COSMOS + TAXIS
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Vol 2 | Issue 3 2015
COSMOS + TAXIS
Studies in Emergent Order and Organization
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Studies in Emergent Order and Organization
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
IN THIS ISSUE
Introduction to a Symposium on Jack Russell Weinstein’s Adam Smith’s Pluralism: Rationality, Education,
and the Moral Sentiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nathaniel Wolloch
Context-dependent Normativity and Universal Rules of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
María Alejandra Carrasco
“… but one of the multitude”. Justice, Pluralism and Rationality in Smith and Weinstein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Lisa Herzog
The Dynamics of Sympathy and the Challenge of Creating New Commonalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Dionysis G. Drosos
The “Spectator” and the Impartial Spectator in Adam Smith’s Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Spiros Tegos
Was Adam Smith an Optimist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Maria Pia Paganelli
The Political Hypotheses of Adam Smith’s Pluralism: A response to my commentators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Jack Russell Weinstein
Editorial Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
EDITORIAL BOARDS
HONORARY FOUNDING EDITORS
EDITORS
Joaquin Fuster
University of California, Los Angeles
David F. Hardwick*
University of British Columbia
Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai
University of Hong Kong
Frederick Turner
University of Texas at Dallas
David Emanuel Andersson* (editor-in-chief)
Nottingham University Business School, China
Laurent Dobuzinskis* (deputy editor)
Simon Fraser University
Leslie Marsh* (managing editor)
University of British Columbia
assistant managing editors:
homas Cheeseman
Dean Woodley Ball
Alexander Hamilton Institute
Peter Gordon
University of Southern California
Lauren K. Hall*
Rochester Institute of Technology
Sanford Ikeda
Purchase College, State University of New York
Andrew Irvine
University of British Columbia
Byron Kaldis
he Hellenic Open University
Paul Lewis
King’s College London
Ted G. Lewis
Technology Assessment Group, Salinas, CA
Joseph Isaac Lifshitz
he Shalem College
Jacky Mallett
Reykjavik University
Stefano Moroni
Milan Polytechnic
Edmund Neill
Oxford University
Christian Onof
Imperial College London
Mark Pennington
King’s College London
Jason Potts
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
Don Ross
University of Cape Town and
Georgia State University
Virgil Storr
George Mason University
Stephen Turner
University of South Florida
Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo
Ashford University
CONSULTING EDITORS
Corey Abel
Denver
hierry Aimar
Sciences Po Paris
Nurit Alfasi
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
heodore Burczak
Denison University
Gene Callahan
Purchase College, State University of New York
Chor-Yung Cheung
City University of Hong Kong
Francesco Di Iorio
Sorbonne-Paris IV, Paris
Gus diZerega*
Sebastopol, CA
Péter Érdi
Kalamazoo College
Evelyn Lechner Gick
Dartmouth College
www.sfu.ca/cosmosandtaxis.html
*Executive committee
http://cosmosandtaxis.org
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Introduction to a Symposium on Jack Russell Weinstein’s Adam
Smith’s Pluralism: Rationality, Education, and the Moral Sentiments
NATHANIEL WOLLOCH
Email: nwolloch@yahoo.com
Bio-sketch: Nathaniel Wolloch is an independent Israeli scholar specializing in intellectual history, with an emphasis on early
modern history and the long eighteenth century, the history of attitudes toward nature and animals, the history of historiography, and the history of economic thought. He has published various articles and also two books Subjugated Animals: Animals
and Anthropocentrism in Early Modern European Culture (Humanity Books, 2006) and History and Nature in the Enlightenment:
Praise of the Mastery of Nature in Eighteenth-Century Historical Literature (Ashgate, 2011). His main recent research project has
centered on the history of attitudes toward nature in economic literature.
hat would be an overstatement. Yet it seems intellectually
sound to see the current, more integrative reconsideration of
Smith’s ideas, as one possible source for better comprehending, and perhaps even ameliorating, modern liberalism.
It is with this in mind that Jack Russell Weinstein’s new
book, Adam Smith’s Pluralism: Rationality, Education, and
the Moral Sentiments, should be read. Rather than centering on an intellectual-history discussion of Smith per se,
Weinstein openly declares his intention of utilizing a thorough analysis of Smith to reinvigorate modern liberalism.
he result is a wide-ranging discussion of Smith’s ideas, including both reassessments of well-known topics such as the
Invisible Hand, and discussions of lesser-studied topics, primarily Smith’s philosophy of education. he articles in the
present forum highlight various aspects of this wide-ranging
project, yet before considering these, a general overview of
the book is in order.
In the Introduction Weinstein presents the main underlying assumptions of his account of Smith’s pluralism as a
preiguration of modern theories of diversity. He rejects the
notion of the Adam Smith Problem, instead identifying an
essential unity in Smith’s works, in which a particular account of human rationality lies at the base of his moral psychology and political economy. Furthermore, pluralism and
rationality are interconnected in Smith in large part due
to their connection to the human capacity to be educated.
Smith’s intricate aspects of rationality are altered and cultivated through education and group identity. he individual
in Smith’s outlook is more than just homo economicus. his
leads to Weinstein’s perception of a contiguity of liberalism
INTRODUCTION TO A SYMPOSIUM ON JACK RUSSELL WEINSTEIN’S ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM: RATIONALITY, EDUCATION, AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS
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When the irst installment of the Glasgow Edition of the
works of Adam Smith appeared in 1976, Smith’s reputation
as the founder of modern liberal economics was already
well-established. Yet the perception of liberal economics,
and of Smith himself, was then conceived in the neo-classical perspective, centering on the promotion of economic
self-interest as the prime motivator of human deliberation in
modern free societies. his approach sidelined Smith’s “uneconomic” works, primarily the heory of Moral Sentiments,
in favor of an emphasis on the signiicance of the Wealth
of Nations. In the four decades since, our understanding of
Smith has, however, undergone a fundamental shit. his
has not only led to increasing attention to his various works,
most signiicantly the heory of Moral Sentiments, but also to
a re-evaluation of the Wealth of Nations, and an increasing
understanding of the general (though not always systematic)
unity of his philosophical project. What used to be termed
the “Adam Smith Problem,” is now considered either an obsolete approach, or else a bridge to a new comprehension
of this unity. his interpretative approach, which notwithstanding other disagreements is shared by almost all Smith
scholars today, has led to a new understanding of the signiicance of Smith for the formation of modern liberal societies.
It would not be an exaggeration to see a correlation between
the socio-economic problems evident in contemporary democracies, and what is broadly considered as a fundamental
miscomprehension of Smith’s ideas increasingly discredited by current scholarship. Does this mean that the longstanding erroneous understand of Smith was responsible
for the emergence of the problems of modern economies?
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and pluralism in Smith, and the consequent need for a theory of education to solidify liberalism and citizenship. hese
perceptions underline the two parts of the book, the irst
(chapters 1-7), centering on Smith’s deinition of rationality,
and the second (chapters 8-11), on the means to improve the
judgments that result from rational deliberation.
he irst chapter discusses Smith’s notion of pluralism and
how it relates to rational deliberation in the context of social otherness. his is followed by a discussion of Bernard
Mandeville and Smith on self-interest. Chapter 2 continues
with a discussion of the inluence of Shatesbury and Francis
Hutcheson on Smith. he former’s notion of soliloquy is
related to Smith’s impartial spectator. he latter developed
a concept of moral sense governing social interactions.
Weinstein continues with a critique of the famous idea of
an Adam Smith Problem. In contrast, he sees the heory of
Moral Sentiments as the foundational work of Smith, with
later works, principally the Wealth of Nations, elaborating
speciic aspects of human behavior treated more generally in
this earlier work.
Chapter 3 presents a sophisticated discussion of Smith’s
notion of sympathy, emphasizing how human beings develop sympathy by living together and through acquired forms
of imagination and decision-making, hence the signiicance
of education for Smith. his is followed in chapter 4 by a discussion not of institutional education, but rather of education as socialization, the development of group identity, and
the ability to balance various associations in a pluralistic society. Smithian sympathy is related to the observation of others, and is augmented in tandem with rational capabilities.
he more informed individuals are, the greater their ability
to overcome social diferences, hence the importance of education. In this context Weinstein discusses Smith’s critique of
slavery, and his less acute critique of gender diferences. his
important chapter ends with a discussion of the signiicance
of education for the development of moral judgment and familiarity with others, speciically for the laboring classes in
the conditions of the division of labor in modern industrial
societies. his last point of course is well-known to Smith
scholars, but Weinstein puts it in a new context, speciically
regarding Smith’s ideas on education.
Chapter 5 discusses Smith’s theory of rationality. he inluence of earlier philosophers, and the emphasis on rhetoric,
led Smith to regard moral deliberation, despite its passionate nature, as a rational process. Emotions and rationality
are not separate for Smith. Like others in the early modern
era, Smith rejected Aristotelian syllogistic logic in favor of a
wider conception of reason. his led him to emphasize rhetVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
oric over logic as a foundation for argumentation. Weinstein
continues this discussion in the following chapter, emphasizing how for Smith rhetoric is a component of reason.
Argumentation is a social act performed by people, and not
an abstract process separate from inter-personal relationships.
In chapter 7 Weinstein claims he has established that for
Smith sympathy is a rational process in which the individual creates a narrative helping to deine justiied inference.
He then presents two examples of such argumentation in
Smith – irst, how in Smith’s theory of price the impartial
spectator encapsulates normative judgment; and second,
how Smith’s approach relates to modern discussions of the
nature of argumentation, informal logic, and critical thinking. Smith’s account of rationality is incompatible with rational choice theory or modern mathematical logic, yet it does
preigure contemporary argumentation theory. According to
Weinstein both in Smith and in modern times argumentation is a vital ingredient for interaction in a pluralistic society.
In chapter 8 Weinstein discusses Smith’s philosophy of
education, this time, supplementing the discussion in chapter 4, centering on informal education. Human beings have
in inherent will to learn, which underlines socialization and
the moral activity of sympathy. In the following chapter
Weinstein continues with a broad discussion of Smith’s views
on education, emphasizing how he preigured modern education to pluralism. Access to education, at least at a minimal level, is a universal right, hence the need for government
support of it. Smith’s curriculum included philosophy and
science, but also the arts. Education nurtured rationality
and was therefore indispensable for a pluralistic society, as
for the perennial Enlightenment battle against such things as
superstition and intolerance.
In the inal two chapters Weinstein addresses Smith’s historiography, thus placing the discussion of rationality, sympathy and education within the wider context of Smith’s
views on human progress. Chapter 10 emphasizes the unity of Smith’s oeuvre and history’s role in it. For Smith both
progress and history were natural. While he was not a historian in the strict sense, he was a philosopher of history. Smith
had a notion of actual history, with speciic observations
on the past, coupled with a notion of an ideal history with
normative claims regarding the development of humanity.
he latter emphasized in particular progress and ethics. he
chapter closes with a detailed discussion of Smith’s famous
Invisible Hand concept. his is followed in the last chapter with a comparison of the historiographies of Smith and
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with Smith’s own views (a much more diicult proposition to
prove). Smith was one of the many cautious Enlightenment
intellectuals who avoided overt political expressions for what
was probably personal expediency. Few among eighteenthcentury literati were willing to sacriice their personal safety
for the sake of Radical Enlightenment ideals in the sense described in recent years by Jonathan Israel. But it seems that
Smith probably did not share such ideals even in private. He
was part of the Scottish Enlightenment, which was by and
large part of the Moderate Enlightenment. Smith himself,
for example, let little evidence of his views on the French
Revolution, the beginnings of which he witnessed in the year
before his death. Yet it seems safe to assume that his outlook
was not far from that of many moderate enlightened savants
such as his friend Edward Gibbon, who abhorred the revolution and its propagators. his was a far cry from supporting
democracy or pluralism in the sense in which we understand
them today.
Does this undermine Weinstein’s intellectual exercise? Not
in the least. It does, however, emphasize the need to read his
book with careful attention to the points at which historiography and philosophy intersect. Weinstein pays attention to
the diference between these two perspectives, but this care
should be shared by the readers, since by its nature, this type
of discussion can easily blur the lines between history and
philosophy, to the detriment of both. Once, however, the
book is read with the proper attention, it makes a serious
contribution both to modern political philosophy, and to the
intellectual history of Smith.
he present forum opens with María Carrasco’s detailed
contribution, which takes into account many of the salient
points in Weinstein’s book. Carrasco emphasizes, based on
Weinstein’s outlook, how Smith combined a contextual normativity underlying moral psychology, together with a universally valid pluralistic morality. his means that Smith’s
rules of justice in particular are both context-dependent and
universal. Carrasco outlines some major interpretations of
Smith’s moral theory, speciically emphasizing the problem
of moral relativism. She then outlines how this problem is
countered by the fact that Smith’s context-dependent judgments are nonetheless objective. his objectivity is the outcome of Smith’s process of moral sympathy, which operates
in large measure, as Weinstein notes, through the creation
of narratives, thus enabling understanding and proper moral
judgment. Carrasco then describes how Smith’s normativity
depends on contexts, thus enabling intercultural judgments.
hese become more reined through proper education.
Despite his sensitivity to cultural pluralism, Smith neverthe-
INTRODUCTION TO A SYMPOSIUM ON JACK RUSSELL WEINSTEIN’S ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM: RATIONALITY, EDUCATION, AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS
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Michel Foucault, inding a surprising, though limited, similarity between them, despite Foucault’s obvious rejection of
Smith’s views on progress. Nevertheless, Weinstein uses this
comparison to criticize postmodernism.
his last point emphasizes a central element shared by
both Weinstein and his object of study – like Smith, he
seems optimistic that a proper social philosophy can help
overcome the obstacles and diiculties raised by modern liberal society, which in itself remains the best option for human progress in the future as it can be construed today. his
is evident in the short Conclusion to the book, aptly subtitled “A Smithian Liberalism,” in which Weinstein emphasizes Smith’s relevance for a re-evaluation and reairmation
of present-day liberalism. In the Introduction to the book,
Weinstein has voiced his intention of supplementing this
volume, in itself more a type of history of philosophy, with
two additional volumes. he irst of these will investigate
how liberalism would have developed had Smith, instead of
Kant, been utilized to ground political theory. he second,
the last instalment to this proposed trilogy, will investigate
the nature of political participation in a Smithian liberalism.
One can only hope that Weinstein will follow through with
this ambitious project, thus presenting a detailed incorporation of Smith’s ideas within current debates about the nature
of modern democratic and liberal society. he present volume no doubt presents a solid intellectual-history foundation for such a project.
Before continuing with short summations of the various
papers in this forum, I would like to begin by pointing to
what I myself consider a problematic methodological issue which surfaces at times in Weinstein’s book. Weinstein
himself recognizes this problem and addresses it in his
contribution to this forum, but by its very nature this issue nonetheless remains inherently unresolved. Weinstein’s
book is part of a growing current in modern scholarship to
utilize canonical igures from intellectual history as foundations for dealing with contemporary issues. here is, in itself, no problem with this approach, and it has indeed much
merit. Nonetheless, the balance between historiography and
philosophy which this type of endeavor demands is by deinition challenging. his is particularly true in studies such
as Weinstein’s, which attempt to be not just philosophical
works, but also intellectual histories.
In Smith’s case this raises speciic problems. In particular,
one should ask not just whether Smith’s philosophy includes
the potential for developing a pluralistic outlook in our modern sense (which it no doubt seems to have), but also, much
more problematically, whether such an outlook conforms
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less considered some moral norms as universally binding,
ruling out cultural justiication for practices such as slavery.
Ultimately, as both Weinstein and Carrasco agree, Smith
views human beings as fundamentally similar despite cultural diferences, thus enabling a universal set of moral norms.
hese norms, however, can inform ethical behavior only in
a cultural context which fosters the sympathetic process and
thus enables the perception of injustice.
Carrasco’s paper is followed by Lisa Herzog’s discussion,
which begins with an emphasis on two aspects of Smith’s
thought – rationality and pluralism, as Weinstein interprets
them. She agrees in general with Weinstein’s interpretation,
and with the emphasis on rationality as a socially-constructed human attribute. She does however claim that Weinstein
does not suiciently develop the related topic of justice in
Smith’s thought. Like Weinstein she sees justice as a crucial
component of social interactions – both a precondition, and
a result, of the development of various types of such interactions. Of these, she emphasizes in particular economic
relations. While she accepts Weinstein’s emphasis on the importance of the heory of Moral Sentiments at the expense of
the Wealth of Nations, she nonetheless regards economic relations as a particularly signiicant aspect of social relations
and justice in Smith’s thought.
Dionysis Drosos’s detailed discussion of Smith’s moral theory is interwoven with an overview of some of Weinstein’s
central arguments. He emphasizes for example the inluence of Shatesbury’s notion of soliloquy on Smith. Drosos
also raises an interesting challenge both to Smith and to
Weinstein, claiming that Smith’s moral theory relies on an
optimistic view of human nature which does not meet the
regrettable challenge of the subsequent disasters of modern
history. He therefore identiies a diiculty in the ability of
this theory to deal with cases such as war or natural disasters, when social cohesion is compromised.
Spiros Tegos’s piece, too intricate to summarize in a few
words, gives a detailed comparison of Smith and Mandeville
on social morality, against the background of a sophisticated
overview of Weinstein’s discussion, while emphasizing particularly the issue of character building. Towards the end of
his paper Tegos also raises some psychoanalytic perspectives
on Smith’s ideas, which he claims that Weinstein has not suficiently addressed, although he gives only a few brief suggestions on how this comparison might enrich the discussion.
he forum continues with Maria Pia Paganelli’s contribution, the most critical paper here. Paganelli takes issue with
Weinstein’s emphasis on Adam Smith’s optimism. She claims
that there is little textual evidence to back the claim for
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Smith as an optimist, speciically regarding the progress of
economic opulence, and its purportedly ameliorating moral
inluences. Paganelli’s interpretation is not just diferent from
Weinstein’s, but also goes against the grain of mainstream
Smith scholarship, which tends to see him as an example of
general Enlightenment optimism. While scholars have long
recognized that there was also a more pessimistic current of
thought in the Enlightenment, it is clear that Paganelli’s approach to Smith’s thought is not run-of-the-mill. Whether
one agrees with her or not, she raises very cogent questions
which challenge common interpretations of Smith.
he forum ends with Weinstein’s response to all these papers. It would be superluous to try and summarize it in a
few lines, but I think that anyone interested in Adam Smith’s
Pluralism should make sure to read these highly illuminating comments, which might be viewed as constituting a kind
of methodological and thematic epilogue to the book, and
at the same time a prelude to the following volumes of this
project.
he various papers in this volume, considered together,
highlight some, though by far not all, of the ways in which
Weinstein’s book enriches our understanding both of Smith,
and of Smith’s potential for furthering current philosophical
and social debates.
One might disagree with Weinstein’s interpretations, but
reading his book provides an original and thought-provoking look at one of the seminal igures in modern thought.
At a time when scholars are inundated with a plethora of
monographs, Weinstein’s book is one of those which stand
out, and that in itself is a remarkable achievement.1
NOTES
1
I would like to thank both Jack Weinstein and Leslie
Marsh for inviting me to edit this forum. I would also
like to thank all the contributors for their timely responses and friendly cooperation throughout the preparation of this forum. his has proven an intellectually
stimulating and generally pleasant experience, thanks to
the personalities of all involved!
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Context-dependent Normativity and Universal Rules of Justice
MARÍA ALEJANDRA CARRASCO
Associate Professor
Facultad de Filosofía
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Av. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul
Santiago
Chile
Email: mcarrasr@uc.cl
Web: http://filosofia.uc.cl/Academicos/carrasco-barraza-maria-alejandra
Bio-sketch: Maria Alejandra Carrasco is Professor of Philosophy at the Pontiicia Universidad Católica de Chile Santiago, Chile.
She is author of several articles on Adam Smith, both in English and Spanish. Her papers include Adam Smith’s Reconstruction
of Practical Reason (he Review of Metaphysics, 2004); Adam Smith: Liberalismo y Razón Práctica (Revista Pensamiento,
2006); From Psychology to Moral Normativity (he Adam Smith Review, 2011), Reinterpretación del Espectador Imparcial:
Impersonalidad Utilitarista o Respeto a la Dignidad (Crítica, 2014), Adam Smith: Virtues and Universal Principles (Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, 2014). She is also co-editor of the monographic issue on Adam Smith for the Journal Empresa y
Humanismo, 2009; and author of Consecuencialismo. Por qué no (Eunsa, 1999).
Jack Russell Weinstein correctly asserts that Adam Smith
proposes a contextual normativity in his heory of Moral
Sentiments, where moral rules are “ater-the-fact constructs,
developed from social interaction.”1 his is one of the reasons
why some important scholars claim that the TMS inevitably
slides into relativism. Weinstein acknowledges this tension
when he airms that “[Smith] implies a universal ethics
throughout his work, yet he adopts a context-dependent
moral psychology” (p. 101). Relying on some of Weinstein’s
insightful observations, I will propose that despite Smith’s
endorsement of contextual normativity, his TMS describes
a pluralistic moral theory. his means that together with
culture-dependent norms, his theory is also able to justify
a central core of universally valid moral norms. In other
words, my aim is to take advantage of Weinstein’s insights
into Smith’s pluralism, understood as “the political situation
in which people of diferent fundamental beliefs and histories share equally in common governance, and live within
common borders” (p. 264), in order to claim that Smith is
also a moral pluralist, and explore the consequences of this
position for moral judgments “beyond the common borders.”
In general, we can distinguish three kinds of moral theories: universalistic, pluralistic and relativistic. Universalists
hold that moral norms ought to be the same for everyone
in every culture without exception. Morality is culturally
neutral and ahistorical. Clearly, Smith’s theory is not universalistic in this strong sense. Pluralists suggest that there are
some rules that should apply equally to everybody, while the
rest would be culture-dependent. Relativists, in turn, assert
that moral standards depend on each community and that
there is no culturally unbiased absolute order to which every
particular code of ethics ought to conform itself. Moral judgments would be incommensurable.
Given this framework, my claim is that even without
the necessity of appealing to transcendent or metaphysical
frameworks to provide warrant for universal moral truths,
Smith’s empiricist moral psychology nonetheless has suicient resources to overcome moral incommensurability and
cultural relativism. here is a small group of norms that are
simultaneously context-dependent and universal. hese are
the rules of justice: a core set of rules with absolute authority
that precludes relativistic interpretations of the TMS and lay
the ground for an empiricist justiication of universal human
rights. Moreover, my contention is that context-dependency
is precisely the feature that enables a defense of the existence
of these universally binding norms.
In order to show how Smith accounts for his pluralistic
theory I will start in Section I by explaining why some interpreters claim that the TMS slides into relativism: it doesn’t
admit of a universal criterion to evaluate the particular impartial spectators’ judgments or legitimate intercultural asCONTEXT-DEPENDENT NORMATIVITY AND UNIVERSAL RULES OF JUSTICE
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sessments. In Section II I focus on the objective justiication
of moral judgments, the irst step towards moral commensurability. In Section III I show how intercultural judgments
may be assessed; inally, in Section IV I claim that Smith’s
moral psychology supports a group of moral norms with
universal authority, norms that enable people to judge the
practices of other cultures.
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What speaks most in favor of the relativistic interpretation
of the TMS is the empirical origin of the moral conscience.
Indeed, when Smith describes its genesis, he clearly says that
the impartial perspective is not innate to us; on the contrary,
we acquire it in “the great school of self-command” where
“through the sense of propriety and justice, [we are taught]
to correct the otherwise natural inequality of our sentiments” (TMS III.3.3). Smith explains that we are all born
with a strong desire to sympathize with our neighbors and
a desire for their approval. his is easily achieved within the
family, since their partiality means they will indulge almost
any passion we express. However, when “we go out to the
world” and face indiferent people for the irst time, we realize that not everybody approves of our conduct. We experience a lack of sympathy and the frustration of one of our
strongest natural desires. Henceforth, motivated by our desire for the pleasure of mutual sympathy, we break away from
our innate self-centeredness by looking at ourselves through
the eyes of those indiferent bystanders. In that moment we
realize that, from their point of view, we are nothing but one
in a multitude of equals and that if we don’t restrain our egotism and act impartially we will gain neither their approval
nor the pleasure of mutual sympathy (TMS II.ii.2.1; III.3.4;
VI.ii.2.2). From then on we begin to train ourselves in this
new attitude. We strive to acquire the habit of looking at ourselves and others from this new perspective, from which we
discover what conduct an impartial spectator might approve
of. his is, for Smith, the moral perspective: a new standpoint in the world. Taking it is not innate, but is nonetheless
a natural development of our original tendencies.
Consequently, in this theory, morality is like a second-order structure built upon our innate psychological drives. In
the irst part of the TMS Smith describes how those drives
incite the sympathetic process. He explains his particular
understanding of the notion of sympathy: identiication with
the other, an entering—as he describes it—into the agent’s
breast in order to understand, from the inside, her feelings
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and actions in each particular situation. his tendency corresponds to some extent to what we now call empathy: a
skill we learn in childhood, and which basically consists in
re-focusing our egocentric map in order to become, in our
imagination, the other person. It’s a job actors generally do:
a know-how, a habit that we improve by experience, and
which Smith characterizes as “changing persons and characters” with the agent (TMS VII.iii.1.4). We bracket out our
particularities in order to see the world through the eyes of
the other.
However, becoming completely absorbed in the other person doesn’t allow us to judge. In order to judge we need a
critical distance, a point of comparison, which could very
well be our imagined attitude when facing a similar situation. his is in fact the irst notion of sympathy that Smith
describes, concluding that “[e]very faculty in one man is the
measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I
judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear … of
your resentment by my resentment” (TMS I.i.3.10). In other
words, in exercising this kind of sympathy, frequently emphasized by the relativistic interpreters of the TMS, we make
ourselves the measure of propriety.
Nonetheless, for Smith, these are not yet moral judgments.
Morality is rooted in and supported by this psychological constitution, but isn’t reducible to it. Moral judgments
are not based on the correspondence of subjective feelings
between partial and naturally biased agents. Moral judgments have the same structure, except that they depend on
the pleasure of—let’s say—mutual moral sympathy, which is
the correspondence of the agent’s feelings with the impartial
spectator’s. his diference will not be clear until Smith explains the emergence of the moral conscience. Moral sympathy arises when the appropriate feelings coincide: the feelings
that “the situation deserves” (TMS I.i.3.4). Sympathy—says
Weinstein—is “the fellow feeling that guides moral deliberation and empathetic judgment” (p. 17) and “the spectator
builds on context rather than on perceived sentiments alone.
He or she must create a story that allows for understanding
as to why the actor responds in a given way and only then is
judgment possible” (p. 184).2
he problem is that, given the empirical origin of conscience, each spectator will “create a story”—or try to make
sense of other people’s attitudes—according to her own experiences, references and values. hese references are more
or less shared between people of the same culture, but might
be quite diferent from those of distant cultures, separate in
space and time. Hence the relativistic interpretations of the
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“justice” to our biological tendencies, he’s clearly relating
it more to natural principles than to any cultural construction.12
However, in discussing Haakonssen’s idea of natural
universal justice, Fleischacker changes his mind about his
sketch-illing interpretation.13 He says that if justice is based
on resentment, and resentment is the feeling that arises
when the spectator sympathizes with the victim of an unjust action, any kind of “natural justice” should be the result
of an equally “natural” harm. he problem is that “harm” is
a culturally mediated concept, and thus “justice” must also
be culturally mediated.14 In other words, if what counts as
harm is essentially a social category, we cannot judge other
cultures’ practices using our own conceptions of harm. In
the Middle Ages it was entirely appropriate to kill a man for
dishonoring the family name. Today that would be a glaring
injustice.
