Peer-Reviewed Review Article
The Importance of Africa in the
African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus:
the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
Halİl Özsaraç*
Retired Naval Staff Captain
*Born in Yenişehir-Bursa in 1970, Halil Özsaraç grew up in Karamürsel-Kocaeli; graduated from the
Naval High School in 1987, the Naval Academy in 1991 and became a naval officer; and graduated
from the Naval War College in 2002 and became a staff officer. He served in various warships,
shipyards, headquarters and military education institutions in the Turkish Armed Forces. His last
assignment before his retirement in 2021 was at the Naval Warfare Institute (DHE) of the National
Defense University (MSÜ) with the rank of Naval Staff Captain. After his retirement in 2021, Halil
Özsaraç continues to give lectures to Turkish and visiting naval officers studying Command and Staff
training at MSÜ-DHE. Halil Özsaraç is a member of the “Board of Directors” at the National Strategy
Center (USMER) and Head of the National Security Desk at USMER. He is a member of the Editorial
Board of Teori Magazine. He wrote several books: “The Historical Adventure of the Navy”, “The
Barbaros: The Untold Story of the Mediterranean” and “The Heart of the Ottoman Empire: Tersâne-i
Âmire-Istanbul Shipyard”. He is the host of the documentary “Turks in the Sea”, which continues
to be broadcast on Ulusal Kanal. He is also and the author of the column “Turks in the Sea”, which
continues to be published in Aydınlık Newspaper. He is married and has 1 child. .
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-5169-1083
Received: 9.1.2024
Accepted: 2.2.2024
How to cite: Özsaraç, H. (2024). The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical
Nexus:the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea. BRIQ Belt and Road Initiative Quarterly, 5(2), 130-153.
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
ABSTRACT
Over the last 20 years, there has been a notable trend of power centers engaging in efforts to establish or
enhance their military presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
have become a tense intersection point between imperialism, which operates on an inseparable logic of
collaboration and power unity, and Asian power centers, which have been unable to break away from
sacrificing continental interests for regional ones. Due to its critical waterway characteristics, this region,
as a major geopolitical power field, has seen Africa being unable to protect its interests for centuries.
This article aims to draw attention to what is happening at the Afro-Asian junction, which will shape the
future of the world, and highlights the pivotal role of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, especially for
Africa and other oppressed parts of the world in search of a secure future.
Keywords: Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Djibouti Bases, Horn of Africa, maritime banditry, Red Sea.
Introduction
AFRICA, WHICH THE IMPERIALIST WEST labeled as the “Hopeless Continent” in 2000, the “Rising
Continent” in 2011, and the “Hopeful Continent”
in 2013, has re-emerged as a dynamic area of competition for global power centers (The Economist,
2000; 2011; 2013; Aydın, 2019). In this rivalry, Western powers, which have been dominant politically,
economically, and militarily, exert a considerable
advantage on African countries, which continue to
be dependent in reality despite being ostensibly independent for on half a century. Moving away from
traditional approaches, the West frequently resorts
to “paternalistic” methods in Africa, imposing liberal political systems and free-market economies
(Altınbaş, 2011). Most African states strive to maintain their “official” independence, hard-earned
through endurance and struggle, under the shadow
of their former colonizers. For the West, wearing a
humanitarian mask, neo-colonialism has become
easier and cheaper. In summary, Africa, possessing
about 1/7 of the world’s population and geography,
can only account for 1/20 of the world’s production
(Taştan, 2023). Furthermore, the Western world, by
hindering Africa’s maritime development, has kept it
far from utilizing the strong geopolitical potential of
the seas (African Union, 2012).. Additionally, with
its incredible cultural diversity, evident in its 3315
ethnic groups and over 2000 spoken languages, Africa represents an effortless domain for imperialism
(Özçelik, 2020).
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In recent years, the West’s presentation of a
“strong image” towards Africa is noteworthy. For
example, in November 2021, U.S. Secretary of State
Blinken stated, “In the future, Africa will shape not
just the destiny of its people, but of the entire world
(The White House, 2022).” In the undoubtedly reshaping world, the narratives that portray Africa as
strong have geo-economic and geopolitical foundations. It is known that today the African continent,
comprising 54 countries and covering a total area of
30.8 million km² along with its surrounding islands,
has a geo-economic potential that will mark the future. Research indicates that the African continent
possesses (TASAM Afrika Enstitüsü, 2022; Yılmaz,
2014; Şöhret, 2023):
- 60% of the world’s unused arable agricultural
lands,
- 9.6% of its oil fields,
- 90% of its cobalt and platinum reserves,
- 64% of its manganese reserves,
- 70% of its tantalite reserves,
- 98% of its chrome reserves;
- Two-thirds of its uranium reserves (and 18% of
its annual uranium production),
- Half of its gold reserves (and its annual supply),
- 30% of its diamond reserves (more than 45%
of its annual supply and 90% of its annual diamond
production),
- The second-largest rainforest.
Guinea alone is the world’s largest exporter of bauxite, while the Democratic Republic of Congo owns
70% of the world’s coltan (used in cell phones) and
30% of its diamond reserves. This robust economic
potential has triggered power centers’ struggle to
capture economic domains in Africa and the need to
maintain military presence for the security of open
economic areas (TASAM Afrika Enstitüsü, 2022; Yılmaz, 2014; Şöhret, 2023).
Africa, located on (or blocking) key trade routes
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through the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea,
Mediterranean, and Atlantic Ocean, stands in the upper league of geopolitical power potential. Politically
and demographically, Africa offers strong potential,
as evidenced by:
- Being one of the largest regional voting groups in
the United Nations (UN) with a 28% share,
- Holding three non-permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
- Anticipated to have a quarter of the world’s
young population by 2050,
- Continuing population growth even after 2100
while the global population stabilizes towards the
end of the 21st century The White House, 2022).
