© Middle East Institute. This article is for personal research only and may not be copied or
distributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal.
The Justice and Development Party
in Moroccan Local Politics
Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner
This article analyzes the performance of the Islamist Justice and Development
Party (PJD) in Moroccan local politics from 2003 to 2009, using a variety of
data sources including interviews, municipal budgets, and audit reports. We find
that the PJD’s campaign and candidates were significantly different from Moroccan political norms. The outcomes of audits and budget patterns show governance in towns where the PJD was elected differed only in those where the party
had high electoral support in 2003, allowing it to govern with a small coalition.
Islamist political parties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been
studied extensively since the 1990s. In the predominantly authoritarian context in which
these parties have operated, most research has focused on Islamist ideology, and more
recently, on electoral strategies and voters.1 With the increasing control Islamist parties
have been gaining in local and national governments in MENA, understanding Islamist
political practices and government performance are becoming more and more relevant.
Until recently, Islamist local governments were limited to a few cases in MENA,
namely Turkey, the Gaza Strip, and Morocco. Therefore, there is not much evidence
to date on Islamist government practices. A number of studies credit Islamist local
governments in Turkey and Gaza with better delivery of services than that of their
Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner are researchers at the Institute of Middle East Studies at the German
Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. They have published extensively on political participation, Islamist parties, and clientelism in North Africa in journals such as Quarterly Journal of
Political Science, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, and Democratization, among others. Eva Wegner is
also the author of Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Party of Justice and Development
in Morocco (Syracuse University Press, 2011).
This article incorporates findings that were published in 2009 as a working paper by the Robert Schuman
Centre under the title “The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development in Local Government: Do Islamists
Govern Differently?” The present article offers an updated and extended version of that paper and contextualizes PJD governance in terms of the practices of typical Moroccan parties. The authors would like to thank
the participants those who participated in the workshop “Spaces for Change? Decentralization, Participation, and Local Governance” at the 2009 Mediterranean Research meeting and on the panel “Islamists in
Government” at the 2012 DAVO conference for helpful comments.
1. See, among many others, Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and
Yemen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam:
Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Janine
A. Clark, “Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle
Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, No. 8 (2004): pp. 941–68;
Carlos Garcia-Rivero and Hennie Kotze, “Electoral Support for Islamic Parties in the Middle East and
North Africa,” Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 5 (Sep. 2007), pp. 611–36; Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner,
“Socio-Economic Voter Profile and Motives for Islamist Support in Morocco,” Party Politics, Vol. 20,
No. 1 (Jan. 2014), pp. 116–33; Michael D.H. Robbins, “What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Parties in the Arab World?” Dubai Initiative Policy Brief (Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, November 2009), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Robbins_-_Policy_Brief_-_FINAL.pdf.
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL M VOLUME 69, NO. 1, WINTER 2015
HTTP://DX.DOI.ORG/10.3751/69.1.12
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 33
predecessors.2 At the same time, studies also have found that that corruption persisted
in Islamist-led municipalities in Turkey, and that better service delivery came at high
costs and increased debt.3 An aggressive stance on moral issues was softened, or at
least mitigated over time.4
This article aims to contribute to the literature on Islamist political practices
and government performance by studying the first cycle of local governments of
the Moroccan Islamist Justice and Development Party (Hizb al-‘Adala wa-l-Tanmiya, known by the acronym of its French name, PJD for Parti de la Justice et du
Développement) from 2003 to 2009. The question that this article aims to answer
is whether the PJD’s behavior in local politics was different from standard Moroccan parties, and if so, in what ways. While there are important differences between
Moroccan political parties, the literature documents a convergence on a number of
party practices that we define as standard: a disregard of party organization for political decision-making and electoral mobilization, the absence of ideology and policy
considerations for coalition-building, a lack of effort of individual politicians, a high
tolerance toward corrupt practices, and a shared — notable-type — profile of elected
officials. These characteristics act as the point of comparison when assessing the
PJD’s behavior in local politics in this article.
We combine a variety of sources and types of data to address the topic, including
interviews with Moroccan party representatives, observation of electoral campaigns,
electoral and census data, as well as audit reports from Morocco’s auditors’ courts.
Additionally, we cite interviews with PJD mayors, as well as budget data for three PJDgoverned municipalities.
Our analysis reveals that the PJD showed a different approach to local politics
governance in the stages before it had to face the realities of governing, shown for
example in the importance it placed in campaign organization and the type of candidates it ran. For the PJD’s performance in governance, the evidence is mixed based on
government outcomes. We only find a difference between towns where the party won
a significant share — above 30% — of local council seats. Only in the these towns did
the PJD government appear to have effected changes, with the data showing indications
of increased investment and decreased corruption, resulting in impressive gains for
the PJD in the following elections. We believe that this may be due to the PJD having
2. Yezid Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On” Middle East Brief, No. 41 (Crown
Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, March 2010), www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB41.pdf; Jenny B. White, “Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey’s Welfare Party in
Power,” Current History (Jan. 1997), pp. 25–30; Nathan J. Brown, “Gaza Five Years On: Hamas
Settles In,” The Carnegie Papers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace June 2012), http://
carnegieendowment.org/files/hamas_settles_in.pdf; Élise Massicard, “L’Islamisme Turc à L’Épreuve
du Pouvoir Municipal: Production d’Espaces, Pratiques du Gouvernement et Gestion des Sociétés
Locales” [“Turkish Islamism and the Test of Municipal Power: Production of Space, Government
Practice, and Local Society Management”], Critique Internationale, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Feb. 2009), pp.
21–38; Ugur Akinci, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal
Activism in Turkey,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 75–94.
3. Akinci, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record;” Massicard, “Turkish Islamism and the
Test of Municipal Power.”
4. Brown, “Gaza Five Years On;” Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza;” White, “Pragmatists or Ideologues?;” Massicard, “Turkish Islamism and the Test of Municipal Power.”
34 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
greater room to maneuver in these municipalities to implement its agenda compared to
towns in which the party had less support and was forced to govern with an average of
five coalition partners.
The first section of this article gives a background on Moroccan politics at the
national and local levels, and the normative behavior of its political parties. The second section analyzes the PJD’s political operations at the local level, including its
campaign in the 2003 elections and its coalition-forming practices. The third section
studies government outcomes in terms of corruption and spending in areas where the
PJD participated in and led local councils. The fourth section looks at the relationship
between the PJD’s performance and the results of the 2009 local elections, and the
final section concludes.
