South China Sea Disputes in the Xi Era

Since becoming president in March 2013 Xi Jinping often refers to the ‘Chinese Dream’ in his first address to the nation as head of state on 17 March 2013 as having three broad prerequisites for bringing about the "renaissance of the Chinese nation", that is, "following the "Chinese road", "developing the China spirit" and "concentrating and crystallizing China's strength". These notions fall alongside President Xi’s focus on building public trust, which signal a continuation of a more populist and nationalistic China. Indeed, the announcement of the Chinese Communist Party’s Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests headed by President Xi at the end of 2012 illustrates the importance the new president places on Chinese maritime interests and a coordinated policy-making process. This development signals increased policy emphasis on its maritime borders in the South and East China Sea by the new leadership, with significant implications for regional security and international relations. While this will be popular with the domestic public, it will not calm international fears that China has abandoned its ‘peaceful rise’ in favour of more aggressive behaviour in the international system. This is a significant foreign policy challenge for the Xi leadership. With the United States’ refocus on the Asia-Pacific region, China will need to regain the confidence of its neighbours if it is to successfully compete with the United States for regional influence. However, what are the opportunities and constraints behind these policy developments? Are there fundamental changes to the structure of Chinese foreign policy decision-making? Do the answers to these questions signal a change in direction for Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea under Xi Jinping?