Flight from disarmament
By M. V. Ramana | 10 May 2012
Editor's note: This article is largely drawn from Ramana's featured piece in the report
"Assuring Destruction Forever," edited by Ray Acheson and published in April 2012 byReaching
Critical Will.
On April 19, India tested its three-stage Agni-5 missile, an
intermediate-range ballistic missile with a reach of 3,100 miles (5000
kilometers) and a payload capacity of about 3,300 pounds (1500
kilograms). Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony praised the launch as
an "immaculate success." India's journalists and defense officials alike
described the test as catapulting the country into an "elite club." In
essence, the missile test means that India now has the capability to
build an intercontinental ballistic missile, making it the sixth country in
the world to have such a weapon.
The Agni-5 missile, which according to the government should
ultimately be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead just about
anywhere in China and much of Russia, represents the latest step in
an ongoing process of modernization of the nuclear arsenal in India -the main focus of which has been on increasing the diversity, range,
and sophistication of ways of delivering weapons. It also symbolizes
the degenerative logic of the belief in nuclear deterrence. Even though
its proponents point out that the possession of nuclear weapons would
eliminate the motivation for arms races, in just about every case,
countries that acquire nuclear weapons also embark on boundless
military weapons acquisitions.
India is by no means unique in this pursuit. As of May 2012, the
nuclear weapon possessors -- China, North Korea, France, India,
Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States -are estimated to possess approximately 19,000 nuclear weapons. And
all nuclear weapon possessors are engaged in modernization activities,
pouring nearly $100 billion, collectively, into their nuclear programs. At
this rate, they will spend at least $1 trillion on nuclear weapons over the
next decade. And yet, all these nations, with the possible exception of
North Korea, will call for a world free of nuclear weapons or engage in
some kind of arms control talks. India is guilty of the same: ramping up
modernization while publicly expressing an interest in disarmament.
A look at India's nuclear forces. The Indian government is secretive
about its military technologies -- especially when it comes to nuclear
weapons. (The one exception is in the case of ballistic missiles, where
every successful test launch is lauded as a mark of India's destructive
prowess.) Based on the scanty available public information, in 2010,
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' Nuclear Notebook estimated that
India has 60 to 80 assembled nuclear warheads, with only about 50
fully operational. Then in 2011, the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute estimated that, as of January 2011, India had
between 80 and 100 nuclear warheads.
India's nuclear weapons program first shot to prominence in 1974,
when the country conducted a nuclear weapons test. After a 24-year
hiatus, India conducted five more nuclear explosions in 1998. Much of
what is known about the designs of India's nuclear weapons comes
from statements immediately following these tests. According to an
official press release from 1998, there were four different designs
tested: regular fission; thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb); boosted
fission, which causes the primary explosive to produce the radiation
that then compresses the fusion part of the two-stage thermonuclear
weapon; and a relatively low-explosive yield. Various heads of the
Department of Atomic Energy maintain that the 1998 tests gave India
"the capability to build fission and thermonuclear weapons" with yields
of up to 200 kilotons. But it is probable that only one or two of these
designs have been deployed.
The most likely design to have been weaponized is the fission
explosive, which was a more sophisticated and lightweight version of
the design tested in 1974. Indeed, in a subsequent public talk in New
Delhi in 2000, India's then-Atomic Energy Commission Chairman R.
Chidambaram said the fission weapon "had been in the stockpile for
several years." He termed the others "weaponizable configurations"
that had yet to be "converted into a weapon." There is no official
confirmation of whether this conversion has subsequently occurred;
though going by past history, it is likely that teams of scientists and
engineers are working on it.
Since 1998, the primary focus of efforts to further India's nuclear
arsenal has been on developing delivery vehicles for the weapons
already tested and enhanced. In fact, because there is so little public
discussion on the nuclear weapons themselves, the frequent testing of
a diverse array of ballistic missiles of increasingly longer range is often
the most visible reminder of India's growing nuclear capability. India
has also developed or otherwise acquired components of an early
warning system and an anti-ballistic-missile defense system.
India's official nuclear doctrine dating back to 2003 is terse, with little
detail on what the nation envisions for its arsenal. However, back in
1999, India's National ecurity Advisory Board released a draft nuclear
doctrine for India that is far more elaborate. It calls for India's nuclear
forces to be deployed on a triad of delivery vehicles -- "aircraft, mobile
land-based missiles and sea-based assets" -- that are structured for
"punitive retaliation" so as to "inflict damage unacceptable to the
aggressor." While this document was never formally adopted by the
government, it's clear that the development of India's nuclear arsenal
has followed the broad strokes laid out in the report.
Land. India's main land-based nuclear delivery system is the Agni
series of missiles. Work on the Agni started in 1983, but this series of
missiles has been substantially redesigned since the 1998 nuclear
tests. Prior to the Agni-5 test in April, the 2,175-mile-range, two-stage
Agni-4 missile was tested in 2011. And the Agni-1, -2, and -3 -- with
ranges from 435 miles (700 kilometers) up to 2,175 miles (3,500
kilometers) -- have all been tested many times, including within the last
two years. And then there is the smaller-range Prithvi missile series,
which has also been tested extensively. The Prithvi-1, with a range of
93 miles (150 kilometers), is nuclear-capable. Defense officials and
media commentators in India routinely describe the Prithvi-2 and
Prithvi-3 missiles as nuclear-capable as well, but neither the Indian
government nor the defense industry has clarified if these are really
intended as nuclear-delivery vehicles.
