THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 2 THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS Nelson Alusala This chapter looks at the emerging trends in the field of peace support operations (PSOs) particularly in Africa, while highlighting some of the challenges that actors in PSO missions face when implementing disarmament programmes in post-conflict situations. With globalization and increasing diversity of threats to security, how will the role of the military evolve to respond to these challenges? In a world being defined by increasing wars, collapsing states, degenerating human rights and declining respect for humanitarian and international law, one cannot avoid turning to a promise of hope and solace. Such is the idea behind peacekeeping missions. The evolution of PSOs Today peacekeeping goes beyond the confines of just monitoring demilitarized zones, to include strengthening the rule of law, monitoring human rights violations, tackling issues related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. Peacekeepers and United Nations agencies are increasingly working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in peace building processes. The expansion in the role of peacekeepers was first underscored by the then United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and reflected in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace in 1995.1 In what he called second generation operations, Boutros-Ghali outlined the expanded role of peacekeepers as being: i) supervising ceasefires, demobilizing forces and reintegrating them into civilian life; ii) designing and implementing demining programmes; iii) returning refugees and internally displaced persons; iv) providing humanitarian assistance; v) supervising existing administrative structures; vi) establishing new police forces; vii) verifying the respect for human rights; viii) designing and supervising constitutional, electoral and judicial reforms; ix) conducting, observing, organizing and supervising elections; and x) coordinating support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. 33 34 A Step Towards Peace The Brahimi report of August 2000,2 whose mandate was to undertake a thorough review of the UN peace and security activities since the end of the Cold War, had as its major argument whether traditional peacekeeping had a future. The report contained innovative elements, though some were hotly contested, such as a call for the creation of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF), which would draw on personnel from throughout the UN system, as the standard vehicle for mission specific planning and support.3 A more popular recommendation of the report was the suggestion that UN field activities, notably civilian policing, be more effectively supported from headquarters and in the field.4 Peace support operations are multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designed to create a secure environment and facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create or restore selfsustaining peace. The UN describes peace operations as encompassing preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building as well as humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding and electoral assistance.5 This is an evolution of classical peacekeeping. Why intervention? For peacekeepers inserted into the anarchic conditions prevalent in contemporary armed conflict situations, the primary objective is restoration of public order, by prohibiting the conflicting parties from escalating the conflict. Conflict, anywhere in the world, has devastating implications for the safety and security of ordinary people. Civilians, who in situations of war constitute a majority of casualties, bear the brunt of death, injury and displacement. In an age of instant communication and growing inter-connectedness, the knowledge of human suffering, no matter how distant, increases our need to act. Public opinion, generated by the media as happened in 1991 and 1993/94 when the media around the world carried stories and broadcast images of the Kurdish and Rwandese mass exodus in Iraq and Rwanda respectively attracted public opinion about the demand for action to alleviate the plight of the victims. Strengthening protection for people in the global community is a clear and pressing priority. Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable, ensuring state and non-state actors fulfil their responsibilities toward affected populations, and developing the tools and strategies as well as principles needed to help Nelson Alusala 35 guide international responses stand out as critical challenges. The level of coercion necessary to achieve this goal will largely depend on the extent of peace enforcement mandated by the UN Security Council, or by regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) or any other recognized mandating bodies. One of the UN founding principles, defined in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter is that of collective responsibility. This entails the responsibility to assist others, especially civilians (non combatants) in times of crisis. Dag Hammarskjold underscored this when he said: “the prohibition against intervention in internal conflicts cannot be considered to apply to senseless slaughter of civilians or fighting arising from tribal hostilities.”6 However, a PSO is normally initiated only if a group of states with a particular common interest in the conflict deems it fit to intervene. Of importance here is the issue of international or regional legitimacy of an operation. This refers to the acceptance of the peace force by the international community and by (most of) the parties to the conflict. Most post-Cold War UN interventions have been in response to requests to verify and monitor the political vision of previously belligerent parties as contained in a mutual ceasefire or comprehensive peace agreement. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are a continuum in the process of conflict management, and can only thrive in a conducive and assuring atmosphere following peace processes and sustained PSOs. The UN defines disarmament as the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population, while demobilization refers to the process by which armed forces–government or factional forces-either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace.7 Demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation or assistance to enable them transform into civilian life. Reintegration is an assistance programme provided to former combatants with the aim of increasing their economic and social potential for reintegration into the civil society. It is a crucial step in the consolidation of a peace process and in the establishment of the main framework for sustainable development. For instance, during the DDR process in Sierra Leone the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) with the overall support of the Government of Sierra Leone, envisaged the objectives of 36 A Step Towards Peace reintegration as being: i) to facilitate and support the return of ex-combatants to their home communities or preferred communities of return; ii) to assist the ex-combatants become productive members of their communities; iii) to utilize the potentials of ex-combatants for social and economic reconstruction; iv) to promote social acceptance and reconciliation; and v) to reduce the fiscal impact of large defence budgets by providing alternative employment support options for demobilized ex-combatants.8 Basic reintegration package for the excombatants included money, food, seeds, cultivating tools, blankets, vocational training and income generating activities. In order to deal successfully with combatants in a post conflict situation, whether they were organized in formal countrywide security forces, paramilitary units or private militias, the mediators and interventionists need to promote a strategy that will entail incorporation into legitimate security organizations or a return to civilian life. A proper and successful DDR programme should ensure this, taking into consideration the fact that to an ex-combatant it may mean the “loss” of a livelihood. In the case where not all ex-combatants are assisted or where there are delays in processing and disbursing assistance, serious tensions, and possible relapses into violence may occur. Structurally, the long-term effect of incomplete or ineffective reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society may lead to armed criminality by former soldiers who believe they have no other means of earning a living. The dynamics of peace operations in Africa The new trends marking PSOs in Africa seems to be the ‘Africanization’ of these operations on the continent. This underscores the logic that underpinned the Organization of African Unity (OAU) principle of “African solutions to African Problems,” or “Try the OAU First;” a principle that originated from practice and was first spelt out in a resolution on “Border Disputes Among African States” during the First Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Cairo, in 1964.9 Mays posits that at least three factors have guided the transition to “African solutions to African problems.”10 The first is the preference by African states (through their elder statesmen) to solve their own problems and reduce the influence of external actors in continental affairs. Second is the degeneration of Western political will to intervene in African conflicts. Withdrawal of Western states from African conflict management after the Nelson Alusala 37 disasters in Somalia and Rwanda left a vacuum to fill. The Rwandan crisis of 1994/95 was viewed by some contingent-providing states as being too costly for the political will necessary to sustain a presence in Rwanda. Belgium, citing the generally perceived lack of mandate to use force, withdrew its contingent following the murder of Belgian soldiers assigned to protect a Rwandan leader. Other United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers caught in the middle of the crisis also lost their lives, leading to the further withdrawal of contingents by other countries. Put simply, the least the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have done has been to pass resolutions and issue mandates on peacekeeping. The countries that have contributed troops for peacekeeping missions in many African conflicts have been non-Western countries. Berman states that the approach of the UN member states; particularly the five permanent members of the Council, to the crisis in the Great Lakes has been shameful. He observes that the Council’s go-slow approach to the conflict in the DRC and its proclivity toward burden-sharing have not worked, while resources appear limitless when the Council addresses conflicts of similar complexity in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.11 Thirdly, according to Mays, the rise of African sub-regional hegemonies such as Nigeria and South Africa have provided a springboard for jumpstarting subregional governmental organizations required to mandate and field peace operation forces. Nigeria in 1997 led the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in restoring normalcy in Sierra Leone, and the on-going multilateral PSO in Liberia, (now under a UN mandate) which has led to the indictment of Charles Taylor, and his subsequent exile in Nigeria, while in 1998 South Africa and Botswana soldiers, under a SADC mandate, deployed into Lesotho to restore order following an uprising of junior military officers in the kingdom. In assessing the current global trends, it is right to state that Western states and coalitions have avoided direct intervention in Africa, except when their interests were at stake. The support is now increasingly being based on peace operation training and funding. An example is the on-going European Union funding of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in West Africa.12 The US on its part has developed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), with the aim of training battalion units from different African countries for PSO deployment within the continent. 