However, if we accept that one of Smith’s main concerns
was “the necessity of coming to terms with the diversity in
the world” (p. 191) and that his moral psychology intended
to allow “for communication and judgments amidst diferences” (p. 25), we must look closer into his theory before
concluding that he failed at one of his main purposes.
MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND SYMPATHETIC
JUDGMENTS
he irst step in arguing against moral relativism in the TMS
is to explain why context-dependent judgments are objective. Moral justiications are not arbitrary. hey depend on
reality and may be discovered by any competent spectator.
hey are objectively justiied.
In Smith’s theory, taking the moral point of view is an
acquired ability. Morality is a second-order structure that
naturally emerges in us, and establishes human equality as
the ultimate moral justiication. It is a new map with a new
standpoint, one from which we no longer consider ourselves
as the center of the world, but just as one among a multitude
of equals. Hence this impartial standpoint is the same for all
human beings. And in spite of its empirical origin, moral
conscience has the same formal structure in all human beings. It is as it is because of our humanity, not our culture.
Nevertheless, formal universality does not rule out the
question of ethical relativism. As Forman-Barzilai asserts:
“We might say that the formal category of propriety is universal for Smith… but its content is necessarily plural.”15 he
relativistic interpretation claims that, since moral judgments
CONTEXT-DEPENDENT NORMATIVITY AND UNIVERSAL RULES OF JUSTICE
7
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TMS, which claim that in the absence of a common measure
for evaluating diferent practices, there cannot be legitimate
cross-cultural judgments.3
For instance, Charles Griswold asserts that “[i]n Kant’s
terms, Smith’s ethics is at heart ‘empirical’ and [therefore]
not appropriately principled”;4 and that if the impartial spectator is the ultimate source of normativity for Smith “the
problem is obvious: how can history yield general normative
principles that are everywhere and always the same? Is not
the process either circular or inherently impossible?”5 More
directly, Forman-Barzilai asks: “How might [Smith] have
sought to generate universality without abstracting morals
from their empirical roots?”6 And: “We need to ask Smith
and those persuaded of the trans-cultural signiicance of his
theory: how do spectators overcome cultural bias, detach
themselves from their own experiences as agents disciplined
in a world of values? How does sympathy avoid speculation
and assumption, avoid becoming an arrogant, smothering
intrusion?”7
A partial solution to this problem was given by Samuel
Fleischacker, who interpreted “human nature” in the TMS as
“a general sketch to be illed in diferently in diferent cultures and historical circumstances.”8 his would mean that
there is neither complete variation nor dogmatic insistence
on a thick human universality. Rather, he says, Smith reasonably “presents cultural variations possible only within a
universal human nature,” variations that satisfy the general
conditions necessary for any society to survive.9 Along the
same interpretive line, Knud Haakonssen states that there
are some areas of morality that are so basic and universal in
their humanity, that the impartial spectator needs to know
little or nothing about the context in order to judge.10 He further says that resentment, or the feeling from which justice
arises, is one of these cases, and that Smith’s theory of jurisprudence presupposes that the virtue of justice is “natural”
in the sense that it is somehow beyond the reach of social
change.11
Smith himself seems to endorse these claims when he afirms that, unlike other virtues, in the case of justice “the
Author of nature has not entrusted to reason to ind out that
a certain application of punishments is the proper means of
attaining this end [i.e. the preservation of society]; but has
endowed him with an immediate and instinctive approbation of that very application which is most proper to attain
it” (TMS II.i.5.10). Further, he even compares justice with
our basic biological desires, such as nutrition and reproduction (cf. TMS II.i.5.10). Accordingly, if Smith is comparing
8
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depend on the approval of the impartial spectator ater her
sympathetic identiication with the feelings of that agent in
that situation, moral norms are by deinition un-universalizable. Moral judgments are context-dependent; they take into
account all the contingent, unpredictable and un-repeatable
conditions of each situation, and cannot be thus codiied in
universal norms.
his is true. But it must not be understood as meaning
moral judgments are arbitrary. In Smith’s theory every impartial spectator, when faced with the same circumstances,
should judge in the same way. In diferent cultures the standard of propriety might be diferent, but nonetheless it is the
impartial spectator who knows the values of that culture,
and it is “her” faculty of judgment that determines the morally right attitude in that context. Such judgments are like
the phronetic judgments of ancient virtue ethics. hey take
into account all the contingencies of each situation and cannot be captured in universal rules of conduct. But since they
are guided by what Aristotle called right reason—and Smith,
who in endorsing that theory uses the igure of an impartial
spectator16—, moral judgments always imply some participation of universal reason that precludes them from being
arbitrary. For Aristotle—says Weinstein, explaining the consequences of a context-dependent normativity—“there is an
objective standard of virtue even given shits of context. he
same is true for Smith” (p. 150).
he objectivity of moral justiications is warranted by “the
sympathetic feelings of the impartial and well-informed
spectator” (cf. TMS VII.ii.1.49). Impartiality, in the TMS, is
not a disengaged, third-person and abstract impartiality, a
view from nowhere. If our innate perspective is a irst-person
perspective, impartiality in Smith is related to what Stephen
Darwall calls the second-person perspective, meaning that
it regulates our moral judgments by determining how the
spectator enters into the agent’s feelings.17 In assessing moral
judgments, the spectator must bracket out her partial feelings and biases in order to put herself into an impartial spectator’s perspective and to evaluate things as any and every
impartial spectator would do. Moral rationality is the process of stepping outside of oneself in order to judge the propriety of—irst—our own actions (cf. p. 141). he impartial
spectator—as Weinstein airms—is an attempt to reach an
ideal objectivity in moral judgments (cf. p. 201).18 Obviously,
this is limited by human capacities, because it is impossible
to be completely outside oneself or to be completely outside
one’s community (i.e. bracketing out all our socialization and
acculturation).19 However, knowing these limits induces the
moral actor to devise methods for overcoming our biases as
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much as possible until, ideally, one has acquired the “sympathetic feelings of the impartial and well-informed spectator”
that Smith points to as the “precise and distinct measure” for
moral judgments.20
However, impartiality is not enough for assessing objective
judgments. Sympathetic identiication is an equally essential
requirement—and the most diicult to attain in contexts of
diversity or in cross-cultural judgments. Nonetheless, following Weinstein’s characterization of the richness of the
sympathetic process, I claim that Smithian sympathy, “the
fundamental mechanism for human connectedness (... that)
bridges the discrete individualism” (p. 184), has the resources to overcome this obstacle.
According to Weinstein, “ ‘[s]ympathy’ is the term Smith
uses to denote the means by which moral actors consider
normative rules and empirical facts to determine propriety.
It is a complicated process, involving inborn faculties and
learned skills” (p. 68). Sympathy involves emotions and can
be fostered with new information, reason, argument, relection and particularly—one of Weinstein’s salient points—the
creation of narratives. “[S]ympathy organizes the discrete
pieces of information regarding moral judgment” (p. 179),
and this organization is done through “narratives”: “narratives allow for all these disparate elements, [and] organizes
them for deliberation… For Smith, understanding requires a
narrative structure” (p. 132). Imagination—through the creation of narratives that try to “make sense” of other people’s
attitudes and actions—“allows individuals to understand the
context and motivation of moral actors” (p. 182). And “[w]
hen agents are skilled enough [e.g. having a reined ability to
sympathize], they use [their] capacities and passions to create narratives that contextually communicate and adjudicate
actors’ and spectators’ sentiments” (p. 195). he better we
sympathize, the more accurate our judgments.
his characterization shows the reciprocal dependence
and co-operation of reason and emotions in the sympathetic
process. Indeed, “[i]n combination with the sympathetic
imagination, emotions and rationality create the possibility of entering into the perspective of others and balancing moral judgments on the basis of our commitments,
the conviction of others, and a normative ideal…” (p. 267).
Emotions are particularly important because they are intentional, “they are responsive to the way the world is” (p. 114)
and thereby can be warranted or unwarranted, true or false
with respect to the situation at stake. Intentionality enables
objectivity.
Sympathy’s core element is the afective reaction we experience in our imaginative identiication with the respec-
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impartial spectator, is what allows Smith to propose objectivity amidst variations.
Nevertheless, the “sympathetic foundation of morality functions best in small communities” (p. 69) and “both
sympathy’s accuracy and motivational power diminish as
cultural and physical distance between individuals increases” (p. 68). Naturally, sympathy works better with those we
know better, we understand better and share cultural references with. In these cases it’s easier to identify the imports
to which people react because—given our similar acculturation—we would react to the same features of the situation.
For this reason Weinstein warns that a lack of commonalities is the biggest barrier to sympathy and thus to accurate
and objective moral judgments (cf. p. 179). Within the
same community it’s easier to ind common references than
among the immense diversity of human cultures. his poses
a problem for intercultural judgments.
INTERCULTURAL JUDGMENTS AND
SYMPATHETIC REFINEMENT
he TMS describes a context-dependent normativity, which
relies on the ability to bracket out our particularities and to
sympathize or identify ourselves with the respective other
to discover the imports to which she reacts. his possibility of identiication depends on the commonalities shared
by the agent and the spectator. Context-dependent normativity enables Smith’s TMS to account for personal and cultural diferences without threatening the objectivity of moral
judgments. Smith himself airms that the impartial spectator’s judgments of propriety vary according to culture, age,
profession, etc. (cf. TMS I.ii.introd.2). What is expected
from a soldier is diferent from that which is expected from
a priest. Most rules of conduct vary because they depend
on a particular culture’s sense of propriety and its ideals of
perfection. his means that what is proper and praiseworthy for one person in one culture, may not be—at least to
the same extent or in relation to other possible courses of
actions—equally proper or praiseworthy for another person
in another culture.22 Normativity depends on contexts, and
diferent cultures represent diferent (sometimes extremely
diferent) contexts.
he lack of commonalities entails that the spectators of one
culture may be incompetent to appropriately judge the practices of others. “he farther removed a spectator is from the
actor, the more diicult a true understanding of the situation
becomes. […] he more knowledge one person has about
the other, the more capacity he or she has to sympathize” (p.
CONTEXT-DEPENDENT NORMATIVITY AND UNIVERSAL RULES OF JUSTICE
9
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tive other. his reaction is triggered by what Charles Taylor
calls the “import” of a situation, or the particular aspect(s) to
which we afectively react according to the kind of being we
are.21 Cats, for instance, belong to a species that fears dogs;
thus any cat will tend to lee at the sight of a dog. Human
beings also react to imports. Some of them are related to
our culture, like situations that cause embarrassment, signs
of honor, etc. Others are culture-neutral: they produce the
same reaction in every human being only because of the
kind of being she is.
he importance of “imports” for deining propriety in the
TMS is manifest in two atypical cases of sympathy. One is
“conditional sympathy,” when the spectator, for whatever
reason, cannot identify himself with the agent, but knows
“from experience” what the appropriate feelings for those
circumstances are and thus approves of them (cf. TMS
I.i.3.4). his non-normal situation conirms that, for Smith,
the judgment of propriety relies more on context than on
an identiication with the contingent feelings of the actors.
he other case is “illusive sympathy,” as when we sympathize with a dead person who is incapable of feeling what we
imagine we would feel if we were consciously “living” in her
circumstances (TMS II.i.2.5). Again, there is no actual correspondence of feelings; but the spectator’s afective reaction
is triggered by what he imagines are the appropriate feelings
for that situation or what “the situation deserves.”
Consequently, the impartial spectator determines the
point of propriety according to the relevant import for each
particular situation. Her recognition of the morally relevant
imports for that agent in that situation is the clue for her
judgment. his is an essential point in the TMS because it
reveals that the impartial spectator does not project values
onto reality but discovers them through her afective reactions, according to the kind of natural and cultural being she
is. Indeed, despite Smith’s strong commitment to fallibilism
he believes that, using the various resources at its disposal
for attaining a better perception, a better identiication and
a more accurate moral judgment, the sympathetic process
discovers truth (objective appropriateness) and normative
ethics (cf. p. 162).
In sum, Smith’s moral normativity is context-dependent
but not relativistic. First, it depends on the import of the
speciic situation and is thereby objective. Second, moral
judgments are validated by the mediation of the impartial
spectator, who moderates our innate self-preference in order
to provide warrant for treating ourselves as we treat others.
his double rapport, the agent with the import through the
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73). If there are no commonalities, there can be no identiication, sympathetic processes or valid moral judgments.
Moral judgments depend on proximity, on shared references
and the possibility of identiication. But “the commonality
between people is oten made invisible by diferences in experiences” (p. 176). hus Forman-Barzilai may legitimately
ask “[H]ow does this process of becoming a more mature,
proper and congenial member of my society better help me
understand someone who has learned [...] what it means in
her world to be ‘in command’ of herself, sociable, proper, polite, etc.?”23 As a result, distance seems in principle to impede
any possibility of intercultural moral judgments.24
Perhaps a problem with the TMS is that Smith basically describes “micro-sympathetic processes” (cf. p. 226), i.e. sympathy within roughly homogeneous communities. However,
he also provides some clues that allow reconstructing an
argument that explains how legitimate intercultural moral
judgments may be assessed and even—as I will explain in
the next section—to defend certain judgments of universal
justice. Following Amartya Sen, I contend that “Smith saw
the possibility that the impartial spectator could draw on the
understanding of people who are far as well as those who
are near”;25 despite the fact that some sympathetic processes
may imply a greater efort and are thus not always equally
accurate.26 My argument is greatly aided by Weinstein’s particularly detailed account of the sympathetic process and the
devices human beings have at hand to reine it.
For Smith, “the ability to sympathize rests either in preexisting commonalities or the ability to create commonalities by learning the contexts and perspectives of others” (p.
96). For this reason the only insurmountable obstacle for
sympathizing is fanaticism: “[V]iolence, conlict, factionalism and fanaticism are the impartial spectator’s greatest enemies” (TMS III.3.43). Fanaticism—which at a global level is
also expressed in chauvinism, nationalism, fundamentalism,
etc.—implies an explicit rejection of the sympathetic process
and silences the voice of the impartial spectator. Diversity,
the lack of commonalities, is a problem for identiication,
but if there is the will to sympathize, there are then rational
ways to enter into the experience of others when sympathy is
hindered by wide gaps in experiences, beliefs or actions (cf.
p. 162).
“In essence,” says Weinstein, “Smith is trying to create a
mechanism through which individuals can become interested in others despite their lack of commonality” (p. 133).
Rather than “creating a mechanism,” he tries to identify the
resources at our disposal for bridging our discrete natures
and cultures. One of these resources is the creation of narraVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
tives that help to make sense of others’ reactions. Narratives
isolate the elements of the situation that an alien spectator
recognizes, organize them in a coherent whole and enable
the spectator to reconstruct the rest of the story. In this way
they facilitate identiication and sympathetic judgments.
his is why Smith airms that “poets and romance writers
... are... much better instructors than Zeno, Chrysippus or
Epictetus” (TMS III.3.14). Storytelling—says Weinstein—is
“part of the human condition, and the need to resolve these
stories is also part of human nature” (p. 236).
Another resource for reining sympathy is argumentation.
Reasoning is part of the sympathetic process, and “argumentation is tied to growth of social awareness. To mature is to
absorb and modify socially constructed identity and argument procedures. It is also to gather vast amounts of data
and to systematize them in such a way that one becomes
aware of an objective standard of propriety” (p. 162). Finally,
speaking more generally, the main ally of moral sympathy
is education. Sympathy can be cultivated by education, and
a wide-ranging education resists ignorance and prejudice,
and inds commonalities without erasing otherness (cf. p.
107). “Education serves several purposes in moral growth
throughout Smith’s corpus. It cultivates our capacity to interpret the sentiments of others; it provides a mechanism
by which we cultivate moral judgment; and it ofers us standards by which we can temper our own sentiments or suggest to others that they do so” (p. 183). Education helps to
bridge diferences enabling the spectator to enter into the
experiences of others (cf. p. 81).
But why would a spectator “go through the trouble of sympathizing with others, especially in those instances when it
requires so much efort[?]” Smith’s answer in the TMS—says
Weinstein—“is the same as in HA. One seeks to sympathize
with others because it is enjoyable to do so” (p. 183). Smith
gives the same sentimentalist account of human motivation
for the scientiic, political and moral spheres. A lack of understanding produces discomfort, while a coherent, inclusive
narrative, in contrast, has a calming efect. Learning soothes
anxiety (cf. p. 178).
Consequently, the sympathetic process that Smith describes mainly for limited scenarios may well be extended to
a broader scale: the impartial spectator, using these diferent resources, is able to “adjust its references” to diverse cultures and successfully judge the propriety of alien practices
and customs with respect to their own contexts. Distance is
an obstacle, but not an absolute impediment for developing
objective moral judgments. For instance, before judging the
morality of killing another for dishonoring the family name,
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INTERCULTURAL SYMPATHY AND UNIVERSAL
RULES OF JUSTICE
here are ways to overcome an initial cultural incompetence,
to understand other cultures and to judge according to their
own standards of propriety. However, this still doesn’t rule
out cultural relativism. A relativist may accept the possibility of sympathizing with diferent cultures and judging
their practices according to their own criteria. However, she
would never accept the possibility of judging other cultures’
standards of propriety, or to condemn a practice that is considered legitimate in that culture. A typical case is slavery.
here must have been multitudes of slave-owners who never
suspected they were harming an equal, and if the impartial spectator adjusts her references to that culture, she will
conclude that, in that context, these people were not in the
wrong. Do we have a right to blame them on the basis of our
own criteria and say that they were unjust? Or should we say
that a few decades ago, in North America for instance, black
people were worthless, had less dignity, were inferior?
In this section I will claim that Smith is a pluralist, in the
sense that together with allowing wide room for cultural
variations, his ethics also includes a group of moral rules
that ought to be the same in all times and places. hese are
the rules of justice, which are exact, absolute and universally
binding. My contention is that Smith’s moral psychology is
able to give a solid foundation to a central core of norms
that, despite being “ater the fact” and context-dependent,
ought to be respected in any and every particular human
culture. It’s not just that human beings may make legitimate
intercultural judgments; they are also entitled to judge, to
condemn or to approve of certain customs and practices that
don’t belong to their own culture employing the same norms
that apply to their culture.
Smith explains that the rules of justice arise when the
spectator feels resentment and approves of punishment because of her sympathetic identiication with the suferer of
an aggression, and the consequent feeling that the injustice
was done, so to speak, to her. his is why, for Smith, rules of
justice are “sacred” (TMS II.iii.3.4): No spectator would ever
accept seeing an equal treated as an inferior when her reason
is constantly telling her that we all are but one in a multitude of equals. Darwall emphasizes that the norms of justice
are more vivid and more binding than other norms because
they implicitly express our equality as human beings,27 the
ultimate moral justiication in this theory. For Smith—says
Weinstein—“people are in some sense fundamentally similar”28; he “starts with the presumption of natural equality:
for him there is no ‘originall diference’ between individuals
(LJ (A) vi. 47-48)” (p. 96). Our diferences are never so radical as to afect our equal entitlement to justice and rights.
herefore, when the spectator sympathizes with the suferer
she feels the suferer’s worth to be her own and cannot bear
such a violation of human equality. his is why judgments
of justice are diferent from other moral judgments: they are
the ones that draw the line between what is morally permissible and what is absolutely forbidden.29
Recognizing another person as a being of equal worth,
an attitude implicitly involved in the feeling of resentment,
demands from us what Darwall has called “recognition respect.”30 his is the proper attitude towards things of intrinsic value; it’s a kind of respect we either give or fail to give,
and doesn’t allow for degrees. My assumption is that Smith’s
virtue of justice safeguards this “recognition respect,” and
that’s why these norms are negative, expressing moral constraints (things we cannot do to others). Rules of justice are
so important for Smith that he even states: “[n]ature, antecedent to all relections upon utility of punishment, has ...
stamped upon the human heart, in the strongest and most
indelible characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred and necessary law of retaliation” (TMS
II.ii.3.9). Haakonssen also explains that justice involves
a stronger feeling than other virtues because it relects the
lack of something that should have been given but was not.31
According to my interpretation, the “something” that produces this reaction, the “import” of the situation is precisely
the lack of recognition respect. And given that we ought to
respect all our equals, this is a culture-neutral import: human beings are human beings regardless of the culture to
which they belong.32
Virtue, for Smith, is having the appropriate degree of all
passions (TMS I.ii.introd.2). For the virtue of justice, this
means absolute respect for the dignity of all our fellow-creatures; anything less is immoral. he context, as for all other
virtues, is also important. he diference is that in judgments
of justice the only relevant aspect of the context that must be
taken into account is whether the one who is being wronged
is a human being. Harry Frankfurt says that what is of genuine moral concern is that “every person should be accorded
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11
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a cross-cultural spectator should irst “adjust her references”
to the context and examine whether dishonoring the family
name is or is not considered to be damaging within that culture. If it were damaging, the agent would be acting for appropriate reasons and his action would be punishment, not
injustice.
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the rights, the respect, the consideration and the concern to
which he is entitled by virtue of what he is and of what he
has done.”33 Applied to the Smithian virtue of justice, this entails treating a person according to what she naturally is: a
human being.
Injustices, for Smith, imply treating an equal as an inferior,
or inappropriately doing harm to an equal. Fleischacker’s
argument against the possibility of universal rules of justice
in the TMS was that the concept of “harm,” to which we react in cases of injustice, was a culturally mediated concept.
He said that Smith’s concept of impartiality does not warrant universal rules of justice for it would be perfectly possible to “impartially hurt all children” without turning it into
a good practice. his is true; but he is not considering the
foundation of moral judgments: the sympathetic process.
Sympathetic identiication implies that the moral standpoint
includes a reversibility test. hat is to say, in order for an action to be morally justiied the agent must be prepared to
be treated in the same way. In the TMS, impartiality is not
enough for being moral.
However, like all other moral judgments, judgments of
justice are also challenged by distance; and the reversibility
test only discriminates where people may indeed identify
with each other, i.e. where (a) they see the other as an “equal”
and (b) they share the same standards for what is considered
“harmful.” hus Fleischacker’s objection would still be valid.
he only possibility for rejecting cultural relativism would
be to demonstrate that there exist at least some universal injustices, or injustices that do not depend on culture-relative
notions of harm or of who is considered an equal.
Harm is indeed, to a large extent, a cultural-mediated concept. Killing a man for dishonoring the family name, stoning women, putting earrings on little babies, circumcision,
etc., are seen as appropriate practices in some cultures and
inappropriate in others. In order to judge these practices, the
intercultural impartial spectator must try to adjust her references (create narratives, argumentation, etc.) before sympathizing. If she succeeds and these are legitimate practices in
their original cultures, she should conclude that, regardless
of the scandal that these practices may represent to external
spectators, they are perfectly appropriate in their cultures.
Or is the spectator allowed to condemn as unjust practices
that in their own culture are not considered as such?
If we focus only on the notion of harm, it seems diicult
to justify the right to condemn other cultures’ practices on
the basis of our own criteria. However, if we begin our analysis by focusing on the second element of Smith’s concept of
justice, the group of equals, we encounter another clue with
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
which to understand moral judgments in the TMS. Is equality also a culturally mediated concept? Who are our “equals”:
barbarians, women, blacks, Indians, embryos, whales? Many
cultures have not recognized some of these groups as equals.
Within our society many exclude unborn people and others include non-human animals as members of the group.
herefore, factually, equality seems to be as culture-relative
as harm: moral good and evil in Smith’s theory would thus
be, unavoidably, conventional.
Nonetheless, unlike the notion of harm, the reality of the
group of “equals” does not depend on our recognition of it.
Acknowledged or not by their cultures, black slaves have
always had the same dignity as free white men. hey have
now been recognized as equals, but they have not been made
equals. Women did not acquire their dignity as they started
to be considered equals. Recognizing the equal dignity of
x does not create or invent that dignity. It has always been
there, but we were blind to it. It is a feature of x and not of
our knowledge of x. My proposal, then, is that this essential diference between the concepts of “harm,” which up to
some point is indeed conventional, and that of “equality as
human beings,” which has an independent, intrinsic content,
may give us a tool to identify some universal injustices and
lay the basis for the recognition of universal human rights.
In general, in cross-cultural judgments, ater adjusting our references, we can know if that particular practice
is appropriate or not in that particular culture. However, in
judgments of justice things are diferent. In assessing justice,
the import to which the impartial spectator reacts is an improper harm inlicted on an equal, and given that the group
of equals is a culture-neutral import, there are some moral
judgments that may legitimately be made. Only “some,”
since the notion of “harm” is to some extent culturally mediated and there will always be “grey zones” that are open
for discussion. Nonetheless, if there is an objective or culture
independent group of equals, to treat any of them as an inferior is to commit a material injustice, which may and must
be condemned by every spectator.
herefore, setting aside the “interpretable” grey zone of
culture-relative harms, we can be sure that any unjustiied
hurt deliberately inlicted on a human being in any culture
will be a material injustice in every culture. his is why the
objective group of equals is so important to identifying the
central core of universal norms. hese rules have universal
authority and also apply when the victim is not recognized
as an equal in her culture, even when the victim herself does
not resent the harm received. he external spectator, in this
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sonal or cultural self-deceit. Argumentation increases social
awareness. Education, information, diversity of experiences,
relection, comparison, etc., are some of the means we human beings have in order to face the diferences regarding
our responsibility for political pluralism and for advancing
towards global justice.
CONCLUSION
Smith accepts that in practical matters there are many
culture-dependent norms that cannot be validly assessed
using alien cultural standards. However, in the case of
equals treated as inferiors he immediately calls it injustice.
Consequently, even though in Smith’s ethics the moral conscience is empirically engendered, the moral standpoint that
naturally arises from our irst-order psychological constitution allows his theory to airm certain universally binding
culture-neutral moral norms. his small central core of rules
of justice is enough to rule out relativistic interpretations
of his ethics, setting up a precise and severe limit between
the permissible and the immoral. he TMS is a pluralistic
theory; not only in Weinstein’s terms but also—as it can be
shown using his insightful description of the sympathetic
process and the conditions for sympathy—at a global level.
he universal or “sacred” rules of justice ought to be respected, and their violation condemned, in every human culture.
