Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 DOI 10.1007/s12117-008-9052-y Illicit arms trafficking and the limits of rational choice theory: the case of the Balkans Jana Arsovska & Panos A. Kostakos Published online: 22 October 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008 Abstract Organized crime is often conceptualized as a business enterprise formed by actors motivated by profits. The Balkans represents an ideal case for testing the extent to which assumptions about the image of actors involved in illegal arms trading can be extrapolated to the macro-level of analysis. Focusing mainly on public discourse, this paper points to several thematic categories of illicit arms trafficking: i) profit-oriented arms trafficking involving organized crime groups ii) trafficking of arms for the purpose of arming criminal-terrorist formations and iii) state-sponsored illegal arms trafficking. Although economic incentives appear strong in many cases, other cultural, social and political issues also frame the illicit arms market in the region. We argue that both understanding and policing organized crime should also embrace the non-economic nature of this type of criminal behavior. Keywords Balkan organised crime . Illicit arms trafficking . Rational choice theory . Social networks . Terrorism . European crime Introduction From 1995 onwards, the political and security agendas of international institutions, EU governments and law enforcement agencies, such as Interpol and Europol, have paid closer attention to ‘the fight’ against organized crime. However, the fight against illicit arms trafficking still appeared to be a low priority at a European level. Official discourse on the accumulation and uncontrolled spread of arms only recently gained prominence J. Arsovska (*) Institute of Criminal Law, Catholic University of Leuven, Hooverplain 10-11, 3000 Leuven, Belgium e-mail: jana.arsovska@law.kuleuven.be P. A. Kostakos Department of European Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath, Bath, UK e-mail: p.kostakos@bath.ac.uk Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 353 on the international agenda (Davis et al. 2001: 9–10). Particularly troubling appears to be the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW).1 Then, with the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and the UN Firearms Protocol, new possibilities emerged for cooperation between national and international law enforcement agencies to fight illicit arms trafficking. Correspondingly, the EU, the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) put forward a number of anti-arms trafficking initiatives (Davis et al. 2001, 9). Recently, the EU parliament passed a law that tightens control of replicas weapons and promotes additional mechanisms for better monitoring of weapons within the Single Market (European Parliament 2007). The reason for this prioritization seems to be the devastating consequences of the large accumulation and flow of illegal, but also legal, weapons. In some cases, it can be argued that the illicit arms trade encourages civil conflicts, leads to high crime rates and provides opportunities for political extremists. It also contributes to the destabilization of whole regions, the escalation of conflicts, the impeding of humanitarian assistance, the disabling of post-conflict development, and to banditry and social violence (Davis et al. 2001, 10; Dhanapala et al. 1999). Significant numbers of small arms and light weapons are also being circulated in the global illicit market to serve a large number of individuals and criminal groups in European countries. Lately, the illegal arms trade has also affected many EU member states which did not have any major predicament with arms trafficking and gun crime in general (Summers 2007). The level of seizures throughout Europe indicates that the illegal arms trade has become a region-wide development (Davis et al. 2001: 5). In 2001, a report published by the British Center for Defense Studies pointed out that, ‘there is a regular trickle of small arms primarily from the Balkan region, as well as from Eastern Europe, which could increase as the EU and the Schengen Rim both expand to the east and south-east’ (Sagramoso 2001: 1–2). The report adds that ‘Small arms and light weapons (SALW) have fed the local criminal underworld as well as European terrorist groups, such as the Real IRA, thus contributing to the undermining of West European public safety’ (2001: 1–2). This trend has had a tremendous impact on the foundation of European societies, as fears have been expressed that gun crime and gun culture are gradually becoming permanent features of Western European capitals.2 Furthermore, the liberalization of trade and the opening of borders, facilitating easier travel of goods, people, ideas and cultures, are expected to augment the impact of this phenomenon. Despite the fact that education about the nature of organized crime is central to the EU strategy against organized crime (Council of Europe 1998: 0001–4, para. 16), very little is known about the nature of illicit markets for weapons. This, once again, might be due to the fact that the EU only recently perceived illegal arms trafficking as a serious threat to society. Hence, various questions emerge: What motivates 1 The definition of small arms and light weapons used here is the one used in the 1997 Report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (United Nations, A/52/298, 27 August 1997). This distinguishes between small arms, which are weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons, which are designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. SALW account for an estimated 60-90 percent of the 100,000 conflict deaths each year and tens of thousands of additional deaths outside of war zones (Small Arms Survey 2005). 2 Gordon Brown’s first speech to the Labour conference as party leader (BBC News 2007). 354 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 criminal actors to engage in this activity? How is the market organized? What issues should be considered when creating policy against arms smuggling? Conversely, although for a long time insignificant in terms of official statistics, small arms and light weapons were at the heart of the upheavals in the Balkans for about two decades. Hence, arms trafficking has a long-standing tradition in the Balkans, and one can learn a great deal about the nature of this market by studying the Balkan case. Are criminals that deal in arms motivated solely by profits? Should illegal arms trafficking be approached like drug trafficking or car theft? Can the rule of supply and demand and the economic approach to the study of organized crime be applied in the case of arms trafficking? Is deterrence the appropriate method to combat this phenomenon? This article seeks to shed some light on these questions by chronologically exploring the arms market in the Balkans. In our view, these are important questions that need to be considered in order to have effective control policies. The conclusions drawn in this paper are based on extensive literature and local/international newspaper reviews, document analysis, investigation of criminal cases and interviews with law enforcement officials. Arms trafficking in Europe today Since the beginning of the new millennium arms trafficking started to gain a foothold in the EU, eventually becoming a serious problem. The increase in gun crime and the availability of firearms is particularly striking in the Netherlands. Recent gun-related cases illustrate the climbing murder rates in Amsterdam, a city whose illegal trade ‘has moved from sex and drugs to focus on firearms—everything from machine guns to anti-tank weapons’ (Bickerton 2000). According to Dutch prosecutors, Balkan criminal organizations that specialize in smuggling immigrants, weapons and drugs chose Amsterdam as a centre for their operations (Simons 2000; Davis et al. 2001: 21). France also saw the same disturbing trends; weapons are increasingly entering the country from the Balkans since the former Yugoslavia disintegrated (Curtenelle 2001). ‘Pistols, assault rifles and even rocket launchers [… ] turn up in France ever more frequently since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Balkans conflicts […] falling prices prove that these arms are becoming more and more numerous’ (Davis et al. 2001: 22). The British National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) (2000: 39) suggests that ‘over the next few years UK law enforcement may observe an increase in the use of firearms among organized criminals’, 90 percent of which will have been manufactured outside the UK. Recent confiscations in the UK of massive arms shipments from Croatia, thought to be destined for the Real IRA, denote the growing threat of the Balkans as a major source of smuggled arms (Bazargan 2003; Akinsanya 2003). An offender who was involved in heavy drug dealing and was convicted for multiple armed robberies in the UK notes: ‘When we got ours [weapons] they all came through the Ireland link, the terrorist link. But you see a lot here, you see a lot of civil war places—Czechoslovakia, the Eastern Europeans[…] there’s a lot coming from Eastern European countries’. Another inmate claims that: ‘A lot of them are coming [via Ireland] from places like Iraq and Kosovo […] Afghanistan, Russia […]’ (Hales et al. 2006: 43). Generally speaking, police sources Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 355 highlight that incidents involving handguns in the London area are running into double figures every week (Davis et al. 2001: 22). Furthermore, the Greek police indicate that approximately 350,000 to 400,000 illegal weapons have been imported into the country (Davis et al. 2001: 22). It is estimated that there are around 1.5 to 2 million hunting guns in circulation in Greece, whilst only 300,000 individuals have a hunting license (Ta Nea 2008). Official statistics also show a significant increase in arms laws violations (1,055 cases in 1991 to 2,384 in 2007). The geographical location of Greece plays a central role in the increase of such activities within the country. According to Ilias Gounaris, Greece’s permanent representative to the UN (quoted in Davis et al. 2001: 22), ‘the Russian mafia, criminal organizations from Albania, the activities of the UCK’s [Kosovo Liberation Army] chiefs, and the remainder of the Foreign Legion in Skopje have laid a tight net around Greece’. The social, economic and security risks from such formations are unpredictable. The acquisition of fire power by criminal groups that operate in Greece is particularly worrying since it gives these groups additional muscle to support their intimidating and threatening tactics against other criminal groups, the police, civil servants and society. Serious intimidation decreases both the risks resulting from their criminal activities and the effort needed to commit their crimes, while at the same time increasing their economic gain. Consequently, the use of explosives and weapons against individuals and property has been a central feature of the ongoing power struggle between local Greek criminal groups (To Bhma 2008). Various sources indicate that the Chinese made Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG-7) used in the 2007 terrorist attack against the US embassy in Athens originated from the Albanian barracks looted in 1997 riots and was then smuggled into Greece via KLA established criminal networks (Kostakos 2007) . Hence, the EU has not been left intact by the consequences of arms smuggling. The Balkans in general, and the former Yugoslavia in particular, have been frequently viewed as the predominant source of Europe’s illegal gun trade, especially for smaller shipments destined for organized crime and terrorist groups. Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth: Bosnia), Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia3 and Kosovo and the criminal groups associated with these countries have been routinely grouped together as the core of the problem (Sagramoso 2001: 48; Khakee and Florquin 2003: 27). As a response, in recent years, the EU put a lot of pressure on the Balkan countries, as well as on its member states to deal with the problem of illegal arms trade. The EU also fostered a ‘justice’/deterrence approach in dealing with the phenomenon. It has highlighted the need for hard security policies (police and judicial measures) and institution building, to adequately respond to the threat. As shown below, this is basically due to the contemporary mainstream conceptualization of organized crime as a rationally organized illicit enterprise that thrives and forms the same way legitimate businesses do. This conceptualization, based on the simple economic rule of demand and supply as well as on rational choice theory, lies at the heart of EU top-down policies. However, does it really grasp the complexity of the arms trafficking market? 3 Pending the resolution of the name issue and for reasons of political correctness, the names ‘FYR of Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonia’ are used interchangeably throughout the article. 356 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 A rational choice model for illicit arms trafficking As a result of a significant increase in organized crime activities, a vast popular, gray and academic literature on the topic has emerged over the past decades. The central issue in the academic literature has been the problem of defining organized crime. As Cressey (1972: 7) notes, ‘rigorous definition is essential to rigorous research, and thus, to clear understanding’. Yet, although organized crime as a legal term or as academic jargon is increasingly used, it is commonly observed that it is very difficult to define it (Levi 2007: 335). There is a general consensus amongst scholars and practitioners that ‘organized crime’ is best conceptualized as a phantom that can only be interpreted through the use of metaphors (Van Duyne 1995; Albanese 2007; Smith 1994). Consequently, throughout the years, different—but often overlapping— viewpoints, often called models or paradigms, have been widely used for analyzing organized crime (Paoli 2002; Halstead 1998; Albanese 2007; Allum 2006). Given the fact that profiteering is at the surface of all organized crime activities, economic and rational explanations have dominated the field of study from the first building blocks of academic literature (Schelling 1967; Cressey 1969; Gambetta 1994). Nevertheless, there is, as Allum and Sands (2004: 134) point out, ‘an ongoing debate’ between on the one hand rational and parsimonious economic models (Schelling 1967; Gambetta 1994) and other so-called ‘irrational’ and holistic sociocultural explanations (Merton 1938; Sutherland 1983). The rational/irrational dichotomy that is currently manifested in organized crime literature is derived from a much wider debate in sociology, economics, criminology and political sciences that itself originates from fundamental philosophical questions about human nature (Mayhew 1980; Wrong 1961). Assessing the explanatory power of these approaches in the case of organized crime is, in our view, important because there is a ‘pressing need for accumulation of case studies, for hypothesis development and testing, for the kind of research that moves forward by careful, additive process’ (Geis and Meier 1977; quoted in Smith 1980: 360). The economic model of criminal behavior is influenced by rational choice theory with strong roots in Utilitarian philosophy.4 Generally speaking, the rational choice approach is a scientific theory about human decision making. The theory has been the dominant paradigm in economics and neo-classical theory (Coleman 1988; Mayhew 1980). The model predicts human behavior by asserting that actors’ choices are motivated by an expected utility, most often profits and economic gains. Rational choice is therefore a normative theory ‘that tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible’ (Elster 1986: 1). As such it has been often applied to explain criminal behavior and criminality. In theoretical criminology, this conceptualization builds on Beccaria’s (1764) first simple model of human choice based on the rational calculation of cost and benefits. Based on this model, Beccaria argued, punishments should be proportional to the seriousness of the offences so the cost of crime always exceeds its reward. Potential offenders would then be deterred, 4 Utilitarianism is the ethical doctrine that the moral worth of an action is solely determined by its contribution to overall utility. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome. Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 357 i.e., rational calculation would lead them to avoid crime (Vold et al. 2002: 196). This approach has become the basis for the modern criminal justice system. For the purpose of this article, economic models are defined as explanations that fulfill several criteria. First, an inclination towards methodological individualism, where the primary focus of analysis is on the agents and their tactics. Second, adaptation of logical-deductive, reductionist or ‘armchair’ strategies that attempt to explicate social behavior as an aggregation of individual conduct (Mouzelis 1995: 28). Hence, economic models focus on the actions and behavior of actors and presuppose that the macro is an aggregation of the micro. It is from this perspective that organized crime is often depicted as an illicit enterprise that shares many characteristics with legitimate business but it is on the wrong side of the legal spectrum (Smith 1980, 1978; Haller 1990). This view holds that criminal groups are operating within a larger illicit market for goods and services and, therefore, are subject to economic and market theory. Issues of supply, demand, core technologies, monopolies, internal cohesion and price fluctuation are deemed central in understanding organized crime and its wider manifestations (Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995). The economic model assumes that criminal activities are rational alternatives to legitimate activities, undertaken by actors motivated by expected economic gains. The expected net benefit from a criminal activity is equal to what the loot from that activity can bring in the market minus all costs of undertaking the activity, minus the value placed on the expected punishment if caught (Thoumi 1999). In past years the economic approach has achieved a hegemonic status in professional and academic literature. Moreover, legal systems and their enforcement mechanisms are mostly or even exclusively based on logico-deductive reasoning, since formal punishment is only applicable to individuals. Consequently, only sporadically has official discourse produced by an international institution like the UN examined organized crime from a non-market perspective.5 In order to assess the explanatory power of the rational choice approach we first need to provide the basic functions of the normative model for arms smuggling. Mouzelis (1995: 29) notes that ‘Rational-choice theorists start by making a number of basic assumptions about the purposiveness and rationality of social action-assumptions such as that actors have clearly formulated goals, that in the light of such goals they evaluate alternative courses of action, that they apply rational criteria when choosing the courses of action for obtaining their ultimate goals, and so on’. Based on this observation we developed a basic framework that simulates individual decision making and market forces in the context of the Balkan conflicts (Fig. 1). In Fig. 1 we show that according to the economic rational model individual actors involved in organized crime have specific needs (e.g., physical, material, etc.) and on the basis of those needs the actors establish specific goals. Then, depending on their goals (e.g., to make profit; to gain power, etc.) the actors search for opportunities. Based on the spectrum of available opportunities, legal or illegal, they make their decisions. The actors take advantage of the opportunity they believe will 5 See the often-neglected UN Pilot Report on Organised Crime (2002) (Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries). Other law enforcement agencies tend to address cultural issues in internal reports, whilst very little of this discussion surfaces in public documents (see for instance internal Europol reports). 358 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 Fig. 1 Micro-level decision making process based on rational choice theory maximize their returns to the greatest extent and thus will satisfy their needs. However, one should bear in mind that the goals and needs of an individual actor are often in flux; therefore the actor is in a continuous search for alternative ways to satisfy the newly formulated goals and to maximize returns. Due to the favorable economic conditions for arms trafficking in the Balkans from 1990 onwards (e.g., weak legislation, lack of law enforcement initiatives, public and state support for arms trafficking, high profits and material gains, etc.) one expects that this is a representative case for evaluating rational choice theory predictions. Thus, basing our assumptions on the image of the rational actor, we made the following predictions about the dynamics of the illicit market of arms trafficking in the Balkans: 1. 