Neopragmatism

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2009

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2013

2018

The book seeks to demonstrate the following main points: * Current debates between realists and antirealists (as well as objectivists and relativists) are significantly similar to early 20th century debates between realists and idealists which Pragmatism addressed extensively. * Despite their debts to Dewey, neopragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam are reenacting realist and idealist stands in their debate over realism thus giving life to something shown fruitless by earlier Pragmatists. * What is absent from the Neopragmatist's position is precisely what makes Pragmatism enduring: namely, its metaphysical conception of experience and a practical starting point for philosophical inquiry that such experience dictates. * Pragmatism cannot take the "linguistic turn" insofar as that turn mandates a theoretical starting point. * While Pragmatism's view of truth is perspectival, it is nevertheless not liable to relativism. * Pace Rorty, Pragmatism need not be hostile to metaphysics; indeed, it demonstrates how pragmatic instrumentalism and metaphysics are complementary. Preface Abbreviations ONE: INTRODUCTION I. Realism, Antirealism, and Neopragmatism II. Plan of this Book TWO: DEWEY AND REALISM I. Pragmatism Enters the Fray II. Idealism, New Realism, and Critical Realism III. Is Pragmatism Realistic? IV. Dewey’s Pragmatic Realism V. Conclusion THREE: DEWEY AND IDEALISM I. Is Pragmatism an Idealism? II. Epistemology: Verification, Experience, Inquiry, and Signs III. Implications of Epistemology: The External World and Knowledge of the Past IV. Metaphysics: Antecedent Objects and The Philosophical Fallacy V. Ethical Implications: Future Consequences, Practical Action, and the Threat of Relativism VI. Conclusion FOUR: RORTY, PUTNAM, AND CLASSICAL PRAGMATISM I. The Reintroduction of Pragmatism II. Rorty’s Interpretation of Dewey III. Rorty’s Neopragmatism IV. Putnam’s Interpretation of Dewey V. Putnam’s Neopragmatism VI. Conclusion FIVE: NEOPRAGMATISM’S REALISM-ANTIREALISM DEBATE I. Introduction II. Terminology: "Realism" and its Contraries III. Putnam’s Realism and Rorty’s Antirealism IV. Rorty and Putnam’s Debate V. Conclusion SIX: BEYOND REALISM AND ANTIREALISM I. What "Beyond" Means II. Historical Parallels: Early Realists and Neopragmatists III. The Theoretical Starting Point IV. The Practical Starting Point V. Pragmatism, Neopragmatism, and Philosophy’s Future Notes Bibliography Index

Zygon�, 1993

2014

In a recent book, Hilary Putnam characterizes pragmatism in the following way: From the earliest of Peirce’s Pragmatist writings, Pragmatism has been characterized by antiscepticism: Pragmatists hold that doubt requires justification just as much as belief; and by fallibilism: Pragmatists hold that there are no metaphysical guarantees to be had that even our most firmly-held beliefs will never need revision. That one can be both fallibilistic and antisceptical is perhaps the basic insight of American Pragmatism. 1 My aim in this paper is to discuss some of implications of this basic insight of pragmatism for political theory. In the first two parts of the paper, I discuss two common features of modern political philosophy, features that are tied to the two aspects of modern naturalist philosophy that pragmatism seeks to upend. 2 The first is the pursuit of theoretical certainty in political theory in

stier.net

Southwest Philosophy Review, 2003

There is a general consensus that pragmatism’s twenty-year renaissance produced two readily identifiable versions. One is typically called “classical” pragmatism (or simply “pragmatism”), the other “neopragmatism” (which I will call “linguistic pragmatism”). This newer form of pragmatism may be assessed by answering three questions: How does linguistic pragmatism “update” classical pragmatism? Why does linguistic pragmatism reject “experience” as a useful philosophical notion? Why is linguistic pragmatism wrong about “experience”? I.e., why is experience indispensable to pragmatism? My contention is that experience is methodologically inseparable from pragmatism, and linguistic pragmatism may neglect or extirpate experience only at the cost of rendering pragmatism overly theoretical, quarantined from practical action. Thus, linguistic pragmatism would revise pragmatism by eliminating the very features that explain the renewed and widespread enthusiasm for it.

This talk was delivered at the Liberal Naturalism Conference, organized by Talia Morag, and held at Deakin University, 23-24 November 2017. It draws on Charles Peirce's semiotics to reconceive ‘objectivity’ in a more open-minded and fallibilist manner, based around a logical rather than scientific notion of ‘object’, by means of an indexical normative pragmatics. At this point, naturalism's key question becomes – is what you're talking about merely a reflection of your own idiosyncracies? Or does it have a "nature"?... As this presentation is as yet unpublished, comments are very welcome. (c.legg@deakin.edu.au)