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Distinctions are drawn between paradoxes and contradictions.
Paradoxes That Aren't, 2021
A brief treatment of some claimed paradoxes that appear not to be paradoxes but instead the result of the violation of the law of non-contradiction, with an expanded treatment of Russell's paradox from the perspective of a non-mathematician.
The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Therefore, it’s surprising that there’s been little effort exerted in evaluating the numerous non-equivalent definitions of ‘contradiction’ found in the literature. This paper initiates the project of evaluating available definitions of ‘contradiction’ by considering the prevalent truth-conditional account, which defines contradictions as propositions that are necessarily false. Five versions of the account found in the literature are considered, and all are found to fail to fulfil the criteria for an adequate definition of ‘contradiction’. In addition, it is shown that the truth-conditional account cannot be meaningfully embedded within the law of non-contradiction whilst maintaining the law’s substance and philosophical importance, a prerequisite for any adequate definition of ‘contradiction’. The paper concludes that these criticisms of the truth-conditional account give us good reason to believe that all versions of the account are inadequate definitions of ‘contradiction’.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
According to a standard view, paradoxes are arguments with plausible premises that entail an implausible conclusion. This is false. In many paradoxes the premises are not plausible precisely because they entail an implausible conclusion. Obvious responses to this problem—including that the premises are individually plausible and that they are plausible setting aside the fact that they entail an implausible conclusion—are shown to be inadequate. A very different view of paradox is then introduced. This is a functionalist view according to which paradoxes are the kinds of things that puzzle people in characteristic ways. It is claimed that this view, too, fails and for the very same reason. The result is a new puzzle about the nature of paradoxes.
Acta Analytica
This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.
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