2. 3. 4. Need of and high demand for weapons due to armed conflicts in the Balkans; Increased supply and import of weapons in the Balkans; End of conflicts and low demand for and need of weapons; Export of weapons and reduced supply. Although the abovementioned assumptions might sound reasonable at first reading they require further investigations in order to asses whether the rational choice theory can explain the arms trafficking market in the Balkans. The question is whether one can theorize how society and illegal markets work based on assumptions built and tested on actors? Before proceeding with our analysis, we want to acknowledge that given the nature of the phenomenon in question, most of the data that can be collected on arms trafficking in the Balkans is almost entirely anecdotal or partial. Thus, our ability to test the economic model, as well any other alternative model on human behavior of a similar nature, is extremely limited by methodological setbacks. Addressing these methodological issues falls beyond the scope of this paper. Although we acknowledge our conclusions may be partial due to reasons beyond our control, this should not constrain us from addressing important theoretical issues. Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 359 Data: Illicit arms market in the Balkans (1991–2007) Global military expenditures during the Cold War period reached a world record high in terms of the share of global GDP spent (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2008). With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent evaporation of communism, a significant number of this surplus was available to be transferred, via illicit and licit means, to countries that were destabilized by ethnic and secessionist tensions. The political card often used by the International Community—arms embargoes—at first appeared to be increasing the risks and efforts of arms transfers to war-torn regions. However, as a deterrence doctrine, arms embargoes are extremely weak since the prohibition of certain goods generates significant economic and political rewards for individuals who are willing to take a risk. Consequently, the emergence of black markets could be considered a direct cause of prohibition regimes. The case of Yugoslavia is a prime example of this development and a plethora of evidence exists to support these claims.6 After the fall of communism, in Yugoslavia, smuggling of weapons, commonly associated with ‘nation building’, was perceived as beneficial by many Balkan people and governments. This made illegal arms trade one of the least visible and most ambiguous organized crime activities in the region. Moreover, although regional stability in the Balkans was restored in the early 2000s, and measures against arms trafficking were strengthened, a large amount of the weapons still remain in circulation in the Balkan territory. Arms trafficking seems to be flourishing in spite of deterrence measures allegedly undertaken by law enforcement agencies. From the cases analyzed for this article, and as presented below, we observed that arms trafficking in the Balkans often fits into three different, but often interlinked, discursive categories: i) purely profit-oriented arms trafficking involving organized crime groups (e.g., trade in small arms, mostly handguns and assault rifles, aimed at local Balkan markets or European markets like Italy, Greece, Holland, UK, Ireland, etc.); ii) trafficking of arms for the purpose of arming criminal-terrorist formations operating in the region (e.g., KLA, ANA, NLA); and, iii) state-sponsored arms trafficking where local governments have been involved in illegal exports/imports of arms and military equipment on a grand scale (e.g., Serbia, FYR of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia). This does not mean that the involved groups operate in isolation or that they do not communicate with each other. References to the different categories have been made further in this section. More specifically, this section provides a comprehensive and chronological overview of the illegal arms trade in the Balkans and looks more closely at: the regional market dynamics with regard to light weapons; background factors leading to increased/reduced arms trade; the formation of criminal Balkan network dealing with arms; and, the network’s operational methods and routes used. The section provides data on the illegal arms trade and, later on, based on this data, we explore the applicability of the economic model to organized crime in the Balkans. 6 An extensive black market archive is maintained by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers. It also contains a substantial volume of information on illicit arms transfer in the Balkans. http://www.nisat.org/. 360 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 Import of weapons in the context of the Balkan upheavals The increase in arms trading in the Balkans is closely related to the regional wars and to the break-up of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The wars in former Yugoslavia left massive quantities of weapons outside of effective government control. Before its violent breakdown, Yugoslavia maintained one of the largest armies in Europe. The Yugoslav policy, based on the Total Defence Doctrine, was to engage the entire Yugoslav population in armed resistance, armament production and civil defense. The Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA)7 was a force of 195,000 soldiers, which were equipped with sophisticated military capabilities, and were under the central control of Belgrade (Bromley 2007: 3). Additionally, each of the six republics had a Territorial Defense Force (TDF) and the total number of TDFs, from all six republics combined, was 510,000. Some estimates suggest that the two forces had a stockpile of 2.3 million rifles at their disposal (Bromley 2007: 3). So, for decades, Yugoslavia was spending a large share of its annual GDP on military spending and on the production of weapons (Kauer 2007: 82). The YPA was largely based on the Soviet model; about 90 percent of the arms were produced domestically (Bromley 2007: 4). Military production in SFRY was extremely decartelized. About 60 percent of the production was taking place in Serbia and the rest mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Bromley 2007: 4), some TDFs weapons were also stored at ‘decentralized depots through the different republics, including schools and other municipal buildings’. These strategic decisions were based on the implementation of Tito’s doctrine of self-sufficiency and nonalignment. Various commentators note that Tito’s Doctrine also led to significant arms exports to Middle Eastern and African countries particularly during the late 70s and 80s (Anastasijevic 2006; Kauer 2007: 83). For decades, the arms industry was one of the most flourishing sectors of entire Yugoslav economy. Also, in Tito’s time nothing was ever thrown away or destroyed. Outdated but fully functional leftovers from the 1950s and 1960s were carefully conserved and stored in secret warehouses throughout the country.8 As the wars in the Balkans started in the early 1990s, these stockpiles were the primary source of weapons for paramilitary and militia structures, which played an important role throughout the war.9 From 1991 onwards, weapons also started pouring in from South America, South Africa, Middle East and from ample stockpiles of the dismembered Warsaw Pact (Anastasijevic 2006). The main warring fractions during the Balkan conflicts that received weapons through illicit channels were Bosnian Muslims (i.e., Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Serb Croats, ethnic Albanians (from Kosovo and Macedonia), Croats, and even Serbs. One of the international community’s first reactions to the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars was the arms embargo, imposed on all six republics: BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Slovenia in May of 1992. Initially, this seemed to have little 7 Also known as the JNA (or YNA). 8 These caches were de facto controlled by Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia. 9 Although some of the old submachine guns (Thompsons) were quickly replaced by the more deadly Kalashnikovs (AK-47), some of them are still in circulation. Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 361 effect on Serbia, which maintained the control of the Yugoslav People’s Army and its vast resources, but the embargo badly hit the defense forces of Bosnia and Croatia. Although Bosnia, for example, had a few significant arms factories on its territory10, during the civil war of 1991–1995, they were the main targets of warring parties and later on of NATO air strikes (Kauer 2007: 83). Most of them, it is believed, have been completely destroyed and had no output capacities whatsoever. In, order to push forward for their independence, various—mainly political—actors from the smaller Yugoslav republics (and Kosovo) engaged in strategic alliances and established networks with foreign state and non-state actors, for the importation of weapons, ammunitions and combat gear. Sources point out that Serbia too imported weapons illegally, often sharing the same smuggling channels with their enemies (Anastasijevic 2006). The wars in Bosnia and Croatia During the conflict in Bosnia (1992–1995), Bosnian Serbs received military supplies from Serbia, while Bosnian Croats received some initial help from Croatia. It appears that the majority of the groups supplying Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) with weapons during that period came from Islamic countries such as: Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Cees 2006: 160). However, the arms supply in Bosnia was restricted due to the country’s geographical position; the most feasible smuggling routes were those passing over the border with Croatia. Hence, although Croats and Bosniaks were enemies in the regional conflicts, this did not hinder their criminal cooperation. Various commentators claimed that within two years (between May 1994 and January 1996) Iran supplied Bosniaks, via Croatia, with about 5,000 tones of arms and ammunition (2006: 176). In fact, one of the largest contingents of weapons that ever entered the Balkan region was in 1994–1995 and shipped from Iran to Bosnia through Croatia, as a part of a secret US program aimed at bolstering the Bosnian Army. Furthermore, sources point out that the first weapon smuggling channels in Bosnia were set up by the head of the KOS (Counter-Intelligence Service), Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a Bosnian Serb (CSD 2004: 47). He allegedly made an agreement with the Bosnian Defense Minister, Deli Mustafic, a Bosniak, who in 1991 was personally involved in arms smuggling from Vienna to Sarajevo (Cees 2006: 180), not to interfere with the shipment of weapons from Serbia through Bosnia to the Serbian-held territories in Croatia. In return, ‘the secret service deflected some of the weapons to the Bosnian-Muslim army-in-the-making’ (CSD 2004: 47). As previously mentioned, Serbia did not only supply weapons to its Serbian held territories in Croatia, but also those in Bosnia i.e., Republica Srpska. Arms deals during the embargo suggested that weapons may very well have been smuggled from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia, with Bosnia as a final destination. In the fall of 1993, six tractor-trailer trucks carrying 100 mortars, 1,000 mines and 250 Dragunov snipers for a total price of $670,000 crossed the Bulgarian-Macedonian border. Initially, according to the official documents, the cargo was destined for Albania. On 10 The target for the Bosnian defense industry was an enormous output of both SAWL and heavy weapons of all types. Even turbo aircraft and air defense arms were manufactured and assembled in Bosnia. Also, more than 50,000 people were employed by the Bosnia arms factories (Kauer 2007: 82). 