Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Ocean and Coastal Management
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ocecoaman
(Mis-)matching framing foci: Understanding policy consensus among
coastal governance frames
Ewert Aukes 1, *, Kris Lulofs, Hans Bressers
Department of Governance and Technology for Sustainability (CSTM), Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217,
7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords:
Coastal governance innovation
Policy controversy
Frame conflict
Case study
The Netherlands
The push and pull between innovation and conservatism is a normal situation in Dutch coastal governance. In
some cases this leads to conflicts over which policy solution to choose. This paper argues that coastal governance
processes are shaped by policy frames. They influence what actors consider the policy problem, the appropriate
solution, and the way to achieve this solutions. The paper features a Dutch coastal governance project called
“Hondsbossche Duinen”, in which the mismatching of heterogeneous policy framing foci almost led to breakdown of the process. After a phase leading to controversy and shifts in project management, the project eventually became realised successfully. This near-breakdown and eventual success is studied from the perspective of
framing foci: policy substance, policy process, and actors’ identities and relationships. In-depth interviews with
policy actors allow for a nuanced analysis of those framing foci. We show that dynamics of emphasising and
ignoring similarities and dissimilarities between actors’ framing foci explain the developments in the case.
Emphasising dissimilarities and ignoring similarities produced controversy in the first phase of the case. In the
end, emphasising similarities and the emergence of a consensus framing focus led to policy consensus.
1. Introduction
Implementing innovative coastal protection projects can be challenging. Coasts are often areas of bustling activity and especially in small
countries such as the Netherlands, dense urbanised cores alternate with
economic production space. Besides, beaches represent popular recreational destinations. Similarly there are ongoing administrative trends
such as deliberative governance (Hajer, 2005), public participation
(Rowe and Frewer, 2000), co-creation (Voorberg et al., 2015) and the
rise of integrated management, e.g. integrated river basin management
or integrated coastal zone management. As a result, decision making
processes about the implementation of coastal protection projects
involve an increasing number and diversity of stakeholders with heterogeneous interests, task assignments and approaches towards coastal
governance. However, coming to terms with conflicting coastal governance approaches to achieve shared binding decisions is at the heart of
the coastal governance process (cf. Kuhlmann, 2001). For example, in
the past, coastal managers often relied on “hard” coastal defences to
protect these coastal areas against storms and – recently –
climate-change-induced sea-level rise. The Hondsbossche Duinen reflects such a coastal area where hard coastal defence, a 5.5 km seawall,
was created in the 19th century already. Some coastal governance experts challenge this “hard” practice. They believe that more flexible,
multifunctional, and ecologically integrated coastal protection solutions
may be more appropriate (Van Slobbe et al., 2013). While innovation in
coastal protection technology was crucial for the survival of the
Netherlands as a country (cf. Disco, 2002; Gerritsen, 2005; Meijerink,
2005; Van Koningsveld et al., 2008), their implementation is not always
welcomed by coastal managers. In principle, they prefer reliable, proven
technologies. Bringing these conservative and innovative positions
together is currently the bread and butter of coastal governance.
Understanding the dynamics of such a governance process is a
complex undertaking. Although it increases predictability, the assumption of rational or even boundedly rational behaviour is an oversimplification (Schön, 1982). Furthermore, what comes out of a policy
process has frequently been explained as a result of throwing everything
in a garbage can in which solutions are achieved by muddling through
(Cohen et al., 1972; Lindblom, 1979). Others have conceptualised
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: e.j.aukes@utwente.nl (E. Aukes), k.r.d.lulofs@utwente.nl (K. Lulofs), j.t.a.bressers@utwente.nl (H. Bressers).
1
Present address: Department of Science, Technology and Policy Studies (STePS), Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social sciences, University of Twente,
P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105286
Received 6 December 2019; Received in revised form 3 May 2020; Accepted 14 June 2020
Available online 20 August 2020
0964-5691/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
different aspects of policymaking – policy, politics and problems – to be
independent of each other most of the time (Kingdon, 2014). The role of
individual actors’ perspectives in the process and outcome of policy
processes does not play a role in these strands of literature. One
exception is the concept of special policy entrepreneurs who can
crucially steer policy processes (Aukes et al., 2017; Huitema and Meijerink, 2010; Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Winkel and
Leipold, 2015). Rather, we argue in this paper that difficulties with the
implementation of innovative coastal protection projects can be understood from the perspective of actors’ policy frames and policy
framing. Policy frames are not only crucial in understanding positions of
actors. The development of frame alignment between actors also clarifies specifically why in some cases actors converge on some coastal
protection technology and not on others (cf. Snow et al., 1986). This
frame alignment becomes visible through the deconstruction of policy
frames into framing foci and tracing their changes over times.
We subdivide actors’ policy frames into three foci, i.e. policy substance, policy process, and identities and relationships (Van Hulst and
Yanow, 2014).2 The central research question we address in this paper
is: why do some coastal protection technologies and the processes by
which they are chosen lead to policy consensus while others do not? To
illustrate this claim we apply this perspective to the case of the Hondsbossche Duinen in North-Holland. There, acts of matching and mismatching of policy frames led subsequently to near-breakdown and
success of the process. We shall see how dynamics of emphasising and
ignoring similarities and differences in framing foci between couples of
actors ultimately elucidate some of the coalition-making and
coalition-breaking in the case.
Hondsbossche Duinen is one of ten weak spots detected during inspections of the Dutch sea defences in the early 2000’s. Within the socalled “Weak Links” framework programme, these weak spots were
supposed not only to be reinforced with regard to coastal safety, but also
to improve spatial quality – the “double objective”. In 2004, the Dutch
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (MinI&E) mandated the
Provincial Government of North-Holland to prepare a reinforcement
proposal for this weak spot. The first proposal by the provincial government was turned down by the ministry in 2006. In the process of
preparing the proposal, the provincial government had not taken into
account detrimental effects to the local population, neglected additional
expertise from the water board and Rijkswaterstaat, as well as exceeded
the budget. After delegation of the project management to the water
board in 2006, it took until 2014 for the first non-experimental meganourishment scheme to be realised in the Netherlands (Fig. 1). During
these eight years, the water board succeeded in bringing together actors
with different opinions regarding the solution to be chosen and the
process by which this solution was to be chosen. While early on in the
case, the project threatened to fail, it was finally realised with a broad
epistemic community of actors supporting it. This is, in a nutshell, the
case in which actors needed more than a decade to fix a weak spot in the
coastal defence. We will analyse this case by emphasising the policy
frames of actors and their interaction.