POLITICS AND PARTY PRACTICES IN MOROCCO
The Moroccan monarchy is an electoral, but authoritarian regime. Democratic
institutions play a role in policy-making, but policies against the core interests of the
palace are impossible to enact. Political liberalization measures that included constitutional reforms in the 1990s — and more recently in 2011 — have continuously
increased the scope for elected representatives’ influence, although they have never
touched on the core of monarchical power.5 Multiparty elections have been held since
the country’s independence from France in 1956. Up until the late 1990s, blatant electoral fraud ensured the dominance of pro-palace parties. Since King Muhammad VI’s
accession to the throne in 1999, elections have become much more transparent. At the
same time, redistricting has occurred before every single election in the 2000s; votebuying and more traditional clientelist practices also remain widespread.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The political reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s also increased decentralization. Since the mid-1970s, municipal councils have held some prerogatives and
some degree of budget control with the goal of using them as sources of patronage and
co-optation for the regime.6 A new municipal charter introduced in 2002 increased the
prerogatives of local councils with respect to governors, who are appointed by the king,
and municipal councillors were also granted indemnities and other office-related benefits. Local budgets in most municipalities are largely self-managed, and the councils
can collect taxes, and can locally organize the provision of public services.
With respect to policy-making, local councils suffer from the same restrictions as national governments. Although many local council decisions are certainly less sensitive than those of national governments, their actions are in practice
5. For more information on the political liberalization process in the 1990s, see Lise Storm, Democratization in Morocco: The Political Elite and Struggles for Power in the Post-Independence
State (New York: Routledge, 2007). For a critical analysis of the 2011 constitutional reforms, see
Ahmed Benchemsi, “Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 1
(Jan. 2012), pp. 57–69.
6. Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “Depoliticization in Morocco,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No.
4 (Oct. 2002): pp. 24–32. Municipal councils existed since 1960, but had a consultative role at best.
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 35
closely monitored by regime representatives (such as pashas in municipalities, governors in regions, and walis in provinces) on the ground. In practice, the budgets
of urban municipalities also have to be approved by the interior ministry before
they can be implemented.7 Moreover, the competences and powers of municipal
councils remain relatively general and ambiguous. The relationship between the
councils’ competences and those of other national agencies and ministries remains
especially vague, thus leaving a considerable margin for the regime to intervene in
local government decisions.
POLITICAL PARTIES
While a multiparty system was already provided for in Morocco’s first constitution in 1962, the recognition of the monarchy’s political and religious legitimacy is a
prerequisite for any party to gain and maintain legal status. However, we can divide
political parties in Morocco into two types: those that are palace creations and those
with a legacy of loyal opposition.8 The first type consists of parties created by the palace and those that were officially founded by public figures close to the regime. Their
most important function is to organize parliamentary support for the king’s political
initiatives. Before the political reforms of the 1990s, these parties were, in different configurations, in government. Key parties in this group are the Popular Movement (al-Haraka al-Sha‘biyya, or Mouvement Populaire), founded in 1958 by Mohand Laenser to organize support of rural notables for the regime, the National Rally
of Independents (al-Tajammu‘ al-Watani li-l-Ahrar, or Rassemblement National des
Indépendants, i.e., RNI); founded in 1977 by Ahmed ‘Osman, a brother-in-law of
King Hasan II; and the Constitutional Union (al-Ittihad al-Dusturi, or Union Constitutionelle), an offshoot of the RNI that formed in 1983. Since 2007, the Authenticity
and Modernity Party (Hizb al-Asala wa-l-Hadatha or Parti Authenticité et Modernité)
has been a powerful addition to this group. It was founded by Fouad ‘Ali El Himma,
known in Morocco as l’ami du roi (the friend of the king).9
The second type of political party emerged from opposition movements and
had aspirations for radical political change at some point in their history. Longestablished important parties in this group are Istiqlal (in full: Hizb al-Istiqlal, the
7. Anja Hoffman, “Decentralization and Re-Centralization in Morocco: A View from the Middle
Atlas,” CERAM Working Paper 2013, No. 1 (2013).
8. For details on Moroccan parties, see Anouar Boukhars, Politics in Morocco: Executive Monarchy and Enlightened Authoritarianism (New York: Routledge, 2010); Jean-Claude Santucci, Les
Partis Politiques Marocains à l’Épreuve du Pouvoir: Analyse Diachronique et Socio-Politique d’un
Pluralisme Sous Contrôle [Moroccan Political Parties and the Test of Power: A Historic and Sociopolitical Analysis of Pluralism Under Supervision] (Rabat: Revue Morocaine d’Administration Locale
et de Développement, 2001); Michael J. Willis, “Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of
Significance?” The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 1–22; Michael
J. Willis, “Political Parties in the Maghrib: Ideology and Identification. A Suggested Typology,” The
Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 1–28.
9. James Liddell, “Notables, Clientelism and the Politics of Change in Morocco,” The Journal
of North African Studies Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sept. 2010), pp. 315–31; Ferdinand Eibl, “The Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM): Trajectory of a Political Deus ex Machina,” The Journal of North
African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Jan. 2012), pp. 45–66.
36 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
Independence Party), and, to its left, the offshoot Socialist Union of Popular Forces
(al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki li-l-Quwwat al-Sha‘biyya or Union Socialiste des Forces
Populaires, i.e., USFP). Although both parties abandoned their revolutionary aspirations in the 1970s, they have continued to call for democratic reforms to some extent. Since their co-optation by the national government in the late 1990s, both parties’ calls for reforms have been dampened and clientelistic practices have become
more common.10 For the more policy-oriented USFP, this has come at the price of a
dramatic electoral decline.11
The third party in this group is the Islamist Justice and Development Party
(PJD).12 Once the most active opposition party, it was brought into the government
after winning the largest seat share in post–Arab Spring elections in 2011. The
PJD emerged in the 1990s as one of two key Moroccan Islamist organizations and
first participated in elections in 1997. Since then, the party has evolved into a very
moderate party where an identity- or Islam-inspired political agenda (such as the
protest against the reform of the personal status law) has been increasingly combined with a more socioeconomic agenda (trying to lower unemployment and reform administration). The PJD still mobilizes against the sale and advertisement of
alcohol, and movies or cultural festivals it considers un-Islamic, but a large amount
of its morality-based interventions have in effect been targeted at corruption.13 Indeed, it has come to identify itself as a party with an “Islamic frame of reference”
and a “genuine economic and social program.”14
Although the PJD has increased its electoral support overall, its short history
features considerable ups and downs. So far, the most critical moment of the party’s
history coincided with its entry into local politics in 2003. In that year, Islamist terrorist attacks in Casablanca created a political climate in which a party ban was not
unthinkable. Under this threat, the PJD made a number of ideological and political
concessions that led to its later rehabilitation. Following a 2007 electoral performance far below its expectations, the party changed its leadership in 2008 from the
technocrat Saâdeddine El-‘Othmani to the more old-style Islamist leader ‘Abdelilah
Benkirane. The period under study in this article therefore begins with a defensive
PJD in 2003 and ends with a more populist PJD in 2009.
