British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/cbjm20
“Intentionality” in radical flank effects: reflections
on Al-Nusra Front’s discourse of moderation
between 2012–2017
Azzam Al Kassir
To cite this article: Azzam Al Kassir (05 Jul 2024): “Intentionality” in radical flank effects:
reflections on Al-Nusra Front’s discourse of moderation between 2012–2017, British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2024.2373079
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2024.2373079
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BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2024.2373079
“Intentionality” in radical flank effects: reflections on Al-Nusra
Front’s discourse of moderation between 2012–2017
Azzam Al Kassir
Department of Politics, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
ARTICLE HISTORY
In this paper, I examine the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs)
reflecting on the case of al-Nusra Front and specifically its oscillation between ‘moderation’ and ‘radicalism’ in the period between
its official establishment in early 2012 and the formation of Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in January 2017. The main contribution in this
paper originates from revisiting Haines’ premise that RFEs happen
‘unintendedly’. Reflecting on the discourse and behaviour of alNusra, I propose that RFEs can be managed purposefully by collective actors in ways that serve their strategic goals. In this sense,
claims to moderation may serve as a strategic tool in the hands of
collective actors, including militant Islamist organizations. In this
regard, the research reveals that al-Nusra’s oscillation between
moderation and radicalism was by and large purposeful, or at
least carefully managed by the organization’s ideologues and
strategists.
Received 25 July 2023
Accepted 4 June 2024
Introduction
In this paper, I examine the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs), reflecting on the case of
al-Nusra Front and specifically its oscillation between ‘moderation’ and ‘radicalism’ in the
period between its official establishment in early 2012 and the formation of Hay’at Tahrir
al-Sham (HTS) in January 2017. The main contribution in this paper originates from
revisiting Haines’ premise that RFEs happen ‘unintendedly’. Reflecting on the discourse
and behaviour of al-Nusra, I propose that RFEs can be managed purposefully by collective
actors in ways that serve their strategic goals. In this sense, claims to moderation may
serve as a strategic tool in the hands of collective actors, including militant Islamist
organizations. The research shows that al-Nusra’s oscillation between moderation and
radicalism was by and large purposeful, or at least carefully managed by the organization’s ideologues and strategists. Given the presence of fierce competition over legitimacy
and resources alongside the raging conflict in Syria as well as the constantly lurking
danger of being targeted by international and regional coalitions against terrorist groups,
al-Nusra sought to manage the issue of ‘moderation’ to increase its power and influence
CONTACT Azzam Al Kassir
azzamnk@gmail.com
Department of Politics, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet St,
London WC1E 7HX, UK
Present affiliation of Azzam Al Kassir is independent researcher
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article
has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
2
A. AL KASSIR
and to ensure its survival in the long run. The research demonstrates the agency of
militant Islamist actors through revealing how al-Nusra managed its ‘moderation’ variably
in its relations with ISIS and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). While the initial swift expansion of
ISIS in Syria pushed al-Nusra to utilize an exceedingly extremist discourse and start
seriously planning to establish an Islamic emirate in northern Syria, it shifted its strategy
towards distancing itself from ISIS discursively and organizationally when ISIS became
under the strikes of the Global Coalition in September 2014. At the same time, al-Nusra
attempted to appear more committed and less compromising than other competing
Islamist groups and factions of the FSA. Moreover, al-Nusra’s leadership frequently
redefined their notion of ‘moderation’ to restructure its internal organization and expel
disobedient members or potentially rebellious subdivisions.
The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section examines al-Nusra’s
responses to the rise of ISIS in a highly competitive ‘jihad market’. The second section
focuses on the relations between al-Nusra and FSA factions and analyses the changes to
these relations over the period between 2012 and 2017. In the third section, I explore the
different currents within al-Nusra and their competition over power and legitimacy and
analyse the impact of that competition on the overall behaviour and strategic choices of
al-Nusra.
What are radical flank effects?
Haines was the first (1984) to highlight and theorize Radical Flank Effects (RFEs),1 which he
defines as ‘interactive processes involving radical and moderate factions of social
movements’.2 Haines focuses specifically on uncovering ‘the impacts of radical group
actions upon the reputations and effectiveness of more moderate collective actors’. He
points out that such impacts may take negative or positive forms.3 Negative effects occur
when the actions, or mere existence, of ‘extremists’ hinders the ability of more moderate
factions to pursue their strategic plans and achieve their objectives. Conversely, RFEs may
lead to positive outcomes for the more moderate actors by rendering them more
acceptable or negotiable, for example. Haines rightly notes that positive RFEs have
garnered the greatest interest from scholars of social movements.4
Importantly, Haines postulates that ‘positive RFEs are almost always unintended results
of movement fractionalization’ and that normally moderate and radical factions do not
collaborate intentionally to bring about positive effects because that is an extremely risky
strategy that could backfire if uncovered.5 This is also believed to be the case because
such a scenario requires radical actors to sacrifice all their own ambitions to advance those
of other actors.
Haines’ insights regarding positive and negative RFEs have been incorporated into the
agenda of social movement research. However, his initial theory has been criticized by other
scholars on the basis that the positive–negative dichotomy ignores other possible effects.
1
Herbert H. Haines, ‘Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970’, Social Problems 32, no. 1 (1984): 31–
43.
2
Herbert H. Haines, Radical flank effects. In: David A. Snow et al., The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political
Movements (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
3
Table 1. Radical flank effects.
Gupta, in this regard, adds four possible RFEs6 radicals benefit at the expense of moderates;
moderates benefit at the expense of radicals; both radicals and moderates benefit; or both
radicals and moderates lose.7 Table 1 illustrates Gupta’s four possible RFEs:
In addition to his significant additions to Haines’ analytical approach, Gupta raises the
possibility that, in order to circumvent becoming irrelevant, moderate factions may be
compelled to alter their strategies and discourses to bring them closer to those of the
radicals.8 This is especially important when the radical flank rises quickly, makes significant
advances, and/or manages to capture the attention of the media and the public. As
a result, the effectiveness and empowerment of the radical factions may prompt their
comparatively moderate counterparts to respond and modify their strategies by repositioning themselves organizationally and ideologically to become either closer to or
further apart from the radicals based on contextual considerations and cost-benefit
calculations, thereby demonstrating agency within militant Islamism.
If we are to determine possible effects, it is crucial to begin by defining ‘moderation’
and ‘radicalism’. First of all, moderation is a relative concept. It always depends on the
context and the angle from which one is perceiving behaviours, attitudes, and statements.
Moderate actors are deemed ‘moderate’ in comparison with others who are more radical.
In our case, both al-Nusra and ISIS are considered radical organizations that do not abide
by national and international laws and use violence for ideological reasons; they are thus
commonly designated ‘terrorist groups’, following Security Council resolution 1566
(2004). However, observing the situation in Syria since 2011 shows that the two militant
Islamist organizations have embarked on two different courses of action despite their
shared ideological and organizational source.
While ISIS emphasized its terrorist character and demonstrably remained committed to
its extremely violent and chauvinistic approach since its inception, al-Nusra seemed to
care more about its reputation and public image, refrained from directing or
6
Devashree Gupta, ‘Radical flank effects: The effect of radical-moderate splits in regional nationalist movements’,
(Working paper, presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 14–16, 2002).
Gupta’s remarks are further discussed in: Rune Ellefsen, ‘Deepening the Explanation of Radical Flank Effects: Tracing
Contingent Outcomes of Destructive Capacity’ Qual Sociol 41, 111–33.
8
Gupta, ‘Radical flank effects’.
7
4
A. AL KASSIR
commissioning external operations, and displayed more pragmatic behaviour. Taking
these differences into consideration, it is plausible to say that al-Nusra was less radical
than ISIS. Yet, al-Nusra was more radical and extremist than most other opposition
factions fighting the Syrian regime. Al-Nusra frequently showed hegemonic tendencies
in its relations with FSA factions, was intolerant, and committed serious violations of
international humanitarian law in the areas under its control.9
In the Syrian context, ‘moderation’ is a factor that played a vital role in determining the
trajectory of al-Nusra’s activism and its strategic choices. In the case of al-Nusra, the RFEs
vary across time and place. They also differ from one standpoint to another because alNusra was concurrently a part of a transnational Salafi-Jihadist movement and a leading
player within the anti-Assad opposition, and by itself was a distinct organizational framework that contained competing currents that varied in their extremism and intransigence.