Respect for the rules of justice requires acknowledging
some “commonality” between all cultures in order to enter
into sympathetic processes. he sympathetic identiication
comes from the recognition of the common humanity that
any attentive spectator sees, with the help, when necessary, of
the resources of our moral psychology. Justice, in the TMS,
is the virtue that responds to the import of the “kind of being” that is being wronged. If that being is an equal, the aggression is called “injustice,” and spectators from far or near
must react against it. his is what happens with the violation
of human rights, and what also provides suicient reason to
create institutional devices—such as a universal declaration
of human rights and global institutions in charge of enforcing them—to prevent their violation.38
he spectators from outside, from diferent cultures, help
to overcome hidden cultural biases and promote global moral progress. “Smithian reasoning,” says Amartya Sen, “not
only admits, but also requires, the use of impartial spectators
at a distance, and the procedure of impartiality to be used
open and broad.”39 Ultimately, moral pluralism is possible
because the context-dependent normativity of the TMS requires being a human being as the only relevant import for
CONTEXT-DEPENDENT NORMATIVITY AND UNIVERSAL RULES OF JUSTICE
13
COSMOS + TAXIS
case, sympathizes with illusive sympathy. And that culture’s
speciic practice must be condemned.
he immediate objection against this thesis is that there
are no culture-neutral or uninterpretable harms, or that
there are no harms which must always be condemned. But
reality belies this claim. Slavery is an injustice everywhere,
as is torturing innocents or traicking in women. Jerry
Evensky, using the same argument, says that for Smith there
are some principles that should, it can be persuasively argued, be absolute.34 If there is an objective group of equals,
and if there are also some injuries that don’t admit of interpretation, it is plausible to suggest that Smith’s empiricist and
context-dependent theory does contain a core of absolutely
and universally applicable moral norms, even if they are not
always recognized.
But can an empiricist ethics convincingly support the
claim that there are real though unknown moral norms?
Smith believes it can, hence the prominent role of self-deceit
in his theory (cf. TMS III.2.32; III.4.3). Moral blindness may
be personal or cultural. People can close their ears to the impartial spectator’s voice. Moreover, given the weakness and
imperfection of our knowledge, we can never be completely
certain about our particular moral judgments. And if there
are communities that don’t see women, black people or children as “equals” it is because justice requires moral sympathy, and sympathy demands the will to sympathize. However,
when interests or passions are too strong, or traditions too
deeply ingrained, self-deception can be diicult to eradicate.
Smith notes this when saying that the slave-owner is too far
from the daily life of a slave to spontaneously sympathize
with a slave’s emotions (cf. WN V.2.9). As long as the slaveowner does not care, as long as he is not “attentive” to the
other, the conditions for the sympathetic identiication are
not met, and, unless his impartial spectator is “awakened”
from the outside, he will remain in his epistemological error
(cf. p. 86 f).35 However, if we are certain that an objective
group of equals exists, and if we have good reason to believe
that our standards are better than others’, we might legitimately make cross-cultural judgments regarding this kind of
practice.
Once again, Weinstein’s illuminating comments regarding
the diferent devices available to our natural drive to sympathize shed light on this topic. he example of slavery is
paradigmatic.36 here had to be a creation of narratives until
people could see their “common humanity” (a basic commonality) and recognize the respective other as an equal,
even in the case of a slave who somehow accepted his condition.37 Narratives are a fundamental device to strip away per-
assessing judgments of justice. And it further shows that
justice, for Smith, is not only a means for preserving peace
and social unity but, irst and foremost, the safeguard of the
absolute respect that all human beings deserve, exclusively
because of the kind of being we are: it is the natural foundation of universal human rights.40
NOTES
1
2
14
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Weinstein (2013), p. 59.
“[S]ympathy is dependent on context, and one must be
aware of as many facts as possible” (p. 73).
I develop this topic in Carrasco (2009).
Griswold (1999), p. 94.
Griswold (2006), p. 184.
Forman-Barzilai (2006), p. 100.
Forman-Barzilai (2006), p. 96.
Fleischacker (2004), p. 81.
Cf. Fleischacker (2004), p. 82.
Cf. Haakonssen (1981), p. 116.
Cf. Haakonssen (1981), p. 147.
Weinstein observes that, for Smith, “the rules of nature
are not as precise as what we would now call scientiic
principles, [however] they still accurately describe the
human condition and each of our normal tendencies”
(p. 337).
Cf. Fleischacker (2004), 153-161.
Cf. Fleischacker (2004), p. 158.
Forman-Barzilai (2006), p. 90.
Cf. TMS VII.ii.1.12.
Darwall (1999), p. 142.
he impartial spectator is “the anthropomorphization
of the rational process and incorporates the sentimental
foundation into a reasoned analysis” (p. 72). Amartya
Sen, in a more pragmatic deinition, states that it is a
thought-experiment for “reasoned self-scrutiny” that
people are capable of (2013, p. 586).
Cf. Weinstein, p. 163. “By imagining the impartial spectator … the actor brings the community with herself or
himself at all times.”
Acknowledging human fallibilism enables the creation
of diferent psychological and institutional processes to
balance as much as possible human innate partiality (cf.
p. 201). Rules are the most evident example of these devices (cf. TMS III.4.7).
Taylor (1985), pp. 45-76.
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
22 Diferent cultures interpret diferent values within a certain range of variations. However, they will usually keep
some “family resemblances” as long as they all point to
the same human goods. “[W]e expect truth and justice
from (everybody)” (TMS V.2.12).
23 Forman-Barzilai (2006), p. 97. My emphasis.
24 “Distance between the spectator and the agent should
be understood both literally and metaphorically; both
physical and psychological separations afect sympathetic ability” (p. 74).
25 Sen (2002), “Open and Closed Impartiality,” p. 457.
26 Sympathy will always be imperfect (pp. 94, 110), but is
also reinable (p. 112).
27 Darwall (2005), p. 133.
28 In WN I.ii.4 Smith argues that “[t]he diference between
the most dissimilar characters… seems to arise not so
much from nature, as from habit, custom and education” (cf. Weinstein, p. 81).
29 I develop this topic in Carrasco (2014).
30 Cf. Darwall (1977), pp. 36-49.
31 Haakonssen (1981), p. 86.
32 Indeed, a signiicant example of a culture-neutral import in the TMS is “the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the main restraint upon the
injustice of mankind,” which Smith further qualiies as
“one of the most important principles of human nature”
(TMS I.i.1.13). his statement is particularly suggestive
since it already associates justice with a culture-neutral
import.
33 Frankfurt (1997), p. 6.
34 Evensky (2005), p. 52 n28.
35 “Rectifying injustice requires truly seeing and learning
from one another. We must, in Smith’s words, be attended to and attend to others” (p. 268).
36 Cf. pp. 86-91.
37 his is, once more, a case of illusive sympathy, similar to
that of a woman who, because of her acculturation, sincerely believes that she is inferior to men and deserves
to be treated as such. he intercultural impartial spectator ought to react with resentment and denounce this
injustice, regardless of the feelings of those women. She
may accept the injustice, but what the impartial spectator claims is that she is really being the victim of an
objective injustice. Smith’s discussion of infanticide in
Greece reinforces this point, calling it “the most dreadful violation of humanity” (TMS V.2.15. My emphasis).
38 “hat broad [Smithian] framework of impartiality
makes it particularly clear why considerations of basic
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REFERENCES
Carrasco, M. A. (2009). Adam Smith y El Relativismo, Anuario
Filosóico XLII/1, 181-206.
Carrasco, M. A. (2014). Adam Smith: Virtues and Universal Principles,
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 68, n.269, 223-250.
Darwall, S. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics 88, 36-49.
Darwall, S. (1999). Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam
Smith. Philosophy and Public Afairs 28, 139-164.
Darwall, S. (2005). Equal Dignity in Adam Smith. he Adam Smith
Review 1, 129-134.
Evensky, J. (2005). Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Fleischacker, S. (2004). On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A
Philosophical Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Forman-Barzilai, F. (2006). Smith on ‘Connexion’, Culture and
Judgment. In: Montes, L., Schleisser, E. (eds.), New Voices on Adam
Smith. London: Routledge, 89-114.
Frankfurt, H. (1997). Equality and Respect. Social Research 64, 1, 146154.
Griswold, C. (1999). Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Griswold, C. (2006). On the Incompleteness of Adam Smith’s System.
he Adam Smith Review 2, 181-186.
Haakonssen, K. (1981). he Science of a Legislator. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C. (1985). Self-interpreting animals. Human Agency and
Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 45-76.
Sen, A. (2002). Open and Closed Impartiality. he Journal of
Philosophy, 99, n. 9, 445-469.
Sen, A. (2013). he Contemporary Relevance of Adam Smith.
In: Berry, C., Paganelli, M. P., and Smith, C. (eds.), he Oxford
Handbook of Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weinstein, J. R. (2013). Adam Smith’s Pluralism: Rationality, Education
and Moral Sentiments. New Haven: Yale University Press.
CONTEXT-DEPENDENT NORMATIVITY AND UNIVERSAL RULES OF JUSTICE
15
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human rights, including the importance of safeguarding
elementary civil and political liberties, need not be contingent of citizenship and nationality, and may not be
institutionally dependent on a nationally derived social
contract” (Sen, 2002, p. 468).
39 Sen (2002), p. 451.
40 Research for this work was supported by the Project
Fondecyt 1141208.
“… but one of the multitude”. Justice, Pluralism and Rationality in
Smith and Weinstein
LISA HERZOG
Center for Ethics in Society
Stanford University
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Email: lmherzog@stanford.edu
Web: https://ethicsinsociety.stanford.edu/people/lisa-herzog
Bio-sketch: Lisa Herzog’s research focuses on the relation between economics and philosophy. Her irst book Inventing the
Market: Smith, Hegel, and Political heory was published by Oxford University Press in 2013. Currently, she is working on a
book project on ethical agency in organizational contexts and on questions of ethics in inance.
16
INTRODUCTION
COSMOS + TAXIS
Jack Russell Weinstein’s Adam Smith’s Pluralism. Rationality,
Education, and the Moral Sentiments is a rich, and immensely enriching, book, of which I can take up only a few threads
in this commentary. Weinstein discusses Smith’s account of
human nature, rationality, and the role of education in human life. He presents Smith’s intellectual context in great
depth, but also shows the relevance of Smithian themes and
arguments for today.
Of the four key terms appearing in the title of the book, I
focus on two: pluralism and rationality. I take the liberty of
adopting a bird’s eye’s view, discussing the “big picture” that
Weinstein ofers us, neglecting various details. In addition to
the themes of pluralism and rationality I introduce a third
one: justice. What Weinstein says is compatible with what I
take to be the role of justice in the architecture of Smith’s system. But I would argue that justice plays a role that is more
central than Weinstein admits. his also has implications
for the relation between TMS and WN. Weinstein is right
to prioritize TMS over WN. But the economic dimensions
of Smith’s vision of commercial society remain nonetheless
central.1
In this brief commentary, I irst describe, as a foil, the
neoliberal cliché of Smith and how rationality and pluralism are related in it. Obviously, Weinstein’s reading presents
a more nuanced, and much richer, picture. But I argue that
for Smith, the role of justice is more central than it appears
in Weinstein’s account, which brings Smith somewhat closVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
er to the cliché, without, however, giving up core tenets of
Weinstein’s reading. In focussing on the role of justice, I run
the risk of anticipating themes that Weinstein might have
decided to postpone to a follow-up volume (13), as part of
the larger project of building a liberalism on Smithian foundations (see 266-269). Nonetheless, these themes also have
implications for the topics of the current volume, pluralism
and education. In the conclusion I sketch some of these implications.
SMITH-THE-CLICHÉ ON RATIONALITY
AND PLURALISM
At the risk of constructing a straw man, let me sketch the picture of rationality and pluralism that a person unacquainted
with Smith’s writings might assume him to have. According
to the cliché, Smith is famous for having defended the single-minded pursuit of self-interest. he form of rationality
needed for this purpose is economic rationality, i.e. a kind
of rationality that is formal, mechanical, quantitative, and
that exclusively aims at maximizing the satisfaction of one’s
preferences. Human sentiments or sympathy do not play any
role in this picture. Both the preferences and the rationality of market participants are taken as given; markets—or
social intercourse more broadly—do not shape individuals
(or at least these are not the aspects of markets that economists would explore). In this picture, “pluralism” among
individuals can only take the form of diferent preferences:
some people prefer apples, others prefer oranges, and yet
COSMOS + TAXIS
tion that individuals, their rationality, and their preference
structures are “given,” and remain the same during all market interactions, is highly problematic. Many phenomena in
economic life—for example advertising or branding—cannot be understood without allowing for the possibility that
human preferences can be shaped in markets.
WEINSTEIN’S SMITH
It is needless to say that the account of Smith that Weinstein
draws in Adam Smith’s Pluralism is not only much richer and
more nuanced, but also more in line with Smith’s oeuvre and
the intellectual contexts in which he wrote. For Weinstein’s
Smith, human beings are socially formed creatures, whose
ability to sympathize with others is a basic precondition for
the development of the capacity of reasoning. heir rationality is not limited to formal logic or rational choice theory.
Rather, it is narrative in structure. Weinstein admits his indebtedness to MacInytre (e.g. 15, 161), but the case for reading Smith in this way stands on its own, especially if one
takes into account the role of rhetoric for Smith (see chap.
6) or his remarks on the role of literature in education (see
89, 213). Neither syllogistic logic, nor economic rationality
in a narrow sense, can fully grasp what human reasoning is.
he two are not identical, but they are similar in the way in
which they exclude many elements—sentiments, rhetoric,
community—in order to focus on clearly deinable, formalizable factors. Even readers who would recoil from some of
Weinstein’s more drastic formulations, and who might prefer
to keep the term “logic” for what it traditionally designates,
can agree that human reasoning is broader. It has social and
psychological preconditions that the account of Smith-thecliché is silent about.
hus, Weinstein provides us with a more plausible picture of human rationality, which he relates to contemporary
debates about argumentation theory and critical thinking (chap. 7). his picture implies that pluralism is not just
the pluralism of diferent preferences. he realm of social
interactions is much broader than that of the economic
exchanges of the market, in which individuals interact as
unchangeable monads. Rather, for the development of one’s
rationality and one’s preferences, encounters with others are
crucial. his picture of human reason thus also ofers a richer account of how individuals in a pluralist society interact
with one another. hey exchange not only goods, but also
opinions and sentiments. hey can learn from one another,
and thus enlarge their perspectives. We do not have to accept
the picture according to which the only way in which indi-
“… BUT ONE OF THE MULTITUDE”. JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND RATIONALITY IN SMITH AND WEINSTEIN
17
COSMOS + TAXIS
others strawberries. hese preferences can all be expressed
in elegant mathematical functions. Markets are described as
places where individuals with diferent preference functions
meet, each of them trying to achieve an optimal outcome,
given their budgets and the availability of goods and services. Markets make possible win-win-situations, with mutually
beneicial exchanges. No other forms of mutual understanding are necessary, as long as the agents understand the potential for such mutually beneicial exchanges. Nor would
one see, in this picture, what other point encounters between
human beings could have: this picture does not take into account the ways in which our preferences, and our rationality,
might develop in social interaction.
his is, of course, a caricature. Nonetheless, it has proven to be a powerful picture; powerful enough to support a
vision of a society in which markets, in which this form of
rationality operates, play a central role. One does not have
to deny that there can be other social spheres, in which “exchanges” of other kinds—of sympathy, of opinions, of love
and friendship—take place. here may also be “thicker”
forms of community, among those with similar preference
structures and similar worldviews. But all social relations in
the wider society are, according to this picture, the instrumental relations of the market; areas such as politics or the
arts are oten also understood along the lines of the market
logic. Weinstein himself sketches a brief account of such a
world, which, he argues, would result if one read WN without the moral foundations of TMS. He calls it “a bleak picture of humanity” (65): the accumulation of wealth would
dominate all social relations, all other spheres of life would
be submitted to the imperative of economic eiciency.
Such a picture, however, is incomplete, even on its own
account. Markets need a framework of positive law within
which they can function. his picture says nothing about
where such a framework would come from and how it would
be enforced. Without property rights and contract law—to
name just the most crucial aspects of the legal framework of
markets—markets can easily degenerate into a Darwinian
struggle for the survival of the ittest. Legal regulation is also
needed to address market imperfections and market failures, for example with regard to information asymmetries or
public goods. And it is likely, in fact, that positive law is not
enough: markets are unlikely to function well if individuals try to get around the law whenever they can, rather than
having some intrinsic motivation to avoid illegal—which are
oten also immoral—actions. It is more plausible to assume
that in real-life markets, there are some elements of intrinsic
habitual motivation to obey the law. Moreover, the assump-
viduals can interact is either the small community in which
individuals with similar preferences and world-views meet,
or the marketplace in which purely instrumental rationality
reigns. here are also other forms of interaction, and hence
other forms in which pluralist societies can develop coherence. heir members have reasons to cherish the fact that
they live in a pluralist society, not only because it allows for
mutually beneicial economic interactions, but also because
it ofers them opportunities to learn to reason better, because
they can sympathetically share a wider range of perspectives.
It is impossible to do justice to the richness of Weinstein’s
picture in this brief commentary. Instead, let me turn to
one element of Smith’s system the role of which Weinstein
does not discuss in detail, although it has important implications for some of the themes he addresses, and can serve to
strengthen his account.
THE PRIORITY OF JUSTICE
18
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Many commentators have pointed out the centrality of justice for Smith. It is, for him, “the main pillar that upholds
the whole ediice” of society (TMS II.II.3.4). It connects TMS
and WN in ways that are similar to the many other ways in
which these two books are related (see e.g. WN IV.IX.51
on the role of justice in commercial society), and which
Weinstein points out. he core of justice is the duty not to
violate the rights of other people (see also Weinstein 76-7),
which holds in the market place just as in other areas of life.
Smith uses the metaphor of a race to describe the importance of justice:
In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments,
[an individual] may run as hard as he can, and strain
every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all
his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down
any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely
at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. (TMS II.II.2.1.)
For Smith, individuals internalize the rules of justice.
Hence, the individuals who enter the Smithian market follow
them. his is a central reason for why these markets work
well, and have the eiciency-enhancing features that are emphasized by the cliché account described above. But, importantly, for Smith justice is not only an individual virtue, it is
also—or rather, it should be—a “virtue of social institutions,”
to anachronistically use Rawls’s expressions (Rawls 1971,3).
In Smith’s words:
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of
citizens, for no other purpose but to promote that of
some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and
equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all
the diferent orders of his subjects. (WN IV.VIII.30)
Why is justice so important for Smith? From the perspective of Weinstein’s book, there are at least three areas in which
it plays a role. he irst is, as already mentioned, the market
place, in which a framework of just rules and an internalized
sense of justice are needed in order to allow the “invisible
hand” to do its beneicial work. In the absence of just rules,
sub-groups of society—in Smith’s time, the “merchants and
manufacturers” that beneitted from the “mercantile system”
(WN Book IV)—can make proits at the expense of others.
Rather than being mutually beneicial, markets can end up
being unjust and exploitative, having nothing to do with
the benevolent mechanisms Smith envisaged. he parallel
between the price mechanism and the impartial spectator
mechanism, which Weinstein emphasises (chap. 7), breaks
down.
A second way in which justice is relevant for Weinstein’s
reading of Smith concerns the process in which individuals
share sentiments and exchange sympathy. Individuals have
diferent rhetorical abilities, and diferent abilities to attract
sympathy from others.2 his is part of the pluralist character
of society: individuals are diferent, and economic and social
circumstances add to whatever natural diferences there may
be. Within the very processes that are so important for the
formation of rationality and the impartial spectator, there
can be inequalities, biases, and historically grown injustices.
Some voices are better able to make themselves heard than
others, for example because of cultural prejudices against
women or non-whites.3 As Weinstein writes: “hinking for
oneself, or reasoned critical analysis, [Smith] argues, is a
group activity” (81). But how is this group constituted? Do
their members enjoy equal standing? Who is included, who
is excluded? hese questions matter for how “impartial” the
impartial spectator can become. Justice, for Smith, includes
the basic insight that every individual is “but one of the multitude” (TMS III.III.4, cf. similarly I.I.1.5, II.III.1.5), that all
voices have an equal right to be heard, and that all individuals have rights that must not be violated. Without the rules
of justice in place within a society, the process of the development of rationality, with all the rich social and emotional
texture that Weinstein depicts, can easily be corrupted,4 and
lead to one-sided prejudices and unjustiied exclusions of
certain perspectives.
COSMOS + TAXIS
least if one considers the long-term, historical development
of justice and the moral sentiments (for a detailed discussion
see Herzog (2014a)). For if economic relations are highly unequal, this makes it harder for individuals to recognize one
another as equals—as Smith writes about slave owners, in
one place, they “will hardly look on him [the slave] as being
of the same kind” because “the disproportion betwixt them
… is so great” (LJ (A) 184).6 he feudal lords of medieval
Europe probably had a hard time putting themselves into the
shoes of their poor tenants and feeling sympathy with them.
In commercial society, in contrast, there is legal equality,
which Smith takes to be crucial for economic development
(see e.g. WN III.II.14). he material conditions of individuals become more equal over time—or so Smith hoped (see
e.g. Herzog 2013a, 101f., for a discussion). Whether or not
he was correct in this hope is a question that is still hotly
debated, with current evidence raising serious doubts (see in
particular Piketty 2014). But it is an important element of
Smith’s vision of commercial society, and of his endorsement
of it.
Last but not least, there is another relation between the
economy and justice. For Smith, markets have an efect on
individuals: they “educate” them, in the broader sense of acculturation or socialization, which Weinstein distinguishes
from formal education (e.g. 170). For Smith, an important
feature of well-functioning markets is that they reward certain virtues, such as justice and prudence. he reason for this
is that in commercial societies, “the road to virtue and that
to fortune, […] are, happily in most cases, very nearly the
same,” at least for the “middling and inferior stations” (TMS
I.III.3.5). In the markets Smith envisaged, working hard, delivering good quality, being reliable, and building up a good
reputation (LJ (B), 538-9), all lead to economic prosperity,
thus providing incentives for these virtues, which may not
be the highest virtues, but which can be expected from all
members of commercial society (for a detailed discussion
see Herzog 2013a, 90f.). But this mechanism only works if
the rules of markets are unbiased, and all participants are on
an equal footing. his is, again, a matter of justice. hus, the
role of justice in Smith’s system is multifaceted and complex;
it matters both at the level of individual behaviour and at the
level of institutions, and the two levels can reinforce one another in either negative or positive feedback loops.
IMPLICATIONS
As noted earlier, these—brief and condensed—arguments
about the centrality of justice are compatible with Weinstein’s
“… BUT ONE OF THE MULTITUDE”. JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND RATIONALITY IN SMITH AND WEINSTEIN
19
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Finally, justice also plays an important role as a common
denominator in a society made up of individuals with different sentiments, diferent rationalities, and diferent worldviews. Weinstein’s rich notion of rationality, plausible as
it is, here has an open lank: how can diferent individuals
come to agreements in the view of plurality and diversity?
What are the moral minima they can agree on? he attraction of, and arguably one motivation for, formal accounts of
rationality, whether in syllogistic logic or in rational choice
analysis, is that one can come to clear-cut conclusions that
apparently exclude dissent. he answers ofered by economic
models claim to possess a kind of scientiic-ness that puts
them beyond the scope of political disagreement. he attraction of a tight logical argument is that once the premises
have been accepted, one cannot doubt the conclusion—or so
the defenders of logic would say. he alleged objectivity of
formal notions of rationality promises ways of inding agreements that everyone who possesses, well, reason, has to concur with.
here is no need to rehearse the various criticisms that
have been raised against this alleged objectivity and neutrality, whether at the level of certain understandings of “rationality” or at the level of the scientiic nature, or lack thereof,
of economics as an academic discipline. But if one accepts
these criticisms, one is nonetheless let with the question of
how one can ind agreement within plurality. Here, justice, in
Smith’s basic sense, matters: it establishes certain basic rules,
such as the rule not to harm others without good reason. he
role of justice is similar to Rawls’ (1971) model of the “overlapping consensus” (which one can share without having to
share his more concrete vision about what justice consists
in).5 I take it that for Smith justice is, in a similar sense, a
moral minimum that individuals with diferent world-views
and diferent rationalities can agree on.
If one asks where the sense of justice comes from,
Weinstein’s account of how human sentiments and human
sympathies function ofers rich material for an answer. His
discussion of the experience of pain in this process (98-9) is
particularly helpful, because a central function of justice is to
avoid unnecessary pain. But as argued above, justice is also
presupposed in this process, at least in the minimal sense of
recognizing that others have an equally valid perspective.
hus, Smith’s picture is coherentist: the way in which the
impartial spectator develops presupposes justice in a certain
sense, but it is also the impartial spectator that helps individuals to develop, and strengthen, their sense of justice.
Arguably, however, this process is one in which not only
moral and social, but also economic factors play a role, at
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account; in fact, “just” is the very last word of the book: “To
paraphrase Smith, every person thus lives by example, or becomes in some measure teacher and student, and the society
itself grows to be what is properly called just” (269). Closer
attention to the role of justice could strengthen Weinstein’s
position, but it also raises new questions. My aim in this
commentary is not to pass a inal verdict on Smith’s theory
of justice, and whether and how it can be a resource for 21stcentury-liberalism. Rather, let me point out some implications for two of Weinstein’s central themes, namely pluralism
and education.
While I share the view that Smith’s account ofers powerful
resources for thinking about the challenges of contemporary
pluralism, I also agree with Weinstein’s warning that Smith
did not anticipate the kind of cultural diversity we ind in
today’s societies, and that his pluralism was “embryonic”
(24, see also the discussion on 265f.). Smith seems to have
thought that there is a suicient amount of commonality between individuals to derive common standards of justice.7
He thus envisioned pluralism within a shared framework of
just laws, and with a shared sense of justice. It is within this
framework that the experience of pluralism enables individuals to become more rational and to broaden the perspective
of their impartial spectator. his raises questions about those
who are not willing to remain within this framework, and
more speciically those who do not accept the fundamental
equality of the moral rights of all individuals. Should they be
treated as “outcast[s] of human society” (TMS VII.IV.26), as
Smith says about the person with whom no rational communication is possible?8 Or are there ways of integrating them
in the community of sympathy and discourse that Smith
and Weinstein describe? Which role can education play in
this process? Which role does economic inequality play in
it? hese are hard questions that contemporary pluralism
is struggling with, both theoretically and practically. he
Smithian themes and arguments that Weinstein so masterfully discusses might help to think about answers.
Justice also matters for education, in ways that, again,
show how economic questions and questions of social class
can impact on other areas of life. Weinstein makes no attempt to hide the fact that in Smith’s time, education was
strongly inluenced by social class (esp. 103-8, 191-5). To
some degree, this is still—or maybe, again—the case today.
he content of education is one thing; the message sent by
the ways in which education is organized is another. Who
is included, who is excluded, in our schools and universities? Is the equality of opportunity that Western democracies
pride themselves on a substantive or a merely formal one?
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
And, as a consequence, what is the spectrum of perspectives
that children and teenagers are exposed to when they start
developing their own impartial spectator? Which opportunities do they have to meet individuals from other socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds? Weinstein writes that
“for Smith, the wider the pluralism, the more rational an individual can be” (83). But in many cases, this pluralism ends
in societal silos when it comes to education: diferent social
groups remain among themselves, with the better-of eagerly
protecting their privileges. To exaggerate a bit: white middle-class parents certainly want their children to read Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, but they do not necessarily want them to go to
the same schools as Uncle Tom’s descendants, and usually
economic factors loom large behind such phenomena. But
the organization of the education system inluences whose
voices children hear, and whom they learn to sympathize
with, or fail to do so. Understanding other people’s stories,
however, is a “necessary precondition for moral judgment,”
as Weinstein rightly points out (143). here are thus serious
questions about the ways in which commercial societies organize their education system, and to what degree economic
diferences should be allowed to impact on the kinds of social relations their members nurture.
