High Representative in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Is the More Interventionist
Way the Right Way to Go?
Anna Orosz
Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
https://doi.org/10.47706/KKIFPR.2023.1.134-145
Abstract: The Office of the High Representative was established by the
Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 to assist the implementation of the
civilian aspects of the agreement. Since then, the High Representative
(HR) has been authorised to intervene directly in domestic affairs if
the HR considers it necessary. The use of the so-called Bonn powers
and its impact on the peace and state-building process divides both
policymakers and experts. This paper draws attention to the fact
that the role of the HR cannot be assessed without considering the
constantly changing domestic and international political context.
The paper also shows that the extensive use of these executive
powers has played a controversial role in achieving the original goals
of the Agreement.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Representative, peacebuilding and state-building
Introduction
Evaluating the role of international actors in peace and state-building
processes often generates disputes among policymakers and experts,
as the outcomes of the interventions often differ from what was
originally intended. There may be several reasons behind this gap:
FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW
domestic dynamics might have been misunderstood or incorrectly
assessed, inappropriate tools might have been chosen or used at an
inopportune time, and even the international context might have an
impact on the decisions made by the local and international actors.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is one successor state of former
Yugoslavia that still carries the burden of the war and the deep
wounds stemming from it, still under international supervision
almost 30 years after the war.
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 1 put an end to the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, having been reached under
huge international pressure. The DPA stipulates that the High
Representative (HR) facilitates and monitors the civilian aspects of
the implementation of the Agreement. After the establishment of
the position, the HR was given additional executive powers by the
Peace Implementation Conference in Bonn in 1997 in that the HR
was called on to directly intervene by imposing laws and removing
local officials. The use of these powers has divided not only the
local actors and civil society but the countries and organisations
that appoint the HR as well. Those who2 favour an interventionist
approach believe that overcoming political deadlocks among the local
actors and the implementation of reform will not happen without
external pressure and intervention. Those who reject this idea claim
that such interventions undermine local ownership, go against
democratic principles, and lack accountability. 3 Both groups can
find supporting arguments in the history and activities of the OHR.
This longstanding debate came into focus again after former HR
Valentin Inzko criminalised genocide denial in Bosnia and Herzegovina
in July 2021, and German politician Christian Schmidt was appointed
as HR in May 2021 under challenging circumstances and surrounded
by high expectations. Both High Representatives intervened by using
the so-called Bonn powers, which has led to controversial outcomes.
1
The full text of the Dayton Peace Agreement is available on the website of the Office
of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina: http://www.ohr.int/dayton-peace-agreement/.
2
The Biden administration supports the use of the Bonn powers.
3
For example, David Chandler, professor at the Centre for the Study of Democracy at
Westminster University in London.
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After a short institutional introduction and a brief review of the debate
on the Bonn powers, this policy brief uses HR Inzko’s decision on the
criminalisation of genocide denial and HR Schmidt’s intervention after
the elections in BiH on 2 October, 2022 to demonstrate the contradictory
character of such interventions, while also considering the domestic
and international context of HR Schmidt’s decision and evaluating the
outcomes of these steps.
The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia
and Herzegovina: institutional and legal
background
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established by the
Dayton Peace Agreement. According to Article II of Annex 10 of the
DPA, the mandate of the OHR is to facilitate and monitor the civilian
aspects of the implementation of the Agreement and report to
the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, the
Russian Federation, and other interested governments, parties, and
organisations. The OHR serves its mandate in consultation with the
Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which was established by the
Peace Implementation Conference in London in December 1995 to
ensure international support for the Agreement.
PIC has 55 members from 40 member states and 15 international
organisations and agencies. The London Peace Implementation
Conference also established the Steering Board of the PIC to work
under the chairmanship of the High Representative as the executive
arm of the PIC. Steering Board members include Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia4, the United Kingdom, the United States,
the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission,
and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is
represented by Turkey. The Steering Board provides the High
Representative with political guidance.
4
Russia decided to leave PIC SB in July 2021.
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In the post-war period, the international community found it necessary
to intervene more directly in the peace implementation process,5 and
therefore, elaborating on Annex 10 of the DPA, the Peace Implementation
Council requested the High Representative at its Conference in Bonn in
December 1997 to remove from office public officials who violate the legal
commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to impose laws as
the HR sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to do so.
Nonetheless, the governing principle of the OHR’s engagement in Bosnia
and Herzegovina is the concept of domestic responsibility, also known
as local ownership. This concept calls for the officials and citizens of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to take responsibility for the peace process and
the problems that their country faces.
