Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215 – 225 Ethics and the athlete: why sports are more than a game but less than a war Steven D. Stovitz, MD*, David J. Satin, MD Department of Family Practice and Community Health, University of Minnesota, 2615 E. Franklin Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55406, USA Are the ethics of athletes complex? Consider that an elite bicyclist might inject himself with hormones to increase his exercise capacity, but if his opponent falls, then that same hormone-abusing athlete will likely stop until his opponent has regained control. Consider that we as a society have very little problem with Mike Tyson trying to give Evander Holyfield a concussion during a boxing match, but we find it horrifying that Tyson bit Holyfield’s ear. What are we to make of these apparent contradictions? Some feel that ‘‘sports ethics’’ is something of an oxymoron [1]. We disagree. Through our formative years, sports provide a wonderful forum by which we can and do develop moral character [2]. At the professional level, sports present a forum to exercise moral fortitude under physical and emotional duress, while placing an entire nation of spectators in the position of arbiters. What are the ethical standards against which we measure the individual athlete’s moral conduct? How can one judge, prescribe, or proscribe an athlete’s behavior? At first glance, it may seem simple. Some say that sports are merely games and that players need only follow the rules. But as we will demonstrate, rule following is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral conduct in sports. Others analogize sports to war, stating that participants must do everything in their power to win. This too will be exposed as an untenable philosophy of moral conduct, as its limits are far too lenient. This article elucidates why, with respect to an athlete’s conduct, sports must be considered more than a game, but less than a war. We will present six cases to further the reader’s understanding of ethics and the athlete. The analysis of each case will reveal a critical concept in as- Gender specific terms have been employed throughout this article for simplicity. * Corresponding author. E-mail address: stovi001@umn.edu (S.D. Stovitz). 0278-5919/04/$ – see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.csm.2004.01.002 216 S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 sessing the moral status of athletic behavior. These concepts form a practical template rather than a metatheoretical account of the morality of sports. The following six concepts will emerge: The behavior of athletes is meaningful. Spectators and participants have a right, and perhaps a responsibility, to judge. The ethos (unwritten rules) of the game is more relevant than the written rules as a context for interpreting the moral quality of individual behaviors. The difference between fouling and cheating is, in practice, a function of the ethos of the game. In principle, this difference is determined by either the spirit of the rules, a contract between competitors, or respect for the game. Sports have both internal and external values. Judging the moral conduct of athletes requires consideration of both. Without exception, the ethics of ‘‘real life’’ trump ethical judgments within sports. Sports may be viewed as institutions of moral education. Role models are critical to this end, thus all involved have a duty to preserve the integrity of their sport. Case #1—Tonya Harding, Nancy Kerrigan, and the fallacy of moral subjectivism: why we have a right, and perhaps a responsibility, to judge How often do we hear the statement ‘‘it’s a war out there’’ in reference to a football game. Or that ‘‘athletes try to win at all costs.’’ But, athletes typically do not try to injure their opponents off the playing field. One obvious exception is the infamous 1994 case in women’s figure skating in which Tonya Harding’s friends and family purposely injured her chief rival, Nancy Kerrigan. If it were as simple as ‘‘win at all costs,’’ wouldn’t incidents like this be more common? Moral subjectivism is the belief that morality is simply a matter of taste and that there is no objective truth regarding right and wrong [3]. If the subjectivist is correct, then who are we to judge? For the moral subjectivist, Tonya Harding’s camp demonstrated a different set of values, neither better nor worse than any other. But we all know that assaulting a competitor with a crowbar is wrong. Our moral intuitions tell us so. Moral subjectivism fails not only on a theoretical basis, herein not discussed [4,5], but more importantly, it fails on a practical basis to capture the most fundamental grounding of morality—the moral intuitions of humanity. Even those who claim that sports are analogous to wars and that athletes should be free to win at all costs would concede that it is not acceptable to physically injure one’s opposition off the playing field. Not only do we have a right to make moral judgments, but as we will discuss in case #6, those involved in sports have powerful incentives to enforce strict standards. The good name of sports relies upon the moral conduct of their participants. We must recognize that the health of athletes within their sport may S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 217 depend upon the priority we place on judging, prescribing, and proscribing behaviors that bear moral