Finally, the question about how markets “educate” individuals is also worth reviving. he question about the relation between character and economic conditions has largely
gone out of fashion, maybe because the cliché-account of
Smith, and mainstream economics, treat preferences structures and rationality as given and unchangeable. It would,
of course, be quite naïve to hope for the civilizing forces of
doux commerce (cf. Hirschman 1977) in the harsh realities
of 21st-century globalized markets. But so much worse for
these markets! If they become places in which unjust behaviour always wins out—as already seems the case in some of
them—this is not only a problem for these markets. It is also
a problem for wider society, for it is likely to have spill-over
efects into other social realms. he nexus is provided by the
fact that acting in markets can have an impact on people’s
character, and maybe also on their rationality. An impartial
spectator cannot endorse markets without a foundation of
just laws. Nor are they likely to have the benevolent efects
on society, and especially on its poorer members, that Smith
hoped for. Rather, they are likely to undermine social cohesion, and the ability of individuals to sympathize with one
another, thus also threatening the form of rationality that
lourishes in pluralist societies. A Smithian liberalism for the
21st century, as Weinstein envisions it, needs to take these
economic dimensions of Smith’s system into account, even if
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NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Although not in the way in which Otteson’s account of
the “marketplace of life” (Otteson 2002) presents it, with
which I, like Weinstein (2013, 50-67), also disagree in
some points.
On unequal rhetorical abilities as a challenge for Smith’s
view of commercial society see also Herzog (2013b).
For a contemporary account see e.g. Fricker (2009).
Weinstein himself writes that “According to Smith,
narratives can be easily corrupted” (133). his holds
true in general, not only with regard to speciic forms
of rhetoric.
As some commentators have argued, Smith’s vision is
also quite close to Rawls’ substantive account of justice,
and more speciically the “diference principle.” For a
discussion see Herzog (2014b).
See also WN III.3.8: “he lords despised the burghers,
whom they considered not only as of a diferent order,
but as a parcel of emancipated slaves, almost of a diferent species from themselves.”
For the record, let me note that Weinstein’s reference
to TMS VI.II.2.7f., and the way in which he presents
Smith’s discussion of groups within society, might imply reading a bit too much into Smith, who could also
be understood as ofering pragmatic advice for political reformers. he passage stands in some tension with
Smith’s rejection of group privileges in WN. For a discussion see Herzog 2013a, 72f.
To be precise, Smith says that a person who is never believed would “feel himself the outcast of human society.”
REFERENCES
Fricker, M. (2009). Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of
Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herzog, L. (2013a). Inventing the Market. Smith, Hegel, and Political
heory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herzog, L. (2013b). he Community of Commerce. Smith’s Rhetoric of
Sympathy in the Opening of the Wealth of Nations. Philosophy and
Rhetoric 46(1), 65-87.
Herzog, L. (2014a). Adam Smith’s account of justice between
naturalness and historicity”. Journal of the History of Philosophy
52(4), 703-726.
Herzog, L. (2014b). Adam Smith on Markets and Justice. Philosophy
Compass, 9(12), 864-875.
Hirschman, A. O. (1977). he Passions and the Interests. Political
Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Otteson, J. R. (2002). Adam Smith and the Marketplace of Life.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the 21st Century. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press.
Rawls, J. (1971). A heory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Smith, A. (1976)[1759]. he heory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by D.
D. Raphael and A. L. Macie. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976. Abbr. heory or TMS, cited by book,
chapter, section and paragraph
Smith, A. (1976) [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations. 2 vols. Edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S.
Skinner; textual editor W. B. Todd. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New
York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Abbr. Wealth or WN, cited by
book, chapter, section and paragraph.
Smith, A. (1978). Lectures on jurisprudence. Edited by R. L. Meek, D.
D. Raphael, P. G. Stein. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978. Abbr. Lectures or LJ, quoted by page number.
LJ(A) refers to the report of 1762-63; LJ(B) to the report dated 1766.
“… BUT ONE OF THE MULTITUDE”. JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND RATIONALITY IN SMITH AND WEINSTEIN
21
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it rightly prioritizes TMS over WN. his can only enrich the
discussions about rationality, pluralism, education, and their
multiple relations.
The Dynamics of Sympathy and the Challenge of Creating New
Commonalities
DIONYSIS G. DROSOS
Professor of Moral Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
University of Ioannina
Greece
Email: drden25@gmail.com
Web: https://sites.google.com/site/dionysisdrosos/
Bio-sketch: Dionysis Drosos is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Ioannina. His notable publications include
the1st critical edition in Greek of Adam Smith’s heory of Moral Sentiments (2011) and he Gentle Commerce of Sympathy:
Civilized Society and Moral Community in the Scottish Enlightenment (forthcoming, also in Greek).
22
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Jack Russell Weinstein’s book is an invaluable source of inspiration. Among its most intriguing insights, I will focus
on three interconnected moments of understanding Adam
Smith. hese are particularly important and central to the
author’s argumentation.
1
2
3
he understanding of Smithian sympathy as a theory of
conscience, continuing and correcting the tradition of
Shatesbury’s perception of soliloquy as a process of selfdivision and internal dialogue.
he understanding of the interplay between the
imagined impartial spectator (see point 1) and the real
spectators, as taking place in moral communities where
individuals preserve their rights.
he extended understanding of rationality as a complex
process underlying and conjoining imagination, moral
sentiments and judgment in the context of moral
communities (see point 2).
THE PRIORITY OF THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS
Crucial for Weinstein’s understanding of Adam Smith is the
prioritization of TMS. he latter is deinitely not to be understood as just a “prelude” for WN, but as a pivotal work
ofering a pattern of theorizing human interaction, socialization, and acculturation. On this basis, the WN cannot provide a market modeled overall pattern for social relations,
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
but it is rather the other way around: economic relations in
Smith’s thought should be considered as a sub-case of the
TMS understanding of social-moral interaction.
As Weinstein argues, Smith’s “theory of rational deliberation is complex and context-dependent, allowing for its usefulness not only in economic circumstances but in the full
range of human experiences, including but not limited to
the moral, political, familial, aesthetic and personal spheres”
(Weinstein, p. 8). Reason is not understood as a device of
“rational choice” limited to the so-called homo economicus,
but following MacIntyre, reason is mainly “a tool of communication” (Weinstein, p. 11).
According to Weinstein:
Smith develops a sophisticated account of otherness
that is able to cultivate social unity despite the presence
of signiicant diferences. his relies upon socialization
and education to maximize the ability of a spectator
to enter into the perspective of an agent” (Weinstein,
p. 16).
But what is more interesting and promising in Weinstein’s
approach is that he is not limited to text study and one more
reading of Smith’s work, but he goes one step further towards
questioning the ways we could proit from Smith’s thought
while addressing our problems of pluralism and education
in our contemporary societies. his approach raises the
question whether our societies’ challenges are identical or
COSMOS + TAXIS
SYMPATHY AND RATIONALITY AND
THE VARIETY OF MOTIVATIONS
Weinstein rightly identiies Smith’s rationality as having its
roots in Shatesbury’s account of soliloquy. Soliloquy, as
an internal dialogue, is a process of dialogical self-division
that anticipates Smith’s impartial spectator. By an ingenious
movement, the platonic search to “know thyself ” is being explored via a modern device—moral sense1 and later
impartial spectator—to address the contemporary question of otherness and pluralism. he intermediary link is
the diversity of motives. Smith (following his predecessors
Shatesbury and Hutcheson) recognizes, against Hobbes
and Mandeville, that there is more than one single motive
to moral action. Smith avoids the trap of explaining eventually nothing by trying to explain everything through self-interest. Even the notion that self-interest is inherently vicious
is being challenged. Along with the self-regarding afections
there are also other regarding and social afections at work
in the moral agent’s soul. he agent is aware of this diversity and competition among sentiments during deliberation.
he model of the divided self ofers an understanding of the
management of competing motivations and of moral adjudication, as a rational process. It is a dialogical rationality,
having nothing to do with rational choice theory (Weinstein,
p. 49).2 his is not an abstract calculating reason, which undergoes such rationality, but sympathy. Sympathy is empirical in nature but “it assumes a certain a priori capacity that
cultivates the social nature of humanity” (ibid.) and as such
it incorporates moral and aesthetic elements. he workings
of sympathy and the impartial spectator is developed in the
TMS, and Weinstein’s answer to the so called Adam Smith
Problem consists in prioritizing the TMS over the other
works of the Scottish philosopher.
Weinstein argues against the notion that for Smith the marketplace is the overarching pattern of social life. Challenging
James Otteson’s thesis, Weinstein opposes his conception of
the diversity of motivations. Human motivation in Smith
is not reduced to self-interest alone. he desire of bettering
our condition, a phrase used in both TMS and WN, is not in
principle incompatible with other motivations such as altruism, if we don’t deine the two terms too narrowly. Smith distinguishes between “self-love” and “selishness,” building on
Mandeville’s distinction between “self-love” and “self-liking.”
One can interpret “bettering our condition” diferently than
meaning acting in one’s strict self-interest. If Smith deines
“that great purpose of human life” as “to be observed, to be
attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation” (TMS I.iii.2.1), then we can see in
this purpose the real betterment of our condition. We really
better our condition by trying to be worthy of sympathy, recognition etc. his is expressed in a moral language in TMS,
and only elaborated in an economic language in the special
case of the WN. Prioritizing “Kirkaldy Smith” over “Chicago
Smith”—using the distinction introduced by Jerry Evensky
(2005)—Weinstein insists that we can reveal Smith’s overall
project, “the search for principles that govern human social
interaction and deliberation” (55). In TMS, Smith lays down
the foundations of this project. Far from misconceiving the
TMS as using the language of altruism, and the WN as using the language of self-interest, Weinstein points out that
there is an interplay of competing motives in the TMS itself.3
Such interplay is managed by the workings of sympathy and
the impartial spectator. And what is more, the author calls
our attention to a distinction not too commonly noticed in
Smith scholarship—the distinction between “passive feelings” and “active principles.” When Smith, in part III. Ch.
III of the TMS, postulates a great disaster in China, and the
proper sentimental reaction to this, he explicitly contrasts
the selishness of our passive feelings to the generosity and
nobleness of our active principles (TMS III. 3-4). his is a
case of juxtaposition between what the agent actually tends
THE DYNAMICS OF SYMPATHY AND THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING NEW COMMONALITIES
23
COSMOS + TAXIS
not to Smith’s. In this respect, I incline to argue that we are
not facing the same problems Smith addressed in his era.
Nevertheless, for all the distance separating our era from
Smith’s, his ideas on conscience may still be of great importance, not just as antiquities, but also as active devices and
powers of understanding our societies. his depends upon
the approach. It would be pointless to search in the writings
of an eighteenth-century thinker for readymade keys to unlock our twenty-irst-century society’s problems. As far as
economics is concerned, it is evident that a post-industrial
stage of hedge funds and speculative inancial bubbles is a
totally diferent economic environment compared to the
manufacture economy of the eighteenth century.
If, however, one chooses to focus on Smith’s moral theory
(considering economics as a special case and not as the central paradigm to apply in all social relations), to engage with
the original texts, interrogating them, asking questions guided by the new interests of an informed reader of our century,
the endeavor pays of. his is the way Weinstein takes by prioritizing TMS and Smith’s theory of conscience in particular.
His reading ofers one of the most deep and well-evidenced
interpretations of Smith’s work. But what is more, he takes
one audacious and conident step beyond this.
to feel, and what the agent understands that he/she should
do to meet the approbation of an imagined impartial spectator. Notably, the title of the chapter in question is “Of the
Inluence and Authority of the Conscience.”
IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR AND “ACTIVE
PRINCIPLES”
24
COSMOS + TAXIS
his stress on “active principles” seems to be very signiicant
for the understanding of what the dialogical rationality consists in. What Smith ofers in his moral theory is not just an
empirical description of passive feelings. What is more important in his theory is the way passive feelings are mitigated, evaluated, and adjudicated in a process of deliberation, in
which conscience4 plays an active part. In Smith’s words: “It
is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast,
the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct”
(TMS III.3.5). If the impartial spectator is not active, how
can he/she be a judge? If there is not a diversity of competing
motivations, then what can the arbiter arbitrate on?
I tend to understand this stressing of the active dimension
of spectatorship as a formidable critique to those readings of
Adam Smith which overemphasize spontaneity.5 Moral rules
are not given a priori, but have to be formed gradually on
the basis of the corrective activity of the impartial spectator’s
adjudications. If we take spontaneity in its strict sense, then
we risk reducing moral rules into a passive conformity guidance. his would mean to succumb to the current common
opinion. his would compromise the project of understanding ethics as a process of moral development. Gilbert Elliot
was the irst to touch this problem. As we can presume (as
Elliot’s original private letter has not survived) from Smith’s
answer (Letter to Gilbert Elliot, October 10, 1759), his old
friend’s objection must have been: “if conscience is a relection of social attitudes, how can it ever difer from, or be superior to, popular opinion?”6 In his answer Smith exposes
(in a note, later incorporated in the 1761 2nd edition of
TMS) his idea of what we call “moral development.” Ater
declaring that man is to be considered a moral being because
he is regarded as an accountable being, Smith provides a
step-by-step account of the ways a moral agent experiences
his/her being accountable to some other, from childhood
to maturity. Being accountable for its action to some other
entails, for a moral being, regulating its behavior according
to the likings of this other. Who is this “other”? his can be
God and its fellow creatures. Leaving God aside for the moment, the irst nearest fellow creatures to a child are his/her
parents. Being accountable to his/her parents means to conVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
form to their instructions and dictations. Next, we are accustomed to rendering our behavior agreeable to every other
person we converse with, to our masters, to our companions.
Soon we learn that it is altogether unattainable to be universally pleasing. hen we begin learning to conceive ourselves
as acting in the presence of an imagined person who is “candid and equitable,” and who has no relation with nor interest in us or those we converse with, who is neither father,
nor brother, nor enemy to us or them. his imagined judge
is set up by our minds; he is the product of our self-division
into an actor and a spectator; he is not an exterior observer
anymore, but he is the “man within.” his is the impartial
spectator. he more mature the moral being, the more it feels
accountable to this “inmate of the breast,” the “abstract man,”
the “representative of mankind and the substitute of God.”7
his moral development renders us less dependent on the
sympathy of the exterior real spectators, and more accountable to our conscience.8
IDEAL AND ACTUAL SPECTATORSHIP
AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT
But by which standards does the impartial spectator judge?
his is a very delicate moment in Smith’s theory. here are
no deinitively laid down, once and for all, universal standards. But this is not the end of the story. Smith alludes time
and again to the principles inscribed by Nature in our hearts.
But what those principles consist of is something that is
manifested to us as moral development unfolds. Smith’s narrative of moral development, as summarized above, seems to
vindicate Weinstein’s hypothesis. It seems that our search for
a more impartial judgment starts with the awareness of the
diversity of interests, motivations and points of view. he development of the internal impartial spectatorship is understood as a reaction to this diversity, fueled by our thirst for
a perfect and never to be fully attained perfection of judgment. In this process partake people with very diferently
and unequally developed consciences. In such a context, the
adjudications of the impartial spectator, internalized by wise
and virtuous persons as inevitable, is at variance or even
at war with what the common opinion concedes to. From
Socrates to Dreyfus, via Calas (a case well known to Smith),
there are innumerable cases in human history where the
opinion of the great majority was very defective in impartiality and equity. In such cases, where “mankind are in the
wrong,” the moral judgment of an impartial spectator meets
the disapprobation and the condemnation of the common
opinion. But the verdict of the “superior court” of our con-
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progress in the perspective of sympathy is something more
humble and not so far-reaching as the idea of a normative
universal principle. It is the new common experience (as
described above) that challenges the existing standards of
normativity. he progress of such standards is a slow, stepby-step one, carried out through the interplay of ideal and
actual spectatorship, and through education and socialization. It is a long and non-linear process of maturation that
respects the “laws of gravity” of the consolidated opinions,
and it is not meant to take big leaps through the circles of
sympathy.
INDIVIDUALITY, MORAL COMMUNITY
AND EDUCATION: CREATING NEW
COMMONALITIES
Such interpretation of moral sentiments allows a fresh view
of our contemporary problems of liberal individuality and
community, of cultural pluralism, and of sympathizing with
otherness. In the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment
tradition, self is understood as a social self. Given our physical separateness, our understanding of the sentiments of others depends upon our imagination. It is through imagination
that we put ourselves in the situation of others. Sympathy
does more than produce imperfect “copies” (sympathetic
sentiments are always imperfect, as our physical separateness
cannot be really overcome). It is not the actual sentiments of
others we sympathize with, but the situation in which they
take place. he more we are acquainted with such situations,
the easier we sympathize with them. How do we become
acquainted with such situations? By sharing the same conditions, values and moral standards. hat is, by being part
of the same commonalities. Even in the simplest and closest relations, these commonalities are based not on blood,
but on common conditions. Individuals form commonalities
through processes of acculturation, socialization and education. Weinstein introduces on the one hand a subtle and
crucial distinction between acculturation and socialization,
and on the other education proper. Acculturation and socialization are educational processes in a broader sense. In
this sense, even the marketplace relations are educational as
well. But education in the strict sense (as it is provided by
distinct institutions), is intentional in character. he more
the proximity of the agents diminishes (in the process of enlarged “circles of sympathy”), the more diicult it becomes to
sympathize with others. he looser the bonds of commonality become, the stronger the imagination is required for the
unfolding of the sympathy process. Imagination is cultivated
THE DYNAMICS OF SYMPATHY AND THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING NEW COMMONALITIES
25
COSMOS + TAXIS
science makes this “appear to be of small moment.” When
one is accustomed to have recourse to this inner judge, one
avoids being a “slave of the world.”
Consulting our “man within” is the only way to “make a
proper comparison between our own interests and those
of other men”.9 Smith explains our correcting false “passive
feelings” via “active principles” by an analogy to the way we
correct the false impressions of things as they appear to the
eye, through our imagination based on the knowledge of
their real magnitudes.10 In Weinstein’s terms, the adjudication of the impartial spectator, by managing and evaluating
a diverse and competing motivation, is analogous to the correction of our vision by what we do not actually see, but can
imagine on the basis of our knowledge on true proportion,
magnitude and dimension.
But more importantly, the perseverance in what our inner
arbiter dictates seems to have, in the long run, a corrective
inluence upon the points of view of others. hat’s why today one doesn’t need to be exceptionally wise or righteous to
realize that in the Calas case there was a miscarriage of justice. Voltaire or Zola failed to convince their contemporaries,
but the opinions of common people did not stay immune in
the long run, although they are always much less perfect in
comparison to those of the more wise and virtuous, and always prompt to new fallacies. his is a slow, unending, and
never satisfactory enough process of moral progress, and the
dynamics of competing adjudications of varying degrees of
impartiality is the explanation provided by Smith, if we read
him this way.
It is not absolutely clear what these ‘active principles’ consist of. Smith does not endorse the stoic normative commitment to overcome the limits of oikeiosis. Any crystallization
of principles of action entails a set of norms that is social
and contextual. We cannot have recourse to any pre-cultural, unsocialized resources of normativity. Nevertheless, all
normative arrangements are sensed to be imperfect as new
knowledge is introduced and new experience built. In modern societies there is a continuous accumulation of knowledge, and enrichment of experience through encounters
with “others” through commerce, social mutations, cultural
intercourse and population movements. “Others” is to be
understood in terms of gender, race, class and cultures. he
notion of the “stranger” has undergone a continuous change.
he more sensible the spectator, the more the pressure to enlarge the perspectives of sympathy is sensed. But this pressure does not low from an explicitly deined substantial
maxim. his would engage us in a vicious circle of discussing
what would be the summum bonum. What really fuels the
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by education. And when the education provided by everyday acculturation is not enough to trigger imagination and
sympathy with unknown conditions, then new knowledge
should be brought in, and intentional education must be of
assistance to cover the gap.
Imagination is of fundamental importance for the workings of sympathy; and sympathy is indispensable for social interaction “which is itself a component of happiness”
(Weinstein, 103). But imagination is an imperfect ground.
Imagination is liable to be strongly inluenced and limited by
culture and custom. Weinstein ofers relevant illustrations in
cases, such as gender, slavery, intimate experience, and class,
where our imagination can be easily misguided by prevalent
prejudices. Even our self-image can be deformed by socially
misguided imagination, and our “impartial spectator” can
be seriously afected in its jurisdictions. he same holds for
aesthetics, where fashion and custom heavily inluence the
impartial spectator. Smith is well aware of this reality (TMS.
V.1.8, V.2.2., V.1.9).
In such cases the importance of education is made crucial.
Education needs to counterbalance acculturation. Education
can provide the corrective mechanism to mitigate the partiality of customary, repetitive usages of imagination. Yet this
is not the only possibility. Pertinently, Weinstein sees in this
a central diiculty in Smith’s system. his diiculty stems
from what seems to me one of the most intriguing characteristics of Smith’s thought, which makes it so compelling even
today. Smith, in Weinstein’s words, “implies a universal ethic
throughout his work, yet he adopts a context-dependent
moral psychology” (101). Moral judgment is being formed
as a compromise between real and ideal evaluations. Moral
community is present in the actual adjudications of the impartial spectator. At the same time, imagination and impartial spectator possibly tend to transcend the limitations of
actual commonalities, by extending sympathy towards what
is not yet sympathizable, anticipating standards and values
not yet meeting the consensus of the moral community. I’ve
tried myself to allude to such a process by depicting the impartial spectator as a personiication of idealized moral community in progress.11 But Weinstein, far more eloquently
and persuasively, proceeds in a detailed leshing out of how
all this works. What I found most attractive and familiar at
the same time is his idea that “the ability to sympathize rests
on either preexisting commonalities or the ability to create
new commonalities by learning the contexts and perspective
of others” (96). Creating new commonalities is in tension
with the inertia of preexisting commonalities. his idea of
dynamics between actual and ideal spectatorship, commuVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
nal and individual perspectives, may prove very helpful for a
modern understanding of Adam Smith’s thought, overcoming the dilemma individualism vs. communitarianism.12
In such a dynamic and uncertain compromise, education’s
importance is both crucial and equivocal. Education has the
potential to unify, and the potential to divide (101). he outcome of this tension could not be securely anticipated. Smith
surely prevents us from the drawbacks of relying too much
on what he calls “love of system,” that is, the perseverance in
consciously shaping society following a preconceived plan.
Such “love of system” should be balanced by “public spiritedness,” that is by awareness of circumstances, and readiness to realize in what a good compromise exists, having in
mind the achievable public good in a historical context. Both
forces in this balance rely on imagination, and imagination,
as we have seen, is being built upon knowledge and education. Regardless of the issue of how optimistic Smith can be
about the long-run outcome of unintended consequences,
what is—or so it seems to me—highly relevant for a twentyirst-century reader, is the clairvoyance of Smith to realize
the limits of his own “system.” His allusions on the urgently
needed corrective role education had to undertake (WN V
i.f.50), prove that Smith wisely avoided falling in love with
his own “system.”
Education proper is intentional and endowed with dual
possibilities, as stated above, and this opens a ield for competing educational policies. he absence of educational
policy would have the undesired efect of harming the intellectual and moral capacities of the bulk of mankind,
abandoned unaided in the stupefying conditions of a dull
and unimaginative work. A conservative policy bolstering
preexisting commonalities risks solidifying exclusions and
prejudices. A policy of developing and encouraging knowledge of, and acquaintance with, less familiar circumstances,
a policy of enhancing the sympathizing potential of people,
would tend to enlarge commonalities and create new ones.
In this respect, education has an important part to play.
“Education must be geared toward encouraging a diversity
of shared experiences that allow for communality between
those whose own experiences seem farther from those of
others” (Weinstein, p.106). Such policies are compatible
with, and furthermore indispensable, for the adequate deployment of Smith’s project. hose who are interested in promoting educational policies which aim at the opening of the
agents’ knowledge and understanding of otherness, can ind
substantial supportive Smithian resources. Weinstein’s eyeopening approach seems to allow us to throw some more
light on this perspective. Smith’s vision of civilized society
COSMOS + TAXIS
ILLIBERAL AND OPEN COMMUNITIES
Proiting from Smith’s subtle and balanced understanding of
the tension between universal (although vague and imperfectly deined) principle aspirations and contextual pragmatism, we are encouraged to give less trust to market-oriented
automatisms, and pay some more attention to the ways we
dispose of, or must invent, for developing sympathizing capacities.13
We can illustrate the urgent need for this by venturing a
counter paradigm. How can we understand sectarianism,
consolidating exclusive, closed communitarianism and fanaticism, using Smithian instruments? We can treat such
cases as examples of non-liberal exclusive communities.
he cohesion of such communities rests on some kind of
sympathy among their attending members with enmity towards other communities. Such enmity is foundational for
the workings of sympathy in the interior of those communities. What would the quality of such a sympathy look like? It
must be considered as a conditional sympathy: we sympathize with the other members of the group on the condition
that they are members of the group, i.e. they do not depart
from the values determining group identity. Collective identity prevails over individual rights and perspectives. his is
reminiscent of premodern societies, where it was easier “for
a spectator to sympathize with any agent since he or she will
always be familiar with the situation of those whom he she
encounters” (Weinstein, p.105). In such cases imagination
has a far more restricted part to play, and narrative rationality is seriously refrained from developing. Such communities can be charged with irrationality, but not in the sense
of formal rationality deiciency. For Smith, as understood
by Weinstein, rationality is “audience focused” and narrative in character. he narrative informing the spectator view
in a non-liberal community is focused on restricted and
homogenous audience. his means that the interior spectator is a prisoner of a cyclical narrative. Moral conscience
is prompted to comply with the judgments of the exterior
spectators, conformable to the standards of collective identity, and insofar that it does, the agent feels more self-assured
as a group member. And this is attended with an agreeable
feeling, consolidating self-approval. In such a context, any
judgment that departs from the judgments of the exterior
spectators (exterior to the individual agent but interior to the
group) is disapproved, and endangers the very community
membership of the individual.14 Such communities are built
on the exclusion of any extension of commonality beyond
their borders. But this is tantamount to thwarting imagination and frustrating sympathy.15 he sympathetic feelings
consolidating the group are mutilated in their potential and
partial by deinition. his is quite the contrary to what Smith
aspires to. Such an attitude would be “natural” in premodern societies, but in societies where the spectator faces differences and gaps in experience, beliefs and customs, it is an
outright denial to sympathize with otherness, perpetuating
prejudices and intolerance. he danger is the enclosure into
a restricted circle of actor-spectator interaction, addressing
a particular sectarian audience providing recognition and
approbation, and motivating unsocial and even evil acting.16
Such a kind of conformism freezes imagination and detains
sympathy. Conformism prompts individual agents to understand themselves not as persons, but as community members, and consequently to treat others not as persons but as
members of other communities.
We could perhaps establish a parallel between this stagnation of sympathy and the efects of dull repetitive movements
of hand workers, as depicted by Smith in his “alienation
passage.” Just as in the case of the workers, the members of
exclusive communities face a closed horizon in their socialization, determined by the unchanged repetition of the same
sentimental experiences, leading to an analogous mental
stiltedness (torpor), blocking imagination, inhibiting their
mental and moral capacities, and perpetuating ignorance
and fear of otherness.