362 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 the way, however, the arms cargo disappeared in Macedonia and the trucks returned empty to Bulgaria. Official investigations concluded that the arms were unloaded at Petrovac Airport in Skopje, loaded onto a plane, which had ‘broken’ over Bosnian territories, where it was unloaded. All evidence points to this being a SerbianBulgarian deal and the main destination of the weapons was Bosnia (CSD 2004: 26). Arms were also coming into the Balkan region from Chile and other parts of South America. Recently, two Pinochet-era generals were given five-year jail sentences for illegal arms trafficking from Chile to Croatia in 1991 (Bunting 2008). The Chilean shipment—11 tons of armaments—was disguised as humanitarian aid to Sri Lanka. U.N. officials intercepted the arms in Budapest airport. The trafficking occurred at a time when the UN had banned arms sales to Croatia. In the 1990s, the Croatian link to Latin America was very strong. It is often noted that Croatian arms dealers, who also trafficked cocaine from Latin America, were protected by their connections with the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the ruling party in the presidency of Franjo Tuđman (Curtis and Caracan 2002: 11). The dealers had connections with the higher echelons of Croatia’s Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs, the customs service, and the secret service. Babic (2001, quoted in Curtis and Caracan 2002: 11) characterizes this arrangement as ‘a classic example of a wellorganized mafia, composed of classic criminals and portions of the state apparatus.’ The Albanian factor For 45 years Albania was under the communist regime of Enver Hoxha (1944–1985). Similar to Tito’s Doctrine, the Albania leader placed enormous emphasis on weapon supplies and a powerful army. After the fall of communism, large amounts of weapons remained in circulation in Albania. Hence, another benchmark event for the region was the breakdown of the Albanian government in 1997. In this context, the most dramatic event was the looting of more than 550,000 small arms, 839 million rounds of ammunition, and 16 million explosive devices from army stockpiles, in a desperate response to the failed pyramid savings scheme in which many Albanians lost all their savings (Khakee and Florquin 2003; Zaborskiy 2007). Some sources estimate that the 1997 Albanian anarchy led to one million light weapons and 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition becoming available on the black market in south-eastern and central Europe, with obvious security implications (Smith and Sagramoso 1999; Anastasijevic 2006). Hundreds of thousands Chinese-made AK-47 and other small arms ended up in the hands of ethnic Albanian rebel groups. According to the Albanian government, in the period between 1997 and 2002 around 150,000 small-arms and light weapons were illegally transferred from Albania, mainly to Kosovo and Macedonia. Most of these weapons ended up in the hands of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the National Liberation Army (NLA) (Zaborskiy 2007; Quin et al. 2003).11 In the late 1990s, the border towns of Bajram Curri and Tropoje in north Albania served as the main ‘illegal arms bazaars’ for local 11 During 2004 the then Prime Minister Fatos Nano was accused of trafficking weapons to the KLA in the late 1990s. Although he formally denied the allegations, Nano stated that it was morally defensible to assist the KLA at that time (JIR 2007). Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 363 traders and KLA sympathizers (Zaborskiy 2007). For many years, the lawless northern Albanian region was considered the main arms trafficking area in the Balkans (Zabroskiy 2007). In the 1990s, only relatively small quantities of Albanian smuggled weapons reached European countries—mainly Italy and Greece due to their proximity to Albania, the large émigré community as well as their cultural and linguistic similarities.12 These exported weapons were destined for ethnic Albanian immigrants widely present in these countries, Greek or Italian citizens who wanted arms for personal protection, or arms dealers who were selling the weapons further afield (Zabroskiy 2007). The KLA fighter remains a powerful image of the desperation of the Kosovo Albanians after a decade of oppression by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and his followers. However, Kosovars did not have their own arms and weapons to fight against the Yugoslav (Serbian) army. They were in an even worse position than Bosnia and Croatia as, unlike them, Kosovo was a Serbian municipality, rather than a semi-autonomous republic. As a means to achieve their secessionist goal, ethnic Albanians relied heavily on weapons illegally trafficked from abroad. Hence, the situation in Kosovo in the 1990s was similar to that of Bosnia. The paradox, once again, is that the primary source of weapons to Kosovo, in addition to Albania (Chinese-manufactured and relatively low-cost assault rifles) was in fact Serbia (Yugoslavian manufactured and comparatively expensive pistols)—Kosovo’s greatest enemy (Khakee and Florquin 2003: ix). Likewise, in FYR of Macedonia, the ethnic conflict of 2001 was clearly an important factor in the arming of the local civilian population, including secessionist Albanian rebel groups and ethnic Macedonians. This was almost inevitable, given the country’s location, situated between Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, but also Bulgaria and Greece. Similarly to Kosovo, the arms in Macedonia came mostly from Albania and Serbia, but also from neighboring Kosovo itself. Already by 2001, Kosovo had a surplus of weapons collected during the conflict in 1998–1999, so some of these weapons were illegally transported to Macedonia via the porous borders between the two countries. The weapons, placed in coffins, were frequently transported on horses via the uncontrolled mountain region between Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, or with cars and vans via the official border crossings. These weapons ended up mainly in the hands of ethnic Albanian nationalists (e.g., ANA and NLA) closely linked to the KLA. In fact, anecdotal evidence points to KLA smugglers using similar tactics, and loading weapons on animals, making the animals move backwards in order to decoy satellite images. As illustrated above, during these hectic years, arms and weapons were both internally trafficked within the Balkans and illegally imported from abroad. Only a small amount of weapons were exported abroad. In addition to the availability of weapons, these post-communist countries also had a vast network of people previously working for the countries’ military services, the secret security services or the police. These actors were well connected and had the ‘know-how’ of arms trading. After the fall of communism, as well as after the regional conflicts, many of them lost their state jobs due to the reduced size of the army, police and secret security services. For example, the abolition of the Albanian secret service Sigurimi in 1991 left around 10,000 agents 12 Many Albanians were able to watch Italian TV station like Rai Uno and so were familiarized with the Italian langiange. The Greek language also had a strong presence in Albania, mainly in the South. 364 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 unemployed. In Bosnia, around 50,000 people who were directly or indirectly employed by arms factories also lost their jobs. In Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, paramilitary formations and/or special police units formed during the conflicts and supported by the respective governments were dismissed; the people (many of them with previous criminal records) ended up ‘jobless’. However, due to the previously established contacts, the access to weapons, and the experience they had gained, many of these former agents and/or fighters remained in the same profitable business, but operating outside government control (Arsovska 2008: 46). Post-conflict export of illegal arms With the end of the conflicts in the Balkans, the ‘war’ factor that fueled much of the illicit arms trafficking in the region evaporated. Criminal groups from the Balkans gradually started to export their weapons to other regions. According to Anastasijevic (2006: 11) ‘this time the flow was reversed’ and a number of ‘weapons started pouring out’, towards other conflict-stricken areas, as well as towards Western Europe. Nevertheless, despite the increased export of illicit arms, illegal arms trading, in its different forms, continued to thrive within the Balkans owing in large part to the networks established during the regional conflicts from the 1990s (Arsovska 2008: 45). State-sponsored export of arms One very important example of state-sponsored trafficking from Serbia to Iraq and Libya is the ‘Oreo’ (‘Eagle’) case. The contract was for exporting weapons and military equipment to Iraq, worth $236 million, signed between the Serbian arms trading company Jugoimport SDPR13 signed and the Iraqi government. This is the most significant deal the Serbian military industry made since late 1990, when a contract was signed with Kuwait for the export of 175 domestically produced M-84 tanks (BBC News 2008). To begin with, in October 2002, NATO forces searched ‘Orao’, an air force maintenance facility near the Bosnian town of Bijeljina, a Serb dominated area. Among the documents seized in the raid was a correspondence with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (then under the control of Saddam Hussein). It turned out that ‘Orao’ was involved in maintaining and repairing jet engines for Iraqi MiGs, breeching the UN sanctions. Further investigation also revealed that a whole network of factories, mostly in Serbia, but also in Bosnia and Croatia, was helping Hussein bolster his army. The series of contracts, secretly closed between Saddam’s and Milosevic’s governments in late 1999, resulted in a flow of weapons and equipment to Baghdad. Although only a fraction of the multibillion dollar deal was implemented by the time of discovery, it seems Milosevic’s downfall and the 13 Arms exports were coordinated by Jugoimport SDPR, Serbia‘s official military procurement agency, which used a set of supposedly privately owned companies to hide its activities and bypass controls. One of these companies, known as JPL Systems, was founded in 1995, by the Serbian State Security, and specialized in manufacturing and exporting rocket fuel to the Middle East. The name became famous when a secret manufacturing facility near Belgrade blew up in June 1995, killing 11 people. The incident was hushed up by Milosevic‘s regime. Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 365 establishment of a pro-Western regime in Serbia had no effect on the agreement between Belgrade and Baghdad: arms deliveries to Iraq peaked in 2002.14 Moreover, Belgrade was also selling arms to Libya, also in breech of the UN arms embargo. Recent Amnesty International reports claim that weapons from Serbia and Bosnia are now flowing into Liberia and DR Congo, fuelling the ongoing conflicts there (Anastasijevic 2006). Although the ‘Oreo’ affair was the largest weapons smuggling operation since the end of the Yugoslav wars, state-sponsored trafficking continued, though on a smaller scale. For example, there are several indications that the Croatian government was involved in weapons trafficking to Palestinians (MISAC 2003: 3). Also, in 2001, NATO forces in Bosnia intercepted a large shipment of small arms, including armor piercing launchers and grenades intended for ex-KLA guerrillas in Kosovo. The shipment was a part of a smuggling channel organized by the Bosnian Security Agency (AID) that also included top officials from the Bosnian Ministry of Defense. Other similar Balkan examples that show government involvement in arms trafficking were recently revealed in FYR of Macedonia. In August 2007, the Macedonian criminal court closed the ‘Army Weapons’ case and sentencing eight people to 13 years imprisonment, including several high-ranking officials from the logistic sector of the Macedonian army, for weapons trafficking to Bulgaria. This case goes back to November 2006, when the Macedonian police intercepted three trucks with Bulgarian license plates transporting large amounts of weapons. The drivers told the police that the Macedonian army loaded the trucks with weapons. It was stated that the transported weapons were old; however, on the contrary, the weapons found in the trucks were new—a recent NATO present for Macedonia. The accused were convicted for falsifying documents and selling the Macedonian army’s new weapons of in Bulgaria at the price of old weapons. For example, machine guns were sold $300 per piece, instead of $3,670 per piece. This illegal trading cost the Ministry of Defense, unaware of the transactions, about 1 million EUR (Arsovska 2008: 47). Similarly, in August 2007, the Ministry of Interior of Macedonia pressed charges against the ex-minister of defense, Vlado Buckovski, and four other high-ranking officials and renowned businessmen for their involvement in the ‘Army Tanks’ affair. They were trailed for abuse of public position and for buying reserve parts for T-55 tanks from Croatia at much higher prices than the real ones. They also bought parts for 80 tanks although the Ministry of Defense had an available budget only for 20. The prosecution office claims that they have cost the country about 3 million EUR (Geshoska 2008), but the case is still in court and no one is sentenced yet. Organized crime and arms smuggling In the 2000s, the Balkan region also witnessed a profit-oriented form of weapons smuggling involving organized crime groups. Evidence points to arms being exported not only by governments but also by criminal groups, both on a large 14 Serbian newspapers in 2007 also stated that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was planning to buy weapons worth $50 million from Serbia. For this reason the Iraqi Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr Jasim visited Serbia in 2007 to negotiate the terms of this major acquisition. In Belgrade, Jasim met with the Serbian Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac and visited the Serbian arms industry (SEESAC 2007). 366 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 and small scale. As an example, in March 2007, a van with Kosovar license plates was stopped at the Macedonian-Bulgarian border of Delcevo while trying to enter the country. The ‘empty’ van was packed with illegal weapons. Criminal charges were raised against the driver N.L. from Prishtina, accused of weapon trafficking (Arsovska 2008: 47). There are also cases that link Greece to this criminal business. In early December 2007, in three police actions, the Macedonian police confiscated large amounts of weapons and munitions; these, according to police sources, were going to be smuggled to Greece. In these cases the weapons were hidden in cars with specially designed bunkers. The criminal groups were multi-ethnic and composed of three to five individuals. Two Macedonian and one Greek citizen were sentenced for illegal production, possession and trade of weapons (Arsovska 2008: 47). Meanwhile, closer cooperation between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian law enforcement agencies led to the disruption of several organized groups involved in smuggling weapons, mostly handguns and automatic pistols, to Italy, Austria, UK, Ireland, Netherlands and further to the West. The link between northern Balkan, particularly Croatian, criminal groups and weapon trafficking has shown to be a very strong one. The lucrative business of arms trafficking is also reflected in several interceptions of arms shipments from the former Yugoslavia to the Irish Real IRA (a paramilitary splinter group of the IRA) and Basque ETA movements (Davis et al. 2001: 5). For example, in August 2000, the police in Croatia seized a rocket launcher, seven anti-tank weapons (RPG-18 type), 130 kg of plastic explosives and other munitions allegedly destined for the Real IRA (Scepanovic 2004; Curtis and Caracan 2002). Although at the time of the arrest Croatian authorities claimed to have broken a major arms smuggling ring whose existence was known as early as 1997, the suspects were released for lack of evidence (Curtis and Caracan 2002: 12; Scepanovic 2002). Moreover, a shipment of Wasp rockets, known to be a favorite weapon of the IRA, was confiscated in Slovenia at the same time as that of the Croatian discovery. Although authorities believe that the shipments in Croatia and Slovenia were part of a larger chain, they were not able to confirm a connection. Arms orders to Croatia from the ETA and the IRA allegedly passed through a criminal group in France (Curtis and Caracan 2002: 12). In 2000 European authorities discovered an attempt by the ETA to buy Croatian arms from the IRA (Curtis and Caracan 2002: 12; Arostegui 2002).15 The IRA probably considers that the logistics of smuggling weapons back to Ireland are easier from Croatia than the US. Once across the border into the common travel area of the European Union, with arms hidden in the back of a car, truck or camper van, there is a clear route back to Ireland by road and ferry with a reasonable chance of evading detection (Scepanovic 2004).16 The criminal 15 One of the most notorious criminals operating in the northwestern Balkans (Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia) is the Tunisian Mohamad bin Saleh bin Hmeidi, known by the sobriquet Carlos. A specialist in narcotics and immigrant trafficking, bin Hmeidi is wanted in several countries for selling weapons to the IRA, the ETA, Islamic organizations, and Italian organized crime groups (Curtis and Caracan 2002: 11). 16 In another case from November 2003, Grgic was arrested after Croat police stopped him at Trilj (Croatia) and found 50 grenades marked as ‘property of NATO forces’ in the boot of his car. Sources believed the weapons were destined for the Real IRA although further details were never released. Police believe the grenades were stolen from supplies for peacekeeping troops stationed in the Balkans (Scepanovic 2004). Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 367 link between Croatia and the IRA is certainly not a new one; some Croatian military leaders who emigrated during the Serbo-Croatian war (1992–93) are known to have participated in IRA operations in the 1990s (Curtis and Caracan 2002: 11). In November 2002, suspicious UK customs officers again pulled over a Croatian registered truck carrying a shipment of frozen pizzas. An X-ray inspection of the truck’s spare tire revealed a more sinister cargo: 30 sub-machine guns, along with silencers and ammunition (Bazargan 2003). The main destination in this case remains unknown. These are some examples of weapons being smuggled into Western Europe by Balkan organized crime groups. Internal arms trade in the new millennium After 2001, due to the somewhat increased export of weapons, particularly to Western Europe, the Western Balkan countries attracted significant international attention. As a result, over the course of the last five years, various measures have been undertaken to address the problem of arms trafficking. In the last three years particularly (2005–2008), this has led to a number of publicized arrests and confiscations and to an increase in official crime statistics, making illegal arms trading a more visible criminal activity (Arsovska 2008: 44–46). There were some improvements on the legislative front as well. The communist laws on possession of firearms were replaced by much tougher ones (Anastasijevic 2006).17 In addition, some of the surplus weapons owned by the national armies of the Western Balkans were recently destroyed as a part of a US-sponsored