10. The USFP left national government in 2011, Istiqlal remained in a coalition that includes the PJD.
11. Eva Wegner and Miquel Pellicer, “Left-Islamist Opposition Cooperation in Morocco,” British
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Dec. 2011), pp. 303–22.
12. For a study of the PJD’s history, political agenda, and party organization, see Eva Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011).
13. Matt Buehler, “The Threat to ‘Un-Moderate’: Moroccan Islamists and the Arab Spring,” Middle East Law and Governance, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2013), pp. 23–24; Eva Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and
Regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2007), pp. 75–90.
14. See Matt Buehler, “Safety-Valve Elections and the Arab Spring: The Weakening (and Resurgence) of Morocco’s Islamist Opposition Party,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 25, No. 1
(2013), pp. 142–43.
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 37
TYPICAL PARTY PRACTICES IN MOROCCO
There is a growing literature on the challenges and shortcomings of Moroccan
political parties.15 While important differences exist between Moroccan political parties, many of their practices have converged over the last decades. Most parties practice
what Anouar Boukhars describes pointedly as “politics without positions.”16 In the following, we will focus on some core common characteristics of Moroccan political parties. These “standard practices” will then serve as a benchmark against which we will
evaluate the PJD’s practices in local politics.
A first shared feature is the irrelevance of party organizations. There is a low
consideration for party committees in making key decisions — such as making coalition alliances or remaining in government or not — or in selecting candidates or party
leaders. At worst, key decisions and leadership selections are made by a small group
and candidates for legislative office, who often pay for good placement on electoral
lists.17 Along the same lines, parties have neglected grassroots activities and building
constituencies.18 This also implies that parties lack activists willing to work in election
campaigns. In fact, most parties are forced to pay for canvassing.19
A second standard practice is the absence of policy or ideological considerations
when building either national or local government coalitions. Instead, coalition building follows “strict opportunistic considerations,”20 the overriding objective of which is
to join a government. As a result, a typical Moroccan coalition consists of four or more
parties, and frequently includes both palace and non-palace parties, as well as both
secular and religious parties.
Third, many parties suffer from the lack of effort of individual politicians. This
is shown, for example, in a high rate of absenteeism in parliament and the general
unpreparedness of politicians when questioning or voting on draft laws.21 This lack of
15. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco; Myriam Catusse, “Affaires, Scandales et Urnes de Verre à
Casablanca: Les Ambiguïtés de la ‘Démocratie Locale’ à l’Ère de la ‘Bonne Gouvernance’” [“Affairs, Scandals, and Glass Ballots in Casablanca: The Ambiguities of ‘Local Democracy’ and the Era
of ‘Good Governance’”], EUI Working Papers: Mediterranean Programme Series, No. 38 (European
University Institute, 2002), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/1796/02_38.pdf; Mohamed
Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections as Positional Strategies,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Mar. 2010), pp. 195–219; Marina Ottaway and Amr
Hamzawy, “Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World,” Carnegie Papers No. 85
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2007), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp85_
secular_final.pdf; Santucci, Moroccan Political Parties and the Test of Power; Lise Storm, Party Politics and the Prospects for Democracy in North Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013); Willis,
“Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of Significance?”
16. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco, pp. 61–83.
17. Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, “Mobilisations Électorales à Derb Soltan et à Hay Hassani (Casablanca)” [“Electoral Mobilization in Darb Sultan and the Hay Hassani (Casablanca)”], in Scènes et
Coulisses de l’Élection au Maroc: Les Législatives 2002 [Behind the Scenes in the Election in Morocco: The 2002 Legislative] (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de Recherches et d‘Études sur le Monde Arabe
et Musulman, 2004), pp. 105–62; Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco.”
18. Ottaway and Hamzawy, “Fighting on Two Fronts,” p. 207.
19. Bennani-Chraïbi, “Electoral Mobilization in Darb Sultan and the Hay Hassani.”
20. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco, p. 64.
21. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco.
38 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
effort was a key target of the PJD’s parliamentary activities from 1997 to 2002, when it
sought to establish itself as a party of hard-working and committed politicians.22
A fourth shared characteristic is widespread corrupt practices of candidates or
elected officials, which can take various forms. In elections, there is a high tolerance
for vote-buying. At the local level, reports of Morocco’s Court of Auditors (al-Majlis
al-A‘la li-l-Hisabat or Cour des Comptes, i.e., CdC) document a high amount of irregularities in public tenders, construction permits, and tax collection, as well as the misuse of municipal resources.23 Through various forms of corruption, municipal councils
have become “sources of immense wealth.”24
A final shared characteristic of Moroccan parties is the demographic profile
of individuals they bring into public office. Based on data published by the Moroccan interior ministry, the typical local councillor is male, relatively uneducated, and
middle-aged, and works as a “peasant” (“fellah”) — implying that he is likely to be
a rural notable.
In the following sections, we will evaluate the PJD’s local government experience
from 2003 to 2009 in light of these five “standard party practices.” A core message of
the PJD has been a promise to be “different” than the typical Moroccan party, implying
that it would not reproduce these practices. The question we seek to answer, however,
is whether this promise of difference holds once the party entered local politics and
local government. Hence, we will assess the role of the PJD’s party organization in
campaigning and decision-making, the importance of party ideology when forming local government coalitions, the profile of its elected representatives, the effort made by
its local politicians, and the party’s tolerance toward corrupt practices.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SETUP
ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS
The PJD’s 2003 election campaign displays two noteworthy characteristics when
compared to the standard practices described above: the importance of the party’s organization and the distinctive profile of PJD candidates in contrast to the typical Moroccan party.