When enclosed in a uniform community, facing an undiversiied audience, we are deprived of incentives to see ourselves in a critical light. As we conform to what the others
(the others of the same community) are expecting from us to
do and to be, we experience no discordance between our real
and our ideal image of ourselves. In this context, inner moral
deliberation is paralyzed. his is a case of self-deception; we
are assured we are doing the right thing. Our “present” impartial spectator prevails over our “past” impartial spectator
THE DYNAMICS OF SYMPATHY AND THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING NEW COMMONALITIES
27
COSMOS + TAXIS
relies heavily on the development of the sympathizing capacities of the individual moral agents. Such development
entails inding interest in the knowledge of others. By “others” we are to understand, in our era of globalization and
multiculturalism, other cultures, attitudes, customs, faiths,
other ways of giving meaning to life, and other not yet open
communities. How can we create new commonalities encompassing those new forms of otherness without compromising individual liberty and independence? We cannot ind
in Smith any readymade recipe. But we can ind some useful
theorizing instruments and attitudes, as Weinstein carefully
shows.
28
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(the spectator of our cool hours). In common cases of selfdeception, the moral voice challenging our actions comes
from outside; it is the external spectators who derange our
easy conscience and invite us to realize our self-deception.17
But in our case, where there is no discordance between our
actions and the standards of the community, this corrective
process does not work. In this case, the challenge could come
only from outsiders; from voices coming from spectators not
belonging to the community. he outcome is not predictable; it may be an open conlict or a moral crisis afecting the
cohesion of the community; in any case the external voices
cannot be internalized and inform the impartial spectator,
before a new normativity has been established.
Nevertheless, there is an issue on which I tend to be more
skeptical than Weinstein. To tell the truth, it is an issue concerning Adam Smith himself and not Weinstein’s reading. In
Smith’s project sympathy has a twofold function. First, sympathy plays the part of imaginatively putting oneself in the
place of another person, and so inferring his/her motives and
entering their feelings and thoughts. his is what nowadays
psychologists call empathy. Secondly, through sympathy we
grasp the way our own motives, feelings, emotions, thoughts
are received and estimated by others. In this case we anticipate other persons’ not real, but potential and probable, reactions. How can we soundly expect that such reaction are
probable? We can rationally predict others’ reactions on the
basis of two premises: a) the hypothesis of the homogeneity
of human nature; and b) the sharing of the same set of values
and standards in the commonality we share. By anticipating
others’ sympathetic sentiments, we tend to respond by mitigating our unsocial, too much self-focused attitudes, and we
eventually come up with a non-preconceived, non-imposed
conformity to the rules and manners the moral community
consents to. his is what is supposed to take place in a civilized society. But what happens when such a civilization process is disrupted? his is not a speculative hypothesis. he
twentieth-century’s bitter experience has severely damaged
both our ethical optimistic progressivism and our self-congratulating image of human nature. We are at least obliged
not to leave unquestionable our received ideas, inherited
from the eighteenth-century’s innocence and optimism.
More precisely, the workings of sympathy seem to change
dramatically as the prerequisites of a civilized society are
challenged. What is such a thing as a civilized society?
Trying to reconstruct this crucial Smithian concept we can
enumerate four indispensable traits: a) a society of independent commerçants, bonded together through exchange, in a
context of a social division of labor and under the rule of
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
law; b) the inequalities must be big enough to incite emulation and ambition, but not so great as to cause unsocial sentiments such as envy and resentment; c) a moral community
of peers, persons of equal moral value, interdependent upon
each other’s free recognition, without being subjected to a hierarchical moral order of personal dependency; and d) each
member should have access to minimal wealth and education, enough to enable them to enter each others’ feelings, so
that the above mentioned sympathy procedure building the
social bonds works properly.
Now let us imagine a case of society afected by a serious
disruption (a natural disaster, a massive migration, a devastating war, an invasion, an economic crisis or a “shock therapy” policy). In such a case, all the three irst prerequisites
of a civilized society would be subverted, and consequently
the fourth one would be seriously jeopardized. In such circumstances we have the phenomenon Simon Baron-Cohen
calls “empathy erosion.”18 Individuals tormented by hunger
and terrorized by anxiety, violent oppression, and the fear
of imminent death, become too focused on themselves only.
Sympathy dysfunctions in both its operations: a) to sympathize with others becomes a hard and rare accomplishment;
and b) the interest in how we appear to our peers, and how
our image is appreciated by them, is replaced by our concern
just to survive. his means that to develop sympathetic sentiments ceases to be the vehicle of social conformity through
alleviation of selishness, and now tantamount rather with
an act of resistance against the distorted conformity and
“normality” of the new established order. Under such “abnormal normality” conformity is gained against individual
independence, and via a vicious circle of empathic mimicry which replaces the virtuous circle of empathic mimicry
through sympathy, as understood in Smith’s idea of normality. In other words, “civilized,” “commercial” moral sentiments could not work anymore as social bonds, and even
elementary sympathy could not stay alive, unless strongly
supported by what Smith calls the “great, the respectable,
the awful virtues,” the virtues of self-denial and self-sacriice.
But the emergence of such virtues brings out discord and
conlict. Sympathy and solidarity pave their way against the
established moral order, preiguring the establishment of an
alternative one. As we move away from Smith’s ideal civilized
world, the set of moderate virtues proposed by him seems
to lack the auto-corrective mechanisms which would get
us back to the desired point of equilibrium. In such a case,
civilized arrangements and concurring sentiments are out
of work, and they could not be restored without the civic
vigilance and the martial spirit, on the importance of which
COSMOS + TAXIS
NOTES
1
Moral sense for Shatesbury does not have the meaning of a sixth sense (Uehlein, 1976, pp. 248-249.) he
notion of sense is related to reason [the Hegemonikon]
(Regimen, Rand I, p. 175). Moral sense is not to be understood as an immediate instinctive reaction, but as
a product of rational cultivation of natural sensibility
(Larthomas, 1985, p. 384). his process is inseparable
from the life of the community. Gadamer stressed the
relevance of the notion of Bildung for understanding
Shatesbury’s conception of socially cultivated moral
sense (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 10-27). What Shatesbury
calls “heart” is not a passive feeling but reason in action,
a sensorium actif as Larthomas calls it (Larthomas, 1985,
p. 383). And this is not just an inner form, but through
informing sensus communis, it becomes the “intersubjective sense of the unity of human genre” (Larthomas,
1985, p. 384). his relective, active and social character of moral sense by Shatesbury seems to have escaped the attention of his Scottish followers, according
to Ernst Cassirer (1979, p. 315). Weinstein helps us see
how more attentive Smith has been. Against this background, we can appreciate the criticism of Smith against
Shatesbury, pointing to the failures of the latter to accomplish such a project, by distorting communication
with his linguistic choices, and thus impairing the sym-
pathetic process and weakening the capacity to make
moral judgments.
2 Shatesbury, challenging the mechanical understanding of rationality (Regimen, Rand I, pp. 114, 139), juxtaposes the notion of the living subject. (Βλ. Uehlein,
1976, p. 136- fn. 4). In this perspective, the idea of the
good cannot ind a form irrespective of the inner form
of conscience. he same holds for the idea of God.
(Larthomas, 1985, p. 183).
3 he case of the economic implications of prudence in
WN is very telling. Smith juxtaposes two motivations:
the passion for present enjoyment, and the principle
which prompts us to save (WN I.viii.44). his discussion
is carried out in a non-moral language. his is evidence
of interplay and judgment between diverse motivations,
notably between two diferent aspects of self-interest.
he moral value of each is discussed in TMS (VII.
ii.3.16). As Weinstein dexterously remarks, “TMS tells
us that attending to one’s own economic self-interest is
an act of propriety, and WN tells us how we are supposed to do it. TMS alludes to the economic discussion
but never completes it; WN assumes moral discussion
but doesn’t quite acknowledge it” (p. 58).
4 he impartial spectator, acting as an “anthopomorphization of duty” (p. 75).
5 Weinstein, relying on Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric
(i.144), invites us to understand “moral observation” as
incorporating much more than feelings and reactions,
signifying “the complete package of observation, relections, deliberations, and conclusions” (p. 136).
6 As formulated by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macie, editors of the TMS, he Glasgow Edition of the Works and
Correspondence of Adam Smith, p. 16.
7 Adam Smith, “Letter to Gilbert Elliot,” op.cit., p. 55.
8 Smith does not go so far, of course, but we might perhaps conjecture that his analysis leaves open the possibility to extend this moral development to the point
where we can conceive even the deity as a higher internal, and no more as an external superintendent of our
sentiments and actions.
9 Adam Smith, “Letter to Gilbert Elliot,” op.cit., p. 55.
10 Adam Smith, “Letter to Gilbert Elliot,” op.cit., p. 56.
11 Drosos (2014), passim.
12 “TMS has strong communitarian elements where ‘communitarian’ is understood as acknowledging some
priority of the community or society, and ‘liberal’ is understood as commitment of the priority of the individual and his or her identity” (Weinstein, pp. 68-69).
THE DYNAMICS OF SYMPATHY AND THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING NEW COMMONALITIES
29
COSMOS + TAXIS
Adam Ferguson so much insists, in his variant of the Scottish
Enlightenment. When the empathic ability is eroded, no invisible-hand remedy seems plausible. he author might consider casting more light on this direction.
If I am not misled, Weinstein’s book brings out, among
other things, the very crucial issue of understanding the
interplay of individual and communal moral judgments
and standards, and their formation in Adam Smith’s theory
of conscience.19 If the impartial spectator is understood as
a theory of conscience that negotiates personal and community judgment (Weinstein, p.169), this understanding
is very helpful for modern theory, helping to overcome an
overly rigid distinction between liberal individualism on
the one hand and communitarianism on the other. And this
provides a pertinent criterion to distinguish between premodern and modern conceptions of moral community. We
are looking forward to seeing the next step in the deployment of Weinstein’s ambitious project as announced in the
Introduction of this fascinating book.
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13 As Weinstein put it: “he ‘self-correcting’ aspects of
the market (...) function only if actors are self-consciously correcting” (p. 226, emphasis in the original).
he term “spontanéité réléchie,” coined by Larthomas,
(Larthomas, 1985, p. 349) for Shatesbury’s “lovely system” seems even more appropriate for Smith.
14 his is another way to address the problem that Kant
understood as “moral heteronomy.”
15 “he barrier to sympathy in both scientiic and moral
contexts is the lack of commonality between the individuals who are engaged in the acts of either sympathizing
or being sympathized with” (Weinstein, p. 169, emphasis added).
16 his eclipse of sympathy lies at the core of the phenomenon Hanna Arendt describes as the “banality of evil.”
17 Fleischacker explains this perfectly (Fleischacker, 2011).
18 Simon Baron-Cohen, 2011, passim.
19 As Weinstein comprehensively deines it, “the impartial spectator is the aggregate of a person’s experience
balanced with what he or she knows of the moderating power of community (... ); it is an anthropomorphization of the rational process and incorporates the
sentimental foundation into the reasoned analysis”
(Weinstein, p. 72).
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
REFERENCES
Ashley Cooper, A. (3rd Earl of Shatesbury) (1992). he Life,
Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of
Shatesbury, ed. R. Benjamin. London: Routledge, hoemmes Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2011). he Science of Evil. On Empathy and the
Origins of Cruelty. Philadelphia: Basic Books.
Cassirer, E. (1979). he Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Droso, D. (2013). Impartial Spectatorship and Moral Community
in Adam Smith’s Vision of the Enlightenment. he Adam Smith
Review, vol. 7 – Symposium: Adam Smith in Greece. Guest editor:
D. Drosos.
Evensky, J. (2005). Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Fleischacker, S. (2011). True to Ourselves? Adam Smith on Self-Deceit.
he Adam Smith Review, vol. 6, 75-92.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). Truth and Method. London: Sheed and Ward.
Larthomas, J. P. (1985). De Shatesbury à Kant. Paris: Atelier National
de Reproduction des theses. Université de Lilles III. Difusion
Didier érudition.
Otteson, J. (2002). Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Smith, A. (1982). he heory of Moral Sentiments. he Glasgow Edition
of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith I. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund.
Smith, A. (1987). Correspondence of Adam Smith. he Glasgow Edition
of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith VI. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund.
Smith, A. (1981). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations. he Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence
of Adam Smith II. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Smith, A. (1985). Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Letters. he Glasgow
Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith II.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Uehlein, F. A. (1976). Kosmos und Subjektivität. Lord Shatesburys
Philosophical Regimen. München: Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg.
COSMOS + TAXIS
The “Spectator” and the Impartial Spectator in Adam Smith’s
Pluralism
SPIROS TEGOS
Department of Philosophy & Social Studies
University of Crete
Campus of Rethymnon
74100 Rethymno
Greece
Email: spyridon.tegos@gmail.com
Web: http://ww2.fks.uoc.gr/english/cvs/TegosCV.htm
Bio-Sketch: Spiros Tegos is Lecturer of Early Modern Philosophy at he University of Crete. He is preparing a book on the political relevance of Adam Smith’s doctrine of manners and its reception by French moderate republicans 1750-1830.
the partial exception of education that has been studied but
not to the extent discussed in this book, Weinstein ofers a
synthetic view of controversial issues within Smith scholarship resting on the simultaneous analysis of reason and sentiments, thus casting new light on liberal sentimentalism of
a Smithian stripe. His methodological baseline consists in
robustly contextualizing each theme before explicitly sketching the genealogy of major philosophical issues in question.
Within this extremely rich text, I pause on the somehow standard Smithian theme of the impartial spectator, but which looks quite diferent once viewed through
Weinstein’s theoretical lens. My approach will be threefold:
irst I examine the narrative nature of the impartial spectator, then following Weinstein’s line I scrutinize Smith’s debt
to Mandeville regarding styles of moral discourse. However,
I shall move beyond Mandeville, and, illing a gap I detect
in Weinstein’s analysis, I develop Smith’s original complex account of character building in the heory of Moral
Sentiments (TMS IV); inally, I briely elaborate on a seemingly odd outgrowth of a psychoanalytic interpretation of
authority in Smith, completing the portrait of the impartial
spectator regarding auctoritas.
1. THE STYLE OF MORAL PROSE AND
THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR
Regarding the moving of rhetoric to center-stage within
Smith’s philosophy and the replacement of logic by rhetoric and informal logic, the core of Weinstein’s relections
THE “SPECTATOR” AND THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR IN ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM
31
COSMOS + TAXIS
Amidst the recent lourishing of Adam Smith scholarship,
Jack Russell Weinstein’s book stands apart for more than one
reason. he main ground of originality lies in his relentless
efort to reclaim vital Smithian concepts in order to rethink
controversial contemporary issues in moral philosophy and
public discourse. In the forefront of such eforts, this book
ills in an important gap in recent scholarship regarding
Adam Smith’s place within the liberal tradition. he prominence of pluralism as a landmark of any liberal society makes
the relative lack of consistent study regarding this issue within Adam Smith’s philosophy even more blatant. Weinstein’s
book inally brings this issue to center-stage. Yet it cuts even
deeper. He explicitly strikes a balance between a novel contextual interpretation of Adam Smith within 18th-century
philosophy and the history of ideas and contemporary currents of thought apparently very distant from the liberal
tradition—no matter how we may deine the latter. He thus
goes far beyond standard narratives about unexpected ailiations or potential anticipations of Smith’s crucial concepts.
On the one hand he thoroughly explores Smith’s place in the
genealogy of rationality in order to make clear not only the
priority of rhetoric over formal logic but also Smith’s argumentation theory as a “psychological account of inference”
within which understanding always requires a “narrative
structure.” Indeed these are not commonplaces within Adam
Smith studies. By the same token Weinstein does not refrain
from the daring task of engaging Smith in the apparently
alien tradition of French “postmodernism,” unveiling possible linkages with Foucault’s archaeological project. With
lies in chapters ive and six, “Finding rationality in reason”
and “Reason and the sentiments.” his evidently moves he
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (LRBL) to the forefront while preserving a priority of the TMS over the other
works throughout the book. Ater having sketched the genealogy of the multiple forms of “rationality in reason” from
Hobbes to Shatesbury via Locke (ch. 5), Weinstein focuses
on the intertwining between reason and emotions, a sometime neglected feature of classic sentimentalism. he latter
is oten conlated with a mere negation or downgrading of
reason, oten following the Humean dictum “reason is a
slave to the passions.” Yet reality is more complex and the
“rhetoric as reasoning” seems to be a crucial component of
Smith’s system, important to understanding both his moral
theory and his economics. hus Weinstein reclaims Adam
Smith’s rhetoric as a “theory of communication” exceeding
and completing the conventional understanding of rhetoric
as an argumentation theory. He then gives a strikingly original account of Smith’s notion of the rhetorical nature of human reason:
32
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First, logic and rhetoric are intertwined; as descriptions of inference and argument analyses and construction, they are necessary elements in mapping
human thought. Second, given the centrality of language in Smith’s system, and given the importance of
spectator-based sympathy, an individual’s role as audience member and as moral actor is an essential part of
what it means to be a human being. herefore, rhetoric becomes a capacity for Smith in the same way that
reason does, or, rather, the faculty of reason is a compound faculty containing both the natural rhetorical
perspective and natural reason. he faculty of reason is
the foundation of narrative rationality because the faculty of reason is itself rhetorical (pp. 135-6).
he importance of narrative structure appears to be Smith’s
remedy in order to secure a multi-linear “script,” the “multiple motivations that inspire a complex character” against
Hobbesian determinism relying on a single motivational
center of human behavior. his partly recalls McIntyre’s understanding of “tradition-bound rationality,” the fact that a
reasoning tradition “infuses what individuals understand as
reason itself ” (p. 113) jointly with a telos to human activities.
Overall, “rationality demands a narrative” (p. 166), or “a plot
to the metanarrative,” a bold statement yet necessary to make
sense of the complex argumentation theory that Weinstein
suggests Adam Smith puts in place. In this context, logical
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
and nonlogical elements are intertwined. he invisible hand
pattern is a component of a broader system transforming the
function of rhetoric and logic within sentimental morality in
the sense of a complex theory of a narrative of progress with
moments of optimism and pessimism, visions of prosperity
and fears of backwardness.
By the same token, one has to bear in mind though that
this argumentation theory is oriented towards intersubjectivity, moral conscience involves a gradual immersion in the
social tissue of argument procedures: “For Smith, argumentation is tied to growth in social awareness. To mature is to
absorb and modify social constructed identity and argument
procedures (p. 162).” hus the key concept of sympathy can
only be understood against a background of a “wide theory
of argumentation” involving rational deliberation, emotions,
relection and normative criteria (p. 165). he “communicative aspect of sympathy” and the “working of the imagination” are both central themes in the TMS and the LRBL.
herefore Weinstein draws the conclusion that “…he purpose of rhetoric is, in part, the cultivation of sympathy. he
proper function of the imagination is based in part on how
we make information available to ourselves and others (p.
145).” Evoking this cluster of concepts, Weinstein reclaims
the somehow neglected “rhetorical” status of rationality and
its vital role alongside education (in the twofold sense of education and socialization/acculturation), for a sympathetic
pluralism within the Enlightenment.
Within this original frame of reference, I shall focus on the
igure of the impartial spectator. Following his abovementioned line of thought, Weinstein revisits in his turn Smith’s
most widely known concept, giving his own twist on the interpretation of this controversial idea in Smith scholarship.
Fonna Forman (2010) in her insightful study ofers a useful
summary of the positions adopted in scholarship regarding
the nature of conventionalism attributed to the impartial
spectator. She categorizes them in three classes: those who
considered the impartial spectator as an internalized convention, “a mere relection of prevalent social norms” (Berry,
2003), those who place themselves on the other extreme of
the spectrum postulating a robust independence of moral
conscience, and inally scholars that endorse a more moderate stance, midway between the two extremes. Weinstein
sketches a brief genealogy of the origins of the impartial
spectator. Accordingly he locates Smith’s pluralism—eloquently deined in the title of chapter 2, One system, many
motivations—in the transformation of Hutcheson’s and particularly Shatesbury’s conception of personal deliberation
and aesthetics within moral deliberation. As he states suc-
COSMOS + TAXIS
2. SOCIAL SATIRE AND MORAL PORTRAITS
Weinstein’s interpretation of Mandeville’s role in Smith is
extremely ine-tuned. However, I claim that in emphasizing
the role of dialogical elements, especially Shatesbury’s soliloquy, Weinstein downplays a crucial aspect of Mandeville’s
inluence on the formation of the concept of impartial spectator, while he touches upon an equally crucial feature of
Mandeville’s inluence regarding the role of satire in the formation of the impartial spectator.
Steele castigates the separation of style and manners from
reason, virtue and religion—“the most polite Age is in danger of being the most vicious” (1711)—while he is endorsing the thesis of manners and politeness as being a modern
phenomenon that marks a progress of civil society in the age
of civility. It can be plausibly claimed that Mandeville does
not conform to the basic requirements of polite satire as he
sheds light on the trivial, “minute” aspect, or the dark side of
the allegedly venerable moral, literary or socio-political authorities.1 His style consists in lampooning, instead of gently
accommodating, the old aristocracy, while cynically manag-
ing, instead of castigating, the nouveau riche, and, broadly,
new forms of commercial wealth. In his work, including the
understudied Female Tatler, Mandeville aims to rescue politeness from the polite moralists, and familiarize the public with the artiicial yet necessary function of manners as a
social lubricant. Adam Smith seriously confronts this challenge to moral philosophy, and grapples with Mandeville’s
corrosive view in a number of ways. It is the second hypothesis of this paper that Smith appropriates, though with qualiications, Mandeville’s satire of modern moralizing while
rehabilitating the importance of anxiety in commercial society that Mandeville lightheartedly downplays. herefore he
amends Mandeville’s satire with his own satiric-ironic style
in dealing simultaneously with the ridiculous and dramatic
aspects of modern urban life. In order to achieve this goal,
he sketches characters, a gallery of virtuous, vicious but most
importantly ambiguous character portraits: the “coxcomb,”
the vain, the ambitious “poor man’s son”—probably the irst
sketch of the American dream—but also the enigmatic “lover of systems.” herefore he endorses the role of the moral
portraitist in order to capture modern life’s tragi-comic
complexity and contradictions while cultivating the reader’s
skills to seize moral ambivalence.
To what extent is the genre of ridicule tolerated in a polite age? How is it linked to moral life? Following Addison,
Steele endorses the thesis of manners and politeness as being
a modern phenomenon that marks a progress of civil society
in the age of civility. Smith did not follow Hume in his conception of politeness as artiicial virtues, and thus his stance
on manners and politeness is more ambiguous. He also disapproves of Shatesbury, as well as of Addison and Steele, in
their praise of “true politeness.”
Smith built up a satire on the character of the nouveau
riche, a case of a ruinous attitude of living following material standards beyond one’s means and, concomitantly, the
illusion that his obsessive imitation of aristocratic manners,
“the frivolous accomplishments of ordinary behavior,” is
the subject of as much sympathetic attention as is received
by true elites.2 Imitation of courtly politeness fosters moral
corruption (as the title of the chapter added to the ultimate
edition of TMS notably indicates).3 hus it replicates aristocratic shallowness within the circle of moderate virtues.
Most importantly it corrupts the moral sentiments of middling ranks as they conlate moderate virtues with immoderate aristocratic manners, and modesty with the launting of
wealth, both legitimate if properly constrained within clear
social borders. his constitutes a plea for social stability
(TMS VI.ii.1.20).
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33
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cinctly at some point “the impartial spectator—Smith’s version of the soliloquy (p. 59),” the “dialogical element found
in the Female Tatler and other philosophers” (p. 40) leads to
Smith’s rationality, and consequently to his conception of the
impartial spectator. So far so good.
As shrewdly noticed by Weinstein, Smith is very much
interested in the form and style of moral conversation and
deliberation. In fact, Smith did not only lecture on rhetoric but on rhetoric and belles lettres, deining his research
project as an inquiry into “the principles of those literary
compositions which contribute to persuasion or entertainment.” Communication and persuasion through language
seems to be the main concern for Smith, but Weinstein perceptively remarks that “Persuasion is, in some sense, beautiful for Smith (p. 136). Taking his cues from Shatesbury’s
style, Smith claims in LRBL, according to Weinstein, that
“…character afects logical consequence. Smith can challenge inferential connections because he is making both a
psychological point and an empirical one. he psychological
point is that since the individual makes inferences justiied
by their own impartial spectator, the nature of their spectators determine the viability of the inferences….In contrast,
Smith’s empirical point is that spectators make moral determinations on the basis of observations, and inaccurate or
distorted information about an actor or his or her context
necessarily leads to inaccurate moral judgments” (p. 139).
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Before rushing to dismiss this portrait of the nouveau riche
as a second-order moral subject, I claim that this is a major
issue for the functioning of the impartial spectator. In reality, this ridiculous imitation of aristocratic manners relies on
the moral autism of the “coxcomb,” the term to denote the
nouveau riche individual (TMS I.iii.3). he nouveau riche is
blind to other spectators’ gaze because he is so vain that he
cannot realize how ridiculous his social image remains. As a
result, this character puts the function of the impartial spectator in serious trouble because he is deaf to social stigma
even in the most conventional sense of the term. It seems
therefore highly unlikely for him to transgress conventional
morality. At the same time, Smith is moving beyond standard opponents such as moral fanatics and other sociopaths.
his seemingly innocuous igure of the nouveau riche proves
extremely helpful to identify hypocrisy, the standard target
of moral theory. Moving beyond classic theology or even
moderate approaches within the Church of Scotland, Smith
develops an original analysis of the nature of hypocrisy in
commercial society. Clearly rejecting any form of casuistic
or essentially repressive attitude as ineicient, he is spotting
a consensually dismissive class of people: nouveaux riches,
people that show of their wealth and status. he type of character that pretends to be socially superior compared to real
social identity is more than obvious to any “bystander.” his
was an apparently very common phenomenon in Scotland
of his time. But then how to awake this deeply problematic
character and make him aware of his deeply “sociopathic”
self-destructiveness? Moral autism prevents the comparison
with what is normally achieved in society and consequently
any possibility of self-judgment against an ideal standard
that transgresses conventional morality. he style of moral
discourse is crucial in order for moral discourse to be audible. he spectators should ind the situation appealing in order to mobilize their sympathetic imagination, “interesting
enough in order for people to attend to them.” “Impartiality
is a process of comparing standards…the virtue of impartial
spectator is itself the result of continual perspective change”
(p. 142). In this sense, the above-mentioned role of moral
imagination is crucial: “Rhetoric either cultivates or hinders
the imagination and thus allows for the creation and regulation of the impartial spectator” (p. 145). Weinstein consistently pauses on Smith’s critique of Shatesbury’s style in the
LRBL:
For Smith this style of writing leads to problems because the lorid prose inaccurately communicates
Shatesbury’s character, when communication is disVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
torted, either intentionally or not…it interferes with
the capacity to sympathize. his impairs the sympathetic process and weakens the capacity to make moral
judgments (pp. 138-39).
herefore sympathy and the impartial spectator are much
depending on the medium of prose and style of moral discourse, in order to appropriately and eiciently address the
audience.
hus moral prose is a genre that needs stylistic elaboration. In this context I think that Smith develops the tragic
but also, predominantly, the ridiculous aspect of actual social characters and the appropriate style of communicating
a clear image of them to the public. Smith assumes in the
LRBL that the problem of sympathy is a problem of clarity
(LRBL i.v.57); Weinstein emphatically pauses on the “communication of ethical cases and judgments. Under Smith’s
system good writing is both descriptive and prescriptive”
(p. 143). In a more anthropological vein, Smith asserts elsewhere that “Men always endeavor to persuade others…everyone is practicing oratory on others thro the whole of his
life” Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ A.vi.56). his is one of the
building blocks of commercial psychology read through the
lens of traditional rhetoric. TMS paired with LRBL follow
a diferent path. he style of moral prose puts in relief the
tragic and ridiculous dimensions of social behavior, sending
a wave of shock to both the autistic actor and spectator of
moral actions. hose genres are the ultimate refuge of moral
discourse in order to become efective.