Framing has its root in Goffman’s (1974/1986) work on frame
analysis. After having been picked up by psychologists Kahneman and
Tversky (1984), the concept gradually diversified into different
social-scientific fields, such as policy sciences (Schön and Rein, 1994),
including water management (Dewulf et al., 2007; Isendahl et al., 2009;
Vink et al., 2013). Framing is also common in the fields of social
movements (Snow et al., 1986), communication, and media sciences
(Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999). By now, two strands of framing
literature have developed characterised by different conceptual outlooks
(Dewulf et al., 2009). One focuses on the interactional component of the
co-construction of meaning, studying the mechanisms by which the act
of framing occurs. This line of thought prefers to study interactions of
2
actors in the field. The other, “the cognitive-representational stance on
framing focuses on the way that people experience, interpret, process or
represent issues, relationships and interactions” (Dewulf et al., 2009).
This article continues with a discussion of framing foci followed by
the methods. Then, we present the empirical results of the case study.
We discuss the main actors’ framing foci and how these changed over
time. The development of framing foci throughout the case allows for an
understanding not only of why the project almost broke down, but also
of why success became more and more likely once the water authority
became project manager.
2. Policy framing foci
In our analysis, we focus on policy frames. We define policy frames as
actors’ “implicit theories of a [policy-making] situation” (cf. Nie, 2003;
Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). Thus, policy frames are representations of
actors’ understanding of the policy situation at hand, including a definition of the problem, possible solutions, and an idea of how to reach
those solutions. In the form of individual stories (Stone, 2002), “frames
(…) guide the ways [actors] perceive their social reality and (re)present
it to themselves and to others; (…) they structure the ways in which
segments of social reality are attended to” (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014).
Which segments of social reality stand out to actors depends on characteristics, such as education, upbringing, organisational membership,
or experience. The selected segments of social reality form the basis for a
definition of the policy problem at hand. In turn, the scope of acceptable
policy solutions is encapsulated in this problem definition (Kurt, 2004).
A policy frame and the problem definition it contains deals with
three policy “framing foci”, as we call them (Dewulf et al., 2009; Van
Hulst and Yanow, 2014). First, the meaning actors give to the policy
content is ‘policy substance’ (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). Second,
actors’ sense-making sense of other involved actors and how these are
networked represents the framing focus of ‘actors’ identities and relationships’ (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). The third policy framing
focus is an actor’s perception of the ‘policy process’, e.g. how and which
actors should be involved in the process (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014).
These framing foci serve as conceptual tools to subdivide actors’ frames.
Using the language of ‘reframing’, we can study the changes in policy
framing foci. Reframing, i.e. a change in the implicit theories of the
policy-making situation, “resolves the controversies that arise in policy
practice” (Schön and Rein, 1994). Policy controversies occur over differences in policy framing foci, e.g. a different framing of the policy
substance. Actors’ policy frames converge, once tensions between policy
framing foci become resolved. A mutually accepted solution, then, becomes more likely. By disassembling actors’ frames into
afore-mentioned framing foci over time during a policy process, we can
follow the development of policy consensus or controversy in a case (cf.
Schön and Rein, 1994).
Alternative concepts to account for the presence or absence of policy
consensus are the concepts of “master frames” or “consensus frames”.
These connect otherwise divided policy frames on a more abstract level
by coupling them with “widely shared terms and concepts” (Candel
et al., 2014) or a “broad scope” (Benford and Snow, 2000). Frames that
are brought together by master frames or consensus frames share
“equifinal meaning” (Donnellon et al., 1986), i.e. they are “interpretations that are dissimilar but that have similar behavioural implications”. Linking framing to action, consensus frames or master
frames can lead to the same results. For example, in situations where
coastal actors’ problem definitions differ, there may be coastal
For definition of the framing foci, see section 2.
2
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
Fig. 1. Top: Hondsbossche Duinen mega-nourishment after completion (https://www.hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma.nl/); Bottom: multifunctionality of the
Hondsbossche Duinen, recreation and safety (https://beeldbank.rws.nl, Rijkswaterstaat/Harry van Reeken).
about the context of the policy situation in question (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
Second, the argumentative dynamics occurring between actors in a
policy situation are suitably understood by having those actors describe
and explain the policy situation to the researcher. Third, as (coastal)
governance does not follow the predictability of rational behaviour, the
diversity of actors, interests and policy networks involved turns it into a
complex social phenomenon. Furthermore, the Hondsbossche Duinen
case was nearly unique at the time of realisation with only one other
(even slightly different) instance in the form of the Sand Engine near The
Hague (Aukes et al., 2017; Bontje and Slinger, 2017). Taking the Zeitgeist into account, it can be characterised as an extreme case (Flyvbjerg,
2006).
protection technologies solving all defined problems without necessarily
converging on the problem definition itself.3 We argue that these
alternative concepts are not exclusively useful. We contend that an
approach centring on the share of the overlap between frames – as
consensus frames and master frames do – fails to increase our understanding of why projects threaten to break down. On the contrary, we
will show that the different framing foci have to be taken into account.
We shall see that even a large overlap in framing foci may still put actors
in opposing camps and that minimal frame overlaps may also lead to
policy consensus.
3. Methods
A case study approach is suitable for studying framing for three
reasons (Yin, 2018). First, studying the dynamics of policy consensus or
breakdown from a framing perspective requires nuanced knowledge
3.1. Access and data generation
We gained access to the case through contract research for the Dutch
public works agency Rijkswaterstaat. From there, snowball sampling led
us to interview eleven policy-relevant respondents (Noy, 2008). All respondents’ organisations are to a certain extent involved in infrastructural decision-making in the Netherlands (see Table 1).4 We
3
Cf. Kingdon’s multiple streams approach posing the relative disconnectedness of policy solutions from problems and the need to bring these together at
the right moment (Kingdon, 2014). Kingdon’s approach differs from the policy
frames approach taken here in that it disavows the teleology of policy problems
that the close connection of policy problem and solution scope in a policy frame
represents.
