NEWSLETTER - APRIL 2005 The main speaker of the evening was Mr Stuart Sterzel the chairman of the Special Forces League. Mr Sterzel gave a well-illustrated and comprehensive "power point" lecture on "The Battle of Cuito Cuannevale, Angola, 1987". He commenced by explaining that the battle for Cuito Cuannevale was actually a series of battles between the Cuito River and the Longwe river valley in Southern Angola and not, as is popularly supposed, a battle for the town itself. During the latter stages of the Cold War the taking of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) became a priority in the Africa policy of the USSR. The RSA's strategic position, its minera l wealth and the prestige to be gained in Africa by its submission, made it of great strategic value. The countries on South Africa's northern borders were all allied against the RSA but, except for Angola, posed no real military threat. In Angola however a large conventional force backed up by Cuban and at least 16 000 USSR and other Warsaw Pact forces posed an extreme threat to the RSA. To prevent having to eventually fight these on South African soil, the RSA had to keep the opposing conventional forces north of the then South West African/Angolan border. This was a costly exercise for the RSA and by 1987 had imposed a severe strain on that country's economy. Angola had two opposing political parties, the MPLA and UNITA, who were waging a civil war in that country. Since 1974 the MPLA had been supported by the Warsaw Pact, and UNITA by the West and the RSA and by 1987 Cuban troops had been fighting in Angola for 13 years, without any great gains. The war had become unpopular in Cuba whilst the USSR was becoming dissatisfied at the lack of success and the costs it was incurring. All three parties felt that something had to be done and the USSR took the initiative. Up until then the main FAPLA (MPLA Army) thrust under USSR command had been into what the South Africans called "Sector 10" (from Angola's Cunene Province into Ovamboland) where the main RSA militar y resistance was concentrated. Now a new strategy was to be adopted by the USSR in which forces under Russian command would launch a big offensive in "Sector 20" (Cuando Cubango area) which was held by UNITA troops and a sprinkling of South Africans. A collapse by UNITA in this area would force the South Africans to withdraw and pave the way for an invasion of South West Africa and, ultimately, an attack from there into the RSA itself. For South Africa the situation thus became critical. Their aim became to bolster UNITA and make every effort to destroy the Warsaw Pact forces' equipment. To attempt to beat back the manpower reserves of the combined forces against them would be to attempt an impossibility, but destroying their equipment would mean that it could only be replaced with difficulty, because of the long logistical lines into the battle area. 2 Thus the stage was set. FAPLA troops under Russian command massed at Cuito Cuanneva le with the intention of taking the town and its bridge over the Cuito River, to take Mavingo with its strategic airstrip and to cross into South West Africa. The RSA forces were heavily outnumbered in all respects and so devised the strategy of drawing the FAPLA forces across the river and into the Lomba River valley, where the bridge behind them could be cut at Cuito Cuannevale and where their equipment could thus be surrounded and destroyed. This is exactly what happened in June 1987. Both sides followed their own strategies and as the FAPLA forces advanced into the Lomba valley the RSA Special Forces cut the bridge behind them, thus trapping them, as per plan, on the western side of the river where they were subjected to a heavy artillery barrage. Sustained contact between the opposing forces led to the RSA launching "Operation Modular" between September and 26 November, during which fierce fighting resulted along the Lomba River. Heavy air strikes and artillery barrages caused large FAPLA losses and eventually forced their withdrawal. By 17 November FAPLA were being pursued north up the Chambinga River. On 26 November the last attack under "Operation Modular" took place. For FAPLA it was a stunning setback but the RSA had achieved its best-case scenario. FAPLA's incursion into South West Africa was abandoned because of its equipment losses. From January to March 1988 FAPLA withdrew over the Cuito River, leaving a rearguard at the Tumpa triangle at the Tumpa River. South African Citizen Force units attacked this rearguard on 25 and 29 February as "Operation Hooper" and again on 23 March as "Operation Packer". At this stage Russian and Cuban negotiators met their RSA counterparts in Havana to discuss peace. Whilst these discussions were in progress, the RSA launched three more attacks against the Tumpa triangle before handing over to UNITA troops as the war was basically over. However the Cubans launched one final push southwards against South West Africa as a show of force to gain leverage before the negotiations were completed. This force was mauled by the South African 32 Battalion and a cessation of hostilities then occurred. The threat to South West Africa by the USSR was lifted and South Africa was able to withdraw from that country and concentrate on her own negotiations for a peaceful internal politica l settlement. The USSR withdrew from Angola and concentrated on her own ailing economy, as did Cuba. Angola was left to sort out her own internal affairs satisfactorily, finally bringing military stability to the region. Mr Sterzel was subjected to a barrage of questions before being thanked by our Vice Chairman, Flip Hoorweg. The winner of the DVD lucky draw then received his prize and the members and guests adjourned for tea and to view the selection of "Border War" weapons on display. ******* South African Military History Society / scribe@samilitaryhistory.org (This is an edited version of the newsletter. For the original version, please click on the url) http://samilitaryhistory.org/5/05aprnl.html