Method Employed to Preserve Fish
Resources: Maritime Piracy
In African waters, despite the West’s illegal fishing
activities, there exists a fishing sector that generates over $24 billion annually and provides jobs
to more than 12 million people (Chatham House,
2013; Kırval, 2022). In Africa, where over 50% of
total protein consumption can be obtained from
fish, this is a critical nutritional component for the
poorest 40% of the population. However, trawler
fishermen from all over the world, converging in
Guinean and Somali waters, are engaging in fish
theft to an extent that leads to the depletion of
fish resources. The “illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)” fishing activities, which weak African maritime states are unable to prevent, pose
a significant security issue for Africa (Chatham
House, 2013). For example, in 2017, 53% of the
405,000 tons of tuna consumed annually by the
European Union was fished from East African
waters (Onyango-Obbo, 2019). The “illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing” activities,
a priority concern for Africans over issues like oil
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
theft, maritime piracy, or armed robbery at sea,
are neglected by imperialists who leave the solution to weak African states. Additionally, there are
claims that the West has been dumping nuclear
and toxic wastes in Somali waters, causing extraordinary damage to the ecosystem (and fish stocks) (Kabba, 2009; Morabito, 2016).
Keeping the Suez Canal, a vital
route for 12% of global maritime
trade and seizing the geopolitical
power of the Afro-Asian junction
comprising the Suez Canal, Red
Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf
of Aden from Africa and Asia, or at
least preventing their real owners
from using it, are goals consistent
with the spirit of imperialism.
In Somalia and Nigeria, unable to cope with
the threat of losing fisheries and the ecosystem
due to reasons like political fragmentation/lack
of authority, local people have resorted to asymmetric solutions that evolved into “maritime piracy” or “armed robbery” in a state of “madness”.
The general view in Somalia and Nigeria is that
poor, heroic, and patriotic fishermen have taken
up arms to keep illegal trawl vessels out of their waters or at least reduce the amount of stolen
fish. Especially in Somalia, the collapse of General Mohamed Siad Barre’s dictatorship regime in
1991 and the ensuing civil war and chaos have
exacerbated the issue of illegal fishing, along with
maritime piracy and armed robbery in territorial
waters. After 2001, incidents of “maritime piracy or armed robbery” in the Gulf of Aden have
drawn Western attention (Kabba, 2009; Morabito,
2016). The unsuccessful attack on the luxury passenger ship Seabourn Spirit carrying 151 passengers and weighing 10,000 tons on November 5,
2005, by Somali pirates, caught the Western public’s attention (Williams, 2005; Hürriyet, 2005;
CBS News, 2005). Maritime piracy in Somalia,
initially started by the impoverished local population, later transformed into a sector providing
economic resources to destabilizing tribes and radical Islamist terrorist organizations within a few
years (Kırval, 2022).
Therefore, Western sources do not limit their
reasons for maintaining a military presence in the
region to merely maritime piracy; they also assert the impacts of terrorism, terror-crime nexus,
arms and drug trafficking, marine pollution, and
environmental disasters related to oil, affecting
them, and claim that coastal states are not powerful enough to handle these issues (Ghosh, 2004).
However, keeping the Suez Canal, a vital route for
12% of global maritime trade and seizing the geopolitical power of the Afro-Asian junction comprising the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb
Strait, and Gulf of Aden from Africa and Asia, or
at least preventing their real owners from using
it, are goals consistent with the spirit of imperialism.
When examining the above table, it becomes
apparent that the incidents of “maritime piracy”
at the entrance and exit of the Red Sea have never escalated to a level that would necessitate the
West’s exaggerated military measures. During
the 2003-2010 period, the risk of facing a “maritime piracy” attack, varying between 3 to 64 in
10,000, is not significant enough to stop or slow
down the annual maritime traffic of 30,000 vessels through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Kırval,
2022).
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Figure 1. Numerical Comparison of Maritime Piracy Incidents in Global Seas and Yemen/Somali
Waters During the 2003-2010 Period
This table was prepared based on Kırval’s (2022) numerical data on maritime banditry incidents in Yemen and
Somali seas. (Figure: Özsaraç, 2023).
Even in 2010, when maritime piracy in the
Horn of Africa waters was at its peak, only
15 of the 192 attacks were successful; the 326
sailors taken hostage along with these ships
were eventually released following ransom
negotiations (Onyango-Obbo, 2019). This
means that out of the annual 30,000 ships
passing through the Horn of Africa waters,
only 15, or 5 in 10,000, fell into the hands of
pirates. In other words, only 15 of the 77,768
commercial ships in the world’s seas in 2010
were captured by Somali pirates, and their
release along with their sailors, secured by
paying a ransom, does not justify the Western
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military reaction (EMSA, 2010). After all,
maritime piracy is common in all the world’s
seas, even in American waters. Moreover,
in 2021, the 192 “ship robbery” incidents in
Somali waters should have been considered less
significant in priority compared to the 1,964
“bank robbery” incidents on U.S. soil alone
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2021).
According to Western sources, the financial
damage caused by Somali pirates to the global
maritime industry is not excessively high. A
study by The One Earth Future Foundation in
Colorado (USA) titled “Oceans Beyond Piracy,”
conducted in 2011, estimated that maritime
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
Figure 2. Pirate Threat in the Northwest Indian Ocean (2005-2010)
Map showing the incidents of maritime banditry in the Indian Ocean during the period 2005-2010.
(Figure: Venter, 2018)
piracy in Somali waters had caused damage
to the global maritime industry between $6.6
and $6.9 billion over ten years (OnyangoObbo, 2019). Accordingly, during the 20002010 period when piracy in Somalia escalated,
the world maritime industry incurred annual
losses of approximately $660-690 million. With
the global GDP in 2010 being $65 trillion, it
raises the question: Has the Horn of Africa
waters been occupied by the West just for 1 in
100,000 of the world’s income?
Furthermore, the calculated damage includes
not only the paid ransoms but also additional
costs such as:
- Costs of route changes,
- Security equipment and private protection
costs,
- Additional fuel consumption due to the
speed increase required for safe passage,
- Increase in risk payments to personnel,
- Rise in insurance premiums for passing
through risky areas,
- Costs of prosecuting and imprisoning pirates,
- Expenses of military operations by warships,
- Costs of multinational organizations created against piracy.
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Therefore, most of the mentioned damages are
additional expenses made by the West, unwilling
to pay the ransom (Çınar, 2022).
The limited and low-damage incidents of maritime piracy have been used as an opportunity
by the West for systematic control of the waters
forming the Afro-Asian junction. A similar instance occurred in 1984.
Implications of Suspicious Naval Mines in
the Red Sea for African Geopolitics in 1984
On July 9, 1984, the Soviet-flagged cargo ship
Knud Jespersen sustained minor damage due
to an underwater explosion while sailing south
from the Suez Canal. Since the batteries of mines
laid during the Arab-Israeli wars would not have
lasted after 1973, it was clear that this was not
a missed bottom mine from those conflict zones. Between July 27-29, 1984, when seven more
commercial ships incurred minor mine damage,
it became certain that there was an active minefield south of the Suez Canal. Between July 31
and August 2, 1984, six new explosions in the
southern Red Sea indicated that mines had been
“secretly” laid in various areas of the Red Sea.