4
3
We aggregated frames to the organizational level.
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
However, we also included these latter topics in the analysis, as they
constitute relevant contextual information. We recorded and transcribed
the interviews. Transcripts were returned to respondents for
fact-checking, if requested.6 The interviews took place between January
and September 2014.
Besides semi-structured interviews we further detailed our exposure
by reviewing relevant policy documents (cf. Böhm, 2005). We triangulated within the interviews and with consulted additional project
documentation, background literature and parliamentary reports
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
Table 1
List of interviewees: Organisation and occupation.
Organisation
Occupation
Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management
Flood risk management
advisor
Two policy advisors
Public Works Agency, division within Ministry of
Infrastructure and Water Management
Province of North-Holland
Water board
Municipality
Lobby group
Public servant
Two project managers
Former project manager
Executive
Policy officer
Former mayor
Leader
3.2. Data analysis
For the analysis of the interviews, we used the policy framing foci as
an initial code list (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The interview transcripts were systematically coded using ATLAS.ti.7 We looked for extracts dealing with the policy substance, policy process, and actors’
identities and relationships. Besides plain descriptions, stylistic devices
such as metaphors served as signposts for a framing focus. We distinguished between extracts explaining actors’ own framing focus and
extracts explaining other actors’ framing focus. Reported framing foci
were used as triangulation. Table 2 shows coding examples, explaining
how we linked parts of the transcripts to policy framing foci. Often,
extracts referred to more than one framing focus at the same time. Such
extracts were double-coded and included for both framing foci. This
elicited actors’ policy frames, argumentative dynamics and
socio-political networks in the case (Noy, 2008).
After coding, all codes were pooled per respondent and framing focus
to develop a label for the framing focus. We discerned variation in
framing focus among respondents in the case. Nonetheless, respondents
from the same organisations had roughly the same framing foci.
We assumed that organisations in the role of project manager have
strong influence on which framing foci dominate. Hence, changes in
which organization leads the project also mean shifts in the dominance
of framing foci. Thus, we divided the case into three phases marked by
changes in the organisation in the lead of the project. In the first phase,
the Provincial Government of North-Holland led the project, followed by
the water board in phase two, and the water board together with
Rijkswaterstaat in phase three. Furthermore, distinguishing project
phases as such led to a more fine-grained overview of framing focus
changes.
attempted to gain an all-around view of the case to cover not only a large
variety of organisations, but also the wide variety of meanings they
attributed to the case. In a metaphorical sense, this leads to an exposure
map (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). Fig. 2 shows such an abstract
exposure map, in which the central triangle denotes the case and the
arrows pointing at it from different angles are the wide variety of
meanings elucidated by interviews or from other sources. Each interview exhibits a unique view of the case depending on respondents
location on the map. Once additional interviews did not yield substantially new perspectives anymore, the point of saturation was reached
and we ceased interviewing.
Studying the case retrospectively, we had to rely on semi-structured
interviews and policy documents from the case (Schwartz-Shea and
Yanow, 2012). Policy framing foci can be derived from conversational,
semi-structured interviews, because these reveal the policy process from
the point of view of the actors. The interview guideline included questions about the respondent’s experience and daily work, expectations
about the project, important controversies and collaboration among
actors. For the contract research, the guideline also touched upon the
construction task, design and organizational tasks and responsibilities.5
4. Analysis: Project managers and their framing foci
Different project managers have their own approaches to managing
Table 2
Coding examples.
Fig. 2. Concept of mapping for exposure (after Schwartz-Shea and
Yanow, 2012).
5
See supplementary material to this publication for the translated interview
guideline.
Example
Framing focus
“I always call [those people] ‘concrete thinkers’. Can’t
think differently than in concrete. (…) A sandy
environment with dunes is my natural background, so
I can also think that way” (executive, water board).
“And [the provincial government] was also separated
from all other governing bodies, such as water board
and Rijkswaterstaat” (policy advisor, ministry).
“You’ll never see Google people at a water board. It’s
not desirable, because we will have a different seawall
every year. (…) Someone can shout ‘Just try
something else!‘. Indeed, until we are flooded”
(project manager, regional Rijkswaterstaat).
Policy substance, actors’
identities and relations
6
7
4
This happened in one case.
https://atlasti.com/.
Policy process
Actors’ identities and
relations
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
projects. This is especially the case if it concerns the various organisations responsible for coastal governance in the Netherlands. Consequentially, changes in who manages a project also mean shifts in the
framing constellation of the policy situation. For example, certain policy
substances may then be preferred over others that were dominant under
previous project managers. This may mean shifts in coalitions of organisations working towards one coastal protection solution or another.
Hence, to trace the evolution of the framing foci of involved organisations, we divided the case into three phases of the project marked by
transitions of the formal project manager role from one organisation to
another. In the first phase, the Provincial Government of North-Holland
led the project, followed by the water board in phase two, and the water
board together with Rijkswaterstaat in phase three. In addition, distinguishing these different phases enabled a fine-grained overview of
framing focus changes.
perspective: “If there is a seawall somewhere, (…) and it has to be
reinforced, you think: ‘I am going to reinforce that seawall’” (water
board executive). Including hard seawall reinforcement in its initial
considerations “did not make [the water board] popular in the region”
(water board executive). In the end, the water board came to the same
conclusions as the previous provincial proposal: the additional height
necessary to make the seawall safe would destroy part of the village. The
water board’s resulting conclusion was different, though: “If you talk
about doubling the size of a seawall, then that is a new seawall from my
point of view. So, if you talk about a new seawall, you may also think of
new solutions” (Water board executive). Thus, sandy and hybrid solutions suddenly became a viable alternative.
The water board involved civil society and Rijkswaterstaat in the
process. Future orientation, flexibility and landscape fit were important
arguments for the water board to open up towards sandy solutions.
Benefits for the local population were not mentioned as such. Nevertheless, the fact that destruction of a part of the village was off the table
carried away appreciation with the local population. This change of
perspective was referred to as a “lifesaver” for the project (Policy advisor
MinI&E).
In the meantime, the provincial government began lobbying for
sandy solutions, too. The provincial official claims the provincial government advocated a sandy solution all along. Success of the sandy solution would even be due to the provincial government’s commitment.
At the beginning, the water board was the opponent, because it “was still
rather conservative at that moment” (provincial official).