The prominent role of the party’s organization, manifest in all aspects of the PJD
campaign, is the most striking feature of the PJD relative to other Moroccan parties.
Months before the election — very early by Moroccan standards — PJD leaders in
collaboration with local party activists released a full campaign strategy, consisting of
a party platform, a video advertisement, and standardized slides for candidates’ presentations.25 The party’s promises in local elections can be summarized as a higher
level of “proximity” to the voters (being responsive to their demands), to “moralize
the management of public affairs” (less corruption), and to provide improved access to
government services.
22. Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence.”
23. Yearly reports are available at on the CdC’s official website, www.courdescomptes.ma.
24. Maghraoui, “Depoliticization in Morocco.” See also, Catusse, “Affairs, Scandals, and Glass
Ballots in Casablanca.”
25. Interview by Eva Wegner with the PJD’s 2003 local election campaign coordinator, September
4, 2003, Rabat.
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 39
Ahead of the elections, local party bureaus received funding from the central
office for their campaign meetings.26 Local party chapters made considerable campaign drives, which not only included the production of local campaign materials,
such as adding a video focusing on local problems, but also organizing rallies and
campaign meetings in which they presented the candidates and the party platform. In
these meetings, operatives put lots of emphasis on the qualifications and skills of PJD
candidates.27 In the Moroccan context, it is important to highlight that local PJD activists and supporters mobilized their election campaign, rather than a centralized party
leadership. Finally, local party members drew up candidate lists, although there was
some important intervention from the party’s central office.28 In short, the PJD’s local
electoral campaign was a party effort rather than an individual effort by a party leader,
as is the case for most Moroccan parties.
A second distinctive feature was the profile of the PJD’s electoral candidates. Table
I displays the profiles of PJD elected councillors in terms of education, age, and profession, in comparison to the averages for councillors across all Moroccan parties. To
determine whether the PJD’s councillor profiles are mainly a product of the party’s deeprootedness in urban areas, the figure also shows the profiles of USFP councillors, which
is the other party with the strongest urban roots among the major Moroccan parties.
As shown in Table I, the PJD fielded candidates in these elections with a substantially
higher level of education than candidates from the average Moroccan party. 61% of its candidates were university-educated compared to only 23% of candidates generally. PJD candidates were also considerably younger than those of other parties: 75% of PJD councillors
were under 45 years old compared to around 40% on average. Finally, the most common
profession among PJD candidates was teaching (either in schools or at university), whereas the average candidate tended to be a “fellah” (most likely a local notable). In respect
to these demographic characteristics, the USFP councillors closely resemble the average
councillor. The PJD thus fielded candidates with a significantly different demographic profile than the average, as well as its main competitor in urban constituencies, the USFP. 29
26. In principle, the USFP also contributed funds to local campaigns. However, USFP members
in Larache and Ksar El Kébir reported that funds and other election materials never arrived on time.
Interviews by the authors with USFP members, November 25, 2008, Ksar El Kébir and Larache).
It is also quite common that candidates in other parties finance their own campaign. See Catusse,
“Affairs, Scandals, and Glass Ballots in Casablanca;” Lamia Zaki, “Le Clientélisme: Vecteur de
Politisation en Régime Autoritaire?” [“Clientelism: A Vector of Politicization in an Authoritarian
Regime?”] in Autoritarismes Démocratiques: Démocraties Autoritaires au XXIe Siècle [Democratic Authoritarianisms: Authoritarian Democracies in the 21st Century] Recherches No. 1 (2007), pp.
157–80; Bennani-Chraïbi, “Electoral Mobilization in Darb Sultan and the Hay Hassani.”
27. These conclusions are based on observations of local campaigns and interviews in Salé, the
Ya‘qub al-Mansur neighborhood in Rabat, the Hay Hassani neighborhood in Casablanca, Meknès,
Larache, and Ksar El Kébir in 2003 and 2009.
28. These interventions mainly consisted of attempts to secure the election of technocrats or other
individuals thought to be able to deliver on the PJD’s electoral promise of better management. See
Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence.”
29. The 2009 electoral campaign confirmed that the 2003 campaign was not an anomaly. The role
of local and central party organizations in preparing and carrying out the campaign remained important. The profile of PJD candidates remained significantly different in terms of age, education, and
profession from the average candidate profile. The 2009 campaign also suggests that an emphasis on
pragmatism over Islamism is a long-term feature of the PJD’s local political strategy.
40 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
Table I. Demographic Profile of Moroccan Municipal Councillors, 2003–9
Level of Education
Party
Primary or Less
Secondary
University
PJD
11%
28%
61%
USFP
44%
30%
25%
all parties
46%
31%
23%
Party
Under 45
45–54
55 and Over
PJD
74%
21%
4%
USFP
47%
36%
17%
all parties
44%
35%
22%
Party
“Fellah”
Teacher
Other
PJD
6%
38%
56%
USFP
27%
18%
55%
all parties
31%
10%
58%
Age Cohort
Profession
Source: Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Local Communities,
Les Collectivités Locales en Chiffres [Local Communities in Statistics] (Rabat: Ministère
de l’Intérieur, 2009).
COALITION-BUILDING
Although the PJD had developed new campaigning strategies and processes of
candidate selection, coalition-building was the party’s first encounter with the realities of Moroccan partisan politics. And indeed, the PJD’s goal to govern led it to adopt
practices and criteria for the formation of coalitions that were not that different from
established practices. In essence, ideology and policy mattered very little.
In 2003, the PJD did not win an absolute majority in any town, but won sizeable
shares of seats in a few. In most towns where the PJD fielded candidates, support was less
than ten percent.30 This was partly due to the PJD’s precarious situation after the suicide
bombings in Casablanca on May 16. Following pressure from the interior ministry, the
party leadership made the far-reaching decision to contest significantly fewer seats than
they had planned before the attacks. Additionally, the PJD only fielded partial candidate
lists in the larger cities to ensure that it could not win a majority in such places.31 These
two measures obviously decreased the potential scope of PJD-led local government.
