Is there Hope in Judicial Activism on Social Rights?
Assessing the Dimension of Judicial Activism on Social Rights in Colombia ∗
Mauricio García Villegas∗*
Maria Paula Saffon ∗**
Introduction
Since its creation in 1991, the Colombian Constitutional Court (hereinafter,
CCC) has been one of the main protagonists of the country’s institutional and
political life. Its vigorous intervention on various economic, political and social
matters has promoted important changes in the institutional balance of power,
as well as in the concrete lives of traditionally marginalized or excluded social
groups. This judicial progressive activism1 has prompted a great deal of both
academic and political discussion. It has been defended by some scholars and
social movements, while it has been strongly criticized by others, including
relevant legal and political actors.
∗∗
We are very grateful to Sebastián Rubiano and Santiago Vargas, who generously assisted us in the
empirical research for this paper.
∗∗∗
Associate professor of Universidad Nacional de Colombia, in Bogotá, fellow of the Institute For
Legal Studies - Law School University of Wisconsin-, former Tinker Visiting Professor at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, and researcher at the Center for the Study of Law, Justice and
Society (DeJuSticia).
∗∗∗∗
Lecturer at Univeridad Nacional de Colombia and Universidad de los Andes, and researcher at the
Center for the Study of Law, Justice and Society (DeJuSticia).
1
Following Uprimny, we do not believe that activism and progressiveness of the judges should be
identified, given that there may also be conservative activism, that is, judicial intervention in political
and social matter that does not promote social transformation, but instead the perpetuation of the status
quo. See Rodrigo Uprimny, The Enforcement of Social Rights by the Colombian Constitutional Court:
Cases and Debates, in COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: AN
INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? 127 (Roberto Gargarella et al., eds., 2006). The best example of
conservative activism is the activity of the United States Supreme Court in the early twentieth century.
Moreover, as Santos points out, “up until recently[,] the best known instances of court activism were
politically conservative, if not reactionary.” Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Los paisajes de la Justicia en
las Sociedades Contemporáneas, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA 85
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Mauricio García Villegas eds., 2001).
1
The discussions regarding the intervention of the CCC have been especially
intense regarding the protection of social rights 2 it has endeavored. Indeed, not
only has this protection been one of the fields in which the Court has been most
progressive; it has also meant a significant judicialization of economic policies,
thus becoming a very sensitive political issue.
That is why, in this article, we will attempt to assess the CCC’s activism
regarding social rights. To do so, we will develop the following hypothesis:
THE POLITICAL ASSESMENT OF THE judicial protection of social rights
depends on the notion of Constitution one defends. If such notion is either too
wide or too restrictive, or takes the material context too little or too much into
account, grasping the real dimension of judicial activism on social rights will
always be a disappointing task. We will illustrate this hypothesis by referring to
an empirical research conducted on the CCC’s intervention on social rights
between 1992 and 2006.3
The article is divided in four sections. In the first section, we will develop our
theoretical approach, by looking at the different notions of Constitution and to
the different ways in which these notions value judicial activism on social
rights and the social change it may bring about. In the second section, we will
offer a contextual description of the Colombian case, so as to offer some key
elements of Colombia’s constitutionalism. In the third section, we will present
2
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the expression “social rights”. It may include or exclude certain
rights, depending on the width with which one understands the concept. From a restrictive point of
view, the notion of social rights only includes welfare rights, that is, rights that imply a State’s positive
duty to deliver a service or an economic subsidy to citizens. In contrast, in the widest conception of the
term, social rights include not only welfare rights, but also rights that only imply a negative obligation
of the State consisting in non-intervention, but that can be considered social rights either because they
are second generation rights, and/or because their protection is determinant for people to be able to
claim their welfare rights (such as the right to form labor unions or to go to strike). Some have
suggested that, rather than dividing social rights between those that are and are not welfare rights, one
should look at the “welfarian” dimension of each right, given that, most of the times, the same social
right might imply both positive and negative State obligations. This position has been defended by the
CCC, see, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, Ruling T-595 de 2002.
. The judicial protection of social rights in a strict sense –i.e., welfare rights- or in their “welfarian”
dimension is that which generates the harshest criticisms, since it is seen as judicial activism, or
judicial intervention in redistributive matters. However, as we shall see, we believe that true judicial
activism on social rights does not cover the whole set of welfare rights or the “welfarian” dimension of
social rights. Rather, we argue that judicial activism on social rights only takes place when judges order
the State to comply with a positive duty to provide a service or a subsidy, which was not clearly stated
as a legal obligation before. Whereas, there is no real judicial activism when the judge simply orders
the State to provide a service or a subsidy, which, according to the preexisting law, it was already in the
duty to provide. That is why, for the purpose of assessing true judicial activism on social rights, we
distinguish between non-welfare and welfare social rights, as well as between welfare rights in a wide
and a strict sense, and only think of real judicial activism in the latter sense.
3
As we will later see in more detail, the research was conducted in two phases. The first phase’s
results, which covered the CCC’s 1992 to 1997 period, were published in Mauricio García, Derechos
sociales y necesidades políticas. La eficacia judicial de los derechos sociales en el constitucionalismo
colombiano, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA 455 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos
& Mauricio García Villegas eds., 2001).The second phase’s results appear in this article for the first
time.
2
our empirical research on the CCC’s intervention on social rights, and will
extract some preliminary conclusions on the real dimension of judicial activism
in Colombia. In the fourth and final section, we will draw some general
conclusions, which will try to link the theoretical approach to the empirical
research.
I.
The Theoretical Approach: Notions of Constitution and its
Relation to Social Change
In our perspective, the understanding of the notion of Constitution is a key
element to value the judicial protection of social rights and its potentialities for
bringing about social change. Indeed, depending on the reach and effects one
believes a Constitution has and should have, one will tend to be more or less
critical regarding the social changes that judicial activism on social rights may
or may not produce. In the following lines, we will first distinguish two
different models of Constitutions and will look at the institutional arrangements
they tend to bring about, particularly regarding the distribution of competences
of social rights protection (a); we will then focus on those Constitutions –such
as the Colombian 1991 Constitution-, which tend to attribute the competence of
protecting social rights to the judiciary, and will analyze the different academic
and political criticisms that arise against them (b).
a) Models of Constitutions
We differentiate two models or types of Constitutional texts: protective
Constitutions and aspirational Constitutions.4
4
On this see Mauricio García Villegas, Law as Hope. Constitutions, Courts and Social Change in Latin
America, No. Gainsville Florida Law Journal, XXX. A difference can be established between two
traditions of constitutional law in Europe after WWII: first, the rule of law tradition, also named Etat
du droit or rechtstaat, and second what is called the social state of law adopted in Gemany in 1948 or
Spain in 1978. The most essential characteristic of the latter consists, according to G. Zagrebelzky, in
the separation of rights and the legislation. The protection of rights – in contrast to the French tradition
– does not depend exclusively on the law made by parliament, but rather on the judicial sanction by the
constitution. See Zagrebelzki, Ob. Cit., at 57. For a discussion on social rights, see Gomez (1988). But
the topic of social rights is not limited to the national context; a study of the relation between
international and national protection of social rights from the European context can be found in AdrianC.-M. De-Kok, Will Lack of Commitment to Fundamental Social Rights Persist in Europe after 1992?,
10 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 1 (1990), 81-84; Antonio Baldassarre, Los
derechos sociales, 5 Revista Derecho del Estado (1998). For a critic of this “maximalist”
constitutionalism see the liberal positions of Ernest W.Bockenforde, Los derechos fundamentales
sociales en la estructura de la Constitución, in ESCRITOS DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES
(Nomos, 1993), cited in Rodolfo Arango, Los derechos sociales fundamentales como derechos
subjetivos, Pensamiento Jurídico 8 (1997). Robert Nozick views social rights from a liberal perspective
of a minimalist state – on his position see Otfried Hoffe, Social Rights as Opposed to the Minimal
State: A Philosophical Exploration, 8 Labour and Society 2 (1983)
3
On the one hand, protective Constitutions are generally fostered in political and
social contexts in which basic conditions of social progress and institutional
stability have been reached. Therefore, these Constitutions tend to protect or
preserve such conditions, and to prevent a history of abuses that has been
overcome from taking place again. Protective Constitutions have thus
minimalist or modest goals, in the sense that they reflect an effort to secure the
present. That is why these Constitutions tend to treat rights, and particularly
social rights, as political matters or programmatic norms, the materialization of
which is mostly carried out by legislators and the executive. 5
On the other hand, aspirational Constitutions usually prosper in contexts in
which there is great dissatisfaction regarding present conditions and a very
weak legal protection of rights, but at the same time a strong belief in the
possibility of reaching a better future through Constitutional law.6 For that
reason, rather than pretending to preserve the present, these Constitutions aim
at radically changing it and to improve social change. That is why aspirational
Constitutions tend to have ambitious or maximalist goals, which imply the
existence of a big gap between the Constitutional text and the social reality it
aims at regulating. Among these ambitious goals, the applicability of
Constitutional rights in general, and of welfare rights in particular, is central.