The afore-mentioned double objective sparked a lasting conflict between the provincial government and the ministry over the allocation of
costs which erupted in this phase. The provincial government insisted
that the ministry should pay for the complete project based on the
double-objective agreement. Conversely, the ministry stressed the clearcut task division between ministry and provincial government – flood
safety and spatial quality, respectively. This task division would imply
the distribution of costs to both organisations. The provincial government still hoped that Rijkswaterstaat agreed with its own interpretation
of the double-objective consensus. It hoped for the use of available national funds for both safety and spatial quality. This hope turned out to
be in vain when Rijkswaterstaat proclaimed to invest in safety only. It
expected the provincial government and water board to pay for nonsafety-related elements. In the end, the provincial government conformed and focused on spatial quality measures, which were also expected to be cheaper. By 2008, the provincial government gravitated
heavily towards sandy solutions.
4.1. Project phase 1: Provincial government in charge
As afore-mentioned, the seawall called the Hondsbossche en Pettemer
zeewering had to be repaired. It had to be prepared for strong storms
while contributing to spatial quality, which was termed a “double
objective”. This double objective was formalised in an agreement of all
involved actors in 2004. The first proposal by the provincial government
in 2006 meant the partial destruction of the near-by village. This proposal not only led to unrest among the local population, but also to its
rejection by the responsible minister of Infrastructure and the Environment. Additionally, it was judged too expensive and designed with
too little public participation.
In the same year, Rijkswaterstaat introduced a new national flood
protection programme. In its role as project evaluator, this programme
saw heightening of the seawall as the only acceptable solution: “Primarily, at the flood protection programme we said: ‘sand is (…) efficient,
but not cost-effective, functional, and robust’. Because that is really only
the seawall” (Project manager regional Rijkswaterstaat). “Functional
and robust” is somewhat of a motto at Rijkswaterstaat. Hence, any solution that also included other objectives did not align with their view.
In addition, Rijkswaterstaat continuously had to justify its passive
evaluative role vis-á-vis municipalities who kept appealing for help
against the provincial government’s rigorous plan (project manager
regional Rijkswaterstaat). At the same time, Rijkswaterstaat disapproved of the provincial government’s top-down approach, which
diverged from the participatory national policy-making tradition
(project manager regional Rijkswaterstaat).
Flood protection is not a municipal task in the Dutch coastal protection system. Nevertheless, flood safety is of course a basic condition
for living at the sea and hence an important topic for municipalities.
Additionally, the concerning region in North-Holland is perceived as
economically weak. This led the municipality to lobby for an economically beneficial solution and to point out the potentially disastrous
consequences of following the provincial proposal. To achieve this, it
used its formal political means as well as informal ways of lobbying. It
advocated what was in its eyes the best solution for the region: sandy
coastal protection with economic benefits. Despite clearly taking a position with regard to the policy substance, the municipality was also
aware of its limited influence in the policy process.
4.3. Project phase 3: Cooperation saves the day
This phase begins in 2009 with the water board presenting its
preferred solution – a sandy coastal protection – as a result of the
environmental impact assessment. A new water board director, who
previously worked at Rijkswaterstaat, stepped up the same year. His
avid endorsement of sandy solutions, only reinforced the water board’s
preference.
Rijkswaterstaat was by then the only remaining actor with substantive objections to the preferred solution. At the national flood protection
programme there was disbelief about the water board’s additional claim
that the sandy solution would be less expensive than the hard reinforcement. This position triggered staff of the programme to rerun the
cost calculations. Although Rijkswaterstaat insisted on reconsidering the
preferred solution, the water board carried on. In this situation, the
water board director’s experience with Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational
culture and language was of no help. The difference of opinion about the
preferred solution meant that cooperation was still difficult.
Regardless of Rijkswaterstaat’s ongoing opposition, the water
board’s new solution satisfied the ministry’s demands. In 2010, the
ministry consented to the sandy preferred solution, but added two
financial conditions. It set a budget cap of €250 000 000 and demanded
4.2. Project phase 2: Water board opens up
In early 2007, the provincial government delegated the project to the
water board. The official reason for this was the reformulation of the
hydraulic conditions that the seawall needed to meet. Some interpreted
this as shirking responsibility to cover up the emerging technical
infeasibility of the provincial proposal (policy advisor MinI&E). In this
way, the provincial government could evade public backlash by “escap
[ing] with the newest hydraulic conditions” (policy advisor MinI&E).
The water board began its project management task with a pragmatic
5
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
the inclusion of 20 years of maintenance in the contract. Especially the
latter led to renewed conflict between the water board and Rijkswaterstaat. Tasking the water board with organising the maintenance of the
project challenged Rijkswaterstaat’s legally enshrined responsibilities in
that field. Additionally, Rijkswaterstaat questioned the water board’s
experience and capability to manage a project of this size and
complexity on its own. Consequentially, Rijkswaterstaat demanded
more influence in the project. This positioning led to resistance
bordering on annoyance on the part of the water board (water board
executive; project manager regional Rijkswaterstaat). The turning point
in this situation was a high-level meeting at the end of 2011. During this
meeting Rijkswaterstaat and the water board agreed to finalise the
project together. Both sides termed this “big change” the “best of both
worlds” to “carry the risk together” (stakeholder manager water board;
project manager regional Rijkswaterstaat).
The tendering procedure concludes this project phase. For this tender, the project management team only set framework conditions such
as a maximum budget of €170 000 000 and “economically and societally
sound investments”. Contractors could use creativity, expertise, and
their own ideas for their plans.8 This process incentivised contractors to
include as many ideas as possible at as low a cost as possible. With €140
000 000, this tendering approach resulted in project costs of merely 56%
of the larger ministerial budget cap. The ministry very much appreciated
this achievement. The final plan features a sandy mega-nourishment of
about 30 000 000 m3 (Fig. 1). The existing seawall loses its function, but
stays intact as a cultural-historic landmark.
Table 3
Framing foci of main actors in each project phase.