38 A Step Towards Peace Emerging challenges The current debate is that Africa should manage its own conflicts despite the numerous challenges facing the continent. Cilliers and Mills concede that Africa’s current peripheral status of global financial instability, coupled with Western peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Angola; and the enthusiasm for sub-regional initiatives under the auspices of sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC have led to successive French, British, American and other initiatives to create African peacekeeping capabilities to deal with African emergencies.13 Besides the many challenges, basic benefits accrue from enhancing regional security arrangements. This has a positive impact to preventing regional conflicts. First is that the countries within the same region will have the ability to intervene and stop or alleviate the conflict at an early stage, hence saving lives and excessive destruction of property, rather than wait for international intervention, which often takes time to mobilize. Regional security arrangements also enhance the sharing of skills and help in building cross-national confidence in tense regions. All PSOs face certain challenges. While some of these challenges are unique to missions with specific DDR mandates some are common to all missions. These challenges are summarized below. Interest of actors in conflict: In every conflict, despite agreements, there are always actors who profit economically or by gaining power, from a sustained level of tension, and who are bent on disrupting the peace processes. However, a clear focus on the mandate of the PSO and on the safeguarding of impartiality should help to check such occurrences. Shift in mandate: PSOs initiated under coalitions will usually face gradual challenges due to shifting conditions in their environment. This is due, as Malan outlines,14 to the dynamic situation on the ground, varying all the time, with different mission tasks in different areas of the country. For instance, of the 6,000 MONUC peacekeepers deployed in the DRC, 740 were deployed in Kinshasa and 800 in Ituri as neutral forces, deployments that had not been envisaged earlier. Economic constraints: The success of PSOs depends largely on funding. Financial limitations can pose a major challenge to the success of any PSO. Unsecured funding can easily cripple the activities of the force, conditioning it to select certain tasks or concentrate on particular regions, rather than Nelson Alusala 39 pursue the entire mandate as defined. While UN PSOs have better economic leverage, regional and sub-regional organizations such as the AU and SADC have not been able to venture into full-scale peacekeeping due, in part, to insufficient funds. Information and intelligence: A lack of, or limited information and intelligence can hamper security forces engaged in PSOs. Fragmented information-sharing systems compound the problem. In the case of UN missions, the absence of an information gathering system creates a gap that is filled in certain cases by unreliable and uncoordinated news from the media and other sources. In certain instances, poor coordination and occasional suspicion between the peacekeepers and civil society may hinder information sharing. For instance, a civil society organization working on the ground may posses valuable information on rebel grouping or arms smuggling, but will be reluctant to share it with a peacekeeping force or the security forces for fear of jeopardizing their rapport with the population they support, and increasing their own risk by appearing partial. On the other hand a peacekeeping force may be reluctant to share information with other actors in the country, for fear that doing so would risk compromising operational sources. Political will: Countries within a conflict zone may sometimes show less commitment in peace support operations after they have been launched, depending on the interests they may have in the conflict. For example when an embargo is placed on the supply of arms to a conflict-torn country, the neighbouring states may simply not feel obliged to enforce such an instrument, as weapons smuggling becomes a flourishing venture. Similarly, a regional organization such as the AU, due to a lack of enforcement apparatus, cannot bring the requisite pressure to bear on member states to support the peace process. Issues of legitimacy:15 Usually, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is the Secretary-General’s designated agent, and the head of the mission. A force commander who works in close cooperation with the SRSG is also appointed. For a successful mission, the two must work in harmony with each other. Both officials should also avoid any act that can be misinterpreted to show favouritism towards one faction or the other. A neutral stance is necessary for the SRSG and the force commander to exercise effective control. Impact on local communities: A large number of international troops arriving with a lot of cash in an environment of scarcity and desperation can easily destabilize the social status quo.16 In such a situation wage distortion becomes 40 A Step Towards Peace common, while prostitution, corruption, drug abuse, AIDS and other problems may thrive. Belligerents may also easily exaggerate these problems for political reasons. Ad hoc versus comprehensive DDR: The multiplicity of actors and the nature of conflicts illustrate the need for a comprehensive DDR operation that includes all actors and covers an entire region designated for the DDR operation. For the Lusaka Peace Agreement17 to succeed in the DRC (and by extension the DDR operation) MONUC operations must try to cover the entire country and implement its mandate as quickly as possible. The other Great Lakes countries captured in the same conflict system should simultaneously engage in DDR programmes. The need for this challenging approach was emphasized in an interview with the outgoing MONUC head, Ambassador Amos Namanga Ngongi in the extract below: Q: Some time ago, MONUC declared that it had brought together groups of Rwandan Interahamwe combatants who had been living in the forests of Kivu provinces and were awaiting MONUC’s intervention in assisting their repatriation. However, every time this repatriation was due to take place, something happened and complicated matters. Can you tell us what was going on? A: (Namanga): Each time MONUC made contact with armed groups in order to disarm them, there would be operations launched by rebel movements in the east, by Rassemblement Congolais de la Democracie-Goma (RCD-Goma) or Rassemblement Congolais de la Democracie-Kivu- Mouvement de la Liberation (RCD-K-ML). It is they who are in this zone, along with the Mayi-Mayi (traditional Congolese militias). But MONUC was always blamed for these failures when it was other groups who were launching operations aimed at destabilizing the DDRRR programme. In all instances we kept the administrators of the various zones fully informed. They were very well informed that MONUC was going to begin activities within several days, but two