So far, the Prithvi-1, Agni-1, and Agni-2 have been formally inducted
into the military. The International Institute for Strategic Studies
estimates that the military possesses about 80 to 100 Agni-1 missiles,
20 to 25 Agni-2 missiles, and up to about 20 Prithvi-1 missiles. These
numbers are much higher than the estimates for nuclear warheads,
because all of these missiles are capable of carrying both conventional
and nuclear payloads.
Air. The Indian air force has made clear that it does have aircraft it can
use in a nuclear strike mission, but there is some dispute over which
aircraft that would be. The Bulletin's Nuclear Notebook lists the Mirage
2000-H, the Jaguar IS/IB, and possibly the MIG-27 as likely
candidates. Some media commentators claim the Russian Sukhoi-30
MKI planes can be rigged to carry nuclear weapons, too. But other
analysts argue that Russian airplanes are not well-suited to nuclear
delivery and that the Jaguar and the Mirage 2000 are the most likely
aircraft to be used to drop nuclear bombs.
Sea. India's navy, meanwhile, has been developing a nuclear
submarine for more than three decades, reportedly with Russian help.
The design for the reactor of this submarine was finalized in the late
1990s. The submarine itself, the Arihant, however, was not launched
until 2009 and is not yet operational. In late 2010, the navy chief stated
that the operationalization of the Arihant would begin in late 2011 or
early 2012. However, in May 2012, the Indian Defense Minister
announced, "The strategic indigenous submarine … would be inducted
by the middle of next year." The submarine had yet to undergo crucial
sea-acceptance or weapons trials. Additionally, reports now indicate
that two more nuclear submarines are also under construction. The
Arihant is likely to make the Sagarika missile -- also called the K-15 -with a range of 435 miles (700 kilometers) its submarine-launched
ballistic missile. The first four launches of the Sagarika were kept a
secret; only the successful fifth test in 2008 was publicly announced.
In addition to India's domestic program, the navy has also leased a
Nerpa-class nuclear submarine from Russia in order to gain experience
operating such an intricate craft. The secretive contract on the 10-year
lease is said to be worth more than $900 million. The submarine is
equipped with 186-mile-range cruise missiles with conventional
warheads, but navy officials say they will use the vessel only "to train
its sailors in the complex art of operating nuclear submarines."
Infrastructure. India's acquisitions and manufacture of delivery
vehicles are just part of the total picture; the country is also scaling up
its nuclear infrastructure. The country's nuclear establishment is in the
process of building a new complex, at a reported cost of $288 million,
that will be far larger than the existing one. The new structure will host
a plutonium production reactor that is scheduled to come online in the
"2017-18 timeframe."
Meanwhile, India has also been enhancing its uranium enrichment
capacity. In addition to the existing Rattehalli complex -- another facility
undergoing an expansion -- there are also plans for a second uranium
enrichment plant, a "Special Material Enrichment Facility." According to
the Atomic Energy Commission chairman, this facility will not be
safeguarded solely for weapons use, as India is "keeping the option
open of using it for multiple roles." It is possible this is true -- that the
new facility will indeed be used only to produce low-enriched uranium
for power reactors. After all, India's existing enrichment capacity is
already sufficient for the nuclear submarine fleet it is currently planning
on building. Still, the facility makes up yet another part of India's
burgeoning defense establishment.
Predictably, India's missile production complex is also undergoing
expansion. The public-sector company that manufactures the Agni and
Prithvi missiles, Bharat Dynamics Ltd., is reported to be planning to
invest an estimated $800 million to open five new manufacturing
plants. Throughout the two years of 2006 and 2007, Bharat managed
to produce 15 Prithvi missiles. Today, the company is believed to
produce 20 missiles every year. This increased production rate is in
part a result of opening up elements of missile production to the private
sector. "The private industry has emerged as a co-developer of the
sub-systems of the missiles," says the head of the Defense Research
and Development Organization, "which is helping us in cutting down
development time."
Dissonance. All these nuclear arsenal modernization and expansion
activities run counter to India's stated desire for global nuclear
disarmament. Historically, India has supported numerous resolutions at
the UN General Assembly calling for the elimination of nuclear
weapons. At the 2011 session of the General Assembly, Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh offered "a concrete road map for achieving
nuclear disarmament in a time-bound, universal, non-discriminatory,
phased, and verifiable manner," for worldwide consideration.
What's missing from all these calls is any legal obligation to constrain
its own arsenal. Even as India has made all the right noises about
disarmament, it has never signed onto any international treaties that
would place meaningful controls on its own nuclear efforts. And when
the offer at the United Nations is followed seven months later by
blasting the Agni-V into the sky -- a metaphorical beacon of the
country's military modernization efforts -- proclamations about the
desire for global nuclear abolition seem somewhat hypocritical, to say
the least. One cannot call for nuclear disarmament while, in parallel,
modernizing and enlarging nuclear arsenals and the means to make
them. As Albert Einstein once wrote, "One cannot simultaneously
prepare for peace and prepare for war."
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