qualities. The behavior of athletes is meaningful. Morality is not simply a matter of taste. Spectators and participants have a right, and perhaps a responsibility, to judge. Case #2—Jan Ullrich, Lance Armstrong, and ‘‘the stop heard round the world’’: why playing by the rules is not enough Consider the sport of elite bicycling, a sport plagued by allegations of the widespread use of illegal methods to boost hemoglobin and increase endurance [6,7]. Yet it is this same sport in which Jan Ullrich was in a neck-and-neck race with Lance Armstrong in the 2003 Tour de France, and when a spectator accidentally hooked Armstrong’s handlebars causing him to fall, Ullrich stopped and waited for Armstrong to get back up on his bicycle. Is there a written rule that you must stop when an opponent falls? No. Had Ullrich continued he might have gained ground and won the race. What would compel a professional athlete to give up an advantage gained legally in a sport renowned for its athletes’ attempts to gain illegal advantages? The answer is the ethos of professional cycling—its unwritten rules. First described by D’Agostino, ‘‘the ethos of the game is that set of unofficial, implicit conventions which determine how the rules of that game are to be applied in concrete circumstances’’ [8]. Level playing fields depend upon the ethos of games, and the value of winning depends upon level playing fields. British Tour de France rider Sean Yates said of the Armstrong-Ullrich incident, ‘‘It is normal for this to happen. If everyone behaves in the same way it all evens itself out in the end. And, it’s best for the sport’’ [6]. Sports at all levels depend upon the general acceptance of unwritten rules. Additionally, the value of victory relies upon defeating a worthy opponent. As legendary basketball coach John Wooden stated, ‘‘What joy can be derived in sports from overcoming someone who is not as capable as you are? But there is great joy and satisfaction in competing against an opponent who forces you to dig deep and produce your best. The worthy opponent brings out the very best in you’’ [9]. Although we cannot say for certain, one would hope that Ullrich stopped in accordance with the ethos of the game, as a means of maintaining a level playing field and allowing the best man to win. Amidst all the money, blood doping, and advertising in professional sports, the ideal remains a contest between fairly matched competitors, each competing with maximal effort, with the winner gaining advantage by sheer will. Although Yates’ statement about a level playing field was in reference to Ullrich’s display of sportsmanship, a parallel argument can be applied to the practice of blood doping. Despite the fact that hematocrits are checked before races and illegal boosting substances have been banned, it is suspicious that the vast majority of hematocrits have fluctuated over the years, consistently falling just within the newest legal limit. A similar pattern has been observed in other endurance sports [10]. In such sports, is raising one’s hematocrit to the legal limit 218 S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 through blood doping, although technically illegal, immoral? Some might argue that to stay competitive, one’s hematocrit must approach the upper level of legal. This requirement to ‘‘keep up with the Joneses’’ has been described by psychologists as a ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’ [11], whereby the only real option for an individual within the game is to seek the illegal advantage, because each participant must assume that his opponents will do the same. The dilemma is that each individual is in the same position, and therefore must act accordingly by assuming that all others will attempt to gain the illegal advantage. Though such an argument may not exculpate the athlete who blood dopes, perhaps at the very least it offers mitigating circumstances for how wrong this act might be [12]. There are still others who believe that no rationalization can excuse blood doping and that a moral high-road remains open to athletes engaging in such sports [13]. Notwithstanding, the link between these two seemingly contradictory behaviors—stopping for the fallen opponent and the use of banned substances—is that both arguably fall within the ethos of the game; both arguably maintain a level playing field. Although reference to the ethos of the game does not, in itself, determine the morality of stopping for a fallen opponent or the immorality of using illegal substances, it does provide a context to better judge the moral conduct of an individual athlete. Adherence to the written rules is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethical conduct in sports. The ethos of the game is more relevant than the written rules as a context for interpreting the moral quality of individual behaviors. Case #3—the special case of Shaquille O’Neal and the intentional foul: how are we to judge the one who ‘‘hacks a Shaq’’? As we have seen, not only does the ethos of the game reveal additional rules, it rewrites some, and erases others. For example, it is common for professional basketball players to commit the violation of ‘‘traveling,’’ yet have their violation ignored by the referees. Furthermore, anyone who has recently seen a professional basketball game knows that in practice, basketball is hardly the noncontact sport it is on paper. A special case of how the ethos of the game