Project
phase
Policy substance
Policy
process
Actors’
identities and
relationships
Rijkswaterstaat
1
2
3
Process
Process
Process
Indifferent
Indifferent
Indifferent
Water board
1
2
Safety
Safety
Safety/
Multifunctionality
–
Safety/
Multifunctionality
Multifunctionality
Safety
–
Process
–
Empathic
Process
Task
Empathic
Indifferent
Safety/
Multifunctionality
Regional
development
Multifunctionality
Multifunctionality
Multifunctionality
Regional
development
Regional
development
Regional
development
Process
Empathic
Process
Empathic
Process
Process
Process
Process
Empathic
Empathic
Empathic
Empathic
Process
Empathic
Process
Empathic
Provincial
government
3
1
2
3
Ministry
Municipality
1
2
3
1
2
3
(Table 3). In this phase, most framing interactions occurred between the
provincial government and the ministry. Other actors were either not
included at all (water board) or did not have a formal say in the process
(Rijkswaterstaat and municipalities). Although the actors were off to a
flying start with the collective agreement on the double objective, this
solidarity is not reflected in the following interactions between actors.
The provincial government’s policy substance in the first phase was
based on safety considerations. Unfortunately, other actors perceived
the proposed solution as detrimental for the already alarming economic
situation in the region. It was unclear, how the proposed solution would
contribute to the double objective and the provincial government’s
general interests (provincial official). In addition, the provincial government followed a top-down and exclusive policy process. According to
the ministry, it neglected other actors, such as municipalities, Rijkswaterstaat, or the water board (policy advisor MinI&E). This task-oriented
policy process focus also limited the scope of the policy substance.
Excluding other actors from the process prevented the provincial government from confronting other policy substance foci. According to
Rijkswaterstaat, the provincial government overrated its own capacity
to realise a project in a policy domain which it is usually not responsible
for. Additionally, it seems to have misinterpreted the framing identities
of other actors. Relationships with other actors worsened due to this
purposeful self-isolation by the provincial government.
The policy substance focus of the ministry is vague throughout the
first phase. It disapproved of the solution advocated by the provincial
government, due to its intrusiveness. The interviews did not elucidate
whether this framing focus came from a disagreement with the exclusion
of other actors (policy process) or a generic support of multifunctional
coastal governance solutions (policy substance). However, the latter is
probable due to enthusiastic ministerial support of multifunctional solutions in other projects (Aukes et al., 2017). The ministry also advocated an open and inclusive policy process. It was dissatisfied with the
way in which the provincial government dealt with the project (policy
advisor MinI&E). The interest in including other actors and hearing their
frame renders the ministry an empathic actor. Nonetheless, the ministry’s role remained in the background.
Rijkswaterstaat thought an innovative, sandy solution would be
efficient. However, it did not match the other standard criterion of
robustness (see 4.1). Thus, Rijkswaterstaat advocated a traditional
safety solution as policy substance focus. It did not matter how safety
5. Results
5.1. Types of framing foci
The case of the Hondsbossche Duinen shows different positions for
each of the framing foci. Policy substance emerged in three positions:
safety, regional development, and multifunctionality. We categorised
policy substance as “safety”, if it revolved around cost-effective coastal
safety solutions. “Regional development” related to livelihoods of the
local population and economic development. Policy solutions that
linked both coastal safety, other functions, and intended to maximise
their synergy were termed “multifunctionality”.
For the other two types of framing foci we found two positions. The
policy process was either envisioned in an inclusive, participatory way,
which we termed “process-oriented”. In others, it entailed an exclusive
perspective termed “task-oriented”, where involving other actors was
seen as detrimental to quick realisation. Furthermore, there were two
positions for actors’ identities and relationships. These positions
included “empathy” and “indifference” concerning other actors. Frames
labelled with “Empathy” were aware of and interested in other actors.
“Indifference” was used, if no signs of interest in other actors or relationships were observable. It turns out that framing foci of policy
process and actors’ identities and relationships are related. For example,
the analysis reveals that a task-oriented framing of the policy process
often relates to an indifference with regard to other actors’ identities and
relationships. On the other hand, there is an interest in other actors’
identities and relationships among actors with a more process-oriented
framing of the policy process. The results are summarised in Table 3
and described in detail below.
5.2. Policy frame developments over time
5.2.1. Phase 1
We find a scattered framing foci situation in the first project phase
8
This approach is uncommon insofar as usually the specific parameters of the
project are laid out by the project management. In those cases the lowest price
is often the decisive argument for selecting the contractor.
6
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
was achieved, as long as the chosen solution would fit its financial and
safety performance criteria. Rijkswaterstaat found the provincial government’s top-down policy process approach inappropriate. Furthermore, it had a clear idea of the distribution of tasks and responsibilities
in the policy process. Towards the municipalities, Rijkswaterstaat felt it
had to justify its passive role in the process continually.
The water board was quite clear about its position in the project. It
did not identify as an actor in the project in this phase. As a result, it did
not yet have relationships with other actors, nor did it take position
concerning policy substance or the way in which to approach the
process.
The municipality also opposed the provincial proposal due to its sole
focus on safety and the partial destruction of the village. It advocated
sandy solutions in its policy substance framing focus. These were said to
be most advantageous for economic development. While aware of its
limited influence in the project, the municipality reached out to its political relationships as the spokesperson for the local population. For
this, it used the formal and informal tools at its disposition. The municipality realised it had a small role in coastal governance, but tried to
make the most of the options it had.
success. It was glad to see a new project manager with policy substance
and policy process framing foci similar to its own.
5.2.3. Phase 3
In the third phase, few framing foci changes happened. However, an
important organisational change occurred: Rijkswaterstaat joined the
project management. At that point, it remained the only actor without
sandy solutions in its policy substance framing focus. Nevertheless, the
ministry’s conditional acceptance of the project proposal influenced
this. It triggered reframing of Rijkswaterstaat’s policy substance: sandy
coastal governance solutions were accepted as a valid safety alternative.
Now it saw its identity threatened by the water board. Rijkswaterstaat
feared the proposed takeover of its coastal maintenance responsibilities.
Joining the project management reduced this threat. The choice of
tender reflects Rijkswaterstaat’s and water board’s process focus with
regard to the policy process.
Meanwhile, the sandy solution become undisputed at the water
board. Before, the water board’s framing focus was policy process based
(“for good project management, you need to include all possible options”). With the new director, the framing focus was grounded more
strongly in the policy substance (“sandy solutions are the preferred
option”). Moreover, the water board’s framing of the policy substance
reframed the water board’s identity as seen by provincial government
and municipalities to “ally”. Although Rijkswaterstaat challenged the
water board’s leading role in the third phase, it was now easier for the
water board to understand Rijkswaterstaat’s identity due to the new
director. This improved their relationship.
