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The EU’s relations with the Southern-Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Arab Spring
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CENTRE FOR THE LAW OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS
The European Union’s relations with the
Southern-Mediterranean in the aftermath of
the Arab Spring
G. Fernández Arribas, K. Pieters and T. Takács
(eds.)
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2013/3
The organization of the external relations of the European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon
CENTRE FOR ThE LAW OF EU ExTERNAL RELATIONS
ThE EURopEAn Union’S RELATionS wiTh ThE
SoUThERn-MEdiTERRAnEAn in ThE AfTERMATh
of ThE ARAb SpRing
g. fERnándEz ARRibAS
K. piETERS
T. TAKáCS
(eds.)
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2013/3
1
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2013/3
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2013/3
Gosalbo Bono
governing board / board of editors
Prof. Fabian Amtenbrink (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Prof. Steven Blockmans (CEPS/University of Amsterdam)
Dr. Wybe Douma (T.M.C. Asser Institute)
Prof. Christophe hillion (SIEPS/University of Leiden)
Dr. Andrea Ott (Maastricht University)
Dr. Tamara Takács (T.M.C. Asser Institute)
Prof. Ramses Wessel (University of Twente)
Associate editors
Dr. Christina Eckes (University of Amsterdam)
Dr. Ton van den Brink (Utrecht University)
Dr. Ester herlin-Karnell (VU University, Amsterdam)
Prof. Dr. Dimitry Kochenov (Groningen University)
Jan-Willem van Rossem (Utrecht University)
Dr. Angelos Dimopoulos (Tilburg University)
Dr. Nikos Skoutaris (London School of Economics and Political Science)
Dr. henri de Waele (Radboud University, Nijmegen)
Prof. Dr. Peter Van Elsuwege (Ghent University)
Dr. Bart Van Vooren (University of Copenhagen)
Dr. Andrés Delgado Casteleiro (Durham University)
Editor-in-Chief/Academic programme coordinator
Dr. Tamara Takács (T.M.C. Asser Institute)
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The governing board of CLEER, in its capacity as board of editors, welcomes the submission
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ISSN 1878-9587 (print)
ISSN 1878-9595 (online)
© Contributors
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P.O. Box 30461
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2
The organization of the external relations of the European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon
ConTEnTS
List of Contributors
5
Introduction: The European Union’s relations with the SouthernMediterranean in the aftermath of the Arab Spring
The Editors
7
The EU mandate to develop a ‘special relationship’ with its (southern)
neighbours
Christophe Hillion
11
The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a
comprehensive strategy
Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet
19
The ENP and ‘more for more’ conditionality: plus que ça change ...
Steven Blockmans
53
The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
José Manuel Cortés Martín and Gloria Fernández Arribas
61
EuroMed, ENP and UfM: ‘Fostering region-building and promoting
interregionalism’?
Nikos Skoutaris
75
EU’s post-Arab spring relations with southern Mediterranean civil society
actors, continuity or change?
85
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués
Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods
and services between the Mediterranean neighbours and the EU
K. Pieters
3
95
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Gosalbo Bono
ConTEnTS
3
List of contributors
5
introduction: The European Union’s relations with the Southern-Mediterranean in the aftermath
7
of the Arab Spring 7
G. Fernandez Arribas, K. Pieters and T. Takács
7
The EU mandate to develop a ‘special relationship’ with its (southern) neighbours
11
Christophe hillion 11
INTRODUCTION 11
1.
ThE EU OBLIGATION TO DEVELOP A ‘SPECIAL RELATIONShIP WITh NEIGhBOURING COUNTRIES’
11
1.1.
An EU express competence
11
1.2.
A formal EU obligation to engage
13
2.
A SPECIAL RELATIONShIP WITh A FiNAliTé
14
2.1.
A reined purpose
14
2.2.
An adjusted methodology
14
3.
AN ExPECTATION-IMPLEMENTATION GAP?
15
4.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
17
ThE ARAb UpRiSingS And ThE EURopEAn Union:
in SEARCh of A CoMpREhEnSiVE STRATEgY
19
Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet*
19
I.
INTRODUCTION
19
II.
ThE EU’S STRATEGY VIS-À-VIS ThE MENA AND ThE ARAB UPRISINGS
20
2.1.
EU strategy prior to the Arab uprisings
20
2.1.1.
Regional instruments
21
2.1.2.
Bilateral instruments
23
2.2.
EU strategy post the Arab uprisings
26
2.3.
interim conclusion
27
III.
TARGETED EU RESPONSES TO ThE ARAB UPRISINGS
28
3.1.
Security and defence challenges
28
3.1.1.
The EU as an external security actor
29
3.1.2.
The EU’s internal security 31
3.2.
Economic challenges 32
3.2.1.
Money
33
3.2.2.
Markets
35
3.2.3.
Mobility
37
3.3.
Challenges related to human rights and democracy policies 39
IV.
EU INSTRUMENTS TO ENhANCE MULTI-LEVEL COOPERATION
42
4.1.
Cooperation with international organisations
42
4.2.
Cooperation with local non-State actors
45
4.3.
Diplomatic instruments to enhance bilateral and regional cooperation
46
V.
WhAT TO DO FOR ThE EU? 48
VI.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
51
The Enp and ‘more for more’ conditionality:
plus que ça change …
53
Steven Blockmans 53
1.
… PLUS qUE çA RESTE LA MêME ChOSE?
53
2.
VISION IMPOSSIBLE?
56
3.
MITIGATING ThE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IMPACT OF “LESS FOR LESS”
58
ThE Union foR ThE MEdiTERRAnEAn:
ChALLEngES And pRoSpECTS
61
José Manuel Cortés Martín and Gloria Fernández Arribas
61
1.
A NEW ENTITY IN ORDER TO REINFORCE ThE BARCELONA PROCESS
61
2.
IS ThE UNION FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN A REAL UNION?
62
3.
ARE ThE AIMS OF ThIS UNION CLEAR?
66
4.
hAVE All FACTORS BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION?
68
5.
IN-DEPTh GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ChANGES
69
6.
IMPACT OF RECENT EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONAL INNVOATIONS ON ThE UNION FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN
71
7.
FINAL REMARKS
72
EuroMed, Enp and UfM: ‘fostering region-building and promoting interregionalism?’
75
75
Nikos Skoutaris*
1.
INTRODUCTION
75
2.
ThE MEDITERRANEAN AS A MACRO-REGION? 76
3.
ThE EU POLICY FRAMES TOWARDS ThE MEDITERRANEAN AREA 78
3.1.
The barcelona process 78
3.2.
Enp 79
3.3.
UfM 82
4.
(IN PLACE OF A) CONCLUSION
83
EU’s post-Arab Spring relations with southern Mediterranean civil society actors:
continuity or change?
85
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués
85
1.
CIVIL SOCIETY IN EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS
86
2.
ThE ARAB SPRING
88
3.
EU CIVIL SOCIETY PROMOTION IN ThE SOUThERN MEDITERRANEAN: CONTINUITY OR ChANGE?
90
4.
CONCLUSIONS
93
dEEp And CoMpREhEnSiVE fREE TRAdE AgREEMEnTS: LibERALiSATion of goodS And SERViCES bETwEEn ThE MEdiTERRAnEAn nEighboURS And ThE EU 95
K. Pieters
95
1.
INTRODUCTION
95
2.
DEEP AND COMPREhENSIVE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN NEIGhBOURS 96
2.1.
origins and purpose of the dCfTAs
96
2.2.
Criteria and steps to fulill before the launch of the negotiations of the dCfTA
97
2.3.
Content of the dCfTAs 98
3.
ThE EURO-MED LIBERALISATION OF GOODS IN ThE DCFTAS
99
3.1.
The current state of play: (free) movement of goods between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours
99
3.2.
Recommendations for deeper and comprehensive Euro-Med trade of goods
100
3.2.1.
The mutual recognition principle in non-harmonised areas
100
3.2.2.
Euro-Med movement of products harmonised at EU level
101
3.2.2.1.
industrial goods 102
3.2.2.2.
Agricultural products, processed agricultural products and ish and ishery products
104
3.2.3.
Derogations in the DCFTA and the Rule of Reason concept in the
Euro-Med context 106
3.2.3.1.
Provision in the DCFTA, its interpretation and some illustrations
106
3.2.3.2.
The concept of the Rule of reason in the Euro-Med context 109
4.
ThE EURO-MED LIBERALISATION OF SERVICES ThROUGh ThE DCFTAS
110
4.1.
The current provisions of movement of services in the
Euro-Med AAs
110
4.2.
Towards a deeper and more comprehensive integration as regards services between the EU and the Mediterranean area
111
4.2.1.
legal concepts as regards the Euro-Med movement of services
in the DCFTAs
112
4.2.2.
Mutual Recognition principle in non-harmonised areas
114
4.2.3.
Approximation in harmonised areas
115
4.2.4.
Standardisation projects in the Euro-Med area 116
4.2.5.
Derogations from the Euro-Med liberalisation of movement of
services in the DCFTAs
119
5.
CONCLUSIONS
120
4
The organization of the external relations of the European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon
LiST of ConTRibUToRS
Steven blockmans is head of the EU foreign policy programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Professor of EU External Relations Law and
Governance at the University of Amsterdam, and member of the governing
board of CLEER.
José Manuel Cortés Martín is Professor at Universidad Pablo de Olavide,
Seville.
Sanderijn duquet is Research Fellow and PhD Candidate, Leuven Centre
for Global Governance Studies - Institute for International Law, KU Leuven.
gloria fernández Arribas is Assistant Professor at Universidad Pablo de
Olavide, Seville.
Christophe hillion is Professor at University of Leiden; Swedish Institute
for European Policy Studies (Stockholm), and governing board member of
CLEER.
Elisabeth Johansson-nogués is Ramón y Cajal Researcher at the Institut
Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals and member of the Observatory for the
European Foreign Policy.
Karolien pieters is Senior Researcher in EU Law at the T.M.C Asser Instituut,
The hague.
nikos Skoutaris is an A. N. hadjiyiannis Senior Research Fellow at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, and representative of partner institution at CLEER.
Tamara Takács is Senior Researcher in EU law and Academic Programme
Coordinator of the Centre for the Law of the EU External Relations (CLEER)
at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut and member of the governing board of CLEER.
Jan wouters is Jean Monnet Chair ad personam EU and global governance
and full Professor of International Law and International Organizations, Director, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies - Institute for International
Law, University of Leuven (KU Leuven).
5
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6
Introduction: EU’s relations with the Southern-Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Arab Spring
inTRodUCTion: ThE EURopEAn Union’S RELATionS wiTh
ThE SoUThERn-MEdiTERRAnEAn in ThE AfTERMATh
of ThE ARAb SpRing
G. Fernández Arribas, K. Pieters and T. Takács
Cooperation with the Southern-Mediterranean has for long been a high priority in the European Union’s external relations. Instruments aimed at supporting
economic and social transition of partner countries, trade liberalisation and
market access for both parties, and strengthening the internal security of the
Union were in focus of multilateral approaches such as the Barcelona Process
(1995) and its re-launch within a regional forum, the Union for the Mediterranean
(2008), complemented by instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy
extended to countries of the region since 2004. In addition, association agreements signed with individual countries have focused on economic relations so
as to foster development, political and social reform, and ultimately, to create
sustainable and overall regional integration. Europe is of the highest importance
for the economic development of the Mediterranean area. For the EU, the
Mediterranean countries have always been economically important since they
are large suppliers of natural resources, such as gas and petroleum, to the
European market.1 The Mediterranean countries have also become an essential outlet for European exports. Therefore, the EU aimed at the development
of a stable economic situation in the Mediterranean region since this would
create attractive export possibilities for the EU. The Mediterranean area has
been important for Europe for reasons of security and strategy as well.
A stable and secure Mediterranean region is in the best interest of the EU,
but so far the situation in the region has remained politically and economically
unstable. Conlicts in the Mediterranean region have direct consequences for
political and social stability in the EU. Instability in the Mediterranean region
may, for example, lead to mass migration, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism,
drugs and organised crime, which is harmful to both the area itself and to the
EU.2 Nowadays, the situation in the Mediterranean area is politically and economically unstable, unpredictable and explosive. Instead of taking effective
action which helps the Mediterranean people to ensure the establishment of
democratic regimes and human rights in the region, the EU has remained very
cautious since the outbreak of the revolts. The EU not only has to support the
implementation of democratic regimes in the Mediterranean area, but also
needs to tackle, now more than ever, the roots of the uprising, being the eco1
T. Sadeh, ‘The Economic Desirability of the Middle Eastern Monetary Cooperation’, 20 The
World Economy (1997) pp. 809-827.
2
K. Pieters, The integration of the Mediterranean Neighbours into the EU internal Market
2010 (T.M.C. Asser Press, The hague), p. 2-3.
7
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Fernández Arribas, Pieters and Takács
nomic and social problems (youth unemployment, rising food prices etc.) in the
Mediterranean area by strengthening and deepening the Euro-Med bilateral
and multilateral relationship. Two years after the Arab uprising, there are still
no real democratic regimes in the Mediterranean countries.
As a response to the events of the Arab Spring, the EU reframed its policy
toward the Southern-Mediterranean region, as indeed its entire neighbourhood,
and redesigned its tools of cooperation so as to deliver support for transition
to democracy and work closely with the partner governments. These instruments include the ‘more aid for more democracy’ conditionality in the reviewed
European Neighbourhood Policy; the Dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries and the conversion of free
trade agreements into deep and comprehensive free trade agreements. The
question therefore arises as to how effective such instruments are and can be
and what the future of the EU’s relations with the Southern-Mediterranean
region is.
To approach these new developments, the conference co-organised by the
Universidad Pablo de Olavide and CLEER on 10-11 May 2012 addressed the
multi-layered construction of EU and Southern-Mediterranean relations, unpacking the new and renewed normative frameworks and policy instruments
available within the European Neighbourhood Policy, bilateral agreements and
regional approaches. Tackling speciic issues from the EU’s Mediterranean
strategy, such as the promotion of fundamental rights, rule of law, security and
the future of deep and comprehensive trade agreements, policy-makers and
academics from the EU and the Southern Mediterranean region evaluated the
cooperation, highlighted the major challenges ahead and put forward recommendations for a stable, mutually beneicial approach.
The contributors to this CLEER Working Paper address some of these questions. Assessing the constitutional foundations of the EU’s relations with its
neighbours, including the Southern Mediterranean, Christophe hillion asserts
that by locating it in the Common Provisions of the TEU, the treaty drafters
have given a considerable prominence to the neighbourhood policy in the
Union’s action, conirming its all-encompassing dimension and endowing it with
a bold inalité by reference to EU values. he adds, however, that the actual
commitment of the Union (and its Member States) following the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty has remained circumspect, despite the strong constitutional mandate given by the TEU and the profound changes in the region, which
both call for a new and ambitious engagement. Taking stock of the various
instruments, Jan wouters and Sanderijn duquet ind that the use of different
policy instruments did not result in the ambitious creation of a comprehensive
strategy, partly because the EU has not been successful in prioritising the interests it has pursued. They assess that the EU’s quest for stability in the MENA
region is still relected in all its instruments, notwithstanding the re-orientation
of programmes towards the engagement of civil society and the support of the
democratic aspirations of the people of the region. Concerning the revision of
the ENP and EIDhR, they claim that on the basis of preparations that had
started before the recent changes in the region, and of the countless tools and
8
Introduction: EU’s relations with the Southern-Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Arab Spring
projects concerned, has not been suficiently thorough. The EU has made clear
progress in using its diplomacy tools; but still lacks a long-term vision on the
future of the MENA. Looking at the negative conditionality (‘less for less’) approach, introduced in the reviewed European Neighbourhood Policy, Steven
blockmans claims that the revised ENP seems unsuitable as the sole agent
for the implementation or support of democratic and socio-economic reforms
and carries the risk of counteracting the normative objective which the EU has
pursued for the last decade, that of transforming the outer periphery into one
area of peace and prosperity built on democratic principles.
Pointing out the meager results of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM),
José Manuel Cortés and gloria fernández Arribas consider that the main
problem can be found in the primarily economic approach to the region, leaving
apart the political and social dimension. Together with this complex situation,
the intricate institutional structure of the UfM makes it also hard to implement
the objectives, and the budgetary restrictions will have a negative impact on
projects. Despite these dificulties, the UfM is considered an appropriate tool
to conduct the Euro-Mediterranean relations, if the necessary changes are
taken. Assessing the Union’s various efforts to foster region building through
instruments and overlapping policy frames of ENP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, nikos Skoutaris gauges the
EU’s success in region-building. he notes that in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring, the UfM does not place emphasis on a region-building approach and
that the asymmetrical political and economic relationship between the EU and
its Southern-Mediterranean partners undermine interregional characteristics
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a policy framework.
Looking at select EU strategies toward the region, Elisabeth Johansson
nogués’ paper looks at the EU’s discourse about civil society actors, as important components to ‘deep democracy’ and the ambitious rhetoric and measures that were introduced following the Arab Spring. Looking at various recent
policy instruments for civil society promotion she observes as positive feature
their obvious mission to strengthen relations between the EU and the region’s
civil society, but laments the EU’s timid efforts to speak up against aggression
on civil society actors and questions whether the Union will (or can) engage in
direct dialogue with civil society actors in the different national assistance plans.
For a genuinely new approach toward civil society actors and an effective and
fruitful policy, she calls for readjustment of existing policy instruments and assertiveness from the EU and its Member States to defend civil society.
Karolien pieters looks at the ongoing liberalisation process of goods between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea through the conclusion of
Euro-Med DCFTAs, through the implementation in the Mediterranean countries
of the most essential EU acquis, but also via the application of the principle of
mutual recognition between the Mediterranean countries and the EU. The application of this principle requires conidence between the Mediterranean countries and the EU. Therefore, the establishment of strong independent and
institutions in the Mediterranean area are crucial to strengthen conidence.
Further she looks at the early stages of the liberalisation process of services
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Fernández Arribas, Pieters and Takács
between the Mediterranean countries and the EU. She notes that the best thing
is for the EU to involve the interested Mediterranean countries already at an
early stage in the liberalisation process of services: common Euro-Med standardisation projects are the best solution to establish an eficient Euro-Med
system of movement of services. She also notes that for the liberalisation of
services, there will be a need for solid institutions in het Mediterranean area;
institutions which develop standards for licensing and certiication of professional service providers equal to those in force in the EU should be established
with inancial support of the EU.
The present CLEER Working Paper thus brings together a number of issues
related to the EU’s relations with the southern-Mediterranean region in the
aftermath of the Arab Spring. The conference organisers and editors are grateful for Professor Lucía Millán Moro at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, and
the T.M.C Asser Institute for continuously stimulating the implementation of the
conference and the publication, as well as the European Commission’s Representation in Madrid, for their support toward the organisation of the conference. A special word of thanks goes to Professor Ramses A. Wessel, member
of the Centre’s governing board, who instigated the idea of collaboration between CLEER and the Universidad Pablo de Olavide.
10
The EU mandate to develop a ‘special relationship’ with its (southern) neighbours
ThE EU MAndATE To dEVELop A ‘SpECiAL RELATionShip’
wiTh iTS (SoUThERn) nEighboURS
Christophe hillion
INTRODUCTION
The terms and modalities of the EU’s relations with its South-Mediterranean
neighbours are not only coloured by the events unfolding in the region, they
are also determined by the evolution of the EU constitutional context. The latter has been signiicantly altered with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
This is the subject of this paper. In particular, since Lisbon, the EU has been
formally instructed to ‘develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries’
(Article 8 TEU). While this express mandate partly codiies past EU engagement with its neighbours, particularly in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it introduces several noticeable novelties in the way in which
the EU conceives of, and develops its policy towards its vicinity. Thus, Article
8 establishes an express EU ‘neighbourhood competence’ which is formulated
in mandatory terms (1). Conirming its all-encompassing scope, the new Treaty provision also adjusts the purpose of the Union’s neighbourhood policy and
the methodology to attain it (2). As it will be argued below, such innovations
may contribute to the cohesion of the EU Neighbourhood Policy. At the same
time, it will be suggested that, despite its general ambition to enhance the
coherence of the EU external action, the Treaty of Lisbon also appears to have
some disrupting effects on the institutional framework of the EU external action
in general, and on the EU policy towards its neighbours, in particular (3).
1.
ThE EU OBLIGATION TO DEVELOP A ‘SPECIAL
RELATIONShIP WITh NEIGhBOURING COUNTRIES’
1.1. An EU express competence
The Treaty of Lisbon introduces an express legal basis for the EU to develop
‘a special relationship’ with its neighbours. While textually identical to Article
I-57 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) where it inds
its roots, Article 8 TEU was placed in a very different section of the founding
treaties. Article I-57 was included in Part I of the TCE containing all the fundamental provisions of the EU constitutional order, and was the sole article of a
speciic Title entitled ‘The Union and its Neighbours’, that preceded the Title
on Union Membership (Title Ix), to which it was thus related. By contrast, Article 8 TEU is inserted in the Common Provisions of the Treaty on European
11
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hillion
Union.1 hence, the new neighbourhood legal basis is no longer structurally
related to the enlargement provision, still located in the Final Provisions of the
TEU (Article 49 TEU). Nor is it formally included in the speciic sections of the
Treaties relating to the external action of the Union, namely Title V TEU, and
Part V TFEU.
Its new home in the Common Provisions colours the meaning of the competence Article 8 TEU encapsulates, the nature of the policy it envisages, as
well as its function. In particular, the inclusion of the speciic legal basis in the
TEU, although outside the chapter on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, entails that the neighbourhood policy should not be affected by the pillarpolitics deriving from the recurrent distinction between the CFSP and
non-CFSP powers of the Union (cf. Article 40 TEU). It thereby consolidates the
all-encompassing character of the neighbourhood policy, as conceived and
developed pre-Lisbon. In this sense, the 2004 Strategic document of the European Commission emphasised that the ENP is ‘a comprehensive policy integrating related components from all three “pillars” of the Union’s present
structure’,2 which offers ‘a means for an enhanced and more focused policy
approach of the EU towards its neighbourhood, bringing together the principal
instruments at the disposal of the Union and its Member States. It was also
conceived to further advancing and supporting the EU’s foreign policy objectives’ (emphasis added).3 To be sure, the Commission underscored the full
accordance of the ENP with the goals of the 2003 European Security Strategy
whereby the EU’s ‘task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the
East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom
we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’. 4
Moreover, its location outside the speciic provisions on the ‛EU external
action’ suggests that the neighbourhood competence is conceived as a policy
with both internal and external dimensions. Its all-encompassing character
might indeed explain why it is not expressly set out in the catalogue of competence included in the TFEU. To be sure, its inclusion in the Common Provisions
of the TEU means that the objective of the EU special relationship with the
neighbours is mainstreamed into other policies of the EU. In practical terms, it
entails that EU institutions ought to take account of the neighbourhood policy
aims when exercising Union competences, for instance in elaborating the
Union’s transport, energy, environment policies, in the development of the internal market and, naturally, in the enlargement process. Such a constitutional
integration of the neighbourhood aims in the policy-making of the Union, if effective, can signiicantly contribute to furthering the consistency of the EU’s
action in general, and towards its neighbours in particular.
1
For an elaborate and insightful discussion on this point, see S. Blockmans, ‘Friend or Foe?
Reviewing EU Relations with its Neighbours Post Lisbon’, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European
Union’s External Relations A Year After lisbon, CLEER Working Paper 2011/3, 113-124.
2
European Commission, Communication on the European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy
Paper; COM(2004) 373, at 6.
3
Ibid., at 8.
4
European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a better world, Brussels, 12 December
2003, at 8.
12
The EU mandate to develop a ‘special relationship’ with its (southern) neighbours
1.2. A formal EU obligation to engage
Not only does Article 8 TEU formally provide an express competence to ‘develop a special relationship’, its mandatory formulation by the use of ‘shall’
entails the Union is under an obligation to develop such a relationship.
In that, the exercise of the neighbourhood competence differs signiicantly
from that of enlargement. The activation of the accession procedure enshrined
in Article 49 TEU is wholly determined by the applicant state’s compliance with
a set of eligibility conditions, set out in Article 49 TEU and articulated in the
so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’. Indeed, the Union is not obliged to trigger the
accession procedure, but may choose to do so if the applicant is deemed to
fulil EU conditions. In the case of the competence of Article 8 TEU by contrast,
the decision to engage with the neighbours is not subject to political conditions
(safe the somewhat ambiguous requirement that the countries concerned must
be neighbouring the EU), but compulsory. Only the modalities of that engagement, i.e., of the actions undertaken, are function of the behaviour of the country concerned. In that, the neighbourhood competence could be likened to
common policies, such as agriculture, transport or the common commercial
policy, which all involve a strong EU mandate to act.
As legal basis establishing an express mandate for an EU engagement with
its neighbours, Article 8 TEU formally integrates the EU Neighbourhood Policy
in the EU constitutional framework. While this may have positive consequences in terms of substantive coherence as suggested above, it may also entail a
degree of formalism in the policy-making that may challenge coordination between various institutional actors. In particular, in constitutionalising the neighbourhood competence, the Treaty adds constraints on the development of a
policy which, thus far, had been incremental and lexible, thanks notably to the
fact that it was carved out outside the Treaty framework, on the basis of soft
law instruments.5 As new express competence, its exercise should fully comply
with the structural and procedural principles of the Union legal order, such as
conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, and consistency. In the same vein, the
exercise of the EU neighbourhood competence might become subject to competence struggle among institutions, as we shall see below.
The lip side of the coin is that the neighbourhood competence is more
constraining as a result of its inclusion in the institutional system of the EU, in
as much as Union’s inaction could lead to possible proceedings before the
Court of Justice, the way failures to develop common policies were in the past
sanctioned by the Court. Moreover, the exercise of the EU neighbourhood
competence requires from both institutions and Member States a higher degree
of compliance with the measures thereby adopted, and a mutual duty of cooperation to ensure the fulilment of the Union objectives thereof.
5
Further, see B. Van Vooren, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Case-Study for
Soft Law in EU External Relations’, 34 European law Review 2009, at 696. C. hillion ‘The EU’s
Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern Europe’ in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), law
and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing landscape (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2008), 309-333.
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2. A SPECIAL RELATIONShIP WITh A FiNAliTé
Indeed, Article 8 TEU establishes a Union’s neighbourhood competence with
a broad political objective: the envisaged ‘special relationship’ is aimed at establishing ‘an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the
values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based
on cooperation’. While partly resonating the objectives of the existing ENP,
Article 8 TEU appears to reine the ultimate purpose of the Union’s neighbourhood policy (2.1) by articulating the foundations of the area it is purported to
establish. It also changes the methodology to achieve this aim (2.2).
2.1. A reined purpose
By including an explicit reference to ‘the values of the Union’ as foundation of
the future area of good neighbourliness, Article 8 TEU is moving away from the
language hitherto employed in most ENP strategic documents. The latter rather referred (as they continuously do) to ‘shared values’ or ‘common values’, if
not to international standards. In other words, Article 8 TEU encapsulates a
normative shift in the EU policy towards the neighbours even if, admittedly, the
previous ‘shared values’ discourse was a ig leaf to the Union’s promotion of
its own principles. In that, Article 8 is more consistent with the genuine EU interest: it afirms, if not conirms the EU as normative power in the region, acting
in coherence with its own political foundations, in line with the general prescription of Article 3(5) TEU.6
2.2. An adjusted methodology
Alongside the normative shift incarnated by the reference to EU values, Article
8 TEU envisages a partial departure from an approach thus far based primarily on conditionality. While it has been argued that the provision ‘impedes the
Union from entering into special relationship with neighbouring countries refusing to commit themselves to the values Union’,7 such a reading does not appear
to it entirely with the terminology of the said article. As suggested earlier, Article 8 TEU binds the EU to engage with the neighbours, precisely with a view
to asserting its own values.
That the EU engagement is conceived as mandatory indeed coincides with
the strategic interest the Union has in a stable and prosperous neighbourhood,
as conspicuously acknowledged in the 2003 European Security Strategy. As it
6
According to Art.3(5) TEU, ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and
promote its values and interests…’.
7
See D. hanf, ‘The ENP in the light of the new “neighbourhood clause” (Article 8 TEU)’, College of Europe, Research Paper in law – Cahiers juridiques No 2 (2011); P. Van Elsuwege and
R. Petrov, ‘Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the Countries of the
European Union?’, 36 European law Review 2011, at 688.
14
The EU mandate to develop a ‘special relationship’ with its (southern) neighbours
has been suggested elsewhere,8 this neighbourhood-security nexus makes
conditionality partly inappropriate inasmuch as the EU cannot passively wait
that the states in its vicinity comply with political and economic conditions,
before eventually engaging if its own security is at stake. Article 8 TEU points
towards the development of an active policy of transformation of the neighbouring states, in line with its own values and interests (Article 21 TEU). In that,
Article 8 TEU is a neighbouring state-building policy, involving the whole array
of EU instruments.
having said this, conditionality is not excluded from the neighbourhood
policy based on Article 8 TEU. While engagement is conceived as compulsory,
the way in which the EU engages with a particular neighbour is signiicantly
coloured by the situation on the ground. Indeed, Article 8 TEU is remarkably
unspeciic as regards the actual form of the ‘special relationship’. The provision
is thus formulated so as to encompass the multiplicity of instruments that have
so far been carved out, viz. unilateral initiatives (e.g., ENP, ENPI), bilateral
(e.g., association or partnership agreements), multilateral (UfM, EaP), in view
of the plurality of the neighbours concerned. It also accommodates the diversity of views as regards the ultimate purpose of the neighbourhood competence,
viz. alternative or preparation for membership. Such an undeined character
makes it possible to adapt the Union’s engagement to the particular circumstances of the country concerned, with a view to inluencing its development,
ultimately to achieve the ultimate political inalité of the policy, namely the establishment of an area of stability, based on the values of the Union.
3. AN ExPECTATION-IMPLEMENTATION GAP?
In the light of the above, it may be suggested that in principle, Article 8 TEU
has the potential to contribute to furthering consistency in the EU policy towards
its neighbours. In substantive terms at least, the competence conferred to the
Union permits it to develop an all-encompassing policy, inasmuch as it is the
irst and only policy to be included in the Common Provisions of the TEU. In
practice however, various elements suggest that the beneits of Article 8 TEU,
in terms of providing a legal basis for pursuing a coherent policy towards the
neighbours, remain to be reaped. In effect, the Treaty of Lisbon has had disrupting effects on the governance of EU external affairs in general, and of the
ENP in particular. While the latter was essentially Commission-driven until the
Lisbon Treaty, its development and management has thereafter been divided
most notably between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), without clear allocation of tasks between the two. The European
Council and its President are also getting increasingly involved in the shaping
of the Union’s relations with its neighbours, and so is the European Parliament,
while the rotating presidency remains active.
8
M. Cremona and C. hillion, ‘l’Union fait la force? Potential and limits of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an integrated EU foreign and security policy’, European University Institute
Law Working Paper No 39 (2006).
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Often presented as a template for cohesive and coherent EU external action,
the ENP is thus less well-integrated post-Lisbon, than it was under the previous
dispensation. In effect, new needs for inter-institutional coordination have surfaced since the Treaty entered into force. A potent illustration of the ensuing
complexity in the governance of the EU Neighbourhood Policy is the 2010
Council Decision on the functioning and organisation of the EEAS,9 and particularly its Article 9(5), which envisages the involvement of both Commission
and EEAS for the programming of ENP funds. Indeed, while the Commission
includes a speciic Commissioner responsible for the neighbourhood, the incumbent has been deprived of his speciic ‘neighbourhood’ staff since the
latter, which formerly belonged to Commission’s DG RELEx, has been transferred to the EEAS.
New policy initiatives as regards the neighbourhood therefore require tight
coordination, notably but not only, between the Commission services and the
EEAS, and so does the management of the policy on the ground, notably at
the level of EU delegations. Coordination and cooperation appear all the more
pressing, since the multiplicity of actors has led to diverging EU approaches to
the neighbourhood. hence, the European Council stresses the contribution of
the ENP to fulilling the Union’s economic interests (see the European Council
conclusions of October 2011), whereas the Commission points to further conditionality by reference to international standards while toning down the EU
value promotion.10 At the same time, Member States have been pursuing their
own agenda towards EU neighbours, particularly in the context of the Arab
spring, including sometimes through military means. This diversity of approaches indicates that the beneits of the uniied normative framework established
by Article 8 TEU remains to be reaped.
To be sure, the institutional actors of the EU Neighbourhood Policy appear
to underestimate, when they do not simply ignore the new neighbourhood
competence of the Union, and the objectives thereof. For instance, the 2011
Joint Communication of the Commission and high Representative11 displays
a failure to draw the full potential of the new EU competence. In effect, and
quite remarkably, Article 8 TEU, namely the constitutional foundation for the
establishment and development of the policy, is hardly mentioned in the 20page document. It is only evoked once, not to articulate its potentiality, but as
a way to include a harmless reference to Article 49 TEU in the document. Indeed, a growing discrepancy is appearing between the policy as conceived in
Article 8 TEU, and as envisaged in the context of the ENP, notably in terms of
its normative foundations and objectives. To put it simply, the objectives of
9
OJ [2010] L 201/30, 3. 8. 2010.
See e.g. Joint Communication of the Commission and high Representative. A New
Response for a Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy.
COM(2011)303, Brussels, 25 May 2011; Joint Communication of the Commission and high Representative. Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy. JOIN(2012)14, Brussels, 15
May 2012.
11
Joint Communication of the Commission and high Representative. A New Response for a
Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy. COM(2011)303, Brussels, 25 May 2011.
10
16
The EU mandate to develop a ‘special relationship’ with its (southern) neighbours
Article 8 TEU are far more ambitious than those of the ENP as set out in, e.g.,
the Joint communication of May 2011. While the latter foresees increasing differentiation within the vicinity, and restraint in the approach, Article 8, as suggested above, establishes a robust transformative mandate.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In constitutionalising it, the Lisbon Treaty has modiied the nature of the Union’s
policy towards its neighbours, particularly in view of the mandatory language
it contains. By locating it in the Common Provisions of the TEU, the treaty
drafters have given a considerable prominence to the neighbourhood policy in
the Union’s action, conirming its all-encompassing dimension and endowing
it with a bold inalité by reference to EU values. however, the reality check is
somewhat humbling. The actual commitment of the Union (and its Member
States) following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has remained circumspect, despite the strong constitutional mandate given by the TEU and the
profound changes in the region, which both call for a new and ambitious engagement. In that, the policy appears to be affected by the disadvantages of
its constitutionalisation (viz. less lexibility, and contamination by the post-Lisbon
institutional politics) without reaping the latter’s beneits in terms of compelling
the EU institutions and Member States to act forcefully.
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18
The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
ThE ARAb UpRiSingS And ThE EURopEAn Union:
in SEARCh of A CoMpREhEnSiVE STRATEgY
Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet*
I. INTRODUCTION
The self-immolation of Mohammed Ben Bouazizi, a university-educated street
vendor, on 17 December 2010 in a Tunisian provincial city is generally seen
as the symbolic trigger for the Arab uprisings. It set in motion a series of civil
protests and revolutionary chain reactions against uncompromising and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) during the
irst half of 2011, and their aftereffects continue until today. Within just a few
months, governments were overthrown in Tunisia (President Ben Ali led to
Saudi Arabia on 16 January 2011), in Egypt (President hosni Mubarak resigned
on 11 February 2011), and in Libya (Colonel Muammar Gaddai was killed on
20 October 2011). The Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was formally replaced on 27 February 2012 and mass demonstrations took place in Iran,
Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and, to a lesser extent, in Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, and
Saudi Arabia.