These rights are thus treated as legal norms 7, which MUST be protected.
Aspirational constitutions are some times the result of a victorious revolution.
When that happens, social rights are applied through the political system, i.e.
through legislation made by a parliament in which a clear political majority is
5
This model of Constitutions is common in core countries, and especially in those with an AngloSaxon tradition. However, at times, protective Constitutions are enacted in peripheral or semiperipheral countries, in which the present is not particularly attractive, or it is so only for a dominant
minority. Such is the case of the Colombian Constitution of 1886.
6
Aspirational Constitutions are common in peripheral and semi-peripheral societies. Cass Sunstein
maintains that there are two kinds of Constitutionalism: one from the North and the West, and the other
from the South and the East of the world. Cass Sunstein, The Negative constitution: Transition in Latin
America, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY (I. P. Stotzky, ed., Westview Press, 1993)., where unsatisfied needs are big, but so are
hopes of law being able to deal with them in the future. This is especially true in the case of Latin
America, where the conception of law, and Constitutions in particular, as the product of the will of the
people capable of transforming the context without restrictions was inherited from the French
Rousseaunian thought and revolutionary tradition. However, in some circumstances, aspirational
Constitutions emerge in developed countries facing times of instability - such as happened in Germany
and Italy after World War II, or in post-Franco Spain. Ruto Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role
of Law in Political Transformation, 106 The Yale Law Journal 7 (1997), 209-280.
7 Nevertheless, this characteristic should be approached with caution, given that the objective of this
type of constitutionalism is to create a pluralist and tolerant society that excludes static and
unchangeable models of society and life. See Gustav Zagrebelzki, IL DIRITTO MITE (1992). In this
sense, emphasis is placed more on procedures than on content, specifically on the procedures required
to achieve co-existence amongst people holding different worldviews.
4
in place, as a result of the previous revolution.8 Indeed, revolutions bring with
them a generalized desire for social transformation, which actors who actively
participated in the revolution are willing to materialize, and which very likely
will receive social support. Besides, revolutions bring about important
institutional changes, which very often imply an opening of spaces in the
political arena for those who were engaged in the revolution. Moreover, it is
very likely that post-revolutionary States will tend to recruit their agents from
those who participated in or at least supported the revolution. And this means
that different State actors will be eager to engage in the effective application of
the aspirational Constitution, which may lead to low levels of inter-institutional
conflict, given that different State agents are committed to a similar political
project.
But very often aspirational constitutions are promulgated in countries in which
no previous political or social revolution has happened. In these cases it is
possible that the constitution become rather a symbolic text. But it is also
possible, especially when a strong constitutional court is established by the
constitution text, that judges take seriously the constitutional obligation for the
protection of social rights and social change and force both the parliament and
the administration to do so. In this case, there a tension between the judiciary
and the other two branches. In seeking social change, judges may end up
intervening in economic and political matters usually dealt with by parliament
or the executive. As a result, important inter-institutional conflicts often arise
between constitutional judges and political organs.
Contexts in which a revolution has not taken place may be more hostile for an
aspirational Constitution. Indeed, even if the Constitution is the result of a
momentary national agreement on the necessity of structural transformations, it
is possible that political actors engaged in the constituency process will not
continue to be committed to its results afterwards. This may happen because of
the fact that, apart from the production of the Constitutional text, not much
social transformation takes place. Thus, political commitment to the social
transformation project may weaken soon after, being reduced to a few State
agents still willing to defend it. In such settings, inter-institutional conflict is
very likely to foster because while some State actors may be willing to support
and effectively apply the progressive content of the aspirational Constitutions,
others –often more- may insist on interpreting the Constitution as a set of
political promises, which need not be materialized right away. As we will see in
detail in the next section, this is precisely what has happened in Colombia since
8
However, this does not mean that aspirational Constitutions emerging from post-revolutionary
contexts are always eagerly applied by all State agents equally. There are some cases that illustrate
that, despite them all being supporters of the revolution; some State agents are more active in the
development of the new aspirational Constitution.
5
the Constituent Assembly of 1991, where the progressive Constitutional text
regarding social rights has only been strongly defended by the Constitutional
Court, thus generating a great deal of conflict between the Court and the
political powers, who tend to interpret it in rather restrictive ways.
For aspirational Constitutions to be materialized, political will of State agents
and social mobilization of the population in favor of their contents are
fundamental. Moreover, for aspirational Constitutions to effectively bring
about the social transformations they promise, the existence of a legal culture
that favors rights protection and social change is also necessary. This is so
because, having such ambitious goals, the legal or judicial development of
aspirational Constitutions is a necessary condition for their effective
application, but it is insufficient. In order to achieve their stated goals, these
constitutions need external sources of support, different from the State
bureaucracy implementing their Constitutional mandates. 9
The existence or absence of a previous revolution is not as relevant for the luck
of protective Constitutions as it is for aspirational Constitutions. Indeed,
protective Constitutions impose minimal restrictions to public authorities in
order to prevent power abuses, but leave the issue of further developing
Constitutional rights or protecting social rights to the competence of political
agents. Therefore, protective Constitutions do not need a strong political will of
State agents or a deep social commitment to it in order to be materialized; their
materialization basically consists in those agents respecting the limits to power
that they impose and, by doing so, in protecting the basic or fundamental rights
of citizens.
b) Debates prompted by aspirational Constitutions
Aspirational Constitutions do not only face the difficulties derived from interinstitutional conflicts. They also face political and academic criticisms.
From a conservative point of view, aspirational Constitutions wonder into
political and economic fields, whose matters should be decided by political
actors. Within this conservative perspective, it is possible to identify at least
two types of critiques
The first defends a minimalist notion of the Constitution, in the sense that it
should only be understood as a set of general principles that guide the action of
9 On the one hand, they require what we call –following Donald Kommers’ use of the concept of
“militant democracy”- militant constitutionalism. This means that the effective application of
aspirational Constitutions needs a permanent commitment from the political forces that enabled them
to emerge, and in particular, a strong support of the social changes they are willing to bring about by
means of the constitutionalization of social rights.
6
the legislator and that, therefore, do not have a normative but rather a political
or programmatic character.10 From this point of view, with their ambitious
goals and their generous formulation of rights –especially social rights-,
aspirational Constitutions go too far in their content and scope and end up
regulating matters that should be reserved to the competence of the legislator.