Besides Egypt, which feared losing Suez Canal
revenues, Saudi Arabia also panicked, concerned
about the safety of tens of thousands of pilgrims
who would arrive by ferries at the ports of Jeddah and Yanbu for the Hajj pilgrimage starting
on September 4, 1984 (Çınar, 2022).
On August 3, 1984, when the Chinese container ship Tang He also suffered minor mine damage, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were compelled to
formally request Western assistance on August
5-6, 1984. A naval force consisting of British,
French, Dutch, and Italian minehunters, along
with the USS La Salle and USS Shreveport am136
phibious ships carrying two fleets of mine-sweeping capable helicopters, was dispatched to the
region (Çınar, 2022).
The United States rapidly completed its mine-searching operations in the Gulf of Suez,
relying on its helicopters. To prove that the area
where no mines were found was clear, the aircraft
carrier USS America passed through the Suez on
August 19. The speed of the U.S. mine-searching
operations and the use of Sea Batallion RH-53D
helicopters, designed not for bottom mines but
solely to detect moored mines, were suspicious.
However, the inadequacy of these helicopters
was not questioned at the time by states other
than the United States, as it was not known (Özsaraç, 2024).
Dutch and Italian minehunters, which also searched Saudi waters in the Red Sea in addition
to the Gulf of Suez, did not encounter any mines
in their searches until the end of October 1984.
French minehunters found 10 obsolete bottom
mines left from the Arab-Israeli wars in the Gulf
of Suez on their return route. The British minehunter HMS Gavinton, on September 12, 1984,
in the Gulf of Suez at a depth of 42 meters, examined a mine stuck in the mud using remotely
operated underwater devices and divers and
then destroyed it in place. The discovered mine
was a Soviet bottom mine, capable of causing
more than minor damage with its 720 kg explosive, but it was not set to explode. This meant
that the found Soviet stock mine had no relation
to the mines being searched for (Çınar, 2022; Özsaraç, 2024).
Although a little-known terrorist organization
called “Al Jihad” claimed responsibility for the incidents, this group, lacking the capability to lay mines, was not taken seriously. No live mine samples
were found, yet a state suspected of secretly laying
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
mines was sought based on assumptions. Initially,
the West tried to blame Iran, which in turn accused the United States and Israel. In reality, Iran,
engaged in a war with Iraq at that time, lacked the
capability to lay mines, as it did not have a single
mine in its inventory until mid-1985. Realizing
that Iran, being the 4th largest user of the Suez
Canal at that time, would also economically suffer from the mines in the Red Sea, the West then
attempted to accuse Libya, which used the Suez
Canal less frequently (Mobley, 2022; O'Flaherty,
2019; Özsaraç, 2024; Chicago Tribune, 1987; Christ, 2009; The New York Times, 1984).
Although Gaddafi denied the
allegations, the West declared Libya,
a state causing problems for them,
as the scapegoat for the Red Sea
mines.
According to the CIA and Egyptian Intelligence, the Libyan-flagged Ghat Ro-Ro vessel, carrying mine-trained Captain Suheir Adham, set
sail to the Red Sea on July 6, 1984. The Libyan
ship, which took cargo from the port of Assab,
remained in the Red Sea for 7 days longer than
usual, exiting on July 21, 1984, which raised suspicions. According to the U.S., the Ghat Ro-Ro
had laid the bottom mines timed to activate on
July 27; the mine that exploded on July 9 had detonated early due to a timing mechanism failure.
It was a highly speculative and forced accusation without solid evidence (Mobley, 2022; O'Flaherty, 2019; Özsaraç, 2024).
On August 23, 1984, while in Marseille, the
Ghat Ro-Ro was temporarily detained by French
authorities for a few hours under the pretext of a
commercial dispute. Examination of photographs
taken during this process led to the interpretation
that slight wear on the stern ramp was evidence of
mine laying. However, finding a Ro-Ro ship without wear on its ramp is nearly impossible. Although Gaddafi denied the allegations, the West
declared Libya, a state causing problems for them,
as the scapegoat for the Red Sea mines (Mobley,
2022; O'Flaherty, 2019; Özsaraç, 2024).
To summarize, in 1984, 17 commercial ships
sustained minor damage from mine explosions
in the Red Sea, but none sank, suffered heavy/
medium damage, or had casualties. The explosives in the mines were just enough to cause alarm.
During the four months of mine searching by
Western states, no ready-to-explode mines were
found in the Red Sea. The world maritime industry appeared to be briefly panicked; in reality,
only Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the ones truly
alarmed (Özsaraç, 2024).
Western Consolidation in the Afro-Asian
Maritime Junction With the Pretext of
Suppressing Piracy in the Horn of Africa
Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines
attacks within territorial waters as “armed robbery,” leaving the responsibility to the coastal
state, while terming ship attacks outside territorial waters as “piracy (United Nations, 2020).”
This distinction laid the groundwork for international intervention in attacks beyond territorial waters and served as a justification for the
West’s establishment of a permanent military
mechanism in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and
Gulf of Aden, preventing coastal states from
utilizing their geopolitical power of the Red
Sea.
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Countries on the route from Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the Red Sea (Figure: BRIQ , 2024).
Indeed, in 2008, the Somali Federal Transitional
Government, unable to withstand Western
pressures and lacking the capacity to ensure
maritime security, prevent piracy, and prosecute
pirates on its own, sought cooperation from
various states and organizations. In response,
the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed five
separate resolutions during the period of June 2,
2008, to November 30, 2009 (Evin, 2012).