It has been observed that the Arab Spring originated from a combination of
an economic deicit, a political deicit, and a dignity deicit.1 Remarkably, the
unrests occurred with such great suddenness that few had seen them coming.2
Reactions in Europe were initially slow and reluctant, in sharp contrast with the
attention they subsequently received. The uprisings triggered a re-thinking of
economic, political and security relations of both the European Union (EU) and
its Member States with the Arab world. The Arab Spring was, moreover, the
irst major foreign policy test for the European External Action Service (EEAS),
which had only become operative in January 2011. At the peak of the Arab
uprisings, the EEAS was confronted with the enormous challenge of coordinating external policies in the region without key oficials being appointed or precedents to fall back on.
This contribution critically reviews the instruments at hand for the EU to
respond to the Arab uprisings, with a focus on EU policies toward Arab countries
in transition (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria). It
starts with a broad overview of the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis the MENA over the
* The authors wish to thank Jed Odermatt for valuable comments and suggestions.
1
T. Behr and M. Aaltola, ‘The Arab Uprisings: Causes, Prospects and Implications’, FiiA Briefing Paper 76 (2011), available at <http://www.iia.i/en/publication/174/the_arab_uprising/>.
2
See J. Goodwin, ‘Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring’, 17 Swiss Political
Science Review 2011, 452; and the May-June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs, entitled ‘The New
Arab Revolt. What Just happened. Why No One Saw It Coming. What It Means. What Comes
Next’.
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last two decades and its strategy reformulation in the wake of the 2011 uprisings (Section II). Subsequently, we examine the instruments which the EU
currently has at its disposal to address the challenges posed by the Arab uprisings, in particular those with regard to security, economics, social issues, politics, and legislation (Section III). We then review the EU’s structural efforts to
engage with MENA countries bilaterally, to cooperate with the United Nations
(UN) and regional organisations, and to engage with non-state actors (Section
IV). Finally, a number of policy suggestions are made in order to enable the
EU to address in a more comprehensive manner the rapid changes in the Arab
world (Section V).
II.
ThE EU’S STRATEGY VIS-À-VIS ThE MENA AND ThE ARAB
UPRISINGS
2.1. EU strategy prior to the Arab uprisings
having close historical, geographical, and cultural links with the region3, the
EU has been moulding its policies vis-à-vis the Arab world for decades. The
relationship today comprises an economic (in terms of trade, inance, energy,
but also migration) and a political (predominantly security, stability) dimension.4
Although a strategic approach is indispensable, the establishment of a coherent regional policy has proven to be a process of trial and error. A number of
different instruments have been launched, tested and re-launched by the European Commission, the Council, and the EU Member States, resulting in a
tangle of different policies and attitudes. Ad hoc instruments, mostly bilateral
economic agreements, were supplemented only gradually by more structural
programmes and working plans. Between 1972 and 1990, trade relations between Europe and the Mediterranean countries were incorporated in the Global Mediterranean Policy.5 The shaping of a more holistic policy towards Arab
States only kicked-off in the mid-1990s following the end of the Cold War and
the attempt of the 1993 Oslo Accords to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conlict.6
It was this often contradictory policy towards the region that the EU relied upon
3
See e.g. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008, at
1; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Barcelona
Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Brussels, 20 May 2008, COM(2008) 319 (Final), para. 1.
For considerations on policy-making in the 1970s and 1980s, see P. J. Cardwell, EU External Relations and Systems of Governance: The CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Migration
(London/New York: Routledge 2009), at 94-95.
4
Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and Regional Indicative Programme (2007-2010) for
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, at 3, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/world//enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf>.
5
See the Declaration of the Paris Summit, 19-20 October 1972, Bull. EC. 10/1972 establishing Global Mediterranean Policy and the Rome European Council Conclusions, 14-15 December
1990, Bull. EC 12/1990 repealing it.
6
S. Keukeleire and J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (New York:
Palgrave 2008), at 274.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
when it was confronted with the Arab Spring in 2011. The next section briely
outlines and comments on the juridico-political regime that existed at this time.
2.1.1. Regional instruments
The Barcelona Conference in 1995 established the central multilateral instrument to govern EuroMed relations: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).7
The continuous regional forum (hence the term ‘Barcelona Process’) instituted
political, economic and cultural co-operation between the then 15 EU Member
States and 12 Mediterranean partners.8 The 1995 Barcelona Declaration9 was
ambitious. It introduced a common area of peace and stability, aimed at gradually establishing a free trade area by 2010 through Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, and promised broader understandings between cultures
and exchanges between civil societies in a decentralized manner.10 This ambition made the Barcelona Process vulnerable to criticism throughout the years
and by its tenth anniversary in 2005 it was considered a failure for not meeting
these (high) expectations.11 While some efforts were made at its decennial to
constructively rethink and reinforce the EMP, it ended up being renewed, devoid
of any critical reassessment.
The search for a new impetus in EuroMed relations resulted in the 2008
creation Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), upon the initiative of French President Nicolas Sarkozy.12 Although this Union builds on the foundations laid by
the EMP, which it does not replace, its institutional framework and rationale are
quite different. The UfM has its own intergovernmental set-up, separate from
the EU, institutionalized in the form of a Joint Permanent Committee in Brussels
and a Secretariat in Barcelona.13 It launched a limited number of realistically
7
Financial programmes were installed under the headings MEDA I (1995-1999) and MEDA
II (2000-2006); Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on inancial and technical
measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework
of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, OJ 30 July 1996, L 189.
8
The EMP nowadays brings together the 27 EU MS and 16 Mediterranean partners: Albania,
Algeria, Bosnia and herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco,
Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
9
Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, 27-28 November 1995, Bull. EU 11/1995, at 136.
10
A. P. Vallelersundi, ‘The Barcelona Process – A Euro-Mediterranean North-South Partnership’, 5 Georgetown Journal of international Affairs 2004, 145-151, at 147. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee hosts senior level meetings (representatives of MS, Mediterranean partners and
the Commission), dialogues also take place in the EuroMed Parliamentary Assembly.
11
A. P. Vallelersundi, ibid., at 147; R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, ‘From EMP to ENP:
What’s at stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?’,
10 European Foreign Affairs Review 2005,17-38.
12
The Commission, aware of EMP criticism, in 2008 expressed scepticism to the intergovernmental approach proposed by France to reform the Barcelona Process. See: M. Emerson, ‘Making sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean’, CEPS Policy Brief No 155, March 2008, at 1.
13
Communication from the Commission, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean,
paras. 11-16. Along with the 27 Member States, members are 16 Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern countries: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia,
and Turkey.
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implementable projects that were speciically chosen to enhance the visibility
of EU actions in the Mediterranean region.14 Concretized commercial missions
were oriented to maintain a status-quo rather than to pursue political objectives,
democracy or sustainable prosperity.15 The UfM has been criticised for adopting a national rather than a European approach and for lacking focus and
strategic objectives.16
Even before the UfM had seen the light of day EuroMed relations were
enhanced through the development of the Southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The general aims of the ENP (stability,
security, and societal well-being) do not substantially differ from those of the
EMP.17 While the ENP targets long-term goals in order to reform partner countries, it puts short term goals of enhancing economic relations and European
security ahead of addressing local socio-economic problems.18 The ENP also
differs from the EMP in that, rather than a partnership, the former constitutes
unilateral – and therefore rather EU-centric – policy-making. The limited multilateral action under the ENP has been subject to criticism, amongst others
from the European Parliament.19 Another complication was that the EU had to
develop relations with the countries of the Arab region, at least partly, through
a different set of instruments than those used with regard to Eastern neighbours.20 Moreover, the lack of a direct connection to the plight of the peoples
in the MENA complicated the implementation of an effective conditionality
policy, an essential part of the ENP.21
It is particularly interesting to consider the position of Libya in the programmes
of the EU. Libya was not invited to be part of the EMP at the kick-off in 1995
14
Nominated projects are the depollution of the Mediterranean, construction of maritime and
land highways, civil protection, alternative energies, higher education and research, and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative.
15
S. Colombo and N. Tocci, ‘The EU response to the Arab uprisings: Old wine in new bottles?’, in R. Alcaro and M. haubrich-Seco (eds.), Re-thinking Western policies in light of the Arab
uprisings (Roma: IAI Research Papers 2012), at 82.
16
J.-R. henry, ‘Sarkozy, the Mediterranean and the Arab Spring’, 16 Contemporary French
and Francophone Studies 2012, 405-415, at 411.
17
European Commission, Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),
Brussels, 12 May 2004, COM(2004) 373 inal, at 3. Like the EMP, the ENP aimed to promote the
Southern neighbours’ commitment to the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights,
all of which were seen as building blocks of good neighbourly relations. See: Communication
from the Commission to the Council on the Commission proposals for Action Plans under the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Brussels, 9 December 2004, COM(2004) 795 inal, at 3.
18
Ch. Kaunert and S. Léonard, ‘EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Appraisal of the Southern Dimension’, 23 Terrorism and Political Violence 2011, 286-309,
at 289. R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, supra note 11,at 19.
19
See: European Parliament Resolution of 19 February 2009 on the review of the European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2008/2236, paras 34-35. The Parliament expressed
its preference for a multilateral regional approach and for the strengthening of regional, multilateral, and cross-border projects within the framework of the ENP.
20
The perspective of accession to the EU gave broad latitude to inluence political and economic developments in Central and Eastern Europe before 2004.
21
J. Kelley, ‘New wine in old wineskins: Promoting political reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 2006 29-55. See generally:
M. Maresceau and E. Lannon, The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies. A Comparative Analysis (New York: Palgrave 2001).
22
The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
and only obtained observer status in 1999.22 EU relations with the country
primarily developed in a bilateral way, the main reason being Libya’s subjection
to both UN and EU sanctions. The political climate in 2004 following the Libyan Government’s steps towards a settlement of claims in connection with the
Lockerbie case in 1988 changed the EU’s position signiicantly.23 The Union
lifted its arms embargo against Libya and included it in the ENP. Libya would
have been granted full partnership in the EMP framework had it carried out its
intention to accept to the Barcelona acquis. In 2008 the Commission made a
inal attempt to close this gap through opening up negotiations for a Framework
Agreement.24 This dialogue was suspended due to the outbreak of the Arab
uprisings.
It should be noted that a number of Arab States are also included in other
EU regional programmes: Northern African countries are part of the EU-Africa
framework.25 The current framework, for the period 2011-2013, was concluded
at the EU-Africa Summit in November 2010 in Tripoli, just weeks before the
uprisings started. The development of good relations with two of the Barcelona
Process partners, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, is incorporated in the
Middle East Peace Process.26
2.1.2. Bilateral instruments
The multilateral EuroMed framework was complemented with bilateral instruments. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans
are the two most prominent examples. The Commission has been the driving
force behind this process. The irst generation of EC Cooperation Agreements
had been in place prior to the Barcelona Summit in 199527 and have been
renegotiated and replaced by Association Agreements, concluded between
1995 and 2005 within the EMP’s framework and later also under the ENP.28
Two notable exceptions exist. EU-Syria relations are still governed by the 1977
22
P. J. Cardwell, supra note 3, 101.
See: Council Common Position 2004/698/CFSP of 14 October 2004 concerning the lifting
of restrictive measures against Libya, OJ L 317, 16 October 2004. The United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1506 (2003) lifting the restrictive measures imposed by UNSCR 748 (1992) and 883 (1993).
24
Press release, ‘Libya: Commission proposes negotiating mandate for a Framework Agreement’, Brussels, 27 February 2008, IP/08/308.
25
The EU-Africa Action Plans deine the long-term policy orientations between the two continents, based on a shared vision and common principles. See: Council, General Secretariat, ‘The
Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership’, June 2008, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EN_AFRICA_inter08.pdf>.
26
See generally: G. harpaz, ‘Mind the Gap: Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap in EU-Israeli Relations’, 13 European Foreign Affairs Review 2008, 117-137.
27
The European Economic Community entered into cooperation agreements with Algeria
(OJ L 263/2, 27 September 1978) and Tunisia (OJ L 265/2, 27 September 1978) in 1976, with
Egypt (OJ L 266/2, 27 September 1978), Jordan (OJ L 268/2, 27 September 1978), Lebanon
(OJ L 267/2, 27 September 1978), and Syria (OJ L 269/2, 27 September 1978) in 1977, and with
Morocco (OJ L 264/2, 27 September 1978) in 1978.
28
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and, respectively, Tunisia (OJ L 79/2, 30 March
23
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Cooperation Agreement since signatures to the Association Agreement, although negotiated in 2004, are still pending for political reasons. The EU is
currently not linked with Libya by similar contractual relations, and neither a
Cooperation nor an Association Agreement is in force.29
Association Agreements have set up all-embracing frameworks to conduct
bilateral relations. Provisions on social and cultural cooperation and cooperation in the ield of justice and home affairs are included, in particular securityrelated issues.30 Association Agreements comprise cooperative efforts on
migration, such as the resettlement of the repatriated,31 and contain provisions
on topics such as money laundering, organised crime, and drug traficking.32
Yet, the main features of association agreements are trade and development
aid relations. As such, the progressive liberalisation of trade is included in the
Association Agreements. The intensity may differ to various degrees depending on the proile of the partner country. The EU entered into a customs union
with Turkey33 and opted for the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) with
other partners in the Southern Mediterranean.34 These bilateral instruments
are the most concrete, legally binding contributions to the EuroMed free trade
area envisioned by the EMP.35
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements also systematically include
human rights and democracy clauses.36 Although not identical, these provisions
1998), Morocco (OJ L 70/2, 18 March 2000), Jordan (OJ L 129/3, 15 May 2002), Egypt (OJ L
304/39, 30 September 2004), and Algeria (OJ L 265/2, 10 October 2005), were concluded.
29
Bilateral negotiations on a EU-Libya Framework Agreement were formally launched in November 2008. The EU decided to suspend these in February 2011. See: Declaration by the high
Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on Libya, Brussels, 23 February 2011.
30
W. Rees, ‘The External Face of Internal Security’ in C. hill, M. Smith (eds.), international
Relations and the EU ( New York: Oxford University Press 2011), at 226-245.
31
S. Lavenex, ‘EU external governance in ‘wider Europe’’, 11 Journal of European Public Policy 2004, 680-700, at 689-690. Migration policies are discussed in further detail infra, Part 3.3.3.
32
As an example see Art. 60 and 61 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Morocco, OJ L 70/2, 18 March 2000; and Articles 61 and 62 of the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, OJ L 79/2, 21 October 2005.
33
An Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community
and Turkey (OJ 217/3687, 29 December 1964) was signed in 1963 and a customs union has
been in force since 1996.
34
For example, art. 6 of the EU-Algeria Association Agreement reads: ‘The Community and
Algeria shall gradually establish a free-trade area over a transitional period lasting a maximum
of 12 years starting from the date of the entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the
following provisions and in conformity with those of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and the other multilateral agreements on trade in goods annexed to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), hereinafter referred to as ‘GATT’.’
35
Multiple association agreements with similar contents, although separate bilateral instruments, can be considered as contributing to a regional, multilateral approach. R. A. Del Sarto and
T. Schumacher, supra note 11, at 21.
36
human rights and democracy clauses are thus relatively new: since the early 1990s, these
have been systematically included in the EU’s bilateral agreements of a general nature. In comparison, the 1963 Association Agreement with Turkey, and even the 1995 Association Council
decision establishing a customs union with Turkey failed to contain such references to human
rights and democracy.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
are shaped in a way that makes the respect for human rights and democratic
principles an essential element of the Agreement.37 Their practical implementation takes two forms. First, the Association Agreements with Morocco, Jordan
and Tunisia have established subcommittees with a mandate to discuss the
promotion of human rights and democracy. Second, all Association Agreements
concluded with Southern Mediterranean partners entail that the application of
such provision may give rise to the adoption of appropriate measures following
failure to respect human rights and democratic principles.38 Although constituting a form of political conditionality, bilateral relations have never been suspended because of human rights violations in partner States. 39 This
implementation deicit is partly due to security concerns of the EU. Instability
in the region is to be avoided at all cost, which has impeded the Union from
taking strong action.40 As Colombo and Tocci put it: ‘Stability and democracy
were perceived as incompatible goals and the latter was increasingly sacriiced
with a view to securing the former’.41
Bilateral policies were also strengthened via the EU’s adoption of ENP Action Plans.42 These Action Plans are negotiated with each neighbouring country, while their follow-up instruments, the annual progress reports are drafted
unilaterally by the Commission. These translate general political and economic reform objectives of the ENP into concrete measures to be applied at the
bilateral level, resulting in differentiated bilateralism.43 The broader EU secu-
37
Art. 2 of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement reads: ‘Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of human Rights
shall inspire the domestic and external policies of the Community and of Morocco and shall constitute an essential element of this Agreement’. This language was copied in Agreements with
other Southern Mediterranean partners. A somewhat modiied version is used in Art. 2 of the
EU-Jordan Association Agreement: ‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions
of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the universal declaration on human rights, which guides their internal and
international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’.
38
See European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Study on
the ‘human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EU’s International Agreements’, 29 September
2005, vii.
39
For further reading on human rights conditionality, see L. Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s international Agreements (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005); B. Brandtner
and A. Rosas, ‘Trade preferences and human rights’ in Ph. Alston, M. Bustelo and J. heenan
(eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999).
40
As A. Driss formulates it: ‘The Union, which certainly does not miss a chance to issue
declarations and condemnations every time it notices violations of human rights, is disappointing
when it comes to taking irm action against these violations. This double standard attitude strongly
handicapped its action towards the Mediterranean Arab countries, whose leaders took advantage
of this ambiguity to entrench their authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes’; A. Driss, ‘The EU
response to the Arab uprising: A show of ambivalence’, in R. Alcaro and M. haubrich-Seco (eds.),
supra n. 15, 97-110, at 98-99.
41
S. Colombo and N. Tocci, supra note 15, at 71.
42
ENP Action Plans are being implemented with Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia since 2005
and with Lebanon and Egypt since end 2006. The Plans can be consulted at <http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm>.
43
R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, supra note 11, at 21. Differentiated bilateralism is increasingly used in MENA politics, see infra.
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rity discourse is more explicitly incorporated in these Action Plans.44 They
contain extensive provisions on collaboration in internal security areas such as
irregular migration, organised crime, human and drug traficking, money laundering and terrorism.45 Similar to the Association Agreements, human rights
and democratic expectations are integrated in the individual programmatic
approaches to the Arab States, yet, they were far from consistently pursued.46
The pursuit of the EU’s interests in trade, inancial, energy, and labour relations was central to the EMP and ENP frameworks. This has been further
translated in the bilateral Association Agreements. As was explained, both
instruments have been used extensively in anticipation of a further integration
of markets, among others via the establishment of FTAs. A result, however,
was that the integration of EuroMed markets became conditional upon the
progress of the partner States, as stipulated in the bilateral agreements. Furthermore, the ENP’s integration of markets’ goal of 2003 was replaced by a
weaker form of integration, the FTAs, or in some cases and depending on the
performances and willingness of partner countries ‘deep and comprehensive
free trade agreements (DCFTAs)’.47
2.2. EU strategy post the Arab uprisings
As from December 2010, events in the MENA region have resulted in new
challenges for the EU. Initial reactions to the uprisings showed European reluctance and indecisiveness, as the EU and various Member States were unsure about which side to support.48 In early February 2011, the European
Council recognised citizens’ democratic aspirations. It committed to providing
effective support to those pursuing political and economic reforms including
through standing mechanisms, the EMP, UfM and the ENP.49
In the course of 2011, three cross-cutting instruments, aimed to set out the
broader EU-MENA strategy were presented and/or renewed. The irst comprehensive initiative was the Joint Communication of the high Representative and
the Commission on ‘a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with
44
S. Biscop, ‘The ENP, Security and Democracy in the Context of the European Security
Strategy’, 3 Global Europe Papers No 3 2008, at 2.
45
D. Lutterbeck, ‘Policing Migration in the Mediterranean’, 11 Mediterranean Politics 2006,
59-82, at 71.
46
S. Colombo and N. Tocci, supra note 15, at 80.
47
K. Pieters, The integration of the Mediterranean Neighbours into the EU internal Market
(The hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2010), at 41-42.
48
Tellingly, the irst joint statement calling for reform, democratic freedoms and free and fair
elections in Egypt was made by Merkel, Sarkozy and Cameron on behalf of their countries, not
the EU. See: Joint statement by Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and David Cameron, 29 January 2011, available at <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/spip.php?page=article_imprim&id_article=14940>.
49
European Council, Conclusions of the European Council of 4 February 2011: Statement
by the heads of State or government of the Euro area and the EU institutions, Brussels, 8 March
2011.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
the Southern Mediterranean’, of March 2011.50 As the Communication’s title
indicates, topics discussed relate to democratic transformations, institutionbuilding, and the enhancement of the role of civil society, as well as to economic development, trade, investment, and inance. The document also
demonstrated the EU’s constant preoccupation with security issues in the Southern Mediterranean. Topics such as the management of migration lows and
border security were included in the democracy partnership. Second, in May
2011 the high Representative and the Commission presented the renewed
ENP, which had been prepared since the Summer of 2010.51 Although it addressed recent changes in the MENA and explicitly referred to them in a neighbourhood context, the basic features of the ENP were not signiicantly rethought.
Third, in September 2011 the Commission launched its SPRING programme
(Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) as a strategic and
cross-cutting inancial instrument to support democratic transformation, institution-building and economic growth.52 To realise these goals in the years 2011
and 2012, a moderate EUR 350 million was foreseen.
2.3. interim conclusion
The MENA has been a focus of EU external actions and policies, both bilaterally and as a component of EuroMed and neighbourhood policies. It remains
dificult, however, to discern a fully-ledged and integrated policy, despite multilevel (bilateral and regional) instruments having been in place for many years.
The Barcelona Declaration was overly ambitious, which accounts for the dificulties experienced in the implementation phases that followed. Succeeding
EU instruments no longer attempted to be all-inclusive. The 2004 ENP embodies a more traditional, unilateral, foreign policy-making model that abandoned
the partnership idea. The 2008 UfM, characterized by intergovernmentalism
and an apolitical approach, represents a micro-management model that focuses on project-based, commercially sponsored cooperation. The EU’s approach of strategic regionalism was replaced by the differentiated bilateralism
in Action Plans and Association Agreements. The sum of these initiatives re50
high Representative and the European Commission, Joint Communication ‘A Partnership
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, Brussels, 8 March 2011,
COM(2011) 200 inal [hereafter: ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’].
51
Joint Communication by the high Representative of the Union For Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, a
review of European Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, 25 May 2011 [hereinafter ‘A New Response
to a Changing Neighbourhood’]. During the strategic review of the ENP prior to the Arab uprisings, a consultation process was set up with Member States, ENP partner countries, experts and
academics, senior oficials, and civil society organisations from all over the region.
52
‘EU response to the Arab Spring: new package of support for North Africa and Middle
East’, Press Release, Brussels, 27 September 2011, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-11-1083_en.htm>. See also Commission Implementing Decision of 09 March 2012
amending Decision C(2011) 6828 adopting the Programme of Support to the Association Agreement and the Transition Process for Tunisia under the SPRING programme, to be inanced under Art. 19 08 01 01 of the general budget of the European Union, Brussels, 9 March 2012,
C(2012)1439 – PE/2012/111.
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sulted in the creation of a toolkit for the EU to use in EuroMed relations rather
than a comprehensive European strategy.
The EU’s relations with the MENA have concentrated on a number of dominant topics, all of which remain very present in post-Arab Spring initiatives.
First, the Barcelona Process initiated progress in economic relations, a subject
that reappeared in the UfM and (revised) ENP framework. Second, the EU has
let security and stability concerns prevail in its relations with the MENA.53 Policies were driven by Member States’ fear of radicalism, migration, and terrorism,
which is relected throughout the regional and bilateral initiatives taken. We
can point to measures combatting money laundering and drugs traficking in
Association Agreements and to the recurring topic of the management of migration lows and borders in the ENP Action Plans. This not only hindered the
development of a comprehensive EU strategy, but also created double standards in the relationship with authoritarian regimes. Socioeconomic, rightsbased, and democratic policy-making remained to a large extent
underdeveloped.54 From the outset, cultural understanding, poverty reduction,
the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and human rights have been present
in EU discourse on the region, but a yawning gap existed between theory and
practice.55
III. TARGETED EU RESPONSES TO ThE ARAB UPRISINGS
After the general overview above, the present section focuses on speciic targeted actions the EU has taken since 2011. This section will present a thematic overview based on three major – often interlinked and even overlapping
– challenges related to: (i) security and defence; (ii) economic concerns; and
(iii) human rights and democratic aspirations of the people in the Arab world.
3.1. Security and defence challenges
As indicated above, the EU’s attitude towards the MENA has been strongly
shaped by its quest for European security and regional stability.56 Regional
conlict combined with rising radicalism in the Arab world were explicitly men53
K. Roth, ‘Time to abandon the autocrats and embrace rights’, 22 Human Rights Watch
World Report 2012, 1-22.
54
T. Behr, ‘L’Union Européenne et le Printemps arabe : Réactions, ruptures et ralliements’, 8
Annuaire français de relations internationales 2012, at 437.
55
The Barcelona Declaration stated that partners are ‘convinced that the general objective of
turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human
rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty
and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of
partnership’.
56
See supra and the European Security Strategy (European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a
better world. European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 2003), stating that the EU’s
task is to ‘make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union
28
The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
tioned in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security
Strategy as factors leading to instability.57 Two security aspects can be discerned: an external (unrest in Arab countries) and an internal one (threats to
the EU caused by spill-over effects).
3.1.1. The EU as an external security actor
The Arab uprisings presented some of the irst real foreign policy challenges
for the Union’s post-Lisbon Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). More speciically, in countries
such as Libya, Syria and Bahrain, the safety of citizens exercising civil and
political rights has been threatened by local leaders, resulting in these communities and opposition groups calling for external support. In spite of its institutional and constitutional innovations regarding CFSP and CSDP 58, the
Treaty of Lisbon did not do away with the old intergovernmental approach to
foreign policy. The effective use of instruments still very much depends on the
European and global context and the dynamics in place between the EU actors
involved.
Thus far, CSDP instruments have remained underutilised in answering the
Arab awakenings, in spite of the EU’s repeated commitment to the ‘responsibility to protect’.59 A failed attempt was made in the case of Libya. On 6 March
2011, the high Representative sent a technical fact-inding mission to the country. On 1 April 2011, the Council adopted the decision to launch an EU humanitarian operation, EUFOR Libya.60 This CSDP operation had the objective
of providing humanitarian support to the operationalization of missions mandated by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1970 and 1973.61 however,
in practice, the Council Decision merely served as a notiication of the EU’s
readiness to assist the UN Ofice for the Coordination of humanitarian Affairs
(OChA) if requested. As such request never came, EUFOR Libya was repealed
and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’.
57
European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 11 December 2008, at 7.
58
See inter alia J. Wouters, S. Bijlmakers and K. Meuwissen, ‘The EU as a Multilateral Security Actor after the Treaty of Lisbon: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects’, in S. Lucarelli, L.
Van Langenhove and J. Wouters (eds.), The EU and Multilateral Security Governance (London:
Routledge 2012), 72-103.
59
For a discussion on the EU’s adoption of the ‘R2P’ concept, see J. Wouters, Ph. De Man
and M. Vincent, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Regional Organisations: Where Does the EU
Stand?’, in J. hoffmann and A. Nollkaemper (eds.), Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to
Practice (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications 2012), 247-270.
60
Council Decision of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation in support of
humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya),
2011/210/CFSP, OJ L 89/17, 5 April 2011.
61
UNSC Resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011 on peace and security in Africa, 6491st meeting, S/RES/1970 (2011) and UNSC Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011 on the situation in Libya,
6498th meeting, S/RES/1973 (2011).
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and the closure of the Operational headquarters was announced in November
2011, without it ever having been operationalized.62
A number of Member States contributed individually to the NATO operations
in Libya.63 The lack of a common understanding within the EU on how to
handle the crisis, and in what multilateral forum, was illustrated by Denmark’s
decision to participate in the NATO actions without having done the same in
EUFOR Libya64, and by Germany’s abstention on Security Council Resolution
1973 establishing a no-ly zone in Libya and mandating the use of force, going
against the position of France and the UK.
The EU has shown more vigour in inding short term alternatives to CSDP
instruments. Most notably it applied its ‘restrictive measures’ policy under Title
VI TFEU. Restrictive measures are instruments that have the dual objective of
restoring international peace and security in accordance with the principles of
the UN Charter and CFSP and maintaining respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance.65 EU sanctions do not need to be
preceded by a UN Security Council Resolution, and are tools of a diplomatic
or economic nature seeking to bring about a change in activities or policies of
external actors.66 The EU has imposed sanctions on regimes and natural persons in Tunisia67, Egypt68, Libya69 and Syria.70
One of the most pressing outstanding challenges in the longer term is initiating a revision of the EU framework for Member States’ arms export controls.
For a number of years, efforts have been made to establish a common European framework for the export of weapons. These did not achieve the results
62
Council Decision 2011/764/CFSP of 28 November 2011 repealing Decision 2011/210/
CFSP on a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations
in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya), OJ L 314/35, 29 November 2011.
63
France and the United Kingdom irst preceded, and subsequently participated in, the NATO
Uniied Protector Operation. Other Member States participating were: Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece,
Denmark, Italy, Romania, Spain and Sweden.
64
In accordance with Art. 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the TEU
and TFEU Recital 11, Council Decision of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation in
support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR
Libya), 2011/210/CFSP, OJ L 89/17, 5 April 2011.
65
Council of the European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), Brussels, 7 June 2004.
66
Council of the European Union, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive
measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels,
15 December 2009.
67
Council Decision 2012/724/CFSP of 26 November 2012 amending Decision 2011/72/
CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the
situation in Tunisia OJ L 327/45, 27 November 2012.
68
Council Decision 2012/723/CFSP of 26 November 2012 amending Decision 2011/172/
CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in
view of the situation in Egypt, OJ L 327/44, 27 November 2012.
69
Council Decision 2011/867/CFSP of 20 December 2011 amending Decision 2011/137/
CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, OJ L 341/56, 22 December 2011.
70
Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning restrictive measures
against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/782/CFSP, OJ L 330/21, 30 November 2012. For an
accurate list of sanctions in force, consult <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_
en.pdf>.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
hoped for. Member States have been adopting legislation and administrative
rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in light
of the 2008 Council Common Position.71 This policy, which was adopted before
the Arab uprisings, has so far had only mixed success. Moreover, reports by
journalists and NGOs of Member State exports of conventional weapon systems
to Libya, which were used by Gaddai for internal repression, have been highly damaging and embarrassing for the EU.72 It became clear that the common
framework had not stopped Member States from delivering ‘made in Europe’
weapons to the Gaddai regime until shortly before the uprisings. The EU arms
embargo, imposed on 28 February 2011, could only prevent worse damage.73
3.1.2. The EU’s internal security
The management of external security threats has to be relected in internal
policies. The area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), integrated in Title
V TFEU, provides the framework to materialise this. It compiles EU policies
related to external border checks, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation
in civil matters and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including
terrorism. Given the often transnational nature of actions falling within this area,
the effectiveness of internal policy often depends on external action.74 As indicated above, the EU had already developed cooperation in AFSJ matters with
partners prior to the Arab uprisings, through its EMP and ENP policies.75 Consequently, Arab countries, and more speciically Northern-African States, in the
past have been serving as a barrier against illegal migration, radicalism, and
organised crime.76
The Arab uprisings have thus far not resulted in a reshaping of AFSJ instruments. however, two of its external aspects have received increased attention
since the uprisings. First, migration issues have occupied a central position
71
Council Common Position deining common rules governing control of exports of military
technology and equipment, 2008/944/CFSP, OJ L 335/99, 13 December 2008. This Common
Position replaced the 1998 Code of Conduct on arms exports. A number of non-EU countries,
none of them Arab countries, have oficially aligned themselves with the criteria and principles of
the Code.
72
The promotion by individual Member States (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK have been named) of weapons
exports followed the lifting of the EU and UN weapon embargoes in 2003 and 2004. See: M.
Bromley, ‘The review of the EU common position on arms exports: prospects for strengthened
controls’, Non-Proliferation Papers No 7, January 2012, at 10, available at <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/markbromley4f7971fb1fd21.pdf> and D. Spleeters,
‘Tracking Belgian Weapons in Libya’, New York Times 28 December 2011.
73
Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP of 28 February 2011 concerning restrictive measures in
view of the situation in Libya, OJ L 58/53, 3 March 2011.
74
J. Monar, ‘The EU as an International Actor in the Domain of Justice and home Affairs’, 9
European Foreign Affairs Review 2004, 395-415, at 395.
75
See e.g. the Barcelona Declaration: ‘Fighting terrorism will have to be a priority for all the
parties’ and ‘in the area of illegal immigration they decide to establish closer cooperation’.
76
See supra; A. Driss, supra note 40, at 100; C. M. O’Donnell, ‘The European Security Policy
and the Euro-Meditarranean region 2010-2011’, in Alcaro and haubrich-Seco (eds.), supra n. 15,
at 164.
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from the onset (and are discussed in more detail below). Second, counterterrorism policies have received attention.77 Former leaders of Arab countries
shared with the Union an interest in controlling the risk of terrorism locally.
Whereas they perceived various forms of political activism as threatening the
stability of their regime, strategically, a status quo in politics was also seen to
be in the interests of the EU. Tunisia, for example, effectively collaborated with
the EU in ighting terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, despite NGO criticism on
the implementation instruments used.78 The uprisings brought about a pressing
need to redeine EU policies in this respect. The EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (CTC) has pointed out that the new Tunisian government, amongst others, is willing to further coordinate terrorism-related policies.79 Aware of the
laws associated with former EU counterterrorism cooperation arrangements,
the CTC stressed that actions have to be brought in line with the ‘deep democracy’ principle endorsed by the European Council.80 The CTC’s efforts to convince the EU to respond to the Tunisian request for assistance had little success.
Counterterrorism does not seem the highest priority of the EU in the post-Arab
uprisings era,81 possibly because threats are perceived to be greater in the
MENA region than in the EU.
3.2. Economic challenges
The external dimension of the EU’s single market remains pivotal in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Its prominence has been translated into the so-called
‘3 Ms’ – Money, Markets and Mobility – policy launched by the high Representative and the Commission in their March 2011 Joint Communication ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’.82
77
Council of the European Union, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, Brussels, 24 November 2005. See S. Wolff, ‘The Mediterranean Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism’, 31 Journal of European integration 2009, 137-156.
78
R. Kéi, ‘Tunisia sparks Arab revolutions’, in Mediterranean Yearbook (Barcelona: IEMed
2011), at 27. NGOs have called upon the EU to engage Tunisia in a programme of action to bring
its terrorism laws and practices into line with the country’s obligations under national and international law. See Amnesty International brieing note to the European Union EU-Tunisia Association
Council 30 September 2003, available at <http://www.amnesty.eu/static/documents/Tunisia_AntiTerrorism_brieing_30Sept2003.doc>.
79
Council of the European Union, EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Discussion paper of the
EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Brussels, 28 November 2011, at 5. Tunisia also requested the
EU’s assistance in Security Sector Reform.
80
Ibid., at 6, the Counter-terrorism Coordinator notes that: ‘In order to be effective this kind
of reform should not consist of a series of piecemeal projects which do not address the core of
the issue, which is transformation of the security sector. There must a broad strategy if reform
is to achieve the depth and sustainability needed for long term success. This applies not only in
Tunisia but also to opportunities in Morocco, Libya and Egypt’.