This is not only problematic because of the inter-institutional conflicts that may
arise between political actors and constitutional judges, but also because of the
deficit of democracy it may bring about as a result of judges colonizing
political and economic matters. This point of view is adopted by some one that
may be named restrictive constitutionalist; he believes that the goals and rights
contained in aspirational Constitutions should be interpreted in the most
restrictive way possible, that is, not as legal norms that can be directly applied,
but as political promises and guiding principles, which may only materialize
when political actors believe it convenient to develop them.
The second perspective shares this critical vision and defends the importance of
interpreting them in a restrictive way, but does so for different reasons. Indeed,
inspired in the economic theories of law11 , he does not belief in constitutional
law as an efficient mechanism for regulating social life, unless it is
subordinated to economics, and particularly to the principles of market
efficiency and wealth maximization.12 From this point of view, aspirational
Constitutions are anything but efficient; they enshrine social rights as
applicable legal norms and, in doing so, they compete with and make civil and
particularly property rights uncertain, interfere with the functioning of the free
market, and create obstacles to economic development.13 The person how
adopts this point of view may be a distrustful economist. He believes that
aspirational Constitutions should be restrictively interpreted, and that the
10
Cita?
11
Mainly the Law and Economics school and the Neo-Institutionalist school of economics. For the
primary sources of the former see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and
Economics, 1-44 (1960); Guido Calabresi THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. (Yale University Press, 1970); Richard Posner, Richard, THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (S. edition, ed., Little, Brown and Co, 1992). For the primary source of the latter
see Douglass North, INSTITUCIONES, CAMBIO INSTITUCIONAL Y COMPORTAMIENTO
ECONÓMICO. (Fondo de Cultura Económico, 1993).
12
Posner, Ob. Cit. These postulates were adopted by the first generation of Law and Economics, but
are currently questioned by most of its advocates. Thus, although most of them consider that the
analysis of law in terms of efficiency is still useful to evaluate the way in which judges should rule,
they do not believe that the notion of efficiency is the only important factor to evaluate law. See for
example, Ulen, 1989.
13
Rodríguez and Uprimny synthesize the different criticisms social rights protection has received from
from philosophical, classical economic, and institutional neoliberal theorists. César Rodríguez and
Rodrigo Uprimny, ¿Justicia para Todos o Seguridad para el Mercado? El Neoliberalismo y la Reforma
Judicial en Colombia, in César Rodríguez, Mauricio García and Rodrigo Uprimny, ¿JUSTICIA PARA
TODOS? SISTEMA JUDICIAL, DERECHOS SOCIALES Y DEMOCRACIA EN COLOMBIA (Norma, 2006).
7
development of their goals should be left to the competence of political actors,
who are more sensitive to economic restraints than constitutional judges are.14
But aspirational Constitutions are not only criticized by authors who defend
conservative positions. From a progressive perspective, aspirational
Constitutions are often criticized not because of their ambitious goals and
generous rights’ content, but, quite on the contrary, for the restrictiveness of
their scope in effects. Indeed, form this progressive, yet critical, point of view,
aspirational Constitutions fail in achieving their purposes, as they are not able
to fully bring about the rights’ protection and social transformation they
promise they would. Within this perspective, it is possible to identify at least
two conceptions of what a Constitution should be.
The first one defends a maximalist but also principled notion of the
Constitution, according to which the constitutional text should be considered
immediately applicable and non negotiable. This personage may be named the
intransigent constitutionalist. He agrees with the content of aspirational
Constitutions, but believes they tend to fall short in their scope and effects.
Indeed, most of the times, aspirational Constitutions encounter difficulties and
constraints in the contexts they are to be applied, especially because,
paradoxically, societies experiencing the greatest degree of need generally
adopt the most pretentious Constitutions. Therefore, the content of these
Constitutions, and particularly the social rights recognized therein, are
interpreted as needing to be progressively materialized, rather than fully and
immediately developed. This is unacceptable for the intransigent
constitutionalist, who then criticizes aspirational Constitutions for submitting
social rights to political or economic considerations, which should be
considered irrelevant given that the full realization of those rights is a legally
binding imperative that needs to be complied with, despite the difficulties this
project may encounter.15
The second progressive personage may be a disillusioned utopist. He agrees
with the aims of aspirational Constitutions but, nonetheless, criticizes them for
falling short in accomplishing them. From this point of view, Constitutions
should be able to promote social transformation. However, they never do so
satisfactorily because they work as a functional apparatus to structural unequal
power relations. According to the disillusioned utopist, aspirational
Constitutions are particularly problematic in the sense that, although they do
not promote real social change, they give the impression of doing so, through
14 For an illustration of this stance in Colombia, see Sergio Clavijo, Fallas y fallos de la Corte
Constitucional (Alfaomega-Cambio, 2001); Alberto Carrasquilla, Economía y Constitución: hacia un
enfoque estratégico, 12 Derecho Público (2001).
15
For an illustration of this stance in Colombia, see Rodolfo Arango, Ob. Cit.
8
generous formulations of social rights and by opening the possibility of their
judicial protection. This possibility allows for social rights to be protected in
certain cases, which, despite of being marginal and of not constituting a true
challenge to actual power relations, show themselves as important
emancipation tools. In that way, from the disillusioned utopist’s perspective,
aspirational Constitutions and their clauses on social rights legitimize the status
quo of power relations, by opening the space to meaningless legal victories
that, moreover, have the perverse effect of deviating attention—through their
emphasis on the legal strategy—away from the true political struggle against
oppression.16
Even though all the aforementioned perspectives are different both in political
orientations and in the arguments they use to criticize aspirational
Constitutions, they share one common methodological stance: an
instrumentalist conception of the relation between law and social change. In
fact, they all believe that Constitutional texts are capable, by themselves, to
promote social change, as if they were external objects to the contexts in which
they aim at intervening, that is, as if they were instruments or tools that may
cause changes on those contexts.17
We are convinced that instrumentalism is not only a theoretically and
methodologically erroneous way of understanding the relation between law and
social change; it is also very counterproductive for progressive political
stances. On the one hand, instrumentalism is founded on the false belief that
legal institutions are external to their context and can act upon them as if they
were causal entities.18 This belief has been refuted by contemporary sociology
of law, and particularly by the constructivist methodological stand regarding
the relation between law and social change. In contrast with instrumentalism,
constructivism understands the relation between law and context not as a causal
relation, but as relation of mutual or reciprocal incidence. Law is therefore not
conceived as an external but as a constitutive element of the context in which it
16
For a general illustration of this theoretical stance, see among many others, Duncan Kennedy,
Libertad y Restricción en la DECISIÓN JUDICIAL. EL DEBATE CON LA TEORÍA CRÍTICA DEL
DERECHO (CLS) (Diego Eduardo López ed., Juan Manuel Pombo & Diego Eduardo López Medina
trans., Siglo del Hombre Editores 1999) (1986). For its illustration in Colombia, see Óscar Mejía and
Lina María Mápura, DERECHO Y COSIFICACIÓN SOCIAL: Límites y paradojas de la jurisprudencia
emancipatoria, in XXX.
For a description and very lucid criticism of instrumentalism, see Austin
Sarat, Legal
Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistence of a Research Tradition, 9
Legal Studies Forum No. 1, pp. 23-31(1985).
17
18
This belief was quite important in the legal sociology field for a while. During the sixties, it was
strongly promoted by the Law and Development movement, which saw in the law the fundamental
motor for bringing development to countries in the global south. However, policies based on this idea
rapidly failed, and the movement was submitted to intense criticisms. See.
