The American Journal of Bioethics
ISSN: 1526-5161 (Print) 1536-0075 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20
Nonexceptionalism, Research Risks, and Social
Media: Response to Open Peer Commentaries on
“Using Social Media as a Research Recruitment
Tool: Ethical Issues and Recommendations”
Luke Gelinas, Robin Pierce, Sabune Winkler, Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez
Lynch & Barbara E. Bierer
To cite this article: Luke Gelinas, Robin Pierce, Sabune Winkler, Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez
Lynch & Barbara E. Bierer (2017) Nonexceptionalism, Research Risks, and Social Media:
Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Using Social Media as a Research Recruitment Tool:
Ethical Issues and Recommendations”, The American Journal of Bioethics, 17:5, W1-W3, DOI:
10.1080/15265161.2017.1293755
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2017.1293755
Published online: 21 Apr 2017.
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Date: 02 May 2017, At: 13:30
The American Journal of Bioethics, 17(5): W1–W3, 2017
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1526-5161 print / 1536-0075 online
DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2017.1293755
Correspondence
Nonexceptionalism, Research Risks,
and Social Media: Response to Open
Peer Commentaries on “Using Social
Media as a Research Recruitment Tool:
Ethical Issues and Recommendations”
Luke Gelinasy, Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard Law School and Harvard Catalyst
Robin Piercez, Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard Law School and Harvard Catalyst
Sabune Winkler, Harvard Catalyst
Glenn Cohen, Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard Law School and Harvard Catalyst
Holly Fernandez Lynch, Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard Law School, Harvard Catalyst,
and Harvard Medical School
Barbara E. Bierer, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Harvard Medical School, and
Harvard Catalyst
We are grateful for the thoughtful commentaries on our
target article “Using Social Media as a Research Recruitment Tool: Ethical Issues and Recommendations” (Gelinas
et al. 2017), commentaries that in many cases further clarify and expand upon our recommendations. For the most
part we find our interlocutors’ suggestions salutary and
think that they enrich the discussion around the use of
social media to recruit research participants. In this reply,
we limit our discussion to three potential points of debate
on which further analysis may help to clarify underlying
issues: (i) the merits of using a “nonexceptionalist” lens in
review of social media recruitment strategies, according to
which social media recruitment should be evaluated using
the same general ethical principles as offline recruitment;
(ii) the distinction between general background risks of
social media and the “research risks” of particular recruitment proposals for the purpose of institutional review
board (IRB) review; and (iii) the ethical significance of the
business rules or “terms of use” of social media platforms.
In our target article, we take an approach to the ethical
evaluation of social media recruitment that we term
“nonexceptionalism,” which involves considering analogous offline recruitment scenarios and applying traditional
research ethics considerations. Eric S. Swirsky takes issue
with this approach in his commentary, saying that we
“beg the question of whether use of social media should be
evaluated differently from other forms of recruitment”
and that our “methodology falls short as a stand-alone tool
for IRBs or investigators to identify and assess some of the
most salient ethical issues facing the use of social media
for recruitment” (Swirsky 2017, 15). Swirsky goes on to
endorse a “sociotechnical” framework for evaluating social
media recruitment, which emphasizes social media as a
“socially constituted” medium, arising from the “complex
interplay between individuals, technology, and society”
and that considers technology as designed and as used to
determine what, if any, unanticipated negative consequences result from its use (Swirsky 2017, 15–16).
In light of this critique, we reiterate two justifications in
favor of nonexceptionalism, one theoretical and one practical (Gelinas et al. 2017). The theoretical justification is that
the general ethical principles governing online and offline
y
Co-lead author.
Co-lead author. Dr. Pierce’s current affiliation is Brunel University London, School of Law.
Address correspondence to Luke Gelinas, Petrie-Flom Center, Harvard Law School, 23 Everett St., 3rd floor, Cambridge, MA 02138,
USA. E-mail: lgelinas@law.harvard.edu
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The American Journal of Bioethics
recruitment are the same, namely, the Belmont principles
of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice, which
applied in this context particularly demand respect for the
privacy of social media users and investigator transparency (Gelinas et al. 2017). Encouraging IRBs and investigators to consider unintended consequences of using social
media in research, as Swirsky’s framework stresses, is laudatory, especially since the potentially negative consequences or “adverse events” of online recruitment may
differ from those of offline recruitment. However, this is
fully compatible with the approach we recommend, to the
extent that the unintended consequences may raise ethical
concerns that deserve consideration. Perhaps Swirsky is
suggesting that the general ethical principles of respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice are insufficient, on their
own, to evaluate the ethical import of those consequences
or social media recruitment generally. But we do not
believe this to be the case, and Swirsky has not suggested
any additional or alternative principles. Thus, assuming
that a sociotechnical framework would simply involve a
sensitive application of the ethical principles of respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice, this would count as nonexceptionalist in our sense.