The fact that the majority of ships passing through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait carried Chinese
trade, and the incidents of piracy in the Horn of
Africa began to affect Russia’s interests, facilitated
the UNSC’s adoption of these resolutions. For instance, the seizure of the Belize-flagged Ukrainian
ship MV Faina by Somali pirates on September 8,
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2008, angered Russia. The MV Faina was carrying
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of cargo,
including 33 T-72 tanks, 73 tank maintenance kits
with spare parts, numerous weapons, and ammunition, while en route via the Bab-el-Mandeb. It
was later captured by 50 Somali pirates, identifying themselves as the “Central Region Coast
Guard,” demanding a $35 million ransom for the
ship’s release (Reuters, 2008). Although the ship’s
captain claimed to be transporting the military
cargo to South Sudan, the governments of Ukraine, Kenya, and the administration of South
Sudan denied this. However, there were reports
that over 100 T-72 and T-55 tanks had reached
South Sudan during those months (Van Oudenaren, 2008). Following negotiations, the Ukrai-
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
nian ship was released after a payment of $3.2 million to the pirates. Kenya subsequently claimed
to have purchased the tanks on the ship for its
own army. The involvement of 6 U.S. warships
surrounding the hijacked Ukrainian vessel and
preventing the Kenyan Armed Forces from boarding operations also drew attention (McGreal, 2009). Considering that the Kenyan Armed
Forces used British Vickers Mk3 tanks and not
Soviet weapons, Kenya’s role in the arms shipment to South Sudan, despite UN embargoes,
seemed to be a cover-up. The exposure of such
incidents by piracy facilitated Russia’s endorsement of UNSC resolutions.
The United States, seizing the
opportunity of the Yemeni Civil
War spilling into the Red Sea,
clearly intends to solidify its
position in the region using CTF153.
Based on UNSC resolutions, NATO initiated
the “Allied Provider” Operation from October
24, 2008, deploying warships in the region.
From December 2008 to August 2009, the EU
Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) operated under the
“Atalanta” Operation, followed by the establishment of the multinational Combined Task Force
151 (CTF 151), led by the U.S., from January 1,
2009 (Evin, 2012). It should be noted that CTF
151 is a multinational force composed of warships from U.S. allies or partner states. Among
the U.S. fleets, the 5th Fleet has the smallest
area of responsibility. Nevertheless, the United
States tends to maximize the use of its allies
and partners to maintain or enhance maritime control in the areas of responsibility of the
5th Fleet, which includes the Red Sea, Gulf of
Aden, Somali waters, Arabian Sea, and Persian
Gulf. The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF),
a multinational naval force led by the U.S. and
significantly relieving the burden of the 5th
Fleet, includes CTF 151, a highly effective force
supported by about 15 countries, tasked with
combating piracy (Combined Maritime Forces, 2010a; 2010b). Among these 15 countries,
Pakistan (10 times), Türkiye (6 times), South
Korea (6 times), Singapore (5 times), and Japan
(4 times) have been the most active in assuming command duties every six months; while
the United States, Kuwait, Denmark, Thailand,
New Zealand, UK, Brazil, Jordan, Philippines,
and Bahrain have tended to be relatively passive. The effective presence of CTF 151 has led to
the eastward expansion of the area of maritime
piracy activities in the Horn of Africa waters
during 2009-2012 (Morabito, 2016).
Alongside CTF-151, which controls the southern entrance of the Red Sea, a multinational
naval force named Combined Task Force 153
(CTF 153), composed of U.S, and Egyptian warships, was established on April 17, 2022, for the
security of the Red Sea (Combined Maritime
Forces, 2010a). The United States, seizing the
opportunity of the Yemeni Civil War spilling
into the Red Sea, clearly intends to solidify its
position in the region using CTF-153. Indeed,
CTF-153 has targeted the asymmetric capabilities of the Houthis in Yemen that can be used
at sea. According to U,S. sources, the number
of Houthi attacks on Israel-linked civilian trade
ships in the Red Sea starting on November 19,
2023, rose to 23 by December 31, 2023; most of
these attacks failed to hit their targets, and the
drones that did hit caused no significant damage (Anadolu Ajansı, 2023; Gambrell, 2023).
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The United States, aiming to eliminate the Houthis’ weak attempts to regain control of Yemeni
waters, invited Saudi Arabia, Israel, UAE, Bahrain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the
UK to join CTF-153 (Bowman, 2023). However,
when the United States launched “Operation Prosperity Guardian” against the Houthis on December
18, 2023, Egypt withdrew from CTF-153, and Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, hostile to the Houthis, refused
to join.
According to a U.S. Department of Defense statement dated December 18, 2023, “Operation Prosperity Guardian” was joined by the United States,
UK, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain. On December 21, 2023, Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder
stated that about 20 countries intended to support
the operation, but Spain and Italy were considering withdrawing their support (Helou, 2024). Like
CTF 151, CTF-153 should be seen as blocking the
geopolitical power of East Africa’s seas. The gradual decline of maritime piracy incidents in the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, and Somali
waters from 2012, and their almost negligible level
from 2018, can only be attributed to “imperialism,”
using Houthi attacks as a pretext for the persistent
presence of CTF 151 and CTF 153 in the region
(Kalay, 2023).
Global Power Rivalry for Establishing
Military Bases on African Coasts near the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti,
attempting to recover from the economic slowdown caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, experienced in 2020 the worst locust invasion in the
last 70 years, leading to significant agricultural production losses and a food security crisis
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(Smith, 2020). However, in recent years, African
countries where China has invested have generally exhibited economic performance above the
world average (Mürsel, 2018). Among these states, Ethiopia and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa
particularly stand out. While the IMF predicts
a global growth average of 2.9% in 2024, the figure is projected to be 6.2% for Ethiopia and 6%
for Djibouti (Visual Capitalist, 2023). Ethiopia,
promising as an agricultural country, is unfortunately landlocked. Djibouti, Ethiopia’s eastern
neighbor with a 370 km coastline, acts as a lifeline for Ethiopia’s foreign trade. Since the end
of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War in 2000, Ethiopia,
having lost hope of accessing the sea, relies on
Djibouti for 90% of its imports. Djibouti, with a
population of only 1 million and a GDP of $5.6
billion, is a dwarf in terms of national power
but a geopolitical giant due to its location at the
entrance of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Lacking
the capacity to utilize its geopolitical potential
independently, Djibouti has recently turned into
an international military garrison (Cabestan,
2019).
Presence of the European Union on African
Coasts near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
French air and naval base, hosting about 1,450
troops (1,000 of which are elite Légion étrangère
soldiers), has been present in Djibouti since 1978.
Since 2009, this base also accommodates 3080 German and 50 Spanish soldiers providing
support for the Atalanta Operation conducted
by EUNAVFOR; they use the Kempinski and
Sheraton Hotels in the region for accommodation
and rest. Additionally, an Italian air base is located
in the same area (Styan, 2020; Cabestan, 2019;
Downs, 2017).