9
intervenes; law determines that context, but at the same time, it is determined
by it.19
The constructivist stance admits a political progressive perspective that falls in
the middle of both too optimistic and too pessimistic views.20 According to this
intermediate progressive view, aspirational Constitutions and the judicial
protection of social rights they entail, constitute an important mechanism to
promote social change; nonetheless, the effectiveness of this mechanism is, if
individually considered, only partial. In order to be more effective, the legal
strategy must be part of a wider political strategy aiming at social
transformation through the materialization of social rights. This wider political
strategy implies the existence of contextual elements, different from law itself,
such as an active political and social support of the Constitutional project in
general and of judicial progressive activism regarding social rights in
particular, as well as of a favorable legal culture of rights protection.
From a political point of view, this constructivist thesis seems more favorable
to social transformation. Given that a serious political commitment of different
social actors with the Constitution is necessary for a real social change to take
place, the critical stances only weaken this possibility, by means of not
committing to the transformation project and thus limiting its possible effects.
In that way, these critical stances actually help their critical visions of
aspirational Constitutions come true, and thus work as auto-accomplished
prophecies. In so doing, these critical stances end up being quite functional to
conservative perspectives: they deem aspirational Constitutions to failure, just
as those perspectives would have wanted.
II.
The 1991 Colombian Constitution: An Aspirational Constitution
in Hostile Ground21
For constructivism’s origins in the theory of social action, see Peter L. Berger y Thomas
Luckmann, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL DE LA REALIDAD (Amorrortu 1967). For a
theoretical application of constructivism to to law, see Pierre Bourdieu, LA FUERZA DEL DERECHO
(Uniandes, 2000). For more contemporary developments of constructivism, see Alejandro Portes XXX;
Peter Evans XXX.
19
20
This intermediate thesis is inspired by the work of Michael McCann, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). For the use of this intermediate thesis in
previous works of the authors, see Mauricio García & Rodrigo Uprimny, Tribunal Constitucional e
emancipaçã social na Colombia, in DEMOCRATIZAR A DEMOCRACIA. OS CAMINHOS DA
DEMOCRACIA PARTICIPATIVA, 298-339 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., 2002); Maria Paula
Saffon, Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic Powers vis-à-vis Neoliberalism? The Case of
the Colombian Constitutional Court, 5 Seattle Journal for Social Justice 2 (2007); Mauricio García
Villegas, No sólo de mercado vive la democracia, 6 Revista de Economía Institucional
No. 10 (2004)
21
This section is mainly based on Saffon Ob. Cit.; García & Uprimny, Ob. Ci.
10
Colombia’s current Constitution is a good example of an aspirational
Constitution that has achieved an important degree of efficacy but that,
nonetheless, faces many obstacles that hinder its possibility of promoting social
change. These obstacles have to do with several factors that characterized the
Constituent process: the absence of a preceding revolution or even of a
triumphant party, the subsequent deficit of a strong political will of developing
the Constitutional emancipatory project in its aftermath, the existence of a
strong judicial activism on social rights operating as a default, and the interinstitutional conflicts and algid academic and political debates derived from
such an activism.
The promulgation of the Colombian 1991 Constitution was not the result of a
prior revolution or even of the triumph of a new political party; it was rather
the product of a consensual attempt to confront a profound political crisis
consisting in political corruption and violence. Thus, the main objective of the
Constituent Asssembly from which it emerged was, without a doubt, that of
broadening democracy. The pluralist composition of the Assembly contrasted
with the traditional two-party system of political domination. Many
traditionally excluded social and political sectors were able to actively
participate in the process of making the new Constitution, such as members of
demobilized guerrilla groups, religious and political minorities, indigenous
communities, and student movements.22
As a result, the 1991 Constitution is strongly aspirational in both its goals and
contents. It was certainly intended to create a new societal model, its main
ideological orientations including the broadening of participation mechanisms,
the imposition of social justice and equality, and the guarantee and effective
protection of a rich set of Constitutional rights. In order to accomplish these
ambitious goals, the Constitution incorporated a genererous Charter of Rights
composed of civil and political rights, as well as social, economic, cultural, and
collective rights.23 Moreover, the Constitution declares that many of those
rights are directly enforceable24 and cannot be suspended during states of
22
More than forty per cent of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly did not belong to the Liberal
and Conservative parties, which until that day had dominated the political scene. Out of the seventy
elected delegates at the Assembly, nineteen represented the Democratic Alliance–April Nineteen
Movement (AD-M19 in Spanish), a political party created by former guerrilla group M-19 after the
peace process; two came from the Patriotic Union, a left-leaning political party that was drastically
targeted by paramilitary violence; two represented children and students; two came from indigenous
communities, and other two represented non-Catholic Christians. See Jaime Buenahora, El proceso
constituyente (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1992).
23
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, arts. 11-82 (1991).
24
Id. at arts. 4 & 85.
11
siege.25 It specifically recognizes social rights as subjective and enforceable
rights, and establishes the State’s duty to satisfy them.26 It also states that
human rights treaties ratified by the Colombian State are legally binding in the
same way that Constitutional rights are.27
Furthermore, the Constitution text designed several institutional and procedural
mechanisms 28, addressed at making access to constitutional justice a simple,
affordable, and accessible endeavor.29 First of all, it created the Colombian
Constitutional Court (CCC), as a high Court specifically devoted to the
interpretation of the Constitution and the protection of fundamental rights.30 In
contrast to the Supreme Court of Justice (the former institution in charge of
carrying on judicial review), the CCC has engaged in progressive activism
regarding many other areas of constitutional law –including the protection of
social rights.31 This progressive activism has been the result of several
contextual elements 32, but it could take place especially due to the
constitutional text’s breadth regarding rights and the design of procedural
mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing their effective protection.33
On the one hand, the 1991 Constitution created the tutela action, which permits
any person to request any judge in the country to protect her fundamental rights
whenever they are being infringed or threatened by the action or omission of a
state institution or of a particular person exercising a dominant position.34 It is
rather easy for people to transform a complaint into a constitutional issue
because the tutela action exempts them from complying with any particular
prerequisites in order to make the legal claim.35 Indeed, the tutela action does
not even need to be written.36 Moreover, tutela actions are decided within a
25
Id. at art. 214.
26
See id. at arts. 42-77.
27
Id. at art. 93.
28
Id. at arts. 83-94.
29
Saffon Ob. Cit.; García & Uprimny, Ob. Cit.
30
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, arts. 239-245 (1991).
31
On this see García & Uprimny, Ob. Cit; Saffon Ob. Cit.; Uprimny Ob. Cit.
32
Such as the increasing weakness of political representation and the emergence of social movements
in Colombia.
33
Id. at arts. 83-94.
34
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 86 (1991). See also Decree No. 2591, November 19,
1991 (Colom.).
35
See Decree No. 2591, November 19, 1991 (Colom.).
36
Id. at art. 5.
12
very short period of time because judges have to decide them prior to any other
legal claim.37 Therefore, tutela actions provide ordinary citizens with an
accessible and inexpensive mechanism to challenge the violation of
fundamental rights. 38
This mechanism of rights protection is all the more effective because of the
CCC’s power to annul the tutela rulings of any judge.39 The power of the Court
consists of a sort of certiorari, by means of which it selects and revises all those
tutela rulings that are, according to its discretion, worthy of a pronouncement.40
This power allows for the CCC to preside over all judges in the country
concerning constitutional matters. This is especially so, given that tutela
actions can also be presented against judicial decisions (even those coming
from high Courts, such as the Supreme Court of Justice and the State Council)
that severely and flagrantly violate a fundamental right.41 By revising them,
the CCC closes the constitutional debate.