The RFEs are found in all three spheres, with each effect having its unique considerations
and circumstances. Another point worth adding here is that the RFEs did not happen
spontaneously or unintendedly but rather were managed and manipulated to serve
certain strategic interests. In this respect, al-Nusra’s ideational framing was strategically
employed in the ‘management of moderation’.
The disputes and confrontations between al-Nusra and ISIS are usually explained as
a result of differing theological and doctrinal standpoints or conflicting geostrategic
ambitions. That is true to a great extent, but there is more to add. At the macro level,
both Salafi-Jihadist players constituted two flanks in one movement despite their differences and occasional clashes. The rise of ISIS as the more radical flank in an amorphous
Salafi-Jihadist movement in some ways benefited al-Nusra, which responded by pragmatically and purposefully trying to appear the less radical and more flexible of the two. This
was meant to serve al-Nusra’s survival and advance its activities in Syria. On one hand, the
discourse of moderation was used by al-Nusra’s ideologues and strategists to engender
local support given the expansion and terrorizing practices of ISIS. Additionally, it aimed
to evade being designated a ‘terrorist’ group and to challenge the designation when it
happened. Moreover, presenting itself as moderate allowed al-Nusra to attract more
recruits based on claims of authenticity, moderation, and centrism in between the more
radical ISIS and the more compromising FSA factions. Claims to moderation also enabled
the leadership of al-Nusra to get rid of disobedient members, accusing them of being
kharijites (deviants) and ghulat (extremists).
To simplify, the following is a hypothetical moderation-radicalism spectrum to help
visualize the position of al-Nusra between the more radical ISIS and the more moderate
factions of the FSA.
ISIS
Al-Nusra
Front
FSA
Extremely radical
Less radical
Moderate
It should be emphasized here that the above depiction is by no means final or fixed.
Rather, I propose that al-Nusra deliberately kept moving between the two hypothetical
9
Syrian Network for Human Rights. the most notable HTS violations since the establishment of Jabhat al Nusra to date,
Report, (31 January 2021): 69. https://shorturl.at/xzAMZ (accessed December 12, 2023).
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
5
poles in order to maximize its effectiveness and influence, as the following sections will
further elucidate.
Islamist moderation in theoretical context
In exploring the dynamics of moderation within Islamist movements, it is imperative to
contextualize the choice of the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFE). Traditional
approaches, such as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and the theory of PostIslamism, have predominantly focused on analysing Islamist parties and movements
through lenses such as ideological evolution or strategic adaptation, often attributing
moderation or radicalism solely to the openness of the political system and choices made
by the state. RFE, on the other hand, offers a novel perspective that is particularly
pertinent to intra-Islamist dynamics.
For example, Jerome Drevon’s assertion that political inclusion and the opening of
political opportunities encourage Islamists to participate and accept democratic means to
power, while maintaining their ideological precepts, is one such ‘statist’ approach.10
According to Drevon, the experiences of the Islamic Group and the Jihad Group in postMubarak Egypt reveal that the presence of democratic institutions may lead Islamists to
pragmatically engage with democratic processes without necessarily altering their underlying ideological principles.11
In the same vein, Ashour postulates that introducing more inclusion and political
openness will lead radicals to interact with ‘non-like-minded’ individuals and groups,
and it is through such interactions that radicals learn to cooperate and shift towards
moderation.12 However, this perspective, while widely debated within academic circles,
can be viewed as overly simplistic and reflective of an old paradigm that sees Islamist
actions as primarily reactive to the nature of the political system. In this regard, Schwedler
(2011) convincingly argues that political learning is not necessarily guaranteed to produce
more moderation because Islamist activists may also learn from radicals.13 Generally
speaking, attributing Islamist moderation or radicalism to the presence or absence of
democratic institutions fails to account for the dynamics within Islamist movements,
including intra-group competition, strategic calculations, and ideological evolution.
Furthermore, such statist frameworks risk underestimating the agency and autonomy of
Islamist actors, portraying them as passive recipients of state policies rather than active
agents shaping their own trajectories.14 While political inclusion and democratic processes may indeed influence Islamist activism, a comprehensive understanding of Islamist
moderation necessitates considering the multifaceted motivations and dynamics at play
within the world of Islamism.
As part of the broader discourse on Islamist moderation, the theory of Post-Islamism,
notably exemplified by the work of Asef Bayat (2007), has heavily influenced writings in
10
Jerome Drevon, ‘Democracy and Islamist Violence: Lessons from Post-Mubarak Egypt’, Digest of Middle East Studies 23,
no.1, (2014): 1–14.
11
Ibid.
12
Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of JihadistsTransforming Armed Islamist Movements (New York: Routledge, 2011).
13
Jillian Schwedler, Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, World Politics 63,
no. 2 (2011): 347–376.
14
Azzam Al Kassir, Arab Jihadism: Nikāya and Tamkīn between ISIL and al-Qaeda by Hassan Abu Haniyeh, Al-Muntaqa:
New Perspectives on Arab Studies 4, no. 1 (September/October 2021): 117–123.
6
A. AL KASSIR
the field of Islamism, especially pre-2011. Post-Islamism posits a transition within Islamist
movements towards a more pluralistic and democratic framework, departing from previous emphases on the establishment of the Islamic state.15 However, the unfolding
events of the Arab Spring and the subsequent resurgence of extremely violent Islamist
factions and discourses have underscored the explanatory weaknesses inherent in the
Post-Islamism theory. The resurgence of radical Islamist organizations, exemplified by the
activities of groups such as al-Nusra Front in Syria post-2011, alongside the continuous
evolution of ideological views and propaganda messaging within Islamist factions, has
highlighted the inadequacies of classical approaches. These developments have illuminated the pressing need for alternative theoretical frameworks. In response, the theory of
Radical Flank Effects (RFE) emerges as a valuable tool that adds to our understanding of
the strategic manoeuvres and tactical calculations underlying groups’ oscillation between
moderation and radicalism.
One of the key rationales for employing RFE in this study is its focus on the interplay
between different factions within Islamist movements. Unlike some classical approaches
that may view shifts towards moderation as enduring strategic decisions, RFE highlights
the tactical nature of such manoeuvres. It underscores the strategic calculus behind
presenting a moderate façade, illustrating how Islamist factions leverage and sometimes
exploit each other to gain legitimacy and acceptance, even if such shifts are temporary.
Moreover, RFE’s applicability is underscored by its relevance to radical and terrorist
groups within the Islamist spectrum. Traditional approaches often centre on Islamist
parties, occasionally extending to movements espousing extremist ideologies. However,
these frameworks may overlook the distinct characteristics of radical groups whose
identities are fundamentally shaped by violence, excommunication, and the targeting
of civilians. With that in mind, I propose that transcending scholarly barriers and employing RFE can help address some of the shortcomings of conventional paradigms. This
approach may aid in understanding moderation dynamics by illuminating the interactions among radical elements within the broader Islamist landscape.
Al-Nusra’s behavioural patterns and shifts
Between 2011 and 2017 there were several developments and incidents that affected the
way researchers and analysts perceived al-Nusra Front. While al-Nusra’s clear doctrinal
leaning towards Salafi-Jihadism was always evident, its organizational affiliation changed
over time. To clarify, in al-Nusra’s early statements and media releases there was no
mention of any direct affiliation with al-Qaeda or any other Islamist organization. Only
when the threat of ISIS became imminent in April 2013 did Abu Mohamad al-Jolani
declare his group’s allegiance to al-Qaeda Central (AQC).16 Al-Nusra then remained an
official branch of al-Qaeda until July 2016, when al-Jolani appeared in a video revealing his
face for the first time and declared that his group had decided to change its name to
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for Liberation of the Levant) (JFS) which would have no links
15
16
Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2007).