Within the constraints of relatively low levels of success and high levels of
party system fragmentation, the PJD’s goal in 2003 was to bring as many party
mayors into office as possible. This goal could afford little to no consideration for
30. The PJD won less than ten percent of seats in 136 municipalities, between ten and 30% in 62
municipalities, and above 30% in only 13 municipalities.
31. Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence.”
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 41
differences in political agendas, as demonstrated in the coalition-formation criteria
provided by the national party leadership.
The PJD’s national party leadership stipulated that coalition-building should take
into account the integrity and competence of other councillors, and how the respective
parties had performed so far in local management.32 Noticeably, the policies promoted
by other parties were not among the criteria on which local alliances were to be built.33
Indeed, PJD mayors admitted in interviews that policies played no role in the
coalition-building process and that there was no coalition contract or action plan.34
Generally, PJD mayors, as well as members of their governing coalitions, confirmed
that the formation of the municipal governments had followed the standard pattern in
Morocco, in which the bargaining almost exclusively concerns the distribution of remunerated offices (who will be mayor, deputy mayor, and so on).
Interviews suggest that in practice, the main criterion in forming a coalition was
whether it was possible to do so with people that were not completely delegitimized by previous municipal (mis)management. The PJD’s tolerance of who fit into that category seems
to have been rather large. When explaining their coalitions, PJD councillors argued that
“nobody was 100% honest,” nor was anyone “100% bad.”35 Sometimes, though, councillors had to metaphorically “close their eyes vis-à-vis some councillors or parties”36 because
they were so objectionable. As a result, the PJD often found itself in “tough” coalitions, not
from an ideological perspective, but from a personal point of view, as the party coalesced,
in the words of one of its councillors, with “all sorts of people, illiterate, corrupted.”37
This evidence suggests that the PJD’s approach to the makeup of local governments in 2003 was strikingly similar to standard practice in Morocco. At the same time,
it is noteworthy that this disregard of policies in coalition-building was largely a party
approach. In the context of the May 16 attacks, the party’s explicit strategy had been to
show potential voters through a moderate, accommodating governing approach that it
was not to be feared. With only limited representation in certain districts and without
any majorities, PJD mayors would have been even rarer had the party been more selective in its choice of coalition partners. The PJD’s 2003 approach to local coalitions was
thus driven by strategic considerations and did not imply an institutional socialization
of its local politicians against the party’s will.38
32. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD leader, November 17, 2003, location withheld on request.
33. Sometimes, there were political reasons why the PJD did not govern towns in which it had
won the largest seat share, such as in Larache. Closely located to Ksar El Kébir, it was, in 2003 not
acceptable for the PJD to govern both. Interview by the authors with Larache councillors from the
USFP and the PSU, November 25, 2008, Larache).
34. In Témara, the governing coalition did draw up a small charter but this document was a “declaration of honor” and did not address content. In other cases, there was no document of any type.
Interview by the authors with town mayors, November 15, 2008, Témara; November 27, 2008, Oued
Zem; and November 14, 2008, Ksar El Kébir.
35. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD deputy mayor, November 12, 2003, location withheld.
36. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD deputy mayor, December 6, 2003, location withheld.
37. Interview by Eva Wegner with a PJD deputy mayor, April 12, 2004, location withheld.
38. In 2009, the PJD won absolute majorities in 14 towns and was thus less desperate to form
government coalitions. The party generally attempted to form “programmatic” coalitions with the
USFP, the only other party it perceived to have an interest in effective local government and in
promoting democratic reforms (see Wegner and Pellicer, “Left-Islamist Opposition Cooperation in
[Continued on next page]
42 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
PJD LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Of the 1,503 municipalities in 2003, the PJD only managed to establish 12 governments, all with coalitions.39 Table II shows some socioeconomic characteristics of
these towns compared to the averages of Moroccan municipalities and urban municipalities specifically. Table III then displays the level of PJD support and the number of
partners it needed to establish a coalition.
Table II shows that the PJD essentially governed in urban areas (nine out of 12
locations). These are typical Moroccan cities in terms of literacy and poverty rates,
although they are slightly lower than average. However, they have a lower share of
inhabitants living in slums than the average urban municipality, the exception being
Témara, which has 30% of its inhabitants living in slums.
Table II. Profiles of PJD-Governed Locales vs. Moroccan Average, 2003–9
Portion of
Illiteracy Rate
Population in
(%)
Slums (%)
Locale
Area
Poverty Rate
(%)
El Guerdane
urban
5
37
2
Ksar El Kébir
urban
9.2
32
3.6
Oued Zem
urban
10.6
35
8.5
Ouislane
urban
13.6
35
7.6
Témara
urban
8.5
27
30.7
Meknès
urban
7.2
27
4.2
Azrou
urban
9.4
31
6.3
Kasba Tadla
urban
7.9
33
6.4
Khénifra
urban
11
35
6
average (PJD areas)
urban
9
32
8
average (nationwide)
urban
11
34
8
Tabia
rural
27
68
0
Issen
rural
20.9
57
0.7
Had Boumoussa
rural
10
59
4
average (PJD areas)
all
12
40
7
average (nationwide)
all
22
57
5
Source: Kingdom of Morocco, High Commission of Planning, “Recensement Général de la Population
et de l’Habitat 2004” [“General Census of Population and Housing, 2004”], www.hcp.ma/
Recensement-general-de-la-population-et-de-l-habitat-2004_a633.html.
[Continued from previous page]
Morocco.”). Therefore, the national PJD’s general policy on local coalitions was again implemented
on the ground, albeit differently than in 2003.
39. This excludes four district councils led by the PJD in Rabat, Salé, Fez, and Casablanca.
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 43
Table III divides PJD-governed towns into three groups according to the seat share
the party commanded in each of these councils: a first group with more than 30%, a second group from 10% to 30%, and a third group below 10%. Broadly speaking, the lower
the seat share, the more coalition partners the PJD had. On one hand, this is natural
because the smaller its own share, the larger the gap to reach the majority in a council.
On the other hand, the difference is quite dramatic, jumping from as low as one coalition
partner in the first group to as many as eight in the second. As we will discuss below,
these different groups of localities have taken different paths under PJD-led governance.
