Talk: blog of the European Journal of International
Law.
https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-commentary-on-the-disputeconcerning-the-maritime-delimitation-in-the-indianocean-somalia-v-kenya/ [Accessed 19 April 2022].
Sabala, K. (2021). “Kenya v. Somalia Maritime Dispute:
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Author would like to acknowledge and extends his
gratitude to Prof. Dr. Elif UZUN for her critical feedback
and comments while developing this decision review.
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