The Conflict in Syria: al-Nusra Front Pledges Allegiance to Zawahiri, Leader of Al-Qaeda (in Arabic), B.B.C. Arabic, April 10,
2013. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/04/130410_nusra_qaeda (accessed January 18,
2020).
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
7
with foreign parties.17 A few months after splitting from al-Qaeda, al-Nusra started to shift
its strategy towards attempting to secure local acceptance and regional and international
recognition of its de facto role in its areas of control, most of which were in the Idlib
province. Henceforth, JFS, formerly al-Nusra, began to assert its local Syrian character
while embarking on an aggressive and hegemonic approach in its relations with smaller
opposition groups. Importantly, JFS led the formation of a new Islamist coalition under
the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017 responding to the initiation of political
negotiations between the Syrian government and several opposition groups including
representatives of militant Islamist factions.
In spite of al-Nusra’s attempts to distance itself from al-Qaeda’s global jihadist
approach and appear organically entrenched in the Syrian context, only a small number
of experts of Islamist activism believed that al-Nusra was going through a pivotal ideological adjustment. However, the group’s tactical moves led some analysts, such as Colin
Clarke,18 to describe al-Nusra as ‘the moderate face of al-Qaeda’. Moreover, other counterterrorism scholars began to openly call for a policy shift towards ‘accepting al-Qaeda’ and
its less dangerous offshoots in order to halt the rapidly expanding ISIS.19 Such voices were
lent credence by al-Nusra’s avoidance of operations against Western targets and the
group’s apparent concern for its public image. Al-Nusra’s ostensible willingness to
respond to international and local pressures was indeed unprecedented considering
the experience of Salafi-Jihadist activism since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 and the subsequent emergence of al-Qaeda in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, one
should keep in mind that al-Nusra’s strategic goals seem to have remained firmly
anchored in Salafi-Jihadism.
The group’s understanding of jihad as an armed conflict and as an obligation did not
change. Since the beginning of al-Nusra’s operations in Syria in late 2011, its members
showed hostility towards democracy and the modern institution of the nation-state,
adopted divisive sectarian rhetoric, and their proclamation of war against unbelief and
apostasy had constantly been their declared drive.
Al-Nusra’s strategic management of the “moderation” discourse
Al-Nusra frequently utilized the pretence of moderation to maximize its benefits during
the conflict in Syria. Qualitatively, however, it employed ‘moderation’ variably in relation
to different competitors and challengers. Examining the variability in the use of the
discourse of moderation offers insight into the Islamists’ strategic management of
discourse.
Studying the qualitative changes of the discourse of al-Nusra reveals that in the
beginning it used the claim to moderation to become more acceptable locally and
persuade more Syrians to join its ranks. Al-Nusra kept its relations with The Islamic State
of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qaeda Central (AQC) undeclared for more than a year after its official
17
Erika Solomon, ‘Al-Nusra’s break from al-Qaeda seen as a strategic move’, Financial Times, July 30, 2016, https://www.ft.
com/content/4eda41ba-5665-11e6-9f70-badea1b336d4#comments-anchor (accessed June 12, 2021).
Colin P. Clarke, ‘The Moderate Face of Al Qaeda’, Foreign Affairs, October 24, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/syria/2017-10-24/moderate-face-al-qaeda (accessed May 19, 2019).
19
See for example: Barak Mendelsohn, ‘Accepting Al Qaeda: The Enemy of the United States’ Enemy’, Foreign Affairs,
March 09, 2015, https://fam.ag/2PmsSCV (accessed June 10, 2017).
18
8
A. AL KASSIR
formation in early 2012. Its designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the
American Foreign Office in December 2012 pushed it to present itself as a ‘moderate’ and
‘authentic’ organization that was being treated unfairly. For al-Nusra, the possibility of
being targeted militarily by American or international forces following the designation
was a lurking existential threat given the newness and immaturity of al-Nusra’s experience
and the ongoing confrontation with the Syrian regime. Appearing moderate was meant
to resonate with the local form of religiosity that is traditionally closer to Sufism and
quietist Salafism than Salafi-Jihadism.
Al-Nusra purposefully attempted to appear as the moderate flank in a Salafi-Jihadist
movement that also encompasses the more radical ISIS. The discourse of moderation was
also used to challenge those who sympathize with ISIS, al-Nusra’s main Salafi-Jihadist
competitor. This was important given the rapid expansion of ISIS and its extreme views
and violent practices that engendered fear locally and internationally from 2013 onwards.
Later, when al-Nusra became engrossed in demonstrating its local Syrian character and
its involvement in the Syrian opposition, it began to present itself as the moderate and
most effective part of the opposition. The claim to moderation was now articulated in
contrast to the perceived ‘too lenient’, ‘unauthentic’, and ‘less committed’ factions of the
opposition, Islamists or otherwise. In its competition with factions of the opposition, alNusra presented itself as the opposition movement most capable of practising politics
since it enjoys popular support and is powerful enough to represent the Syrian people
and negotiate on their behalf without needing to make substantial concessions.
The leadership of al-Nusra instrumentalised the discourse of moderation to enforce
internal discipline and rid the organization of any rebellious figures and units. This process
led to the consolidation of al-Jolani’s power and provided him with the freedom to
implement his strategic visions, most of which revolve around breaking with global
Jihadism, embedding into the Syrian context, and maintaining his group’s de facto
dominance in Idlib province.
Competitive “jihad market”: Al-Nusra’s discursive reactions to the rise of ISIS
The expansion of ISIS in Syria posed a grave threat to various rebel groups including alNusra. Operating under its newly coined slogan, ‘remaining and expanding’, ISIS sought
to become the only dominant Salafi-Jihadist actor in Iraq and Syria. Citing the help and
resources with which it had provided al-Nusra from its inception, it demanded full
compliance and cooperation. ISIS leaders, especially the group’s spokesman al-ʿAdnani,
struck an increasingly commanding tone in their messages to al-Nusra. Tensions escalated
quickly into militant confrontations in the eastern part of Syria. ISIS achieved a relatively
easy victory and consequently powerful military commanders and entire units of al-Nusra
joined ISIS. Fearing ISIS, al-Jolani swore allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of alQaeda Central (AQC), and al-Nusra began to assert its Salafi-Jihadist character, trying to
appear firmly anti-democratic, anti-secular, and committed to the ideas of abolishing
man-made laws, establishing an Islamic state, and applying the rules of sharia. Militarily,
al-Nusra’s leadership turned towards solidifying its influence and presence in the countryside of Idlib and Aleppo, Damascus’ Ghouta, and Daraa.
Discursively, ideologues from the two jihadist groups engaged in heated competitions
for authenticity on two fronts: firstly, regarding the group’s adherence to the principles of
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
9
the founding fathers of contemporary Salafi-Jihadism such as Abdallah Azzam, Osama
b. Laden and Abu Musʿab al-Suri; and secondly, concerning the group’s commitment to
following the literal understanding of the Quran and the Hadith especially in regard to
matters that have political and strategic relevance. These competitions manifested in
virtual debates, exchanges of tweets, and written commentaries, among other forms.