Smith detects tragic traces in commercial vanity. He underlines the aspect of anxiety that pervades the vain man’s
life and most particularly the nouveau riche. here is a dark
side of sympathy (Dickie, 2011) the insecurity towards the
possibility of negative sympathy or antipathy from the real
or hypothetical spectator of one’s conduct.4 Most importantly, Smith focuses on the insecurity inherent in commercial
vanity. Finally the vain counterfeiter of status is tormented
by fear of disrespect. he “empty coxcomb…solicits with the
most anxious importunity all external marks of respect…
of being taken notice of in public places with the appearance of deference and attention.” He is “anxious to obtain
new expressions of esteem, and cannot be kept in temper
but by continual attention and adulation” (TMS, VII.ii.4.89). Becoming the “proper object of honour and esteem,” being immune to public acclamation and respect, conduce to
tranquility and fall within the jurisdiction of the impartial
spectator. On balance, hypocrisy carries along manifold tor-
COSMOS + TAXIS
both together form a System of morality from whence
more sound and just rules of life for all various characters of men may be drawn than form most set systems
of Morality (1.125).
In cases where “real foibles and blemishes” of a character are castigated instead of accidental ones, to satirize “is
altogether consistent with the character of a Gentleman as
it tends to the reformation of manners and the beneit of
mankind” (1.88), through the eicient medium of laughter
and sarcasm constrained within borders of propriety. As
Weinstein succinctly argues: “For Smith then, pathos does a
good portion of the work that in classical rhetoric is more
typically assigned to logos” (ibid).
he reference to Swit is crucial6: Smith sketches a lattering portrait of Swit who targets at least partly the same laws
in his contemporary society that Smith does, the vulgarity
of the upstarts (ibid). Swit “ridicules some of the prevailing follies of his Time... chiely levelled against Coxcombs,
Beaus, Belles and other characters where gay follies than the
graver ones prevail” (I.119). Indeed, in chapter 4 of part VII
of the TMS, on the “licentious system” of Mandeville, depicted as a case apart “of the diferent accounts which have been
given of the nature of virtue,” the igure of the vain coxcomb
looms large:
...who sets his character upon the frivolous ornaments
of dress and equipage, or upon the equally frivolous
accomplishments of ordinary behaviour. He is guilty of
vanity who desires praise for what indeed very well deserves it, but what he perfectly knows does not belong
to him. he empty coxcomb who gives himself airs of
importance which he has no title to... (TMS VII.ii.4.8).
Weinstein observes that “Smith shows how intertwined
class is with the rhetorical and artistic structure of the society” (p. 145). his insight is conirmed through a diferent
angle here. he socially high and the socially low “stations,”
the “Grand” and the “little” are simultaneously social and
moral notions and invoke a speciic style of moral prose to
be expressed in line with LRBL’s dictum that “Prose is naturally the Language of business; as poetry is of pleasure and
amusement” (ii.115). Smith seems to be fully aware of the
necessity of a novel moral language and a moral prose that
relects unprecedented commercial realities. In this section I
have discussed the epideictic genre of ridicule in Smith and
its role in moral improvement. By the same token I have emphasized, in line with Weinstein’s insights, the interplay between commercial vanity, rhetoric, “belles lettres” and moral
prose. In a nutshell, I suggest that it is crucial for Smith to
develop a novel ironic style of writing concerning manners
and morals, in order to highlight commercial laws that traditional moral discourse standardly castigates without much
eiciency. To this end, I argue that he primarily sketches
original portraits of characters, his main category of moral
prose, that match the complexity of motivations to wealth
getting in commercial context.
3. THE “LOVER OF TOYS,” THE “POOR
MAN’S SON” AND THE LOVER OF
SCIENTIFIC SYSTEMS: ADAM SMITH’S
FABLE OF HUMAN OBSESSION
By and large, Adam Smith’s appropriation of Mandeville cuts
even deeper. here are other instances in the TMS where
Mandevillean themes loom large. I suggest that such a case
is TMS IV.i, clearly an intriguing discussion of the multiple
motivations of wealth getting in commercial society. In this
context I would like to challenge Weinstein’s recurring critique of the alleged conlation of vanity with moderate ambition about “bettering condition” (TMS I.iii.2). By the same
token I shall notice an omission that could possibly enrich
Weinstein’s line of thought: the lack of consistent study of
TMS IV and its main character, the poor man’s son. I now
THE “SPECTATOR” AND THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR IN ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM
35
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ments, and Smith as a moralist reclaims for a modern context the ancient moral ideal of being able to live with oneself.
Turning now to the status of ridicule, Smith mobilizes
some moral caricatures, in partly appropriating Mandeville’s
sardonic style (p. 140). his is a crucial moment because my
core claim is that Smith inds a novel way to awaken some
moral sensibility in those who seem impervious to any
other form of didactic discourse or callous moral conventions. In line with Weinstein, who argues that in the LRBL,
Smith presents his critique of Shatesbury as an instance of
a broader theory about “argument, inference and character” (ibid). Ridicule is an epideictic genre in rhetoric within
which Adam Smith primarily theorizes the moral status of
ridicule.5 It deines it as suitable to what is “in most respects
Grand or pretends to be or is expected to be so, [yet] has
something mean or little in it or when we ind something
that is really mean with some pretensions and marks of
grandeur” (1.108). Jonathan Swit is declared to be an expert
in the former kind of ridicule whereas Lucian is an exemplar
of the latter. One could object that these are triling matters
with respect to the issues of “hard-core” moral philosophy,
but Smith notes rather astonishingly that:
36
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discuss the interconnectedness of Smith’s theory of systems
and systemized knowledge and the gallery of characters
emerging in TMS IV.
In the TMS, the striving for social recognition is attributed
to sympathy, while the deference to the socially powerful has
been interpreted—as I shall examine in due course here—as
an apotheosis of high status from the low status agents, due
to the generalized “sympathy from the whole of mankind”
that high status unexceptionally gains (cf. Tegos, 2014). On
this score, I subscribe to the interpretation of vanity as a
corruption of the natural tendency to “bettering condition.”
However, Smith quite clearly presents alternative, multiple
centers of motivations, and a variety of characters that ranges from major to minor yet signiicant moral portraits, from
the vain to the prudent, through igures such as the poor
man’s son that go beyond vanity and moderate ambition. he
poor man’s son’s love of luxury is doomed to remain unsatisied and is conceived in a non-hedonistic manner by the
poor man’s son himself. hus we need to dissect more carefully this odd character.
In TMS IV, the novelty as regards the analysis of utility is
based on reclaiming the notion of system (Cooper, 1999).7
In a bold move, Smith straightforwardly links desire for gain
and admiration of “beautiful and orderly systems,” vanity
and aesthetic admiration of the “palaces and the oeconomy
of the great” (TMS IV.i.9). Earlier in the TMS, the striving
for social recognition is attributed to vanity, while the deference to the socially powerful has been interpreted as an
apotheosis of high status from the low status agents due to
the generalized “sympathy from the whole of mankind” that
high status unexceptionally gains (cf. Tegos, 2014).
In TMS IV, if we examine, however, why the spectator distinguishes with such admiration the condition of the rich
and the great, we shall ind that it is not so much on account
of vanity or the superior ease or pleasure which they are supposed to enjoy, as of the numberless artiicial and elegant
contrivances for promoting ease and pleasure. He does not
even imagine that they are really happier than other people:
but he imagines that they possess more means of happiness.
And it is the ingenious and artful adjustment of those means
to the end for which they were intended, that is the principal
source of admiration (TMS IV.i.8, emphasis added).
he poor man’s parable in the TMS IV.i is one of the most
striking and discussed parts of the TMS. More speciically
there has been a certain amount of discussion regarding the
interpretation of the “poor man’s son” fable and its place
within Adam Smith’s oeuvre. In this context, Mandeville’s
shadow looms large. I’m bound to think that there is a smokVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
ing gun in Smith’s overall construction of the poor man’s
character as a lover of system. I would then shit the focus
from the routinely debated moral status of luxury to the status of the love of system.
Smith seeks to palliate the coxcomb’s excessive ambition
by highlighting his ridiculous obsession of imitating aristocratic manners and the poor man’s son’s ordinary obsession with wealth, by putting forward the latter’s ambiguous
tragic-ironic status. His generic character of “lover of system” depicted ironically as a “lover of toys” constitutes a key
component of his gallery of characters. In fact, an important
aspect of the poor man’s son oten passes unnoticed; the
poor man’s anxiety and restlessness recalls a kind of manic-depressive personality in the non-technical and widely
popularized sense of the medical term.8 he main reason for
this oversight resides in a more serious oversight: the poor
man’s son’s character is a species of a broader genre, and his
obsessions are species of obsessions proper to a broader family of characters, the “lovers of toys.” And for those who rush
to overlook these thoughts as overstatements, Smith issues
a warning as he oten does; minute things contain important messages. he style and the content of the passage are
strongly reminiscent of Mandeville:
How many people ruin themselves by laying out money on trinkets of frivolous utility? What pleases these
lovers of toys is not so much the utility, as the aptness
of the machines which are itted to promote it. All their
pockets are stufed with little conveniences. hey contrive new pockets, unknown in the clothes of other
people, in order to carry a greater number…Nor is it
only with regard to such frivolous objects that our conduct is inluenced by this principle; it is oten the secret
motive of the most serious and important pursuits of
both private and public life (TMS IV.i.6).
he particularly striking aspect of this passage is the emphasis on the universality and the triviality of this obsession: “the secret motive of the most serious and important
pursuits” such as politics, or science and philosophy, is this
love of system that can be encountered in its most elementary form in the “lover of toys,” a gadget junkie in today’s
parlance. Note that the lover of toys, apparently the most ridiculous case of love of system that Smith provides, displays
self-destructive features—“how many people ruin themselves by laying out money on trinkets of frivolous utility”—
that strongly recall the language Smith uses in his narrative
of the demise of feudal lords in Wealth of Nations (WN III.
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4. INTERNALIZATION OF SOCIAL AUTHORITY:
A CHALLENGE TO THE IMPARTIAL
SPECTATOR’S AUTHORITY?
In line with Weinstein’s spirit of updating Smithian sentimentalism by mobilizing the language and terminology of
contemporary discourses, there are potentially interesting
links to establish between central Freudian psychoanalytic
concepts and the igure of the impartial spectator. As noted,
Weinstein discusses the impartial spectator’s multi-layered
status throughout his book. Yet there is no signiicant attention paid to the psychoanalytic implications of the Smithian
impartial spectator. Initially, D.D. Raphael noticed similarities between Smith’s conception of conscience as internalized social regard and Freud super-ego. He then dismisses
any further analogies because, according to him, Smith’s
analysis involves the internalization of both “favorable and
unfavorable attitudes” (Raphael, 2007), while Freud’s emphasis is predominantly placed on fear and broadly on internalized repression. Fonna Forman in her aforementioned
book clearly thinks that there is some analogy between the
Freudian concepts revolving around the idea and practice of
internalization (including super-ego) and the Smithian “psychological processes by which an individual internalizes and
then reproduces her world” (Forman, 2010, p. 91) Smithian
self-command, in this view, is considered far more optimistically, or in a more conservative perspective, as insensibly9
internalizing social norms without major psychological
costs to be feared for a culture as a whole. hen she remarks
that this internalized social conscience has raised worries in
Smith himself, due to its excessive conformism ranging from
the irst to the last edition of the TMS, as he witnesses the
unpredictable, rapid progress of the commercial society of
his time. he igure of the impartial spectator sketched in the
TMS’s irst editions appears largely inadequate to account for
the corrupting potential of advanced commercial societies.
I think we could complete this picture by spotting a quite
unexpected potential anticipation of another Freudian concept, the concept of idealization, sketched in “Mass psychology and Analysis of the ‘I’” ego. Quite interestingly, this
analysis is to be found in Smith’s account of the internalization of social distinction, a reminder of the centrality of divers processes of internalization for Smith’s moral psychology.
In his chapter on ambition and the origin of distinction of
ranks, adopting an ironic tone, Adam Smith emphasizes the
quasi-idolatrous attitude of ordinary men toward greatness:
A stranger to human nature, who saw the indiference
of men about the misery of their inferiors, and the regret and indignation which they feel for the misfortunes and suferings of those above them, would be apt
to imagine, that pain must be more agonizing, and the
convulsions of death more terrible to persons of higher
rank, than to those of meaner stations (TMS I.iii.2.30).
On this head, Smith’s account of the “natural disposition
to respect”10 controversial kings such as Charles I is striking. He lucidly recalls that there is no utilitarian motivation
THE “SPECTATOR” AND THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR IN ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM
37
COSMOS + TAXIS
iv.15) (he feudal lords ruined themselves consuming “baubles and trinkets of frivolous utility”). In the case of the lover
of toys and the lover of science, both share the same love of
system, the same obsession with order, instead of regard to
utility or functionality of the orderly system. It is their prime
albeit secret motivation. Furthermore, the inventiveness of
this ordinary obsession strongly recalls the spontaneous inventive power attributed to the division of labour (WN I,
i.8) but also Hume’s natural inventiveness with which the
human species is endowed in Treatise, III. At this juncture,
Smith’s prose parallels Mandeville’s in the most unexpected
way. Indeed, it suices to pick up any description of avarice,
greed or prodigality from the Fable of the Bees (FB), and the
similarity is striking: “Prodigality has a thousand inventions
to keep people from sitting still, that frugality would never
think of; and as this must consume a prodigious wealth, so
avarice again knows innumerable tricks to rake it together,
which frugality would scorn to make use of ” (FB I, 105).
Yet the anxiety inherent even in the slightest form of the
trivial lover of toys, takes on a particularly disquieting form
in the context of the ambitious poor man’s son. his semitragicomic, semi manic-depressive igure shares the same
obsessive anxiety with all path-breaking scientists or social
reformers (TMS IV.i.11), not to mention that this obsession
has civilized Planet Earth through hard labor and inds itself
behind the spirit of capital accumulation of entrepreneurs in
commercial society (TMS IV.i.9). In TMS IV, Smith seems to
imply that a universal trait of human imagination—the love
of system—gains new life in commercial contexts where, in
contrast to earlier socio-economic stages, opportunities for
the acquisition of wealth are more abundant, and synonymous with social ascent for larger strata of the population.
hus the poor man’s son as a case of the love of system destined to lourish in commercial society, entails an ambiguous assessment—a blend of surprise, admiration, laughter
and sadness—and demands the inest ironic skills to be fairly
gauged that go beyond Mandeville’s satire.
38
COSMOS + TAXIS
behind our tendency to worship the great, “Neither is our
deference to their inclinations founded chiely or altogether,
upon a regard to the utility of such submission and to the order of society, which is best supported by it” (TMS I.iii.2.3).
“he kings are the servants of the people. To be obeyed, resisted deposed or punished, as the public convienency may
require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is
not the doctrine of Nature” (TMS I.iii.2.3). Oddly enough
Smith’s main thesis is that crowd psychology is fundamentally similar to the superstitious factional spirit of intimidated believers, let alone those mentally mutilated by the woes
of commercial life among the modern crowd. herefore it
is doomed to luctuate between a “habitual state of deference,” the most deep-rooted afection towards authority in
human psychology of common people, and rare uprisings
against royalty when, exceptionally, the “most furious passions fear, hatred and resentment” seize the “bulk of the people.” In other words, the rare enthusiastic transgressions of
the respect due to authority are followed by long periods of
superstitious reverence of greatness. Resuming the theme of
the style of philosophical prose, at this point one can see the
anticipation of a novel style of moral discourse that will account for complex moral and socio-psychological realities in
a more adequate way than traditional accounts of moral and
social authority.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I shall conclude by stating the extreme synthetic value of
Jack Weinstein’s book, that succeeds in moving forward
Adam Smith studies in the sense of a lively dialogue between
contemporary scholarship, history of ideas, and the philosophy of the 18th century. his dynamic move enables scholarship, among other things, to reclaim the legacy of classic
rhetoric for the understanding of socio-economic, political
and moral early modern issues. In this paper I do not discuss all aspects of Weinstein’s contribution, although I found
intriguing his comparative account of Smith’s project and
method with Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge. I rather
focus on the conceptual genealogy of the impartial spectator, that leads me to a shit of attention from Shatesbury/
Hutscheson to Mandeville’s legacy in Smith. In line with two
crucial insights regarding Smith’s project found in this book,
the complex motivation/one system thesis, and the emphasis on rhetorical narrative for a pluralistic, commercial society, I further develop two points: the importance of satire
in moral prose and consequently the twin tragi-comic status
of ridiculous nouveau riche in the formation of an eicient
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
moral prose matching complex commercial realities. Filling
in a gap in Weinstein’s narrative, according to my interpretation, I elaborate on the theme of complex commercial motivations, focusing on the enigmatic portrait of the poor man’s
son found in TMS IV.i. Finally, I complete the discussion of
socialization/acculturation of moral sentiments developed
by Weinstein, with a psychoanalytic addendum regarding
the internalization of authority, a rather visionary Smithian
anticipation of contemporary debates in social sciences and
political theory on the relationship between the mental and
the social. his parallels and possibly extends Weinstein’s
sense of Smith’s relevance for problems of our times.
his book is emblematic in respecting current Adam
Smith scholarship by meticulously quoting and discussing major as well as minor works, while being iconoclastic
in mobilizing Adam Smith’s thought to interact with formal
logic and French post-structuralism. Being iconoclastic is
deinitely a Smithian virtue, as Weinstein’s mode of inquiry
plainly reminds us.
REFERENCES
Berry, C. (2003). Sociality and Socialisation. In: he Cambridge
Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. A. Broadie.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Castiglione, D. (1986). Taking things minutely. Relections on
Mandeville and the science of man. History of Political hought, VII,
3, 463-5
Cooper, A. A. (hird Earl of Shatesbury) (1999). Characteristics of
Men, Manners, Opinion, Times, An Inquiry concerning Virtue or
Merit, ed. L. E. Klein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dickie, S. (2011). Cruelty & Laughter, Forgotten Comic Literature
and the Unsentimental Eighteenth Century. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Forman, F. (2010). Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy.
Cosmopolitanism and Moral heory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hanley, R. (2008). Style and Sentiment. Smith and Swit. Adam Smith
Review, 4
Kerkhof, B. (1995). A fatal attraction? Smith’s ‘heory of Moral
Sentiments’ and Mandeville’s ‘Fable’. History of Political hought,
XVI, 2
Mandeville, B. ([vo. I 1714- vol. I 1729] 1988). he Fable of the Bees or
Private Vices, Publick Beneits, vol. I-II, with a Commentary, Critical,
Historical and Explanatory by F. B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund.
Mitchell, R. (2006). Beautiful and Orderly Systems, Adam Smith on the
Aesthetics of Political Improvement. In: New Voices on Adam Smith,
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NOTES
1
2
3
4
A helpful synthesis of the critique of “free thinkers”
sketched by igures such as Joseph Steele or Berkeley,
who coined the term “minute philosophers” is found in
Castiglione (1986).
“Politeness is so much the virtue of the great that it
will do little honour to any body but themselves. he
coxcomb, who imitates their manner, and afects to be
eminent by the superior propriety of his ordinary behavior, is rewarded with a double share of contempt for
his folly and presumption. Why should the man whom
nobody thinks it worth while to look at, be very anxious
about the manner in which he holds up his head, or disposes his arms while he walks through a room?” (TMS
I.iii.2.5/54-5).
“his disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the
rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction
of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time,
the great and the most universal cause of the corruption
of our moral sentiments.” (TMS I.iii.2.3).
Kerkhof ’s (1995, pp. 230-31) insightful paper sheds
light on the underrated aspect of sympathy related to
insecurity and anxiety, and reads it as a Mandevillean
response to the omnipresence of pride: the conscience
that we “constantly overvalue ourselves” makes most of
the people nervous. Yet he does not pay particular atten-
tion to the fact that anxiety is almost constantly tied to
commercial vanity.
5 LRBL, 92: “Ridicule is appropriate when it issues from
an appropriate sentiment and communicates clearly the
nature of the object that gave rise to the sentiment.”
6 Regarding the relationship between Smith and Swit
and, broadly, for the importance of style in the prose of
moral philosophy and in practical moralizing in Smith,
see Hanley, 2008.
7 See especially II.1.3, III.3.3, where the universe is conceived as a “set of interlocking, co-dependent ‘systems.”
On other notions of system of which Smith was probably aware, see Mitchell, 2006, pp. 63-7.
8
For helpful insights about nervousness in early consumer society, see Porter, 1992.
9 TMS III.3.3: “Habit and experience have taught us…”
10 In this context, the appeal to eastern adulation is telling: “Great King, live for ever! is the compliment which,
ater the manner of eastern adulation, we should readily
make them, if the experience did not teach us its absurdity…His air, his manner, his deportment, all mark that
elegant and graceful sense of his own superiority, which
those who are born to inferior station can hardly even
arrive at” (TMS I.iii.2.2, 4).
THE “SPECTATOR” AND THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR IN ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM
39
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Porter, R. (1992). Addicted to Modernity: Nervousness in the Early
Consumer Society. In: Culture in History. Production, Consumption
and Values in Historical Perspective, eds. J. Melling and J. Barry.
Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
Raphael, D. D. (2007). he Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. (1976-1983). he Glasgow Edition of the Works and
Correspondence of Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Smith, A. heory of Moral Sentiments, ‘Introduction’ D. D. Raphael and
A. L. Macie, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations.
Smith, A. Essays on Philosophical Subjects, (he History of Astronomy,
History of Ancient Physics, Of the Nature of Imitation that takes
place in what are called Imitative Arts),
Smith, A. Lectures on Jurisprudence. (A, B).
Smith, A. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.
Tegos, S. (2014). he two sources of corruption of moral sentiments in
Adam Smith. Adam Smith Review, 7
Was Adam Smith an Optimist?
MARIA PIA PAGANELLI
Department of Economics
Trinity University
One Trinity Place
San Antonio, TX 78212
United States
Email: maria.paganelli@Trinity.edu
Web: https://new.trinity.edu/faculty/maria-pia-paganelli
Bio-sketch: Maria Pia Paganelli works on Adam Smith, David Hume, 18th century monetary theories, and the links between
the Scottish Enlightenment and behavioral economics. She is the book review editor for the Journal of the History of Economic
hought and co-edited the Oxford Handbook on Adam Smith (2013).
40
COSMOS + TAXIS
Jack Russell Weinstein claims “Adam Smith was a man of his
time, an Enlightened scholar with the optimism that came
from a scientiic belief in progress and moral betterment”
(2013, p. 239). Claims like this are spread across Weinstein’s
volume and are not supported by textual evidence.
I fear that this lack of textual evidence may not just be because of the adoption of a more narrative approach, but because evidence for this “inevitable” progress that Weinstein
claims to see in Smith may not be as clear as Weinstein wants
it to be.
One can read Smith’s Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1981) not
as a declaration of the inevitable march of history toward a
better future, but as a scream of fear that the future may be
bleak and worse than the present.
Smith attacks the mercantile system as a parasitical system
which may cause the stagnation of the British economy. he
British economy, like any other economy, is not subject to
perpetual improvements, but may become more stationary,
or regressive. China was an expanding economy for centuries, but then it became stationary for centuries, with little
hope for improvement. “China had been long one of the
richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most
industrious, and most populous countries in the world. It
seems however, to have been long stationary” (WN i.viii.24).
Smith goes as far as to say that there does not seem to be
much diference between the description of Marco Polo and
the ones by Smith’s contemporaries (WN i.viii.24). Bengal
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
was an expanding economy and had all the potential to remain such, given the fertility of its land, yet it turned into
a regressing economy. In Bengal “notwithstanding [subsistence should not be very diicult] three or four hundred
thousand people die of hunger every year” (WN I.viii.26).
he American colonies were a growing economy, but Britain
was no longer one. In Smith’s view there was more growth
in North America than in England (WN i.viii.23). Only
America has a growing population, testiied to by the fact
that a widow with children will remarry immediately since
the children are considered an asset. In Britain on the other
hand, the same widow with the same amount of children
would not be able to remarry because her children would be
considered a liability:
[A] young widow with four or ive young children,
who, among the middling or inferior ranks of people in Europe, would have so little chance for a second husband, is there [in North America] frequently
courted as a sort of fortune. he value of children is the
greatest of all encouragements to marriage. […] [T]
here is a continual complaint of the scarcity of hands in
North America. he demand for labourers, the funds
destined for maintaining them, increase, it seems, still
faster than they can ind labourers to employ (WN
I.viii.23).
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he whole system of her industry and commerce has
thereby been rendered less secure [by the monopoly of
the colony trade]; the whole state of her body politick
less healthful, than it otherwise would have been. In
her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of
those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital
parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are
liable to many dangerous disorders scarce incident to
those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood–vessel, which
has been artiicially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of
the industry and commerce of the country has been
forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most
dangerous disorders upon the whole body politick. he
expectation of a rupture with the colonies, accordingly,
has struck the people of Great Britain with more terror
than they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or a French
invasion. … he blood, of which the circulation is
stopt in some of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges
itself into the greater, without occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopt in any of the greater
vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and unavoidable consequences (WN IV.vii.c.43).
And while it is true that a poor worker in Britain is better
housed than a savage king (WN I.i.11), those accommodations come at a dear price, the atrophy of the minds (V.i.f.50)
and the “drowsy stupidity” (V.i.f.51) of the great masses of
people. “Mental mutilation, deformity and wretchedness” is
an epidemic as serious and as damaging as leprosy: they “deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same
manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and ofensive disease,
though neither mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself
among them; though, perhaps, no other publick good might
result from such attention besides the prevention of so great
a publick evil” (WN V.i.f.60). If there is progress in Smith, it
is not necessarily inevitable or something to take for granted.
he moral betterment that Smith allegedly promotes may
also be questioned. Smith does say that time changes morals,
but it is diicult to say that that change is inevitably for the
better.
Ater all, this “progress” brought about by the inexorable
march of time transforms men from brave and courageous
warriors to weak and fearful soldiers, which is not necessarily an improvement in Smith’s eyes (LJ 1766, pp. 538-541).
he change in attitude of people toward war also challenges
an alleged moral betterment. he prosperity that goes with
what Weinstein calls “Smith’s commitment to the natural
spread of universal opulence” (p. 245) allows government
to rely on public debt rather than on taxes to inance wars.