81
On the general ‘EU counterterrorism fatigue’, see: EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, EU
Counter-Terrorism Strategy – discussion paper, 26 November 2009, available at <http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09717.en09.pdf>, at 2 and R. Coolsaet, ‘EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?’, 86 international Affairs 2010, 857-873, at 858.
82
A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 14.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
3.2.1. Money
The MENA is a particular area of focus of the European Investment Bank (EIB).
The Bank clusters three tasks (the development of inancial instruments, the
support of the private sector, and the creation of investor friendly environments)
in its Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP).
Through the instrument, introduced in 2002 by the European Council and now
part of the UfM and ENP, EUR 12 billion were invested on behalf of the Union
in the form of loans, private equity investments and technical assistance in the
period 2000-2009.83 The March 2011 Communication called upon the EIB ‒
already the biggest development lender in the region ‒ to take the lead in the
promotion of inclusive growth. In follow-up to this, the Council reached agreement with the European Parliament to increase the ceiling for EIB operations
for Mediterranean countries undertaking political reform by EUR 1,68 billion.84
The capital injection was approved by the General Affairs Council without much
discussion.85 Civil society has cast a critical eye on the mere increasing of
funding. NGOs have argued that the EIB may not be the right institution to inancially support the transition in the region86, recalling that the high level of
funding already provided to the region had too few results and lacked effective
accountability to external stakeholders.87 The Communication’s proposal to
allow the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to support ‘the current democratic wave in the region’ is even more problematic. The
Bank has had no running projects or any experience in the MENA region. Its
statutes had to be amended for it to be able to be active in the region.88
Within the existing EuroMed framework, additional funding was made available to face short-term dificulties resulting from the impact of the revolutions
on trade and investment, domestic market failures and a decrease in tourism.89
This is done so via the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
83
See the EIB’s website at <http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/med/index.htm> and Studi e
Ricerche per il Mezzogiorno, ‘EU inancial instruments for the Mediterranean Countries’, available
at <http://www.srm-med.com/images/stories/allegati/nicchia_2%20_eng_a.pdf>.
84
Decision No 1080/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2011, OJ L 280/1, 27 October 2011.
85
See Council approves agreement with EP on EIB lending mandate, Press release, Brussels, 18 July 2011.
86
See CEE – Bank Watch, ‘Keep European public banks out of Mediterranean region, say
NGOs’, 9 March 2011, available at <http://bankwatch.org/news-media/for-journalists/press-releases/keep-european-public-banks-out-mediterranean-region-say-ng>.
87
For further reading, see: N. hachez and J. Wouters, ‘A responsible lender? The European
Investment Bank’s environmental, social and human rights accountability’, 49 Common Market
law Review 2012, 47-95.
88
Decision No 602/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on
amendments to the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) extending the geographic scope of EBRD operations to the Southern and Eastern
Mediterranean, OJ L 177, 7 July 2012.
89
A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 12. As such, recovery support programmes were set up and grants were released to, for example recently, Tunisia
(‘EU releases €107 million to boost Tunisian economy’, Press Release, Tunis, 8 December 2012)
and Libya (‘EU-Libya: supporting transition and reforms in key sectors’, Press Release, Brussels,
20 December 2012).
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(ENPI) that not only supports the ENP but also replaced the former EuroMed
cooperation programme MEDA. Through the ENPI, the EU has set up programmes providing inancial assistance to Arab partners.90 More importantly
in the long run, the refocusing of the economic and socio-economic aspects of
bilateral programmes of ENP/ENPI is noteworthy. The renewed instrument
foresees funding of social and economic development, and links this to positive
and negative conditionality.91
Southern Mediterranean countries had seen only occasional Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) operations before 2011.92 Yet, Arab partners are also
eligible to receive this type of assistance if requested.93 This policy-based inancial instrument provides medium and long-term loans or grants on a caseby-case basis for countries experiencing exceptional balance-of-payments
dificulties.94 It is speciically designed for countries close to the EU. Like the
instruments discussed above, this inancial assistance model has not been
spared from criticism. The lengthy decision-making process and the Council
being the only legislator for this form of EU assistance has been a thorn in the
90
In particular bilateral cooperation, co-inanced by the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF), between EU Member States and Southern Mediterranean partners was set up as
well as regional programmes such as the ENPI CBC Mediterranean Basin and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF).
91
Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006, OJ L 310/1, 9 November 2006, establishes the inancial envelope for the period 2007 to
2013. A Regulation renewing European Neighbourhood Instrument is proposed, see Proposal for
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, COM/2011/0839 inal, 7 December 2011. On the negative conditionality, see
also: A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 3 states: ‘They will recognise that meaningful reform comes with signiicant upfront costs. It will take the reform track record of partners
during the 2010-12 period (based on the annual progress reports) into account when deciding
on country inancial allocations for 2014 and beyond. For countries where reform has not taken
place, the EU will reconsider or even reduce funding’.
92
In a study entitled ‘EU macro-inancial assistance: a critical assessment’, by the European
Parliament’s Directory-General for external policies of the Union, 23 February 2012 and available
at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/inta/studiesdownload.html?languageDocumen
t=EN&ile=67351>, it is argued that Arab countries suffered less from the 2009 recession, and
were therefore in less direct need of this type of assistance. Yet, it is concluded, the damaging
economic consequences of the Arab Spring may generate substantial new demands from this
region. Decisions on MFA are taken following a request by a third country. For example, at the
November 2012 EU-Egypt Task Force, it was announced that, upon the agreement of an EgyptIMF arrangement, the EU will provide an additional €50 million in grants and €450 million in
concessional loans, in the form of Macro-Financial Assistance. See: Co-chairs conclusions of the
First Meeting of the EU-Egypt Task Force, Cairo 13-14 November 2012.
93
A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 13.
94
The MFA complements inancing provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Eligibility for MFA has been informally based on the ‘Genval criteria’ originating from the conclusions of
the informal ECOFIN Council of 9 October 1993 and reconirmed in the Conclusions of the Council meeting Economic and Financial Affairs, Luxembourg, 8 October 2002, available at <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecoin/72608.pdf>, para. 4. The
Genval criteria provide for a non-legally binding framework that guides MFA proposals by the
Commission and following Council (ECOFIN) deliberations. The ive criteria are: (i) exceptional
character of the assistance; (ii) complementarity to inancing of the international inancial institutions; (iii) existence of policy conditionality attached to the assistance; (iv) existence of political
pre-conditions; and (v) strong inancial discipline that needs to accompany the MFA.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
side of the European Parliament since 2003. The Lisbon Treaty stipulated that
legislative decisions on MFA are to be taken by the Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 209 and 212 TFEU). however,
this constitutional change also ampliied the need to further streamline MFA
procedures. The MFA still struggles to function as a crisis response instrument
to effectively deal with macroeconomic and inancial emergency situations.95
2011, a tumultuous year in international politics, witnessed continuous implementation of existing MFA actions, while no new MFA was approved by the
Council and Parliament.96 Admittedly, the Arab uprisings created momentum
to address these critiques: initiatives that speed up the allocation process were
revitalised soon after the start of the uprisings. In July 2011, the Commission
proposed a Framework Regulation that makes it possible to grant MFA via an
implementing act of the Commission under the supervision of a committee of
Member State representatives.97 The proposed allocation procedure is similar
to those used in other external inancial instruments of the EU.
3.2.2. Markets
A second area of economic focus is the improvement of market access for
MENA producers and the facilitation of export and import of both goods and
services. The Arab awakenings opened up new possibilities for the establishment of the Barcelona-envisioned free trade area. By 2010, the EU had largely fulilled its part of the arrangement. Bilateral FTAs had been included in the
Association Agreement instruments, discussed supra. Two remarks are in order.
First, the coverage of these Agreements is essentially limited to trade in goods.
Second, for the multi-State area to be completed, the FTAs need to be concluded among the Southern Mediterranean partners themselves.98 The only
partners that have engaged in such projects so far are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. These countries concluded the Agadir Agreement in accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
95
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 7 July 2011
on the implementation of macro-inancial assistance to third countries in 2010, COM/2011/0408
inal, at 4.
96
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of macro-inancial assistance to third countries in 2011, Brussels, 28 June 2012,
COM(2012) 339 inal, at 3.
97
Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
laying down general provisions for Macro-Financial Assistance to third countries, Brussels, 4 July
2011, COM(2011) 396 inal. At the time of writing, the Parliament’s irst reading is awaited and a
decision by the co-legislators is expected for 2013.
98
The EU faced dificulties to engage Arab partners to cooperate amongst each other. An important example of a similar exercise is the 1997 Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), established by the League of Arab States. The agreement has reached full trade liberalisation of goods.
Negotiations on services and investment liberalisation were ongoing at the outbreak of the Arab
uprisings. The Arab League foresees to upgrade GAFTA into a customs union by 2015. For further reading: B. hoekman and Kh. Sekkat, ‘Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links’, 44 Journal
of World Trade 2010, 1273-1308. The GAFTA has been criticized for not living up to expectations
formulated at its launch: W. Abdmoulah, ‘Arab Trade Integration: Evidence from Zero-Inlated
Negative Binomial Model’, 32 Journal of Economic Cooperation & Development 2011, 39-66.
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1994 (GATT) and the EU rules of origin.99 The EU has been inancially supporting the consolidation of the Agadir Agreement through ENPI100 and it should
now grasp the opportunity to push forward the inclusion of other Arab States.
The development of the capacity of the Agadir Technical Unit (ATU) to support
potential future signatories to the Agadir Agreement was a speciic objective in
the second phase of the EU support project, but has to this date not been successful.101
Rather than investing in an inclusive multilateral agreement102, the EU has
opted to continue to apply differentiated bilateralism in market access policies.103
In December 2011, by adopting negotiating directives, the Foreign Affairs Council gave the Commission a mandate for trade negotiations about the conclusion
of DCFTAs with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.104 Currently, preparatory work is being carried out for the Commission to start conducting negotiations to establish deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTAs) that
may lead to giving these countries a stake in the internal market, by upgrading
existing Association Agreements to an advanced status.105 One new feature
compared to the former agreements, which concentrated only on removing
tariffs, is the proposed full coverage of all regulatory issues relevant to trade
such as trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, investment protection, public procurement, and competition policy.
Additionally, the EU established advanced preferential market access arrangements for agricultural and isheries products with Egypt and Jordan, while
EU-Morocco relations now also include an exchange of offers to liberalise
99
The Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area Amongst Arab Euro-Mediterranean Countries (Agadir Agreement), signed in Rabat on 25 February 2004 between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
and Tunisia, entered into force 6 July 2006. For the full text and most recent status of the Agreement <http://www.agadiragreement.org>.
100
See ENPI Project: Agadir Agreement-EU support project (phase II). The project provides
EUR 4 million in the 2008-2012 period, see <http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=314&id_
type=10>.
101
Ibid.
102
Reference should, however, be made to the opening for signature on 15 June 2011 of
the regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Rules of Origin. Since then, only the EU,
the EFTA States, FYROM, Montenegro, Croatia, Albania and Turkey have done so. At the time
of writing, no MENA country has formally endorsed this. For an up-to-date overview, visit <http://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_
en.htm>.
103
For an assessment of the effects of the EU’s market access policies in the different Arab
countries from an economics perspective, see: A. Ghoneim N. Péridy, J. Gonzalez and M. Parra,
‘Shallow versus Deep Integration between Mediterranean Countries and the EU and within the
Mediterranean Region’, CASE Network Report No 96 (2011), available at <www.ceps.eu/ceps/
dld/6795/pdf>.
104
Council conclusions on the EU response to the developments in the Southern neighbourhood, 3130th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 1 December 2011, para. 10. The
authorization of the Foreign Affairs Council to start the negotiations of DCFTAs happened on 14
December 2011.
105
R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, supra note 11, at 34. Negotiations on a DCFTA can
only be launched after the decision of the Trade Policy Committee of the Council on the basis of
a report from the Commission. Green light was given in the case of Morocco in November 2012.
See: Council, press release, 3203rd Council meeting foreign affairs and trade, Brussels, 29 November 2012.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
services.106 In conclusion, facilitated by impulses from the Commission’s DG
Trade, medium- and long-term revised market access policies are amongst the
most concrete instruments the EU has used effectively to reconnect to the Arab
world. Other objectives that remain to be achieved include the conclusion and
EU approval of trade liberalisation agreements on agricultural and isheries
products with Tunisia, the launch of negotiations on agreements on conformity assessment and acceptance of industrial products, and the acceleration
of on-going bilateral negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in services.107
The EU has also sought to take action to stabilise economies within the Arab
region through participation in G8 initiatives. On 27 May 2011, in the French
city of Deauville, a Partnership was launched between the G8, MENA countries,
and a number of external actors108 to implement home-grown reforms and
programmes to restore economic growth and conidence.109 This informal forum
managed to address two of the aforementioned structural bottlenecks which
the EU faces in the Arab region: (1) the inclusion of the topics of trade in services and investment and (2) the expansion of trade and intra-MENA investment
cooperation.
3.2.3. Mobility
The turmoil of Arab awakening caused an alarming numbers of people to move
both within and away from the region.110 EU Member States were the preferred
destination of many migrants. The EU responded to this challenge in a rapid
manner and with a strong focus on security issues. In February 2011, the joint
operation EPN hERMES of Frontex and Europol was launched following Italy’s
request for assistance in managing the inlux of migrants. Additional funds of
€25 million were made available by the Commission to be mobilised under the
External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund following concrete requests
106
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, 8-9.
Ibid. at 9. Since the launch of the Partnership, an EU-Morocco Agreement on agricultural,
processed agricultural and isheries products entered into force 1 October 2012 (OJ L 255/1, 21
September 2012) and a regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Rules of Origin was
opened for signature, see supra note 102.
108
Since the inaugural meeting in Jordan on April 11-12, 2012, partnership States are ive
MENA countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, and Libya), the G8, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, qatar, and Turkey. Participating International Financial Institutions include
the African Development Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab
Monetary Fund, the EBRD, the EIB, the Islamic Development Bank, the International Finance
Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, the OPEC Fund for International Development,
and the World Bank. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development is also a
Partnership member.
109
Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Spring, G8 Summit of Deauville, 26-27 May, 2011, available at <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/the-2011-summit/declarations-and-reports/
declarations/declaration-of-the-g8-on-the-arab-springs.1316.html>.
110
Member States had lively discussions on how to control this ‘human tsunami’ (dixit Berlusconi) within the Schengen zone: D. Perrin, ‘Arab Revolts and Migration: Behind the Mediterranean Wall, the Unity of Europe’, in Mediterranean Yearbook (Barcelona: IEMed 2011), at 283-286.
107
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of Member States.111 A more comprehensive approach was sought in the opening of a Dialogue on Migration, Mobility, and Security (‘the Dialogue’).112 The
Dialogue was presented in May 2011 and aims at enhancing and facilitating
the regular channels for migration and mobility of the citizens between Arab
countries and the EU. Under impulses of the Member States, extra funds were
made available, technical assistance to the migration operations was increased,
and a resettlement policy was presented.113
The EU’s management of migration lows relects pre-Arab Spring practices
and a Member State-driven reasoning. To a certain extent, and despite the title
of the instrument, the Commission attempted to de-connect migration from its
security dimension when it presented its medium and long-term views in the
Dialogue. It was argued that mobility would enhance economic prosperity, and
thus job creation, and even democracy.114 Thereto, migration policies were
integrated in the economic 3Ms policy framework. The movement of people is,
however, not to be reduced to a mere side-effect of market integration. As
stated, increased international mobility of people challenges the EU in terms
of security and human development as well.
In a follow-up instrument to the Dialogue, the Commission re-introduced a
tool it had launched itself, with limited success, in 2006: Mobility Partnerships.115
In June 2011, the European Council embraced the Commission’s proposal to
conclude partnerships these with Arab States.116 The Mobility Partnerships are
to be agreed at the political level between the EU, its Member States and the
partner country concerned. The reciprocal dimension of the envisioned Partnerships includes increased opportunities for legal (economic) migration, increased
capacity building and inancial support for border management, in return for
cooperation in preventing and ighting irregular migration and traficking in human beings.117 Mobility Partnerships will be differentiated according to partner
countries’ individual merits, agreed with each partner country separately, and
will be conditional on efforts and progress made.118 The conditionality principle
(‘more for more’) was as such included in migration politics, transforming the
‘partnerships’ into rather unilateral instruments, with a strong role for the Union.
111
See: The European Commission’s response to the migratory lows from North Africa,
MEMO/11/226, Brussels, 8 April 2011.
112
See: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A dialogue for
migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries, Brussels, 24 May
2011, COM(2011) 292 inal.
113
Ibid., at 4-6.
114
Ibid., at 6-7.
115
On 16 May 2007 the Commission issued a Communication on Circular Migration and
Mobility Partnerships between the EU and third countries Brussels, COM(2007) 248 inal, on the
basis of which the Council deined the purpose and parameters of Mobility Partnerships. See:
Council Conclusions on extending and enhancing the Global Approach to Migration, 2808th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 17-18 June 2007, para. 10.
116
Conclusions of the European Council of 23-24 June 2011, Brussels, paras 27-28. Before
the uprisings partnerships had been concluded with Cape Verde and Moldova (2008), Georgia
(2009), and Armenia (2011).
117
A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 7.
118
Conclusions of the European Council of 23-24 June 2011, para. 28.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
Through its ‘Erasmus Mundus’ programme, the Commission doubled the
number of education and teaching grants available for young people and university staff from MENA countries.119 Though valuable, this is a relatively small
project that only encourages short-term stays.
3.3. Challenges related to human rights and democracy policies
The upheavals in the Arab region underlined the need for the EU to revisit its
role as a promoter of human rights, democracy, rule of law, socio-economic
equality, and its contribution to reforming institutions in partner countries.120
Despite external human rights and democracy policies having been in place
for many years, the EU cannot take credit for having enhanced the 2011 democratisation processes.121 Neither had the European human rights and democracy discourse impeded gross human rights violations from happening or
dictators from remaining in power for many years.122 Coming clean with the
past, nostra culpa speeches were delivered by Commissioner for ENP Štefan
Füle and high Representative Ashton. Both recognised that policies favouring
short-termism had to be replaced by a ‘sustainable stability’ which includes
political, social, and economic development, as well as enhanced efforts in
defending human rights and local democratic forces.123 Instruments considered
to be it to put such promising words into practice were those Europe was al-
119
The Commission announced an allocation of nearly EUR 30 million through Erasmus Mundus in the 2011-2012 academic year, speciically for Southern Neighbourhood countries; European Commission, Erasmus Mundus: funding boost for Arab Spring countries, MEMO/11/918, 16
December 2011.
120
The EU sees itself as a normative actor in global governance. It prioritises the promotion
of human rights, democracy, good governance, and rule of law and seeks to develop relations
and build partnerships with third countries and organisations that share these values; see e.g.
Art. 21(1) TEU.
121
K. Roth, supra note 53, at 12; A. Driss, supra note 40, at 97.
122
This critique on European pre-Arab Spring policies has been very present. It was also observed that, at the outset, the uprisings were not particularly supported by the EU and its Member
States. See, among others: R. hollis, ‘No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis
of the Arab Spring’, 88 international Affairs (2012), 81-94; B. Ward, ‘Europe’s own human rights
crisis’, Human Rights Watch essay 2012, available at <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/iles/related_material/eucrisis_2012.pdf>.
123
C. Ashton remarked: ‘We know that we need the right blend of democratic and economic
reforms to build sustainable stability. Events in the region show that the “old stability” wasn’t working. That is why we need to build a new “sustainable stability”. This will require us to tackle the
political and economic aspects in an integrated manner. What these last few weeks have shown
us is that political and economic reforms must go hand-in-hand. Populations are striving for political rights and freedoms, accountability and participation’: Remarks at the Senior oficials’ meeting
on Egypt and Tunisia, Brussels, 23 February 2011, A 069/11. Commissioner S. Füle stated: ‘We
must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and
local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at
best, short-termism – and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more dificult
to build’: Speech on the recent events in North Africa Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), European Parliament, Brussels, 28 February 2011.
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ready familiar with: the ENP, the European Instrument for Democracy and
human Rights (EIDhR), and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED).
First of all, the EU made convenient use of the strategic revision of its ENP
framework to stress the importance of human rights and democracy in its
neighbourhood policies. The new ENP approach is more explicitly based on
mutual accountability and enhanced commitment to the universal values of
human rights, democracy and rule of law, and as such builds on the normative
approach the EU has taken for years.124 More emphasis is put on comprehensive implementation. It does so by differentiating levels of assistance, depending on progress made in building and consolidating human rights.125 This is
realised, irst, via a ‘more for more’ political conditionality, notwithstanding the
implementation deicit that such clauses suffered from in the past.126 Additionally, a ‘less for less’ conditionality was introduced enabling the EU to reduce
beneits when democratic expectations are not met.127 A second method used
to differentiate policies was the move towards a multi-level and multi-actor approach. This included the boosting of joint initiatives in international fora on
issues of common interest128 and the further engagement of civil society. In this
respect, the ENP explicitly aims to address criticism that, although human rights
principles have been integrated into ENP action plans and association agreements, they are not matched by suficient and effective instruments adapted
to the local context and needs of the countries and regions concerned.129
The second tool in human rights and democratisation policies is the Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR). It functions as the concrete
expression of the EU’s intention to integrate the promotion of democracy and
human rights into all of its external policies.130 It thereby serves to respond to
the often-voiced criticism of a lack of coherence of EU human rights policy.131
The instrument reaches out to local NGOs and supports those promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law via a chain of micro-projects.132 The
EIDhR has also suffered from an implementation deicit. The requirement to
approve projects on a case-by-case basis has severely limited the scope of
124
A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 2.
Ibid., at 3.
126
Ibid., at 6.
127
Ibid., at 3.
128
Ibid., at 2.
129
B. Van Vooren, EU External Relations law and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A
paradigm for coherence (London and New York: Routledge 2012), at 255.
130
Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a inancing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human
rights worldwide, OJ L 386/1, 29 December 2006. Through a variety of EIDhR projects the European Commission demonstrates a signiicant political and inancial commitment to supporting
human rights and democracy worldwide.
131
S. Gstöhl, ‘Patchwork Power’ Europe: The EU’s Representation in International Institutions’, 14 European Foreign Affairs Review 2009, 385-403; G. de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken:
The European Union as a Global human Rights Actor’, 105 American Journal of international
law 2011, 649-693.
132
See for further reading: F. Bicchi, ‘Dilemmas of implementation: EU democracy assistance
in the Mediterranean’, 17 Democratization 2010, 976-996.
125
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
EU action, and in some years not all of the allocated budget has been used.133
Remarkably, if anything, the EIDhR has become further marginalised in the
EU’s Arab uprisings strategies. It was not signiicantly revised recently nor was
it referred to in the Joint Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and
Shared Prosperity. This is noteworthy because the EIDhR is a programme inanced through the Commission’s EuropeAid, and EU delegations are involved
in the monitoring of calls to support new local projects, which are now booming
in the Arab region. The revised ENP merely refers to EIDhR activities as supplementary to its own. The EIDhR Strategy Paper 2011-2013, adopted in April
2010, states that the EIDhR is intended to complement geographical programmes such as ENP and ENPI.134 Notwithstanding new demands resulting
from the rapidly changing realities in the Arab region, the EIDhR will continue
to support projects and civil society in the region in the same manner as prior
to 2011.
Generally, democracy support is also provided via EU Electoral Observation
Missions and mechanisms to empower civil society.135 During the uprisings,
the promotion of the new, though ill-deined, concept of ‘deep democracy’ found
its way into European policies.136 A particular instrument to promote this deep
democracy is the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), intended to
help political parties, non-registered NGOs, trade unions, and other social
partners striving for democratic change in their countries. The EED functions
as a fund to enhance democracy building around the world. Originally proposed
by Poland prior to the Arab uprisings, the EED was endorsed by the high
Representative and the Council in the Spring of 2011.137 It ‘will seek to bring
133
T. Behr, supra note 54, at 437; F. Bicchi, supra note 133, at 989.
European Commission, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR)
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013’, C(2010)2432, 21 April 2010, para. 30.
135
The empowerment of civil society is a vital part of the renewed ENP, see infra.
136
A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 3. In this respect, C. Ashton recalled
that “Democracy is of course about votes and elections – but it is also about far more than that.
What we in Europe have learned the hard way is that we need “deep democracy”: respect for the
rule of law, freedom of speech, respect for human rights, an independent judiciary and impartial
administration. It requires enforceable property rights and free trade unions. It is not just about
changing governments, but about building the right institutions and the right attitudes. In the long
run, “surface democracy”, democracy that loats on the top – people casting their votes freely on
election day and choosing their governments – will not survive if “deep democracy” fails to take
root”. See: C. Ashton, Speech on main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence policy, European Parliament Strasbourg,
11 May 2011.
137
See: C. Ashton, ‘Empowered, Energised, Engaged’, Speech at the 6th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies, Vilnius, 1 July 2011, where she states: ‘That is why, I put
my support to the proposals put forward by Poland, by Radek Sikorski, for a “European Endowment for Democracy” – lexible, non-bureaucratic tool, free of the imprint of government and free
of EU bodies, which can help countries ind their democratic voice’. See also Council Conclusions on the ENP, 3101st Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 20 June 2011, para. 4.
In December 2011, EU Member States agreed on a political Declaration on the establishment of
a European Endowment for Democracy (COREPER, 15 December 2011). For further reading,
see R. Youngs and K. Brudzinska, ‘The European Endowment for Democracy: will it ly?’, Fride
Policy Brief Nº 128, May 2012, available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/1019/the-europeanendowment-for-democracy:-will-it-ly>.
134
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greater inluence and consistency to the efforts of the EU, its Member States
and several of the large European political foundations that are already active
in this ield’.138 From a EU policy strategy point of view, the creation of the EED
– a purely political and intergovernmental creation – in itself contradicts the
November 2009 Council Conclusions. These held that the EU is already reinforced by an extensive array of instruments related to democracy support and
that neither new conditionality arrangements nor instruments were necessary.
Instead, the focus should be on the consistent and effective implementation of
policies.139 The EED does not replace the other instruments intended to inancially support democratisation processes, but is a supplementary instrument
with a speciic objective that could have been included just as well in the EIDhR.
It is therefore desirable for the EU to make further efforts, as was agreed in
2009, to streamline the existing instruments and frameworks aimed at democracy support in third countries.140
In conclusion, it is doubtful whether these renewed (ENP), untouched (EIDhR), and somewhat redundant (EED) frameworks will have a signiicant
impact in the Arab region. Despite new rhetoric, in human rights and democratisation policies, the EU has not been distancing itself from old politics and
attitudes. Although it seems to have accepted the idea that no actual tool exist
to open up societies and enhance democratisation from the outside, more can
be achieved than what is the case today. Reducing the mutual incomprehensiveness of the recycled ENP, EIDhR, and EED programmes will be key in this
regard as well as the comprehensive use of the different instruments at the
EU’s disposal.
IV. EU INSTRUMENTS TO ENhANCE MULTI-LEVEL
COOPERATION
In its search for innovative approaches for enhanced collaboration in the MENA
the EU needed to revise relations with global, regional, and local actors. Moreover, the high Representative and EEAS have made considerable efforts to
build personal relationships and to involve different actors, at different levels,
in post Arab Spring dialogues. The present section discusses these and indicates where there is room for improvement.
4.1. Cooperation with international organisations
The EU engaged with the UN in responding to the Arab uprisings. The EU
cooperated with the UN Security Council on the situation in Libya. It has been
138
A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 4.
Council conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations 2974th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 17 November 2009, para. 3.
140
Similar comments were made by Véronique De Keyser in the Report on EU external policies in favour of democratisation, 2011/2032(INI), Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European
Parliament, 16 July 2011, para. 35.
139
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
active in urging members of the UNSC to assume their responsibilities as well
as in providing assistance in the writing of draft resolutions. Furthermore, in
April 2012, the internal crisis platform established by the high Representative
brought together different services of the EU speciically to better support the
UN in the implementation of the Annan plan.141 The high Representative also
takes part in the Action Group for Syria, a forum to support the implementation
of UNSC Resolutions on Syria that is based at the UN Geneva Ofices.142
The Union’s engagement with regional multilateral organisations, including
the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States (Arab League), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC)143 has been developing at different speeds. Particularly notable is the
EU’s rapprochement to the Arab League which, led by Secretary-General Amr
Moussa, had reinvented itself as an advocate of the protesters’ claims throughout the Arab world.144 This is remarkable for an organisation that, although it
aspires to goals similar to the EU,145 was primarily occupied with safeguarding
the independence and sovereignty of its Member States. Moreover, until recently, it operated in a climate of weak democratic practice, and as such, has
little experience engaging in core democratic activities.146 Even so, the enhanced EU-Arab League cooperation did not entirely come out of thin air. The
Arab League had been included in all meetings of the EMP since 2008.147 In
addition, in March 2010, the high Representative visited the headquarters of
the Arab League in Cairo, where she indicated her appreciation for the ‘grow141
Council conclusions on Syria, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 14 May
2012; Council conclusions on Syria, 3183th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 23 July
2012. Prior to this, the Libyan case had also demanded increased internal coordination. An EEAS
Crisis Platform was activated to conglomerate crisis response and crisis management structures
of the EEAS, the Council, and the Commission. In July 2011, a Conlict Prevention Group and an
EU Situation Room were launched to improve the early warning capacity, both of which were integrated in the newly established EEAS Crisis Response Department. The latter also coordinates
the work of the EEAS Crisis Platform.
142
Other invitees are the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Arab League, the
Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, UK, USA, Turkey and representatives of competent
committees of the Arab League.
143
The EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council discussed topics of regional security and stability at a Joint Council held in Abu Dhabi on 20 April 2011, in which they also underlined the need for
close cooperation with the Arab League, the African Union, and the UN. See: 21st EU-GCC Joint
Council and Ministerial Meeting Abu Dhabi, 20 April 2011, Joint Communique, available at <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/121610.pdf>.
144
See, among others, its efforts in (i) convincing the Security Council to create of a light ban
over Libya (February 2011); (ii) suspending the Arab League membership of Syria (November
2011); (iii) sending an observer team to Syria (January 2012); (iv) instructing President Bashar
al-Assad to delegate power to the government of national unity (January 2012).
145
These include the driving of closer relations between and coordination of political and
economic activities of Member States. See also the above discussed efforts of the Arab League
to further integrate markets.
146
For further reading, see: E. R. McMahon and S. h. Baker, Piecing a Democratic Quilt?
Regional Organizations and Universal Norms (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press 2006).
147
In 2008 the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers invited the Arab League to participate in all
meetings at all levels of the Barcelona Process (prior to this decision, it participated in meetings
at the Ministerial level only); Final Statement of the Marseille Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 3–4 November 2008, at 1.
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ing co-operation with the Arab League, with programmes that are aimed at
bringing us closer together’.148 Nonetheless, the EU and the Arab League have
ampliied their cooperative efforts during the last few months. The Council
underlined its support for the Arab League’s efforts to end the cycle of violence
in Syria, and for the deployment of its monitoring mission. Concrete cooperation
modes furthermore include (i) the creation of the League of Arab States Situation Room to improve communications and real time response to natural disasters or political crises; (ii) EU training of Arab League oficials to develop
analysis and the ability to respond to crisis situations; (iii) the establishment of
permanent EEAS-Arab League focal points; and (iv) the implementation of
projects by the EU-Arab League Liaison Ofice in Malta.149 In addition to more
immediate political and operational support, the EU and the Arab League have
engaged in exploratory talks regarding their medium and long-term cooperation
in the economic, social, educational, cultural and legal ields.150 A structural
redeinition of the EU-Arab League relationship to contribute to regional security, stability, and prosperity has been announced. The increased cooperation,
judged positively by both the EU and the Arab League, will furthermore be
wielded with regard to other important dossiers: the Middle East Peace Process
and Iran.151
The crisis situation has resulted in alternative forms of multi-organisational
consultation as well. In February 2012, the high Representative joined in rather unique deliberations with the Secretary Generals of the Arab League, UN
and OIC on the Syrian matter.152 The Libya Contact Group, later re-named
‘Friends of Libya’, was created following impulses from the high Representative. In addition to this, the EU is part of ‘Friends of Syria’, an informal contact
group of 70 States, the opposition group ‘Syrian National Council’ and seven
international organisations153 and is involved in a similar ‘Friends of Yemen’
initiative. These contact groups deliberately moved away from the UN Security Council to discuss the highly political issues related to regime changes in
the countries in question.154
148
C. Ashton, ‘A Commitment to Peace – the European Union and the Middle East The
League of Arab States’, SPEECh/10/94, 15 March 2010.
149
C. Ashton, ‘Speech on Syria’, European Parliament Strasbourg, SPEECh/12/272, 17 April
2012; Written answer of 26 march 2012 to question of MEP Simon Busuttil (PPE) to the Council
of 20 January 2012, E-000167/2012.
150
Ibid.
151
Cairo Declaration, adopted at the second European Union-League of Arab States Foreign
Affairs Ministerial Meeting, 13 November 2012, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133465.pdf>, paras 10 and 12.
152
The meeting was organised by the Arab League. See: European Union, Statement by
high Representative Catherine Ashton following the EU-LAS-UN-OIC meeting on Syria, Brussels, 23 February 2012, A 80/12.
153
The African Union, the Arab League, the Arab Maghreb Union, the EU, the GCC, the OIC,
and the UN.
154
The high Representative stated in this regard: ‘I equally welcome and will play an active
part in the Group of Friends of Syria, aiming at building an international consensus on Syria and
putting forward urgent proposals to stop the violence, alleviate the suffering of the Syrian population, seek a peaceful outcome to the current crisis and promote a new era of democratic change’;
European Union, Statement by high Representative Catherine Ashton on the decisions by the
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
4.2. Cooperation with local non-State actors
The EU’s level of success in its interaction with non-State actors before the
uprisings was relatively low. Admittedly, the circumstances did not allow for
extensive interactions with businesses, civil society, NGOs, and opposition
groups. In authoritarian societies, even civil initiatives are closely linked to the
governing regimes.155 The recent changes in the domestic legal orders brought
about opportunities in this regard. hence, goals of real engagement with local
non-State actors were taken on board in the revisions of foreign policy instruments. These included cooperation initiatives primarily intended to ensure the
embracing of economic challenges (via the funding of local projects and businesses) and socio-economic and State-building challenges (via the funding of
human rights NGOs). The irst, economic, engagement draws on UfM initiatives.156 The second form of engagement, the strengthening of the role of
civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, had already
been included in the EIDhR and ENP.157 The EIDhR Strategy for 2011-2013
states that projects will be implemented in the irst place by civil society organisations.158 The ENP reaches out to non-State actors in different ways.159
A new feature is the ENP Civil Society Facility to encompass and reinforce in
a comprehensive way existing initiatives of support to non-State actors.160 The
EU also prioritises the support for human rights defenders, which are regarded
as key interlocutors for EU diplomatic missions in third countries.
The motivation behind these forms of cooperation is twofold. The Union
wants to provide a role for civil society in the local democratic and constitutional reform processes. It also wants the people in the Southern Mediterranean
to experience a visible change in their daily lives, by acting locally through actors with whom they are familiar.161 Although not expressly communicated, the
fact that supporting NGOs is a convenient way to exercise inluence locally
without having to interact directly with government bodies, also may have played
a role. Cooperation with civil society may therefore be used to rebalance forms
of governance in the countries of the Arab region. It should be noted, however,
that the use of aid instruments to pursue political objectives remains contested
League of Arab States on Syria, Brussels, 13 February 2012. See also the continued support by
the Council: Council conclusions on Syria, 3179th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg,
25 June 2012, para. 4; Council conclusions on Syria, 3183th Foreign Affairs Council meeting,
Brussels 23 July 2012, para. 3.