Table III: PJD-Governed Locales and Coalition Partnerships
Locale
PJD Seat Share (%)
Parties in Coalition
(alongside the PJD)
El Guerdane
45.5
1
Ksar El Kébir
40.0
1
Oued Zem
32.3
4
Issen
30.8
1
Témara
25.7
8
Meknès
25.5
6
Azrou
20.0
5
Kasba Tadla
13.8
3
Khénifra
12.9
at least 4
Ouislane
12.0
5
Had Boumassa
8.0
n/a
Tabia
7.7
n/a
Sources: Interviews by the authors with PJD officials and local press reports
We will now assess two core aspects of PJD-led local governments relative to
standard practice. The first is the level of corruption and mismanagement based on
audit reports, the second looks at efforts made by the PJD’s local politicians in investment and tax collection. Our discussion of corruption and mismanagement is based on
audits of five PJD-governed towns (Ksar El Kébir, Témara, Meknès, Azrou, and Kasba
Tadla) by the CdC, while our discussion of the PJD’s performance in local government
is based on the evolution of budgets in three municipalities governed by the party (Ksar
El Kébir, Témara, and Oued Zem).
CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT
Empirically, corruption is difficult to assess. The assessment is perhaps more difficult in a country such as Morocco, where corruption is generally high, but is typically
only prosecuted for political motives. Consequently, we rely on yearly reports of Morocco’s regional auditor courts (CdCs) that provide detailed accounts of their jurisdictions. The local CdCs do more than verify the accounts of a municipality, they investi-
44 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
gate public tenders, construction and other public projects, tax receipts, expenses, and
other public finances. The regional CdCs that are responsible for auditing the municipalities were set up in 2004. From then until 2009, regional CdCs undertook control
missions in 86% of urban municipalities (144 out of 212) and in 7% of rural towns (86
out of 1,305).40 The recurrent observations highlighted by CdCs stated that there was
no respect of the procedures for public tenders, issues relating to construction, lack of
collection of a variety of taxes or fees, and waste of municipal resources.41 While the
evidence from these reports does not allow us to quantify the level of corruption and
mismanagement in PJD-governed towns relative to the average, the reports allow for
a comparison between stated PJD practices and these recurrent issues noted by CdCs.
The CdC reports are sober in style, giving detailed accounts of irregularities in public expenditure and public administration. Detailed responses of the audited towns’ mayors
to the issues raised by CdCs are also included in the reports. We are thus quite confident
about the quality and neutrality of the assessments themselves. Since 2007, the reports
have not published the full list of audited towns, but instead the audit details a selection of towns that get “recommendations,” meaning where problems were identified. It is
therefore possible that further towns were audited but not included in the reports. Because
political pressure against the inclusion of a badly managed town would certainly not help
the PJD, we are confident that we have the full list of recommendations for PJD towns. In
contrast, it is possible that more PJD towns were audited and received a clean audit.
Of all audited PJD towns that we know of, only Ksar El Kébir did not get “recommendations” from the regional CdC, suggesting that the amount of irregularities was negligible in
this municipality. Audited PJD-governed towns that did get recommendations are Meknès,
Témara, Azrou, and Kasba Tadla. An overview of irregularities in these towns is shown in
Table IV below, organized by the recurrent problems noted above, including issues relating
to the granting of construction permits, tax collection, and waste of municipal resources.
Table IV. Level of Irregularities in CDC Audits in PJD-Governed Towns
Locale
Year of Audit
Construction
Permits
Tax Collection
Municipal
Waste
Ksar El Kébir
2005
n/a
n/a
n/a
Témara
2007
high
low
high
Meknès
2006
—
high
high
Azrou
2006
low
high
low
Kasba Tadla
2009
low
high
high
Source: Annual reports of the Court of Auditors between 2005 and 2011, see Kingdom of Morocco,
Court of Auditors, “Publications,” www.courdescomptes.ma/fr/Page-27/publications.
40. Kingdom of Morocco, Court of Auditors, Rapport Annuel de la Cour des Comptes 2010: Partie II — Activités des Cours Régionales des Comptes [Court of Auditors Annual Report 2010: Part
II — Activities of the Regional Courts of Auditors] (Rabat, 2011), www.courdescomptes.ma/upload/
MoDUle_20/File_20_53.pdf, p. 681.
41. Kingdom of Morocco, Court of Auditors, Rapport Annuel de la Court des Comptes 2008:
Tome 2 [Court of Auditors Annual Report 2008: Book 2] (Rabat, 2009), www.courdescomptes.ma/
upload/MoDUle_20/File_20_49.pdf, p. 71–79.
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 45
The first important observation is that CdCs did not find problems relating to public tenders in PJD-governed towns.42 In contrast, there were irregularities in all other
categories, but to different extents, and with generally a low level of issues relating to
construction permits but a high level of issues regarding tax collection and the waste of
municipal resources. Whereas all of these actions may reflect corrupt practices, a careful reading of the reports suggests that this is less likely in the areas of tax collection
and municipal resources than in the area of construction permits.
Regarding tax collection, the observations by CdCs do not concern new tax exemptions, but the continuation of old practices. This suggests the unwillingness or inability of PJD governments to determine the tax base accurately and to enforce tax
collection, rather than corrupt practices.
The waste of municipal resources ranges from the renting out of municipal
property at absurdly low rates (one building for 13 Moroccan dirhams, i.e., MAD, or
roughly $1.50 per month in Azrou), to the use of municipal resources (space, cars,
furniture, etc.) by people not entitled to them, to the payment of fees such as phone
bills, gasoline, and rents for all sorts of ineligible public servants, and the payment
of public servants that are in fact not working for the municipality but for the executive branch (i.e., the local representatives of the interior ministry such as pashas and
caïds, including 126 public servants in Témara alone). Again, these issues appear to
be a continuation of practices that existed prior to the PJD’s entry into office. CdCs,
whenever possible, explicitly date the beginning of certain practices or contracts.
And indeed, many of these predate the PJD-led governments. In this sense, the continuation of such routines again suggests not so much corrupt dealings by the PJD
itself, but its inability to dramatically change entrenched arrangements, especially
when these benefit the regime.43
The existence of corruption is less clear regarding construction permits or their ex
post facto approval, as these were newly provided by PJD-led executives. In Témara,
the key issues raised by CdCs were additional levels for all buildings that were previously limited to two and three floors, additional levels for a number of other buildings,
and construction permits for areas that were ineligible for construction. It is not clear
whether this involved corrupt practices by the PJD — or anyone else for that matter —
but it certainly could have.