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
French Naval Base in Djibouti (Photo: SSI, 2017).
U.S. Presence on African Coasts near the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
In October 2002, the U.S. established a military
unit called ‘Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa’ (CJTF-HOA) under CENTCOM, consisting of 1,500 personnel (200 civilians), and stationed it at Camp Lemonnier, a former French base
in Djibouti. The operational area for CJTF-HOA
includes all the land and airspace of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Yemen, along with their coastal waters in
the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.
CJTF-HOA was established to “identify, disrupt,
and defeat international terrorist groups operating in the region (Ploch, 2007),” and its additional tasks include:
- Providing freedom of movement for the United States in East Africa,
- Protecting U.S. military personnel, diplomats, facilities, and interests in the region (Yüksel, 2016).
As the rationale behind the establishment of
CJTF-HOA suggests, the United States uses terrorist organizations to legitimize its military presence in Africa (Şimşek, 2020).
On February 6, 2007, U.S. President Bush directed the establishment of a new structure called
‘U.S. Africa Command’ (U.S. AFRICOM). Using
the headquarters infrastructure of ‘U.S. European
Command’ (EUCOM), AFRICOM became an independent command under the U.S. Department of
Defense on January 1, 2008, with its area of responsibility being all of Africa, except Egypt (Yüksel,
2016). The decision by the United States to approach Africa holistically is thought to be driven by the
increasing influence of many new actors in Africa,
including China, Russia, Brazil, Japan, and Türkiye.
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The rising competition in the African continent has
been interpreted by some experts as a “New Cold
War unfolding in Africa (TASAM Afrika Enstitüsü,
2020).” Some sources summarize the establishment
purpose of AFRICOM as U.S. desire to expand
its “offshore balancing” strategy, compete with
China’s growing diplomatic, political, economic,
and cultural presence in Africa, increase trade
and investment with African countries around
mutual interests, and improve the United States’
tarnished image (Conteh-Morgan, 2018; Özel,
2020; Bekar, 2021).
The creation of an independent
strategic command for Africa
reflects the continent’s increasing
geopolitical significance and
indicates the long-term nature of
the U.S. military policies towards
Africa
Prior to AFRICOM, responsibility for Africa was divided among the European Command
(EUCOM), responsible for Europe, the Central
Command (CENTCOM), responsible for the
Middle East, and the Pacific Command (PACOM), responsible for the Pacific and countries
with Pacific coastlines. The creation of an independent strategic command for Africa reflects
the continent’s increasing geopolitical significance and indicates the long-term nature of U.S.
military policies towards Africa (Yüksel, 2016).
AFRICOM has supported operations aimed at
stabilizing conflict zones, establishing strategic
relationships, and promoting military cooperation, as well as supporting the efforts of U.S. soft
power institutions like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (Buğra, 2012).
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With the transfer from CENTCOM to AFRICOM, the strength of CJTF-HOA was increased
to 2,000-2,500 military and civilian personnel.
Although CENTCOM retains primary responsibility against “maritime piracy” in the waters
of the Horn of Africa, the regional CFTF-HOA
force under AFRICOM plays a critical role in
providing land support to the U.S. “blue water”
navy operating in the region (Ploch, 2007). Today, CJTF-HOA carries out its missions using
Camp Lemonnier Naval Base, which accommodates 4,500 U.S. troops (2,000 of them marines),
and Chabelley Air Base located in the desert area
of Djibouti. Since 2017, the U.S. Camp Lemonnier Naval Base has also hosted a British platoon.
Since 2011, the U.S. has used Chabelley Air Base
for continuous MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper
Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flight
operations over Yemen and Somalia (Cabestan,
2019).
Despite the presence of numerous U.S. bases
in Africa, the U.S. military presence is perceived
as an occupation in many parts of Africa, still
bearing the fresh traces of Western colonialism.
Consequently, no African state has agreed to host
the AFRICOM headquarters, so it remains in
Stuttgart, Germany. This situation has created an
irony of an Africa command not located in central Africa (Yüksel, 2016).
In recent times, China’s use of the allure of its
economic investments in Ethiopia and Djibouti
to gain military presence in Djibouti has forced
the United States into economic competition
with China. The $1.55 billion, 550 km long Horn
of Africa (Djibouti-Ethiopia) Fuel Pipeline is a
product of this competition, an investment by the
U.S. Extending from Damerjog Port in Djibouti
to a storage facility with a capacity of 950,000
barrels in Awash, central Ethiopia, the 20-inch
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
Map of the World showing the Locations of AFRICOM and CENTCOM (Photo: USNI, 2013).
diameter Horn of Africa Pipeline can transfer
240,000 barrels per day. Completed in 2018, this
pipeline enables the United States to transport refined diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel from Africa or
the Middle East to Ethiopia (VOA, 2015; Ecofin
Agency, 2015; Sudan Tribune, 2015; CGTN Africa, 2023).
The spillover of the Yemeni Civil War into the
Red Sea since 2015 has served as a pretext for the
West, supported by UAVs or warplanes from imperialist bases in Djibouti, to establish a firmer presence in the Red Sea and engage in shows of force.
For instance, on October 1, 2016, a high-speed
hybrid catamaran military cargo vessel owned by
the UAE, Swift-1, was damaged by a C-802 missile
launched by the Houthis from land. Subsequently,
on October 10, 2016, the USS Mason, a U.S. destroyer, and the USS Ponce, a U.S. amphibious ship,
assessed two objects launched from the Yemeni
coast while crossing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait as
a suspected guided missile attack. The USS Mason
quickly launched two Standard Missile-2 (SM-2)
and one Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) air
defense missiles towards the aerial objects, also
deploying Nulka decoys as a passive measure. The
Houthis, through the Saba News Agency, denied
the allegations of attacking the USS Mason and
USS Ponce (Lagrone, 2016; Vaughan, 2016). There is no available information on whether the two
aerial objects were anti-ship missiles, launched
by the Houthis, targeted at U.S. ships, or if they
were shot down by the SAMs launched by the USS
Mason. However, the U.S. government, sharing its
military sources’ speculative information and reactions with the global public, has created the perception that the Houthis attacked U.S. warships.
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Japanese Presence on African Coasts near
the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
Since 2009, Japan, maintaining a constant naval
presence in Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden,
has built a runway suitable for fighter jets at its
logistical base in Djibouti in 2016, which houses
600 troops (Pajon, 2017).