From a practical perspective, our methodology is supported by the fact that finding analogies to offline scenarios
where researchers and IRBs are more familiar with application of the relevant ethical principles can help orient
them to salient issues in a potentially unfamiliar context.
That said, as indicated in the target article (Gelinas et al.
2017), part of the reason to compare online and offline
recruitment scenarios is to help isolate and illuminate differences that require further scrutiny. Far from obscuring
differences, our approach makes them explicit so we can
evaluate them more precisely. Our methodology is thus
compatible with recognizing that social media may differ
in important ways from other communication mediums
and forms of interaction, for example, in terms of its degree
of connectedness and the tendency toward self-disclosure
to unfamiliar people; we further acknowledge that applying research ethics guidelines will require careful attention
to these differences as well as to how particular social
media platforms work, including sensitivity to their internal culture and norms.
Swirsky’s deeper concern may be with background
risks inherent in all social media use, not just social media
research recruitment, and privacy risks in particular.
“Researchers cannot,” he says, “control user privacy, and
social media providers are hell-bent on obfuscating and
eroding it to get at user data,” and further asserts that
we condone “taking advantage of the same vulnerabilities as social media peddlers” (Swirsky 2017, 16). A. L.
Bredenoord and M. Boeckhout echo this concern, claiming that it does not suffice to claim that “possible side
effects of research recruitment from online tracking are
simply part and parcel of the ‘background risks associated with social media use’” and that “questions about
moral obligations pertaining to research recruitment in
social media are . . . closely intertwined with questions
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about moral obligations of social media platforms
themselves” (Bredenoord and Boeckhout 2017, 30).
We agree that researchers should avoid complicity in
clearly unethical practices and that ethically suspect background conditions should not be used as a baseline from
which to measure research risks. However, we disagree
with any assumption that social media is on balance ethically problematic, since it has genuine benefits that for
many people outweigh its privacy risks. Moreover, social
media users have already made a risk–benefit decision in
favor of social media use and accepted its risks. In general,
when evaluating recruitment proposals, the IRB’s responsibility is limited to evaluating the risks and benefits of the
recruitment strategy itself and any difference in risk/benefit between it and background conditions that individuals
have already accepted. Two analogies may help to make
this point. Imagine a research study whose target population is intravenous (IV) drug users. In this situation, IRBs
are not responsible for considering the risks of IV drug use
for this population, nor do researchers necessarily incur
ancillary duties of care by (say) recruiting from designated
safe injection sites. Similarly, when evaluating recruitment
in hospital settings, IRBs need not weigh the background
risk of (for example) hospital-acquired infections in their
deliberations.
While researchers have an obligation not to compound
social media’s privacy risks (Gelinas et al. 2017), it would
be overly paternalistic and outside the purview of the IRB
to second-guess individuals’ voluntary choices to engage
with social media by providing special protection against
background (i.e., nonresearch) risks that they have already
accepted in their personal lives. We acknowledge that in
reality people often fail to comprehend the range of possible risks associated with social media, but we do not agree
that this fact justifies further protection from IRBs as a
form of “soft paternalism.” While the extent to which the
public understands the risks of social media is an empirical
matter, it seems likely that by now many members of the
public at least comprehend that their information is being
collected and tracked by social media platforms, given
(among other things) how common online personalized
ads have become. In addition, all social media users have
the opportunity to learn how social media platforms will
use their data prior to joining them. But finally—and most
critically—IRBs can only do so much; insisting that they
must protect individuals not only from risks unique to
research but also from all possible background risks of
social media goes too far, and would have serious implications for the research enterprise
Finally, the preceding discussion reinforces the need to
distinguish, as we do in the target article (Gelinas et al.