155
See for the Syrian example: J. Stacher, ‘Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria’s hereditary Succession’, 65 The Middle East Journal 2011, 197-212.
156
See for example, the UfM Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, aimed at
assisting existing entities in partner countries operating in support of small and medium-sized
enterprises.
157
Art. 10, EIDhR Regulation No 1889/2006, makes, for example, private actors eligible to
receive EU funding for human rights or democracy related projects.
158
European Commission, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR)
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013’, C(2010)2432, 21 April 2010, para. 18.
159
It e.g. upgrades the role of civil society organisations, to promote democracy, human
rights, and to assist in institution-building: A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 3.
160
Ibid.
161
Ibid., at 5.
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and may not be the most effective way to reach out to the needs of the people
of the countries in question.
4.3. Diplomatic instruments to enhance bilateral and regional
cooperation
As indicated above, a differentiated use of policies and instruments in MENA
countries is considered crucial for the EU to achieve its foreign policy objectives. One way to improve bilateral relations on a country-by-country basis is
to reach out to its partners via the diplomatic instruments the EU has at its
disposal.
Throughout the last months, the EU has presented itself as a listening partner, willing to communicate with Arab partners, to better understand local dynamics and build personal relationships. This is considered important in the
Arab world, and can contribute to the rebuilding of trust. however, caution is
also in order. The ‘overspending’ of diplomatic capital in personal relationships
in this context – a region still in lux – may recall erroneous attitudes towards
regimes in the past and complicate the European vision on the MENA’s future
direction. Recent events in Egypt, in the fall of 2012, outline the complications
of such policy choices. The constitutional trials, the referendum, and further
tribulations have left the country in a deadlock state, reminiscent of ‘defeated’
Arab uprisings regimes. The high Representative approached the situation
very cautiously, not wanting to jeopardize any relationships. hence, public
statements were limited to ‘following with concern the events in Egypt’162 prior
to the referendum and ‘I reiterate my previous calls for dialogue among all
parties in Egypt […] I urge those concerned, in particular the President, to intensify efforts in this regard’ following the vote.163 It is highly questionable
whether the maintaining of personal interactions is preferred over putting pressure on individuals or governments ignoring human rights and democratic
principles and, if necessary, strongly condemning these.
The building of diplomatic relationships has taken place in high-level task
forces, co-chaired by the high Representative and respective leaders of the
partner countries.164 The Union also has a permanent diplomatic presence on
the ground in the form of EU Delegations.165 These Delegations operate as the
162
Statement by EU high Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Egypt, Brussels, 5 December 2012.
163
Statement by EU high Representative Catherine Ashton on the referendum in Egypt,
Brussels, 25 December 2012.
164
The EU-Tunisia Task Force in September 2011, which gathered expertise from the Commission, EEAS, EU Member States, the private sector, the EIB, the EBRD, and other international
inancial institutions has been set up to ensure better coordination of the country’s political and
economic transition. This concept has been applied in Jordan (February 2012) and in Egypt
(November 2012).
165
The EU has an active and passive jus legationis and relies on a worldwide bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic network to conduct international relations. For further reading, see J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New horizons?’, 7 The Hague
Journal of Diplomacy 2012, 31-49. On 12 November 2011, the high Representative oficially
inaugurated the EU Delegation in Libya’s capital Tripoli. An EU Ofice had been operational in
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
diplomatic missions of the EU as a whole and serve as bilateral contact points
with governments and civil society. The EU Delegations have proven to be an
excellent instrument in the Arab region by allowing the EU to already have a
foot on the ground. Tasks include the brieing of the Union, and more speciically the Brussels-based EEAS headquarters, on the situation on the ground.166
As was foreseen in the 2010 EEAS Decision, the head of Delegation also has
to implement operational credits in relation to the Union’s projects in the country of stationing.167 Many EU initiatives were launched, but have yet to be established and kept running, and the Delegations are given the central task to
comprehensively follow-up on these.168 It is yet unclear whether these tasks
are being performed in the most effective way. First, EU Delegations have to
maintain their role in promoting friendly relations with different sides in the
conlict.169 To illustrate the complexity it can be recalled that in the midst of the
Arab uprisings, heads of EU Delegations found themselves accredited to ‘old’
regimes (e.g. Morocco), transitional governments (Libya, Egypt), and newly
elected governments (Tunisia). The situation in Syria is even more complicated: the EU Delegation in Damascus remains operational and continues to
host diplomats of Member States that decided to suspend the activity of their
own embassies.170 Second, the diplomatic function of the Delegations must at
all times be preserved. The Delegations form a network of embassies and
fulil a similar function: the representation of the EU with local governments.171
As such, a reciprocal EU commitment to respect the 1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)172 terms and conditions in the application of
privileges and immunities is vital to its diplomatic relations. EU Delegations
have to respect Art. 41(1) VCDR regarding the non-interference in the internal
affairs of the receiving State. Local laws and regulations have to be obeyed
and thus a careful balancing act is needed between the tasks assigned under
EU instruments and the diplomatic functions of the EU Delegations under international law.
the country’s second city Benghazi since 22 May 2011 to enable EU actors to interact with the
Transitional National Council, civil society groups and international partners.
166
See also Art. 5 (9) which states that the Union delegations shall work in close cooperation
and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States.
167
Art. 5 (4) EEAS Council Decision.
168
As a side remark, given that delegations are staffed with diplomats, additional inancial
support is desired for the training and recruitment of staff to take up these tasks.
169
When regime change is taking place in a country, in general, diplomatic delegations cautiously adhere to the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Today’s opposition group may become tomorrow’s oficial representatives of a country.
170
C. Ashton, EU high Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Speech on Syria European Parliament Strasbourg, 17 April
2012. By December 2012, following MS have closed their Damascus embassies: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden
and the UK.
171
Art. 221(1) TFEU.
172
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961, entry into
force 24 April 1964, UNTS, vol. 500, at 95, no. 310. The EU is not a party to this convention but
the latter’s provisions are widely considered as being part of customary international law.
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The EU’s policies and interests are also promoted by its network of Special
Representatives. The Special Representatives are tasked to play an active role
in efforts to consolidate peace, stability, and the rule of law. As a result of the
Arab awakenings, the Council appointed the Spanish diplomat, Bernardino Leó
n, as the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean.173 his
mandate includes, irst, the vaguely formulated mission to support an orderly
transition of the region to sustainable democracy, as well as human rights, and
rule of law.174 Second, and on a more concrete level, he serves as the personiication of the EU’s enhanced diplomatic cooperation with the region as a
whole, with external partners, and bilaterally.175 Following the inclusion of local,
non-State actors in all EU’s instruments and policies, the Special Representative is furthermore responsible for coordinating relations with these partners.176
V. WhAT TO DO FOR ThE EU?
It has become clear that the EU, after a slow start, now assumes an active role
in addressing the needs of the people of the MENA. Yet, it has been stuck in
old habits of thought. The EU has chosen to answer the variety of challenges
by adapting its existing instruments. hasty policy-making, especially in the
period from March to October 2011, resulted in vague programmatic language.
This is unsatisfactory, since, up until now, a majority of the medium- and longterm measures are awaiting further implementation. Additionally, the lack of
critical creative thinking about an EU strategy in the MENA hinders the more
profound and much needed regeneration of EU attitudes. high stakes are
nevertheless involved: if the EU fails in the region, this will have an impact on
economic, human development, political, and even geo-strategically conditions.
A comprehensive strategy for the EU requires an original way of re-thinking a
number of issues, a selection of which are discussed here.
(i) Find a good mix between multilateralism and bilateralism
A recurring challenge for the EU is the development of comprehensive, multilateral policies while at the same time effectively differentiating its bilateral
relations. As demonstrated above, one has witnessed a shift from the more
multilateral EMP towards a policy of differentiation and bilateralism in the (revised) ENP and UfM. When promoting domestic reforms, differentiated bilateralism can be supported, but only to the extent that the multilateral basis it
builds upon is well-deined. Differentiation in policies may not contribute to
differences in the enjoyment of human rights and democracy, nor may it lead
173
Council Decision of 18 July 2011 appointing a European Union Special Representative for
the Southern Mediterranean region, 2011/424/CFSP, OJ L 188/24, 19 July 2011.
174
Ibid., Art. 2 (b) and 3 (e).
175
Ibid, Art. 3 (d); The SR enhances the EU’s effectiveness, presence and visibility in the
region and in relevant international fora. Art. 2 (c) names international organisations such as
‘African Union, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, the Organisation of the
Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States and the United Nations’.
176
Ibid., Art. 2 (c) and Art. 3 (a); (b).
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
to the use of conditionality mechanisms. Concretely, the policy of ‘less for less’
conditionality warrants caution, especially since further isolation of countries
may contribute to regional instability.
It is interesting to compare the MENA strategy with the EU’s relations with
other regions at this point. In the East, the EU is also confronted with a diversity in country proiles. Some States are doing relatively better (Moldova,
Ukraine) while others disapproved or even rejected a European rapprochement
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus).177 In this context, the EU has initiated a
return to multilateralism via its Eastern Partnership (EaP). Yet, it does so without abandoning existing bilateral structures. While the EaP is formally incorporated in the Eastern dimension of the ENP, an EU Neighbourhood East
Parliamentary Assembly, Euronest, has also been launched. Not only does this
reinforce multilateral structures, it also builds on the idea of a partnership rather than unilateralist approaches.178 The Barcelona process also includes a
parliamentary dimension. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly
(EMPA) can be further consolidated into a forum in which democratically elected members of parliaments can discuss the changes that have been taking
place in the countries. Accordingly, it provides for unique opportunities to exchange views in a multilateral arena on topics such as political reform and
state-building. A return to multilateral solutions may not only be interesting to
consider for this reason, but also because institutional support is needed to
install an Euro-Arab free trade zone and to increase intra-Arab cooperation. If
needed, a multilateral model could also take a more informal shape. The clublike network established under the G8 Deauville Partnership offers an example
of engagement by some of the most important neighbours, international organisations and development banks with the Arab region.
(ii) Make (the monitoring of) funding more coherent
The EU lacks a mechanism to oversee the distribution of funds of the different
ENP, EIDhR, UfM and EMP programmes. Financial support for the MENA
region has been channelled through a wide variety of sources, including the
ENPI, the EIB and the Refugee Fund. Although announced as a lagship initiative, the Commission’s SPRING Programme is not the integrated instrument
one may have hoped for. Funds continue to be incoherently distributed through
a variety of instruments, of which SPRING is just one example. Among the
most promising changes of the renewed ENP and EED is the treatment of
civil society as full partners and receivers of European funding.
Since 2011, the principle of conditionality has been (re)introduced in the
SPRING, ENP, Mobility Partnerships and Association Agreements. Including
conditionality in different instruments demands an integrated implementation
177
For further reading see G. Christou, ‘Multilateralism, Conlict Prevention, and the Eastern
Partnership’, 16 European Foreign Affairs Review 2011, 207-225 and S. Stewart, ‘EU Democracy
Promotion in the Eastern Neighbourhood: One Template, Multiple Approaches’, 16 European
Foreign Affairs Review 2011, 607-621.
178
See: Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary
Assembly, April 2011.
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mechanism. Additionally, the incentives in conditionality policies have to be
deined precisely. Previous experience in the MENA has proven that using inancial assistance as a ‘carrot’ does not automatically generate sustainable
human rights and democracy. Other offers that may be included to make the
acceptance of European proposals more attractive are the long-promised realisation of the ‘stake in the market’ for Arab countries and the conclusion of
mobility agreements striving for broader labour-related mobility. In this regard,
the EU should be aware that the public opinion prefers the pooling of efforts in
these ields over the external support for State system reforms.
(iii) Enhancing EU-Arab cooperation
Progress has been made in the EU’s structural cooperation with States – multilaterally and bilaterally, e.g. with governments of Arab countries – as well as
non-State actors. A clear shift in the EU’s policy towards its partners can be
observed. First, the Euro-Med relationship has progressed from merely being
a Commission-directed unilateral one to being more dialogue-based. Second,
civil society is increasingly treated as a full-grown actor in all revisited EU
programmes, although admittedly this trend had started before December 2010.
Third, the EU deepened its relations with the Arab League and envisions further
cooperation. It has been announced that in addition to joint crisis-management,
collaboration will also be set up on economic and political themes in the longer
term. Fourth, the systematic deployment of EU Delegations is relatively new
to the EU. The EU Delegations, working closely with partner governments and
civil society, are given a formal role in the implementation of EU policies. Under
the SPRING programme, for example, EU Delegations are tasked to locally
identify initiatives for the EU to sponsor. Yet, it is far from certain that the EU
will be able to reach out to Arab society through the funding of civil society.
Civil society often has close ties with governments and other funding organisations (international organisations, e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council and States,
e.g. Saudi-Arabia). Cooperation should be further enhanced with regard to the
non-organised part of society in the Arab region, a group still generally neglected in EU tools. The engagement of ‘society behind civil society’ should be
more prominently put forward as a priority. Additionally, insuficient attention
has gone to the establishment of relations with the military and religious groups,
inluential as political parties and as providers of social (health, education, and
social security) services.
(iv) Why does the EU need a strategy?
The EU’s actions in the MENA have been tools-based rather than strategyled.179 None of the renewed or launched instruments display an original and
well-thought-out EU vision on the MENA. More concretely, it is unclear where
the EU wants the MENA to be in twenty or thirty years and what it expects from
local policy-makers and cooperation partners in this regard. Even when setting
179
See supra and D. Greenield and R. Balfour, ‘Arab Awakening: Are the US and EU Missing
the Challenge?’, Atlantic Council Publication, (June 2012), available at <http://www.acus.org/iles/
publication_pdfs/403/95825_ACUS_arab_awakening_us_eu.pdf.pdf>, at 19.
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The Arab uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy
up cooperation structures, the lack of vision is striking. The EU has presented
itself as a listening partner to the MENA. The Arab world has seen the high
Representative coming clean with the past, listening to complaints and bringing
outreach visits to the region. Self-effacement was in order for the EU, but is
this suficient? This approach was probably defendable in the irst months of
the awakenings, considering the failures of past policies. But it rapidly loses its
strength if it is not backed up by a forward-looking strategy that comprises a
vision on the future development of the region. In fact, feedback has been, if
not indifferent, very mixed.180 Claims for European money, access to markets
and increased mobility are more present than requests for European assistance
in democracy- or institution-building.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Arab uprisings provide unique opportunities to revise the EU’s relations
with countries in transition in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Caught by
surprise at irst, the EU has now embraced security, economic, socioeconomic, political, social, and diplomatic challenges. The exact impact of the instruments created or modiied is hard to measure, especially since the region is
still in the middle of one of the greatest changes it has seen in 50 years. As
outlined, in countries such as Egypt, the political impasse is to be followed up
very closely until present day. The use of different policy instruments did not
result in the ambitious creation of a comprehensive strategy, partly because
the EU has not been successful in prioritising the interests it has pursued.
Ultimately, the EU’s quest for stability in the MENA region is still relected in all
its instruments, notwithstanding the re-orientation of programmes towards the
engagement of civil society and the support of the democratic aspirations of
the people of the region.
The revision of the ENP and EIDhR, on the basis of preparations that had
started before the recent changes in the region, and of the countless tools and
projects concerned, have not been suficiently thorough. The EU has made
clear progress in using its diplomacy tools. The mobilisation of EU Delegations,
the coordination by the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean, the organisation of task forces, the intensiication of partnerships,
whether formal and informal, with local actors, regional and global international organisations are all steps in the right direction. Yet, all these actions
have to be guided by a long-term, coherent strategy. Now that the optimism of
the early days of the Arab awakenings has ebbed, it has become all the more
clear that the EU still lacks a long-term vision on the future of the MENA.
180
See R. Youngs, ‘The EU and the Arab spring: from muniicence to geo-strategy’, Fride
Policy Brief No 100, (October 2011), available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/950/the-euand-the-arab-spring:-from-muniicence-to-geo-strategy>.
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The ENP and ‘more for more’ conditionality: plus que ça change ...
ThE Enp And ‘MoRE foR MoRE’ CondiTionALiTY:
pLUS qUE çA ChAngE …
Steven Blockmans
1. … PLUS qUE çA RESTE LA MêME ChOSE?
The revolutionary upheaval in the southern Mediterranean and the disparate
reforms in Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries have pushed the EU to revise
its approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). While EU institutions and Member States were caught by complete surprise by the so-called
‘Arab Spring’, a comprehensive discussion on the future of the ENP by the
Council had – coincidentally – already been planned for the irst half of 2011.1
In March 2011, the European Commission and the high Representative presented some ideas on a new ‘partnership for democracy and shared prosperity’ with the southern Mediterranean.2 In May 2011, they presented a full review
of the ENP.3 Whereas these documents were presented as a strategic response
to the sea change brought about by the revolts in the southern neighbourhood,
the priority areas of the revised ENP are essentially the same as those of the
‘old’ ENP, which was launched in 2003, revised at different intervals since, and
widely regarded as unsuccessful by analysts.4
With an emphasis on the promotion of democracy and the support for democratisation processes, reinforcing the rule of law, improving the respect of
1
See Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, 27 July 2010, para 1.
Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, COM(2011) 200 inal of 8
March 2011, Brussels.
3
European Commission and high Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A New Response to a
Changing Neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303 inal of 25 May 2011, Brussels.
4
See J. Kelly, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Adaptation in the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 44 JCMS (2006), 29-55; S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski, ‘Conclusions: Squaring the
Ring of Friends’, in S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski (eds.), The European Union and its Neighbours: A legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and integration (The
hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006), 613-639; M. Cremona and C. hillion, ‘L’Union fait la force?
Potential and Limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an Integrated EU Foreign and
Security Policy’, EUi Working Papers lAW 2006/39; M. Cremona and G. Meloni, ‘The European
Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?’, EUi Working Papers lAW 2007/21
(2007); G. Noutcheva, N. Popescu and M. Emerson, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years
on: Time indeed for an ‘ENP Plus’’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 126, March 2007; G. Edwards, ‘The
Construction of Ambiguity and the Limits of Attraction: Europe and its Neighbourhood Policy’,
30 Journal of European integration (2008), 45-62; B. Van Vooren, ‘The European Union as an
International Actor and Progressive Experimentation in its Neighbourhood’, in P. Koutrakos (ed.),
European Foreign Policy: legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing
2011), 147-171.
2
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human rights, judicial reform, administrative capacity-building, ighting corruption, and economic modernisation, the revised ENP is again based on the
principle of positive conditionality: the more governments in neighbouring countries implement reforms in the sectors outlined in the EU strategy paper, the
more assistance the EU will offer. Rebranding the incentive-based principle of
conditionality as ‘more for more’ cannot disguise the fact that the EU is essentially promising more of the same, thus reincarnating a weak pledge that
has still not been reciprocated by commitments of the region’s leaders to democracy, the rule of law and political reforms.
In real terms, the EU has allocated €700 million in new grants for the Southern neighbourhood, in particular through the SPRING programme (Support for
Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) which provides additional funding
to southern partners showing commitment to, and progress in, democratic
reform: e.g., €90 million for Egypt to support the government’s socio-economic reform programme; €70 million to Jordan (to support the electoral process,
to assist in reforming the justice system, to support efforts targeting public inance management, education and social security, and to help develop the
private sector and foster job creation), in tranches of 30 and 40 million, with
the second tranche linked to progress achieved in terms of democratic reform.5
Arguably, the sums mustered on top of the existing envelopes under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument are too small an incentive
to bolster the change needed to secure a successful transition from authoritarianism to democratic rule in the southern Mediterranean.6
The revised ENP does offer one major innovation by indicating more clearly than ever before that the EU will restructure or even reduce inancial aid and
sectoral support for those governments of neighbouring countries which delay,
impede or abandon reform plans. With the categorical reference to the principle of ‘less for less’, the EU has implicitly declared an end to the days that it
would simply acquiesce to a retreat on reforms by ENP partners. however,
while the introduction of negative conditionality cannot be dismissed out of
hand, the problem with the less for less principle rests with its implementation
of ‘other political measures’ ‘and targeted sanctions’. Two years on, the EU has
unfortunately not a whole lot to show for in terms of implementing the ‘less for
less’ principle, neither with regard to the eastern neighbourhood (e.g. Belarus,
Azerbaijan),7 nor for the southern Mediterranean (with the exception of cutting
5
For these and other details, see European Union, ‘EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The
State-of-Play after Two Years’, Press release A 70/13, Brussels, 8 February 2013. Towards the
eastern neighbourhood “more for more” has been applied in the visa liberalisation process, allowing the EaP’s poster child Moldova to progress faster than the Ukraine of Victor Yanukovych.
6
This observation takes account of the sums generated through the EU-induced Task Forces
for Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt, preferential loans granted by the EIB, and other collateral funding
mechanisms. See J. Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the
World, 1972-2006 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010).
7
See P. Pawlak and x. Kurowska, ‘EU foreign policy: more for more, or more of the same?’,
EU observer, 5 October 2011: The results of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw on 29
and 30 September 2011 “clearly show that while the EU is taking a strong stance in its mid-ArabSpring southern neighbourhood, it is repeating its old mistake in the post-Soviet east. Rather than
paying respect to ‘more for more’ the EU has again turned a blind eye to lack of reform in the
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The ENP and ‘more for more’ conditionality: plus que ça change ...
EU support to war-torn Syria, the ‘less for less’ principle has not been used to
signal the EU’s dissatisfaction with, e.g., the ongoing abuse of human rights
resulting from continued de facto rule by the military in Egypt and the lack of
reform of a mistrusted police force and justice system in Tunisia).8 In its application, the revised ENP must therefore be seen as a continuation of the EU’s
inability and lack of political will to exert effective inluence on (quasi-)authoritarian regimes to establish and maintain democratic reforms.
Politics aside, design is partly to blame for this. Both the joint communication
of 8 March 2011 and the May 2011 strategy paper read more like blueprints for
an assistance programme than strategic documents which offer a coherent
approach to a clearly deined reform agenda designed to foster ‘deep democracy’ (yet another new label to distinguish the ‘new’ approach from the EU’s
hapless efforts at promoting democracy before the Arab revolts erupted). Going by its path dependency in the formulation of external relations,9 it is hardly
surprising that in the revised ENP the Union again proceeds from the assumption that governments in the southern Mediterranean are ready to embark on
a path of reform accompanied by EU assistance.10 The ‘new’ ENP fails to acknowledge the complexity of the transition processes in the Arab Mediterranean,
the impact of the simmering conlicts between secular and religious movements,
as well as the wide variety of other drivers for change in each of the countries
concerned. This lesson took a while to sink in. Whereas the 2011 strategy
paper still contained an unjustiied assumption that the Tunisian development
model could be projected to the other countries in the region, the 2012 ENP
strategy paper’s references to the changed internal power structures in Tunisia,
Morocco, Egypt and Libya show that the Commission and EEAS have learned
to distinguish the countries’ different transition pathways.
Another structural shortcoming of the revised neighbourhood framework
relates to what has already been noted in passing, i.e. that the EU’s key documents still pack the diplomatic langue de bois which characterised the ‘old’
ENP. Ill-deined terms (e.g. ‘deep democracy’,11 ‘rule of law’, ‘governance reregion by promising more inancial support and deeper political co-operation. The EU’s $9 billion
offer to Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, in exchange for freeing political prisoners
and holding free and fair elections (which do not require him to step down) is surprising, to say the
least, and is an unfortunate reminder of the mistakes the EU has made in the southern Mediterranean. This suggests that the EU has not learnt from the Arab Spring and will continue to repeat
the same mistakes it has made in the past.” Another case worthy of the application of “less for
less” concerns Azerbaijan. See J. Kobzova and L. Alieva, ‘The EU and Azerbaijan: Beyond Oil’,
ECFR Policy Memo No. 57, May 2012.
8
There is a total absence of references to “less for less” in European Union, ‘EU’s response
to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years’, Press release A 70/13, Brussels, 8 February 2013.
9
See, e.g., T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights. international
Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999).
10
See E. Adler and B. Crawford, ‘Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, in E. Adler, F. Bicchi, B. Crawford and
R. Del Sarto (eds.), The Convergence of Civilizations; Constructing the Mediterranean Region
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press 2006).
11
According to the May 2011 Joint Communication, the notion includes “free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of
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form’) are sometimes used interchangeably (e.g. ‘democratisation’, ‘democratic transformation’, ‘transition’). Moreover, the EU’s mechanisms to assess
whether the situation in neighbouring countries matches the revised terminology, or is apt for the application thereof represent a return to the status quo
ante of donor-driven aid policies based on programmatic priorities and levels
of absorption capacity.12 Thus, the ‘new’ ENP stands in the tradition of ‘old’
bilateral action plans, representing nothing more than a vague and incomplete
catalogue of reforms.
2. VISION IMPOSSIBLE?
Whether the ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ conditionality can produce a
leveraging effect and inspire wholesale reform as desired by the EU is, to a
considerable extent, dependent on the prospects offered by the Union to neighbouring states. Whereas the eastern neighbours have reason to be hopeful
that they may be offered a membership perspective (perhaps as early as November 2013, at the EaP Summit in Vilnius),13 the southern neighbours have
no such prospect as they are not considered ‘European’ in the sense of the EU
membership clause in Article 49 TEU. Thus, the EU has to develop its strategic
commitment to the South if it wants the ENP to steer the revolutionary momentum in the direction of what is spelled out in Article 8 TEU, i.e. the creation of
‘an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the
Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’.
Whereas extending economic integration has been the EU’s method to beef
up the ENP, slogans like ‘close relations’, ‘everything but the institutions’ and
‘a stake in the internal market’ have in the past ten years proven to be too vague
and bureaucratic to rally support from the people on the streets of Cairo, Tunis
and Amman, or to inspire governing elites to engage in dificult and politically
costly legal, administrative and economic reform.14 One way of resolving this
law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; ighting against corruption;
security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces”. In February 2012, high Representative Ashton and
European Commissioner Füle sent an unpublished letter to EU Foreign Ministers on the operation
of conditionality that added “the respect of other human rights” to this shopping list.
12
N. Gros-Verheyde, ‘quand le «more and more» devient un «peu plus» c’est tout!’, Bruxelles2, 8 July 2012 : “Sous couvert de préciser quelques termes et déplacer quelques mots, on
place en fait la barre «démocratique» beaucoup plus bas. L’incitation différenciée liée aux critères
d’avancée dans les réformes, en particulier à l’approfondissement de la construction démocratique, fait ainsi place aux seuls critères, classiques, d’absorption et aux priorités «déinies d’un
commun accord». L’incitation démocratique est renvoyée à un soutien «additionnel». Un petit
plus, simplement… En quelque sorte, on revient à la situation quo ante. L’aide européenne –
pourtant ixée au titre de l’Instrument pour la démocratie – ne sera pas évaluée et conditionnée
aux avancées démocratiques mais à des seuls critères techniques (l’absorption) ou programmatiques (les priorités).”
13
See R. Sadowski, ‘Commissioner Fule wants prospective EU membership to be offered to
Eastern European countries’, Eastweek, 7 November 2012.
14
For a legal analysis, see K. Pieters, The Mediterranean Neighbours and the EU internal
Market: A legal Perspective (The hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2010).
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The ENP and ‘more for more’ conditionality: plus que ça change ...
lack of incentive is by offering neighbouring countries a real prospect of regional integration. Inspired by projects such as the Energy Community Treaty,
the European Common Aviation Area and the draft Transport Community Treaty, the EU could explicitly inject ‘legally binding sectoral multilateralism’ into the
ENP as a means to provide a tangible perspective of real long-term beneits
from EU cooperation to Mediterranean partners and to reinvigorate the ENP
for the next decade.15 The strong symbolism of such a well-deined project
would enhance the political proile of EU relations with the southern neighbourhood where the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has faltered. While there is
no silver bullet for EU engagement with the post-Arab Spring Mediterranean,
the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the Energy Community Treaty has
already illustrated the potential of this approach in the Eastern Partnership.16
Another way to achieve those goals would be to increase the level of differentiation between individual ENP partners. The ‘more for more’ and ‘less for
less’ conditionality approaches lay the basis for a stronger differentiation between neighbouring countries, one not based on geographic criteria but on
merit in individual performances. Ironically, the success of the revised approach
would steer the EU further away from its constitutional obligation to create ‘an’
(i.e. a single) area of peace and prosperity that Article 8 TEU calls for.17 however, the revised strategy does not set out which precise cooperation and association prospects might provide to the agents of reform in return for legal
adaptation, administrative shake-ups and tightening belts. As said before, the
EU continues to rely on the same instrument regardless of whether they are
attractive to the recipient country. This applies to the bilateral ENP action plans,
which may call for partly differentiated reform efforts at the micro level but which,
due to their vagueness and the EU’s path dependency, fail to offer a framework
for the implementation of fundamentally different policies. The same applies to
the offer of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), the
central component of the ‘more for more’ approach, whose structural distinctions between EaP countries (compare the templates for, e.g., Ukraine and
Moldova) and among southern Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Jordan,
Egypt and Tunisia) remain to be explained by the European Commission. The
fact that the EU claims to differentiate between neighbouring countries through
a merits-based approach, but is instead pushing model characteristics in the
DCFTAs, irrespective of different conditions in partner countries, serves to
conirm accusations of duplicity levelled against the ENP over the years.18
15
See S. Blockmans and B. Van Vooren, ‘Revitalizing the European ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’: The Case for Legally Binding Sectoral Multilateralism’, 17 European Foreign
Affairs Review (2012), 577–604.
16
See S. Blockmans and B. Van Vooren, ‘Strengthening the Strategic Choice Offered to the
EU’s Southern Mediterranean Neighbours’, CEPS Commentary, 7 February 2013.
17
For a legal commentary on the EU’s mandate under Article 8 TEU, see the contribution of
Christophe hillion to his working paper.
18
See T. Schumacher, ‘New Neighbors, Old Formulas? The ENP One Year After the Start of
the Arab Spring’, in A. Garcia Schmidt and J. Fritz-Vannahme (eds.), The Arab Spring: One Year
After Transformation Dynamics, Prospects for Democratization and the Future of Arab-European
Cooperation (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012), 87-104, at 92-3.
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Despite declarations to the contrary, the EU has continued its ‘one size its all’
policy since the outbreak of revolutionary upheaval in the southern Mediterranean. Arguably, prevailing conlicts of interest between Member States, among
themselves and with the Commission, EEAS and EP, only lead to the continuation of the lowest common denominator and affect the effectiveness and
credibility of the revised ENP. Thus, much like earlier editions of the ENP strategy paper, the implementation of the revised neighbourhood policy is hampered
by a variety of inherent structural weaknesses and contradictions. These are
especially evident in the area of political transformation and also apply upstream,
when considering the binding language of Article 8 TEU.
3. MITIGATING ThE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
IMPACT OF “LESS FOR LESS”
The success of political reforms and democratic transformation in neighbouring
countries is inextricably linked to improving the micro- and macro-economic
situation, i.e. people’s living conditions. In the light of the prevailing socioeconomic problems in almost all Arab Mediterranean states, a concern about
the implementation of the revised ENP therefore pertains to the potential application of a “less for less” approach. Given that the reduction or cancellation
of external support negatively impacts societal welfare, it is worth considering
the option of partially detaching the application of negative ENP conditionality
from those economic and social sectors that are most affected by structural
(e.g. urban vs. rural; touristic coastal regions vs. agrarian interior) discrepancies: transport, energy, communication, distribution of water, health care, and
others.19 Arguably, negative conditionality does not have to apply to all policy
ields. The logic of “more for more” and “less for less” could be more deftly
evoked in those non-negotiable sectors in which reforms primarily affect the
(abuse of the) power monopoly of the ruling authoritarian regime: political accountability, independence of the judiciary and freedom of expression. Excluding certain socio-economic and humanitarian areas from the application of “less
for less” may prevent potential veto players from exploiting socio-economic
hardship to block those transformation processes already underway.20 Although
the ENP is – in all but in constitutional vocation – based on the principle of
differentiation, the application of negative conditionality is expendable in the
above-mentioned areas, not only because it would generate more socio-economic problems and contradictions without necessarily generating greater
political and societal inluence over local transition processes, but also because
the basic socio-economic deiciencies are comparable in all Arab Mediterranean
neighbouring states.
In sum, the revised ENP seems unsuitable as the sole agent for the implementation or support of democratic and socio-economic reforms and carries
19
Ibid.
See N. Witney and A. Dworkin, ‘A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations’, ECFR, September 2012, at 58.
20
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the risk of counteracting the normative objective which the EU has pursued for
the last decade, that of transforming the outer periphery into one area of peace
and prosperity built on democratic principles. A bolder revision is needed if the
EU is to make good on its own promises, as indeed the expectations from both
neighbouring countries and strategic partners.
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60
The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
ThE Union foR ThE MEdiTERRAnEAn:
ChALLEngES And pRoSpECTS
José Manuel Cortés Martín and Gloria Fernández Arribas
1. A NEW ENTITY IN ORDER TO REINFORCE ThE BARCELONA
PROCESS
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is a new entity founded in July 2008
aimed at improving the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This entity conirms
the continuation of the Barcelona Process, launched in November 1995 with
the objective of reinforcing its most successful elements.1 This multilateral
partnership encompasses 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean
basin: the 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) on the one hand,
and 16 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and
the Western Balkans on the other. Among this group of 43 countries all EU
Member States are included, even though most of them do not have a Mediterranean character. Precisely, this diverse membership has been considered to
be one of the main constraints the UfM has faced so far, due to the dificulties
of reaching consensus between countries with so many different interests.2
Promoting peace, stability and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region
are the objectives of this new entity, which are postulated on three main pillars3:
(a) Equality among members within a context of strong co-ownership and
effective joint action;
(b) A mostly intergovernmental approach, based on traditional diplomacy and
political realism;
(c) A focus on selected economic and social projects, which present a transversal and strategic perspective, and whose success is expected to reinforce political dialogue and promote political cooperation.
Despite the interest raised by this organisation at its onset, its developments
and results have been fairly modest up to date, and it has not come up with
the desired outcomes yet. The reasons could surely be found in the European
1
F. Granell Trias, ‘La Unión por el Mediterráneo como organisación internacional y como catalizadora de cooperación europea’, 44 Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo (2013) Forthcoming. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, doc. COM (2008) 319
inal, 20.5.2008, at 4; L. huici Sancho, ‘La participación de la Unión Europea en la Unión por el
Mediterraneo’, 28 Revista General de Derecho Europeo (2012), at 6.
2
F. Bicchi, ‘The Union for the Mediterranean, or Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean
Relations’, 16 Mediterranean Politics (2011), at 9.
3
R. Aliboni and F.M. Ammor, ‘Under the Shadow of ‘Barcelona’: From the EMP to the Union
for the Mediterranean’ 77 Euromesco Paper (2009), at 24.
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inancial crisis or the revolutions emanating from the Arab Spring. Be that as it
may, the idea behind the establishment of the UfM was a positive one – that
of a high level partnership between the two shores of the Mediterranean. however it must be recognised that its endowment did not deliver the expected
results, thus failing to fulill its initial expectations.4 Given these moderate
achievements, this paper will be focused on exploring the reasons of such an
outcome, raising several questions as well as evaluating its future prospects.
First and foremost, it will be necessary to analyse the objectives of the UfM
and the instruments at its disposal to accomplish these goals. Secondly, this
relection will address both the changes in the region as well as in the institutional architecture of the EU and the UfM. To conclude, some hints about the
capacity of action of this entity will be presented.