program. The program specifically targeted weapons that could be used for terrorist activities. Nevertheless, despite all efforts, vast quantities of weapons are still owned by civilians or are poorly guarded, and, as shown above, may easily find their way in to the hands of terrorists. Also, many have argued that repeated disarmament campaigns, launched by UN and NATO after the conflicts, yielded very pitiful results. It appears that regardless of the regional conflicts ending, enhanced law enforcement measures and various anti-arms trafficking initiatives, local black markets and the internal arms trade continue to flourish in the Balkans (Arsovska 2008: 47). Local demand for weapons The recent crime statistics in the Balkans indicate that only a small number of illegal weapons have been exported abroad while most of the weapons still remain on the Balkan territories. So far the Albanian authorities have collected only 223,000 weapons and 118 million rounds of ammunition. According to Albanian government estimates, excluding the 150,000 weapons trafficked illegally out of the country, this leaves at least another 200,000 weapons still in civilian hands (Quin et al. 2003: 8). Various surveys and unofficial data suggest that most ethnic Albanians still keep firearms in their household; thus black arms markets still exist all over the country to satisfy the needs of local customers (Zaborskiy 2007). Furthermore, a report by 17 Licenses to possess a weapon no longer automatically include a license to carry it, and the possession of automatic weapons and explosives can now bring serious jail time to the offender. 368 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 Small Arms Survey (Khakee and Florquin 2003: ix; Quin et al. 2003: 5) estimated that there are between 330,000 and 460,000 small arms and light weapons in Kosovo, some 300,000 of them unlicensed. A poll conducted by an international NGO suggested that two out of three households in Kosovo still have a gun. Meanwhile, a survey by the UNDP produced startling evidence that one in five school students is armed. In Kosovo, KFOR and UNMIK have collected only about 25,000 illegally held weapons since June 1999 (Quin et al. 2003: 6). As far as Macedonia is concerned, international police expert Filip De Ceuninck (quoted in Arsovska 2008: 45) explains: ‘Many families in Macedonia have their own weapons for protection. After the conflicts, there were attempts to collect and destroy the weapons, but often, only old weapons were destroyed’. Images of the NATO-led operation ‘Essential Harvest’ point out the problem of weapons trafficking in Macedonia. In this weapons collection effort ethnic Albanian nationalists, who caused conflict in Macedonia in 2001, handed over 3,800 small arms and light weapons to international forces. However, although between 2003 and mid-2007 approximately 20,000 weapons were destroyed, according to recent statistics from the Macedonian Ministry of Interior and the UN Development Program (UNDP), more than 15 percent of Macedonia’s 2 million inhabitants (about 330,000 people) still possess weapons. Approximately 170,000 of these possess weapons illegally, while the other 160,000 are registered (Arsovska 2008: 46). Recent data collected by the Small Arms Survey further suggests that many of these people hold more than one weapon.18 However, in a survey of 1,200 respondents, conducted by the Association for Democratic Initiative, over half the respondents (58%) are convinced that in their neighborhood people possess weapons at home, while around one third were not able to give any assessment. Similarly, a third of respondents were not able to answer the question on how many people who possess weapons have a license for them. This reflects a somewhat disturbing situation where the perception among the population of the areas surveyed is that almost two thirds of weapons possessed are illegal (Haziri 2003: 13). Moreover, a survey on small arms undertaken in Croatia in 2006, showed that Croatian citizens possess nearly twice as many illegal than legal arms. The survey, conducted by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion in cooperation with the Zagreb agency PULS (SEESAC 2006b) estimated that Croatians possess 371,000 registered and as many as 597,000 unregistered weapons. In Bosnia various actors have tried to collect illegal SALW, which have an uncontrolled presence in the country, through a variety of disarmament initiatives: ad hoc confiscations (NATO), Operation and Project Harvest (SFOR/AF/local authorities), Small Arms Project (UNDP), and so on. Each initiative targeted security institutions, communities, and society as a whole, but the results remain very weak. All these images of guns in the Balkans fit neatly with long-standing perceptions held in other parts of Europe of the region being ‘unruly’ and strongly attached to the gun. 18 Between January and November 2007 the Macedonian police confiscated 400 illegal weapons (51 percent guns), pressing charges against 137 people (Arsovska 2008). Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 369 Fueling nationalism with arms In addition to the trafficking of arms for the needs of the local population, arms in the Balkans have been trafficked also for the needs of various criminal-terrorist formations. In 2001, in a similar situation to that in Kosovo, ethnic Albanian paramilitaries in Macedonia (such as the Albanian National Army (ANA) and other criminal-terrorist formations) were in need of weapons to pursue their political goals. They often contacted criminal groups from Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and beyond to supply them with illegal arms. Nowadays, despite the fact that the regional conflicts are officially over, it appears that arms trafficking for terrorist purposes once again is flourishing in Macedonia. In November 2007, the Macedonian police seized large amounts of weapons and munitions hidden in bunkers in the village Prvce in western Macedonia. This was the third major confiscation of weapons in this area in two months; many weapons, hidden mainly in bunkers or berried under ground, were found close to Tetovo and Kumanovo. According to sources, the weapons ‘belonged’ to the ANA and were brought from Albania mainly on horses. A case from October 2007 confirms this assumption: the Macedonian police arrested eight and searched four more ethnic Albanians who on seven horses were carrying 15 coffins full of munitions, army clothes, AK-47 guns, bombs, sniper, and guidelines for military training in the Albanian language (Arsovska 2008: 46). Anonymous sources claim that the logistics of the criminal-terrorist organisation ANA, which initially fought for ‘Greater Albania’, are based in the Macedonian cities of Struga, Skopje, Tetovo and Kicevo. They argue that ANA has formed a special unit called ‘Tahir Sinani’ (named after a KLA colonel killed in Gostivar) that is responsible for military attacks on Macedonia. The main channels via which the weapons are smuggled into Macedonia are: over Shara mountain, the illegal passage of ‘Koblica’ in Debar, and the mountain curve of Suva Gora between Gostivar and Kicevo (Arsovska 2008: 46). In November 2007, in the major military-police action ‘Mountain Storm’ at Shara mountain, organized by the Ministry of Interior of Macedonia,, four criminal figures linked to ANA were killed, six were arrested and some managed to escape. Among the fugitives are the convicted criminals Lirim Jakupi and Ramadan Shiti, who a few months ago escaped from Dubrava prison in Kosovo. The leader of this group, Habit Ameti, was arrested. According to the police, this heavily armed criminal group was composed of 15 members, for most of whom international search warrants were issued. In this action, a lot of illegal weapons mainly of Yugoslavian and Chinese origin were confiscated (Arsovska 2008: 46). Many similar arrests followed in 2008. Analysis For the purpose of testing some underlining assumptions emerging from rational choice theory, we reviewed cases of illicit arms imports in the Balkans that took place during the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. Then we pointed out that, following the end of the conflict era, criminal groups dealing with arms established exporting channels from the Balkans to other unstable regions. and supplied criminal groups in the EU. So far, one can note that environmental opportunities and market forces 370 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 obviously play an important role in understanding the dynamics of arms trafficking, and profit is certainly a significant motivation for criminals to commit crime. However, in the Balkans we often come across evidence which goes against market rationality, challenging the idea that solely profit motivates criminals. In the Balkans, foreign observes often monitor some ‘irrational’ behaviors (Arsovska 2007). By ‘irrational’ we mean not in line with the more western economic model of organized crime however ‘rational’ in terms of the political, historical and socio-cultural context from which groups spring. As illustrated above, nowadays one would expect that there is no longer demand in the Balkans for illegal weapons as the conflicts are over and because the costs of illegal arms trading is higher due to international pressure on local governments to combat the threat. On the contrary, internal arms trafficking in the Balkans is still flourishing and the export of weapons out of the region is not yet the core activity of local criminal groups. There are a number of weapons in circulation in this region and a large internal black market. The lack of systematic effort means that in reality arms trafficking remains seriously neglected, and unlike drug dealing and human trafficking, it is still not perceived as a menace to society, neither on a public nor political level. This stands in stark contrast with global anti-terrorism efforts, as well as with the declared willingness of Balkan nations to help in the fight against terrorism (Anastasijevic 2006: 10). Thus, formal deterrence, which according to Akers (1973: 654) is based on the expectation that ‘the rational calculus of pain of legal punishment offsets the motivation for the crime […] thereby deterring criminal activity’, has not worked in the Balkan context. The question is, then, how can one explain this paradox? What are the limitations of rational choice theory in explaining illegal arms trade in the Balkans? Limitations of rational choice theory In terms of theoretical limitations, classical criminologists have recently adopted different, sometimes softer, variations of rational choice that