The provincial government now focused completely on the orphaned
spatial quality part of the double objective. Because of reframing the
policy substance, the provincial government retreated from the safety
project. By now, the provincial government saw itself more as a
spokesperson for the interests of the local population. In this phase of the
project, there were officially two sub-projects dealing with coastal safety
and spatial quality separately. The latter was in the hands of the provincial government, municipalities, and nature organisations.
5.2.2. Phase 2
In phase 2, with the water board as project manager, the framing foci
experienced considerable reframing (Table 3). It argued that inclusion of
all possible types of coastal governance solutions – traditional, sandy,
and hybrid solutions – was a reflection of thorough project management.
This made its original policy substance a combination of the safety and
multifunctionality framing focus. The water board also appreciated the
participation of other actors. Later on, concluding that “seawall reinforcement” would equal “new seawall construction” mirrors the
reframing of the policy substance on part of the water board. Additionally, looking for new solutions warranted a search for a coastal
governance solution which would also respect other actors’ needs and
interests. A multifunctional solution was more in line with the prevailing
double objective. It also led to improved relationships with the municipality and local population. Overall, the openness with which the water
board approached policy substance and policy process considerably
reduced the tensions among the involved actors.
The provincial government reframed to a multifunctional policy
substance framing focus in this phase. It began criticising actors who did
not explicitly advocate sandy solutions. This included the water board
with its broad view on possible coastal governance solutions. The provincial government intensified its focus on the spatial quality aspect of
the project. Thereby, it joined the municipalities in the framing focus on
maximising the economic and spatial benefits of the project – regional
development (Table 3). This improved the previously severed relationship between provincial government and local population.
Rijkswaterstaat did not incur substantial reframing in its framing
foci. It remained sceptical of sandy solutions. When the water board’s
outlook on policy substance moved towards sandy solutions, Rijkswaterstaat urged to reconsider: it would be too uncertain that sandy solutions could be cost-effective investments. Rijkswaterstaat risked further
impairment of its relationship with the local population, but policy
substance seemed to have precedence over actors’ identities and relationships in this case.
Regional development remained the municipality’s policy substance
focus. It regarded the water board’s policy substance with ambivalence.
On the one hand, it welcomed the water board’s inclusion of sandy solutions. This increased the chances of selecting a minimally destructive
solution. On the other hand, there was still a possibility that a non-sandy
solution would be chosen. The municipality stayed alert and kept
making use of its participatory opportunities to try and influence the
policy process. In this phase, its relationships with both the water board
and the provincial government improved.
Regardless of its reduced role, the ministry thought the openness
with which the water board approached the project essential to its
6. Discussion
6.1. (Mis-)matching framing foci
Throughout the case actors reframed their framing foci. Failure or
success in the project phases depended on mismatching or matching
framing foci, as a comparison of framing foci constellations reveals
(Table 3; cf. Entman, 1993).
The provincial government as the project manager looked for a
coastal governance solution promoting safety in the first project phase.
Its search can be characterised by a task focus and indifference for other
actors’ positions. Unfortunately, this was an isolated stance. Rijkswaterstaat was the actor with the most similar framing foci, converging on
the policy substance and actors’ identities and relationships. However,
its process orientation was decisive for Rijkswaterstaat to oppose the
provincial government’s proposal in 2006. Rijkswaterstaat prioritised
one framing focus over others. Other actors were either not involved,
such as the water board, or differed from the provincial government on
all framing foci. The municipality’s opposing stance on policy substance
and the policy process may have triggered the rejection of the provincial
government’s proposal by the ministry. As the second-most important
actor for the course of the project in the first phase, the ministry disapproved of the task-orientation of the provincial government and the
resulting exclusion of other ideas about policy substance in the case. This
difference in framing foci explains the negative reception of the provincial proposal marking the end of the first phase.
Actors converged towards a state of consensus in the second phase. A
main factor is the entrance of the water board as project manager, which
had a much more open-minded framing with regards to policy substance
and policy process. This increased other actors’ willingness to cooperate.
7
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
Especially the initial undecidedness of the water board regarding the
policy substance kept the other actors on board. On the one hand,
Rijkswaterstaat expected that safety would be safeguarded by the water
board. On the other hand, other actors advocating multifunctionality
and regional development could still hope for a project solution in their
favour. The water board also welcomed participation much more and
was concerned to find a solution that would benefit all.
The final framing setting, after which the project was realised, shows
a number of partial overlaps among framing foci. The water board’s
multifunctional solution was acceptable for the provincial government
and municipalities, because it promised new space for recreation and
potential for the tourist industry. Meanwhile, Rijkswaterstaat also
reframed the policy substance to the multifunctional solution, owing to
its membership in project management, the strong preference of the
ministry for multifunctional solutions and the increasing certainty that
the safety performance was indeed warranted. The framing differences
in the other two domains weighed less strongly for Rijkswaterstaat,
because its main aim was to guarantee coastal safety, regardless how this
state was achieved. This is different from the first phase, where the
provincial government’s task orientation was a barrier for Rijkswaterstaat to support the proposal. The water board’s approach to the policy
process as well as its awareness of the interests and needs of other actors,
made for a smoother decision-making process towards realisation of the
project.
policy process framing focus of the provincial government. Rijkswaterstaat – and other actors – emphasised the dissimilarity between the
provincial government’s and their own framing foci (Table 4). For the
ministry, with framing foci centring on innovative, multifunctional solutions, and an inclusive process, the differences with the provincial
government were too large. The framing foci constellations of the
ministry and Rijkswaterstaat also reveal another mechanism. In their
case, it was enough to agree on the policy process framing focus to take
the same position. In this phase, two emphasising mechanisms occurred.
First, emphasising the dissimilarity of two actors in their policy process,
but ignoring the similarity in the other two framing foci, defined an
opposing relationship. Second, emphasising the similarity of two actors in
the policy process, but ignoring the dissimilarity in the other framing foci,
defined a coalescing relationship.