2. IS ThE UNION FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN A REAL UNION?
Some authors have categorised the UfM as an International Organisation.5
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to observe that the UfM does not self-denominate
like an International Organisation, but as a multilateral partnership.6 On the one
hand, some misgivings remain about its real autonomy, even though, it is possible to afirm that the UfM is gradually becoming an international organisation.
On the other hand, it is doubtful whether it could be categorised as such at the
moment, at least, if the International Law Commission deinition in the framework of the responsibility of International Organisations7 is taken into consideration. First of all, due to the fact that the UfM is the continuity of the
Barcelona Process, it does not have a Founding Treaty. however it is worth
stressing that in its Final Statement, while Ministers and delegates established
the institutional architecture of the UfM and granted legal personality to the
Secretariat,8 they did not bestow international legal personality to the whole
entity as such. Moreover, the Final Statement established the UfM objectives,
but no reference was made to the creation of an International Organisation
whatsoever, which makes it dificult to consider that such an idea was the intention of the States. Secondly, the only entity the Statutes of the UfM is provide
it with is the Secretariat, which incorporates the structure of an International
4
Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Partnership
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. COM (2011) 200 inal,
8.3.2011, at 11.
5
F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
6
“The Union for the Mediterranean is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the
potential for regional integration and cohesion among Euro-Mediterranean partners”. http://www.
ufmsecretariat.org/en/who-we-are/
7
“International organisation” means an organisation established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality. International organisations may include as members, in addition to States, other entities. Draft articles
on the responsibility of international organisations, 2011.
8
“have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status”. Final Statement. Marseille,
3-4 November 2008, at 5.
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The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
Treaty. In this Treaty, the legal personality bestowed to the Secretariat in the
Final Statement and in its Statutes,9 and the recognition of privileges and immunities10 mentioned in these legal texts, are elements that could allow the
UfM to be considered as an International Organisation, but only in relation with
its Secretariat.
Thirdly, in this respect, the Secretariat has signed a headquarters agreement
with Spain, in which the latter recognised the legal personality of the former.11
But this is internal personality, exclusively. Therefore it is dificult to afirm that
the UfM has international legal personality or, that it is a mere permanent intergovernmental conference or a conference of governments.
however, taking into account the implied powers doctrine, the UfM could
acquire this nature as it goes in the exercise of its competences. In this direction, in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case
‘Reparation for injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations’ from 1949,
the Court appeared to support the view that the legal personality of an organisation exists when: it has been given competences in order to achieve
certain objectives; it exercises them; and, in particular, when such an exercise
shows a separate will of the organisation.12
“The Organisation was intended to exercise and enjoy, and in fact is exercising and
enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality.”13
9
Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean. Article 1.
“A headquarters Agreement between Spain and the Secretariat will grant the Secretariat
the privileges and immunities for carrying out its activities” Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union
for the Mediterranean. Article 1. See also Final Statement. Marseille, 3-4 November 2008, at 7.
11
España reconoce la plena capacidad jurídica del Secretariado de la Unión por el Mediterráneo para contratar, adquirir o enajenar bienes muebles e inmuebles, recibir y desembolsar
fondos públicos y privados, y entablar acciones judiciales y/o realizar cualquier acto necesario
para desempeñar sus obligaciones y cumplir sus objetivos. BOE Nº 145, 15/6/2010. The rest of
the participant States are reluctant to recognise that legal personality. L. huici Sancho, supra n.
1, at 12.
12
J.M. Cortés Martín, las Organisaciones internacionales: Codiicación y Desarrollo Progresivo de su Responsabilidad internacional (Sevilla, Instituto Andaluz de Administración Pública,
2008), at 91.
13
ICJ, Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion
11 April 1949, ICJ Rec. 1949, at 179. See C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the institutional law
of international Organisations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1996); P.h.F. Bekker,
The legal Position of international Organisations. A Functional Necessity. Analysis of Their legal
Status and immunities, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994); M. Bettati,
‘Création et Personnalité Juridique des Organisations Internationales’, in R-J Dupuy, Manuel sur
les Organisations internationales, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998);
J.M. Cortés Martín, supra n. 12.; G. Fernández Arribas, las capacidades de la Unión Europea
como sujeto de Derecho internacional, (Granada, Educatori 2010); J Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’, in M Koskinniemi (ed.)., international law
Aspects of the European Union (The hague, Kluwer International Law 1998); M Rama-Montaldo,
‘International Legal Person and Implied Powers of International Organisations’, 44 The British
Yearbook of international Organisations (1970), at 11; F Seyersted, ‘International Personality on
Intergovernmental Organisations. Do their capacities really depend upon their constitutions?’, 4
The indian Journal of international law (1964), at 1; F Seyersted, ‘Is the International Personality
of Intergovernmental Organisations valid vis-à-vis Non-Members?’, 4 The indian Journal of inter10
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Consequently, it should be necessary to prove whether the UfM is effectively exercising such a kind of functions and rights.14 Should this be the case,
it could be appropriate to speak about the UfM as an International Organisation,
something that at present times seems to be dificult to assert. Furthermore,
concerning the nature of the UfM, it is worth mentioning that this entity has
been conceptually referred to as a Union of projects,15 although some of its
institutional developments point more to a Union of agencies. In this sense,
the activities carried out by the UfM are in the framework of projects concerning technical cooperation, although the objectives enshrined in its Statute are
of political nature. Ultimately, the UfM has also been deined as an institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation structure.16
Regardless this complex set of deinitions, it has been claimed that this
entity is a irst stage in the path towards a genuine political cooperation17.
Besides, should the case be that the UfM inally develops projects that truly
affect in a positive way the life of the population, it could be possible for the
UfM entity to secure an effective political leverage. In general terms however,
it seems that the beginning of deining a policy, in which the sequence and
effectiveness of the instruments at stake, as well as the question of how they
will be assigned to achieve its intermediate goals, remains unspeciied.
The current state of affairs seems to demonstrate that the UfM could be
perceived as an entity which does not take into account the reality of Mediterranean region. This argument is based on the substantial differences to be
found regarding the few shared interests and opposite aspirations between the
countries on the two shores of the Mediterranean. For instance, Albania’s and
Montenegro’s future are said to be within the EU family, while the same cannot
be assumed for the North African countries. In addition, Monaco and Turkey
(which initially did not even wish to be part of the UfM) or inally Mauritania and
Slovenia may have quite rather divergent national interests so to say. The high
number of participants has been criticised because of the dificulties of reaching consensus. It has been noted, that, ‘by increasing the range of diverse
interest that must be accommodated, it ampliies the need to focus on subregional projects and the related impossibility to achieve any substantial result
by a group of over 40 members’.18 In any case, it has been pointed out that the
contrary option — including only European countries whose interests lie in the
Mediterranean area — would have broken the focus of attention of the EU into
two diverging directions: one directed towards the southern neighbourhood,
national law, (1964) at 233; N. D. White, The law of international Organisations (huntingdon,
N.Y. Juris Publishing; Manchester, Manchester University Press 2005).
14
It can be inferred that these rights come to manifest the capacity to operate upon international plane. G. Fernández Arribas, supra n. 13, at 63.
15
F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
16
L. huici Sancho, supra n. 1, at 11.
17
Ibid. at 5.
18
F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 9.
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The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
and other pointing to the East, thus undermining the role of the EU as a civil
power in these geographic areas, respectively.19
Pertaining to the number of participants issue, the French proposal should
be analysed. The proposal did not foresee the participation of all EU countries
at the launching of a joint project or action. however, it included a model which
tried to mitigate the consequences of the high number of eventual participants:
the variable geometry method.20 This method allowed different degree of implications by the participants depending on their interests in the projects or
actions at stake. Nevertheless, the inal decision for the approval of a project
was subject to an agreement among all participants, which would have made
the success of the UfM inevitably dificult .21
One of the immediate consequences of this architecture is that the UfM only
keeps the appearance of a Union on one side of the Mediterranean, namely
the EU: a proper union of States, that, most of times, speaking with one voice.
On the other side, an agglomeration of States with complex or limited relations
among themselves is to be observed; including certain countries of the southern shore involved in internal conlicts, together with the different countries of
the Adriatic Sea. As a result, it seems that this conglomerate of member countries does not correspond properly with the term Union. There are two radically different blocs, instead. As it has been stated: on the one hand, a real
unity, the EU. On the other, a large number of countries with no real link between
themselves and, consequently, no common voice to negotiate as a bloc.
This situation however could have found a turning point with the arrival of
the new Secretary General in early 2012, who has expressed fresh, clear and
tangible ideas. One of these new proposals includes the possibility of making
a distinction between Western and Eastern Mediterranean countries, which
are facing different realities and pursuing different goals. Mr. Fathallah Sijilmassi, UfM’s Secretary General since February 2012, launched the idea of
focusing the UfM’s work at the sub-regional level and making a broad distinction between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean countries from the south
shore. The aim would be to take into account their speciic constraints and
particular problems, including political obstacles. Nonetheless, this division
between East and West is not the only contrast among Southern-Mediterranean
countries. In this regard some remarkable differences inside the sub-regions
are to be observed. One example is the disparity of GDP/per capita among
countries of the western area: Morocco (31 million population and €3,800 per
capita), and Tunisia (10 million population and €6,800 per capita).22 Furthermore,
some more divergences can be identiied: in relation with their exports, integration of women in the labour market, education, etc. however, the main differences between them are the political transformations that have already taken
place or, those which are meant to occur across the region. No distinction
19
G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, ‘After Partnership, Neighbourhoods and Advanced Status… Who fears the Union for the Mediterranean?’ 21 Papeles de Europa (2010), at 32.
20
L. huici Sancho, supra n. 1, at 5
21
Ibid., at 29.
22
F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
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between West and East can be made here, since these political upheavals are
taking place in both parts of the region. As a valid example, the cases of Tunisia or Syria can be mentioned. In addition, there are some conlictive areas
that could be complicating the activity of the UfM. Indeed, the Middle East
conlict has come to affect the UfM’s agenda.23
The proposal of the Secretary General could be probably the irst step for
an effective application of the variable geometry method: the number of countries participating in projects will vary in line with their real interest in those
speciic ventures. The problem remains however, as it would be still necessary
to count with the green light of all members in order to implement these actions.
3. ARE ThE AIMS OF ThIS UNION CLEAR?
As has been stated the main objectives of the UfM are the establishment of
peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean countries. however, these
objectives are rooted in the particular interests of the EU in some areas as
security, migration or energy.24 These interests, however, might be distant to
the speciic interests of the South-Mediterranean countries. For example, the
Arab countries are developing relations amongst themselves which, in many
cases, bear no relation to their Mediterranean shoreline. In this context, the
position of the countries of the other side of the Mediterranean differs greatly
from the aspirations held on the EU side.
For the achievement of the UfM’s political objectives, technical projects in
six priority areas have been established: (1) de-pollution of the Mediterranean;
(2) maritime and land highways; (3) civil protection; (4) alternative energies,
like the Mediterranean Solar Plan; (5) higher education and research, like the
Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) project; and (6) the Mediterranean
Business Development Initiative.25 It has been accepted that the development
of the region can foster democracy and good governance and, consequently,
it would lead the region to peace and stability. Nevertheless, advances on
projects of technical nature exclusively, without a political strategy accompanying them do not guarantee the success of the UfM. The EU has been acting in
this area throughout several decades, providing tailor-made plans for each
country, and also by the means of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the
European Neighbourhood Policy. Assessing its results, the EU has been somehow involved in the region without getting important political changes in those
countries. Therefore, the economic problems of the Southern Mediterranean
23
F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 11-12.
F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1; Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 4.
25
Final Statement. Marseille, 3-4 November 2008. Together with the projects that the UfM
has approved, there are some areas where the UfM should focus its activities. Rural development is considered for experts and scholars one of the priority areas due to half of the population
depends on farming so it is necessary “to modernize the agriculture and prepare for it competition”; and also strengthening the small and medium size company should be one of the main
initiatives of the UfM with the objective of improving business productivity. See G. Escribano and
L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 35-37.
24
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The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
countries still persist, also due to the existence of deep structural problems. As
a consequence, the impact of the EU’s cooperation policies has been lowered,
thus making political dialogue necessary.
however, political dialogue is not the only method to move forward, since
the mentioned projects are also crucial to the development of the growth potential of the Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, several questions can be
raised in relation to these projects:
Firstly, it seems doubtful if there are synergies between the projects designed
by the Union for the Mediterranean and those featuring in the objectives of the
EU’s policy for the Mediterranean. The UfM is neither part of the EU’s development and cooperation policy nor of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 26
however, the UfM is acting in the same area where these EU’s policies are
performing their activities. Therefore, from this perspective, it seems necessary
to increase the interaction between the actors, aimed at establishing a closer
relationship with the European institutions. In this direction, the UfM could be
more in line with the institutional policies that affect the Mediterranean, thus
creating synergies. As a matter of fact, the EU as a whole fulills the co-presidency of the UfM since 2012.27 Thus, it will be necessary to coordinate its
activities in order to avoid the overlapping of projects and areas of performance.
Secondly, as stated above, political and economic development must go
hand in hand. Democracy and involvement of civil society into the political life
will not materialise without improvement in the population’s socio-economic
situation. The recent transformations in the Mediterranean countries, namely
riots, upheavals and changes of government, have demonstrated again that
economic aid itself does not have an impact on the population. It does not
contribute to the real development of the country either, nor to peace, security
or stability. For that reason, the UfM must contribute through its cooperative
instruments to the consolidation of democracy and lasting stability in all the
Southern Mediterranean countries. To accomplish this, it is imperative to
strengthen the cooperation with Mediterranean partners and their civil societies,
who have chosen the road to democracy and who expect signiicant support,
particularly in inancial terms, from the European Union.
The clariication of aims and competences of the UfM, considering the implications of the new political changes across the Mediterranean, and the necessity of a renewed approach to the region, which ought to take into account
civil society and its preferences,28 will allow the UfM to play the role of a catalyst to help and support the ongoing process of reconstruction and transforma26
But half of the budget of the UfM come from the European Commission’s budget of Neighbourhood Policy. See F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
27
Concerning the EU institutions and organs which assumes this task see Conclusions of the
Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the Northern
Co-Presidency of the UfM, doc. 6981/12, 27 February 2012; and infra n. 45, at. 10.
28
“The dynamics of not dealing with relevant issues in order not to bother MPCs governments
(democracy, human rights, institutional and economic reforms, civil society…) nor EU’s sensitive
sectors (agriculture, labour movements, funding increases…) to focus on EU’s Member States
immediate interests (energy, environment, university education) is not sustainable in the long
run”, G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 39.
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tion in the region. Last but not least, it is important to ensure that the UfM will
not be kept to be used by the Mediterranean elites as an instrument to retain
power.29
4. hAVE All FACTORS BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION?
The EU’s vision has been somewhat illusory and possibly even a bit selfcentered as regards the possible future transitions of these countries.30 The
EU has promised to support countries which make a serious commitment to
democracy. however in practice, not so long ago the EU was demanding these
countries to adopt ‘European society values’, with the principles and beliefs
that this entails. In this regard Article 8 TEU can be highlighted, that calls for
the respect of European values as a condition for participating in the European
Neighbourhood Policy. These requirements have been linked with the policy
of conditionality that could provide the EU with a very important instrument to
promote democratic changes in the partner countries. But this policy has had
a limited application.31 This is particularly true in the Euromed relations, where
this policy has been characterised for being ineffective, arguing that its agenda
focused basically on security and trade.32
The UfM does not intend to change this practice. however, the Paris Declaration does not contain references to conditionality. Even though its objective
is to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social
and cultural understanding, it is stated that this should be ‘accomplished on
the basis of equality and mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty.’33 Taking
into account that the conditionality policy has been viewed as an asymmetric
relationship34 this reference to ‘equality’ brings the idea of the elimination of
conditions. This lack of conditions can be observed on the projects of the UfM,
where no conditionality has been imposed in order to develop them.
29
Ibid. at 34. The recent European Commission Communication concerning ‘A partnership
for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ could be an important
proposal and way of action for the new approaching to the Mediterranean region. In this sense
the Communication, among economic or trade objectives, introduces the democracy and institution building objective, based on: expanding support to civil society; establishing a Civil Society
Neighbourhood Facility, and support Social Dialogue Forum. These objectives must be assumed
and implement by the UfM in order to accomplish its mission, see COM(2011) 200 inal, 8.3.2011.
30
Concerning the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean countries see. A. Blanc
Altemir, La Unión Europea y el mediterráneo. De los primeros acuerdos a la primavera árabe
(Madrid, Tecnos, 2012)
31
In this sense, the European Parliament has expressed its concern because of violation of
human rights in some of these countries and the narrow response of the EU, and as an example, in 2002 the European Parliament demanded to suspend the EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreement because of the activities of Israel in the Palestinian territories getting
a negative answer from the Council. European Parliament Resolution on the Middle East,
P5_TA(2002)0173. 10/04/2002.
32
A. El Maslouhi, ‘Une conditionnalité dépourvue d’effectivité: clause démocratique et gestion des risques dans les relations Euromed’, 1 EuroMeSCo Paper (2011) at 10.
33
Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris 13 July 2008, at 9.
34
A. El Maslouhi, supra n. 32, at 10 -15.
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The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
Despite the characteristically limited success of this conditionality policy, its
elimination from the UfM framework will create obstacles to demand the fulillment of requirements in terms of democracy and respect for human rights. This
proves again that the UfM seems to be focused on economic matters without
paying special attention to the social demands of the population.
Proceeding with the analysis of factors affecting the Euro-Mediterranean
relations, it is also necessary to remark the weight of traditions, mainly religious
ones. In this respect, the EU has been somewhat disappointed to realise that
the population of these countries has largely voted on the basis of their own
religious beliefs and traditions. This has driven Islamic political parties to power, generating a sense of mistrust among European countries. These transformations, however, seem to present a new opportunity for the European Union
to back a real democratic change in these countries, although it is important to
mention that the outcomes could be unpredictable at the moment, owing to the
absence of political culture and of new political leaders in the region.35
5. IN-DEPTh GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ChANGES
Concerning this question, it is necessary to focus on the role of the UfM in the
present context. The global environment has changed substantially since the
Paris Summit of 2008, as both areas of the Mediterranean basin, North and
South, have been the subject of a radical transformation. In the North, the EU’s
room of maneuver is restricted by the limitations arising from the economic
crisis, in particular since 2008. It has neither the resources or the determination
to make any further commitments to countries on the Southern shore of the
Mediterranean. In this dificult budgetary context, it seems essential to achieve
more with less, and to determine priorities clearly, especially those actions that
could contribute to the economic recovery and tackling high unemployment.
One should also take into account that the UfM’s attempt to address the problems of the Mediterranean region with less inancial resources than those of
the cooperation policy of the EU is a utopia.36
In any case and despite the dificulties, it seems that in order to achieve this
objective, the European Commission’s overall approach concerning the economic and inancial dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy goes
in the right direction in particular with the launching of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility.37 Moreover, the idea of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Investment Bank38 has been mentioned, but the current inancial crisis makes the
implementation of this project quite a dificult one. On the one hand, according
35
F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
Ibid.
37
It is inancial mechanism aimed at mobilising additional funding to cover the investment
needs of the EU Neighbouring region for infrastructures in sectors such as transport, energy, the
environment and social issues (e.g. construction of schools or hospitals). The NIF also supports
the private sector particularly through risk capital operations targeting Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises.
38
G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 38.
36
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to the mentioned projects of the European Commission, it could be observed
that the EU is increasing the level of funds allocated to the Mediterranean
partner countries. This could be interpreted as a way of incorporating in its
portfolio the needs arising from the Arab Spring and the consequences of the
economic crisis. As a matter of fact, half of the funding of the UfM in 2011 came
from the European Commission.39 On the other hand, it looks like the EuroMediterranean region suffers from a lack of investors’ conidence. Even though
one of the objectives included in the French proposal was to gather private
funding to develop projects,40 the success of this initiative has been limited. It
is necessary to bear in mind that there are only some projects that could beneit from private funding, as energy or public services; while others as civil
service reform need the allocation of public funding.41 In this framework, it
seems that conidence can only be achieved by improving the economic and
legal environment through major structural reforms, in order to make the region
more attractive. To this end the use of public funding needs to be materialised.
In relation with the southern basin, the so-called Arab Spring has created a
new political reality that has brought winds of democracy to the front line of
politics. At the same time, it requires urgently the dutiful management of the
transition processes and quick responses to the needs of the population. Therefore, the relations between the EU and the countries of the Southern shore of
the Mediterranean cannot leave aside and ignore the new reality. Particularly,
it is necessary to take into account some concrete factors that may determine
the political character of the region despite the latest events:
(a) The links between the countries of this Southern shore and the rest of the
Arab world;
(b) The growth of Turkey’s presence and importance in the region as a geopolitical actor has also affected the UfM’s activity. Worth mentioning is the
opposition of Greece and Cyprus to a Turkish candidate for the post of
Deputy Secretary General in the UfM’s Secretariat.42
(c) Finally, the Arab–Israeli conlict has politicised and disrupted the agenda
of the UfM, as national interests have come to the forefront and democracy and human rights have come to a second place.43
Mediterranean countries also need to send a positive message to Europe. They
are not external partners similar to the rest of countries which have a relationship with de EU; they are natural partners, instead. Due to the geographical
proximity, they are linked commercially, economically and in human terms. In
fact, the majority of migrants coming from these countries do indeed live in
Europe. As a matter of fact, migration movements, the colonial past or the
39
Together with the European funding the UfM has also received public funding from the
World Bank and the Gulf countries. See F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
40
L. huici Sancho, supra n. 1, at 6.
41
G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 38.
42
F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 14.
43
Ibid. at 11-13.
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The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
geographical proximities have been some of the reasons for the implication of
the EU with these southern Mediterranean countries.44
6. IMPACT OF RECENT EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONAL
INNOVATIONS ON ThE UNION FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN
The evolution of the EU’s institutional architecture has also had a remarkable
inluence on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Indeed, the UfM is now directly connected to the European institutions, as a result of the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
Concerning this aspect, the northern co-Presidency of the UfM has been
transferred to the EU as a whole, in line with the Lisbon Treaty objectives. In
other words, instead of EU Member States exercising the northern UfM coPresidency individually, this task has been entrusted to the EU in its entirety.
At the moment the co-Presidency is held by the EU and Jordan. According to
the Conclusions adopted by the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the high Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton,
will take over the co-presidency for meetings of Foreign Ministers. The European Commission will take over for Ministerial Meetings that solely concern
matters falling within areas of exclusive EU competence. For other Ministerial
Meetings, the Commission will also do so, in cooperation with the Member
State holding the rotating Presidency of the EU Council, except when such
meetings deal exclusively with matters falling within the scope of actions and
responsibilities of the Member states. Should this be the case, then the chair
will be held by the rotating presidency only. The EU’s External Action Service
will take over the UfM’s northern co-Presidency for Senior Oficial Meetings.45
This internal set-up gives a clear illustration of the European Union’s central
role in the UfM. Enhancing the role of the EU and elevating its proile in the
governance of the UfM means that the former, by means of its European Neighbourhood Policy, will provide greater support to speciic UfM projects.
Despite these institutional innovations in the EU, it remains doubtful whether this new supranational approach will be enough to overcome the standstill
of the UfM. The paralysis of the co-Presidency and the election of programmes
motivated by States’ preferences, instead of by populations needs have been
criticised; as well as the UfM’s complex and oversized structure, regarding its
functions and objectives.46 Other critics point to the Secretary General, which
is considered to be a politicised organ. In this respect, tensions between States
have also arisen, culminating in the election of six deputy Secretaries. The
great dificulties presented by the election of the Secretary General also demonstrated the States’ reservations and misgivings.47
44
F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1; F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 4.
Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States on the Northern Co-Presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 27 de febrero de
2012, doc. 6981/12 MED 9 PESC 245.
46
G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 39.
47
Ibid. at 31.
45
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7. FINAL REMARKS
This paper has asserted that the UfM still faces problems that do not enable it
to accomplish its objectives. however, one must recognise the success of the
projects and joint actions approved and implemented so far, i. e.: the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the Trans-Maghreb
Motorway axis, or the EMUNIU University in Slovenia.48
Nevertheless, in spite of these activities, it is not possible to properly talk
about an international organisation regarding the UfM, although its Secretariat
may seem to incorporate some characteristics of an international organisation.
Be that as it may, the most harmful constraint affecting the action of the UfM
is the lack of internal unity, due to the presence of different countries with diverging interests. The dificulties of the UfM do not lie in its objectives per se,
but in the implementation and the approach that ought to be taken to reach
them. As this relection has laid out, the objectives of the UfM are peace, stability and prosperity, attaching to all of them a political as well as a social character. The activities of the UfM, however, are focused on economic matters
leaving apart the political and social dimensions. Once again, this is not the
right approach. Otherwise, it must have been wrongly assumed that the economic success will exclusively bring the desired political and social changes.
In any case, it is worth pointing out that the elimination of the policy of conditionality in the UfM’s framework will complicate the process of obtaining the
necessary changes to really improve the lives of the population.
Implementing these objectives is not the only problem that the UfM needs
to tackle. The UfM has to take into consideration other factors that come to
complicate the dificult relationship between its members, like their religious
traditions. In the broader context and importantly, the economic crisis and the
Arab Spring have also imposed several hurdles to the work of the UfM. The
budgetary limitations, despite the efforts taken by the European Commission
to allocate more funds to these projects, will affect the success of the UfM.
Furthermore, private investors’ lack of conidence, as a result of the region’s
political instability after the riots and upheavals, will surely not contribute to the
improvement of the work of the UfM. The action of the UfM is orchestrated by
an institutional structure that has been deined as complex and oversized, which
come again to hinder the activities of the UfM. It is therefore necessary to stress
that the complicated representation of the EU in the UfM will hardly improve
this situation. Despite the complexity of this scenario, on both sides of the
Mediterranean basin, the necessity of creating a beneicial relationship has
been assumed, because of its potential for economic growth, its economic
complementarities, its energy market and human exchanges. As a result, the
Union for the Mediterranean has the potential to become more useful, relevant
and necessary than ever. It may be an appropriate tool to improve the new
Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
48
22 million euros to de-pollution of the Mediterranean; 5 millions euros to the solar plant; 7,5
millions euros to the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis; and 1 million euros to the Euro-Mediterranean University. A. El Maslouhi, supra n. 32, at 23.
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The Union for the Mediterranean: challenges and prospects
Priorities and methods need to be amended and adapted, however, in order
to search for the possible synergies between the UfM’s projects and the EU
policy for the Mediterranean. Therefore, important decisions and steps have
to be taken in the right direction. After having agreed upon procedures, institutions and headquarter’s location, the UfM has to abandon the Eurocentric
diplomatic bargaining exercise and incorporate a renewed approach urgently.
This approach should concentrate on: (i) implementing the selected projects
effectively; (ii) extending its scope of action to more signiicant domains for the
Mediterranean countries and its population; and (iii) posing a credible and
recognisable inal goal that allows economic agents to effectively fulill their
expectations.
Finally, it is necessary to remark once again that even though the intergovernmental method has largely prevailed in the Euro-Mediterranean relations,
the European Union is exercising the northern co-Presidency. This puts an end
to the intergovernmental approach followed so far, giving a new perspective of
action to the UfM.
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74
EuroMed, ENP and UfM: ‘Fostering region-building and promoting interregionalism’?
EURoMEd, Enp And UfM: ‘foSTERing REgion-bUiLding
And pRoMoTing inTERREgionALiSM’?
Nikos Skoutaris
1. INTRODUCTION
The term ‘region’ is a polysemous concept. ‘historically, the concept of the
region has evolved primarily as a space between the national and the local
level within a particular State. These types of regions are referred to as subnational regions or micro-regions.’1 however, the very same concept ‘can also
refer to macro-regions, which are larger territorial units or subsystems, between
the State level and the global system level such as the EU’.2 The present paper
focuses on the latter understanding of the term, by mainly asking whether the
EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean do aim at building such a
macro-region.
It is important to reply to this question not least because some of the most
prominent scholars of regionalism have consistently argued that one of ‘EU’s
main foreign policy objectives is to […] promote a world order where regions
gain increasing legitimacy as actors in international affairs’.3 In other words,
fostering region-building and promoting inter-regionalism are really crucial ingredients of the EU’s foreign policy. Evidence of such view can be found in
statements of EU oficials and documents of Union institutions where the will
and intention to use the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a medium
for region-building has been declared. In fact, the establishment of an economic community emerging between the EU and its ENP partners is the longterm goal of the Neighbourhood Policy.4 Such a vision was very much present
from the beginning of this endeavour as Solana and Patten were foreseeing ‘a
gradually evolving framework for an economic and political space surrounding
the Union, which would nevertheless stop short of full membership or creating
shared institutions’.5 Similarly, the then president of the Commission Romano
Prodi clariied, in a speech on December 2002, that the ENP concept ‘sharing
everything but the institutions’ does not exclude the possibility of developing
1
P. De Lombaerde, F. Söderbaum, L. Van Langehove and F. Baert, ‘The Problem of Comparison in Comparative Regionalism’, 36 Review of international Studies 2010, 731-753, at 736.
2
Ibid.
3
F. Söderbaum, P. Stålgren and L. Van Langenhove, ‘The EU as a Global Actor and the
Dynamics of Interregionalism: a Comparative Analysis’ 27 Journal of European integration 2005,
365-380, at 373.
4
European Union, Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, COM
(2006) 726, 4 December 2006; European Union, A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, Brussels, COM (2011) 303, 25 May 2011.
5
Solana-Patten letter on Wider Europe, 7 August 2002, available at <ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf>.
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new structures with our neighbours at a later stage, if necessary.6 hence, it
seems that there is an understanding among EU political elites that has also
been relected in academia: ‘if the ENP is to develop into something substantial and long-term, thought needs to be given to the nature of its own institutional framework, and in particular whether to maintain the bilateral approach
[...] or to seek to establish either a two-pillar approach (like the EEA) or a multilateral/regional framework (like the Barcelona Process)’.7
The aim of the proposed paper is exactly to problematise the view according
to which the EU ‘promotes a world order where regions gain increasing legitimacy as actors in international affairs,’8 by focusing on whether the Union does
foster in reality region-building through the overlapping policy frames of ENP,
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EuroMed) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The thesis of the paper is that, irstly, the chiely bilateral character
of the ENP questions the region-building dimension of this policy. Secondly,
the ENP multilateral dimension with regard to the Mediterranean area, consisting mainly out of overlapping policy frames of EuroMed and the UfM, could be
better understood in sub-regionalist (marked by dependence of countries on
the fringe of Europe on the EU) rather than inter-regional (an interaction between
supposedly diplomatic equals) terms.9
To achieve its aim, the paper discusses the term ‘region’ and questions
whether the Mediterranean basin could be understood as such. having established tensions between the deinition and the political and historical reality, it
then analyses the different overlapping policy frameworks that exist with regard
to the Mediterranean. In particular, the paper focuses on the ENP instruments
and methodologies for region-building including the aforementioned multilateral initiatives of EuroMed and UfM and the new Neighbourhood Initiative. In
the last part, the paper shows that the ENP multilateral dimension could be
better understood in sub-regionalist rather than inter-regional terms. Such a
critique is coupled by an analysis that sheds light on the tension between regionbuilding and inter-regionalism.
2. ThE MEDITERRANEAN AS A MACRO-REGION?
In order to examine whether the overlapping policy frameworks of ENP, EuroMed
and the UfM indeed foster region-building in the Mediterranean, we should irst
deine the term ‘region’ and examine whether the Mediterranean area falls
under the deinition. Contested as the term ‘region’ may be, it seems that in
order to be characterised as such, a certain group of States must present a
6
R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’, Brussels,
SPEECh/02/619.
7
M. Cremona and C. hillion, ‘l’Union fait la force? Potential and limits of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an integrated EU foreign and security policy’, European University institute
law Working Paper No 39 (2006), at 18.
8
F. Söderbaum et al. supra note 3, at 373.
9
M. Comelli, ‘Sub-regional Cooperation around the Mediterranean and the role of the EU’ 15
European Foreign Affairs Review 2010, 385-401, at 394.
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EuroMed, ENP and UfM: ‘Fostering region-building and promoting interregionalism’?
certain geographical proximity. however, it seems that geographical relationship
and territorial contiguity are necessary but not suficient conditions in order to
call a group of States a ‘macro-region’. A degree of mutual interdependence
should also be exhibited.10 Such degree of interdependence could vary between
different ields. In fact, Nye distinguished between political integration (the
formation of a transnational political system), economic integration (the formation of a transnational economy) and social integration (the formation of a
transnational society).11 By the same token, a number of scholars have emphasised the function of regions either as integrated market places12 or as
political ideas and administrative units.13 Finally, some have also stressed the
characteristics of cultural homogeneity,14 sense of community15 or ‘regionness’.16
Overall, ‘regions’ consist of a number of geographically proximate countries
that are perceived as having a certain internal coherence in social, economic,
political, linguistic and or institutional terms.17
So, the question is whether the Mediterranean basin could fall under such
deinition. Starting from the geographical component, it is clear that the States
around the Mediterranean Sea are geographically proximate countries. Still, it
seems that under the different EU policy frameworks, the geographical limits
of the region are far from clear. In 1995, the Barcelona conference brought
together the then 15 EU Member States with 12 invited ‘Mediterranean partners’:
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Almost 10 years later, the newly
launched ENP obviously did not include Cyprus and Malta that meanwhile
became EU Member States but also excluded Turkey, because Turkey is a
candidate for EU accession. Libya, which was not invited to participate at the
moment of the Barcelona Declaration because it was under a UN sanctions
regime, was also added to the catalogue of the ENP countries.18 Finally, when
during the French presidency of 2008, Sarkozy relaunched EuroMed as the
10
J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts. integration and Conlict in Regional Organisation (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company 1971), at vii.
11
Ibid., at 26-27.
12
J. Bhagwati, ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in J. de Melo and A. Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional integration (New York: Cambridge University Press
1993), at 22; E. D. Mansield and h. V. Milner, ‘The New Wave of Regionalism’ 53 international
Organization 1999, 589-627.
13
T. A. Börzel, L. Goltermann, M. Lohaus and K. Striebinger (eds.), Roads to Regionalism:
Concepts, issues and Cases (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate 2012).
14
B. Russett, international Regions and the international System. A Study in Political Ecology
(Chicago: Rand-MacNally 1967).
15
K. W. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell and R. A. Kann, Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area: international Organization in the light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957).
16
B. hettne and F. Söderbaum, ‘Theorising the Rise of Regionness’ 5 New Political Economy
2000, 457-474.
17
E. Johansson, ‘Subregionalization in Europe’s Periphery: The Baltic and Mediterranean
Dimensions of EU’s Foreign Policy’, Institut Universitari d’ Estudis Europeus, Quaderns de Treball
2000/36, 9-10.
18
P. J. Cardwell, ‘EuroMed, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the Mediterranean’, 49 Journal of
Common Market Studies 2011219-241, at 225.