So wars will become both longer and more numerous. And
this is just to satisfy the mean rapacity of big merchants and
manufacturers and the deluded dreams of empire of lazy
citizens who enjoy reading war news in the comfort of their
living rooms. Smith tells us indeed that the self-interest of
great merchants and manufacturers causes the system of justice to degenerate into a system of lobbies, and the system of
lobbies becomes a source of the most severe injustices. he
government grants favors to organized interests at the expense of the majority of the members of society, and the laws
become so unjust that “the cruellest of our revenue laws, I
will venture to airm, are mild and gentle, in comparison
of some of those which the clamour of our merchants and
manufacturers has extorted from the legislature, for the support of their own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like
the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in
blood” (WN IV.viii.17).
he blood Smith refers to is not just a colorful image of the
lack of moral restraint of merchants’ manufactures, but it is
a condemnation of their immoral conduct which results in
their willingness and ability to bring the country into wars
“for the sake of that little enhancement of price which this
monopoly might aford our producers” (WN IV.viii.53). And
as mentioned, their fellow-citizens do not display high moral
standards or signiicant moral betterment either: they “live
in the capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene
of action…enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in
the newspapers the exploits of their own leets and armies,
enjoying their dreams of empire” (WN V.iii.37).
Smith also analyzes how the alleged “natural spread of
universal opulence” brings about a sovereign’s morally irresponsible spending. Smith explains that the sovereign will
squander his revenues on frivolous trinkets (WN V.iii.2-3)
WAS ADAM SMITH AN OPTIMIST?
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Smith is afraid that if Britain succumbs to lobbyists and
mercantilists, it may go the way of Bengal rather than its
North-American colonies. he “optimism that comes from a
scientiic belief in progress” is not evident.
In addition, it is diicult to see optimism or progress when
Smith speaks of an economic system as a living body, with
economic privileges granted by the government functioning
like diseases. Privileges granted by the government make a
body sick. hey can even kill it:
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during times of peace. When war comes, debt will be incurred, which “will in the long run probably ruin all the
great nations of Europe” (WN V.iii.10). Not the most optimistic view of the world’s future.
his universal opulence to which Smith is allegedly committed also unleashes sordid and childish passions, rather
than moral betterment. When opulence started spreading,
the “most childish, the meanest and the most sordid of all
vanities” (WN III.iv.10) of barons and great landlords hopelessly attracted them to the glitter of a “pair of diamond
buckles perhaps, or […] something as frivolous and useless”
(WN III.iv.10). So that “As soon, therefore, as they could
ind a method of consuming the whole value of their rents
themselves, they had no disposition to share them with any
other person” (WN III.iv.10). In addition to these accusations, Smith repeats the point ive paragraphs later. he lords
run ater “trinkets and baubles, itter to be the play-things
of children than the serious pursuit of men” (WN III.iv.15).
his language does not describe what I would think of as
moral betterment. here may be unintentionally a betterment of society as a whole, but it is diicult to see any moral
improvement in a vanity which can now bloom almost without limits.
Weinstein’s claims of Smith’s optimism and belief in progress seem therefore weak and partial, more like straw-men
built to make a diferent point, rather than a genuine description of Adam Smith. Smith may be optimistic, but his
optimism is a very complex one, with awareness of nuances
and problematic issues. Ignoring the sophistications and the
shades of Smith’s analysis in a book on Smith is, to this reader, writing a book about something other than Smith.
Weinstein’s agenda is terriic and interesting on its own
terms. It therefore leaves the question of why he uses Smith
in such a deformed way when he could have made the argument without Smith. As much as I praise Weinstein for
his interest in exploring pluralism, I wish he had portrayed
Adam Smith more realistically and with textual evidence.
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Smith, A. ([1776] 1981). An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Indianapolis: Liberty
Classics.
Weinstein, J. R. (2013). Adam Smith’s Pluralism: Rationality,
Education, and the Moral Sentiments. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
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The Political Hypotheses of Adam Smith’s Pluralism:
A response to my commentators
JACK RUSSELL WEINSTEIN
Department of Philosophy and Religion
Director, Institute for Philosophy in Public Life
University of North Dakota
Box 7128 Grand Forks
ND 58202-7128
United States
Email: jack.weinstein@und.edu
Web: http://www.jackrussellweinstein.com
Adam Smith’s Pluralism (ASP) develops a framework to connect Smith’s eighteenth-century discourse with twenty-irst
century debate about the nature of liberal democracy. It is
the irst in a series of three volumes, the second of which will
present a modernized account of Smithian justice. he third
will ofer a theory of democratic political participation.
he irst, the subject of this special issue of Cosmos +
Taxis, establishes the rules of engagement, so to speak. It
outlines my theory of interpretation and modernizes the vocabulary required for Smith to authentically engage Rawls,
Nozick, Nussbaum, and other contemporary liberal thinkers. While there are some historians of ideas who might ind
this project inherently corrupt—some might argue that epochs cannot be bridged—most philosophers would hold that
the past is material to the present and future. Our history
not only reveals our assumptions, but it helps illuminate our
mistakes. Sometimes our ancestors were wrong, sometimes
not, but the challenge of the history of ideas is as much in the
exploration as the conclusion. Textual exegesis is scientiic
inquiry and sport; it is the pursuit of truth and the celebration of ideas. here is no a priori reason why philosophers
of a previous age cannot help advance today’s investigations.
he devil, of course, is in the details. Discourse simultaneity cannot presume that all texts are prima facie compatible.
Words, assumptions, metaphysics, and historical context
may be signiicantly diferent, so one must do signiicant prep
work to make texts talk to one another. Historical settings
might be bracketed when teaching Descartes’s Meditations
in Philosophy 101, but they cannot be ignored for any serious scholarship. hus, readers of Adam Smith’s Pluralism can
rightly ask both whether my interpretations are persuasive
and whether I managed to convincingly connect Smith with
what most concerns political philosophers today.
My interest in contemporary issues directed me towards
the irst three topics named in the title: pluralism, rationality, and education. My focus on interpretation led me to the
last: the moral sentiments. But as I articulate throughout the
book, each of these ideas have histories as well as contemporary lives. All of them bridge the centuries.
Furthermore, no matter how much we want to read the
“historically accurate” Adam Smith, it is virtually impossible
to read he Wealth of Nations (WN) without considering
Mill, Marx, Rawls, and others on some level. he heory of
Moral Sentiments (TMS) cannot be encountered without the
more recent disciplinary additions of anthropology, sociology, and psychology, the Freudian subconscious especially.
No matter how much we try to immerse ourselves in the his-
THE POLITICAL HYPOTHESES OF ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS
43
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Bio-sketch: Jack Russell Weinstein is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute for Philosophy in Public Life at
the University of North Dakota. He is the author of three books, most recently Adam Smith’s Pluralism (Yale, 2013), the subject of this special issue of Cosmos + Taxis. He has edited numerous collections and published dozens of articles in a wide
range of journals. He is also the host of public radio’s Why? Philosophical Discussions About Everyday Life, a monthly interview
program dedicated to making contemporary philosophical debate accessible to non-academic audiences. You can visit it at
www.whyradioshow.org.
44
COSMOS + TAXIS
tory of ideas, our current understandings shape our imaginations.
Smith also cannot be considered without attending to
capitalism, even though the term was not coined until one
hundred years ater he wrote. His impartial spectator cannot
be evaluated without one eye on Kantian autonomy and the
liberal/communitarian discourse that debates its coherence.
In other words, my attempt to write with one foot in the past
and one in the present is really an attempt to be intellectually honest. Many authors who claim to be doing history of
ideas are not really being forthcoming about their political
and intellectual motivations, because all the history of ideas
can ever be is today’s history of ideas.
On the other hand, pretending that we can read Smith as
a contemporary is also intellectually dishonest. Consider, for
example, how diferent Smith’s reading experience was. Any
book he bought would have been a very limited run by our
standards, but read by a much wider percentage of his educated interlocutors.1 He would have received the book with a
simple board cover and then hired his own binder to cover
it with leather of his choice. He would have read it by candlelight, holding a book knife, cutting each page apart as he
turned it. How much diference this makes to the intellectual
experience of reading, I can’t say, but it suggests that reading
was a slower, more active process than what we experience
today. In Smith’s time, the book was much more an object of
wealth and status than the mass-produced object of today,
but it still wasn’t as rare as in the Middle Ages.
Smith didn’t have electric lights or recorded music. Most
of the oldest major museums we recognize today didn’t appear until the second half of the 18th century, ater Smith
was done writing.2 He probably never saw works of art by
Rembrandt, Titian, Michelangelo, or Da Vinci. Western
democratic standards of gender equity were embryonic, if
they existed at all, as were gay rights, regardless of how relatively egalitarian Smith might have been. Modern notions
of race were established in Germany a hundred years ater
Smith died, created around the same time as the nation state
and the modern academic professionalized disciplinary divisions. And, the recognized length of childhood in Smith’s
time is incomparable with our own – Smith would have had
no notion of the extended adolescence that marks the late
20th and 21st centuries. Apprentices started as young as ten.
Fashion, rules regarding nudity and sexual propriety, and
notions of formality and informality all difered signiicantly
from today. In other words, Smith’s experience and his understanding of the everyday world is so much removed from
the modern liberal democratic experience that it seems alVOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
most absurd that American politicians refer to its founders
with reverence and that we look towards Hume, Smith, and
Kant for such fundamental guidance as we do.
Yet, Smith wrote about almost all of those topics: art, music, and theater, gender equity and race, ethnicity and national identity, childhood, fashion and propriety. He made
empirical observations and normative claims. He commented on cultural norms and made grand claims about what
would eventually be called the world-historical level. He
thought human nature was a constant and that “an hour’s toil
and trouble” remained the same through the ages.3
We also have to recognize Smith’s political motivations in
addition to his philosophical interests. He was a pamphleteer as much as he was a scholar, even though at over 1,000
pages and comprising two quarto volumes, WN seems as far
from a pamphlet as one can get. A political advocate has a
diferent relationship with an audience than a philosopher or
historian, and he or she must rely on diferent rhetoric and
utilize other forms of persuasion to explicate evidence. As
Nathaniel Wolloch points out in his introduction to this volume, the scholarly world is still undecided as to how to balance Smith’s context with his cross-temporal, cross-cultural,
multi-contextual comments.
My remarks so far should be seen as a preamble to my responses to the authors in this volume, each of whom I am
grateful to. heir comments belie the tension they inherited
from my book. All of them have one foot in contemporary
times and one in interpretation; all of them improve my
work. And, while there are a few moments of disagreement
(including one extended argument), my rebuttals should not
be read as dismissive in any way. he contributors to the volume are top-notch scholars whom I have learned a great deal
from, and I sincerely hope that I do not return the kindness
of their labor with the kind of hostility and condescension
that so oten mar academic philosophy.
My commentators inherited another tension from my
book. Like Smith’s corpus, Adam Smith’s Pluralism is an uninished work, the irst, as I already noted, of a three-volume
series. I have therefore chosen to read these essays, not as
oppositional, but as guidance for my future endeavors. his
point will be repeated several times when I emphasize a particularly cogent contribution.
JUSTICE
I begin my comments addressing Lisa Herzog’s observation
that Smith’s account of justice is “more central than it appears” in my account. She is correct; I didn’t concern myself
COSMOS + TAXIS
come from the economic historian homas Piketty (2014).
Herzog’s comments are representative of this debate, luctuating back and forth between identity politics and economic
consideration, but her point is inarguable: economic disparity interferes with individuals’ abilities to cultivate their capabilities, and justice is the mechanism by which we equal
the playing ield. As she writes: “without the rules of justice
in place within a society, the process of the development of
rationality, with all [its] rich social and emotional texture…
can easily be corrupted.”
My choice not to address economic inequality is, for
Herzog, an “open lank” because justice, in general, acts as
a “common denominator in a society made up of individuals with diferent sentiments, diferent rationalities, and different worldviews.” However, she explains my motivations a
few paragraphs later when she writes, “justice is also presupposed in the process, at least in the minimal sense of recognizing that others have an equally valid perspective.” I do,
in fact, presuppose a minimal economic justice in my discussion of the cultural and experiential diversity that leads
to individuals having diferent sentiments, rationalities and
worldviews, but I do not clarify what that economic justice
looks like. I ofer many educational prescriptions, but I do
not address the role of economic disparity in schooling, such
as the immense inequality that results in the United States
from funding schools based on property taxes. I also consider the role of choice in curriculum, but I do not remark on
the parental protection of privilege as illustrated by Herzog’s
use of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Her agenda is a useful one to follow. She is adroitly nudging me where I need to go next.
In short, her critique is as much one of contemporary
liberal theory as of ASP. As I articulate in the introduction, my organizational scheme is based on the four dominant discourse threads in liberalism: diferences in personal
motivations and aims, diferences in group identiication,
diferences in experience and education, and diferences in
rationality and ways of thought (pp. 13-14). Economic considerations are not there. hey should be, and this discussion
must begin with understanding better what Herzog calls the
common denominator of justice. She is most certainly correct that in the Rawlsian model, the overlapping consensus
allows people to talk using a common vocabulary and political conception of justice. It is a suitable location for debate.
But what does her phrase “common denominator” mean
economically? It can’t mean common experience. People are
raised in diferent circumstances and as Smith illustrates better than most, as the means of production changes, and as
history progresses towards commercial society, employment
THE POLITICAL HYPOTHESES OF ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS
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COSMOS + TAXIS
with it as much as I might have. he irst reason was strategic. As she notes, I plan to discuss it in ASP’s sequel. he
second reason, however, is more philosophical. Justice may
be central for the state, but it is not psychologically primary
for individuals. Justice creates the conditions for capabilities,
not the capabilities themselves. My work in ASP was more
focused on the processes of rationality, sympathy, and judgment than the political circumstances that cultivate them.
Smith did not share the classical Greek notion of justice
as a character virtue. He did not regard it as a balance of the
soul in the Platonic sense. Instead, justice represents a person refraining from harming others. It may result in “very
little positive merit” since a person may “oten fulill all the
rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing” (TMS
II.ii.1.9).4 his is not to suggest that justice isn’t relevant to
ASP, only that it is a secondary focus. Justice is an elaboration on my other comments.
As Herzog points out, “markets need a framework of positive law with which they can function,” including “property
rights and contract law,” but Smith wrote almost nothing
about legislation (if he did, he burnt these comments shortly
before his death). His description of the limited role of the
sovereign in WN IV provides very few speciics, and Smith
ofers us no democratic or republican theory. His readers
are even let guessing as to whether he was a Whig, Tory,
or something else entirely.5 Furthermore, whatever moral
foundation Smith did ofer for such legislation can only be
discussed in combination with his account of progress and
the normative value of history, issues I address in the inal
two chapters of the book but which are beyond the scope of
Herzog’s paper.
Herzog focuses on two areas: pluralism and economic
inequality. Obviously, class diference is a form of diversity
in and of itself, and it its into many discussions of plurality, including holding a prominent place in ASP. But there is
something unique about economic diference that deserves
special attention; it is more than just sociological and cultural. As Smith reminds us, basic economic needs are the irst
concern, which is why (as Herzog illustrates) no society can
be just that is not universally opulent.
his was also the case for Marx and the early Rawls, but
in Rawls’s later work, economic disparity was eclipsed by
cultural questions, especially those revolving around liberty.
Most liberal theorists followed his lead, a reversal of the several centuries before him.6 But the last few decades have seen
various attempts to pull liberal theory back to real-world
economic discussions, especially from Sen, Nussbaum,
and the development ethicists; the most powerful pull has
46
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diversiies daily experience. Common denominator in this
case is cultural, not commercial. Does common denominator mean instead that every culture establishes common
standards of minimal goods and possessions? Smith suggests
this, pointing to the importance of linen shirts and leather
shoes (WN V.ii.k.3), although he makes no claim as to who
should supply these goods to the needy. he United States
saw a form of this debate recently when political pundits and
he Heritage Foundation suggested that anyone who owns
a refrigerator ought not be considered poor (hompson,
2011).
Calling for a minimal economic standard is, of course,
the path that Marx took, and Marx was probably the best
Smithian who ever lived. But in the end, the discussion must
revolve around the exact nature of universal opulence, not
the general call that I emphasize in ASP. As it does today, this
discourse may involve broad questions such as whether the
state has an obligation to provide food, shelter, and clothing,
but it may also dive deeper into asking what kind of food,
shelter, and clothing people are entitled to.7 In either case,
Herzog’s call for attending to the economic conditions that
underpin sympathy, the impartial spectator, and social unity
cannot be ignored.
Herzog’s call for more attention to the economic should
not overshadow Maria Carrasco’s analysis of justice. In her
insightful essay, she shows that Smith’s pluralism is not just
a theory of diversity management, but a moral pluralism in
and of itself. his pluralism, she writes, is defensible precisely because of its context-dependency.
Carrasco is, in a certain sense, elaborating on Herzog’s
attempt to ind a common denominator, postulating an
embryonic, but Smithian version of Rawls’s overlapping consensus. She writes:
Smith’s empiricist moral psychology…has suicient
resources to overcome moral incommensurability and
cultural relativism. here is a small group of norms
that are simultaneously context-dependent and universal. hese are the rules of justice: a core set of rules
with absolute authority that precludes relativistic interpretations of the TMS and lay the ground for an empiricist justiication of universal human rights.
he problem in TMS, she explains, is “the empirical origin
of the moral conscience.” Many of our moral terms, she reports, are culturally bound; even harm is contextual. But, she
insists, the fact that these ideas are local does not mean they
are arbitrary:
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
Smith’s moral normativity is context-dependent but
not relativistic. First, it depends on the import of the
speciic situation and is thereby objective. Second,
moral judgments are validated by the mediation of the
impartial spectator, who moderates our innate selfpreference in order to provide warrant for treating
ourselves as we treat others. his double rapport, the
agent with the import through the impartial spectator, is what allows Smith to propose objectivity amidst
variations.
his insight recalls my emphasis on Alasdair MacIntyre’s
tradition-bound rationality and Toulmin’s ield-variant
argument standards. While MacIntyre is oten labeled a
communitarian and a conservative, his work on multiple
rationalities is a form of deep respect. It is his way of recognizing that even those moral traditions that one profoundly
disagrees with can be understood as rational, and that humans have a drive towards reason that even our religious history bears out. Recognition of multiple rationalities, I would
suggest, is a prerequisite for mutual respect in a diverse society, because it doesn’t exclude any tradition as animalistic or
sub-human in the classical sense, where rationality is a solely
human character trait.
Ultimately, Carrasco writes, Smith’s ethics “includes a
group of moral rules that ought to be the same in all times
and places. hese are the rules of justice, which are exact,
absolute and universally binding.” Smith’s justice safeguards
“recognition respect,” or “‘equality as human beings,’ which
has an independent, intrinsic content, [and] may give us a
tool to identify some universal injustices and lay the basis for
the recognition of universal human rights.”
Smith’s pluralism, Carrasco ofers, has both pluralistic and
universalist elements, but the universalism isn’t always apparent because culture has epistemological consequences
that may obfuscate the moral truths that all societies ought
to recognize. Nevertheless, there are truths independent of
recognition, a point that echoes my claim that moral progress aims towards discovering morality as opposed to creating it. As she writes, for Smith, “moral justiications are not
arbitrary. hey depend on reality and may be discovered by
any competent spectator. hey are objectively justiied.”
Here, Carrasco’s focus on pluralism overshadows the obvious realism implicit in her account. he impartial spectator
is a solution to an epistemological problem; it aims towards
discovery, irst as an individual but then as a society. As she
explains it:
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I am honored that Carrasco credits my book for inspiring
her meditation; an author can ask for little more than to help
contribute to such sophisticated work. In particular, what
Carrasco does is illustrate how moral epistemology necessitates the discussion of progress laid out in the inal chapters. If she is correct that lack of recognition-respect does
not eradicate Smith’s faith in the fundamental equality of all
people (and I think she is), then the question of how to force
such knowledge upon an ignorant or unwilling populace
moves front and center.
Here again we move from the moral realm to the political
one. How does one cultivate a state that makes people not
just act morally but understand morally as well? How does
justice difer from the other virtues? For Smith, as mentioned above, justice is a negative virtue, but this isn’t enough
of a distinction. Neither is his claim, as Carrasco phrases it,
that justice is “exact, absolute and universally binding.” What
is special is Smith’s emphasis on the equality implicit in justice, which is, she argues, “a culturally-neutral import.” As
she writes, “any unjustiied hurt deliberately inlicted on a
human being in any culture will be a material justice in every
culture.” his is why, as she points out, I claim that slavery
is paradigmatic. Any case of “equals treated as inferiors” are
“immediately” called injustice.
Carrasco leaves us in two helpful places. he irst is that
we now have a sophisticated rejoinder against those who
claim Smith is a relativist. I argue in ASP that Smith does, in
fact, derive “an ought from an is” (pp. 139, 231). Carrasco in
turn gives us a clear mapping of how this works in the realm
of justice. Second, Carrasco provides a clear terminological
bridge between Smith’s psychological theory of discovery
and argumentation, and contemporary accounts of pluralistic justice that depend on some common denominator (in
Herzog’s words). If Smith is going to be a contender, we have
to highlight the normative core of his prescriptions.
In ASP, I emphasize normativity in two ways, irst by arguing that “central to the human understanding is an undeniable experience” of pain in the face of inequality or
oppression (p. 98) and second, by showing how, in the long
run, human moral knowledge progresses. Carrasco supplements this by showing that in the case of justice, experience
and progress presuppose the fundamental equality in humanness. With this established, Smith can be used to provide an even stronger alternative to Kantian liberalism.
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
Dionysis Drosos illustrates just how intimately connected interpretation is to contemporary debate. He begins by calling
attention to my discussion of “active principles,” distinguishing them from the passive feelings that inspire apathetic responses to, among other things, a devastating earthquake in
China (TMS III.3.4). He also observes how important they
are to dialogical rationality, asking: “if the impartial spectator is not active, how can he/she be a judge?” his is not
a rhetorical question. An impartial spectator is active by
deinition, and dialogical rationality presumes agency that
descriptions of economic agents as preference-seeking overlook.
But Drosos’s emphasis on the complex intentionality of the
judging mind has a more crucial target than simple interpretation. He is taking aim at contemporary debate. He writes:
“I tend to understand this stressing of the active dimension
of spectatorship as a formidable critique to those readings of
Adam Smith which overemphasize spontaneity.”
Drosos is inarguably correct. Active principles are central
to deemphasizing spontaneity, and even though he is elaborating on my book and ascribing this motivation to me, I
must credit him with getting to this insight irst. I did not see
it, and wish that I had, because just a few additional pages of
explication in ASP would have helped forestall Craig Smith’s
condemnation that “more troubling still is Weinstein’s argument that for Smith the rules of morality are not spontaneous but rather are progressive and the product of rational
inquiry” (Smith, 2014, p. 163).
I will not respond to Craig Smith in detail here other than
to record that Drosos starts the rebuttal for me. Drosos is
yet another contributor who has guided me to where I need
to be for the second volume. He explains: “If we take spontaneity in its strict sense, then we risk reducing moral rules
into a passive conformity…. his would mean to succumb to
the current common opinion. his would compromise the
project of understanding ethics as a process of moral development.”
Drosos is pointing out that understanding the moral process as spontaneous precludes the possibility of distinguishing oneself from the crowd. he self-critical analysis that
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47
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Acknowledged or not by their cultures, black slaves
have always had the same dignity as free white men.
hey have now been recognized as equals, but they
have not been made equals. Women did not acquire
their dignity as they started to be considered equals.
Recognizing the equal dignity of x does not create or
invent that dignity. It has always been there, but we
were blind to it.
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cultivates the impartial spectator requires deliberation and
personal growth, especially since, as I argue, the impartial
spectator is a form of conscience. A spontaneous conscience
is nothing more than blind faith to the status quo; Adam
Smith clearly wants more than that.
An analogy to Kant is useful here. As he describes it, the
manifold of understanding organizes sense data according
to their appropriate category. he process is precognitive in
the sense that agents do not consciously choose to understand an object as having quantity, quality, modality, relation, and modality. he categories are part of the structure of
the mind. As a result, the understanding feels both intimate
and spontaneous. But, just because the understanding feels
this way, does not make it so. For Kant, a great deal of organizational work goes into sorting sense data into a form that
the human mind can grasp. To see the manifold as spontaneous because it is automatic (or structural) is to confuse
epistemology and phenomenology and conlate spontaneity
with instantaneity.
Sympathy feels similarly spontaneous. Our shock at experiencing someone’s impropriety is immediate and natural,
but it is more oten than not (as Herzog tells us) a cultural
by-product. Further, we can change this reaction, although
sometime this takes a great deal of efort. Individuals learn
from new experiences. We are self-critical. We grow. To reduce Smithian moral judgment to a spontaneous action is to
both erase human agency and to abdicate individual responsibility. Spontaneity makes the question “why be moral?” irrelevant because it is a form of determinism in disguise.
Let me put this in a completely diferent way. Imagine a
jazz pianist who has spent three decades playing the instrument, who has developed impressive aural skills, and who
has superior command of music theory. One day during a
performance, an accompanying guitarist plays an Asus4
chord. he pianist, in response and without forethought or
relection, improvises on the Dorian scale in the key of D.
Only the most disrespectful listener would call this spontaneous. Doing so would erase the pianist’s decades of practice
and study. It would eradicate the musician’s expertise and
agency. Spontaneity, in this case, is the product of decades of
preparation and critical thought. It is not really spontaneous
in any Hayekian sense.
he same is true of moral judgments on the political level.
No one does a better job than Foucault of showing how ideas
such as madness or sexuality are the very opposite of spontaneous. hey are intersubjective and the product of an unmappable network of cultural micro-judgments growing out
of, of course, the texts, rituals, and practices that MacIntyre
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
highlights. As I showed in the inal two chapters, in many
respects, Foucault and Smith are quite compatible. If moral
development were truly spontaneous, TMS would have been
one paragraph long.
he attempt to make Smith an advocate of spontaneity is
yet another layer in the seemingly endless libertarian cooption of Adam Smith. It is, as I allude to above, more evidence
that one never reads Smith on his own terms but always
through one’s own contemporaries. In the next volume, I’m
simply going to have to tackle this issue head on.8 I thought
I might be done arguing against the libertarian Smith. I was
wrong.
Drosos anticipates another concern for the second volume: the roles of shock and civilization in commercial societies. To illustrate them, he postulates a believable scenario
in which a natural or human-created disaster disrupts a society to such an extent that the four criteria of civilization
break down. hey are:
a) a society of independent commerçants, bonded
together through exchange, in a context of a social
division of labor and under the rule of law; b) the
inequalities must be big enough to incite emulation
and ambition, but not so great as to cause unsocial
sentiments such as envy and resentment; c) a moral
community of peers, persons of equal moral value,
interdependent upon each other’s free recognition,
without being subjected to a hierarchical moral order
of personal dependency; and d) each member should
have access to minimal wealth and education, enough
to enable them to enter each others’ feelings, so that
the above mentioned sympathy procedure building the
social bonds works properly.
Drosos is doubtful that Smithian sympathy is strong
enough to withstand such chaotic conditions, and, as such,
he questions whether social bonds would continue to work
efectively. Smith’s response to his scenario, I suspect, would
emphasize the circles of sympathy. He would likely argue that
those farthest from our hearts and our everyday experiences
would be trusted the least, and those closest to us would be
trusted the most. In other words, the strongest social bonds
would be the ones most likely continuing past the disaster.
his would also probably result in the return to a clan-based
society in which small familiar groups rely upon each other
for their basic needs and long-term planning.