In sum, we found that the town audits reveal a number of insights. First, only one
town received a clean audit, signaling that the arrival of the PJD in town halls did not
lead to a revolution of transparency and legal practices. Second, the scale of irregularities in PJD towns was not that large.44 Importantly, the irregularities do not involve
42. There was a small problem in Meknès where the terms of a public tender were modified
later on so that in hindsight, the municipality had not chosen the cheapest company. See Kingdom
of Morocco, Court of Auditors, Rapport Annuel 2007 [Annual Report 2007] (Rabat, 2008), www.
courdescomptes.ma/upload/MoDUle_20/File_20_47.pdf, p. 509.
43. In fact, the mayor of Témara pointed out that the pasha was such an important figure for the
work of the municipality that it warranted his use of municipal resources. Interview by both authors,
November 15, 2008, Témara.
44. It is interesting to note that Meknès, where the mayor was later dismissed by the governor on
corruption charges, does not stand out negatively in its practices, either among PJD-governed towns
or more generally. This supports the notion that this was a purely politically motivated dismissal in
an effort to tarnish the PJD’s reputation. James N. Sater, “New Wine in Old Bottles: Political Parties
[Continued on next page]
46 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
public tenders, an issue that CdCs highlight as one key recurrent problem. With the
exception of construction permits, many practices appear to reflect the inability of the
PJD to challenge established arrangements and thereby live up to its promise of conducting itself differenly once involved in the practical details of government. Finally,
it is worth noting that the town with the clean audit was one where the PJD had a high
level of popular support and only one coalition partner, whereas the municipalities with
recommendations had lower levels of support with the number of coalition partners
ranging from three in Kasba Tadla to eight in Témara.
EFFORT OF PJD LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL BUDGETS
An important way of assessing the effort and managerial effectiveness of local governments is to study their investment and revenue patterns by analyzing municipal budgets.
We obtained key items of municipal budgets from 2001 to 2007 in three PJD-governed
towns, Ksar El Kébir, Oued Zem, and Témara. Because we have information on budgets
before the PJD came into power, we are able to uncover the impact of PJD governance.
Budgets are generally divided into current revenues and expenditures, and investment revenues and expenditures. Current revenues are the revenues earned on a
regular basis (local taxes collected by the municipality, local taxes collected by the
state, and part of the nationwide value-added tax, or VAT). Current expenditures are the
type of expenditures that recur every year, such as salaries of civil servants, payment
of debts, and other expenses. There are also investment expenditures. From the revenue
side, the items used to finance investments are reserves (the accumulated wealth of the
municipality), loans (borrowing), or government grants (a special VAT allocation assigned for investment). Investment expenditures include works such as roads or cultural
centers; acquisition of goods such as new buildings, cars, or trucks for municipal use;
and participation in national or integrated programs such as the well-known national
program Villes sans Bidonvilles (Cities without Slums) to eradicate slums and relocate
their inhabitants in standard housing.
The budget entries that best reflect managerial effort and competence are investment revenues and expenditures, as well as taxes collected by the municipality. Local authorities in developing countries often have problems spending their budgets and
making investments due to the lack of expertise and management resources needed to
program and follow multiyear investments. In Morocco, there is indeed consensus that
the collectivités locales tend to accumulate too much in reserves.45 A municipality without too many reserves and with some borrowing used for investment can thus be a sign
of an active local authority. Similarly, a municipality with a high level of tax collection
reflects efforts to obtain resources to undertake these investments in a sustainable way.
[Continued from previous page]
under Mohammed VI,” in Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society Under Mohammmed
VI, eds. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 9–23.
45. See Nalini Burn, Larabi Jaidi, and Hayat Zirari, Budget Local Et Genre Au Maroc [Local
Budget and Gender in Morocco] (Casablanca: Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc,
2005) www.un.org.ma/IMG/pdf/unifem_18_fr.pdf. In a similar vein, a civil servant from the treasury
that also held the office of deputy mayor of Rabat, argued that under-spending was one of the biggest
problems of municipal management. Interview by the authors, November 2, 2007, Rabat.
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 47
We first studied the evolution of investment expenditures and municipal taxes in
PJD-led towns relative to the average of urban municipalities and all local authorities in
Morocco (the latter including rural municipalities, provinces, and regions). The urban
series offers a better comparison to PJD-governed towns, but the series including all
local authorities is available for a longer period of time, including some years before
and after the arrival of new local governments in 2003.46 In order to make meaningful
comparisons, we have divided all budget items by the relevant population. Quantities
have also been deflated using a price index with base in 2005. Thus, the numbers provided should be interpreted as dirhams per person per year in real terms.47
Graph I plots the evolution of investment expenditures and local tax extraction from
2000 to 2007. The thin dotted lines correspond to the averages of urban and all local authorities. First, we consider investment expenditure. For both averages, there has been an
important increase in investment expenditure. The increase was relatively modest until
2006 and accelerates substantially in 2007. The PJD-governed towns show different patterns. Témara starts with higher than average investment per capita and remains virtually
at the same level throughout the years. Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem, in contrast, start
with investment levels far below the average but show a marked upward trend.
The specific chronological pattern in Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem is striking. In
particular, it is clear that investment expenditures rise significantly after 2004, the first
year of PJD rule. In Ksar al-Kébir, the change in trend is truly dramatic, from around
20 MAD per inhabitant from 2000 to 2004, to around 250 in 2007, a more than tenfold
increase. The increase is also very significant for Oued Zem, which started with even
lower levels, close to zero, and was investing around 100 MAD per inhabitant by 2007.
In contrast to the average, these increases were not particularly concentrated at the end
of the period, but started at the beginning of the PJD-led legislature.
Municipal taxes, in contrast, show much less variation than investment expenditures.
All series remain relatively flat, particularly the average of urban municipalities. PJD-governed towns show a slight upward trend, but there is no evidence of a rupture in the trend.