While unable to outweigh ISIS militarily, al-Nusra managed to win the support of
numerous jihadist ideologues inside and outside Syria. The support of these ideologues
helped al-Nusra immensely and preserved its popularity in the jihadist circles through
validating its doctrine and endorsing its strategic approach at a critical time. In a 2014
account of the three ‘camps’ of Syrian jihadism,20 for example, the ideologue Tariq
Abdelhaleem describes ISIS as so extremist that it is ‘more dangerous than al-Assad’s
Nusayri regime’.21 At the same time, he dismisses those who aspired to find a middle way
between ‘the infidel secular and democratic regimes and the jihadist movement’ as
immature, having failed to realize that their ‘compromising approach’ will lead to another
democratic state in Syria supported by the West and ruled by man-made laws.22
The period between 2013 and 2015 was marked by jihadist infighting in addition to
rising dogmatism and intransigence across all jihadist fronts. During this period, the rise of
ISIS as a powerful and extremely radical flank in Salafi-Jihadism appeared to push al-Nusra
closer to ISIS’ end of the spectrum, albeit only discursively. As a result, al-Nusra’s marajiʿ
(leaders and referential figures) began to focus on demonstrating their dogmatic adherence to Salafi-Jihadism and their rejection of pragmatism and the recurring and expansive
employment of the concept of maslaha (public interest). Veteran jihadists known to be
close to al-Qaeda, such as Radwan Nammous (aka Abu Firas al-Suri), surrounded al-Jolani
and became the main representatives of al-Nusra at this stage. Additionally, calls for the
establishment of Islamic emirates near the Turkish borders started to emerge.23
Later, when al-Nusra decided to break ties with al-Qaeda and shift towards attempting
to embed in the Syrian opposition, several of the group’s ideologues were relegated to
a less significant role. Most of them voluntarily distanced themselves from al-Nusra’s new
policies. Others who were closer to the field were marginalized or forced to leave al-Nusra.
Accusations of being ghulat (extremist) became more common. Accusations of being ISIS
sympathizers were also used, as will be further elaborated in later sections.
ISIS posed a serious international threat as well. ISIS’ brutality and ruthless executions
of foreign journalists and aid workers in addition to its responsibility for numerous local
and external terrorist attacks triggered an international military response, which began in
September 2014. As Coalition airstrikes and ground offensives by the predominantly
Kurdish ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) gradually pushed ISIS back, there was less
pressure on al-Nusra, allowing the latter to concentrate on projecting its power over
other militant Islamist groups and FSA factions. As such, despite sporadic targeting by
Russian and American airstrikes, al-Nusra benefited indirectly from the international
military campaign against ISIS and became ready to shift its strategy towards asserting
20
Tariq Abdelhaleem, ‘The Syrian Jihad at a Crossroads’ (in Arabic), Tariq Abdelhaleem’s Website, May 29, 2014, http://
www.tariqabdelhaleem.net (accessed August 02, 2019).
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Thomas Joscelyn, ‘Leaked audio features Al Nusrah Front emir discussing creation of an Islamic emirate’, FDD’s Long War
Journal, July 12, 2014, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/leaked_audio_of_al.php (accessed May 20,
2020).
10
A. AL KASSIR
its local character and de facto dominance in northwest Syria. This strategic shift was
accompanied by a finetuning of al-Nusra’s jihadist discourse which began to feature signs
of willingness to engage pragmatically with the increasingly visible Turkish influence in
the north and readiness to adhere to localized and temporary ceasefire initiatives.
Al-Nusra and IS: the rival brothers
The relationships between al-Qaeda Central (AQC) and The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) had
never been stable. Strategic and theological disputes between the two parties arose
frequently since the time of Zarqawi. However, despite their disagreements, al-Qaeda
supported ISI and praised its activities in Iraq. This should be seen in the light of the fact
that al-Qaeda was losing in Afghanistan and Pakistan.24 The successes and popularity of
ISI served to revive al-Qaeda and remind people of its presence and far-reaching
influence.25 ISI remained officially loyal to al-Qaeda until it expanded into Syria, became
the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and clashed with al-Nusra Front. ISIS’ unanimous
announcement of the Khilafah in mid-2014 and the momentous confrontation with alNusra and other factions in Syria marked a point of divergence within the world of SalafiJihadist activism and the beginning of a phase of jihadi hostilities, infightings and takfir.
Significantly, ISIS’ expansion and hegemonic tendencies brought al-Nusra closer to alQaeda Central (AQC) and fostered the consolidation of two separate trends in global
Jihadism. On one hand, ISIS’ ‘achievements’ made it more intransigent and committed to
its excessively violent and authoritative approach. The group’s rapid geographical expansion and ever-growing popularity that overshadowed all other Jihadist organizations in
2013 and 2014 made it confrontational and aggressive in its relationships with competing
militant Islamist groups in the marketplace of jihadism. On the other hand, AQC and its
affiliates chose to present themselves as more discursively ‘moderate’ and practically
‘flexible’ than their rival ISIS especially in terms of their relationships with other Islamist
groups and schools of thought.
On the ground, being under constant pressure from ISIS, al-Nusra became officially alQaeda affiliate in Syria in April 2013. Shortly after that, al-Nusra embarked on a strategy to
dissociate itself from ISIS, promote its own version of jihadist activism, and reposition itself
on the map of the conflict in Syria.
The year 2013 witnessed a war of statements between ISIS and al-Qaeda as well as calls
for reconciliation. However, all attempts to bring the rival brothers together failed. In
January 2014, Jaysh al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Army), which included several Islamist
factions such as Fastaqim Union, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Battalions and Ansar al-Khilafa
Brigade, launched swift attacks on various ISIS posts in northern and north-western
Syria.26 Soon after, al-Nusra began attacking ISIS especially in the countryside of Idlib.27
24
Wesley Morgan, ‘Whatever Happened to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan?’, Politico, August 15, 2018, https://www.politico.com/
story/2018/08/15/al-qaeda-afghanistan-terrorism-777511 (accessed April 12, 2020).
Zarqawi’s ‘Testimony to Prevent Bloodshed Among the Mujahedeen in the Levant’ Al-Sahab Media Production,
May 2014, cited in: Yasir Abbas, Another ‘State’ of Hate: Al-Nusra’s Quest to Establish an Islamic Emirate in the
Levant, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, (April 29, 2016). https://shorturl.at/pvEQX (accessed January 12, 2024).
26
Aron Lund, The Mujahideen Army of Aleppo, Diwan-Carnegie Middle East Center (April 08, 2014). https://carnegie-mec.
org/diwan/55275?lang=en (accessed September 02, 2023).
27
Syria Countrywide Conflict Report 4, The Carter Center, (September 11, 2014). https://shorturl.at/dpyT9 (accessed
April 22, 2024).
25
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By engaging in a serious military confrontation with ISIS, al-Nusra sought to show
commitment to its claims of religious authenticity, look like a moderate faction facing
an extremist one, and get closer to factions of the opposition that were already engaged
in widespread military confrontations with ISIS.
The orchestrated military operation of Jaysh al-Mujahideen and al-Nusra Front managed to push ISIS away from Aleppo towards the eastern countryside of the city and
resulted in the death of ISIS’ top commander and mastermind Sameer Abd Muhammad
Khleifawi, known as Hajji Bakr. However, large numbers of al-Nusra’s local and foreign
fighters, including powerful allies such as Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (known as
Abu Omar al-Shishani and Omar the Chechen), joined ISIS.28 Fearing more defections, alJolani warned against ‘drifting into a jahili conflict between muhajireen (migrants) and
ansar (local supporters)’, and stated that ‘there is an essential need for the presence of
migrant elements in the field of jihad in order to demonstrate the unity of Islam in such an
historic conflict’.29 Al-Jolani also directed members of al-Nusra, especially the Syrians, ‘to
take responsibility for protecting those who have sought their assistance and defending
them with blood and money’.30 However, in the conflict between al-Nusra and ISIS, the
latter seems to have managed to win the battle for foreign fighters, inadvertently fostering the ‘Syrianisation’ of al-Nusra Front.
ISIS accused al-Nusra of apostasy and in February 2014 began attacking the latter’s
positions in Deir Ezzor and other parts in the east of Syria. By August 2014, ISIS defeated
al-Nusra and other Islamist factions decisively in Deir Ezzor and captured the city of Raqqa.
Meanwhile, entire units of al-Nusra pledged allegiance to ISIS and some al-Nusra leaders,
such as Abu Malik al-Talli in al-Qalamoon, refused to fight ISIS revealing serious internal
divisions within al-Nusra. Although Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, leader of al-Nusra in the
eastern part of Syria, remained loyal to al-Jolani and decided to move with the remaining
members of al-Nusra to the southern governorate of Daraa, he was soon replaced by
a more hard-line jihadi, Jordanian Sami al-ʿUraydi. The growing influence of al-ʿUraydi and
his countrymen Iyad al-Tubasi, Bilal Khreisat, Khalid al-Arouri, and Abu Anas al-Sahaba, all
of whom are close to al-Zawahiri’s line of global jihad, reflected al-Nusra’s desire to assert
its Salafi-Jihadist character and alignment with AQC in response to the ISIS grave threat.