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‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, Albania, Bosnia-herzegovina, Croatia, Mauritania, Monaco and Montenegro were also invited to sign the
joint Paris Declaration apart from the 27 EU Member-States and the original
Barcelona Declaration partner States’.19
But it is not only the territorial scope of the different policy frameworks that
questions whether the Mediterranean is a region as a whole. The extent of the
political, economic and cultural differences between the different groups of
Mediterranean States have made some commentators argue that the basin is
‘more of a frontier’ than a region.20 ‘Arab countries are Arab before they are
Mediterranean; similarly, Southern European countries are European irst and
then Mediterranean.’21 Despite its exaggerating tone, such aphorism sheds
light on the fact that characteristics such as the cultural homogeneity, the sense
of community and the ‘regionness’ might not be present in the region in question. having noted that, the next issue that we have to discuss is whether the
overlapping policy frameworks of the EU intend to and could create a region
characterised by mutual interdependence in political and economic terms. The
thesis of the paper is that on the one hand the ENP has very few elements of
region-building while the EuroMed and the UfM are better understood as subregionalist frameworks in the sense that they are marked by the dependence
of the non-EU Mediterranean countries on the EU.
3.
ThE EU POLICY FRAMES TOWARDS ThE MEDITERRANEAN
AREA
3.1. The barcelona process
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was oficially launched in 1995. The then
15 EU Member States and the 12 invited ‘Mediterranean partners’ signed the
Barcelona Declaration that signiied their agreement ‘to establish a comprehensive partnership […] through strengthened political dialogue on a regular
basis, the development of economic and inancial cooperation and greater
emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension’.22 In order to achieve
this aim, the EuroMed was structured around three main dimensions (‘baskets’
of co-operation) which remain today as the broad working areas of the partnership under the UfM umbrella: political and security dialogue, economic and
inancial partnership and social, cultural and human partnership. Under the
framework of each ‘basket’, general and sectorial ministerial meetings were
taking place at least on an annual basis. The work programme of those ministerial conferences was prepared by the EuroMed committee, which is comprised
19
Ibid., at 229.
M. Comelli, supra note 9, at 389 quoting S. Calleya, ‘European Union Policy towards the
Mediterranean: The Euro-Med Partnership and Region Building’, paper presented at the conference ‘The Convergence of Civilisations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region’ (Lisbon, 6-9 June
2002).
21
Ibid.
22
Barcelona Declaration available at <http://tinyurl.com/8dj2ydt>.
20
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EuroMed, ENP and UfM: ‘Fostering region-building and promoting interregionalism’?
of senior oficials from both sides. Finally, the multilateral dimension of this
initiative was also underlined by the existence of the EuroMed Parliamentary
Assembly, the EuroMed Civil Forum and the Anna Lindh Foundation for the
Dialogue of Cultures.
Next to the progressive institutionalisation of the multilateral cooperation, it
is also important to note for the purposes of the present paper that the Barcelona Process envisaged the creation of a vast Euro-Mediterranean free trade
area for the exchange of goods, services and capital between the EU and the
non-EU Southern Mediterranean countries. Such a free trade area was proclaimed to be achieved by 2010. According to the Barcelona Declaration, it
would have been established through the new EuroMediterranean Association
Agreements and free trade agreements between Mediterranean countries
themselves. however, the establishment of such a free trade area has been
challenged as ‘unrealistic and even counter-productive’,23 while at the same
time it has been questioned whether it would actually result in improved economic performance for the region.24
Despite those criticisms, it is noted that the EuroMed appears to ‘demonstrate
the EU’s preference for multilateral, region-based frameworks’.25 The asymmetrical relationship between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean partners
in both political and economic terms, however, undermines the interregional
characteristics of this policy framework. To put it differently, it is recalled that
interregionalism is marked by the interaction among supposedly diplomatic
equals. however, in the case of the multilateral dimension of EuroMed, the
Commission and the Council act as ‘central points’ channeling the interests of
the EU Member States. But no such channeling exists on the other side, since
the non-EU Mediterranean partners have not formed a fora that would allow
for something similar. It is even questionable that they should consist of a coherent regional grouping of States, as we pointed out in the previous section.
It seems rather that the strong bilateral dimension of the EuroMed combined
with a multilateral dimension dominated by the strong presence of the EU suggests the creation of a relationship that is characterised by the dependence of
the Southern Mediterranean countries from the Union.
3.2. Enp
Before the tenth anniversary of EuroMed, the EU oficially launched the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 as a new framework of its relations with a
number of neighbouring countries, including most Southern Mediterranean
23
R. Balfour and A. Missiroli, ‘Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European
Policy Centre (EPC), issue Paper No 54 (2007), at 7, available at <http://www.epc.eu/documents/
uploads/963724382_EPC%20Issue%20Paper%2054%20-%20Reassessing%20the%20ENP.
pdf>.
24
D. Müller-Jentsch, ‘Economic Prospects for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: deeper
Integration and Trade in Services’, World Bank and European Commission Programme on Private Participation in Mediterranean Infrastructure, PPMi Paper (2003), at 3. See the contribution
of K. Pieters on liberalisation through free trade agreements later in this volume.
25
P. J. Cardwell, supra note 18, at 231.
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ones. In fact the only EuroMed partner State that is not covered by the ENP is
Turkey, which is candidate for EU accession. The ENP’s genesis, however,
could be traced back to the later stages of the ‘Big-bang’ Enlargement process.
References to a more substantive ‘proximity policy’ were contained in Strategy
Papers attached to the pre-accession country reports in 2001 and 2002, in a
joint position paper in the form of a letter from Javier Solana and Chris Patten26
and in a speech made in December 2002 by the then President of the Commission, Romano Prodi. In this speech Prodi referred to a proximity policy based
on ‘mutual beneits and obligations, which is a substantial contribution by the
EU to global governance’.27 he also underlined the link between Enlargement
and ENP by mentioning that the new policy was to be based on the idea that
‘accession was not the only game in town’. ‘We have to be prepared to offer
more than partnership and less than the membership’. The overall long-term
goal of this new policy is to create a ‘ring of friends’ in the periphery of the
enlarged Union by incorporating the neighbours into an EU-led economic region.28
Despite the existence of a long-term goal that points to region-building, the
ENP is chiely a bilateral process that involves the EU on the one side and the
relevant partner country on the other. This is apparent if one looks at the
mechanism that the Union has used in order to realise the vision of an increasingly closer relationship with the neighbouring countries and a zone of stability,
security and prosperity for all. At the outset of the process, the Commission
had to prepare Country Reports analysing the political and economic situation
in every partner State as well as institutional and sectoral aspects. It did so in
order to assess when and how it is possible to deepen relations with the relevant country. The next stage was the development of ENP Action Plans with
each country. Those are non-binding instruments that are agreed between the
EU and the ENP States. They are tailor-made for each country based on the
country’s needs and capacities as well as their and EU’s interests. In those
Action Plans, the EU and the partner States jointly deine an agenda of political
and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term priorities pointing
to the ‘joint ownership’ character of the ENP. The incentives on offer in return
for progress on relevant reforms are greater integration into European programmes and networks, increased assistance and enhanced market access.
The implementation of the mutual commitments and objectives contained in
the Action Plans is regularly monitored through sub-committees with each
country, dealing with those sectors or issues.29
The nature and structure of the Action Plans underline the fact that the ENP
is mainly a framework of soft law. however, the relationship with its Southern
26
Solana-Patten letter on Wider Europe, 7 August 2002.
R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’, Brussels, SPEECh/
02/619.
28
M. Pace, The Politics of Regional identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean (Abingdon:
Routledge 2006), at 106.
29
For a detailed analysis of the Action Plans and the methodologies of the ENP, see
M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy. More than a Partnership?’ in M. Cremona
(ed.), Developments in EU External Relations law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 245.
27
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EuroMed, ENP and UfM: ‘Fostering region-building and promoting interregionalism’?
Mediterranean partners is still based on legal agreements, being the EuroMediterranean Association Agreements. Those are a type of association agreements which contain legally binding provisions in each of the three
aforementioned areas covered by the Barcelona Declaration. So, in a way the
ENP with its policy documents and the Action Plans that provide for a ‘framework
of modernisation’30 is complementary to the bilateral contractual relationships
that have been created within the framework of Barcelona Process. According
to Commissioner Wallström,
“It is not a matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, rediscovering it and
realizing, as certain analysts have said, its potential. […] Whilst the action plans
already agreed with the first signatory Mediterranean countries contain differences,
they are also the bedrock of shared values and objectives which the Commission
deems indispensable if we are to avoid divergent paths.”31
The bilateral character of the ENP is also very much visible in the ‘new approach’ of ENP towards the Southern Mediterranean that was launched in the
aftermath of the Arab Spring. In the Joint Communication with the title ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’32 the high Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (hR) speaks about an ‘incentive-based approach based on more differentiation (‘more for more’): those that go further and faster with reforms will
be able to count on greater support from the EU.’33 It is true that differentiation
is a principle underlying the ENP from its very beginning together with conditionality. however, such tailor-made approach based on a ‘more for more’
policy strengthens even more bilateralism as the main characteristic of ENP
and thus undermines its region-building characteristics.
Given the bilateral nature of both the Action Plans that consist of the main
ENP instruments and the pre-existing Euro-Mediterranean Agreements that
are supplemented by the Neighbourhood Policy, it is rather clear that the ENP
does not have a strong region-building element. Still, a few elements of regional cooperation are present in the ENP and especially in its current inancial
instrument. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI
hereafter)34 replaced existing inancial instruments (TACIS and MEDA) for the
ENP countries and Russia for the period 2007-13. According to Article 2 of the
30
See, M. Cremona and G. Meloni (eds.), ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: A framework for Modernisation?’ EUi Working Paper law No. 2007/21, available at <http://cadmus.eui.
eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6976/LAW-2007-21.pdf;jsessionid=7A7946AA7E11EB7AE0CBEB678
76E49FE?sequence=1>.
31
M. Wallström, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Cairo, SPEECh/05/171.
32
Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, Brussels, 8. 3. 2011 COM
(2011) 200 inal.
33
Ibid., at 5. On instruments of conditionality, see the contribution of S. Blockmans in this
volume.
34
Regulation 1638/2006/EC laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument [2006] OJ L310/1.
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Regulation, the overall scope of this programme is to ‘promote enhanced cooperation and progressive integration between the European Union and the
partner countries’. Approximately 1 billion EUR out of the overall 12 billion EUR
budget has been speciically provided for cross-border cooperation.35 Crossborder cooperation allows for the implementation of joint programmes covering
regions from the Member States and the partner countries sharing a common
border.36 There are two main categories of programmes: the ones covering a
common land or short sea crossing; and the ones covering a sea basin such
as the Mediterranean.37 however, only two of the 15 ENPI cross-border cooperation programmes relate to the Southern Mediterranean and concern a sea
crossing (Italy-Tunisia) and basic-crossing programmes (The Mediterranean
Sea programme).38 Analogous provisions concerning cross-border cooperation
are also included in the proposed European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
that will replace ENPI.39
Despite the existence of those cross-border cooperation elements, it is clear
that the multilateral dimension of the ENP is rather weak. This becomes even
more apparent if one takes into account that there is no institutionalised forum
where all the heads of governments of the EU Member States and the ENP
partner States would meet as it happens within the EuroMed framework. So,
overall, we could argue that while in the case of the EuroMed the rather asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the partners questions the interregional dimension of the framework suggesting a rather sub-regional character,
in the case of the ENP its chiely bilateral dimension sheds light to the almost
absolute absence of region-building characteristics.
3.3. UfM
Ironically enough, the project that entailed most region-building characteristics
has been a rather failed endeavour. During his election night press conference
on 6 May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy announced his intention to found Union de la
Méditerranée. his initial aim was to ‘develop a Mediterranean region through
intra-sub-regional cooperation between the Northern and Southern shores’40
loosely resembling that of the early European Economic Community (EEC)
and based around an economic free trade area. The new organisation ‘would
have developed outside an EU context and would have therefore excluded all
35
Arts. 6(2) and 9 of the ENPI.
Note the difference with Regulation 1082/2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC) that regulates cross-border cooperation between EU Member States and their
sub-state entities, [2006] OJ L210/19. According to this relatively new legislative instrument, substate entities from different Member States may also establish an EGTC, which enjoys legal
personality under EU law. Such an option is not available under the ENPI.
37
Art. 9 of the ENPI.
38
<http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/en/regional-updates/cross-border-cooperation.
html>.
39
Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, Brussels,
7. 12. 2011, COM(2011) 839 inal.
40
M. Comelli, supra note 9, at 399.
36
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EuroMed, ENP and UfM: ‘Fostering region-building and promoting interregionalism’?
non-Mediterranean EU Member States’.41 Pursuant to Article 207 TFEU (ex
133 TEC), however, the EU enjoys exclusive competence in the area of external trade. Thus, it would have been legally impossible to create such a free
trade area only with the Mediterranean EU Member States. So the Sarkozy
project had to be reformulated.
The project in its inal format is a compromise and its title points to the fact
that it consists of a repackaging of the EuroMed: ‘Barcelona Process: Union
for the Mediterranean’. As such, it has brought together 43 Mediterranean
countries including the 27 EU Member States, Balkan countries bordering on
the Mediterranean Sea such as Albania, Bosnia-herzegovina, Croatia and
Montenegro, small States like Monaco plus a few non-littoral States like Jordan
and Mauritania. Thus, this new initiative includes States covered by existing
policy frameworks and bilateral agreements. To facilitate its role, it has a Secretariat that focuses on the coordination of concrete projects such as the depollution of the Mediterranean, the establishment of maritime and land highways,
civil protection, alternative energies etc.
As it is the case with the EuroMed, its predecessor, the UfM consists of a
forum that it is not characterised by the interaction of diplomatic equals. On the
one side there is the EU speaking with one voice while on the other there are
the Mediterranean partners each with its own contractual relationship with the
Union and its very different political aspirations. Again, it seems that this framework nourishes relations that are marked by the dependence of the partner
States on the EU. At the same time, the political dificulties of the endeavour
should not be ignored. To this end, it is noted that in the aftermath of the Israeli attacks in Gaza, the Arab countries blocked the political activities of UfM.42
This led the EU to acknowledge that the urgent progress on the Middle East
process is vital for the success of the UfM.43 Despite such recognition, it seems
that in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the emphasis is not placed on a regionbuilding approach through UfM. The EU has decided to strengthen the ENP
through an incentive-based approach based on more differentiation as we have
noted in the previous section of the paper. This undermines even further the
region-building characteristics of the EU overlapping policy frameworks for
Southern Mediterranean.
4. (IN PLACE OF A) CONCLUSION
It has become clear from the analysis that despite the statements of EU oficials
and institutions declaring ENP as a medium for the region-building, the reality
is somewhat different. The mainly bilateral character of the Neighbourhood
Policy as underlined by its soft-law mechanism and its ‘new approach’ towards
the Southern Mediterranean entailing even more differentiation questions the
41
Ibid.
Ibid.
43
high Representative, ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, supra note 32, at 11.
42
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engagement of the EU in region-building in the area. At the same time, the
asymmetrical relations between the EU and the partner States with the differentiated contractual relations with the Union and the very different political
ambitions suggest that the multilateral dimension of the overlapping policy
frameworks could be better understood in sub-regionalist (marked by dependence of countries on the fringe of Europe on the EU) rather than inter-regional (an interaction between supposedly diplomatic equals) terms.
having mentioned that, one should also keep in mind the possible tensions
between region-building and inter-regionalism. By this, I mean that if a certain
entity engages in efforts to build the mutual interdependence of a certain group
of States, there is a considerable possibility that the relationship between the
two entities –the one that engages in region-building and the other that it is to
be built– will acquire hierarchical characteristics. The process of region-building by deinition entails that the two entities will not be diplomatically equal at
least in the beginning of the relationship. So, it should not raise any eyebrows
that the multilateral dimension of the EU overlapping policy frameworks towards
Southern Mediterranean mainly has sub-regional characteristics. It is to be
expected that until the moment that the Southern shore of the Mediterranean
basin acquires a level of interdependence that would be at least comparable
to the one of the EU, inter-regionalism is out of the question and the relationship will be one of dependence from the Union.
In the meantime, we note that the current policy frameworks correspond to
a certain extent to the constitutional requirements of Article 8 TEU. The EU
indeed through the ENP and its multilateral dimension tries to ‘develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union.’44
For those purposes it has concluded ‘speciic bilateral agreements with the
countries concerned’45 within the frameworks of EuroMed, ENP and UfM. It
remains to be seen whether all those different contractual relationships will also
evolve towards the creation of a region at a later stage.
44
45
Art 8(1) TEU.
Art 8(2) TEU.
84
Relations with southern Mediterranean civil society actors, continuity or change?
EU’S poST-ARAb SpRing RELATionS wiTh SoUThERn
MEdiTERRAnEAn CiViL SoCiETY ACToRS:
ConTinUiTY oR ChAngE?
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués
The popular uprisings in several southern Mediterranean countries during the
2011 Arab Spring caught the European Union (EU) – along with most other
observers – off-guard. After decades of stagnant authoritarianism, the scale,
spontaneity and dynamism of the demonstrations and the accompanying intense
political activity in social networks in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco,
Jordan and elsewhere was indeed unexpected. Regional autocrats had for
years helped fuel the (never veriied, but still lingering) Western perception that
Arab culture was to some extent incompatible with democratic practices1. The
‘Arab street’ was therefore to a majority of outsiders not associated with political initiative and the resulting protests appeared to spring from nowhere.
The conclusion which the EU apparently immediately drew was that the
popular uprisings indicated the birth of an independent Arab civil society. The
EU therefore offered a mea culpa for having in the past predominantly concentrated on supporting government- and regime stability in the southern Mediterranean countries and not focused enough on helping non-state actors. To
remedy such shortcomings in light of the changing circumstances, the Union
has discursively shifted civil society actors from a rather marginal status prior
to 2011 to becoming portrayed as an important component of what the EU
refers to as ‘deep democracy’.2 On the whole thus, in the post-Arab Spring era
the Union appears to seek to intensify its engagement with civil society in the
Euro-Mediterranean area.
The purpose of the present paper is, however, to ask whether the strengthened EU rhetoric and new associated measures truly constitute a before and
after in terms of the Union’s engagement with southern Mediterranean civil
society actors. The irst section will provide deinitions and a historical backdrop
for the European Union’s attempts to engage with such actors in the southern
Mediterranean area. The second section will describe some of the Union’s new
initiatives related to civil society actors which the Arab Spring has triggered.
The inal section will ponder whether the emerging EU initiatives will constitute
a truly new chapter in EU-southern Mediterranean civil society relations or not.
1
R. Alenius Boserup and F. Tassinari, ‘The Return of Arab Politics and Europe’s Chance to
Engage Anew’, 17 Mediterranean Politics 2012, at 99.
2
See European Union, high Representative Ashton visits Tunisia and wider Middle East,
Brussels, A 052/11, 14 February 2011; European Commission and high Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication. ‘A New Response
to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, COM
(2011) 303, 25 May 2011.
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1. CIVIL SOCIETY IN EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS
‘Civil society’ is a widely used concept whose exact meaning nonetheless
continues to be contested in academic literature. We will here deine civil society as referring to actors independent from the state, independent from private
business and independent from ‘primordial structures’, i.e., family, clan or tribe.3
More concretely we ind civil society actors to be characterised by voluntary,
non-lucrative, associative activity in the spirit of the three ‘independencies’
noted above.4 This would entail referring to a group of actors which a recent
EU document describes as including, for example, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), independent political foundations, community-based organisations, and private-sector non-proit agencies.5
The European Union’s engagement with civil society is nothing new. The
EU has shown notable off-and-on interest for promoting civil society actors
beyond its borders in the past decades. The end of the Cold War and the Velvet Revolutions in the Central and Eastern European countries revealed the
important role of (often clandestine) associative networks for organising political resistance and eventually for bringing down the sitting Communist regimes.
The events which came to pass in the late 1980s and early 1990s therefore
encouraged the EU and its member states to engage with civil society actors
for their perceived role as catalysts of democracy and/or direct contributors to
democratic transitions processes. The Union therefore took up civil society
promotion as a foreign policy objective in its relations with most geographical
regions of the world as the bipolar era came to an end and the ‘end of history’
appeared to roll out democracy as the only viable political system across the
globe.
In terms of the Mediterranean, the EU’s efforts to further civil society action
would irst be channeled into the Renewed Mediterranean Policy of the early
1990s and then, more concertedly, into the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. The
Barcelona Declaration put its faith to ‘the essential contribution civil society can
make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnershipʼ
3
A. Jünemann, ‘From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational NGOs in the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, in R. Gillespie and R. Youngs (eds.), The European Union and
Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa (London: Cass 2002), 87-105.
4
We recognize, however, at the outset that this threefold set of ‘independencies’ do not provide us with an entirely satisfactory conceptual clarity. A typical example would be that such a
deinition does not allow us to properly distinguish between a regular NGO and a so-called ‘governmental non-governmental organisations’ (GONGOs), especially when such GONGOs fail to
be forthcoming about their state patronage and/or the implications of such patronage. We also
note that in certain countries (e.g., Egypt under Mubarak) NGOs at times registered as for-proit
organisations in that the national legislation given that scrutiny of such entities was less strict than
of non-proit voluntary associations, see F. Bicchi, ‘Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean:
An Overview’, 14 Mediterranean Politics 2009, at 61.
5
European Commission, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR)
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013’, Brussels, C(2010)2432, 21 April 2010.
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Relations with southern Mediterranean civil society actors, continuity or change?
and even made civil society dialogue the centerpiece of the Partnership’s third
basket devoted to the social, cultural and human affairs partnership.6
however, the EU was soon to discover that, although a worthy objective,
fomenting civil society was not going to be an easy task. While some northern
EU governments championed a fairly free and self-sustained interaction between civil society actors across the Mediterranean basin, most North African
and Middle Eastern countries insisted upon that control was needed. having
drawn their own conclusions from the democratic revolutions in Central and
Eastern Europe they were not eager to allow an independent civil society which
might later transform into effective political opposition and undermine their
regimes. The EU, on its hand, was struggling with consolidating itself as a
political actor and with its post-Maastricht institutional reconiguration was in a
relative weak position to impose the views of the more ambitious pro-civil society advocates among the EU’s member states.7 The combined effect was
that the third basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would never become
fully operative.8
Then, 11/9 would once more put the issue of democratisation and hence
civil society into the limelight. As a consequence. at the 2002 Valencia EuroMediterranean minister meeting, the EU members fairly unanimously pushed
for good governance, democracy and human rights and the Arab Mediterranean
governments saw no alternative this time but to acquiesce.9 New bold plans
were made for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s third basket and distinct
accent was placed on the added value of civil society action. The main ideas
underpinning the Valencia Action Plan were also later mainstreamed into different EU policies. A irst example would be the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, in which civil society cooperation is given
a more prominent role. In particular, the ENP aspired to make civil society
cooperation a central aspect of a reinforced political dialogue with partner
governments (top-down). Another example would be the Commission’s Communication titled Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners – Strategic guidelines.10 The Communication
set out ten concrete recommendations for how the EU should pursue these
issues, many of these recommendations relating to boosting civil society action.
The EU’s civil society promotion appeared therefore to pick up speed in the
period between 2002 and 2005. however, at the tenth anniversary meeting
held in Barcelona in November 2005, all progress appeared to come undone.
6
Euro-Mediterranean minister meeting, ‘Barcelona Declaration’, Barcelona, 27-28 November, 1995.
7
E. Johansson-Nogués, ‘Civil Society in Euro-Mediterranean relations: What success of
EU’s normative promotion?’, 40 RSCAS Working Paper (2006), available at ˂http://cadmus.eui.
eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6386/RSCAS-2006-40.pdf?sequence=1˃.
8
Although a few areas did register activity, like, e.g. Euromed heritage, Euromed Audiovisual, Euromed Youth, see A. Jünemann, supra note 3.
9
R. Gillespie, ‘The Valencia Conference: Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process?’ 7 Mediterranean Politics 2002, at 105.
10
European Commission, ‘Reinvigorating EU actions on human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners – Strategic guidelines’, Brussels, COM(2003) 294 inal, 21 May
2003.
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The British and (above all) the Spanish co-hosts of the anniversary meeting
had worked hard towards inding a consensus in regards to the inal declaration
and the Work Program amongst all Euro-Mediterranean partners in the months
before the summit. however, in the end they had to concede defeat on several fronts.11 In terms of civil society cooperation, the declaration and the ive
year Work Program would appear to a large extent as a restatement of the
(very limited) objectives in the third basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration.
The Work Program was to be lamentably vague on how the objectives set for
civil society dialogues for the period 2005-2010 were to be achieved.12 These
set-backs can be said to be as a result of that the global impetus which existed
after 11/9 in terms of democratisation (and hence focus on civil society) was
lost in the latter half of the 2000s. The insurgency and dificulties in winning the
peace in Afghanistan, Iraq and the dithering US foreign policy sapped the
strength out of Western democracy promotion. European civil society actors
and the European Parliament have attempted with various initiatives to keep
the EU torch on civil society high, however, EU governments appeared unwilling to follow suit. A good example of EU governments’ lack of stomach for
civil society promotion in this period was the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 whose sector-speciic focus abandoned any pretensions to
speciic democratisation promotion or to foment civil society.13
2. ThE ARAB SPRING
The onset of the Arab Spring would, however, once again force civil society
onto the center stage of EU policies. The changing conditions in the southern
Mediterranean countries warranted new dynamics in the relations. Only days
after Mubarak was ousted, the EU Foreign Affairs Council therefore stated that:
“[t]he Council expresses its support to the peoples of the South Mediterranean and
their legitimate hopes and aspirations for democratic change, social justice and
economic development. The EU stands ready for a new partnership in its relations
with the countries of the region to support the process towards democracy, rule of
law, socio-economic development and strengthened regional stability, on the basis
of shared principles, cooperation and local ownership”.14
Catherine Ashton, the European Union high Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, further
elaborated that such a new partnership should be based on the southern Mediterranean countries’ aspirations to achieve ‘deep democracy’, i.e., regularly
11
R. Gillespie, ‘Onward but not Upward: The Barcelona Conference of 2005.’ 11 Mediterranean Politics 2006, at 271.
12
Council of the European Union, ‘10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit: Five Year
Work Programme’, Brussels, 15074/05, 28 November 2005.
13
E. Johansson-Nogués, ‘The UfM’s Institutional Structure: Making Inroads towards “CoOwnership”?’ 16 Mediterranean Politics 2011, at 21.
14
Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on Developments in the Southern Neighbourhood (Egypt/Tunisia), Brussels, 6774/11, 21 February 2011.
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Relations with southern Mediterranean civil society actors, continuity or change?
held pluri-party elections, freedom of association and expression, the rule of
law, the ight against corruption and democratic control over security forces.
Ashton has also emphasised that ʽ[d]eep democracy can only take root and
lourish through and with the participation of all civil society stakeholdersʼ.15
The European Commission in a set of Communications therefore pronounced
that the Union would henceforth seek to establish good working relations with
civil society to ʽsupport this greater political role for non-state actorsʼ, helping
such actors in particular ʽto develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to
monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmesʼ.16
The Union’s frequently noted rationale for engaging with such actors is that ʽ[a]
thriving civil society empowers citizens to express their concerns, contribute to
policy-making and hold governments to accountʼ.17
EU funding for civil society agency is to be channeled principally through a
new Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility. The Facility is a speciic inancial
envelope inside the more general ‘SPRING’ (Support for Partnership, Reform
and Inclusive Growth) program which the Union created in May 2011 and which
is open to all the Union’s neighbouring partners in Eastern Europe and in the
southern Mediterranean. Out of the total €350 million for the 2011-2012 biennium, €22 million of the SPRING program are speciically earmarked for the
Civil Society Facility. The Civil Society Facility will in coming years set aside
€11 million for three large areas of action in relation to the southern Mediterranean civil society: (1) capacity-building; (2) support for regional and country
projects; and (3) ʽincreasingʼ the civil society ʽinvolvementʼ in the dialogues
between EU and partner country government on EU programs and priorities.18
Additional sums for civil society actors will be made available from other instruments, such as the Civil Society Regional Programme,the Non-state Actors
and Local Authorities in Development program, the European Instrument for
Democracy and human Rights, the Good Governance program and others.
Another novel feature in the EU’s outreach to southern Mediterranean civil
society actors is the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) ʽto help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partnersʼ.19
The political declaration supporting the EED’s set-up was issued by EU Member States in December 2011. however, at the time of writing very little is known
about the speciic institutional set-up and purpose of the Endowment.20
15
European Union, supra note 2.
European Commission and high Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, supra note 2.
17
ibid.
18
European Union, ‘EU response to the Arab Spring: the Civil Society Facility’, Press Release, Brussels, MEMO/11/638, 27 September 2011.
19
European Commission and high Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, supra note 2.
20
For an insightful relection on the potential and added value of the European Endowment
for Democracy cf. R. Youngs and K. Brudzinska, ‘The European Endowment for Democracy: will
it ly?’, FRiDE, Policy Brief No 128 (2012), available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/1019/theeuropean-endowment-for-democracy:-will-it-ly>.
16
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3. EU CIVIL SOCIETY PROMOTION IN ThE SOUThERN
MEDITERRANEAN: CONTINUITY OR ChANGE?
As we have seen, the Arab Spring appears to have triggered a re-think in Brussels on the importance of civil society. The events of the popular uprisings in
the southern Mediterranean have also put into motion a set of EU civil society
initiatives which must be seen as the Union’s most ambitious ones to date.
however, are we witnessing a genuine change in the EU’s approaches to
civil society?
The EU’s engagement with southern Mediterranean civil society is a longstanding one, as noted above. The accent, then as now, was always placed
on that civil society should perform the function of watchdog of their governments, of holding their governments accountable. This is the great value of
civil society in mature democracies. however, prior to the Arab Spring, this
function of civil society was effectively undermined by authoritarian governments. Civil society organisations were closely monitored by their governments
and independent associations were often outlawed. harassment and violence
were the order of the day for those southern Mediterranean activists who dared
to speak up and demand change and/or to hold governments accountable. The
EU, on its part, would only on numbered occasions speak up against repression
and in favor of civil society actors or seek to protect them prior to Arab Spring.21
In the post-Arab Spring setting it is dificult to see that the EU has truly
changed its ways in order to help strengthen the alleged civil society ‘pillar’ of
‘deep democracy’. In early 2012 there was a crackdown on civil society in Egypt,
including the raids on foreign22 and Egyptian NGOs, excessive use of force on
demonstrators and criminal proceedings opened on some human rights activists.23 On top of this, a new Egyptian NGO draft law has been introduced in
parliament which local associations describe as even more restrictive than that
under the Mubarak regime. Against the backdrop of such events, the EU
ʽreiterates its deep concern with regard to restrictions on civil society organisations in Egyptʼ,24 but still launched negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area (in December 2011) without any pre-condition – and even
before a democratically elected Egyptian government had taken position. Similarly, an April 2012 governmental repression of demonstrators in Tunisia did
not warrant any EU response.25 Elsewhere in southern Mediterranean area,
for example in Algeria, parliamentary bills to further restrict civil society activity
have also been introduced in the midst of ongoing EU consultations with the
country for an ENP Action Plan. The lessons drawn from this by southern
21
See h. Malmvig, ‘Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures’, 10 Mediterranean Politics 2005, at 349.
22
Including US Freedom house and German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
23
‘Civil society groups are the new spies, says Egypt oficial, as UN warns NGO curbs undermine transition’, Democracy Digest, 26 April 2012, available at ˂http://www.demdigest.net/
blog/2012/04/civil-society-groups-are-the-new-spies-says-egypt-oficial-as-un-warns-ngo-curbsundermine-transition/˃
24
Council of the European Union, supra note 14.
25
Democracy Digest, supra note 23.
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Relations with southern Mediterranean civil society actors, continuity or change?
Mediterranean activists is that in spite of EU post-Arab Spring rhetoric, EUcivil society relations are essentially back to square one again.
Second, as noted above, the EU’s new Civil Society Facility, inside the
SPRING program, offers new additional funds to southern Mediterranean civil society actors for capacity-building. In absolute terms, the sums are also
fairly generous for the period 2011-2012. however, the pre-requisite is the same
as it was under the Barcelona Process and the ENP, i.e., that recipient civil
society organisations be ‘registered’ (legal and iscal personas) before the
national law in their respective host countries. The registration process was
employed by the southern Mediterranean government as an additional means
of control of civil society actors operating on their territory. For example, in Ben
Ali’s Tunisia, associations were required to present a detailed description of
their activity plans and budget to the authorities before being given the green
light to operate legally and must, in addition, have all their elections, leaders
and members cleared by the security apparatus. For this reason, the 2004 ENP
Country Report for Tunisia estimated that out of the approximately 8000 NGOs
operating in Tunisia only a small fraction can be considered genuinely independent.26 What is more, foreign funding, like that from the EU, destined to
southern Mediterranean NGOs had, as a rule, to be channeled through the
state or through intermediary bodies approved by the host government. Southern Mediterranean governments were therefore in an unparalleled position to
grant or deny funding to local and foreign registered associations even if the
latter were fully entitled to the money. The European Union’s insistence on that
projects be co-funded by the host government was an additional obstacle for
NGOs to receive money for their activity, especially those associations dedicating themselves to issues which might be sensitive for the southern Mediterranean government. Finally, it is worth noting that although in theory the EU
had at its disposal one inancial instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR), which was created to be able to get
around such restrictions and channel funds directly to NGOs, the Union was
reluctant to use it. In practice the European Union has always shown itself
sensitive to its partner governments’ preferences and on the whole consulted
with the target country’s government over which projects to fund.27 As a result,
only those civil society organisations approved by the Mediterranean partner
governments have been eligible for Barcelona Process/ENP/EIDhR money.
This susceptibility of the EU vis-à-vis the wishes of the partner governments
has regularly been criticised. however, indignation in the NGO community
would run especially high when the Commission in 2003 withdrew the funding
of already approved projects to civil society actors in Egypt. The withdrawal
was due to the insistence of that country’s authorities that some of them were
linked to Islamic terrorism.
26
European Commission. ‘European Neighborhood Policy Country Report – Tunisia’, Brussels, SEC(2004) 570, 12 May 2004.
27
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, ‘No Lasting Peace and Prosperity without
Democracy and human Rights: harnessing Debates on the EU’s Future Financial Instruments’,
Report Commissioned by the European Parliament, July 2005.
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The situation for civil society actors in most southern Mediterranean countries
is not that different today compared to prior to the Arab Spring. The Egyptian
authorities – the Egyptian armed forces transition government supported by
the Muslim Brotherhood and even the Salaist Nour Party – have imposed
limits to what post-Arab Spring NGOs would be allowed to register. Civil society actors linked to Coptian or Nubian communities or to other minority rights
organisations have had their application to register denied.28 The claim is that
ʽ[a]ll the organisations that have been rejected [are those which] steer up fanaticism and sentiments hostile to the national spiritʼ.29 In other southern Mediterranean countries like Morocco or Jordan continue undeterred their use of
restrictive registration/notiication procedures on NGOs.
Finally, the EU has made it an objective for the Civil Society Facility to increase the civil society involvement in the dialogues between EU and partner
country governments on EU programmes and priorities.30 The trilateral dialogue
(EU-partner government and NGOs) has in the past been undermined by authoritarian governments unwilling to engage in direct discussions with civil
society actors out of fear that, such contacts would circumscribe governmental
power and/or its freedom of action. At the moment, as we have seen above, it
is dificult to gauge how much this governmental reluctance has changed, even
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. We nonetheless leave the door open to
that governments might at a later stage of the political transition process be
more positively inclined towards such dialogues. A much more feasible prospect
in the short to medium term would be for the EU to foment a bilateral EU-civil
society dialogue instead. Indeed, both the Barcelona Process and the ENP
envisioned exchanges of ideas between the EU and southern Mediterranean
civil society actors and this is the spirit to which the Civil Society Facility appears to return. This would also cater to a longstanding demand from southern
Mediterranean NGOs to be consulted by the EU when Brussels designs national framework programs or aid strategies of different kinds. In terms of the
SPRING Program, actors such as the Arab NGOs Network for development
and ten afiliated associations therefore welcome EU’s intention of giving civil
society a central role and propose that ʽcivil society groups should be at the
core of consultations around SPRING allocations, identiication and use of
benchmarksʼ ʽincluding at all stages of policy design, project and program
identiication, implementation, and evaluationʼ.31 Other civil society activists
broaden such consultations to encompass future Association Agreements,
DCFTAs, etc., between the EU and relevant governments. Still, the NGO community in these countries drily notes that in terms of the SPRING program
ʽconsultations with civil society have not yet taken place, and [as far as they
28
Democracy Digest, supra note 23.