In the following two phases, actors began to emphasise similarities
more than dissimilarities. Most importantly, the new project manager,
the water board, had a more connective policy substance focus – multifunctionality. There was no necessity for other actors to reframe their
policy substance framing focus, because it was broad enough to
accommodate other policy substances. The multifunctionality policy
substance acted as a consensus frame on the framing foci level, by
emphasising the similarities in the policy substance (Table 4). Another
factor was that other dissimilarities between actors in policy process and
actors’ identities and relationships decreased. It was less necessary for
actors to emphasise or ignore agreements or disagreements, because
they were heading towards a total consensus. The only disagreement in
policy substance was reconciled with a consensus framing focus.
6.2. Emphasising (dis-)similarity
Throughout the case we see actors agreeing and disagreeing with
each other over one framing focus or another. However, the project
phases show different patterns with regard to the emphasis on similar or
dissimilar framing foci (Table 4). We understand the mechanisms of
process breakdown or success as a result of these emphasising motions.
In phase 1, there were largely two coalitions. First, there was the
provincial government. Other actors who were against the provincial
government’s policy substance and policy process formed the second
coalition. This latter, larger coalition was not a unified whole, though,
with differences in the policy substance and the interest in other actors
and relationships with them. In this phase, the provincial government
was the only actor focused on mono-functional safety solutions, without
including other actors in the decision-making process or interest in their
positions. The other actors all framed a broad, inclusive policy process
necessary. Most actors also disagreed on the policy substance and were
empathic of other actors. However, Rijkswaterstaat overlapped with the
provincial government in two of the three framing foci. Both wanted a
coastal governance solution dealing with the safety problem and were
not very interested in other actors. But the difference in policy process
framing focus between the two turned out to be crucial for Rijkswaterstaat’s opposition against the provincial government. Agreeing on the
policy substance was not enough for Rijkswaterstaat to condone the
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we set out to show what policy frames and policy
framing can contribute to our understanding of the complex dynamics of
coastal governance leading to policy consensus or policy controversy.
We argued that it is appropriate to break down policy frames into their
framing foci. The analysis has shown that a focus on either of the three
framing foci – policy substance, policy process and actors’ identities and
relationships – alone would not have increased our understanding of
why the sandy solution was chosen in the Hondsbossche Duinen case.
Instead, looking at all three framing foci and their interplay is more
fruitful. Understanding how actors in a coastal governance case actively
and subconsciously match or mismatch their framing foci explains
certain frictions in the process. This had not been possible without
looking at the way framing foci change over time. Breaking up the case
into three phases enabled us to see this. Framing foci are thus useful to
understand actors’ policy frames at a certain point in time. To understand how policy frames contribute to policy controversies and their
resolution the dynamic perspective is necessary.
In the coastal governance case of the Hondsbossche Duinen, we
found the policy substance framing focus of multifunctionality to
Table 4
Dynamics of emphasising and ignoring framing foci.
8
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
Appendix A. Supplementary data
become dominant, because it accommodates other policy substance
positions. While this case illustrates that complete agreement in all
framing foci is not necessary for actors to reach consensus, it also becomes clear that consensus frames or master frames do not tell the whole
story either. It may be enough for actors to differ in one of the framing
foci to increase the potential for conflict in a process. The further
development of a decision-making process – towards consensus or towards controversy – then depends on which framing foci are emphasised
and which are ignored. Multifunctionality has proven a versatile
framing focus in the case presented here. It is also an example of the
interconnectedness of the framing foci. The broad view on possible
functions connected with multifunctionality also increases the probability of perceiving the stakes of other actors and the willingness to
include them in the process.
While the Hondsbossche Duinen case is atypical in the set of other
Weak Links projects, which have been realised in less time and with less
conflict, it still shows the signs of a typical case for the Dutch policymaking arena, in which participation of affected and concerned actors
is important. Provincial governments in the Netherlands usually take
into account the interest of their population and are responsible for
regional development as well. The fact that the first phase ended in
controversy with a policy solution found with limited participation is
rather surprising from this perspective. Digging their heels in, provincial
project managers avoided opinions and advice from outside their own
organisation. The water board, on the other hand, is an institution with a
bottom-up history, originally established by farmers to protect their life
and work surroundings. In the water board’s case, organisational history
was part of the reason for the choice of approach.
The final aspect at play that this analysis revealed, is the interplay
between framing foci and actors’ institutional power. In the first project
phase, the ministry’s authoritative veto power prevented the realisation
of a project that was not in the national government’s interest. Other
actors also had no formal power in the process. They could only have
participated with the goodwill of the provincial government, which did
happen in the following phases. The framing foci perspective clarified
the reasons for the use of formal power in the decision-making process.
Understanding actors’ ability to reach policy consensus in the Hondsbossche Duinen project despite their differences in framing foci requires the exploration of the assemblage of frames. Our framing foci
perspective enabled us to specify which constellations of framing foci
between actors led to conflict and why the project finally succeeded. It
produced an in-depth analysis of the elements of policy framing which
may otherwise be convoluted. We observed different mechanisms with
regard to emphasising or ignoring similarities and dissimilarities between actors’ framing foci. These mechanisms deliver an understanding
of why the Hondsbossche Duinen project almost broke down in the first
project phase, while it thrived in the later phases. By extension, the
approach we present underlines the value of a policy framing foci
perspective in understanding how coastal governance processes play
out.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105286.
References
Aukes, E., Lulofs, K., Bressers, H., 2017. Framing mechanisms: the interpretive policy
entrepreneur’s toolbox. Crit. Pol. Stud. 12, 406–427.
Benford, R.D., Snow, D.A., 2000. Framing processes and social movements: an overview
and assessment. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 26, 611–639.
Böhm, A., 2005. Theoretisches codieren: textanalyse in der grounded theory. In:
Flick, U., Von Kardorff, E., Steinke, I. (Eds.), Qualitative Forschung: Ein Handbuch,
fourth ed. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Hamburg, pp. 475–485.
Bontje, L.E., Slinger, J.H., 2017. A narrative method for learning from innovative coastal
projects - biographies of the Sand Engine. Ocean Coast Manag. 142, 186–197.
Candel, J.J.L., Breeman, G.E., Stiller, S.J., Termeer, C.J.A.M., 2014. Disentangling the
consensus frame of food security: the case of the EU Common Agricultural Policy
reform debate. Food Pol. 44, 47–58.