occasionally shift away from concentrating on deterrence and purely economic application as proposed by earlier scholars (see Becker 1968). The concept of limited or bounded rationality was developed in order to account for the gaps in previous economic models that applied to normative rationality. This notion challenges some of the existing Utilitarian assumptions about the motives and behavior of law-breakers. The assumption that actors do not always behave rationally, in the economic sense, raises the possibility that different people in different social contexts have different perceptions about the probable consequences of a specific behavior. Thus, people develop different perceptions of the risk, effort and reward entailed in criminal behavior (Clarke 1995: 98). In theoretical terms, the notion of bounded rationality increases the complexity of social phenomena and raises problems in linear explanations of crime based on the norm of causality; however, criminality in general is a very complex phenomenon and no single factor can explain its manifestation. Thus we should not steer away from multi-factor approaches in explaining organized crime for the sake of simplicity. If we look at Fig. 1, the problem with rational choice theory explanations arises particularly, in our view, when one is trying to explain the link between actors’ Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 371 goals, opportunities and decisions. Actors are often faced with several different opportunities at a time; all of them can eventually lead to the achievement of their goals. The key question, which not properly addressed in rational choice theory, is what makes these actors select one of these opportunities? Not all actors faced with the same opportunities will make the same decision. The rational model argues that actors will take the opportunity which they see as the best for them; yet what is best for a person depends on various background factors. The same logic applies to the formulation of goals which closely dependent on a person’s socio-cultural environment (see Merton 1938). So, we argue that factors such as culture, social networks, family history and personality play a very significant role in a person’s decision making process. One of the most important critiques of the notion of normative rationality rests on the observation that all human behavior takes place within a web of social relations (Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1988). Structuralist explanations provide a great deal of evidence disputing the reductionist logic of rational choice theory (Sutherland 1983; Merton 1938; Chambliss 1978; Kleemans and van De Bunt 1999; Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Paoli 2003). From a structuralist perspective the social image contains more drawn from a ‘historico-genetic’ inquiry, which has in principle more content sensitive characteristics than the reductionist ones (Mouzelis 1995: 40). Thus, in order to understand how illicit arms markets work, it is necessary that one considers the premise that criminal associations are embedded in pre-existing social relations (Kleemans and Van De Bunt 1999). The closer the actors are to each other in terms of location, as well as culture, language and so on, the stronger the bonds between them are. Actors living for years in close proximity continuously influence each other and often share similar patterns of behavior. The key idea that frames much of the emerging social network theory on organized crime is the concept of ‘homophily’. According to McPherson, Smith-loving and Cook (2001: 416) ‘homophily is the principle that contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people’. A number of conditions facilitate and increase the opportunities for the formation of bonds between people and groups. For example: i) Geographical proximity; ii) Similarities in terms of language, culture, religion, a shared history and political ideas; iii) Participating in the same social group and sharing the same economic or other motives (McPherson, Smith-loving and Cook 2001). These principles apply to non criminal relations and we expect to find similar outcomes for criminal relations. In our view one’ intimate social network greatly influences the decisions, motives and behavior of actors, as well as the actors’ perception of the risks, effort and rewards in violating criminal laws. Thus, in line with positivistic criminology, we argue that humans are greatly affected by social structure and that their rationality is closely dependent on the context in which they operate. Humans are not absolutely self-determining agents free to do as they wish and as their intelligence directs. Consequently, we favor a type of soft determinism and agree with certain libertarian views.19 Soft determinism often 19 The libertarian view takes soft determinism even a step further, and while not seeing behaviour as wholly unconstrained, argues that human choices are not entirely predictable. In their view free does not mean uncaused, since this would imply chance. Glaser (1977) for example argues: ‘Thought always has much determination by the input of learning from experience…but it also has, at times, some free creativity in its output’. 372 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 sees freedom and determinism as compatible: people make choices but these choices are generally constrained. They are mainly rooted in some previous experiences from which later one can choose (Matza 1990: 7). Actors facilitate between choice and constraint and ‘the fundamental assertion of soft determinism is that human actions are not deprived of freedom because they are causally determined’ (1990: 9). Taking this view, a person’s prior history is essential; the criminal actor’s behavior is affected not only by his/her ‘economic reasonableness’ and utility maximization, but also by his/her often overlapping social, political and criminal networks. Hence, in addition to market forces, culture, social structure and socio-political context are essential in understanding the dynamics of Balkan organized crime groups. Establishing the parameters that shape the criminal actors’ behaviors are consequently vital for generating effective polices against arms smuggling. Beyond market rationality and economic profits? Power, culture and social networks Illicit arms markets deal with a product that is significantly different from other illicit products or services offered by criminal networks. Firstly, it is essential to understand that the inherent nature of firearms and other weapons is their ability to take and/or protect human life. Their ability is to intimidate, threaten or defend the survival of ‘imagined communities’ including, groups, gangs, communities and nation states. It is often reported that arms trafficking is in fact a very ‘useful tool’ for expanding the influence of organized crime groups and if one wishes to combat organized crime, first of all, he/she needs to deal with illegal arms trafficking (Davis et al. 2001: 22). So unlike some other organized crime commodities (e.g. drugs, cigarettes or cars) that can be seen as more economic in nature, arms are indisputably linked to issues of power. For that reason one should expect that normative rationality, that is to say calculation of loses and gains based purely on economic terms, is in contrast with the power nature of firearms. In addition to the parameter of power, we consider culture to be a very important behavior-shaping factor in the Balkan context. In our view, the cultural parameter can provide some explanation of why gun trafficking is still flourishing in the region. It can also shed some light on the nature of the arms trafficking market. For example, the customary Albanian Kanun laws20, which even nowadays are ‘alive’ in an ethnic Albanian context, place enormous emphasis on the importance of firearms (Arsovska and Verduyn 2008; Arsovska 2007). Male honor is closely linked to the possession of firearms and the courage to use them. A Southern Albanian proverb says, ‘You can kill an Albanian, but you cannot make him give up his gun’. In Albania there is a cultural belief that a man who is disarmed also loses his honor, and would prefer death to a loss of honor (SEESAC 2006a: 7). Cultural proverbs also represent guns as a means of social and national identity; ‘The gun protects your 20 The Kanun of Lek Dukagjini sets up the rules upon which the traditional ethnic Albanian culture is based, primarily focusing on the concept of honor. The influence of the Kanun among the ethnic Albanians has been enormous during the last six centuries. The Kanun has been particularly described as an expression of the de facto autonomy of the northern Albanian clans during the Ottoman Empire. The Kanun was an oral tradition and no written form existed until 1913 when a Franciscan priest, Stjefën Gjecov from Kosovo, started codifying the laws. The 1262 articles of the Kanun regulated every aspect of the social lives of the Albanians. Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 373 head, the gun protects the fatherland’ (from Kosovo), and ‘an Albanian loves his rifle as much as [he loves] his wife’ (from Albania). Weapons are also glorified as tools for independence and freedom: ‘If you don’t fight, nobody will sing a song for you’ (from Kosovo), ‘What do you want a gun for, when it does not shoot’ (from Albania), and ‘The Albanian is not born of a womb, but of a [rifle’s] trigger’ (from Albania).21 Dukajin Gorani, director of the Human Rights Center at Prishtina University in Kosovo, explains: ‘You think twice before getting in an argument in Kosovo because someone always ends up dead. In this part of the world, there is a strong belief in customary law, which means an eye for an eye. It is commendable that KFOR [the NATO stabilization force] is trying to collect weapons, but it is an impossible task. Kosovars have learned from the Kosovo Liberation Army that you get international attention if you have a gun. In our lifetime the rule of law has never achieved anything, only guns have provided a measure of justice. So you stick to your gun’ (quoted in Arsovska 2007: 49). However, one should bear in mind that the way society perceives guns today is also largely influenced by the popular media also placing enormous emphasis on guns and their use. Furthermore, it is important to note that there are also individual differences between smugglers and that the cultural/power significance of illegal commodities such as guns also lies in the eyes of the consumer. For some smugglers guns could have enormous power/culture significance while for others they might