Ibid.
30
European Union, supra note 18.
31
Arab NGO Network for Development et al., ‘A Letter from Civil Society Groups in the Arab
Region to EU Oficials: “What Does ‘More’ Stand for and how to Ensure Economic Policy Conditionality is not Exercised?”’, unpublished open letter, 18 October 2011, available at <http://www.
annd.org/useriles/ile/latestnews/General-%20CS%20reaction%20to%20CSF_SPRING%20initiatives-%20October%202011-%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed 9 August 2012).
29
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Relations with southern Mediterranean civil society actors, continuity or change?
are aware of] none are publically plannedʼ.32 They therefore await their invitation to participate further in the dialogues between EU and partner country
governments on EU programs and priorities.33
4. CONCLUSIONS
The European Union has expressed an interest for civil society organisations
since the early 1990s for their role in the democratic overturn which swept
across the Central and Eastern Europe. The Union has created several mechanisms and allocated signiicant sums to civil society promotion. The Arab
Spring stimulated the EU to put forth an ambitious set of initiatives. The EU
has also upped its rhetorical ante on the civil society with its various Communications emerging in connection to the Arab Spring.
however, it remains to be seen whether the EU’s new rhetoric and inancial
instruments amount to a true change in EU-southern Mediterranean civil society relations. We have noted that the Union continues to be lamentably timid
in view of speaking up against aggressions on civil society actors. It has yet to
learn the pertinent lessons of the insistence on working with registered NGOs,
many of which have fallen into disarray or disrepute as a consequence of the
fall of their former authoritarian governmental patrons. Finally, there is also
uncertainty surrounding whether the Union will (or can) engage in direct dialogue
with civil society actors over objectives in the different national assistance plans.
Southern Mediterranean civil society actors are awaiting the EU’s cue to become
policy makers in areas related to their operation and not simply policy takers.
Thus, there is much which points to that the EU’s ‘new’ approach toward
southern Mediterranean civil society represents more re-packaging than novelty. While the new Arab Spring EU measures have amounted to an important
political message for civil society actors, the way the Union follows up on its
propositions in the years ahead will now become key. A genuine change in EU
policy would require some assertiveness from Brussels and other EU capitals
in terms of defending civil society activists and some readjustments of the
policy currently proposed the Union. Let us hope that with time, 2011 will prove
to having been a pivotal year for the European Union’s engagement with southern Mediterranean civil society.
32
33
Ibid.
European Union, supra note 18.
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94
Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
dEEp And CoMpREhEnSiVE fREE TRAdE AgREEMEnTS:
LibERALiSATion of goodS And SERViCES bETwEEn ThE
MEdiTERRAnEAn nEighboURS And ThE EU
K. Pieters
1. INTRODUCTION
The current Euro-Med Association Agreements (AAs) between the European
Union (EU), the Member States on the one hand and the Mediterranean partners on the other hand are, amongst others, designed to lead to the establishment of a Euro-Med free trade area of goods, services and capital.1 Besides
the establishment of a free trade area, the AAs also contain provisions on
competition, intellectual property rights, inancial and economic cooperation,
agriculture, investments, transportation, telecommunications, energy, science
and technology, environment, tourism, statistics and the ight against illegal
drugs. The Euro-Med free trade area is not yet complete, since free trade
agreements between the Mediterranean countries themselves are lacking.
Nevertheless, the EU has the intention to take the Euro-Med liberalisation
process of goods, services and capital to a higher level through the conclusion
of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) between the
EU and the Mediterranean countries which will form part of the existing EuroMed AAs. The DCFTAs will cover three of the four freedoms of the EU internal
market: free movement of substantially all goods, many services and capital.2
DCFTAs will have an enormous impact on the Mediterranean countries involved
and the entire region since their markets will be open to the European markets,
including European multinationals, which will increase competition between
1
The Mediterranean neighbours in this paper are the countries of the Maghreb (Morocco,
Algeria, Libya and Tunisia), the Mashreq (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian
Authority (PA)) and Israel. At present there are seven Euro-Med AAs and one Euro-Med Interim
Agreement. Before the Summit in Barcelona in November 1995, the EU and its Member States
had already signed a Euro-Med AA with Tunisia on 17 July 1995, which came into force on 1
March 1998 after being ratiied by all 15 EU Member States. In the framework of the Barcelona
process, the EU and its Member States signed an AA with Morocco on 26 February 1996, which
entered into force on 1 March 2000, with Israel, which entered into force on 1 June 2000, with
Jordan on 24 November 1997, which entered into force on 1 May 2002, with Egypt on 25 June
2001, which entered into force on 1 June 2004, with Algeria on 22 April 2002, which entered into
force on 1 September 2005, and with Lebanon on 17 June 2002, which entered into force on 1
April 2006. An Interim Association Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the EU
and the PA has been in force since 1 July 1997. At the end of 2004, the AA with Syria had been
submitted to the political authorities on both sides for inal approval and signature. The EU Council has never signed the proposed EU-Syria AA.
2
P. M. Wijkman, ‘Fostering Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements for the Eastern Partners’, Eastern Partnership Review, no. 8, December 2011, p. 5.
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the Mediterranean countries with the EU and other parts of the world.3 This
paper offers legal recommendations for an intensiied Euro-Med liberalisation
of goods, services and capital.
2.
DEEP AND COMPREhENSIVE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN NEIGhBOURS
2.1. origins and purpose of the dCfTAs
The concept of ‘DCFTA for the Mediterranean area’ is found in several documents of the Commission on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) since
2006.4 It has been envisaged that the DCFTAs will form a part of the existing
Euro-Med AAs, and will thus be based on Article 217 TFEU.5 Many agreements
concluded on the basis of Article 217 TFEU refer to the prospect of accession
to the EU and are called Accession Agreements, but the Euro-Med AAs never
embodied the idea of future accession to the EU, nor will the new DCFTAs with
the Mediterranean countries do so. Accession Agreements aim at accession
and thus at full acceptance of the EU acquis. Since the DCFTAs with the
Mediterranean countries do not aim at EU accession, but only at association,
the Mediterranean countries are not obliged to align all their legislation with the
EU’s acquis.
With the conclusion of the DCFTAs, the EU aimed at a better competitive
position of the EU and the Mediterranean countries in the world through the
‘highest possible degree’ of Euro-Med liberalisation of goods, services and
capital.6 however, the EU’s purpose of the DCFTA changed ever since the EU
3
M. Cermak, A. Canonne and R. Knottnerus, EU Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreements: A Threat to the Aspirations of the “Arab Revolutions”, A Seattle to Brussels Paper, available at www.s2bnetwork.org.
4
Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 4 December 2006 on strengthening the ENP, COM (2006) 726. On 15 November 2007, the European
Parliament adopted a report on the 2006 Communication (P6_TA (2007)0538). The Commission
stated in its Strategy Paper of December 2006 that trade with its neighbouring countries should
also include ‘behind the border’ issues, meaning progressively achieving comprehensive convergence in areas, such as technical norms and standards, sanitary and phytosanitary rules, competition policy, enterprise competitiveness, innovation and industrial policy, research cooperation,
intellectual property rights, trade facilitation customs measures and administrative capacity in the
area of rules of origin, good governance in the tax area, company law, public procurement and
inancial services. In its Communication of 5 December 2007, the Commission again proposed
measures towards further economic integration, such as tailor-made FTAs, which should include
strong legally-binding provisions on the implementation of trade and economic regulatory issues,
COM (2007) 774 inal.
5
E. Zapater, El Fundamento juridico de la actuacion exterior de las Comunidades Europeas
en el ambito de la cooperacion energetica internacional (Catalunya, Universidad Autonoma de
Barcelona 2000) p. 389, cited by D. Miralles Sole, An instrumental Analysis of the European
Union’s Capability to Act in Conlict Response (Catalunya, Grup Artyplan-Artympres 2004) p. 27;
C-12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, para. 9-10; C-12/86 Demirel v
Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, para. 9-10; R. Leal-Arcas, ‘The European Community and Mixed Agreements’, 6 EFA Rev. (2001) pp. 483-513.
6
Communication of 4 October 2006 on a Global Europe.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
has fallen into an economic and inancial crisis. The Commission clearly states
that priority will be given to the conclusion of DCFTAs with rapidly growing
economies, such as Korea, the Mercosur countries, the countries that belong
to ASEAN,7 India and Russia. These countries maintain high trade barriers to
European imports which the EU intends to abolish through the conclusion of
DCFTAs.8 Free trade with these emerging economies will result in huge economic beneits for the EU. The DCFTAs with developing countries, such as the
Mediterranean countries, will not offer the EU the same economic beneits, and
become less important for the EU.
2.2. Criteria and steps to fulill before the launch of the
negotiations of the dCfTA
The launch of the negotiations for a DCFTA is possible only after assessment
of multiple economic indicators by the Commission.9 Firstly, accession of the
(Mediterranean) country to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an absolute
requirement for the conclusion of a DCFTA. Secondly, the size and growth of
the country will be assessed.10 Thirdly, protective measures against European
exports such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) or regulatory barriers, sanitary and
phytosanitary standards (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT) will be evaluated. Fourthly, European access to resources such as energy, metals and
primary raw materials play an important role. Finally, the impact of the DCFTA
on European markets and economies will be considered. Besides economic
standards, also political criteria are taken into account: the respect for democracy and human rights, the adherence to key multilateral instruments and the
geostrategic relevance of the Mediterranean country.11 A inal criterion concerns
the possible detrimental effect of the DCFTA on other neighbours of the EU.
This means that preferential access currently enjoyed by the neighbouring
countries of the EU, should not be eroded by the future DCFTA.12
If all conditions are fulilled, the Commission will launch a feasibility study
on the scope of the DCFTA and will verify the (Mediterranean) country’s willingness to negotiate on the various topics of the future DCFTA. On 14 December
2011, the EU Council of Foreign Affairs authorised the opening of trade negotiations with four willing Mediterranean countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and
Tunisia.13 The EU Commissioner of Trade, Karel De Gucht said: ‘We are offer7
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See A.C. Robles Jr., Negotiating Services with the
ASEAN: The EU between WTO and Japan, EFAR 16: 379-400, 2011.
8
Communication of the Commission of 4 October 2006, Global Europe: Competing in the
World. p. 9.
9
Annex to the Communication of the Commission of 4 October 2006, Global Europe: Competing in the World (A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, SEC (2006) 1230.
10
The assessment of market potential has never been a condition for concluding Euro-Med
AAs.
11
Annex, p. 17.
12
Communication of 4 October 2006 on a Global Europe, p. 9.
13
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia signed a free trade agreement amongst themselves,
called the Agadir Agreement in February 2004, which came into force in March 2007.
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ing Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia progressive economic integration into
the EU single market and want to improve the conditions for market access to
the EU for these four WTO members as they engage in a process of democratic and economic reform.’ The Commission made recommendations for the
negotiations between the EU and those four Mediterranean neighbours. The
Ministries of Economy of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have to submit
an Action Plan for the implementation of these recommendations in the future.
2.3. Content of the dCfTAs
The terms ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’ indicate that the Mediterranean countries
and the EU want to establish a form of integration which goes beyond the
level of integration established through free trade agreements. Deep integration
refers to the removal of legal, regulatory and institutional barriers between the
EU and the Mediterranean countries. Comprehensive integration does not
imply a full harmonisation of laws, regulation and institutions, but implies an
appropriate degree of regulatory and institutional convergence. The extent to
which harmonisation will take place will be analysed for each Mediterranean
country separately. The Working Group on Services, established by the EuroMed Ministers of Trade in 2003, for example, is assessing the extent to which
liberalisation in the ield of services with the Mediterranean countries should
take place.
The DCFTAs should largely cover all trade, including energy, and aim at the
‘highest possible degree’ of liberalisation.14 The criterion of the ‘highest possible degree’ signiies that the agreements will only exclude a number of areas,
for example, some agricultural products, from full liberalisation. The DCFTAs
will encompass several chapters of which the most important are the free
movement of goods and further liberalisation of trade in services and capital.15
Free movement of goods (industrial goods, agricultural products, processed
agricultural products and ishery products) will be established through a system
of well-functioning Euro-Med rules of origin, Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs), the mutual recognition of SPS standards for agricultural and food products, standards and
conformity assessment procedures etc.. Next, further liberalisation of services
and capital will be obtained via provisions on mutual recognition of legal and
institutional frameworks, better conditions for establishment of companies, more
opportunities for persons to be temporarily present in the territory of the parties
for business and recognition of diplomas.16 Other chapters include horizontal
issues and institutional provisions. horizontal issues will include provisions on
competition issues and state aid, on intellectual, industrial and commercial
property, on public procurement, safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing
14
Communication of the Commission of 4 October 2006, Global Europe: Competing in the
World (A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy), COM (2006) 567 inal.
15
Based on the expected outline for the DCFTA with Georgia.
16
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Eastern Partnership, COM (2008) 823/4, p. 4-5.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
measures. The chapter on institutional provisions will include amongst others
a dispute settlement mechanism.17
3.
ThE EURO-MED LIBERALISATION OF GOODS IN ThE
DCFTAS
3.1. The current state of play: (free) movement of goods between
the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours
All Euro-Med AAs ensure the import and export of goods between the Mediterranean countries and the EU.18 The AAs make a distinction between trade in
industrial products, on the one hand, and agricultural, ishery and processed
agricultural products, on the other hand. industrial goods originating in a Mediterranean country which are imported into the EU are completely free of ‘customs duties’ and ‘charges having equivalent effect’ (similar to article 30 TFEU)
upon entry into force of the AAs. Industrial goods originating in the EU which
are imported into a Mediterranean country are still subject to ‘customs duties’
and ‘charges having equivalent effect’, but a lot of these duties and charges
have been progressively abolished according to the timetables in the Annexes
to the Euro-Med AA. As concerns trade in agricultural, ishery and processed
agricultural products, the EU and all Mediterranean countries will progressively establish greater liberalisation, according to agreed schedules included
in the Euro-Med AAs. At this moment many agricultural, ishery and processed
agricultural products remain subject to customs duties.19 The Mediterranean
countries and the EU examine on a regular basis in the Association Council,
product by product, the possibilities of granting each other further concessions.
There is no ‘free’ movement of agricultural products, ishery products and industrial products with an agricultural component between the Mediterranean
countries and the EU.
The prohibition of quotas and equivalent measures (similar to article 34
TFEU) only applies to fully liberalised goods, namely industrial goods. Agricultural products, ishery products and industrial products with an agricultural element and some industrial products can still be subject to quantitative restrictions
or measures having the same effect. The prohibition of quantitative restrictions
and equivalent measures encompasses direct or indirect obstacles to trade
between the EU and the Mediterranean country. ‘Direct’ restrictions concern
17
For the establishment of a Euro-Med free trade area, a network of bilateral agreements
needs to be established between the Mediterranean partners itself, inspired at the model of the
European Economic Area and will be called Neighbourhood Economic Community (NEC), see
Non-paper ENP – a path towards further economic integration’ of spring 2007. This non-paper is
expanding on the proposals contained in the Communication of the Commission of 4 December
2006 COM (2006) 726 inal.
18
PA: 2001; Tunisia: 2010; Morocco: 2012, Jordan: 2014; Egypt: 2016; Algeria: 2017 and
Lebanon: 2018.
19
The Communication of the Commission on its new neighbourhood policy in an enlarged
Europe also points out that there is still room to deepen the Euro-Med AAs in the domain of trade
in agricultural products.
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quotas or other bans related to the quantity of trade in industrial goods. ‘Indirect
restrictions’ or ‘measures having the same effect as quantitative restrictions’
result from contradictory technical and regulatory standards between the Mediterranean country and the EU.20
3.2. Recommendations for deeper and comprehensive Euro-Med
trade of goods
With the establishment of the EU Internal Market, the Member States realised
that free movement of goods entailed the risks which differ by product sector:
allowing medicines, for example, presents higher risks than allowing bread.
Low-risk products were not subjected to harmonisation at European level. Trade
as regards ‘non-harmonised’ goods, relies on the ‘mutual recognition’ principle.21
For high-risk products, the EU introduced detailed technical rules. The harmonisation process based on detailed technical rules proceeded extremely
slowly and was replaced by a new harmonising tool, called the ‘New Approach’.22
The New Approach directives deine essential requirements related to health,
safety and environment issues. Products must meet these requirements in
order to be placed on the European market.
The DCFTAs aim at the highest degree of liberalisation of movement of
goods, which will practically result in the establishment of Euro-Med Internal
Market of goods. The establishment of the Euro-Med Internal Market of goods
takes place along the same principles used in the EU Internal Market.
3.2.1. The mutual recognition principle in non-harmonised areas
In the EU Internal Market, the mutual recognition principle emerged from the
Cassis de Dijon case of the ECJ: EU Member States must allow all products
from other Member States to their territory if these products have been lawfully produced in the exporting Member State.The Member State of destination
may refuse the marketing of a product when this is strictly necessary for the
protection of, for example, public safety, health or environment.23 The applica20
All Euro-Med AAs contain the possibility of derogations from the (free) movement of goods.
All AAs contain an infant industry clause for industrial products which can only be invoked by
the Mediterranean countries that want to restrict imports from the EU to protect new and infant
industries or sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious dificulties in their country. See
‘Anti-dumping and Safeguards in the Euro-Mediterranean AAs’, study carried out in collaboration
with UNCTAD Technical Cooperation Project on Trade Relations and Economic Cooperation in
the Mediterranean Region (INT/93/A34), April 1998.
21
See 3.2.1. Mutual recognition principle in non-harmonised areas.
22
P. Brenton and M. Manchin, Trade Policy Issues for the Euro-Med Partnership, Working
Paper published by the CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project (2003) p. 8 and paragraph
3.2.2. Euro-Med movement of products harmonised at EU level.
23
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR
649. See also Regulation No 764/2008 of 9 July 2008 laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State
and repealing Decision No 3052/95/EU, OJ 13.08.2008, L 218/21.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
tion of the principle of mutual recognition for goods in the Euro-Med context in
non-harmonised areas requires a substantial amount of conidence in the
other party. The development of trust in the Euro-Mediterranean relationship
will take time.24 Trust can be improved by setting up test facilities and inspection services that ensure and certify the quality of products for which there is
no harmonisation in the EU. Still, different views and practices used in the
testing facilities on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea might lead to disagreements as concerns the testing of goods. Study visits of members of
European testing facilities to their Mediterranean colleagues and vice versa
might mean a step forward in improving conidence. Encountered problems
and different practices on-site can be resolved during Euro-Med workshops.
Another solution is the conclusion of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs).
The MRA is an international agreement by which countries recognise one
another’s conformity assessments procedures, such as testing methods, surveillance methods, inspections services, certiication services for goods for
which there is no harmonisation. MRAs will not involve any legislative alignment
to European norms, but concerns the guarantee of quality of products through
the acceptance of conformity assessment procedures of other countries. Only
Israel signed a MRA on Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) with the EU, which
entered into force in May 2000, by which some goods enter the EU without
need for double testing.25
3.2.2. Euro-Med movement of products harmonised at EU level
The Euro-Med AAs do not offer interesting concepts as how to enhance EuroMed trade in goods for which harmonisation (New Approach) is necessary.
They only stipulate that the Mediterranean countries should approximate their
legislation to that of the EU in the areas covered by them but do not explain
how this approximation process should be initiated and developed. For example, in the case of the Maghreb countries, the Euro-Med AAs state that ‘the
cooperation shall be aimed at helping to bring the legislation closer to that of
the EU’.26 In the case of Lebanon and Jordan, they stipulate that ‘the Parties
shall use their best endeavours to approximate their respective laws in order
to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.’ The Euro-Med AAs deine
that the Mediterranean countries will make use of EU rules in standardisation,
metrology, quality control and conformity assessment.27 Aligning to EU standards and technical requirements will lower double testing and certiication
24
M. Jakubiak et al., Countries Bordering the EU and Enhanced Economic integration (Warsaw, Centre for Social and Economic Research 2006, pp. 22-23.
25
Agreement on mutual recognition of OECD principles of good laboratory practice (GLP)
and compliance monitoring programmes of 9 October 1999 between the European Community
and the State of Israel, OJ L263/7.
26
Art. 48 AA Egypt, for example, stipulates: ‘The Parties shall use their best endeavours to
approximate respective laws in order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.’ Art. 52
AA Morocco, for example, stipulates: ‘Cooperation shall be aimed at helping Morocco to bring its
legislation closer to that of the Community in areas covered by this Agreement.’
27
Art. 55 AA Algeria; Arts. 40 and 51 AA Morocco, Arts. 40 and 51 AA Tunisia, Art. 47 AA
Egypt; Art. 48 AA Lebanon; Art. 68 AA Jordan.
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costs, which will lead to an increase in Euro-Med trade. At present, a number
of important harmonisation steps across the Euro-Mediterranean region have
been taken. A working group on trade measures started the approximation of
legislation in the ield of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures in 2003.28 Since the Mediterranean countries have no
prospect of accession to the EU, they are not obliged to implement all EU
standards and technical requirements.
3.2.2.1. industrial goods
The Mediterranean countries should implement those EU standards and requirements that will lead to economic development of the Mediterranean countries, namely those that cover industrial goods which constitute a signiicant
part of Mediterranean countries’ export to the European market. Each Mediterranean country has to indicate which EU harmonisation directives it wants to
implement. The Mediterranean countries have already identiied priority areas
for harmonisation and have started adopting some relevant EU.
harmonisation is closely related to standardisation. The setting of standards
will help the Mediterranean manufacturers to comply with the essential health
and safety requirements in the EU directives. In practice, the Mediterranean
importer to the European market provides the attestation of conformity which
ensures that his product is in conformity with the European technical speciications. Manufacturers will need to be aware of the content of EU norms which
apply to their products. For the Mediterranean manufacturer of construction
products this means that he needs to know the content of the Construction
Products Regulation (CPR)29 according to which it is mandatory for manufacturers to apply CE-marking to products which comply with the EU standards.
The organisation of specialised training courses for manufacturers, authorised
representatives and their trade associations of the Mediterranean countries will
contribute largely to the improvement of understanding of the EU standards
and requirements in particular ields in the region.
28
Conclusions of the Euromed Trade Ministerial Conference in Palermo of 7 July 2003, 64
Euromed Report (2003) para. 6. The Ministers instructed the working group to implement a sixpoint work programme that deines the steps required to approximate legislation in this ield: (1)
identiication of priority sectors; (2) acquaintance with the applicable EU legislation and conduct a
gap analysis on the basis of the existing legislation; (3) transposition of the necessary framework
legislation and sectoral legislation; (4) creation/reformation of existing institutions; (5) set up necessary certiication and conformity assessment bodies; (6) identiication of technical assistance
needs and make most of existing programmes. For an overview of the progress of approximation
of legislation in the ield of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, see Annexes A, B and C of the Report on the Approximation of Legislation of 15 July 2004,
available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ enterprise_policy/ind_coop_programmes/
med/doc/f1947_en.pdf>.
29
Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 March 2011
of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products
and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC, OJ L 88/5, 4.4.2011 was adopted on 9th March 2011
and published as regulation No 305/2011. The irst parts of the Regulation will come into force 20
days after publication. The provisions on human health and environment (dangerous substances)
shall apply as from 1st July 2013.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
After the adoption of the relevant EU acquis, the Mediterranean countries
should establish an adequate infrastructure in the ield of standardisation, accreditation and conformity assessment (metrology, certiication, analyses and
tests) as well as market surveillance. Testing of products of the Mediterranean
countries is necessary for export of these products to the EU. The standardisation, accreditation, conformity assessment bodies and market surveillance
authority in the Mediterranean country must meet several requirements.30 If no
such institution is present in a Mediterranean country, institutions from neighbouring countries can be asked to deliver certiication services.31 Further, the
Mediterranean countries should participate in European and international standardisation bodies.
This approximation process and the establishment of the necessary infrastructure will lead to negotiations about the establishment of Agreements on
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance (ACAAs) for industrial products.32
ACAAs are a speciic type of a MRA and will probably be included as an addendum to the DCFTA.33 An ACAA is an MRA but based on the alignment of
the legislative system of the Mediterranean country with the EU legislation and
establishment of infrastructure that fulills all EU requirements. ACAAs are
currently being prepared with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the
PA and Tunisia in industrial sectors where the legislation is harmonised at EU
level. A irst ACAA for medicinal products, active pharmaceuticals excipients
or mixtures thereof, for human and veterinary use has been concluded with
Israel in the form of a Protocol annexed to the Euro-Med AA.34 The ACAA
30
<http://www.industrie.gov.tn/marquage-ce/www/en/doc.asp?mcat=59&mrub=150>.
S. Rawdan and J.-L. Reiffers, FEMiSE Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
2006: Analysis and Proposals of the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic institutes (Marseille, Institut de la Méditerranée 2006) p. 33.
32
See Commission Staff Working Paper of 25 August 2004 on Agreements on Conformity
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs), SEC (2004)1071.
33
See V. Movchan and V. Shportyuk, EU-Ukraine DCFTA: the Model for Eastern Partnership Regional Trade Cooperation, No. 445/2012, for CASE (Centre for Social and Economic
Research), 2012, Warsaw, p. 15.
34
Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of a Protocol to the
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities
and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, on Conformity
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (CAA); OJ L 145 of 11/06/2010, p. 1. There
are objections claiming that the ACAA must be rejected because Israel violates human rights in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, legally based on Article 2 EU-Israel AA deines that the relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based
on respect for human rights and democratic principles. Example of a reservation to the Protocol:
Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 13 June 2012 for the Committee on International
Trade. “At the present israel applies all the agreements concluded with the EU in the whole of
“the territory of the State of israel” as deined in israeli national law, including the territories she
has occupied since 1967. The EU does not recognise israel’s application of these agreements
to the occupied territories, nor does it recognise any israeli legislation advocating the annexation
and settlement of those territories (e.g. the Basic law: Jerusalem, Capital of israel adopted by
the Knesset on 30th July 1980 annexing East Jerusalem), which it considers to be contrary to international law. EU authorities, therefore, are required to refrain from giving effect to them in any
way whatsoever, since it is prohibited by current Community law and by the EU’s international
obligations. in this context, the terms of the proposed text might allow israel to implement the
Protocol on the basis of its national law deining the territorial scope of its domestic market, hence
31
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provides for two mechanisms, irst, alignment of the speciic EU acquis by Israel. Israel aligned its legislation to EU law that sets essential requirements for
medicinal products in harmonising directives (New Approach) and participates
in the European organisations in the sector covered by it.35 Thus the ACAA
allows medicinal products, which fulil all essential requirements, to be placed
on the Israeli market without needing any further authorisation, and vice versa.36
A second mechanism is the mutual acceptance of medicinal products that are
lawfully placed on the market in one of the parties. For medicinal products for
which there exist no harmonising directives, these products may be traded
between Israel and the EU on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition:
a product lawfully traded on the Israeli market, will be lawfully imported in the
EU and vice versa.37
3.2.2.2. Agricultural products, processed agricultural products and ish and
ishery products
The Mediterranean area is very depending on imported agricultural products
to feed its population. Therefore, further liberalisation in trade in agricultural
products, processed agricultural products and ish and ishery products is of
utmost importance and will happen in accordance with the Euro-Med Roadmap
for agriculture (Rabat Roadmap) adopted by the Euro-Med Ministers of Foreign
including the territories she has occupied since 1967 which are not under Palestinian economic
administration. if that were to happen, the EU would be failing to comply with its Community law
and its obligations under international law. in addition, when conducting its foreign policy, the EU
must not deviate from the provisions of the Treaty of lisbon which imposes an explicit requirement on the EU to ensure consistency between different areas of its external action and between
these external policy areas and other policies. With this regard, the EU’s common commercial
policy shall be conducted in the context of the objectives of the Union’s external action, in the spirit
of the principles the EU is founded on, including the respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. These obligations also apply to the EU’s revised Neighbourhood Policy, which relies on
positive conditionality (“more for more”). Against this background, current israeli government policies, with special regard to the continued building and expansion of settlements in East Jerusalem
and the West Bank and the blockade of the Gaza Strip, as well as the situation of Arab citizens of
israel and the increasing pressure on human rights NGOs in the country raise serious concerns
about the political context of this agreement.”
Israel serves as a good example as how to integrate further in the EU market of industrial
products: Israel created an infrastructure in the ield of standardisation, accreditation, conformity
assessment and metrology; EU sectoral legislation was transposed in the priority sectors: i.e.,
pharmaceuticals legislation and standards in the areas of pressure equipment and medical devices. There is convergence with certain EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules and Israel became
a member of the European standards bodies CEN and CENELEC. This should be the end goal
of all Mediterranean neighbours.
35
Israel serves as a good example as how to integrate further in the EU market of industrial
products: Israel created an infrastructure in the ield of standardisation, accreditation, conformity
assessment and metrology; EU sectoral legislation was transposed in the priority sectors: i.e.,
pharmaceuticals legislation and standards in the areas of pressure equipment and medical devices. There is convergence with certain EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules and Israel became
a member of the European standards bodies CEN and CENELEC. This should be the end goal
of all Mediterranean neighbours.
36
On 23 October 2012, the European Parliament (EP) approved the ACAA. The protocol is
not yet published in the OJ and thus has not entered into force.
37
Cf. supra 3.2.1 the mutual recognition principle in non-harmonized areas.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
Affairs on 28 November 2005.38 The liberalisation agreement will take the form
of an Exchange of Letters which amends the Euro-Med AA and its Protocols.
Also here, the Mediterranean countries should implement EU directives
covering agricultural goods which constitute an important part of Mediterranean
countries’ exports to the European market in order to establish trade corridors
for agricultural goods. In the future this approximation process should lead to
the establishment of trade corridors, in the form of Agreements on Conformity
Assessment and Acceptance (ACAAs) for agricultural products, processed
agricultural products and ish and ishery products. The Mediterranean country
involved will have to align its legislation to harmonising EU directives which
contain essential requirements for agricultural and ishery (New Approach).
Agricultural products, processed agricultural products and ish and ishery
products for which there exist no harmonising directives in the EU, may be
traded between the Mediterranean country and the EU on the basis of the
principle of mutual recognition.
Agricultural products, processed agricultural products and ish and ishery
products must comply with all sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules such as
additives and toxic substances in food or drink, and technical barriers to trade
(TBT) measures, such as labelling of composition of food; quality requirements
for fresh food; volume, shape and appearance of packaging etc. These are
also tested upon conformity by strong independent institutions before they
enter the EU. At present a Common Declaration on SPS and TBT issues is
added to the Euro-Med AAs.39 Some Euro-Med AAs mention the need for
harmonisation of SPS standards40, such as article 46 of the Israel/EU AA.
Other Euro-Med AAs such as the Morocco/EU AA do not mention anything
about SPS measures.Only the EU and Morocco concluded a special Agreement concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products
and ishery products in which it is clariied which SPS and TBT measures should
be implemented before trade can start.41 The EU and Morocco have to apply
the following SPS measures: those that derive from the ‘WTO Agreement on
38
Five Year Work Programme adopted at the 10th Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean
Summit, Barcelona 27-28 November 2005, see http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/
documents.htm.
39
See for example Annex III of the EU/Egypt Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning reciprocal
liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products and ish and
ishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1 and 2 and their annexes and amendments to the
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part,
28/04/2010, L 106, p. 41.
40
Annex A of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement entered into force with the establishment of the World
Trade Organization on 1 January 1995. It concerns the application of food safety and animal and
plant health regulations.
41
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the
Kingdom of Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, ish and ishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 3 and
their Annexes and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the King-
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the Application of SPS Measures42 and the standards, procedures and recommendations of international standards organisations.43 As concerns the TBT
standards, the EU and Morocco must oblige with standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessments of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The European Parliament welcomed this EU/Morocco special
Agreement, yet emphasised that access of Morocco and other Mediterranean
neighbours to the EU’s internal market should not only be subject to compliance
with SPS and TBT standards but also to environmental standards.44 Nevertheless, the special Agreement does not mention environmental standards.
For the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the EU designed a different Agreement
in order to support the building of a Palestinian state. The agreement gives
immediate access and full liberalisation, for a transitional period of 10 years to
the EU market, with possible further extension in time, to all agricultural products, processed agricultural products and ish and ishery products originating
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.45
3.2.3. Derogations in the DCFTA and the Rule of Reason concept in the
Euro-Med context
3.2.3.1. Provision in the DCFTA, its interpretation and some illustrations
Similar to what is stated in the TFEU,46 the parties to the DCFTAs may derogate
from the principle of free movement of goods on the grounds of: (i) public morality, public policy or public security; (ii) the protection of life and health of
humans, animals or plants; (iii) the protection of national treasures possessing
dom of Morocco, of the other part, 7.9.2012, OJ L 214/4, p. 4. This Agreement can be seen as the
result of Morocco’s steps to democracy by reforming its constitution and conducting fair elections.
42
All Mediterranean neighbours should adopt all EU SPS standards on the protection of: (a)
animal or plant life or health from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests,
diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; (b) human or animal life or
health from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in
foods, beverages or feedstuffs; (c) human life or health from risks arising from diseases carried by
animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or (d) to
prevent or limit other damage from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, see articles 12-14,
Annex A to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, available
at www.wto.org.
43
These international standards organisations are the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the
World Organisation for Animal health, the International Ofice of Epizootic Diseases, the International Plant Protection Convention and the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation.
44
European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2012 on the Agreement between the EU
and Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products and ishery
products (2012/2522(RSP) P7_TA-PROV(2012)0055.
45
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union, of the one
part, and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, providing further liberalisation of agricultural products, processed agricultural products and ish and
ishery products and amending the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade
and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) for the beneit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, of the other, 10.12.2011 OJ L 328/5.
46
Article 36 TFEU.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
artistic, historic or architectural value; (iv) the protection of intellectual, industrial or commercial property; (v) rules related to gold and silver; and (vi) the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.47 The national measure which
derogates from the free movement of goods must be the least restrictive on
the free movement of goods.48
This provision applies to industrial goods as well as to agricultural, ishery
and agricultural processed products. When a Mediterranean country believes
that religion or culture are undermined by certain trading activities, they are
likely to impose trade restrictions, especially on the grounds of public morality
and public policy, and are given wide liberty by the EU to do so.49 An interesting case of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is that of Omega Spielhallen
of 14 October 2004.50 In this case, the ECJ ruled that a restriction on the free
movement of goods between the Member States was possible to protect fundamental values laid down in the national German constitution. If the same
principle is also applied in the Euro-Med relationship, many goods will be prohibited from entering the Mediterranean region because of their strict national
constitutions.51 Also according to the ECJ, the concept of ‘public policy’ in the
EU context must be interpreted strictly; public policy may be relied on only if
there is a genuine and suficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of
society.52 But the interpretation given by the ECJ to the derogation provision
Article 36 TFEU is not necessarily valid for the derogation principles in the
Euro-Med AAs. The ECJ ruled that a similarity of terms is not a suficient reason
for transposing ECJ case law to the provisions of the international agreement.