On the other hand, the 1991 Constition assigned the CCC the exclusive power
of deciding “public actions of unconstitutionality”, which any citizen may
bring against all laws and certain governmental decrees.42 Since its creation,
the CCC has been able to exercise this form of judicial review in a rather
progressive way because neither the citizenry nor other state institutions view
this function as strange or exaggerated to the country’s legal culture. This is
due to the fact that judicial review has existed in Colombia since 1910, but
37
Id. at art. 15.
38
However, the structural problems of citizens’ lack of awareness of their rights are far from
disappearing.
39 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 86 (1991); Decree No. 2591, November 19, 1991,
arts. 32-36 (Colom.).
40
See id. In general, the CCC revises a tutela ruling either because it has never before made a
pronouncement on the subject or because it wants to change its precedent.
41
See, among others, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, Rulings T-173, 1993; T-008, 1998; SU-159, 2000;
C-590, 2005.
42 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 241 (1991). See also Decree No. 2067, September 4,
1991 (Colom.). The CCC can exercise judicial review of those governmental decrees that have been
promulgated either in the exercise of exceptional powers conferred by Congress to regulate matters that
are the competence of the legislature or to declare states of siege. Judicial review of all other
governmental decrees is exercised by the State Council. Besides the competence to decide public
actions of unconstitutionality against laws and the aforementioned decrees, previous to their
promulgation the CCC decides on the constitutionality of statutary laws (which regulate special
constitutional issues, such as fundamental rights and political participation mechanisms), laws that
incorporate to the legal order international treaties ratified by the state, and laws that are objected by
the President for constitutional reasons. Finally, the CCC also revises public actions of
unconstitutionality against projects to reform the Constitution, acts convoking a referendum or a
Constituent Assembly to reform the Constitution, and acts convoking and executing referendums
regarding laws, plebiscites, and public consults. Regarding these projects and acts, the CCC exercises
an exclusively formal revision of eventual procedural vices. Saffon, Ob. Cit.
13
previously fell under the power of the Supreme Court of Justice.43 The CCC’s
progressive activism while exercising judicial review has also been possible
because public actions of unconstitutionality44 are not conditioned to any
special prerequisites; demandants to not need to prove they have a special
interest in the issue and they can present the action without a lawyer.45 This has
resulted in a frequent use of this action by citizens.
Although these procedural mechanisms allow for an important degree of
judicial activism, the CCC’s development of the 1991 Constitution’s
aspirational goals and contents would not have been as intense, had the
political forces themselves taken on this task. However, what happened in the
aftermath of Constitution’s promulgations was that many of the social and
political actors who were the main participants in the Constituent Assembly
dispersed and weakened soon thereafter.46 Thus, political institutions, and
Congress in particular, were not composed of people truly committed to the
development of the Constitution’s goals of a social state of law and an inclusive
society.
To some extent, this lack of commitment of political actors to the social
promises of the Constitution can find an explanation in the Constitutional text
itself, whose tension between its neoliberal economic clauses and its social
promises has allowed the political actors to favor the former in detriment of the
latter. In the first years of the nineties decade, the Colombian government
began the implementation of a strategy of economic liberalization, which was
supported by economic international agencies. This meant that, whereas the
social clauses of the Constitution demanded more state’s intervention in wealth
redistribution, the government implemented policies aimed at cutting back on
State’s intervention so as to let the market forces assign resources. Over time,
this created a tension between the normative or aspirational Constitution
(composed of the text, the values and the rights set out in the Charter) and the
real Constitution (consisting in the relation between political forces)47 , which
has translated in an inter-institutional conflict between political actors and the
Constitutional Court.
43
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA (1886).
44 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 241 (1991); Decree No. 2067, September 4th, 1991
(Colom.).
45 See id.
46
This was particularly the case of the AD-M19 Movement and the National Salvation Movement,
which played an important role in the Constituent Assembly, but which, a few years later, practically
lost all political prominence.
47
(Gómez, 1995)
14
Indeed, little by little, the weakening of the political forces committed to the
1991 Constitution and the government’s neoliberal strategies translated in the
Constitutional Court presenting itself as one of the few institutions 48 eager to
defend the social clauses and progressive content of the Constitution. This
semi-isolated struggle has been confronted by many state institutions, which
consider it an infringement of the principle of separation of powers and an
obstacle to economic development49, and therefore resist it by insisting in
privileging neoliberal policies over social state policies, by being reluctant to
obey the CCC’s rulings, and even by proposing legal reforms intended to
curtail the CCC’s powers.50
To some extent, this inter-institutional conflict has been reproduced in the
Colombian political and academic debate on the Constitution and on the role of
the Constitutional judge. The different perspectives in this debate partially
coincide with those exposed in the previous section of this article. Firstly, there
is a conservative perspective, which considers that the aspirational content of
the Constitution is excessive and thus allows for a dangerous intervention of
Constitutional judges in political and economic matters. This perspective is
defended by some social sectors -such as businessmen- and certain
academicians -mainly economic analysts-, who have harshly criticized the
CCC’s progressiveness, and particularly its activism regarding social rights, for
being populist and ingenuous.51
Secondly, there is a progressive but critical perspective, according to which,
unless the CCC is able to develop the whole of the Constitutional social clauses
–which it has not-, it cannot be considered as an institution in favor of social
transformation, and should not then be supported but criticized.52 As we saw in
the last section, this perspective is functional to the conservative perspective,
for it weakens social commitment to the aspirational content of the Constitution
and, in so doing, contributes to its failure.
Thirdly, there is another progressive perspective, which supports the
aspirational content of the Constitution and the way the CCC has intended to
materialize it. This perspective is defended by some social sectors, which
48
Other institutions that have played this role are some judges when deciding tutela actions, and
control organs such as the Ombudsman and the Public Ministry.
49
Such is the case of members of government agencies in charge of developing economic and financial
policies—like the Central Bank or the Treasury Minister.
50
Uprimny, 2006, Ob. Cit.
51
See, e.g., Alberto Carrasquilla, Ob. Cit.; Salomón Kalmanovitz, Las Consecuencias Económicas de
los Fallos de la Corte Constitucional, 276 Economía Colombiana (1999) Sergio Clavijo, Ob. Cit.
52
See , e.g., Mejía and Mápura, Ob. Cit.
15
politically sympathize with the Constitution’s social clauses -such as human
rights NGOs and tutela users-, and by some academicians –mainly
constitutional lawyers- provided the CCC with an important support from
certain social sectors and benefit from their implementation.
For this perspective not to incur in the absolute disappointment and skepticism
of the previous one regarding the Constitution’s aspirations, it is important to
always understand it as an intermediate position according to which the CCC’s
role is an important but insufficient element to bring about social
transformation.53 This implies that it is neither the Constitutional text itself, nor
the CCC’s interpretations of it, but the active commitment of social and
political movements to one another, which may end up promoting social
change. It is from this perspective that we analyze the important but
insufficient achievements of the CCC regarding the protection of social rights
in the next section.
III.
Assessing the True Dimension of Judicial Activism on Social
Rights: an Empirical Study
In this section, we will present the results of an empirical research aimed at
assessing the efficacy of the CCC’s activism regarding social rights. In
particular, we will try to illustrate that this activism has had a very important
although still restricted efficacy. We will first start by briefly describing the
scope and methodology used for conducting the empirical research (a), and we
will then analytically describe the main findings of the research (b).
a) Scope and Methodology of the Research
The main objective of the research hereby described and analyzed was to have
a precise idea of the way in which the CCC decides individual cases
concerning social rights, so as to be able to assess the efficacy of its decisions.
That is why the research focuses on the CCC’s tutela decisions and not on its
abstract decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws.54 That is also why,
although all Colombian judges decide tutela actions, we only focused on the
53
García and Uprimny, Ob. Cit.
