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Pakistan is on the clock. “A fast-expanding Islamic insurgency…threatens to devour the country,” wrote The New York Times this month. The 175 million-strong nation has been on deathwatch since at least February, when The Atlantic Council sounded the alarm that Pakistan was headed for turbulence within twelve months. Recently, General Petraeus’s advisor shortened the time frame to within six months. “We could see the collapse of the Pakistani state,” said David Kilcullen. “Al Qaeda acquiring nuclear weapons, an extremist takeover—that would dwarf everything we’ve seen in the war on terror today.”

Middle East, 2007

Journal of International and Global Studies, 2012

2011

Pakistan, a nation of 185.5 million people and a neighbor to Afghanistan, India and China -- in other words, a country of paramount strategic importance -- is in danger. Unlike other failed states, both a democratic government and a semblance of civilian infrastructure remain intact, and yet the nation is ranked #10 on the 2010 Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace's Failed States Index. Out of the 12 axioms that govern the index, Pakistan scores especially poorly on 'Security Apparatus,' 'Factionalized Elites,' 'Group Grievances,' and 'External Intervention.' A truly failed Pakistani state has grave implications for the international community. In addition to posing terrible physical, economic and humane costs to Pakistani society and citizenry, which constitutes the sixth-most populous nation in the world, a full-blown failure will surely lead to an explosion in militancy that places destabilizing pressures on sensitive neighboring countries. In this paper, I present a reform strategy to overhaul the country's political and economic stability and ensure security, while building on the country's robust elements. Some priorities of this approach are: i) the immediate provision of necessary services and security to disenfranchised groups such as women, minorities and rural peoples, ii) better enforcement of property rights to promote economic development, iii) increased transparency and accountability while reducing bureaucracy, iv) reformation of rules currently governing the security arms of government, v) improving communication between various branches of the state and iv) expanding access low-cost technological developments such as mobile phones in ways that can both empower the Pakistani people and reinforce the pursuit of institutional reform. The rules of the state must change to better reflect the nature of Pakistani society. I first express the policy goals of this strategy and briefly explain the ideology behind the strategy. I then provide a brief history of the nation, survey relevant statistics and identify key players. I will elaborate in detail the challenges facing Pakistan, and the questions we must consider when dealing with these challenges. I finally deliver my proposals to achieve each one of these policy goals, as well as my plans for their funding and implementation. I conclude with an overview of the anticipated effects of a fully-implemented strategy, and some finishing thoughts.

Milken Institute Review , 2005

Contemporary South Asia, 2008

My Chapter in the volume titled Demography in South Asia: Implications lor Regional and Global P olitical Narratives, Edited by M A L L IK A JOSEPH, Sponsored by the Australia India Institute. This chapter addresses the challenges faced by Pakistan in terms of demography and how the accumulating of failures since the 1970s has left the nuclear-armed country with a dangerous imbalanced economy and demographic profile with profound implications for regional and global stability. Employing a historical approach, the chapter contends that failure to draw lessons from the past and an excessive regard for 'narrative' oriented delusions have led Pakistan to the point where it faces a demographic debacle rather than being in a position to reap a demographic dividend.

Security Nexus, 2005