Claiming “religious authenticity” in the face of ISIS
Mazhar al-Wais remained one of al-Nusra’s leading marajiʿ since an early stage. He is
a Syrian Salafi-Jihadist Sheikh and known to belong to al-Jolani’s small circle of trusted
figures. He has criticized ISIS sharply and written books and commentaries trying to
invalidate its approach to religion, and defend the jihadist doctrine of al-Nusra and
other al-Qaeda affiliates.
Al-Wais shares with Abu Musʿab al-Suri, who was described by Lia (2008) as the
‘architect of global jihad’,31 the notion that the interest of jihad justifies everything and
28
Bill Roggio, Senior Islamic State military commander, ’emir of suicide bombers’ among Treasury’s terrorism designations, Long War Journal (September 24, 2014). https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/senior_islamic_state.
php (accessed April 28, 2024).
29
Voice message by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani entitled Allah Allah fi Sahat al-Sham (Fear Allah in the Avenue of Sham) (in
Arabic), al-Manarah al-Bayda’, January 07, 2014.
30
Ibid.
31
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, (London: Hurst, 2008).
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A. AL KASSIR
must be the fundamental reason behind any strategic decision.32 In this sense, the
interest of the ummah is partly dependent on the continuation of jihad; and the very
pursuit of jihad is understood to be both a religious principle and a strategic necessity.
Following that, ISIS was accused of giving primacy to the interest of the group over any
other religious or political considerations.33
Al-Wais argues that ISIS members are superficially firm and that they are strict only on
matters pertaining to Muslims. For him, members of ISIS excommunicate entire Islamic
formations and legal schools accusing them of ceasing the application of hudood (Islamic
capital punishments), while they only apply the hudood that are useful to their
propaganda.34 Additionally, al-Wais highlights ISIS’ ‘disloyalty’ to the legacy of the architects of contemporary jihadism. He gives an example ISIS members’ refusal to support the
popular revolutions of the Arab Spring which contradicts the approach of Osama b. Laden
and his companion Ayman al-Zawahiri.35
Moreover, he draws a historical analogy, comparing the doctrine of ISIS with that of the
khawarij (Kharijites).36 He explains that ‘like their ancestors, who had attractive slogans,
the IS group deceives the public by their discourse, whereas the truth is that their actions
have nothing to do with shari’a; they are pretentious, utilitarian, opportunistic, pleasureloving and greedy’.37 Al-Wais highlights another commonality between ISIS and the
Kharijites which is the exaggeration in the application of the rule: ‘who does not excommunicate a kafir, or doubts that, is kafir’.38 Al-Wais explains that such traditional rules have
been used by ISIS to excommunicate those who disagree with their doctrine or practices.
Following that, and in his defence of al-Nusra, he states that the closest people to truth in
the time of disunity are those who face the Kharijites and endeavour to establish a ‘Sunni
project that will return the glory of the ummah’.39
Importantly, al-Wais criticizes ISIS’ notion of qatl al-maslaha ‘interest killing’ which
refers to killing any person if that would benefit the group regardless of any religious or
ethical considerations. He adds that practising ‘interest killing’ is another feature shared
with the Kharijites.40
ISIS’ Caliphate proclamation represented a major point of disagreement in the SalafiJihadist camp. Numerous Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ around the world denied the legitimacy of
the newly announced caliphate, which was used by al-Nusra in its counter propaganda
campaigns. Sizeable portions of al-Nusra’s magazine, Al Risalah,41 are dedicated to
renouncing the newly announced Caliphate and highlighting statements and opinions
of ulama that disprove ISIS’ unilateral move. The jihadist magazine states that despite the
ulama’s clear disproval of ISIS’ behaviours, ISIS continued slandering the respected ulama
32
Mazhar Al-Wais, ‘Distinctive Signs for Exposing the Religion of Deviants’ (in Arabic: al-ʿalamat al-fariqah fi kashf din almariqah), 2015. www.Jihadology.net
33
Ibid, p. 189.
34
Ibid, p. 190.
35
Ibid, p. 191.
36
Ibid, p. 200–9.
37
Ibid, p. 209.
38
Ibid, p. 246.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid, p. 81.
41
The first issue of Al-Risalah was released online in July 2015. The magazine was originally in English and was produced
by the Al-Risalah Production Center, which was affiliated with al-Nusra and dedicated to producing written and visual
materials in defence of the group’s actions and doctrine.
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
13
labelling them as ‘old, senile men’.42 Al Risalah mentions that some ISIS figures went as far
as saying ‘we don’t need scholars, we have Qur’an and Sunnah’ which the magazine
describes as an ‘ill-advised statement’.43 The magazine’s main criticism is that ISIS considers the ulama ‘mere common men who are prone to make mistakes’; a criticism that
reflects the turn towards re-establishing the authority of a class of epistemic leaders in alQaeda’s version of Salafi-Jihadism.44
It is noteworthy that al-Nusra’s discourse of moderation drew on the experiences of
other Islamist groups, militant and non-militant. Al-Nusra presented its adaptations and
changing discourse and behaviour as a corrective movement within militant Islamism. It
tried to maintain a Salafi-Jihadist discourse in tandem with its attempts to become more
localized and closer to factions of the opposition.
For al-Nusra’s leading marjiʿ Abd al-Rahim Attoun,45 numerous Islamist groups
appeared during the last century driven by a shared desire to return the rule of Islam
but employed different methods. He considers one of the most significant experiences to
be that of the Muslim Brotherhood, who believe that, since Muslims are a majority in the
region and will choose the rule of Islam at the ballot box if given the chance, participating
in parliamentary life is a way of achieving Islamic government.46 Attoun argues that
‘regardless of the fallacies in this heretical method (the parliament), the Muslim
Brothers have never applied Islamic rules in any of their experiences with government’.
He mentions the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of
Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an example of the Brotherhood’s political behaviour. He criticizes the AKP because ‘it has not ruled by Islam’ despite its economic achievements.47
Attoun adds that the AKP abides by the rules of the international community and is still
determinedly seeking membership of the European Union, and that its army is still part of
NATO.48
On the other hand, Attoun adds that there are also the ‘extremists who follow the
doctrine of Kharijites and wage jihad against the ummah instead of fighting tyrants’.49 For
him, this extremist school encompasses the Takfir and Hijrah group, the GIA in Algeria,
and the Islamic State group, and, wittingly or unwittingly, these groups ‘serve the interest
of the enemies of God since they distract the mujahideen and prevent them from
achieving their goals’.50
Attoun considers that neither ‘lenience and democracy’ nor ‘extremism and backstabbing the mujahideen’ will eliminate the currently prevalent state of jahiliyya.
Therefore, he praises the activism of Salafi-Jihadists describing them as the most committed and the closest to the essence of Islam and placing them between the
42
Al Risalah Magazine, Issue 1, mid-2016, p. 23.
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Abd al-Rahim Attoun (aka Abu Abdullah al-Shami) is a well-known Islamist scholar, who was a member of al-Nusra’s
Shoura Council. Between 2012 and 2018, he frequently appeared in numerous video recordings and issued statements
and fatwas on various religious and strategic matters. Significantly, he represented al-Nusra in al-mubahala, which is
a doctrinal and strategic dialogue held over Skype with Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani, ISIS’ spokesman.
46
Abd al-Rahim Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’ (in Arabic: fi zilal dawhat al-jihad), 2016,169. www.
Jihadology.net
47
Ibid, p. 169.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid, p. 172.
50
Ibid.