Israeli Presence on African Coasts near the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
It is claimed that since 2012, Israel has had
some small naval units stationed in the Dahlak
Archipelago and Massawa in Eritrea and even an
intelligence facility on Mount Soira (Amba Sawara) in Eritrea to monitor Iran’s activities in the
Red Sea. Indeed, in 2017, a Houthi spokesperson
threatened that Israeli targets in Eritrea could be
struck (Melvin, 2019).
Chinese Presence on African Coasts near
the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
In recent years, China’s peaceful policies in
global competition, challenging the dominance
of the United States, are based on principles of:
- Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,
- Non-aggression,
- Non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs,
- Equality,
- Mutual benefit (Yüksel, 2016).
These peaceful policies have facilitated China’s investments in Africa under the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI). A 2019 study by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies
found that China is involved in at least 46 of
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the existing, operated, and planned port projects among 172 Sub-Saharan African ports, having a role in the construction of 41, financing
27, and controlling 11 of them (CSIS, 2014). In
short, Sub-Saharan African port investments
have become one of the primary ways for China
to establish commercial superiority in the region. This is believed to provide strategic depth
to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
in meeting future logistical needs (CSIS, 2014;
Devermont, Cheatham, & Chiang, 2019).
Since its first military presence in Africa in
2003 with peacekeeping duties in the Democratic Republic of Congo, China has increased
its trade relations with Ethiopia over the last 20
years (Cabestan, 2019). This economic relationship has also benefited Djibouti, Ethiopia’s
gateway to the sea. Indeed, the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, originally built by France
in 1890, was renovated by Chinese companies
China Railway Group Ltd. and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation as part
of a $3.95 billion project from 2011-2017 and
opened in January 2018 (Downs, 2017). The railway line, now with a capacity of 3,500 tons per
trip (seven times its original capacity), reduces
the travel time between Addis Ababa and the
Doraleh Port from three days to 12 hours, also
cutting the cost of freight transport by a third
(Çelik, 2023). Following the completion of this
large-scale transportation infrastructure, China continued its investments in Djibouti with
the $340 million Doraleh Port, a $320 million
daily 100,000 m3 capacity freshwater pipeline
between Ethiopia and Djibouti, the $64 million Ghoubet Port, and the $30 million Djibouti
International Free Trade Zone (Downs, 2017).
Since 2008, China has conducted anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, where 40%
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
of its total imports pass, and until 2017, tried
to support its warships sent for this purpose
from regional civilian ports (Cabestan, 2019).
It is claimed that some Chinese warships could
not port for 124 days during these missions
(People’s Daily, 2013). Between 2009-2013,
Chinese warships made at least 23 port visits
in Djibouti (Downs, 2017). During this period,
as economic relations between China and Djibouti continued to rise, they also began to gain
a military dimension. Indeed, a security and
defense agreement signed between China and
Djibouti in 2014 was vehemently protested by
the United States. In 2015, China and Djibouti
signed agreements for 14 mega projects worth
$9.8 billion as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (Edens, 2015).
During this time, China frequently expressed
the need for a naval base in Africa to evacuate
hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals when
necessary, citing the evacuation of 36,000 Chinese
citizens from Libya in 2011 as an example (Cabestan, 2019). Indeed, China’s use of civilian ports in
Djibouti to evacuate 900 Chinese nationals from
Yemen in March-April 2015 confirmed this thesis
(Zhen, 2016).
Evacuation of Chinese Nationals from Yemen to Djibouti (Photo: People’s Daily, 2019).
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In November 2015, China announced its decision to establish a logistics facility to escort merchant
ships in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters and to
support UN peacekeeping/humanitarian aid/evacuation missions (Cabestan, 2019; Jacobs & Perlez,
2017). Although the Chinese Government tries to
mask it as a military area, this facility possesses all
the characteristics of a military base.
The Chinese Djibouti Naval Base, operational
since August 2017 under a 10-year leasing agreement between China and Djibouti, houses approximately 2,000 military personne (Wong, 2015;
Cabestan, 2019)l. According to some sources in
Western media, China has built the base in Djibouti
with the capacity to accommodate up to 10,000 soldiers (Winsor, 2016; Dube, 2016; Cabestan, 2019).
The Chinese Djibouti Naval Base, adjacent to
the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and costing $590
million, allocates one of its six docks for Chinese
warships (Zhen, 2016). This particular dock can
accommodate all Chinese warships except aircraft
carriers and Type 071 Yushao-class amphibious
transport docks (LPD) (Downs, 2017).
The Chinese Djibouti Naval Base, situated 8 miles from the U.S. Base at Camp Lemonnier, covers
36 hectares. The base includes four-story logistics
warehouses, a helipad with a helicopter runway,
hangars, and maintenance facilities. It also has a
hospital and sports facilities and is surrounded by
an 8-meter high security wall and patrol roads. The
helicopter runway (Bhat, 2017) is suitable for drone
take-offs and landings, but a major disadvantage of
the Chinese base is the absence of a runway suitable for aircraft take-offs. The Chinese Djibouti Naval Base is five times smaller than the U.S. Base at
Camp Lemonnier (Cabestan, 2019).
Since the opening of the Chinese Djibouti Naval Base in 2017, regular heavy weapons firing training exercises have been observed for the security
of the base’s Chinese military units (Zhao, 2017).
Satellite map showing the locations of 1.China Djibouti Naval Base, 2.Doraleh Multipurpose Port and 3.Doraleh
Container Terminal (Photo: BRIQ, 2024).
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Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
The U.S. forces in Djibouti meet their logistic needs through the Doraleh Container Terminal, located
near the Chinese Djibouti Naval Base. This situation,
implying an additional security problem for the U.S.
Base at Camp Lemonnier, is uncomfortable for the
United States (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2020).
In Djibouti, due to the proximity of the bases, tensions between China and the United States are on the
rise. For instance, it has been alleged by the United
States that “10 separate laser attacks were carried out
from the Chinese Djibouti Naval Base against U.S.
warplanes, resulting in serious eye injuries to two U.S.
pilots (Dahir, 2018).” Besides these “allegation-level”
tensions, the U.S. Government closely monitors multinational exercises conducted by the South African,
Chinese, and Russian Navies in the southern waters
of Africa and by the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese Navies in the Indian Ocean. According to reports
presented to the U.S. Congress, during joint military
activities, China has allowed Russian warships to use
its base in Djibouti (Shainn, 2020).