The use of the Bonn Powers: legal and political
debate about the need to intervene
After the Peace Implementation Conference in Bonn, the HR was
authorised to impose legal decisions and suspend public officials in order
to support the implementation of the DPA. It is clear that the removal
of locally elected officials undermines the democratic principle, but
in the post-war period some could argue that such interventions were
necessary, otherwise the basic elements of the peace process could not
be implemented. Without the intervention of the OHR, the introduction
of the common currency, national symbols, and the establishment of
common institutions could hardly have been imagined. There was also
5
Some examples that contributed to the decision of the PIC include the following.
In the elections held in September 1996, the three major nationalist parties
managed to get 86% of the seats in the bicameral parliament of BiH (Bideleux
& Jeffries, 2007, p. 363). In the Republika Srpska, there was a power struggle
to push the associates and supporters of Radovan Karadžić out of power, who
was later brought to the Hague and convicted of war crimes (Ibid. pp. 365-370).
Furthermore, nationalist representatives boycotted the return of internally
displaced persons and refugees. During the night of 2-3 May, 1997, some 25 houses
were set ablaze in the Croat-controlled municipality of Drvar, Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation). The arson occurred after an international
delegation headed by Federation mediator Dr Christian Schwarz-Schilling had met
with local authorities and other international agencies earlier in the day to discuss
the return of displaced Serbs to the area (ICG, 1997).
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a need to counterbalance the major ethnonationalist parties that strongly
resisted the implementation of the DPA. It should be noted that until the
early 2000s, the major ethnonationalist Croat and Serb parties, the Croatian
Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska
zajednica Bosnie i Herzegovine, HDZ BiH) and the Serb Democratic Party
(Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS) did not declare openly that they had
given up the idea of secession and accession to Croatia and Serbia (Bideleux
& Jeffries, 2008).
Nonetheless, there were some “extreme” cases in the use of the Bonn
powers. More than 130 officials had been removed from or banned from
taking public positions by 2004 (Dijkstra & Raadschelders, 2022, p. 300).
Furthermore, in some cases, especially during the mandate of Wolfgang
Pertritsch and Paddy Ashdown, the removals happened en masse: HR
Ashdown dismissed 58 public officials from their office on 30 June, 2004
(Banning, 2014, p. 268). According to the information on the website of the
OHR, Wolfgang Pertritsch removed 23 persons from public office on 29
November, 1999. One frequent reason was related to the obstruction of the
return of refugees or displaced persons, but HR Ashdown also dismissed
several public officials based on the allegation that they were supporting
and hiding Radovan Karadžić as well as sustaining criminal networks.
Although these steps might have been justifiable, it should also be
highlighted that, as Bideleux and Jeffries (2008) point out, HR Ashdown’s
activities in some cases made more moderate Serb politicians, such as the
Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska, Dragan Mikerević, resign, and only
time will tell whether it was a good decision to go so far. Since then, even
those Serb politicians like the former President of RS, Dragan Čavić who
once showed readiness to deal with the war and the Srebrenica genocide
(Trifunovic, 2020), have joined Milorad Dodik, the current President of the
RS, and his radical nationalist rhetoric (N1 Sarajevo, 2018).
The extensive use of the Bonn powers was followed by a sudden shutdown
in the mid-2000s. HR Christian Schwarz-Schilling was appointed, and
he was asked by the PIC to decrease the use of the Bonn powers, as
there was increasing international demand for local ownership of the
decisions and measures made in the country. On the other hand, it was
becoming difficult to make this interventionist approach acceptable for
the domestic public of the Western countries. Even a plan to close the
OHR was announced, but then in 2008 the Steering Board of the PIC
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decided to define a set of criteria as a prerequisite for the closure,
known as the Agenda 5+26. Due to those decisions, the OHR, whose
capacities were significantly decreased, has lost a great part of its
leverage and power to influence.
The criminalisation of genocide denial
HR Inzko was the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina from
2009 to 2021. During his mandate, he regularly reported to the PIC and
the UN Security Council about the worsening political environment in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, including secessionist rhetoric and actions
in Republika Srpska, worsening interparty relations in the country, as
well as ongoing genocide denial and the glorification of convicted war
criminals (OHR, 2021). He often directly criticized Bosnian Serb politicians
for glorifying convicted war criminals and engaging in genocide denial,
claiming that the Srebrenica genocide was just a myth. Despite his reports
and calls for action, no major legal change has taken place.
As the BiH Parliament failed to adopt a law on banning genocide denial,
HR Inzko decided to criminalise genocide denial and the glorification
of war criminals, amending the Criminal Code of BiH by using his Bonn
powers right before the end of his mandate in July 2021. This decision
would have made sense if it had been done much earlier, and the HR had
had time to properly explain, facilitate, and foster implementation.
In addition, such a drastic intervention after long years of inaction
was difficult to understand.