54
While all nine members of the CCC decide abstract constitutionality rulings, tutela rulings are
decided by panels of three Magistrates, except when, due to the relevance of the issue, the panel
decides to put the case under the consideration of the whole Court. According to the Court’s
conventions, constitutionality rulings are identified with a C letter; tutela rulings of the different panels
of the CCC are identified with a T letter, and tutela rulings of the plenary of the CCC are identified
with the letters SU. Each of these letters is followed by the number of the ruling and its issue date. We
will use these conventions to cite CCC’s the rulings to which we will refer.
16
way in which, based on its certiorari power, the CCC revised their judgments in
individual cases. The reason for limiting the research to the CCC’s tutela
decisions is that this has probably been the field in which the CCC’s activism
concerning social rights has received the harshest criticisms 55, so it is important
to have a clear understanding of such activism. The reason for excluding of the
analysis other Constitutional judges’ tutela decisions is that the CCC plays a
key role in the functioning of the tutela action. This is so not only because the
CCC is the last instance of decision in tutela cases, but also because its
precedent determines to a great extent the way in which all other Constitutional
judges interpret and apply the Constitution’s Charter of rights.56
The empirical findings that we will describe and analyze were derived from a
random sample of all tutela rulings brought in by the CCC between 1992 and
2006. 57
b) The Judicial Protection of Social Rights by the CCC
In order to assess the dimension of the CCC’s activism on social rights, we will
analyze the data of our empirical study, by showing: the ratio of the CCC
judgments on social rights (i); the ratios of the different types of judgments on
social rights, based on the nature of these rights (ii), and the annual evolution
of the CCC’s activism on social rights (iii).
i) Quantity of the CCC’s favorable judgments on social rights
55
This can be explained by the fact that, as we will see, social rights are not conceived as directly
applicable rights that couldcsn be generally protected by tutela judges. However, the CCC has
developed the conexity doctrine, according to which they could be protected in some exceptional
circumstances. This doctrine has been criticized, especially because this judicial protection generally
implies the State’s obligation to deliver a service or subsidy.
56
Despite Colombia’s continental legal tradition, the CCC has developed a very rigorous doctrine of
the mandatory character of its precedent, not only for herself, but for all judges who decide
constitutional issues, including the other two high courts –the Supreme Court of Justice and the State
Council-. The implementation of this doctrine has found great resistance in the latter courts, which has
brought about what is commonly known as the “clash of trains” among the high courts. For an analysis
of the CCC’s doctrine on constitutional precedent, see Diego López, EL DERECHO DE LOS JUECES
(Legis, 2000). For a discussion of the “clash of trains” issue, see Mauricio García and Rodrigo
Uprimny, la reforma a la tutela: ¿ajuste o desmonte?, in ¿Justicia para todos?, Ob. Cit.
57
The sample is composed of data obtained at two different stages of empirical research: the first stage,
conducted in 1998 and published in 200157 , covered the CCC’s rulings from 1992 to 1997, and used as
sample 334 randomly selected judgments; the second stage, conducted in 2007, covered the CCC’s
rulings from 1998 to 2006, and used as sample 309 randomly selected judgments. Since the period of
time covered by each sample was not the same and nor was their degree of representativity, we used a
mathematical formula so as to be able to ponder the data of each period of time.57 However, we will not
always present the pondered data; whenever there are interesting or substantial differences between the
two periods under analysis, we will distinguish them.
17
The first step in assessing the CCC’s activism on social rights is to determine
how many of its judgments nominally deal with the issue of social rights and,
moreover, how many of these judgments concede the demanded protection of
the right(s) invoked and how many do not.
Here, the criteria we use to determine if a judgment deals or not with a social
right is if the CCC’s decision refers to a right that is classified as such by the
Constitutional text itself or not. Indeed, the 1991 Constitution distinguishes
between civil and political rights or fundamental rights –which are those that
are directly applicable, and include rights such as life, due process and personal
integrity (Title I, Chapter 1 of the Constitution)- and economic, social and
cultural rights –such as health, education, or housing (Title I, Chapter 2 of the
Constitution)-.
The following tables show this distinction in terms of percentages of the CCC’s
rulings dealing with one type of right or the other, and the percentage of
judgments in which the CCC concedes or denies the protection of a social
right.
Table 1. Ratio of pondered social rights’ judgments (1992 – 2006)
Cases
Civil and Political Rights
Social Rights
Total
% Out of the total
44%
55%
100%
Table 2. Judicial decisions on social Rights
Social Rights
Conceded SR
Denied SR
Decisions %
66
34
As the previous tables show, more than half of the CCC’s tutela judgments in
the last fifteen years have dealt with Constitutionally classified social rights,
and 66% of these judgments have favorably protected these rights. Besides, the
number of judgments on social rights has augmented in 10% in the last ten
18
years, but the ratio between conceded and denied protection of such rights has
not changed.
These are particularly suggestive numbers, given that, as it is expressly stated
in the Constitutional text and in the CCC’s consolidated precedent on the
matter58, as a general rule, only fundamental or civil and political rights have
immediate application and can be judicially protected through the tutela
action.59
However, in half of the tutela cases selected and reviewed by the CCC, there is
a claim of violation of a social right, and in 66% of those cases the CCC has
conceded its protection. Although this might sound like outstanding judicial
activism at a first glance, looking into the CCC’s decisions on social rights with
a bit more of detail will lead us to tinge this conclusion.
ii) Different types of judgments on social rights
A detailed analysis of the CCC’s judgments shows that there is a great variety
of tutelas concerning social rights, which, apart from the fact of referring to a
right included in the Constitutional chapter on social, economic and cultural
rights, do not have much in common. For the moment, we distinguish between
two types of judgments on social rights:
1) Judgments on social rights in general: these judgments include all
those cases that imply a right that is classified as economic, social or
cultural by the 1991 Constitution (Title II, Chapter II).
2) Judgments on welfare rights: these judgments include those cases,
which belong to the former classification and, moreover, imply an
economic decision on weather a service or subsidy should or should not
be delivered to an individual or group of persons, generally by the State.
Examples of this sort of cases include, among many others, the payment
of a retirement pension, the construction of a house, or the opening of a
space at a public school.
The following table shows this classification of social rights in terms of
number of cases and percentages of the CCC’s rulings dealing with one type of
right or the other, as well as the number and percentage of judgments in which
the CCC concedes or denies the protection of either kind of right right.
58
See CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, Rulings T-633, 2002; T-1239, 2001; T-150, 2000; C-112, 1998; T-395,
1998; T-271, 1995.
59
This rule is derived from the constitutional distinction between directly applicable or fundamental
rights and social rights. On this, see CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, Ruling T-395, 1998.
19
Table 3. Pondered distribution of social rights’ cases (1992 – 2006)
Cases
% of total
social rights
cases
% of conceded % of denied cases
cases
76%
71%
28%
24%
50%
50%
N/A
N/A
Welfare rights
Non welfare
social rights
100%
Total
The previous tables show a very interesting evolution of the distribution of the
CCC’s judgments on social rights. Indeed, while in the first studied period the
CCC’s judgments on social rights were almost evenly distributed between
welfare rights (54%) and non welfare rights (46%) cases, in the second period
almost every judgment of the CCC concerning social rights had to do with a
welfare right (91%). Also, in both periods, decisions conceding the welfare
right protection were more than those denying it, always being around 70% of
the total judgments on welfare rights.