or three days before our activities were due to begin, fighting would erupt in the region and the armed groups (awaiting demobilization) would be dispersed. You can see what is happening right now in North Kivu where MONUC has made contacts with hundreds and hundreds of Interahamwe around the town of Lubero. And what happens? Fighting breaks out around Lubero. And MONUC is supposed to walk into the middle of all this fighting to seek out people in the forest, demobilize and repatriate them?18 Nelson Alusala 41 Such an extensive DDR approach would require heavy funding, a budget which no international donor currently seems ready to meet and recalls the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, which proved to be a costly attempt in solving the myriad ethnic differences in the Congo. Mays19 points out that more peacekeepers died in ONUC than in any other UN peace operation before or after. He concludes that it is that experience that resulted in reluctance for UN peacekeeping on the continent for twenty-five years. Conclusion Today the majority of wars are no longer fought between states, but within their borders. These intra-state wars are not being fuelled by ideological motives of former Cold War confrontation. The predominant factors today are political, economic and identity related, particularly in Africa. The rise of ethnic conflicts in regions and countries where different national/ethnic or religious groups once lived together peacefully is a matter of great concern. Hobsbawm, in his book The New Century, urges us to distinguish between what comes from below and what is imposed from above, while Thual on the same basis, in his article, Les Conflits Identitaires, enquires about who ignites and fuels the fire of identité, and for what reasons?20 Both writers concur that the ease of acquiring weapons and modern communications are among the factors propagating small (armed) groups to operate independently, sometimes even without external support. The situation is further exacerbated by weakened state structures, economic and social instability. The end result is massive losses of life, damage to property and displacements. Therefore learning from the past and constantly improving PSOs and DDR programmes become matters of urgency. Notes 1. Document A/50/60 – S/1995/1, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 January 1995, paragraph 21. 2. UN General Assembly, Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York: United Nations, 21 August 2000, (subsequently referred to as the Brahimi Report). 3. Brahimi report, paras. 198-217. 42 A Step Towards Peace 4. For a comprehensive debate on the Brahimi Report, see Brahimi Lakhdar, “The Debate on the Report on UN Peace Operations: Fighting Battles on the Wrong Grounds?” Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 22 March, 2001, p.3. 5. Ibid, p. 3 6. D Hammarskjold, quoted in M Malan, Boundaries of Peace Support Operations: The African Dimension, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph No. 44, February 2000, p. 20. 7. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines, December 1999, p.15. 8. See Kai-Kai (Dr), “Reintegration of Ex-combatants”, in Transition From War to Peace-Management of a Complex DDR Process, Vol.01 May 2002, p. 2. 9. See N Alusala, The Role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Conflict Management: A Case Study of the Comoros,1996-1999, a thesis presented to the University of Nairobi for the degree of Master of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2000, Ch.2, for a comprehensive discussion on the origin and challenges of the OAU principles of conflict management. 10. T M Mays, “African Solutions for African Problems: The Changing Face of AfricanMandated Peace Operations,” The Journal of Conflict Studies, New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict Studies, Spring 2003, pp. 106-125:107. 11. E Berman, “The Multinational force for the Congo,” in African Security Review, Volume 12 Number 3, 2003, p. 97. 12. Besides ECOWAS and SADC, there have been also several other sub-regional peace operation initiatives in Africa, such as Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), which in October 2002 mandated a peacekeeping operation deployment to the Central Africa Republic (CAR), following a coup attempt. Libya and Sudan had also deployed their soldiers under another sub-regional body; the Community of Sahel-Sahara States (COMESSA). On the same basis, in 1997, the francophone members of ECOWAS (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo and Burkina Faso) under Non-Aggression and Assistance Accord (ANAD) signed a report detailing future joint peacekeeping arrangements, while lusophone countries (Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde, under the Community of Lusophone Countries (CPLP) have agreed on a single peace force capable of conducting humanitarian operations. 13. See J Cilliers and G Mills, From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, The South African Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 1999, pp. 1-8: 4. Nelson Alusala 43 14. M Malan, Boundaries of Peace Support Operations: The African Dimension, op. cit, p. 16. 15. Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the PSO force by the international community and more importantly by the parties to the conflict, its mandate and the way it relates to the conflict. The degree of legitimacy also affects security and stability in the conflict area. 16. See D Last (Major), “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding,” in The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution (OJPCR), 5.1 Summer: 1-8 (2003), p.7. 17. The Lusaka Peace Agreement has provision for the normalization of the situation along the DRC border; the control of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups; the holding of a national dialogue on the future government of the DRC; the need to address security concerns and the establishment of a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups. 18. See http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=35159, “DRC: Interview with outgoing MONUC head, Amos Namanga Ngongi..” 19. T M Mays, “African Solutions for African Problems: The Changing Face of African-Mandated Peace Operations” op.cit; p. 107. 20. See E Hobsbawn, The New Century, London, Abacus Publishers, 2000 and Thual, François, Les Conflits Identitaires, Paris, Ellipses, 1995.