6
The objectives that need to be delivered by the BiH authorities prior to OHR closure are:
1. Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of the Issue of Apportionment of Property
between State and other levels of government;
2. Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of Defence Property;
3. Completion of the Brčko Final Award;
4. Fiscal Sustainability (promoted through an Agreement on a Permanent ITA Co-efficient methodology and establishment of a National Fiscal Council); and
5. Entrenchment of the Rule of Law (demonstrated through Adoption of National
War Crimes Strategy, passage of Law on Aliens and Asylum, and adoption of National Justice Sector Reform Strategy).
In addition to these objectives, the PIC SB agreed that two conditions need to be fulfilled prior to OHR closure:
1. Signing of the SAA; and
2. a positive assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement (Source: Website of the OHR, https://www.
ohr.int/agenda-52/).
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High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina...
Beyond the timing, the measure itself was also controversial. Although Pistan
(2021) acknowledges that such a law on genocide denial is necessary in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, she also underlines that “[i]n the absence of an internal
political will to address past wrongs, the imposed legislation risks to trigger
an internal memory war and further exacerbate divisions”. After the decision,
the domestic political context became even more tense. Milorad Dodik (the
Serb member of the tripartite Presidency of BiH at the time) immediately
announced that the law would not enter into force in RS, even stating that
secession from BiH was the only way for Republika Srpska to go. Serbian
politicians started to boycott the work of state institutions. The RS National
Assembly also adopted a law banning any definition of the entity as based
on genocide (Crawford, 2021). It is important to add, as László Márkusz,
former Senior Researcher of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade and
Hungarian diplomat also underlines, that some of the Bosniak parties in BiH
wish to abolish RS based on the argument that it is the result of a genocide. This
significantly contributes to RS resistance to accepting that what happened in
Srebrenica was a genocide (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, 2021).
While the Director of the Srebrenica Memorial Center, Emir Suljagić, stated
that Inzko’s move was a “relief” in a climate of increasing genocide denial by
some Bosnian Serbs and in Serbia (Crawford, 2021), the outcome of imposing
the law is not fully positive for the victims. Namely, the amendment to the
criminal code also put a break on several trials that were launched on the
basis of the existing legislation on hate speech, and the HR’s intervention
left many important ongoing cases without a final verdict.
To conclude, although Inzko tried to overcome a legal gap in the absence
of consensus among the representatives of the constituent peoples, it is
doubtful whether his decision really contributes to the reconciliation
process and helps victims, even if it was to serve the morally right goal.
Furthermore, it seems that HR Inzko thus left behind a BiH with even more
tensions for his successor to deal with.
The appointment of Christian Schmidt and increasing
domestic and international polarisation
Partly as a consequence of Inzko’s last decision, the next High
Representative, German politician Christian Schmidt was appointed
under worsening domestic political conditions, which were accompanied
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by deteriorating international circumstances. The increasing tension
between the West and Russia affected the decision-making on the OHR
and the appointment of the new HR.
Moscow (and Beijing) did not support the extension of the mandate of the
OHR and the appointment of the German politician. Although it is legally
not necessary, this time the appointment of the HR was not confirmed
by the UN Security Council, and therefore both China and Russia refused
to accept Schmidt as High Representative. The two UNSC members
even initiated in the UN the closure of the OHR by July 2022. Milorad
Dodik, who is a close partner of Russian President Vladimir Putin, also
announced that he would not cooperate with the new, in his view illegal
and illegitimate HR (AFP, 2021).
Despite Dodik’s and Putin’s resistance, the West decided to maintain support
for the OHR, and the PIC appointed Schmidt. The Russian Federation, in
an official letter addressed to the High Representative on 28 July, 2021,
announced that it would no longer participate in the meetings of the
PIC Steering Board under the chairmanship of the High Representative.
In another letter sent on 17 February, 2022, the Russian Federation
announced its suspension of financing the OHR (OHR, 2022). The Bosniak
political leaders welcomed the decision to sustain the OHR in light of the
strengthening secessionism in the RS.
Changing the rules of the game after it is over –
Schmidt’s measures after the 2022 elections
Despite the secessionist actions in RS, Schmidt’s first “memorable”
decision was not related to this issue but to the elections held in
October 2022. The election of Croat representatives7 at the state level
7
In the Federation, both the Bosniak and the Croat members of the tripartite Presidency
are directly elected, and it has happened on several occasions that Željko Komšić, a Croat social democrat politician was elected mainly by Bosniak voters, whose ratio in the
population is significantly higher than that of Croats. The HDZ BiH considers itself the
legitimate representative of Croats in BiH, and it wished to change the election law in a
way that only Croats could vote for the Croat Presidency member. Furthermore, there
were additional attempts by mainly Bosniak-favoured parties to exclude HDZ BiH from
the government coalition. HDZ BiH expressed its objection to this practice by blocking
decision-making processes at the entity level.