Again, this seems like very important judicial activism on social rights, since
the judicial protection of welfare rights implies an intervention of the judge in
economic decisions, and particularly an order –most of the times to a State
entity- to make a payment or provide a service. However, this appreciation
should be tinged once again, given that it is possible to distinguish between two
kinds of judgments concerning welfare rights:
1) Judgments on welfare rights implying a payment of what is owed:
these judgments include those cases, which demand from the judge an
economic decision on weather a service or subsidy should or should not
be delivered, but which can be decided by telling if what is requested by
the petitioner is owed to her, most of the times by the State. These cases
include all those situations in which the petitioner has a clear right of
20
receiving a payment or service, pre-established in a contractual or
administrative relation.
2) Judgments on welfare rights in a strict sense: in contrast to the
previous type of judgments on welfare rights, this type of judgments
only include those cases in which the economic decision of the judge is
not the result of verifying a pre-existing obligation, but the consequence
of the judge considering necessary for that obligation to be realized.
The following table shows this classification of welfare rights in terms of
number of cases and percentages of the CCC’s rulings dealing with one type of
right or the other.
Table 4. Pondered distribution of CCC’s judgments on welfare rights
(1992 – 2006)
Cases
% of total welfare cases
63%
Payment of what is owed
37%
Welfare rights in a strict sense
100%
Total
The former tables show that, although the CCC’s judgments on welfare rights
occupy quite an important ratio of its task as a tutela judge, more than half of
them (63%) constitute a payment of what is owed to the petitioner by virtue of
a preexistent obligation. This type of judgments grew in ten percent from one
period to the next.
Strictly speaking, judgments on welfare rights that constitute a payment of
what is owed cannot be considered true judicial activism on social rights.
Indeed, in these cases, the tutela action functions as a judicial remedy against
the administration’s inefficacy. This is so because the judicial order of paying
an amount of money or delivering a service is nothing different from an order
to comply with an already existent obligation. In that sense, tutela judgments of
21
this kind are a sort of action of compliance60, through which the beneficiary of
a service or subsidy demands a payment of what has been recognized to her
beforehand. Moreover, in these cases, the tutela judge does not accomplish her
natural function of discerning rights; rather, she executes an administrative
routinely function aimed at collecting payments owed by the State as a result of
its pecuniary duties.
In contrast, judgments on welfare rights in a strict sense may be considered as
judicial activism on social rights because, in these cases, the legal problem
judges face is weather they should recognize a right whose protection demands
the deliverance of a service or subsidy, despite the fact that this service or
subsidy is not clearly stipulated as a legal obligation. Judicial activism only
takes place in those cases in which the judge responds this question
affirmatively or, exceptionally, when responding it negatively, the judge
explicitly admits the possibility of an affirmative response.
In that way, if we exclude CCC’s judgments concerning cases of payment of
what is owed from her judgments on welfare rights, we certainly have a more
precise idea of the dimension of real judicial activism on social rights. Only in
this kind of cases does the CCC truly intervene in political or economic issues,
by means of directly applying the Constitution –with no legal intermediationand clearly confronting political state organs. As the following tables illustrate
it, these truly activist judgments are rather rare if compared to the total amount
of tutela judgments pronounced by the CCC. The following tables identify the
number and percentage of judgments in which the CCC concedes or denies the
protection of welfare rights in a strict sense, compared to the numbers and
ratios of other types of social rights.
Table 5. Pondered ratios of social rights protection conceded and denied
(1992-2006)
Cases
Decisions
% of the % of
case
welfare
rights
% of total
60
This is a specific Colombian legal action aimed at guaranteeing public authorities compliance with
legal norms. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 87 (1991).
22
27%
19%
11%
44%
34%
20%
27%
22%
12%
50%
12%
7%
49%
11%
6%
Welfare rights in
a strict sense
Protection Payment of what
is owed
conceded
Welfare
rights
Non
welfare
rights
Protection
denied
Protection
conceded
Protection
denied
56%
Total
According to the previous tables, the CCC’s judgments in which the protection
of welfare rights in a strict sense is conceded only represent eleven percent of
all her tutela judgments. Although this percentage has grown from 9 to 12% in
the last years, we are still in the presence of a restrictive phenomenon of
judicial activism.
This does not mean, anyhow, that these judgments are totally irrelevant for the
purpose of achieving social change. Indeed, they are extremely important for
the lives of individual petitioners who obtain Constitutional protection, but also
for similar cases in the future, given that they create a precedent on how similar
cases should be solved. Moreover, as we will see in the next section, some of
the topics addressed by these judgments have suffered important structural
changes, due to the CCC’s precedent –as is the case of the right to health.
The next table illustrates the different topics that these judgments on welfare
rights in a strict sense addressed in the period of 1998 to 2006.
23
Table 6. Protection of welfare rights conceded by the CCC (1998 – 2006)
Facts of the tutela action
% of the total of judgments
on welfare rights
49%
Payment of what is owed
32%
Right to health
14%
Right to social security
(pensions)
3%
Children’s right to health
1%
Children’s right to education
1%
Others
100%
TOTAL
The previous table shows that tutela actions on the right to health constitute
more than half of the total of tutela actions regarding welfare rights in a strict
sense. As we will see in the next section, the relevance of the topic of health
has marked the evolution of the CCC’s judgments on social rights, noth by
substantively increasing their number, and by pointing towards a new phase of
consolidation of the CCC’s precedent on the subject.
Since 1998, tutela actions concerning social rights grew exponentially.
Whereas in 1995 citizens brought three thousand tutela actions concerning the
protection of the right to health, in 1999, the number increased to
approximately forty thousand tutela actions.61 This implied a big emphasis of
tutela judgments on social rights, since health tutela actions alone started
61
CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL & CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE LA JUDICATURA, ESTADÍSTICAS SOBRE LA TUTELA
(1999).
24
representing around 30% of all tutela actions presented in the country.62 It also
implied a growth of tutela judgments on social rights, which acquired its
maximum peak in 2000. This is illustrated by the following graphic.
63
Graphic 1. CCC's protecton of social rights (1998-2006)
30,0
28
22,5
18
15,0
15
7,5
11
14
12
10
8
0
1
8
DESCs 1998
DESCs 1999
DESCs 2000
DESCs 2001
DESCs 2002
DESCs 2003
DESCs 2004
DESCs 2005
DESCs 2006
The growth of tutela actions on the right to health came along with an
outstanding growth of public expenditure on health issues, which went from
two million dollars in 1998 to almost seven million dollars in 1999.64 As a
result, the CCC’s judgments on social rights were generically criticized in a
vehement way by political actors and ecomic analysts. Indeed, a plausible
reason for this outstanding increase of both tutela actions on the right to health
and the public expenditure derived from them may be found in the fact that,
applying the CCC’s precedent, constitutional judges were consistently making
favorable rulings for citizens, which generated a massive use of the tutela as a
way of obtaining medical services in an easy and prompt way.
Criticisms of the CCC’s judgments on social rights generated inter-institutional
conflicts, as political actors in charge of the health system resisted to comply
with the CCC’s orders. Prove of this resistance is the fact that, in this first
phase, although the executive power complied with individual tutela decisions,
it did not make any structural changes in public policy, so as to prevent these
judgments from taking place again. This is precisely why CCC’s judgments
that imply mere reiterations of the precedent are so frequent. Another prove of
this resistance is the fact that, during this phase, government actors publicly
defended proposals in favor of curtailing the CCC’s powers concerning
economic issues.
62
Id.
63
64
The Enforcement of Social Rights, supra note 7; Should Courts Enforce Social Rights?, supra note 5.