43
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A. AL KASSIR
compromising Brotherhood and the extremist Kharijites. However, he holds that SalafiJihadists also have their own problems as well. He explains that most jihadist factions
have been preoccupied with performing jihad but developed very little knowledge of
political reasoning.51 For him, the mujahideen of al-Nusra stand out because they reflect
on the experiences of other Islamist groups and are aware of the need to formulate
a comprehensive and balanced strategy that includes jihadist activities, sophisticated
political reasoning, and commitment to the core tenets of Islam.
Portraying al-Nusra as a committed Salafi-jihadist organization with a mature understanding of the socio-political situation in the Middle East was a cornerstone of the
group’s propaganda. Such claims were used to persuade bystanders to participate and
to attract members from other Islamist groups in a serious intra-Islamist competition over
human resources and legitimacy.
Al-Nusra’s calculated moderation and conditional cooperation
Al-Nusra remained AQC’s official branch until July 2016 when it started operating as an
independent militant group by the name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). The phase of JFS
represents a purposeful strategic turn marked by what I term ‘calculated moderation’, that
is the carefully managed transition from global Jihadism to local activism, and ‘conditional
cooperation’ in reference to al-Nusra’s attempts to embed in the Syrian opposition but on
its own terms.
Breaking ties with al-Qaeda
Al-Nusra’s decision to disband from al-Qaeda and rebrand itself in mid-2016 followed
mounting local and international pressures to change its discourse and behaviour and rid
itself of any extremist influences.
Locally, there had been important developments that drove al-Nusra to make behavioural changes. Firstly, al-Nusra’s relationships with locals in opposition-held areas had
deteriorated in consequence to al-Nusra’s recurrent attempts to purge small factions of
the FSA and harass and detain tens of civil society activists.52 From late 2014 onwards, alNusra started attacking externally backed factions, justifying its action in religious terms.
Its maraji’ accused several FSA factions of receiving money and weaponry from the United
States and Britain and thus breaching the Islamic principle of ‘loyalty and disavowal’.
Following attacks on Haqq al-Muqatilah Front, the Hazm Movement and Unit 30, Attoun
stated that ‘some leaders have been compromised and have begun to alter their agendas
and transform into extensions of the American project’.53 Al-Nusra appeared ready to
distance itself from al-Qaeda’s global Jihadism and focus on arrogating to itself the role of
a mover and shaker within the militant opposition in Syria.
Secondly, the Russian military intervention in September 2015 tipped the balance of
power in favour of the regime and put an end to months full of strategic territorial
51
Ibid, p.171.
Yasir Abbas, ‘How Al Qaeda is Winning in Syria’, War on the Rocks, May 10, 2016, https://bit.ly/31gEIUD (accessed
June 10, 2020).
53
Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’, p.195.
52
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
15
advances by the rebels54 in the countryside of Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, and Daraa. Backed by
Russian air operations and numerous Shia militias on the ground, including Lebanese
Hezbollah, the regime swiftly regained territory.
At the same time, the increasing power and influence of al-Nusra were putting the
regional and international supporters of the Syrian opposition in a difficult and embarrassing position, and calls for the opposition to isolate it were on the rise. In December 2015,
the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2254 initiating talks between
the regime and opposition members and calling upon all parties to combat terrorism and
repudiate extremists. Militarily, the strategy of the US-led international coalition to defeat
ISIS formed in September 201455 involved stemming the flow of all foreign fighters into
and out of Syria including those fighting with al-Nusra. As a result, al-Nusra suffered heavy
losses as the Russian and American airstrikes continued to target its top-ranking fighters
in addition to senior members of its allied groups.56
These factors deprived al-Nusra of two sources of power and influence. On one hand,
rising hostilities with factions of the opposition and local people weakened al-Nusra’s
claim of being accepted and supported in the areas that had been captured from the
Syrian regime. On the other hand, the Russian intervention and the increasing local
ceasefires reduced its military effectiveness considerably. Under these circumstances, alNusra’s leadership decided to cut ties with al-Qaeda in July 2016 and turn towards
solidifying its position in the armed opposition against the Syrian regime.
Blending into the Syrian opposition
A few months after splitting from al-Qaeda, al-Nusra started to shift its strategy towards
attempting to secure local acceptance and regional and international recognition of its de
facto role in its areas of control, most of which are in Idlib province. It appears that alNusra built its new strategy on claims of being able to contain other factions, capable of
establishing governing bodies that provide services and mobilize people,57 willing to
acquiesce in more visible diplomatic and military roles by regional powers such as Turkey,
and uninterested in launching international attacks.
Aiming to blend into the Syrian context, JFS, formerly al-Nusra, pursued a strategy of
‘calculated moderation’ which was translated practically through undertaking several
steps. Firstly, JFS started to pay more attention to local politics and show a willingness
to take part in coalitions and coordinate with other factions, on its own terms, however.
JFS’ discourse at this stage indicates that al-Jolani’s leadership was preoccupied with
trying to form a broad coalition or merger aiming to justify its strategic turn away from alQaeda and global Jihadism.
54
For more on Jaysh al-Fatah see: Mohammed Alaa Ghanem, ‘Syria: An Opportunity in Idlib’, Atlantic Council, April 03,
2015. https://bit.ly/3gqaTr1 (accessed June 12, 2020); and, Ben Hubbard, ‘A Look at the Army of Conquest, a Prominent
Rebel Alliance in Syria’, The New York Times, October 01, 2015, https://nyti.ms/2Xn2tco (accessed July 22, 2020).
55
Tom Cohen, ‘’Obama Outlines ISIS Strategy: Airstrikes in Syria, More U.S. Force’s, CNN, September 11, 2014, https://
edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/isis-obama-speech/index.html (accessed September 15, 2020).
56
Karen DeYoung; Liz Sly; Missy Ryan, ‘U.S. Airstrikes Target al-Qaeda Faction in Syria’, The Washington Post,November 06,
2014, https://wapo.st/39YR9Is (accessed July 14, 2020). For more information on the US targeting of al-Nusra see, for
example: ‘US Targeted “Legacy” al Qaeda Leader Abu Firas al-Suri in Syria Airstrike’, DW,April 04, 2016, https://bit.ly/
2EKnozx (accessed June 16, 2020); and: Adam Entous, ‘Obama Directs Pentagon to Target al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria’,
The Washington Post, November 10, 2016, https://wapo.st/2EQNAIR (accessed October 12, 2020).
57
Abbas, ‘How Al Qaeda is Winning in Syria’.
16
A. AL KASSIR
Secondly, JFS began to assert its local presence and dominance over all aspects of
governance in Idlib. This included launching propaganda campaigns that focus on showing the group’s new outlook that revolves around ensuring accountability, fighting
corruption, and providing public services.
Thirdly, JFS embarked on a process of rearranging its internal power distribution which
began with arresting or expelling leaders who were known to be loyal to AQC and those
who opposed or expressed dissatisfaction with the decision of disbanding from al-Qaeda.
JFS also launched attacks against groups that were suspected of being sympathetic to or
affiliated with IS. In addition to that, JFS became clearly interested in asserting its
‘Syrianness’ and embeddedness in the local context.58
The discourse of al-Nusra has changed noticeably, reflecting the group’s new strategic
repositioning. It signalled a departure from al-Qaeda’s old strategy of fighting the ‘far
enemy’. This is the case in the writings of al-Nusra’s marjiʿ Attoun who reminded members
of al-Nusra that the strategy of targeting the West is not eternal or untouchable; rather it
was adopted in response to specific circumstances.59 Defending al-Nusra’s turn towards
focusing on the context in Syria and blending into the opposition, Attoun says: ‘Another
September [attack] is not possible given the extraordinary security measures put in place
currently and the fact that the raid of September 2001 has achieved its goals’.60 Following
that, Attoun states that the United States remains an enemy but ‘the most useful way to
fight the U.S.A. today is through thwarting its plans by cutting off its hands and proxies’.
This reasoning was used to justify al-Nusra’s military campaigns against several factions of
the FSA who were in control of parts of Idlib and Aleppo provinces and were challenging
al-Nusra’s military and administrative dominance.