not. Accordingly, notions such as risk, effort and rewards have different meanings for the majority of actors who participate in arms smuggling. This, as indicated in the previous sections, depends on the smuggler’s prior history and the socio-cultural environment from which he/she springs. This observation indicates that formal deterrence methods seeking to increase the risk and effort and reduce the rewards of arms trafficking may have little impact on the targeted illicit activity. Social control through deterrence could very likely lead to a phenomenon were massive resources are spend in controlling firearms, whilst firearm offenses increase. The failure of arms embargoes to prohibit arms transfers into the Balkans as well as the failure of a number of recent international and local efforts to combat arms trafficking supports this hypothesis. Controlling firearms requires a political and social solution rather than a justice approach. Additionally, there is the issue of trust. Due to a turbulent history, Balkan people often do not trust in the state institutions. For many of them the state has been intruding for centuries, so institutional forms of justice often remain distrusted (Arsovska and Verduyn 2008; Arsovska 2007: 48). For example, according to the NGO Association for Democratic Initiative’s survey (1,200 respondents) conducted in Macedonia in 2003, trust in state institutions like the police, judiciary, official army, paramilitaries, and so on, is extremely low among the different ethnic groups, particularly among ethnic Albanians (Haziri 2003: 15–16). The results indicate that citizens believe that the main reasons for arms possession are primarily feelings of insecurity (2003: 13). So, in addition to honor, families keep guns for safety. The 21 More thorough discussion on the link between culture and guns can be found in SEESAC (South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons) (2006a) The Rifle Has the Devil Inside: Gun Culture in South Eastern Europe. Belgrade: SEESAC. 374 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 paradox is that the international community considers guns to be threat to society whereas in the Balkans they are often perceived as a symbol of pride, masculinity, courage, and, above all, security (Arsovska 2007: 47–49). Hence, due to historical, cultural and socio-political factors, for many Balkan people weapons remain a ‘must-have’. Finally, we want to put emphasis on the role of social (criminal) networks in determining and shaping criminal behavior in the Balkans. Besides the issue of criminal motives that we consider central to the understanding of illicit arms markets, there is also the question of who collaborates with who and why. Unlike ordinary crimes, organized crimes require collaboration between people. Based on our review of media and governmental reports we conclude that the Balkan criminal network is composed of a number of loosely connected criminal groups that are based in the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the ongoing inter-ethnic conflicts, criminals in this region continuously work together due to ‘shared interests’, but also due to common history, language, culture, socio-political environment, religion, political ideas and so on. At the heart of the Balkan network the closest cooperation seems to be among Albanians, Kosovars, Macedonians, Serbs, Croatians, Bosnians, Bulgarians and Greeks. Even more specifically, the strongest ties seem to be those between Albanians, Kosovars and Macedonians (Slavs and Albanians); Albanians and Serbs; Serbs and Greeks; Greeks and Albanians; Macedonians (Slavs and Albanians) and Bulgarians; Bosnians, Serbians and Croatians. Following the principle of homophily, we argue that many of these groups are loosely connected to each other, thus composing the Balkan criminal network.22 The power of the criminal network, particularly in collective societies such as those in the Balkan region, can lead criminal actors to somewhat more ‘irrational’ behaviors. Actors lose part of their individuality for their social network. The criminal network in the Balkans serves as one of the main sources of reinforcement for the criminal actors and plays a very important role in their decision-making process. These are not individualistic societies where the actors have a possibility to make more personal and maybe somewhat more ‘rational’ decisions. In the Balkans, the decision of an actors is very much affected by his/her social network. For example, one aspect of ‘irrationality’ could be the multi-criminality which lies at the heart of Balkan organized crime.23 Our working hypothesis is that due to increased risks and efforts that occur when dealing in two markets simultaneously (e.g., arms and drugs, and/or people smuggling) actors that behave somewhat more rationally should not be involved in two markets. From a rational, economic point of view, criminal groups should behave like business enterprises, which most often specialize in one activity to minimize returns and reduce risks and efforts. However, this is 22 We often came across inter-country cooperation with Turkey, Italy, Hungary, Czech Republic and other countries but we consider these links more peripheral (e.g., Turkish and Bulgarians; Italians and Albanians; Turkish and Albanians; Serbians and Russians). 23 We, do not however claim that for non-Balkan criminals specialization is always economically rational, nor do we argue that non-Balkan criminals are always rational and thus never involved in multi-crime activities. We do however argue that in numerous personal interviews, law enforcement officials have stated that multi-criminality is something closely linked to Balkan criminals groups and that multicriminality often ‘brings these groups in trouble’. Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 375 certainly not the case in the Balkans.24 In the Balkans new criminal activities come with expansion of contacts, and old criminal activities continue to exist due to previously established networks. Due to the power of the social (criminal) network, criminals do not let down their ‘old friends’ for ‘new friends’ easily. Consequently, they often continue to operate in several markets simultaneously. Consequently a person’s social capital is very important in the Balkans, because people are often valued by the number of contacts they have and by their wideranging ‘know-how’. Strict division of labor and specialization in different fields is lacking, and very often everyone appears to be the expert for everything. Broadly stated, this goes in line with what Durkheim calls ‘mechanical societies’, which are in contrast to organic societies which have a stricter, rational and more cost-efficient division of labor. In our view, the link between rationality, power, social capital and arms trafficking is a very important one, and a methodical understanding of the abovementioned parameters and their mutual interconnectedness can lead to a more effective policy. Conclusion Organized crime has become a central strategic and political issue for the EU and the Balkans alike. There is a vast literature on issues relating to the nature of organized crime activities. Illicit arms trading, however, has received very little attention. In this article we tested several underlining hypothesis emerging from the prominent rational choice theory of organized crime in order to explain the dynamics of the illicit arms market in the Balkans. We argued that the Balkans is a representative case for testing the extent to which assumptions about the image of the actors involved in illegal arms trading can be extrapolated to the macro-level of analysis. Our initial findings pinpoint the limitations of theorizing about social phenomena on the basis of the assumptions provided by rational choice theory. Thus, although we acknowledge the importance of micro-level market rationality in explaining illicit arms trafficking, analysis of our data supports several hypotheses that transcend purposive action and utility maximization. First, we argued that actors who participate in illicit arms markets develop different interpretations of risks, efforts and rewards produced by illicit arms smuggling. These distinct interpretations depend closely on micro-and macro-level background factors and on person’s prior history, not only on the specific situation in which an actor finds him/herself at a particular moment. Second, we argued that actors’ behavior is underpinned by a limited rationality rather than a normative one. Arms, unlike other illicit goods, have the characteristic of giving individuals the ability to take or save 24 There is large amount of literature that points to the Balkans’ multi-criminality. The Greek Minister of Public Order, Mikhail Khrisokhoidhis, stressed the strong links between arms trafficking and criminal gangs also running drug and human trafficking. According to Davis et al. (2001: 21), trafficking in arms, drugs and people are typically interconnected, as criminals utilize established routes to branch out into different illicit commodities. Data gathered by the US government and NCIS supports this. NCIS notes that firearms are already entering the UK alongside drug consignments and confirms the ‘strong link between firearms possession and drug trafficking’ and the networks used to smuggle them (Sagramoso 2001: 1-2). Our investigated cases confirm this trend. 376 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:352–378 lives. Hence, for example, the motives for committing arm-related offences during a dispute between two gangs or during a conflict between two nations are all but economic in nature. One should pay closer attention to the concept of power as well as to the importance of person’s social networks and cultural heritage when trying to understand how actors make decisions and formulate goals. Although this article can be seen more as an interpretative critique to rational choice theory, our findings are nevertheless significant as they offer indications with regards to control policies that could disrupt, limit or prevent illicit arms trafficking. More specifically the findings offer little support to the hypothesis that formal deterrence, as we have seen with the imposition of embargoes, will stop and control arms trafficking. Further research, however, is required to determine the actual importance of each of the previously discussed parameters in shaping criminal behavior, and possibly to identify additional discursive categories that emerge from available sources providing information on illegal arms markets. 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