Thus, there is evidence of large increases in investment in Ksar El Kébir and
Oued Zem, but these increases do not appear to have been financed by locally collected
taxes. Offering insight into the origins of the resources for the increased investment
expenditures, Graph II shows the evolution of reserves and borrowing for the three municipalities. Here, again, we observe significant differences across the PJD-governed
towns. The main insight from these figures is that whereas reserve depletion seems to
have played a role in Oued Zem, borrowing seems to have been relevant in Ksar El
Kébir. The left panel of the figure, depicting the evolution of reserves, clearly shows
46. Data for urban municipalities come from the 2005, 2006, and 2007 activity reports of the Kingdom of Morocco, Directorate of Budget, “Rapport d’Activité de la Direction du Budget” [“Budget
Directorate Activity Report”]. Data for the totality of local authorities (collectivités locales) come
from a report by the finance ministry that contains a consistent series from 2002 to 2007. Kingdom
of Morocco, Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Tableau de Bord des Finances Publiques” [“Dashboard of Public Finances”], Dec. 2008, available on the website of the National Observatory of Human Development, www.albacharia.ma/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/31146/0901Tableau%20
de%20bord%20des%20finances%20publiques.pdf.
47. The population data comes from Kingdom of Morocco, “General Census of Population and
Housing, 2004.” The price index data come from the World Bank’s world development indicators.
48 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
how reserves in Oued Zem were increasing steadily until 2004, at which point they
leveled off and then started to fall. Reserves in Ksar El Kébir were also increasing and
then grew to a halt in 2003, but they were low to start with, so there was not much room
for depletion in order to finance investment; reserves were maintained during the PJD
tenure of office and the town resorted to borrowing. The amount borrowed was actually
very large, reaching around 200 MAD per inhabitant in 2006.
Graph I. Investment and Taxes in PJD-Governed Towns
Compared to the Moroccan Average
Sources: For municipality averages, see Footnote 45. For PJD-governed municipalities, data were collected by the authors from financial managers of each respective municipality.
Graph II. Borrowing and Reserves in PJD-Governed Towns
Sources: Collected by the authors from financial managers of each respective municipality.
THE PJD IN MOROCCAN LOCAL POLITICS M 49
In sum, the performance of the different PJD governments differs significantly. The
most noticeable difference is between Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem on the one hand,
and Témara on the other. The PJD seems to have made a true difference only in the
former group, where investment levels increased substantially. This could be partly due
to the fact that Ksar El Kébir and Oued Zem started with very low levels of investment.
However, it is also worth noting that these two towns are precisely those where the PJD
obtained larger levels of support in 2003, thus having more room to follow its own policy.
It is not completely clear, however, if these trends reflect good management. Tax
collections have barely increased. The increase in investment appears to have been financed partly by diminishing reserves in Oued Zem and by borrowing in Ksar El Kébir,
putting into question the sustainability of their model.
ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
Using the results of the 2009 municipal elections, we evaluated the electoral outcomes of PJD-led local governments. These results are a good performance indicator,
even if we are unable to tell which PJD government actions voters were actually evaluating with their votes. To assess the potential role of local governance, we compared the
2009 results to their 2003 counterparts.
Table V shows the share of seats obtained by the PJD in all municipalities in the
2003 and 2009 local elections. Naturally, in 2003, the PJD obtained a much larger share
of seats in the municipalities it ended up governing. Comparing the 2009 results with
those of 2003, it becomes apparent that the PJD improved, on average, regardless of
whether it governed or not. Moreover, the increase in seat shares is not dramatically
different in places where it governed (from 23% to 30%) compared to where it did not
govern (from 1% to 4%).
This pattern, however, masks an important distinction between places where
the PJD governed with a strong mandate versus those where it did not. The third
and fourth rows of the table distinguish PJD-governed municipalities according to
whether they had obtained more (or less) than 30% of the seats in 2003. The pattern is
striking: among PJD-governed municipalities, the party’s election performance skyrocketed in places where its 2003 results had been strong to begin with. In contrast,
the PJD stagnated in places where it governed with a limited mandate. This suggests
that governing made an important difference in the subsequent elections, but only in
those municipalities with strong 2003 results.
Table V. PJD Results in Local Elections, 2003 and 2009
Average
PJD seat
share, 2003
Average
PJD seat
share, 2009
Without PJD-led government in 2003 or 2009
1%
4%
With PJD-led government in 2003 or 2009
23%
30%
Where PJD received less than 30% of seats
15%
11%
Where PJD received more than 30% of seats
37%
68%
Local Areas
50 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
This article studied one cycle of local-level political activity by Morocco’s
Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), from its election campaign in 2003
to the outcomes of the subsequent 2009 elections. There is some evidence that the
PJD’s performance — in both elections and in government — stood apart from Moroccan norms. For the campaign, the PJD featured a much more prominent role of
the national and local party organization as opposed to that of individual politicians.
The pool of candidates that the PJD put to the forefront were also different, younger,
more educated, and with more teachers and fewer “peasants” (“fellahin”) — suggesting a lower presence of local notables.
Regarding actual governance, we find an interesting difference between governed places where the PJD obtained a substantial share of seats (30–49%) and those
where it did not. In towns with high PJD support, the analysis of local budgets reveals
a substantial increase in investment upon the arrival of the PJD. Regarding corruption,
although it is unclear if all of these towns were audited, we find that none received
“recommendations” from the Court of Auditors (CdC). In those towns, the party experienced dramatic electoral gains in the subsequent local election. In contrast, in
towns where it governed with low support, we do not observe significant changes
upon the arrival of the PJD-led government.
We argue that these different governance outcomes might be due to constraints
imposed by coalition partners. As we have seen, in places where the PJD governed with
less than 30% of seats, it did so within broad coalition (an average of more than five
partners). The need to satisfy these large coalitions might have limited the performance
of PJD mayors. This appears to be likely at least for corruption or mismanagement
where the PJD did not appear to engage in new illicit practices, but rather was rather
unable to change existing arrangements.
It is important to note that, even in towns where the PJD governed with substantial support, the extent of its efficiency and the policy orientation of its rule must
be qualified. Policies and ideology did not appear to influence coalition-formation.
While mayoral candidates emphasized their personal appeal in addition to the PJD’s.
there was seldom reference to any political platform. Whereas there were indeed increases in investment, their sustainability is unclear, as they were financed either by
reserves or by borrowing instead from increases in local tax collection. The evidence
from subsequent electoral results is stronger and clearer, but leaves open the possibility that these improvements were the result, not of the successful provision of public
services, but of clientelistic practices.