From Jabhat Fateh al-Sham to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
Towards the end of 2016, al-Nusra worked on reaching a merger of all rebel groups under its
umbrella, calling its attempt a ‘uniting of the ranks’.61 Al-Nusra’s efforts resulted in the
formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organisation for the Liberation of al-Sham) (HTS) in
January 2017. However, in the way towards forming HTS, JFS sought to become the sole
powerbroker in the armed opposition. Therefore, it used its military capabilities and exerted
tremendous pressures on all the factions present in the northwest. In the few weeks prior to
the formation of HTS, JFS eliminated several armed groups including Jaysh al-Mujahideen in
spite of the objections expressed by Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham.62
Threatened by JFS, other groups decided to come together and form smaller coalitions
to survive which eventually resulted in the creation of two militant Islamist camps, the
JFS-led HTS on one side and the powerful Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham and its allies on the
other side.63 It is worth noting that although Ahrar al-Sham was angered by JFS’
58
Charles Lister, The Syria Effect: Al-Qaeda Fractures, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, (December 2019). https://shorturl.
at/bgrt3 (accesses October 23, 2023).
59
Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’, p.177.
60
Ibid, p.178.
61
Charles Lister, ‘Al Qaeda Is Starting to Swallow the Syrian Opposition’, Foreign Policy, March 15, 2017, https://bit.ly/
3gr3ZSo (accessed May 20, 2020).
62
‘Fatah al-Sham’ Eliminates Jaysh al-Mujahideen and Takes Over Arms Depots (in Arabic), Sham Network, January 25,
2017, https://bit.ly/2TNgA8G (accessed May 14, 2019).
63
For more details about the circumstances surrounding the formation of HTS refer to: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, ‘Idlib
and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes 75,
February 2020, https://bit.ly/35WwP93 (accessed December 11, 2020).
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
17
escalating aggression, it did not intervene militarily to protect the groups under attack,
which was enough to allow the newly formed HTS to attain and maintain dominance over
most of the ‘liberated’ areas and eventually drive other rebel groups, including Ahrar alSham itself,64 out of their Idlib strongholds.
Initially, HTS included powerful Islamist groups such as al-Zinki Movement and Ansar
al-Din Front, received the support of influential Islamist marajiʿ such as Abd al-Razzaq alMahdi, Abdullah al-Muhaysini, and Muslih al-Alyani, and attracted military commanders
such as Hashim al-Sheikh (Abu Jabir) who left Ahrar al-Sham and was appointed the
general commander of HTS.65 Later, however, several groups defected from HTS including
al-Zinki Movement66 and Ansar al-Din, both of which soon realized that HTS was to be
managed and led by al-Jolani and the rest of the leadership of JFS (formerly al-Nusra).
Additionally, al-Muhaysini, al-Alyani, and other Islamic scholars left HTS at the beginning
of September 2017 in consequence of leaked recordings containing conversations
between military commanders close to al-Jolani wherein they harshly criticize the
mashayekh (religious figures) in HTS and disparage them as being ‘mere apologists’.67 It
soon became clear that HTS was another attempt to modify and rebrand al-Nusra and
strengthen al-Jolani’s control, after the short-lived experiment of JFS.
The JFS-led merger was a strategic move aimed at countering intensified international
diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict and reach a political settlement in Syria. Such
initiatives were mainly organized by Russia after it provided vital assistance to the Syrian
regime enabling the latter to decisively defeat the armed opposition in Aleppo and regain
most parts of the strategic city in December 2016.68 Specifically, as Russia, Iran, and Turkey
arranged and oversaw indirect talks between representatives of the Syrian government
and representatives from several armed opposition factions in January 2017 in Astana, the
capital of Kazakhstan, JFS lobbied factions that opposed negotiating with the regime and
count on winning militarily. On the ground, soon after its formation, the JFS-led HTS
launched a broad attack against factions that agreed to attend the peace talks in Astana.
Through that, JFS wanted to prove to regional and international players that opposition parties and armed factions that agreed to engage in political negotiations with the
government do not represent the will of the people living in ‘liberated’ areas and that they
do not have influence in the field. Discursively, JFS dedicated much of its propaganda at
this stage to challenge the legitimacy and utility of the ongoing negotiations.69
In May 2017, the Astana peace talks produced a plan to implement four ‘de-escalation
zones’ in Eastern Ghouta, Daraa, Homs, and Idlib; with each zone being surrounded with
monitoring posts.70 The plan did not prevent the Syrian regime from escalating its
offensives in the ensuing months allowing it to retake all de-escalation zones apart
64
Khalid Al-Khatib, ‘The War of the Bab al-Hawa Crossing is Over. Will Ahrar al-Sham Disintegrate?’ (in Arabic), al-Modon
Online, July 27, 2017, https://bit.ly/2K5rpBv (accessed June 10, 2020).
65
‘Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: Its Formation, Leadership, and Joining Factions’ (in Arabic), Sham Network, January 28, 2017,
https://bit.ly/38GPFEn (accessed October 12, 2020).
66
‘Al-Zinki’ Announces Its Disbanding from ‘Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’ (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, July 20, 2017. https://
enabbaladi.net/archives/162465 (accessed October 06, 2020).
67
‘Defections Return HTS to Its Initial Core’ (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, September 14, 2017. https://enabbaladi.net/archives/
172765 (accessed September 30, 2020).
68
Jonathan Landay; Arshad Mohammed, ‘Aleppo’s Fall Would Be Win for Russia, Defeat for U.S. in Mideast’, Reuters,
December 05, 2016, https://reut.rs/2XCXMLv (accessed October 02, 2020).
69
See for example: Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’, p.196.
70
‘Syria: The Astana Peace Process’, France 24, September 05, 2018, https://bit.ly/33Cydhu (accessed July 15, 2019).
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A. AL KASSIR
from the north-western province of Idlib. This made Idlib the last stronghold of the
opposition, with a very high demographic density, since it had become the destination
for several mass internal displacements and evacuations.71 HTS gradually consolidated its
control over the area by eliminating or integrating other groups72 and through expanding
the work and authorities of its newly founded ‘modernised’ administrative bodies such as
the civilian-led ‘Salvation Government’ that, in November 2017, replaced al-Nusra’s ‘Civil
Administration for Services’.73
Competing flanks inside al-Nusra
As discussed above, acting as the official branch of al-Qaeda in Syria started to impede alNusra’s attempts to blend into the Syrian opposition and engender local popular support.
The bad reputation of al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization made international and
regional backers of the opposition reluctant to increase their financial and military
support. Moreover, influential Islamist marajiʿ such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi issued fatwas
against joining al-Nusra because the presence of al-Qaeda began to tarnish the reputation
of the rebels and delay their victory.74 Under these pressures, al-Jolani’s leadership
decided to cut ties with al-Qaeda in July 2016, a decision that has proven to be a bone
of contention between different currents within al-Nusra.
Fearing internal divisions, leaders of al-Nusra presented their decision to lay members
as a step coordinated with AQC and accepted by influential jihadi figures around the
world.75 In reality, the decision was taken without AQC approval. Consequently, serious
internal divisions became apparent, especially when the AQC leadership, represented by
its overall leader al-Zawahiri, publicly censured al-Nusra’s decision to break from al-Qaeda
and change its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.76 Al-Zawahiri issued several letters wherein
he seemed furious with the leadership of al-Nusra accusing the latter of acting autonomously and breaking its oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda.
Al-Nusra’s leadership responded to al-Zawahiri’s rebuke by citing maslaha and public
good and blaming AQC for its slow and unresponsive bureaucracy and lack of knowledge
of the context in Syria. Regarding maslaha, al-Nusra framed the HTS project as the
crystallization of a common idea developed and endorsed by most of the factions in
Jaysh al-Fatah.
Al-Jolani’s leadership directed much of its criticism to a group of leaders within alNusra who had direct links with the leadership of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Most of the al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadists inside al-Nusra belonged to a Jordanian current
71
Tom Rollins, ‘Syrian evacuations break the will to resist’, The New Humanitarian, September 20, 2016, https://bit.ly/
2C5UpVW (accessed July 18, 2019).