Russian Presence on African Coasts near
the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
Seeking to increase its influence in the Red Sea,
Russia has been searching for a base near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait since 2009 (Ramani, 2018).
Amid the Russia-Ukraine tensions and seeking
political support internationally, Russia’s visibility
in Africa began to increase, leading to the signing
of 19 military cooperation agreements with African countries between 2015 and 2019 (TASAM
Afrika Enstitüsü, 2022). Although not officially
acknowledged by the Moscow administration,
Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group
are stationed in Libya, Mali, the Central African
Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan,
which has a coastline on the Red Sea (Siegle, 2021;
Lindén, 2023).
According to statements made in August 2017
by former RF Naval Forces Commander Admiral
Feliks Gromov, Russia’s need for a naval base in the
Gulf of Aden has become vital. The Moscow-based
Institute of Oriental Studies, after extensive research, has suggested Yemen’s Socotra Island as an
ideal location for a Russian naval base. Russia continues negotiations with the al-Hadi Administration in Southern Yemen regarding this. Similarly,
Russia has been intensively pursuing the establishment of a naval base in Eritrea since September
2018, alongside a logistics center, to facilitate trade
in agricultural products and minerals in the Red
Sea and in Berbera, a major trade port in Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden (Ramani, 2018; Tesfa
News, 2018).
Since May 2019, Russia has been in talks with
the Sudanese Government and successfully signed a military cooperation agreement in November-December 2020. This agreement granted Russia a “logistical support point” in Port Sudan and
allowed for the establishment and operation of a
military facility by 300 Russian military and civilian personnel for 25 years, providing Russia with
the convenience of basing in the Red Sea for shortterm shelter of warships. However, this agreement
was canceled in April 2021 (Kollakowski, 2022;
Saballa, 2021). Negotiations between Sudan and
Russia continue regarding the reinstatement of the
military cooperation agreement (Reuters, 2022).
In recent years, Russia’s persistent search for
permanent military bases in African countries,
including Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique,
particularly in the Red Sea waters, has been closely
monitored by the global community (Ersozoglu,
2021; Lindén, 2023; Nia, 2020).
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Saudi Arabian Presence on African Coasts
near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
Led by Saudi Arabia and with the participation of
some Arab countries, a coalition launched military
operations against the Houthi-Saleh forces starting
March 25, 2015 (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2014). Due
to the multifaceted Yemeni Civil War, weapons like
anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used in the south of the Red Sea
have impacted a small number of merchant ships, in
addition to the warships participating in the conflict (Kozanhan, 2020). Particularly, the attacks by the
Houthis on Saudi Arabian war/commercial ships
using drones, boats, and explosive devices (especially during 2017-2018) have been a major topic in the
global public discourse (Kalay, 2023).
In an attack near Yemen’s Al-Hudaydah Port on
January 30, 2017, a fast boat loaded with an unmanned bomb used by the Houthis struck the Saudi Al-Madinah (RSN 702) frigate near its helicopter
platform, resulting in the death of two and injury of
three Saudi soldiers. Saudi Arabia reported that the
attack involved two remote-controlled, bomb-laden
fast boats, of which two were detected and evaded by
Al-Madinah, but the third boat hit the ship (Lagrone,
2017; BBC, 2017’ RSN AL Madinah, 2017).
Months after this incident, in 2017, Saudi Arabia joined the list of countries with military bases in
Djibouti (Downs, 2017; Cabestan, 2019; Al-Abyadh,
2017). The number and function of Saudi personnel
in Djibouti remain largely undisclosed.
During 2018-2019, Saudi Arabia entered into close military cooperation with Egypt in the Red Sea,
exemplified by their joint execution of “The Red
Wave” Exercise in December 2018 in the Red Sea.
Following the drone attack on two Saudi oil facilities
in the Persian Gulf on September 14, 2019, the armed
forces of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Djibou148
ti, Yemen, and Somalia decided to make “The Red
Wave” series of joint exercises a regular event to be
repeated annually in the waters of Jeddah in the Red
Sea. The fifth of these series, “The Red Wave-5,” was
conducted in June 2022 (Muhammed, 2019; Khan,
2019; Arab News, 2022).
United Arab Emirates Presence on African
Coasts near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
To support its military operations in Yemen, the
UAE, which has deployed troops in Eritrea and Somaliland, had its 2015 request to establish a naval
base rejected by Djibouti (Cabestan, 2019; Meester & Lanfranchi, 2021; Chegraoui, Lyammouri, &
Skah, 2021). Although the UAE’s military activities
have recently decreased, it has a naval and air base
in Assab, Eritrea, which it has leased for 30 years
since April 2015 for use against the Houthis in Yemen. The Assab base in Eritrea has also served as
a transportation terminal for the transit of 10,000
Sudanese fighters to Yemen and is alleged to have
been used for transporting military equipment to
Haftar in Libya (Taşkömür, 2023; Alexandre, 2020).
Turkish Presence on African Coasts near
the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
In 2002, Türkiye only had 12 embassies in Africa,
but with its “Africa Opening Policy,” it has increased
this number to 44 in 20 years. Today, Türkiye has the
second-highest number of embassies in Africa after
France. Similarly, while only 10 African countries had
embassies in Ankara in 2008, this number has now risen to 37. Expanding rapidly in Africa, Türkiye opened
embassies in Somalia in 2011, and in Eritrea and Djibouti in 2013, and then began to implement its “Africa
Partnership Policy.” Closely monitoring terrorism, civil
wars, coups, social and humanitarian crises, political
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
chaos, and security threats arising from climate change
in Africa, Türkiye has gained sympathy as an advocate
of “African solutions” by sharing its experiences (TASAM Afrika Enstitüsü, 2022).
The port visits to 24 African countries by the Barbaros Turkish Naval Task Group, consisting of two frigates, one corvette, and one replenishment oiler, during
its 102-day journey starting from Gölcük on March 14,
2014, have strengthened Türkiye-Africa relations (Mavi
Vatan, 2023).
Following the economic hardship
caused by 20 years of U.S. sanctions
and the loss of over 70% of its
oil revenues, with South Sudan’s
independence in 2011, Sudan under
Omar al-Bashir’s regime grew closer
to Türkiye after 2014.