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G., Olsen, J.P., 1972. A garbage can model of organizational
choice. Adm. Sci. Q. 17, 1–25.
Dewulf, A., François, G., Pahl-Wostl, C., Taillieu, T., 2007. A framing approach to crossdisciplinary research collaboration: experiences from a large-scale research project
on adaptive water management. Ecol. Soc. 12, 14.
Dewulf, A., Gray, B., Putnam, L., Lewicki, R., Aarts, N., Bouwen, R., Van Woerkum, C.,
2009. Disentangling approaches to framing in conflict and negotiation research: a
meta-paradigmatic perspective. Hum. Relat. 62, 155–193.
Disco, C., 2002. Remaking “nature”: the ecological turn in Dutch water management. Sci.
Technol. Hum. Val. 27, 206–235.
Donnellon, A., Gray, B., Bougon, M.G., 1986. Communication, meaning, and organized
action. Adm. Sci. Q. 31, 43–55.
Entman, R.M., 1993. Framing: towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. J. Commun.
43, 51–58.
Flyvbjerg, B., 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qual. Inq. 12,
219–245.
Gerritsen, H., 2005. What happened in 1953? The Big Flood in The Netherlands in
retrospect. Phil. Trans. Math. Phys. Eng. Sci. 363, 1271–1291.
Goffman, E., 1974/1986. Frame Analysis: an Essay on the Organization of Experience.
Northeastern University Press, Boston.
Hajer, M.A., 2005. Setting the stage: a dramaturgy of policy deliberation. Adm. Soc. 36,
624–647.
Huitema, D., Meijerink, S., 2010. Realizing water transitions: the role of policy
entrepreneurs in water policy change. Ecol. Soc. 15, 26.
Isendahl, N., Dewulf, A., Brugnach, M., François, G., Möllenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C.,
2009. Assessing framing of uncertainties in water management practice. Water
Resour. Manag. 23, 3191–3205.
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1984. Choices, values, and frames. Am. Psychol. 39,
341–350.
Kingdon, J.W., 2014. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, second ed. Pearson,
Harlow, Essex.
Kuhlmann, S., 2001. Future governance of innovation policy in Europe - three scenarios.
Res. Pol. 30, 953–976.
Kurt, R., 2004. Die Praxis der Auslegung, Hermeneutik. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche
Einführung. UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Konstanz, pp. 237–257.
Lincoln, Y.S., Guba, E.G., 1985. Audit Trail Categories, Files Types and Evidence,
Naturalistic Inquiry. Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
Lindblom, C.E., 1979. Still muddling, not yet through. Publ. Adm. Rev. 39, 517–526.
Meijerink, S., 2005. Understanding policy stability and change. The interplay of
advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities, windows of opportunity, and Dutch
coastal flooding policy 1945–2003. J. Eur. Publ. Pol. 12, 1060–1077.
Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., 1994. Early Steps in Analysis, Qualitative Data Analysis:
an Expanded Sourcebook, second ed. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp. 50–89.
Mintrom, M., 1997. Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation. Am. J. Polit.
Sci. 41, 738–770.
Mintrom, M., Norman, P., 2009. Policy entrepreneurship and policy change. Pol. Stud. J.
37, 649–667.
Nie, M., 2003. Drivers of natural resource-based political conflict. Pol. Sci. 36, 307–341.
Noy, C., 2008. Sampling knowledge: the hermeneutics of snowball sampling in
qualitative research. Int. J. Soc. Res. Methodol. 11, 327–344.
Rowe, G., Frewer, L.J., 2000. Public participation methods: a framework for evaluation.
Sci. Technol. Hum. Val. 25, 3–29.
Scheufele, D.A., 1999. Framing as a theory of media effects. J. Commun. 49, 103–122.
Schön, D.A., 1982. Some of what a planner knows A case study of knowing-in-practice.
J. Am. Plann. Assoc. 48, 351–364.
Schön, D.A., Rein, M., 1994. Frame Reflection: toward the Resolution of Intractable
Policy Controversies. BasicBooks, New York.
Schwartz-Shea, P., Yanow, D., 2012. Interpretive Research Design. Concepts and
Processes. Routledge, Oxford.
Snow, D.A., Rochford Jr., E.B., Worden, S.K., Benford, R.D., 1986. Frame alignment
processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. Am. Socio. Rev. 51,
464–481.
Stone, D., 2002. The Market and the Polis, Policy Paradox: the Art of Political Decision
Making, Revised ed. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, pp. 17–34.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgements
We thank Maartje van Lieshout, Imke Lammers, Katrin Hahn and the
anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. We are very grateful
for all the interviewees who took time to talk to us and contribute their
invaluable perspectives on the Hondsbossche Duinen case. This research
was made possible by the Corporate Innovation Programme of Rijkswaterstaat. Funding: This work was supported by Technology Foundation STW [grant number 12691].
9
E. Aukes et al.
Ocean and Coastal Management 197 (2020) 105286
Van Hulst, M., Yanow, D., 2014. From policy "frames" to "framing": theorizing a more
dynamic, political approach. American Review of Public Administration.
Van Koningsveld, M., Mulder, J.P.M., Stive, M.J.F., Van der Valk, L., Van der Weck, A.W.,
2008. Living with sea-level rise and climate change: a case study of The Netherlands.
J. Coast Res. 242, 367–379.
Van Slobbe, E., De Vriend, H.J., Aarninkhof, S., Lulofs, K., De Vries, M., Dircke, P., 2013.
Building with Nature: in search of resilient storm surge protection strategies. Nat.
Hazards 65, 947–966.
Vink, M.J., Boezeman, D., Dewulf, A., Termeer, C.J.A.M., 2013. Changing climate,
changing frames. Environ. Sci. Pol. 30, 90–101.
Voorberg, W.H., Bekkers, V.J.J.M., Tummers, L.G., 2015. A Systematic Review of CoCreation and Co-Production: embarking on the social innovation journey. Publ.
Manag. Rev. 17, 1333–1357.
Winkel, G., Leipold, S., 2015. Demolishing dikes: multiple streams and policy discourse
analysis. Pol. Stud. J. 1–22, 00.
Yin, R.K., 2018. Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods, sixth ed.
Sage, Los Angeles.
10