72
Fabrice Balanche, ‘Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War a Geopolitical Study’, The Washington Institute, February 05, 2018,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sectarianism-syrias-civil-war-geopolitical-study
(accessed
April 04, 2019).
73
Mona Alami, ‘HTS Continues to Evolve’, Atlantic Council, December 01, 2017. https://bit.ly/3fOtxHR (accessed
February 14, 2018).
74
Abd al-Rahim Attoun, ‘A Dialogue with Shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi’ (in Arabic), October 01, 2015, www.Justpaste.it
(accessed January 20, 2020).
75
Ahmed Abazid, ‘Jolani’s Final Plan: War in Search of Politics’ (in Arabic), Ala Basirah, February 09, 2017, https://
alabasirah.com/node/523 (accessed March 22, 2020).
76
‘Al-Zawahiri Attacks al-Jolani: We Have not Approved the Breaking of Ties’ (in Arabic), al-Modon Online, November 29,
2017. https://bit.ly/354MaVU (accessed January 04, 2020).
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
19
that included Iyad al-Tubasi (aka Abu Julaybib) who was a top military commander in HTS,
Sami al-ʿUraydi who was the chief of religious affairs in al-Nusra Front, and Abu al-Qassam
al-Urduni, among others.77
Attoun raises another point and blames AQC for turning its back on the newly formed
HTS and getting fixated on its organizational affiliation.78 At this stage, al-Nusra’s propaganda focused on demonstrating the need to prioritize a united Islamist front in Syria over
any other doctrinal or organizational considerations—signifying the incorporation of
pragmatism into the group’s official discourse.
As such, the transition to HTS came to mark a complete departure from al-Qaeda and its
line of global jihad. At the same time, the HTS merger marked a turn towards more politics
and less ideology, discursively and practically. From 2017 onwards, al-Jolani and his affiliated
cadre have demonstrated willingness to accept the presence of Turkish troops near their
areas of influence and even cooperated with Turkey through the diplomatic activities of
their affiliated Salvation Government.79 Since al-Nusra’s marajiʿ have different positions on
Erdogan’s government and its policies and interventions in north Syria, HTS’ gradual
rapprochement with Turkey triggered further withdrawals of support.
Dissatisfied with the localization of its jihadist activism and the decision to disengage
from al-Qaeda, numerous jihadists distanced themselves from HTS and founded or joined
other jihadist groups. Significantly, a group of jihadists deserted HTS and in the second
half of 2017 established a new al-Qaeda-affiliated group that was officially declared in
early 2018 by the name Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion) (HaD) and led by Abu
Humam al-Shami. Other jihadists joined already established groups such as Ansar alIslam and Ansar al-Tawhid. However, these seemingly competing jihadist actors have in
fact served HTS’ strategies by sustaining its claims of being moderate and centrist,
especially with the declining influence and presence of ISIS as the most hard-line jihadist
organization.
When its dispute with AQC went public and with the solidification of its control over
most of the Idlib province including a monopoly over the strategic border crossing of Bab
al-Hawa with Turkey,80 HTS moved to reorganize its internal leadership structure, using its
pretence of moderation to rid itself of any disobedient or dissenting figures. On one hand,
HTS launched offensives against groups that it accused of being ghulat (extremists) or
affiliates of IS. For instance, in February 2017 the newly formed HTS launched a military
operation in southern Idlib to uproot its previously close ally Liwa’ al-Aqsa (formerly Jund
al-Aqsa) justifying the move as a war on extremism and takfir.81 On the other hand, in
conformity with its new strategy of asserting its ‘Syrianness’, HTC led frequent campaigns
to rid itself of numerous non-Syrian figures (muhajiroun). For example, in November 2017
HTS arrested leading figures of the Jordanian jihadist current that was in favour of
remaining officially affiliated with AQC.82 In effect, the absence of these figures meant
77
Abd al-Rahim Attoun, ‘Testimony on the Breaking of Ties of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda’ (in Arabic), 2017, www.
Justpaste.it (accessed February 21, 2020).
78
Ibid.
79
Alami, ‘HTS Continues to Evolve’.
80
Al-Khatib, ‘The War of the Bab al-Hawa Crossing is Over’.
81
Aqil Hessein, ‘Tahrir al-Sham Declares War on “Liwa” al-Aqsa’’ (in Arabic), al-Modon Online, February 14, 2017, https://
bit.ly/3iAjVlW (accessed May 12, 2022).
82
‘Tahrir al-Sham Explains the Circumstances of Arresting “Abu Julaybib” and “al-ʿUraydi” (in Arabic), Enab Baladi,
November 28, 2017. https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/187330 (accessed June 12, 2021).
20
A. AL KASSIR
that al-Jolani has gained more power, maintained his control of HTS, and become freer to
implement his own visions supported by a small group of loyal marajiʿ and strategists.
Conclusion
This paper has elucidated al-Nusra Front’s purposeful and adaptable utilization of the
discourse of moderation and illustrated how such strategic employment of discourse
aimed to maximize the group’s advantages across various episodes of the Syrian conflict
between 2012 and 2017. Al-Nusra’s discourse of moderation accompanied its recurrent
behavioural shifts that were prompted by three key factors: the rise of ISIS as a strong
Salafi-Jihadist challenger, the overall downturn of the militant opposition, and managing
the relationship with al-Qaeda and its local affiliates and sympathizers.
Studying the discourse and conduct of al-Nusra Front against the backdrop of the rise
of the more radical and excessively violent ISIS group demonstrates the utility of Haines’
theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs). It also corroborates the idea that the emergence of
a radical flank does not necessarily lead to a positive impact on the more moderate flank.
However, the findings challenge Haines’ premise that RDFs, whether positive or negative,
happen unintendedly.
Since 2013, al-Nusra capitalized on the rise and expansion of ISIS to present
itself as the moderate flank in Salafi-Jihadism, portraying itself as adaptable, less
violent, and more politically and strategically adept. The claim to moderation at
that stage was employed to evade the consequences of being designated
a ‘terrorist group’, including the risk of international targeting and the inability
to integrate into the opposition and encourage locals to join and support alNusra’s activities.
Furthermore, al-Nusra used the claim to moderation differently in relation to factions of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In mid-2016, al-Nusra underwent a strategic shift
when its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, announced breaking from al-Qaeda and
cutting ties with all foreign parties. This decision signified a turn towards asserting alNusra’s ‘Syrian character’. Therefore, the Salafi-Jihadist group began to employ
a discourse emphasizing ‘organicity’ and representation of local will. Aiming to
expand, attract more members, and become a de facto dominant player in the northwest, al-Nusra resorted to challenging the effectiveness and cultural authenticity of the
FSA by portraying the latter’s components as timid, dependent on external aid, and
acting in compliance with foreign agendas. In this respect, al-Nusra’s moderation
discourse was constructed around claims of commitment, effectiveness, autonomy,
and cultural resonance.
The research shows that al-Nusra used its internal radical flanks to appear
centrist, pragmatic, negotiable, and separate from globally oriented jihadism.
Recurrent internal campaigns against extremism and intransigence took place
since disengaging from al-Qaeda and the subsequent formation of HTS. It appears
that these campaigns happened to serve the interest of a specific group within alNusra. Al-Nusra’s central leadership—al-Jolani and a select group of close associates—launched military operations and propaganda campaigns to rid their organization of any ‘extremist’ elements. This, in effect, resulted in the arrest, expulsion,
or assassination of numerous members and leaders who in reality were potential
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
21
challengers of al-Jolani’s authority and strategic plans. Consequently, the pretence
of moderation served as a tool in the hands of al-Nusra’s leadership, enabling alJolani to tighten his grip on power and gain more freedom to implement his
strategic plans most of which revolve around breaking from global Jihadism and
embedding into the Syrian context, on one hand, and maintaining his group’s de
facto dominance in the Idlib province, militarily and administratively, on the other
hand.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).