2017), between what social media users might in fact
believe and expect, on the one hand, and what would be
reasonable to believe and expect, on the other. While
researchers and IRBs have reason to honor the reasonable
expectations of social media users when evaluating
recruitment strategies, expectations without foundation in
fact carry little if any ethical weight. This raises the
May, Volume 17, Number 5, 2017
Social Media as Recruitment Tool: Ethical Issues
question of how to determine which expectations should
count as reasonable. In the target article, we point out that
website policies and “terms of use” can form a basis for
reasonable expectations and are to that extent ethically relevant (Gelinas et al. 2017). In response, Galbraith (2017)
claims that website terms of service have “little to do with
ethics” on the grounds that they are often complicated and
that many people do not in fact read them—a concern
shared by other commentators (Bredenoord and Boeckhout 2017; Swirsky 2017).
We acknowledge that many social media users do not
read or comprehend website terms of use, which is why
we do not claim that terms of use are the only source of
reasonable expectations, or even the most important. Reasonable expectations arise in multiple ways, perhaps most
prominently from the cultures developed on particular
sites among their users. This is why, as Abbas Rattani and
Amelia Johns stress in their commentary, communicating
with site moderators can be so valuable, as they typically
have insight into the shared norms, mores, and values of
the online communities they represent (Rattani and Johns
2017). But terms of use can also play a role in fostering
common understandings and norms of engagement:
When individuals do read and understand “terms of use”
that, for example, prohibit research activities on a given
platform, it is reasonable for them to expect that other
users of the site who have agreed to the same terms do so
with the intention to abide by them and that the site will
take steps to enforce them. In our view (Gelinas et al.
2017), the ethical weight of expectations based on terms of
service is not dispositive; there may be overriding reasons
for IRBs to permit research that conflicts with website policies (with input from institutional and legal counsel). For
example, in certain situations an IRB might justifiably permit research that conflicts with website policies when the
research is very important, there is no other way to conduct it, and other relevant conditions are met. But this will
involve balancing the importance of the research against
the ethical risk of conflicting with users’ reasonable expectations, in addition to legal and prudential considerations.
Recruitment to research is challenging, and underenrollment carries distinctively ethical concerns, including
delaying the acquisition of socially valuable knowledge
and exposure of participants to unjustified risks in studies that do not produce generalizable knowledge. Social
media hold great promise as a form of recruitment
medium but may be at risk of being underutilized due
to lack of specific regulatory and ethical guidance on
how to review and implement social media recruitment
strategies. Our target article addressed this gap by
May, Volume 17, Number 5, 2017
proposing an ethical framework for evaluating social
media that is theoretically well grounded and practicable to apply. In this reply, we have further defended our
ethical framework, argued that general background risks
of social media accepted by individuals already using
these platforms should not be the subject of IRB review,
and clarified the different sources of reasonable expectations for social media users and the ethical import of
website terms of service. We are pleased that the ethical
and regulatory issues surrounding social media recruitment are getting the attention they deserve and hopeful
that this will contribute to greater adeptness in identifying novel elements and potential risks of social media
and will facilitate the review and use of this important
recruitment tool.
FUNDING
This work was conducted with support from Harvard Catalyst j The Harvard Clinical and Translational Science Center (National Center for Research Resources and the
National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences,
National Institutes of Health Award UL1 TR001102) and
financial contributions from Harvard University and its
affiliated academic health care centers. The content is
solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of Harvard Catalyst,
Harvard University and its affiliated academic health care
centers, or the National Institutes of Health. &
REFERENCES
Bredenoord, A. L., and M. Boeckhout. 2017. Ancillary care obligations for social media platforms. American Journal of Bioethics 17(3):
29–31.
Galbraith, K. L. 2017. Terms and conditions may apply (but have
little to do with ethics). American Journal of Bioethics 17(3): 21–22.
Gelinas, L., R. Pierce, S. Winkler, I. G. Cohen, H. F. Lynch, and B.
E. Bierer. 2017. Using social media as a research recruitment tool:
Ethical issues and recommendations. American Journal of Bioethics
17(3): 3–14.
Rattani, A., and A. Johns. 2017. Collaborative partnerships and
gatekeeping in online research recruitment. American Journal of
Bioethics 17(3): 27–29.
Swirsky, E. S. 2017. A billion tiny ends: Social media, non-exceptionalism, and ethics by association. American Journal of Bioethics
17(3): 15–17.
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