The interpretation in the Euro-Med context is different; more restrictions are
allowed in the Euro-Med context, since the DCFTA do not aim at full acceptance
of all EU acquis, but at deep and comprehensive integration.53 however, the
deeper and more comprehensive the Euro-Med integration in the ield of goods,
the fewer exceptions will be tolerated. Derogations from the Euro-Med move47
Art. 27 Algeria AA; Art. 28 Morocco AA; Art. 28 Tunisia AA; Art. 26 Egypt AA; Art. 27 Jordan
AA ; Art. 27 Israel AA and Art. 27 Lebanon AA. The derogation regarding the conservation of the
exhaustible natural resources is only provided for in the Lebanon AA (Art. 27 Lebanon AA).
48
See for example Art. 27 EU/Algeria AA: Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justiied on grounds of public morality,
public policy or public security, of the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants,
of the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, of the
protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property or of regulations concerning gold
and silver. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.
49
hakura, EU-Mediterranean and Gulf Trade Agreements (Isle of Wight, Palladian Law Publishing 2000) p. 12.
50
C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberburgermeisterin
der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
51
See C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris [2002] ECR I-1335.
52
Cf. supra n. 51 at para. 17.
53
According to settled case law, a mere similarity in the wording of a provision of the EC
Treaty and an international agreement between the EC and a non-member country is not suficient to give to the wording of that agreement the same meaning as it has in the EC Treaty, see
Polydor case, paras. 14 to 21; Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, paras. 29 to 31, and
C-312/91 Metalsa [1993] ECR I-3751, paras. 11 to 20.
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ment of goods will no longer be possible after the Mediterranean countries and
the EU have concluded the ACAA.54 In the EU, article 114 TFEU provides restrictions by Member States even after harmonisation at the European level.
The exception deines that, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure, a
Member State deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on grounds
of major needs referred to in Article 36 TFEU, or relating to the protection of
the environment or the working environment, the Member State will notify the
Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them.
Such an additional exception is not (yet) available under the Euro-Med relationship.
In the Euro-Med relationship, goods will be prohibited from entering the
Mediterranean region because of their strict national measures inspired by
religion, tradition and culture in the Middle East and North Africa. When Mediterranean countries believe that religion or cultures are undermined by trading
activities, they are likely to impose trade restrictions, especially on the grounds
of public morality and public policy.55 Trade in alcohol (wine, beer, spirits) for
example between the EU and the region will be subject to restrictive measures
in many Mediterranean countries. Another illustration concerns the protection
of national treasures. The EU Internal Market led to an increase of stolen art
goods since stolen goods could be transported between the Member States
without border control. To prevent this, the EU took some measures to protect
national artistic, historic or archaeological treasures,56 such as Directive 92/280
on the procedure of restitution of treasures that have been taken illegally from
one EU country to another which includes a basic list of protected national
treasures.57 Beyond this list, EU Member States are free to take restrictive
national measures under the article 36 TFEU exception and add other
54
Case C-1/96 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Compassion in World Farming ltd [1998) ECR I-1251.The ECJ made it clear that a Member State could
not rely on the views or behaviour of a section of national public opinion in order to unilaterally
challenge a harmonising measure (in this case a directive) adopted by the EC institutions.
55
hakura, supra n. 49 at p. 12.
56
Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State, OJ L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 74. See also C. Barnard, The
Substantive law of the EU, the four freedoms (Oxford, 2010), p. 163; Council Regulation (EC) No
116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the export of cultural goods, OJ L 39, 10.2.2009, p. 1–7; C. G.
Jernigan, Protecting National Treasures in a Single-Market EC, Boston College international and
Comparative law Review (B.C. int’l & Comp.l. Rev.) (1994), Volume 17, Issue 1, 153.
57
The annexes 14-15 set out 14 categories of items ranked as national treasures: (1) archaeological discoveries more than 100 years old; (2) objects (including furniture) from artistic,
historical, or religious monuments more than 100 years old; (3) paintings executed prior to 1600;
(4) engravings and prints; (5) sculpture; (6) constructions and composite works; (7) photographs;
(8) manuscripts more than 100 years old; (9) books more than 200 years old; (10) archives over
50 years old; (11) philatelic specimens; (12) fauna, lora, minerals, or anatomy of historical, archaeological, paleontological, ethnographic, or numismatic interest; (13) motor vehicles over 75
years old; (14) antiques over 100 years old. A second list indicates minimum monetary value for
an object to be considered a national treasure: paintings dated between 1600 and 1900 with a
value of at least 75,000 ECUs; paintings dated after 1900 with a value of at least 150,000 ECUs;
engravings and prints worth at least 7,500 ECUs; sculpture worth at least 50,000 ECUs; constructions and composite works worth at least 100,000 ECUs; photographs worth at least 7,500 ECUs;
philatelic specimens worth at least 25,000 ECUs; furniture or musical antiques worth at least
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
national treasures. The Netherlands has compiled an additional list of approximately 300 objects that need governmental permission to leave the country.
The Mediterranean countries consider much more objects as a part of the
cultural heritage. In Greece, anything dating back before 1830 is considered
state property. Italy considers over 30 million works of art as falling within the
article 36 TFEU category.58 The protection of national artistic, historic or archaeological treasures in the Mediterranean area will be a challenging task
due to the general lack of documentation and information in the cultural and
artistic ield.
3.2.3.2. The concept of the Rule of reason in the Euro-Med context
In the Cassis de Dijon case about the rule of reason, the ECJ stated that other
restrictions to the free movement of goods within the EU were also possible.59
Restriction of free movement of goods is allowed, in anticipation of harmonisation of laws in particular ields at EU level, if a mandatory requirement or public interest needs to be satisied such as the protection of public health, the
protection of consumers, the protection of the environment, the protection of
trafic safety, or the proper functioning of telecommunication services.60 The
national measure that restricts trade must be of a non-economic nature, applicable without any distinction at the national level as to imported products.
Also the proportionality principle must be met. The rule of reason can only be
applied in the Euro-Med relations in anticipation of harmonisation of particular
ields if a mandatory requirement or public interest needs to be satisied. The
Mediterranean countries and the EU aim at aligning their legislation in certain
ields only, such as areas where the Mediterranean countries have vital export
interest to the EU.61 In such ields, in anticipation of harmonisation of laws, it
can be argued that the rule of reason also applies between the Mediterranean
countries and the EU.
20,000 ECUs; or any other antique under category 14 worth at least 50,000 ECUs. id. see also
annex with list of possible treasures.
58
Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic
and Social Committee on the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) n° 3911/92 on the export of cultural goods and Council Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural objects unlawfully
removed from the territory of a Member State, COM/2000/0325 inal.
59
Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR
00649.
60
This list in not exhaustive.
61
For example, Jordan has vital export interests to the EU as concerns pharmaceuticals;
Morocco exports mainly agricultural products to the EU and Egypt exports energy, chemicals and
textiles and clothes to the EU.
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ThE EURO-MED LIBERALISATION OF SERVICES ThROUGh
ThE DCFTAS
4.1. The current provisions of movement of services in the
Euro-Med AAs
All Euro-Med AAs, except for the PA-EU Interim AA, include provisions on the
movement of services.62 The provisions in the AAs with Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Egypt differ from those in the AAs with Algeria, Lebanon and Jordan
since these countries were members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
at the time the AAs were drafted. These countries basically refer to the services provisions as provided for in the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in
Services) in general and the MFN (Most Favoured Nation) treatment in particular.63 The MFN treatment will not apply when WTO parties decide to conclude
a ‘preferential economic integration agreement on services’ as provided for in
Article V of the GATS.64 In the event of such a preferential agreement, the
partners to the agreement will grant each other preferential treatment, which
is different from the treatment of all other countries.65 Jordan, Algeria and
Lebanon were not a member of the WTO at the time the AAs were drafted.66
These Mediterranean countries had to create a legal framework concerning
the movement of services themselves, since they could not simply refer to the
GATS and the MFN treatment. Jordan and the EU included a best endeavour
clause which should lead to a gradual supply of services by European and
Jordanian companies.67 Algeria grants treatment to European cross-border
service suppliers no less favourable than that accorded to companies of any
third country.68 Lebanon only included a reference to the obligations under the
GATS, which will take effect from the date of accession of Lebanon to the
62
On 23 June 2005, the Commission adopted a proposal to open negotiations on the liberalisation of services and investment with the Mediterranean countries. This marks an important step
towards the creation of the free trade area between Europe and the Mediterranean.
63
Art. II(1) GATS and Art. 32 Morocco AA; Art. 30 Tunisia AA; Art. 31 Israel AA and Art. 29
Egypt AA.
64
See, for example, Art. 30(2)(a) Tunisia AA.
65
The ‘preferential economic services agreement’ must fulill all conditions set out in Article
V of the GATS.
66
It must be noted that Jordan has become a member of the WTO in 2000. For Jordan, the
GATS provisions and the Euro-Med provisions apply. As regards the interaction between the
relevant services provisions in the Jordan/EU AA and the GATS, article 44 of the Jordan/EU AA
stipulates that treatment granted by a party to the other shall, as from the day one month prior
to the date of entry into force of the relevant obligations of the GATS, in respect of sectors or
measures covered by the GATS, in no case be more favourable than that accorded by such irst
party under the provisions of the GATS and this in respect of each service sector, subsector and
mode of supply.
67
Art. 37 Jordan AA.
68
Art. 31 Algeria AA.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
WTO.69 Jordan, Algeria and Lebanon also included the possibility of concluding
a preferential agreement on services.70
The AAs with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel refer to the GATS and its
‘derogation from the movement of services’ provisions. The Lebanon-EU AA
does not provide for derogations from the movement of services. The Jordan
and Algerian AAs offer several possibilities to derogate from the movement of
services, such as restrictions on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health;71 restrictions as regards services connected to the exercise of
oficial authority;72 measures for prudential reasons to protect investors, depositors or to ensure the integrity and stability of the inancial system;73 particular rules concerning the establishment and operation in one party’s
territory of branches of companies justiied by legal or technical differences.74
4.2. Towards a deeper and more comprehensive integration as
regards services between the EU and the Mediterranean area
Most Mediterranean countries and the EU wish to create a preferential integration agreement on services. Contrary to the Euro-Med movement of goods,
there are almost no binding provisions in the Euro-Med AAs as regards the
Euro-Med movement of services. To become DCFTAs, the Euro-Med AAs
should encompass binding legal provisions; a mere referral to the provisions
in the GATS will not be suficient anymore. The future agreements must include
similar provisions on services for all Mediterranean countries in order to ensure
consistency of the legal framework. however, also speciic provisions will be
inserted in the agreements which will take into account the special economic
situation and inancial needs of the least-developed Mediterranean countries.
After the inclusion of binding provisions in the Euro-Med AAs, it should be assessed whether further liberalisation of the movement of services is feasible
via approximation of legislation and/or the application of the mutual recognition
principle in the ield of services. The Istanbul Framework Protocol serves as a
non-binding basis for negotiations about the liberalisation of services between
the Mediterranean countries and the EU.75 The EU and the different Mediter69
Art. 30 Lebanon AA: Treatment granted by either party to the other with respect to the
rights of establishment and the supply of services shall be based on each party’s commitments
and other obligations under the GATS. This provision shall take effect from the date of the inal
accession of Lebanon to the WTO. The parties shall not, between the date of entry of into force
of this agreement and Lebanon’s accession to the WTO, take any measures or actions which will
render the conditions for the supply of services by the EC or Lebanese service suppliers more
discriminatory than those existing on the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
70
Art. 65 Jordan AA.
71
Art. 35, para. 1 Algeria AA and Art. 41 Jordan AA.
72
Art. 35, para. 2 Algeria AA and Art. 41 Jordan AA.
73
Art. 46 Jordan AA and Art. 35 para. 4 Algeria AA.
74
The Jordan and Algerian AAs also stipulate that the movement of services do not apply to
air transport, inland waterways transport and maritime transport: Art. 34 Algeria AA and Arts. 31
and 39 Jordan AA.
75
Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries, International
Trade Department of the World Bank, May 2009, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1248204247129/Negotiating_Trade_in_Services.pdf.
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ranean partners will negotiate about the liberalisation of services on the ‘voluntary participation’ model. Negotiations will be opened with Mediterranean
partners ‘willing’ to enter into such an agreement.76 The negotiations with the
‘willing’ partners will be made public to the non-willing countries. This allows
all Mediterranean partners to be aware of and acquire the best offer made by
the EU in any sector to any country. The future preferential services agreement
as part of the DCFTA includes a vertical dimension meaning that Mediterranean
countries open their sectors to the EU and vice versa, but includes also a
horizontal dimension meaning that the different Mediterranean partners open
their services markets to each other. The horizontal dimension is relected in
the regional Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause: a Mediterranean country,
which maintains a preferential treatment with the EU, should grant the other
Mediterranean countries a preferential treatment that is not be less favourable
than the one granted to the EU. This principle will be dificult to apply in practice,
since there are almost no written agreements amongst the Mediterranean
partners.
4.2.1. legal concepts as regards the Euro-Med movement of services
in the DCFTAs
The free movement of services is deined as the right of self-employed persons
to move freely between Member States in order to provide services on a temporary basis. According to hakura, a service within the scope of the Euro-Med
AAs is an economic activity which is intangible and involves an element of
commercial motivation, such as transport, advertising, construction, engineering, distribution, education and the transmission of television signals. For instance, situations where a French professor offers his educational services in
Tunisia; where a Swedish constructor builds roads in Jordan; and where a
Moroccan professional football player offers his services in the EU. It does not
apply to state education and sports purely based on sporting interests, since
these involve no economic element.77 An economic activity in the Euro-Med
AA means an activity of an industrial, commercial or professional character.78
The Istanbul Framework Protocol adds that services include any service in any
sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.79
76
This approach mirrors the Framework Protocol on Services, which was adopted by the
Ministers of Trade in Istanbul in July 2004 and which served as a template in further negotiations.
77
F.S. hakura, supra n. 49 at p. 35. Films are considered as goods.
78
Deinitions are based on Art. 36 Algeria AA.
79
In the EU, the movement of services resorts under articles 51–62 of the TFEU and the
harmonisation Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ L 376/36) aims at further dismantling of remaining barriers. There are many services are excluded from the scope of this EU Directive such
as electronic communications; transport (urban transport, taxis, ambulances); inancial services;
audiovisual services; gambling; social services (housing, childcare, family support); taxation; public and private healthcare provided by professionals to patients; and pharmaceutical services. For
those excluded services the general provisions on the free movement of services (articles 51– 62
of the TFEU) apply.
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Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
A provision on temporary presence should be inserted in the DCFTAs. Temporary presence relates to persons of one country temporarily entering the
territory of another country to supply a service (for example, circus artists,
lawyers, sportsmen or teachers). This concept is narrowly related to the movement of persons. Freedom to provide services across borders within the meaning of the EU Directive on Services means that a provider who is established
in one EU Member State may temporarily or occasionally provide its services
within the territory of another member state without having to settle there. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)80 includes an interesting provision about the temporary local presence of enterprises in the territory of the
other party in the case of cross-border provision of services. The provision
deines that no party may require the service provider of the other party to
establish or maintain a representative ofice in any form or enterprise, or to be
resident, in its territory as a condition for the cross-border of a service. According to the WTO, the notions non-permanent or temporary range from an employing period varying between 3 months to 5 years.
For each service there are different methods in which they can be supplied.81
Mode 1 concerns the cross-border trade in services. To deine the cross-border
supply of services between the EU and the Mediterranean countries, other
services liberalisation agreements may serve as an example. The NAFTA is
used as an example to deine the cross-border provisions of a service as follows: the provision of a service (a) from the territory of a party into the territory
of another party, (b) in the territory of a party by a person of that party to a
person of another party or (c) by a national of a party in the territory of another
party.82 Services under mode 1 are supplied through the telecommunications
or postal infrastructure of a country and may include consultancy or market
research reports, telemedical advice, distance training, architectural drawings
being electronically transmitted etc. Mode 2 concerns consumption abroad
which refers to European residents obtaining services in the territory of a Mediterranean country and vice versa. For example, it applies to an Algerian lawyer
going to France to provide legal advice and European tourists visiting Morocco.
Mode 3 concerns the delivery of services through commercial presence, such
as the establishment of a branch ofice of a foreign bank in a partner country.
Mode 4 concerns temporary movement of natural persons such an independent
supplier (consultant, health worker, etc.) or an employee of a service supplier
(for example employee of a consultancy irm, hospital, construction company).
Free movement of services often implies movement of persons. Therefore
mobility agreements will need to be negotiated.
Free movement of services implies the prohibition of quantitative restrictions
and all measures having the same effect. A quantitative restriction is a nondiscriminatory measure that imposes limitation on: (a) a number of service
providers, whether in the form of a quota, a monopoly or an economic needs
test, or by any other quantitative means; or (b) the operation of any service
80
81
82
See http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590.
See Article I:2 GATS.
See Nafta.
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provider, whether in the form of a quota or an economic needs test, or by any
other quantitative means.83 A measure having the same effect as a quantitative
measure might be for example the obligation for the service provider to obtain
authorisation from the authorities of the country in which the service provider
wants to provide its services. In the Euro-Med context however, full free movement of services is not the end goal. The desired degree of integration in the
ield of services is not yet clear, but there should be a deep and comprehensive
movement of services. According to Müller-Jentsch, the purpose of the EuroMed liberalisation of movement of services is the removal of the main tariff and
non-tariff barriers that hinder the movement of services, reliant on the economic development of the Mediterranean country involved.84 Since full Euro-Med
liberalisation of services is not the end goal of the future DCFTAs, each party
will have to explain all restrictions on the movement of services it wants to
maintain. Services that will still be subject to quantitative restrictions and/or
measures having the same effect should be notiied to the other party and included in an Annex to the DCFTA. The same goes for the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality. This prohibition will not apply to the services
included in the Annex to the DCFTA. To further liberalise Euro-Med trade in
services, the EU and the Mediterranean country may, after a period of time,
renegotiate and remove some services from the Annex.
4.2.2. Mutual Recognition principle in non-harmonised areas
In the EU, the ECJ introduced the principle of mutual recognition in the ield of
services85: if a service was lawfully authorised in one Member State, the service
should be acceptable throughout the EU. In Euro-Med context, the mutual
recognition principle would imply that a service lawfully supplied in a Mediterranean country should be accepted in the EU, even when this service does not
fully comply with the rules of the EU and vice versa. There is one exception to
this principle: the EU or an EU Member State may refuse the supply of the
service in its present form as the refusal is strictly necessary for the protection
of, for example, public safety, health or environment. In that case, the EU or
the EU Member State must also demonstrate that its measure is the least
trade-restrictive measure. In the EU, the application of the mutual recognition
principle in the ield of services seemed ineffective in practice: numerous barriers remained in the EU Member States and prevented providers from offering
services in another EU Member State.86 The application of the judicial principle
of mutual recognition of services proved to be a challenging form of transna83
See NAFTA, article 1207.
D. Müller-Jentsch, Deep integration and trade in services in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, World Bank/European Commission, p. 15.
85
Such as Case 205/84, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of
Germany, ECR 1986, p. 3755.
86
Claes-Mikael Jonsson, Paper for the ETUC Working Group on Social Policy and Legislation, Comparing the mutual recognition principle and the country of origin principle, 2005, at http://
www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/Mutual_recognition_prinEN.pdf, p. 10.
84
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tional governance in the EU and will certainly be too demanding between the
Mediterranean countries and the EU. Jakubiak correctly remarks that the principle of mutual recognition requires a substantial amount of conidence in the
other party which will take time to develop in the Euro-Mediterranean relationship.87 It implies the existence of and trust in each other’s regulations on services, quality assessment mechanisms and testing facilities that should offer
equivalent levels of protection. ‘Equivalence’ between levels of protection in
the Mediterranean countries and those in the EU cannot be presumed. The
Istanbul Framework Protocol deines that the EU and the Mediterranean countries shall provide recommendations on the criteria for the authorisation, licensing, operation and certification of service suppliers. The EU and the
Mediterranean country involved will consider the level of correspondence of
their respective regulations. When both parties decide that the recommendation
is consistent with the provisions of the agreement, the recommendation will be
implemented through a Mutual Recognition Agreement on requirements, qualiications, licenses and other regulations to be negotiated by the EU and the
Mediterranean country involved. MRAs do not involve any legislative alignment
to European norms, but concern the guarantee of quality of services through
the acceptance of authorisation, licensing, operation and certiication of service
suppliers other countries. For example, through a mutual recognition agreement
(MRA), qualiied professional accountants from a Mediterranean country can
practice in the EU without double testing.
4.2.3. Approximation in harmonised areas
The EU established another liberalisation mechanism through the Services
Directive since the principle mutual recognition was not suficiently effective.88
The Directive regulates the mutual recognition principle (regulatory mutual
recognition) which is different from the previous mutual recognition principle
which was developed by the ECJ (judicial mutual recognition).89 The implementation of the Services Directive in the different Member States was hindered
by many legislative problems as well as practical problems such as language
barriers and insuficient awareness.90 Aligning their norms to other existing EU
standards and legislation, such as EU legislation in the inancial sector and
banking sector, is not the priority of the Mediterranean countries at this moment
87
M. Jakubiak et al., supra n. 24, pp. 22-23.
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2006 on services in the internal market, OJ L 376/36. Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualiications
applies to all EU Member State nationals wishing to practise a regulated profession, on either a
self-employed or employed basis, in a Member State other than that in which they obtained their
professional qualiications.
89
C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.
90
In October 2011 the Commission has decided to refer Austria, Germany and Greece to the
ECJ on the ground that they have so far only partially transposed the Services Directive.
88
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and is be too costly and complex.91 The Mediterranean countries have weak
administrations with not much inancial means and are trying to reform their
state into a more democratic system and to improve their legislation on human
rights. The example of Turkey that is in the process of aligning its legislation to
the EU acquis as regards the movement of services demonstrates that liberalisation of services is very dificult to achieve at the legislative level and in
practice. Negotiations between Turkey and the EU were opened in 2000,92 but
until now no progress has been made on the chapter on the freedom to provide
services.93 The Turkish example shows that such harmonisation is very time
consuming and comes to a halt in times of political unrest in the country. At
present there is no real progress as regards the alignment of Turkish legislation
in the area of free movement of services and the right of establishment to the
EU acquis. however, the Mediterranean countries could opt for harmonisation
in certain ields. The Euro-Med liberalisation of services goes hand-in-hand
with the protection of some vital principles, such as the protection of the consumer. The EU harmonised essential requirements for the protection of its
consumers.94 For the protection of such vital interests, the Mediterranean consumers could opt for alignment of their legislation to the already existing EU
acquis on consumer protection.
4.2.4. Standardisation projects in the Euro-Med area
In the EU, standardisation in the services sector is heavily supported by the
Commission. The Commission wants to open up standardisation to the widest
range of services.95 Also the Services Directive encourages the development
91
I. Dreyer, Trade Policy in the EU’s Neighourhood, Ways Forward for the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, 2012, Paper for Notre Europe, available at http://www.notreeurope.eu/.
92
Decision No 2/2000 of the EU-Turkey Association Council of 11 April 2000 on the opening
of negotiations aimed at the liberalisation of services and the mutual opening of procurement
markets between the EU and Turkey, SEC/2000/0476 inal.
93
Commission Staff Working Paper Turkey 2011 Progress Report of 17 October 2011, SEC
(2011) 1201 inal states as follows: Work on the detailed alignment strategy is ongoing. Disproportionate requirements are still in place with respect to the right of establishment. There has been
no progress in the area of freedom to provide cross-border services. The granting of work and
residence permits to service providers established in an EU Member State remains subject to registration, license or authorisation requirements that are incompatible with the acquis. Alignment
with the Services Directive still has to be achieved, and a Point of Single Contact for the provision
of services has to be set up. No progress can be reported on mutual recognition of professional
qualiications. Recognition of professional qualiications still has to be differentiated from recognition of academic qualiications. It has to be noted that, in December 2006, due to the Turkish
failure to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement the Council decided
the chapter on right of establishment, the freedom to provide service and inancial services will be
put on hold until Turkey fulills its commitments towards Cyprus.
94
See Services Directive and Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualiications, OJ L 255/22.
95
Communication from the Commission to European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, A strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward
to enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020, Brussels,
1.6.2011, COM (2011) 311 inal, p. 14; Communication from the Commission: Single Market Act:
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of European standards for services. The EU promotes its standardisation of
services through technical assistance to the countries from the Mediterranean
basin in order to create common a Euro-Med economic area.96 According to
several authors, the Euro-Med liberalisation of services will develop best when
the different countries perceive this process as a form of ‘cooperation’ rather
than a competitive process.97 The best way to remove the barriers to the movement of services is for the EU and the Mediterranean countries to reach agreement on a common set of standards.98
There are different steps to be followed towards common standardisation
in the ield of services. Firstly, the types of services have to be selected. Since
the Mediterranean countries have no accession prospect, the end goal is to
establish a deep and comprehensive Euro-Med liberalisation of services. The
EU and the Mediterranean countries will have to select the services they want
to liberalise. An example of a chosen service concerns the information and
communications technology (ICT) sector. The Commission wants common ICT
standards for the entire European area, but also for the Euro-Med area. An
ongoing Euro-Med standardisation process aims at common ICT standards so
that the EU and the Mediterranean countries proit to the highest extent from
ICT.99 Second, training courses for the Mediterranean partners have to be
initiated. An essential part of the ‘Common Standardisation Process’ exists out
of the organisation of multiple training courses for oficials of the willing Mediterranean countries by the EU to improve knowledge amongst these oficials
in the areas of standardisation, testing, certiication, inspection, accreditation
and metrology. An improved knowledge will result in educated oficials which
will be able to negotiate in an effective way about the opening of their markets
to the EU. In the past CEN100 organised training courses, called the ‘EUROMED
quality Programme for the movement of goods’. Follow-up courses, called
‘EUROMED quality Programme for the movement of services’ should be performed, in order to improve knowledge amongst the oficials which will lead to
better quality of services that move between the EU and the Mediterranean
Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen conidence: Working together to create new growth,
COM(2011)206/4; Commission Staff Working Document, Delivering the Single Market Act: State
of Play, SWD(2012) 21 inal.
96
Commission staff working document, of 18 October 2004, on the challenges for European
standardisation [SEC(2004) 1251 – Not published in the Oficial Journal], p. 10. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-standards/iles/standards_policy/role_of_standardisation/doc/staff_working_document_en.pdf.
97
K. Nicolaïdis and S. K. Schmidt, Mutual Recognition on “Trial”: The Long Road to Services
Liberalization, Paper to be presented at the EUSA Tenth Biannual International Conference, Montreal, (2007), available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/7985/1/nicolaidis-k-03a.pdf, p. 31: citation from K.
Nicolaïdis and G. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government’, Michigan Review of international law (2005) 68: 267-322 and K. Schmidt, ‘Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance’, Journal of European Public Policy (2005) 14(5).
98
P. Brenton and M. Machin, Trade Policy Issues for the Euro-Med Partnership, Working
Paper published by the CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project (2003) p. 8.
99
Communication from the Commission, A strategic vision for European standards: Moving
forward to enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020,
Brussels, 1.6.2011, COM (2011) 311 inal, p. 15.
100
Comité Européen de Normalisation or European Committee for Standardisation.
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countries.101 The training courses should take place before the actual negotiations about the standardisation of certain services commence. It is essential
that the Mediterranean partners are involved in the negotiations rounds at the
very beginning of the standardisation process. Oficials of the Mediterranean
countries and the EU should involve important stakeholders, such as the relevant industry, academics, consumer groups and international organisations.
Thirdly, the EU needs to know which regulations, rules and practices are in
place in the Mediterranean countries and needs a better understanding of the
regulation and practices of the delivery of the speciic service in the Mediterranean area which should happen through in-depth studies of the rules governing the admission to and exercise of a profession. A good example of such a
study is the comparative survey on called ‘The accounting and auditing profession in the Mediterranean area’.102 The study provides the regulatory framework
governing the professions; use of professional titles by members of each national professional society; mandatory requirements of citizenship/residency
as a condition for membership of the relevant national body; distribution of
members in public practice, industry or governmental bodies; restrictions imposed by national law on the establishment and legal form of professional
partnerships; general statistical information; statutory audit reports and listed
companies audited. The study also focuses on the practice of the profession
in the Mediterranean Area. A detailed analysis is offered on, inter alia, the range
and scope of activities performed by members of each national professional
body, as well as limitations and/or prohibitions imposed by national law on the
performance of certain activities; accounting, auditing, practice and rules of
professional conduct.103 In the banking sector, a common Euro-Med study was
performed through the exchange of information between the Mediterranean
countries themselves and the EU. All Mediterranean countries and the EU were
able to compare national rules and practices. This resulted in standards convergence both in the Mediterranean region and with the EU. Finally, the Mediterranean partners must become member of the EU standardisation bodies.
Most Mediterranean countries have national standardisation bodies (Algeria,
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Palestine), but competition between the different national standardisation bodies in the Mediterranean area
will work contra-productive. Most Mediterranean countries are also afiliated
with the European standardisation body.104 Afiliation means no voting rights
and simply implementing the produced standards. Mediterranean countries
must become member of the existing European standardisation bodies so they
will have a say in the standardisation process. Most standards of these bodies
101
http://www.cen.eu/cen/Services/Visibility/Euromedquality/Pages/default.aspx.
Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Romania,
Serbia – including the special status territory of Kosovo, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.
103
http://www.fcmweb.org/
104
Algeria (IANOR Institut Algerien de normalization), Egypt (EO Egyptian Organisation for
Standardisation and quality Control), Israel (Standards Institution of Israel), Lebanon (LIBNOR)
Lebanese Standards Institution, Morocco (SNIMA Service de Normalisation Industrielle Marocaine) and Palestine (PSI Palestine Standards Institution) and Jordan (JSIM Jordan Institute for
Standards and Metrology)
102
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are voluntary, but some standards become mandatory when they are adopted
by regulators as legal requirements. The abovementioned steps should result
in the establishment of need to set up sectorial Euro-Med Entities for Standardisation that will coordinate the standardisation process for the selected services. The establishment of the central Euro-Med entity for Accountancy and
Auditing, for example, is a sectorial standardisation body which will coordinate
the standardisation process for the professions of accounting and auditing.105
These sectorial Euro-Med entities can be compared with the DCFTA Task Force,
composed of technical working sub-groups (such as market access; barriers
to trade; inancial services) which was set up for the liberalisation of services
between the EU and Moldova.106
Trade in Euro-Med services will be hampered by inadequate mutual recognition of qualiications.107 The EU and the Mediterranean countries should
promote the development of mutually acceptable standards and criteria for licensing and certiication of professional services suppliers on the basis of
factors such as educational background, qualifying examinations and experience.108
4.2.5. Derogations from the Euro-Med liberalisation of movement of
services in the DCFTAs
The Istanbul Framework Protocol provides us with a whole range of general
restrictions: 1) protection of public morals or public order (the public order
exception may be invoked only where a genuine and suficiently serious threat
is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society); 2) protection human,
animal or plant life or health; 3) conservation of exhaustible natural resources;
4) compliance with laws or regulations which are in line with the provisions of
this Framework Protocol 109 etc. The Protocol also provides for security reasons
and no country may be asked to furnish any information about essential security interests. Finally any country may action in pursuance of its obligations
105
Final Conference of the EuroMed Market Programme Barcelona, 28-29 April 2009 Final
Conclusions, available at http://www.fcmweb.org.
106
See quarterly Progress Report no. 1/2011 on the Action Plan for implementing the Recommendations of the European Commission for the future negotiations of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). See DCFTA Task Force for the Moldova/EU DCFTA.
107
I. Andersen et al. for the World Bank, From Political to Economic Awakening in the Arab
World: The Path of Economic integration Deauville Partnership Report on Trade and Foreign
Direct investment, Volume II: Main Report, May 2012, p. 40.
108
Directive on mutual recognition of services in the EU is the mutual recognition of professional qualiications between the different Member States via Directive 2005/36/EC covering all
recognition rules (except for those applicable to lawyers, activities in the ield of toxic substances
and commercial agents). I. Andersen et al. for the World Bank, From Political to Economic Awakening in the Arab World: The Path of Economic integration Deauville Partnership Report on Trade
and Foreign Direct investment, Volume II: Main Report, May 2012, p. 75.
109
Including those relating to: (i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to
deal with the effects of a default on services contracts; (ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of conidentiality of individual records and accounts.
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under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security, even if it restricts the Euro-Med movement of services. The number of derogations from the Euro-Med movement of services depends on the
degree of economic integration of services the EU and the Mediterranean
partners envisage: the deeper the Euro-Med integration in the ield of services,
the fewer exceptions will be tolerated.
Further, the ECJ made it possible to restrict free movement of services on
the grounds of the rule of reason within the EU. The ECJ accepts long list of
public interest objectives that need to be safeguarded in services, such as for
example in health care where it is in the public interest that there is no seriously undermining the inancial balance of the social security system or overcapacity in the supply of medical care. Restriction of free movement of
services is allowed, in anticipation of harmonisation of laws in particular ields
at EU level, if a mandatory requirement or public interest needs to be satisied
such as the protection of public health, the protection of consumers, the protection of the environment, the protection of trafic safety, or the proper functioning
of telecommunication services.110 As regards the Euro-Med relationship, the
rule of reason can be applied in the Euro-Med relations in anticipation of harmonisation of particular ields if a mandatory requirement or public interest
needs to be satisied. It can be argued that the rule of reason also applies
between the Mediterranean countries and the EU in anticipation of harmonisation of laws in particular ields of services. Parties may restrict free movement
of services if a mandatory requirement or public interest needs to be satisied,
in ields that are waiting of harmonisation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
By means of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) the
EU and the Mediterranean countries intend to establish a form of integration
which goes beyond the level of integration established through free trade agreements. Deep integration refers to the removal of legal, regulatory and institutional barriers between the EU and the Mediterranean countries.
Comprehensive integration implies a degree of regulatory and institutional
harmonisation to the highest extent possible. The EU currently focuses on the
four countries that created a free trade area by means of the conclusion of the
Agadir Agreement; being Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. however, the
European inancial crisis and slowdown of the European economies resulted
in a shift of focus of the EU towards more economically interesting countries,
such as Korea, instead of free trade agreement with developing countries, such
as the Mediterranean countries. The Mediterranean countries come now second in rank as concerns the conclusion of DCFTAs.
The movement of goods and services between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea (will) happen(s) via legally enforceable provisions in the EuroMed DCFTAs and further through the implementation in the Mediterranean
110
This list in not exhaustive.
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countries of the most essential EU acquis. For some goods for which there is
no harmonisation, the principle of mutual recognition of goods will apply. The
application of the principle of mutual recognition between the Mediterranean
countries and the EU is only possible if goods are being tested by strong independent and trustworthy institutions. This means trustworthy institutions dealing with health, safety or environmental standards of goods should be established
in the Mediterranean area. Independent and reliable test facilities responsible
for standardisation, conformity assessment, metrology and market supervision
should be established in all Mediterranean countries and/or the Mediterranean
neighbours should participate in European and international standardisation
bodies. As regards the future movement of services between the Mediterranean
countries and the EU, the application of the principle of mutual recognition in
the services sector will also require conidence. Therefore, institutions that
develop standards for licensing and certiication of professional service providers equal to those in force in the EU should be established with inancial support of the EU. It can be stated that common Euro-Med standardisation projects
are the best solution to establish an eficient Euro-Med system of movement
of services.
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