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and in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has for many years
been an obstacle to forming governments and the proper functioning
of the entity. During the summer, news was leaked that Schmidt would
intervene if the parties could not agree on the amendments to the
election law. The leaked “plans” were considered to favour HDZ BiH,
which led to protests among the Bosniaks. The timing was already
a problem, as the elections were too close. Schmidt later only made
some technical changes (e.g. on institutional funding and the election
budget8), but he then decided to use his Bonn powers more extensively
to amend the Election Law of BiH and the constitution of the Federation
on election eve, after the closure of polls on 2 October. This timing of
his actions raised even more concerns, as it happened after the votes
had been cast. Although the High Representative emphasised that his
amendments did not influence the directly elected officials, and the
intention was to make coalition formation and the elections of officials
in the Federation more efficient, the move was definitely not in line
with democratic principles.
As Sahadžić (2022) summarizes, “[t]he election-eve decisions of the
HR did not tackle the quota issue, but they did tackle the number and
proportional representation of the constituent peoples, based on the
2013 census. The HR’s decision increased the number of seats in the
Federation House of Peoples from 17 to 23 seats per constituent people.
Because the Schmidt decisions appear to give Croats a more prominent
place, it is understood that the decisions are an appeasement to HDZ
BiH.” This assessment seemed to be confirmed by the statements of
Andrej Plenković, the Prime Minister of Croatia, who presented the
decision of the HR as a victory for Croatia. While the decision is likely
to bring more seats for HDZ BiH, it could be justified with the “perceived
underrepresentation of Croats in institutions at the state level in BiH”
(Sahadžić, 2022). On the other hand, the decision also for the first time
facilitates “Others” to be elected in each canton, which was not the
case previously.
As HR Schmidt also argued during his hearing in the UK Parliament’s
Foreign Affairs Committee on 30 January, 2023, his intervention
was necessary to overcome political deadlock in the Federation, to
8
The HR’s decisions are available on the website of the OHR: https://www.ohr.int/decisions-of-the-high-representative/
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bring all parties on board again, to make the Federation functional
again. After the elections, it seemed that in contrast with previous
political stalemates, there would be a chance to form a government
coalition more smoothly at the federation and the state level. As an
ESI analysis (2023) highlights, the process went smoothly at the state
level: the tripartite Presidency was inaugurated on 16 November, 2022
and nominated a new Chairwoman (Borjana Kristo, HDZ BiH). The
appointment was approved by the majority of the House of People in
December 2022. In January 2023, the upper house also approved the
new Council of Ministers.
In contrast, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the political
stalemate continued at the federation level (although not at the cantonal
level), as HDZ BiH and the Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska
partija Bosne i Hercegovine, SDP BiH) agreed to form a government
coalition with eight smaller parties (Osrmorska), thus excluding
the leading Bosniak Party, the Party for Democratic Action (Stranka
demokratske akcije, SDA). However, they lacked the necessary support
to implement this agreement. Consequently, the crisis of building
coalitions continued (ESI 2023).9
While the use of the Bonn powers on the eve of elections has not
managed to resolve the obstacles, it has also increased the gap among
the Western allies. While the US Embassy explicitly supported the
direct intervention of the HR (US Embassy, 2022), the European Union
only took note of the decision (EEAS, 2022) and did not express any
direct support for it.
Based on these examples of the decisions made by HR Inzko and
Schmidt, it can be concluded that direct intervention via the Bonn
powers is a risky practice. On the one hand, it can strengthen domestic
fragmentation and undermine the relations of the OHR with the
political actors in BiH. On the other hand, it can cause conflicts among
the international partners as well, and the unintended consequences
can easily undermine the leverage of the West in the country.
9
The deadlock was finally resolved by another intervention of HR Schmidt in April
through which he took away the opportunity from the Bosniak Vice-President of
the Federation (coming from the SDA) to endlessly block the formation of the coalition government without the SDA (Kurtic, 2023). This intervention, however, can be easily interpreted as a direct intervention to domestic (party) politics
of BiH.
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Conclusion
As domestic political conditions deteriorated in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Western (especially US) demand increased for more
direct intervention by the High Representative in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This paper did not have the space to introduce all
the details of how the international and domestic conditions have
changed over the almost three decades of the existence of the OHR,
but the above examples of the use of the Bonn powers by the High
Representative allow us to understand the complexity of their
impact and the challenges to predicting the final outcomes of such
interventions.
While it must be added that the deteriorating situation makes the
OHR’s work in early warning necessary, sometimes these actions even
sped up the negative spillover effects on entity-state and/or interparty
relations. Reconciliation cannot be put in place by external actors,
and sustainable solutions necessitate local compromises.
The war in Ukraine and the rising tension between Moscow and
Washington has increased Western (US and EU) demand for resolving
conflicts more quickly in the Western Balkans so that the region is
more resilient towards Russia. This puts great pressure on the High
Representative as well. The question is, however, whether in light of
previous experiences this is really the right way to go.
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