But then scarcity would arise (not to mention the inevitable adventurous human spirit).9 he clans would be forced
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market” is a misnomer; a civilized society houses a “wellmanaged” market at best. For Smith, the term free market
refers to global trade, not completely unfettered trade. In
fact, while Smith uses the terms free competition (and free
and universal competition), free commerce, free circulation
(particularly the free circulation of labor), free trade and
freedom of trade, and free importation many times, he only
uses the term free market once (WN IV.viii.26). hose who
seek to create free markets within communities either overemphasize or misunderstand Smith’s point.
What a free market actually is is unclear. On the global
scale, Smith ofers a clearer blueprint—no tarifs or regulations that limit trade or promote bootlegging, for example,
or no monopolization of trade routes—but what would such
a market look like within a given society? Whatever it is, it
promotes the ability for people to change trades as oten as
they please; it brings the market price in as much alignment
with the natural price as possible; it necessitates a reasonable
form of informed consent, and it probably does not permit
much price ixing.12 But other questions abound. Are all
products permissible? Does sales tax have to be evenly applied? What forms of consumer protections are acceptable or
required? As we saw with Herzog’s economic comments, we
are used to dealing with these questions on the general level,
but much more needs to be said.
hese are tentative conclusions at best; signiicantly more
work needs to be done on the interpretive level, let alone
prescriptively. But I am conident of my basic point: free
markets exist within government structures, and are necessarily guided by regulation and intervention to a signiicant
extent. his is a fact that should be celebrated, not lamented.
A rejection of the governmental role in managing the economy is a form of anarchy, not free commerce.
MORAL EDUCATION THROUGH SATIRE
Returning to Drosos’s disaster, it is worth noting that the
chaos that he describes does more than create a breakdown
of laws and practices. It also destroys the mechanism of social recognition that Spiros Tegos addresses in such detail.
First of, what is easy to forget about Drosos’s scenario is that
the irst breakdown is that of conversation. In times of crisis,
there is little leisure and little attention to the more rhetorical
aspects of day to day life. here is also little attention to satire
as public engagement.13 Without satire, there are fewer ways
with which to socialize individuals. It is, as Tegos points out,
harder to temper hypocrisy.
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49
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to trade with one another, irst tentatively with many explicit
safeguards and then, eventually, once the trustworthy have
been identiied, with a comfort level that would allow for intermingling and the enlarging of the clan society.10
In a certain sense, this seems like Nozick’s societal genealogy in Anarchy, State, Utopia, giving prima facie credence to,
yet again, a more libertarian interpretation of Smith. But giving too much attention to the similarities would be misleading, since Drosos’s scenario necessarily divorces the social
evolution from Smith’s stadial theory.
Smith’s point in WN is that human progress is integrated
with discovery—the very irst pages of WN present an account of specialized innovation. Government structures
naturally change as the means of production changes, which
is why agricultural and feudal societies have diferent types
of governance than commercial societies. But in the wake of
a disaster, human learning does not go backward. Certain
technologies may be unavailable, but the populace knows
they existed and would strive to reinvent them as quickly
as possible. hey are restoring society, not inventing it. his
means, ultimately, reestablishing law and order, as well as social bonds, as quickly as possible. hus, however libertarianlike the response to a disaster might appear, the Smithian
goal is always to move away from libertarian structures towards a more robust and orderly society as quickly as possible. Smith’s libertarian genealogy, if it exists at all, is only a
way station on the way to a thick polity.
We are once again back to the political questions I put
aside for the irst volume. We are asking about the social
foundation of justice, and the relative power of laws over
character and inclination. Smith understands that personal
commitment is the greatest threat to political stability and
sees religion as the surest road to factions. I will address this
further in the next volume, especially since religion fanaticism is such a pervasive problem today.11 But a recent study
by the journalist Naomi Klein suggests that there is an even
greater threat, the use of shock to manipulate markets (Klein,
2008). She outlines the ways in which neoconservatives have
created or exploited disasters to make real economies into
laboratories, and the horrendous economic circumstances
that result.
Klein’s claims are controversial to say the least, but they
must be addressed and I am currently working on postulating a Smithian response to her work that will also ind its way
into the next volume. However, an abridged version of my
anticipated response might be as follows: markets are managed by legislation and government maintenance to a much
larger extent than most people like to admit. he term “free
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Echoing Freud, Tegos maps out the process by which the
impartial spectator internalizes social standards and identity
cues. Following D. D. Raphael and Fonna Forman, he sees
Smith’s account of the internalization of favorable and unfavorable attitudes as anticipating Freud’s super ego. He then
adds Smith’s foreshadowing of the role of Freudian idealization in establishing both the “I” (ego) and identifying those
whom the moral agent should emulate (even when worshipping “the great” has no utilitarian value). his is useful because it reminds us that society chooses whom to advertise
as virtuous. Role models are culturally deined, and as society changes or breaks down, those who stand out change.
his is related to Carrasco’s point that harm and its concomitant categories are socially deined as well.
But this breakdown is not solely a product of large-scale
disasters. It also happens in instances of signiicant personal
change. To illustrate this, Tegos highlights Smith’s suspicion
of the “coxcomb” or the nouveau riche. As he summarizes it:
Multitudes of working poor” (Mandeville and Kaye 1988,
p. 355). However immoral or misguided the poor man’s son
is, he has signiicant utilitarian purpose.
So, there is a tension between Smith’s optimism and the
poor man’s son who is a “lover of system.” On the one hand,
as Tegos writes:
he nouveau riche is blind to other spectators’ gaze
because he is so vain that he cannot realize how ridiculous his social image remains. As a result, this character puts the function of the impartial spectator in
serious trouble because he is deaf to social stigma even
in the most conventional sense of the term. It seems
therefore highly unlikely for him to transgress conventional morality.
he poor man’s son misunderstands his true economic
goals. He confuses bettering oneself with amassing toys and
prestige. Yet on the other hand, the
Vanity, Tegos claims, prevents the coxcomb from hearing the tempering voices of others, but I would suggest that
this is only possible because the nouveau riche have, for lack
of a better phrase, lost their way. hey have little life experience evaluating the virtuous and the vicious among the
aristocracy, and they are uncertain whom to emulate. Like
those faced with a new and unprecedented crisis, they ind
their old ways eclipsed. Perhaps this is why ridicule works so
well. Humor is cutting and is almost always more efective in
countering vanity than persuasion is. But also, the coxcomb,
as Tegos explains, has trouble distinguishing between vanity
and bettering his or her own condition.
Tegos is no doubt correct that vanity is a “corruption of
the natural tendency to ‘bettering condition.’” He is also wise
to emphasize Smith’s poor man’s son. But he must remember
that for Smith, the lie that the poor man’s son tells himself is a
lie that drives economic advancement. As Mandeville points
out before Smith, the proligate, the “sensual Courtier” and
“Fickle Strumpet that invents new Fashions every Week”
are the agents that “procure an honest Livelihood to the vast
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the poor man’s anxiety and restlessness recalls a kind
of manic-depressive personality in the non-technical
and widely popularized sense of the medical term. he
main reason for this oversight resides in a more serious
oversight: the poor man’s son’s character is a species of
a broader genre, and his obsessions are species of obsessions proper to a broader family of characters, the
“lovers of toys.” And for those who rush to overlook
these thoughts as overstatements, Smith issues a warning as he oten does; minute things contain important
messages.
universal trait of human imagination—the love of system—gains new life in commercial contexts where, in
contrast to earlier socio-economic stages, opportunities for the acquisition of wealth are more abundant,
and synonymous with social ascent for larger strata
of the population. hus the poor man’s son as a case
of the love of system destined to lourish in commercial society, entails an ambiguous assessment—a blend
of surprise, admiration, laughter and sadness—and
demands the inest ironic skills to be fairly gauged that
go beyond Mandeville’s satire.
Tegos’s point, I think, is that commercial success is both so
powerful and so desirable that ordinary moral education will
not overpower its negative side efects. As such, only satire
and ridicule can tame the famous and powerful. But, at the
same time, one can’t walk away from the inherent optimism
present in Smith’s fable. he poor man’s son’s qualiied success and his walk away from virtue make us all better of.
his, as Tegos reminds us, is Mandeville’s inluence on
Smith. But it is also indicative of the book’s two Smithian
themes that I announce in the introduction:
First, as already noted in his philosophy of history,
Smith’s work assumes a constant interaction between
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A second theme is that that which divides people also
unites them. Perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of Smith’s work is that the very factors that help
unify people in the face of diversity are the same ones
that cause them to understand one another as diferent
in the irst place. his is an empiricist’s dilemma and
an accurate account of the human condition; Smith’s
philosophical problem is everyone’s existential one.
As we shall see, natural tendencies make individuals
want to domineer, but these same tendencies motivate
people toward mutual sympathy. Lived experience results in agents’ having diferent perspectives, but this
same root empiricism (however limited it may turn out
to be) allows people to imagine themselves in another
person’s circumstance. he division of labor creates
political divisions just as it creates universal opulence.
How Smith manages these factors and how he overcomes the divisive forces that may also be used to cement society are important questions that guide my
investigation (p. 18).
In other words, the poor man’s son, like the slave, as
Carrasco has pointed out, is paradigmatic. He sets himself an
ideal and fails to achieve it, and he does so because the ideals
that make us a closer community can also push us farther
apart. We strive to do the right thing and even though we act
appropriately, we cannot avoid the possibility that it will all
end up negatively. I don’t believe one can grasp the accuracy
of Smith’s work without attention to these two themes. I also
think, if I can speculate, that being inattentive to them has
led to the greatest miscommunication in this volume: Maria
Pia Paganelli’s misunderstanding of my use of optimism and
progress.
OPTIMISM
Paganelli’s analysis makes two diferent points. he irst is
that I do not provide enough textual evidence to claim that
Smith is an optimist and the second is that Smith should not
be read as one. Obviously, the second is more philosophi-
cally interesting than the irst, and while I do not believe that
my evidence was as spare as she suggests, to the irst point I
will respond simply that if she, as a reader, walked away unconvinced, then I probably did not do the job I needed to do.
However, it is important to recognize, as Nathaniel
Wolloch remarks in the introduction, that Paganelli’s conclusion “goes against the grain of mainstream Smith scholarship, which tends to see him as an example of general
Enlightenment optimism.” his doesn’t mean she’s wrong, of
course, but it speaks to why my defense was less vociferous
than she would have liked. I, like many scholars, simply take
Smith’s optimism for granted.
Is Smith an optimist? he contributors to this volume
certainly seem to think so. Maria Carrasco writes: “Indeed,
despite Smith’s strong commitment to fallibilism he believes
that, using the various resources at its disposal for attaining
a better perception, a better identiication and a more accurate moral judgment, the sympathetic process discovers
truth (objective appropriateness) and normative ethics.” Lisa
Herzog, quoting Smith himself, explains:
51
…in commercial societies, ‘the road to virtue and that
to fortune, […] are, happily in most cases, very nearly
the same,’ at least for the ‘middling and inferior stations’ (TMS I.III.3.5). In the markets Smith envisaged,
working hard, delivering good quality, being reliable,
and building up a good reputation (LJ (B), 538-9), all
lead to economic prosperity, thus providing incentives
for these virtues, which may not be the highest virtues,
but which can be expected from all members of commercial society.
Spiros Tegos keenly calls Smith’s parable of the poor man’s
son as “probably the irst sketch of the American dream” and
quotes him as believing that satire “is altogether consistent
with the character of a Gentleman as it tends to the reformation of manners and the beneit of mankind” (1.88). And,
as we have seen, Dionysis Drosos sees enough optimism in
Smith as to suggest excess on his part. I will add that even
the irst line of TMS is optimistic, suggesting that people do
care about the happiness of others, despite having no real interest in it, and, as we have seen with our discussion of the
poor man’s son, Smith is profoundly optimistic that people’s
personal betterment, even the attempts that go awry, can
make the whole better of. he invisible hand is an optimistic
story, as is Smith’s stadial theory, his faith in the expertise of
the worker, and his belief implicit in all of his work that we
can learn from history.
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an ideal that acts as evaluative criteria for human
thought, motivation, and moral inquiry and an actual
but imperfect process of discovery that illustrates well
the limitations of the human project. Smith’s agents always aim for perfection but never achieve it; progress
and comparison must always be the standard of betterment.
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But perhaps I am being unfair. Showing optimistic elements in Smith does not prove he is an optimist, and there
is no doubt that Smith is, at times, mean, suspicious, critical,
and even dark. here also seems to be little fruit in asking
how many optimistic beliefs a person must have in order to
be considered an optimist; I don’t want to engage in casuistry. Instead, I would suggest that Paganelli and I difer in that
I consider Smith’s role as a pamphleteer, emphasizing what
I call elsewhere the educative nature of his texts (Weinstein,
forthcoming). I see his work as calls to action—calls that demand comparisons of what is to what might be.
Notice, for example, that all of the quotes Paganelli cites
involve his present-day circumstances: China wasn’t stagnant, but it is now, and Marco Polo is not much diferent
than his contemporaries; Bengal was booming but it is now
regressive; there isn’t enough demand for laborers in Europe
to match the birthrate; in its present condition, Great Britain
resembles a diseased body; the workers face lives of torpor
and “drowsy stupidity”; progress has made great warriors
into weak men; government can now use public debt to inance war, leading to ruin; organized interests get governmental favors, especially the merchants and manufacturers;
citizens are entertained by the news of wars and dream of
empire for amusement; the sovereign squanders public
monies on trinkets; and the barons and landlords spent their
money on trinkets with no disposition to share. Each of
these observations are descriptive not prescriptive.
I let a few out, not because they don’t it my thesis, but
because they are posed as conditionals or prescriptions: “if
Britain succumbs to lobbyists and mercantilists, it may go
the way of Bengal rather than its North-American colonies”;
the diseased body of England “deserves the most serious attention of government” otherwise it will spread like a leprosy; and, when war comes, it will “probably” ruin the nations
of Europe. hese quotes clearly point to a fork in the road.
hey are advisory in nature. hey show that Smith is giving
us both a pessimistic warning and an optimistic alternative.
he one quote I have passed over is Smith’s observation
that North America has more potential for growth than
England, but, of course, this is neither pessimism nor optimism, it is simply fact. An unexplored continent of uncultivated and largely unpopulated land does indeed have
more growth potential than the crowded, exploited lands of
Europe that are buried in history and politics. Nevertheless,
this is why trade is so important for Smith. Commercial interaction can bring these opportunities to Europe, revitalizing the economies of countries that are on the brink of ruin.
his sounds optimistic to me.
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Smith wrote his “very violent attack . . . upon the whole
commercial system of Great Britain” because he wanted to
change policy and he did (Corr. 208). He wanted to show us
how bad things are under mercantilism and then project the
positivity of free trade. He is doing what any sophisticated
pamphleteer would do. He is gathering evidence for his advice and explaining all the good that will come from it.
Insofar as we can know anything about his mind, I’m conident that Smith was optimistic enough to believe that his
works could inluence policy. his is the same kind of optimism he revealed when he observed that students will learn
what is worth learning without compulsion: “No discipline is
ever requisite to force attendance upon lectures which are really worth the attending, as is well known wherever any such
lectures are given” (WN V.i.f.15). In this, he is certainly more
optimistic about student enthusiasm than I am. And regarding the impact of WN, he was correct. His book changed the
world.
In the midst of her criticism, though, Paganelli changes
tone. She starts of by suggesting that Smith wasn’t an optimist at all, but then remarks: “If there is progress in Smith, it
is not necessarily inevitable or something to take for granted.” Regarding this, she and I couldn’t agree more. here is
nothing inevitable about progress at all. As I state in ASP:
…whether there has or has not been progress in opulence is not arbitrary. his is an empirical matter depending on the deinitions of progress and opulence,
accepting the fact that no single meaning may be deinitive. Certainly, there might have been progress
for some people and regress or stasis for others…As
Maureen Harkin suggests, in addition to Smith’s recognizing that progress does come with some loss, he
seems to suggest that his own narratives are “local to
a time and place, neither unconditionally true nor unqualiiedly certain.” For Smith, this is yet again the tension between the actual epistemological limitations of
inquirers who create the narratives and the ideal theoretical constructs they use to investigate nature (ASP
258-259).
As I go to great pains to detail, Smith’s notion of progress
is an ideal by which he measures actual history, just as the
impartial spectator is an ideal moral standard by which one
evaluates actual activity, and natural price is an ideal measure of comparative worth that one strives for when evaluating market price. Smith is interested in asking why actual
events do not conform to the way they should be; if he was as
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If Smith really did think every jot and tittle of human
history could be accounted for by the design of a benevolent deity, we might expect a cheerful story about
progress to run through his work, telling us that we can
be sure that our societies today – the more “advanced”
ones, at any rate – are better of in every respect than
past societies were, and that we will continue to progress until we reach some ideal utopian state…But
one of the most striking features of Smith’s work…is
the way that he complicates the easy story of progress
that dominated the Enlightenment (Evensky, 2007, pp.
196–197).
Fleischacker then lists many pessimistic moments in
Smith’s writing and concludes, “No cheerful progressivism
here! Rather we have a story every bit as much about ‘corruption and degeneracy’….as about improvement.” (ibid).
Fleischacker’s misreading is not of Smith; everything he
writes is a reasonable interpretation. It is, however, deeply
unfair to Evensky, who ofers no such Pollyannaish interpretation. hankfully, Evensky had his say. In his response,
ater pointing out that Fleischacker has “done to Evensky
just what he claims Evensky has done to Smith, grossly
oversimplify[ing] his work,” he summarizes his position as
follows: “the reality of human history is primarily pain and
struggle as individual societies emerge, progress, stagnate,
and decline.” he stories of China and Bengal, for example,
he explains as “each a story of unbridled self-interest and absurd institutional structures leading to human exploitation,
immiseration, and starvation.” (Evensky, p. 199). His description of history is similar to mine and Evensky’s book included all of this information, but his reviewer simply didn’t
recognize it.14
Now, let me be clear: Paganelli is not as egregious as
Fleischacker. We disagree, but she has not misread my book.
We may difer on how much evidence counts as enough,
but I fully accept that she herself was not persuaded, and I
appreciate her being so forthcoming. I also agree that her
understanding of Smith is defensible—there are many ways
to read Smith. But there is no “straw man” in ASP and my
interpretation of Smith, however it difers from hers, is not
“deformed.” If the evidence for Smith’s optimism, in her
words, “may not be as clear as Weinstein wants it to be,” then
all she has established is that there is ambiguity, not that my
interpretation is of. She has overstated her points for efect
and not engaged my whole argument.
She is not alone. here is something about the idea of
progress that drives many people to rhetorical apoplexy.15
hey seem to think that if someone suggests there has been
progress, then he or she is suggesting that there has never
been sufering, or that they are using a means-ends justiication to excuse the sufering there was. Yet, I explicitly
reject the notion that pain is necessary for goodness, writing, “by victims, I mean those whose cultures, economic or
moral lives, or institutions did not survive the vast historical
change, or who endured more sufering because of the successes of others. I do not claim that these tragedies are necessary for progress” (256 n. 97). I also write:
Furthermore, Smith never claims that sufering is required for progress. While he does think that lessons
come from tragedy and sufering—the experiments of
history yield results—he never makes an argument for
the necessity of oppression. As a result, his philosophy
of history is not susceptible to the postcolonial critique
that any notion of progress justiies historical injustice. To use Kipling’s phrase, there is no “White Man’s
Burden” in any of Smith’s work (p. 259).
here is always sufering; I never claim Smith is utopian.
here are always stops and starts; progress is not perfectly
linear. I was as explicit about that as Evensky was. I am disappointed that Paganelli didn’t see it.
I must admit that I anticipated this reaction to a certain
extent, which is why I spent the inal chapters presenting
Smith’s philosophy of history and arguing against Foucault,
the person who most powerfully argued against the concept
of progress itself. If Paganelli had addressed these chapters
as well, I am sure I would have learnt a great deal from her
analysis.
CONCLUSION
I fear that it may be unsatisfying to read an author respond
“I’m getting to that,” over and over to his commentators. I
have tried to include many substantive arguments in this essay and to anticipate many of my coming conclusions. But
THE POLITICAL HYPOTHESES OF ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS
53
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optimistic as Paganelli claims I think he is, then his project
would be nonsensical because there wouldn’t be any variation between the ideal and the actual.
It is unclear what Paganelli means by “an optimist”, but
I suspect I have seen this debate before. In a serious misreading of Jerry Evensky’s Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy,
Samuel Fleischacker casts doubt on Smith’s progressivism.
He writes:
the fact of the matter is that my project is too long for one
book, and were I to wait until it was all completed, the result
probably wouldn’t be available to the public for another decade.
More importantly, though, I cannot complete my research
without engaging the community of scholars along the way.
here is no point in writing if one does not address the audience and learn from their experience. Adam Smith had the
luxury of living in a scholarly culture that permitted a person to revise the same work year ater year until he or she
died. We do not. Instead, the best we can do is present our
indings and immerse ourselves in the discourse that results.
his is the opportunity that this issue of Cosmos and Taxis
has given me, and I am thankful for every moment of it. he
sequel to Adam Smith’s Pluralism will be better because of
the commentary included here. I look forward to the time
when the contributors read that next volume and help teach
me where I need to go ater that.16
54
REFERENCES
COSMOS + TAXIS
Evensky, J. (2007). Jerry Evensky’s Response to Review by Samuel
Fleischacker. In: he Adam Smith Review: Volume 3, edited by
V. Brown, 198–202. Abingdon: Routledge.
Haakonssen, K. (1989). he Science of a Legislator: he Natural
Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith. Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Hamowy, R., and I. Ross (1987). he Scottish Enlightenment and the
heory of Spontaneous Order. 1st edition. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Hont, I. (2005). Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the
Nation-State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Klein, N. (2008). he Shock Doctrine: he Rise of Disaster Capitalism.
1st edition. New York: Picador.
Kraemer, J. L. (2010). Maimonides: he Life and World of One of
Civilization’s Greatest Minds. New York: Doubleday Religion.
Mandeville, Bernard de, and F. B. Kaye. (1988). Fable of the Bees: Or,
Private Vices, Publick Beneits. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Translated by
Arthur Goldhammer. First Edition. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Pinker, S. (2011). he Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has
Declined. First Edition. New York: Viking Adult.
Ross, I. S. (2010). he Life of Adam Smith. 2nd edition. Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, C. (2014). Review of Jack Russell Weinstein’s Adam Smith’s
Pluralism: Rationality, Education, and the Moral Sentiments.
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7, no. 2 (Autumn):
162–69.
VOLUME 2 | ISSUE 3 2015
hompson, D. (2011). 30 Million in Poverty Aren’t as Poor as You
hink, Says Heritage Foundation. he Atlantic, July 19, 2011.
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/07/30million-in-poverty-arent-as-poor-as-you-think-says-heritagefoundation/242191/.
Weinstein, J. R. (forthcoming). Adam Smith and the Educative
Critique: A Response to My Reviewers.” Studies in Philosophy and
Education.
Weinstein, J. R. (2007). Evensky’s Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: he
Wealth of Nations and the Morality of Opulence. Research in the
History of Economic hought and Methodology 25-A: 61–69.
Weinstein, J. R. (2012). Overlapping Consensus or Marketplace of
Religions? Rawls and Smith. Philosophia 40, no. 2 (June 1): 223–36.
Weinstein, J. R. (2014). What My Dog Can Do: On the Efects of WN
I.ii.2. In: Propriety and Prosperity, eds. D. F. Hardwick and L. Marsh,
147–65. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Winch, D. (1978). Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic
Revision. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
NOTES
1
2
3
To illustrate, while TMS was successful enough to
warrant six editions in Smith’s lifetime the total print
run during the life of it copyright was 7750 copies (Ross,
2010, p. 188).
he British Museum opened to the public in 1759; the
Louvre opened to the public in 1793.
Here we face a compelling interpretive issue. While
Smith’s basic point is understood, an hour has not
been a consistent measure throughout the ages. As Joel
Kraemer explains: “It is important to realize that the
hours of the day for Maimonides’ contemporaries had
diferent lengths depending on the seasons. As the earth
revolves around the sun, the length of the period of
daylight changes. he ancients divided a day into twelve
equal parts of daytime and nighttime, so the length of
their hours called seasonal hours, actually varied. In
Maimonides’ milieu, people counted twelve hours of
nighttime and twelve hours of daytime, whatever the
length of daylight. If daylight was long, each hour would
be correspondingly long, and if short, the hour would
be correspondingly short. An hour was one-twelth of
the length of daylight or nighttime. Instead of our sixtyminute hour, then, the ancient hour could be from forty
to eighty minutes. For astronomical calculations, the
hours knows as equinoctial were one twenty-fourth of a
day, or equal to the length of a seasonal hour at equinox”
(Kraemer, 2010, p. 78). It is worth asking, then, whether
the Smith interpreter should address the fact that an
COSMOS + TAXIS
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
research time is probably the most valuable commodity.
hat all the participants thought my book worthy of their
eforts is an immeasurable compliment. I was humbled
by Leslie Marsh’s invitation to this special volume and
overwhelmed by Nathaniel Wolloch’s willingness to
devote such time to the editorial process. Finally, I hope
that my respect for Maria Alejandra Carrasco, Denis
Drosos, Lisa Herzog, Maria Pia Paganelli, and Spiros
Tegos permeates every sentence. I thank them all for
their kindness and thoughtful attention.
THE POLITICAL HYPOTHESES OF ADAM SMITH’S PLURALISM: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS
55
COSMOS + TAXIS
4
hour’s toil and trouble could not be the same because
an hour had such luctuation, or is it better to think of
Smith’s point as he intended it: physiologically, basic
human labor capabilities have not varied in recorded
history.
As I point out in the book, Smith does ind Plato’s
account of justice compatible with his own (TMS VII.
ii.1.11; ASP 56).
For more on Smith’s politics and the attempt to
determine his legislative perspective, see: Haakonssen,
1989; Winch, 1978.
As Istvan Hont astutely observes, Hobbes’s theory
was purely political with no economic consideration
at all, but by the time the tradition got to Marx, these
characteristics were reversed: “Marx had no use for
politics at all” (Hont, 2005, p. 2).
Such a discussion might involve asking questions such
as: Should countries equalize access to meat or other
forms of protein? Should each person be entitled
to a speciic range of square footage? Is culturallyappropriate clothing a reasonable government beneit
for those receiving assistance?
A primer on this spontaneous order tradition can be
found in Hamowy and Ross, 1987.
Smith sees the desire to trade as innate, although while
he suggests that it is a unique human trait, nothing rests
on his claim of uniqueness. See, Weinstein, 2014, pp.
447-65.
My description of the breakdown is as speculative
as Smith’s and I make no attempt to root it in the
sociological research of social activity during disasters.
I do this because Drosos asks a question about the text,
not about the real world, so to speak.
See also Weinstein, 2012, pp. 223–36.
his list is not intended to be exhaustive.
I do not mean to suggest that people don’t insult one
another in times of crisis. Instead, I mean that satire
changes its rhetorical purpose. Its goal is to motivate
allies against a common enemy and not to inspire social
change through education of the object of satire.
For more on Evensky, see: Weinstein, 2007, pp. 61–69.
Consider the critical reaction to Stephen Pinker’s
argument that the world is less violent now than it has
ever been. Many of his critics refuse his position on
principal and avoid debating the content of his very
sophisticated argument (Pinker, 2011).
I am deeply honored to have my work attended to by
such wonderful scholars. In today’s academic world,
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