Türkiye’s use of the waters of Africa, including the
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, stands at a high level. In fact,
according to 2019 figures, 5.3% of the north/south cargo transported through the Suez Canal consists of Türkiye’s imports and exports. Among the countries using
the Suez Canal, Türkiye ranks:
5th for southbound petroleum products,
7th for southbound ore and metals,
4th for southbound fertilizers,
1st for southbound processed metals,
3rd for northbound petroleum products,
5th for northbound LNG,
4th for northbound chemicals,
2nd for northbound processed metals,
4th for northbound vegetable oils,
1st for northbound coal,
2nd for northbound fertilizers (Mavi Vatan,
2023; Suez Canal Authority, 2019).
According to these statistics, Türkiye is among the
top users of the Red Sea. As can be seen, Türkiye, which vitally depends on the waterways of the Afro-Asian
junction, is compelled to have a military presence in the
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, where Western imperialism is militarily concentrated.
Since 2017, the Turkish Task Force in Somalia has
been based in Mogadishu to provide training support
to the Somali Armed Forces (Al-Jazeera, 2017). However, the distance from Mogadishu to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is about 1,400 nautical miles by sea. There
have been reports that Türkiye, seeking a base closer to
the strategically important Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, has
acquired land for a military base in Djibouti (Erandaç,
2018). It is unclear if the land mentioned in these reports is the 500-hectare area allocated to Türkiye for 99
years to establish a “Special Economic Zone” under an
agreement signed on December 10, 2014 (DEIK, 2023).
Following the economic hardship caused by 20 years of U.S. sanctions and the loss of over 70% of its oil
revenues, with South Sudan’s independence in 2011,
Sudan under Omar al-Bashir’s regime grew closer to
Türkiye after 2014 (Mashamoun, 2022). In this positive atmosphere, on December 29, 2017, Türkiye and
Sudan signed 22 agreements, including leasing Suakin
Island for 99 years for $650 million and increasing bilateral trade volume to $10 billion annually. Although
Türkiye claimed it intended to restore the dilapidated
old Ottoman port on Suakin Island and turn the island
into a cultural and tourism center, this assertion was
not found credible by Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia
(Cagaptay, 2019; Habertürk, 2018’ Arpa, 2019; Mashamoun, 2022; ASSAM, 2022). According to some reports in the Turkish and Egyptian media in 2018, Türkiye planned to complete the construction of a military
base on Suakin Island by 2020 and additionally make a
$4 billion investment to renovate Suakin Port (Mourad,
2018). These reports triggered the formation of a reflexive anti-Türkiye axis comprising Saudi Arabia, UAE,
and Egypt in the Red Sea (İnanç, 2023).
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Figure 3. Port Visits of the Barbaros Turkish Naval Task Group in 24 African Countries in 2014
Barbaros TGDD travelled the entire continent in 102 days (Figure: Bilgen, 2023).
In 2019, Sudanese Vice President Ibrahim es Senusi stated that Türkiye would not establish a military base on the island, but he found it difficult to
understand the reaction to this agreement by those who did not object to the many foreign military
bases in the Red Sea (Bag, 2019). Sudanese Foreign
Minister Ibrahim Ghandour said that Türkiye would
first construct a port on the island for the repair
and maintenance of military and commercial ships
(Kaya, 2021).
After the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir’s regime
in Sudan in 2019, the transitional government canceled the lease agreement of Suakin Island to Türkiye (Sofos, 2022). Abdulfettah el-Burhan, the head of
the Sudanese Transitional Military Council formed
in 2019, announced on social media his opposition
to the allocation of Suakin Island to Türkiye for 99
years and his intention to work for its cancellation.
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Amid increasing debates, former Sudanese Minister
of International Relations Idris Suleiman defended
that the agreement was legally signed at the state level and could not be changed (Kaya, 2021). Despite
these controversies, the momentum between Türkiye and Sudan did not diminish, and in a bilateral
meeting between Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay
and Sudanese Sovereignty Council Deputy Chairman General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, it was
stated that the agreements signed during the Omar
al-Bashir era between the two countries would remain in effect (Mashamoun, 2022). Moreover, Türkiye expressed its willingness to mediate the ongoing
issues between Sudan and Ethiopia (Orakçı, 2021).
Finally, in August 2021, President Erdogan met with
Sudanese Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to sign a series of agreements and restart cooperation (Sofos, 2022).
Halil Özsaraç - The Importance of Africa in the African-Asian Geopolitical Nexus: the Red Sea and the Yemeni Sea
Conclusion
This article has highlighted events such as the mysterious seabed mines in the Red Sea in 1984 causing minor
damage to a few merchant ships over about a month,
the descent of impoverished Somali fishermen into piracy due to the theft of fish resources and pollution of
marine ecosystems in the early 2000s, the transformation of regional piracy into a profitable finance sector for
terrorist organizations, and the spillover of the Houthi
struggle for survival into the Red Sea since 2016.
These incidents, occurring at different times and involving different actors, share two overlooked common features. First, contrary to popular belief, none of these incidents were severe enough to halt or significantly slow Red
Sea traffic. Second, Western imperialism, despite creating
a contrary perception, has used these incidents as pretexts
to seize or consolidate control over the Afro-Asian junction comprising the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and
Gulf of Aden. The geopolitical power of this Afro-Asian
joint area, an area of common power for Africa and Asia,
has historically belonged neither to Africa nor to Asia.
Africa and Asia must work to remove imperialism from
these semi-enclosed seas and their surroundings.
During World Wars I and II, the homelands of imperialists, other than the United States, were turned into
ruins as they became battlegrounds. With the current
expectation of a transition to multipolarity, or even significant shifts in hard power, the question arises, “Will
the upcoming wars, involving a struggle for power, occur
in the homelands of these powers and their surrounding
seas?” It seems plausible that global/continental/regional power centers, unlike previous world wars, might
prefer to conduct their power struggles in geographies
far from their own territories and living spaces. The African continent, being a potential geography for a bloody,
hybrid-natured world war aimed at changing the world
order, could be the most likely - and expendable - choice.
Such a scenario would spell new devastation for Africa.
African nations, historically unaware of their own geopolitical power, now face an urgent need to embrace the
Red Sea as a geopolitical lifebuoy, considering its strategic importance as a busy and narrowing waterway. The
Red Sea, which fortuitously did not become a primary
battleground in previous world wars, could be at the very
center of a potential Third World War. To prevent this,
Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, still not
fully aware of their responsibilities, need to urgently seek
policies to end the imperialist military presence in the
Afro-Asian junction, without further delay.
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