25
These criticisms of the CCC’s judgments on social rights also prompted intrainstitutional conflicts, as not all Magistrates of the CCC were willing to support
a precedent that implied such problematic effects for the institution. As a result,
in its first phase, the CCC’s precedent on social rights in general, and on the
right to health in particular, was not completely univocal and consolidated, and
dissident votes were frequent.65
This situation has radically changed in the last years, or in what can be
considered as the second phase of the evolution of the CCC’s judgments on
social rights. Indeed, the CCC’s precedent on social rights in general, and on
the right to health in particular, is so consolidated within the CCC that it is rare
to find a tutela ruling on this issue, which contains a single dissident vote.66
Moreover, the CCC is so convinced on its precedent that it keeps selecting
tutelas concerning topics it has already discussed and settled, so as to insist in
the necessity of uniformly applying it. This explains why, as we so in the last
section, between 1998 and 2006, 35 out of 37 rulings of the CCC on social
rights were not originary.
But the second phase of the evolution of the CCC’s judgments on social rights
is not only characterized by the changes occurred within the CCC. It is possible
to affirm that, in the last years, the relation between the CCC and political
powers in charge of developing public policy on social rights has become less
conflictive and more complimentary. Indeed, in the last years, State institutions
in charge of issuing regulation on public health services have applied the
CCC’s precedent on the right to health, and have thus incorporated the
possibility of a Committee within the medical entity to decide weather a patient
should receive a medicine that is not included in the Mandatory Health Plan, in
those cases in which the requirements imposed by the CCC are complied with.
Besides, last year, Congress issued a law in which it attempts to generate
positive and negative incentives so that medical entities comply with the CCC’s
precedent on health issue, without the need of having a tutela action presented
against them.
Moreover, it has been a few years since the government has openly attacked the
CCC and its powers, or defended legislative reforms in order to curtail its
powers. Although this may have a different explanation –such as the fact that
most of the Justices’ periods are ending and the government will have the
opportunity of appointing quite a few-, it still shows that the relation between
the CCC and the government has moved to a less conflictive situation.
65
We thank Aquiles Arrieta for this idea.
66
Id.
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Nothing of what was previously said means that all tensions between the CCC
and political actors have disappeared. Rather, it means that, due to the
consolidation of the CCC’s precedent on social rights, government’s resistances
against its applicability have been reduced, or at least they have become
subtler. As a result, this has also made the activity of the CCC concerning
social rights much more routinary and less activist. This is only natural, given
that activism is the first step of achieving a change in the normative system,
which, once attained, reduces the degree of activism needed.
However, it is important to bear in mind that this activism was not as important
as the CCC’s critics would suggest. Since its creation, the CCC’s judgments on
social rights have been mostly on welfare rights, the protection of which was
already recognized in a legal disposition. The following shows this graphic.
It is also important to clarify that the CCC’s activism on social rights -that is,
those judgments that protect welfare rights not previously recognized by lawhas not been equally intense concerning all welfare rights. Thus, while the CCC
has been particularly insistent in the necessity of protecting the right to health
under certain circumstances, even when it has not been previously recognized
by a legal disposition, it has very scarce judgments on subjects such as the
welfare rights to housing or alimentation. This indicates that the CCC is
selective regarding the battles she decides to carry out. It also means that the
fact of having reached a phase of decantation of its precedent regarding social
rights does not imply that the CCC can now sit still or move on to other
subjects. In order to achieve some degree of social change through its
decisions, it is still crucial that it applies its precedent to other very relevant
welfare rights.
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IV.
Conclusions: Aspirational Constitutions, Social Rights and Social
Change
In the first section of this article, we tried to prove why aspirational
Constitutions and the judicial activism on social rights they allow for, are
important, although insufficient tools for achieving social transformation. In
order to attain full efficacy, these legal elements must be supported by a
militant constitutionalism, which commits to their materialization and is thus
able to make the promises of the Constitution come true.
In the second section, we showed that this was particularly the case in contexts
in which, like Colombia, aspirational Constitutions are not the product of a
previous triumphant revolution and, moreover, are not strongly defended by
political actors in the aftermath of their issuing. In these situations, no matter
how activist Constitutional Courts are, their efforts will always be limited in
their possibilities of attaining social transformation.
In the third section, we analyzed the CCC judgments on social rights through
an empirical research, which tried to assess the real dimension of the Court’s
activism on social rights, and showed that this dimension is much less
important than what it seems because it contains a big portion of judgments on
welfare rights based on a payment of what is owed, which, added to judgments
on non welfare social rights, leave quite a small room for real judicial activism,
i.e. judicial protection of welfare rights in a strict sense.
In this last section, we wish to conclude by showing that the CCC’s activism on
social rights is best understood and valued if analyzed from a constructive and
intermediate perspective, according to which this type of activism is a relevant
and necessary element for attaining social transformation, but it is nonetheless
insufficient to generate it by itself. A constructivist perspective allows us to
understand that no matter how aspirational a Constitution or how activist the
judges in charge of applying it, they cannot produce social transformation, as if
they were external elements capable of causing changes in the contexts to
which they belong. However, it also allows us to see that there is a relation of
mutual reciprocity between law and context, based on which law’s promises
can be used by political and social movements as part of a wider struggle for
achieving social transformation.
In the case of the CCC, its judgments on social rights are insufficient to
promote social transformation for various reasons. On the one hand, most of
those judgments do not actually constitute judicial activism capable of directly
applying social rights and, by so doing, producing changes in their respective
28
fields. Rather, they are remedial judgments, intended to protect already
recognized social rights, which public agents deny or refuse to apply, despite
their obligation to do so. Moreover, these judgments are only able to protect
those persons that are, to some extent, already legally protected, and thus leave
marginalized and excluded groups unprotected. As a result, these groups do not
use the tutela action as a mechanism for claiming their rights’ protection, which
helps explain the fact that most tutela judgments do not deal with their cases. If
these judgments do not refer to the cases of the most needed, it is very difficult
to sustain that they may help promote social change. Instead, these judgments
may be interpreted as a means for protecting middle classes and, thus, for
preserving the status quo.
On the other hand, the CCC’s judgments on social rights that can really be
identified as judicial activism are not very many, and consequently their effects
are, even if important, limited to produce effective social transformation. This
is so not only because of the low number of decided cases, but also because
they are, by nature, individual cases, which do not have immediate or direct
effects at a macro level. Although individual cases constitute a precedent for
future similar cases, these future cases are still individual, and therefore their
decisions do not imply structural transformations. Furthermore, the CCC
activism on social rights is also limited because, as we argued in the second
section, it is mostly a lonely struggle, which faces great resistances. This
implies that the changes it may promote do not find the necessary political will
to be materialized. Moreover, this implies that the CCC might reduce or limit
its activism by the fear of having its powers curtailed by those who oppose it.
That is why the CCC’s activism on social rights may be interpreted, at the same
time, as an unstabling and a stabling mechanism. Indeed, as well as insisting in
the need of direct applicability of social rights and, thus, of social
transformation, this activism could also have a legitimizing function. This
function would be aimed at attenuating the tension between the aspirational
discourse of the Constitution and a reality full of deprivations and institutional
difficulties that hinder it from being materialized. And it would consist in the
delimitation of a space of what is possible in Constitutional law, which does
not commit neither with the ineluctable protection of social rights, nor with the
dominant social and institutional structure. In that way, the CCC would allow
for the rhetoric of solidarity to maintain the citizenry hope in change, while at
the same time it would admit and deal with the restrictions derived from the
context. According to this vision, Constitutional law would imply processes of
negotiation and conciliation of opposed interests, allowing for renovation and
stability to achieve agreements. In so doing, the CCC would allow for a way
too generous Constitution to have an impact in a way too unfair society.
29
The former interpretation is also important because it does not close the doors
of a wider political and social struggle of defense of social rights to seize its
emancipatory content. Indeed, aspirational Constitutions and judicial
progressive interpretations of their contents are a double edge sword. They may
function as a strategy against deception and despair, but they may also be taken
seriously and used as a tool for promoting social change. This is, in fact, the
only way of seriously thinking about social emancipation.
30