supercedes the rules is the issue of intentional fouling. Intentional fouls occur when one purposely breaks written rules and accepts the ramifications. All intentional fouls are not equal, and those that follow the ethos of the game remain acceptable, whereas those that do not are deemed unacceptable. Intentional fouling exposes subtle issues within the concept of the ethos of sports. Shaquille O’Neal (Shaq) is a dominant basketball player, but a very poor freethrow shooter. As a result, opponents have taken to the so-called ‘‘hack a Shaq’’ strategy, whereby they intentionally foul O’Neal (by pushing in a manner that will not cause injury) toward the end of the game to take advantage of his poor foul shooting. How are we to judge this act of intentional rule breaking? Regarding the way it is practiced at the moment, the ‘‘hack a Shaq’’ strategy is, de facto, acceptable within the NBA. In other words, unlike the faux pas of S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 219 passing a leading Tour de France cyclist when he is down, the ethos allows for ‘‘hacking a Shaq’’. Not only does the ethos allow for such play, competitors who are savvy enough to initiate the strategy at the opportune time are praised for their smart and competitive play. In response to the widespread use of this strategy, the National Basketball Association even adopted new rules to shore up this loophole and restore greater equality of competition. What if a team put in its worst player to not only intentionally foul Shaq, but to do it in a manner that might cause injury to Shaq (eg, with an elbow to the face or other means of physical contact that occasionally happen inadvertently within the course of a game)? This would further the fouling team’s chances of winning were Shaq to become injured. As physical a game as basketball has become, this would be seen as cheating and as an unacceptable act. What distinguishes this cheater who performs an illegal and unacceptable act from the worthy competitor in good standing who performs an illegal but acceptable act? Once again, it is the ethos of the game. The cheater’s behavior falls outside of the ethos, whereas the worthy competitor’s falls within. But this tells us only how a given rule violation likely will be judged. It says nothing of how the violation ought to be judged. This distinction exposes how the ethos of games is a descriptive theory, in that it describes how the sports culture actually is. It is useful in that it provides a context for interpreting the moral significance of a player’s actions more accurately. What we need, however, is a prescriptive theory to illuminate how the sports culture should respond to a particular rule violation. Of those surviving academic natural selection, three such theories [14] may be instructive: The spirit of the rules: one might subscribe to the spirit of the rules by placing oneself in the shoes of the game’s creator, looking to the intended purposes behind the actual rules. This notion is commonly played out when a participant assists an opponent in the spirit of competition. The weakness of this theory is that it says nothing about how to precisely determine the spirit of the rules. Fair play as a contract: one might ground appropriate play in an informal contract between competitors about what sorts of actions will be acceptable within the competition. This theory is strong in that consenting to formal and informal rules before each competition disposes of much potential for disagreement. The fault with this theory is that it is unrealistic to negotiate the acceptability of every possible strategy before each game. Fair play as respect for the game: this sophisticated theory contends that treating the game with respect, as you would a person you greatly admire, should result in a morally appropriate outcome. This is helpful in addressing our question of how the intentional fouler ought to be judged, because the answer to whether such a player is a cheater or not hinges on what adopting this style of play would do for the game itself. For example, if this sort of intentional foul makes for a more skillful, strategic, or competitive game, (elements known as internal values—see case #4), then 220 S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 the fouler is a worthy competitor, respecting the game. If it places an unnecessary burden of time stoppage, imposes an unfair advantage, or increases the chances of serious injury, then the fouler is deemed a cheater. Given Shaq’s dominance, intentionally placing him on the foul line arguably promotes a more competitive game. The challenge of this theory hinges upon whether it is fair to expect a player, in the heat of competition, to discern the impact of a given play on the future of the sport itself. Admittedly, all of these approaches have loopholes, most notably their inability to deal effectively with competitions that are themselves unethical, such as dueling to the death or gladiator games. Still, they provide a framework depicted by Table 1. As we will discuss in the next case, in addition to fair play as respect for the game, playing to the internal values of sports is a critical element of ethical athletic conduct (see Table 1). The difference between fouling and cheating is, in practice, a function of the ethos of the game. In principle, this difference is determined by either the spirit of the rules, a contract between competitors, or respect for the game. Case #4—John Wooden on internal and external values: how television is changing the spirit of the game When asked what is ruining the game of basketball, former The University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) coach John Wooden named, among other things, ‘‘television.’’ He comments that players now play to the television camera at the expense of the game of basketball: ‘‘Today’s showboating runs contrary to what the spirit of the game is all about. Excessive dunking, pointing at other players and taunting them, all belittle your opponent and show a lack of respect’’ [9]. Although we have discussed the ‘‘spirit of the rules’’ and ‘‘respect for the Table 1 Rule and ethos driven categories of behaviors in sport Rule and ethos - prototypic character Example of behavior Illegal and unacceptable - ‘‘cheater’’ - A basketball player intentionally fouling another team’s star player with the hope of inducing injury. - A basketball player intentionally fouling a poor free-throw shooter when losing by a close margin towards the end of the game. - A bicyclist using illegal means to raise his hematocrit to just below the legal limit.a - A bicyclist in the Tour de France passing the leader that was knocked off of his bicycle by a spectator. - The vast majority of actions within sports. Illegal and acceptable - ‘‘worthy competitor’’ Legal and unacceptable - ‘‘social outcast’’ Legal and acceptable - ‘‘rule abider’’ a We recognize that many would argue that it is not acceptable to use illegal means. Others would say that it has become so commonplace that it is somewhat accepted. S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 221 game,’’ what is meant here by the ‘‘spirit of the game’’? Wooden touches on a characteristic of sports that we believe to be a missing link in prescriptive theories of moral conduct. In describing the positive aspects of sports, there appear to be two distinct values: internal and external. Whereas some believe that external values, which mirror the values of society, are the only values that exist in sports, we believe that ‘‘sports have internal connections to certain values and these internal values can often conflict with those of the wider society’’ [15]. Whether a player is playing consistently with the internal values of their sport is a key to the moral status of a given behavior. Examples of internal values include adherence to mutually agreed upon rules, strategy, and competitiveness, all of which promote enjoyment and fulfillment of participants. Literature within the philosophy of sport suggests that the ideal game is one in which competitors ‘‘play at or near their best’’ and ‘‘the outcome [is] determined by sporting skill’’ [14]. More specifically, each sport has its own internal values, such as the value of teamwork and physical sacrifice in the game of football versus the value of prolonged concentration in a four-day golf tournament. Note that adherence to the internal values of sports, although a necessary condition, is not sufficient for moral conduct. It too fails to deal effectively with sports that are themselves unethical. This challenge will be addressed in case #5. In contrast to internal values, external values include such things as fame and fortune. The critical distinction is that external values can be realized in non sports-related ways, such as becoming a rock singer or a movie star. Interestingly, studies suggest that motivations for internal and external values (known as intrinsic and extrinsic motivations) are not additive, but rather that extrinsic motivations tend to diminish intrinsic motivations [16,17]. ‘‘Scholarship athletes . . . in high-profile sports like basketball and football, showed decreased intrinsic motivation in the presence of extrinsic rewards, whereas those in low profile sports, such as wrestling, and women with scholarships did not . . . . If the extrinsic rewards are seen as controlling or coercive, they will tend to diminish intrinsic motivation’’ [14]. Coach Wooden was well known for extolling the virtues of the intrinsic and expressing his disdain for the extrinsic values of basketball: ‘‘I believe you should go out and work hard, play hard, and compete hard in sports and in life without extra histrionics’’ [9]. There is good reason to believe that motivation for the internal values of sports is especially beneficial for the athlete: ‘‘The general position on intrinsic motivation is that people who are intrinsically motivated . . . get more enjoyment from the activity and persevere longer than those who have been extrinsically motivated. People who are intrinsically motivated also tend to be more creative in their approach to the task at hand, whereas those who are extrinsically motivated tend to do the minimum required to receive the reward’’ [14]. Sports have both internal and external values. Judging the moral conduct of athletes requires consideration of both. The relative degree to which an athlete is motivated by particular internal and external values is essential in understanding the intentions behind that athlete’s behavior. 222 S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 Case #5—Jackie Robinson and ‘‘Who’s going to cover first base?’’: when there are more important issues than playing to the ethos of the game, the spirit of the rules, and respect for the game When Jackie Robinson broke baseball’s color barrier in 1948, he suffered innumerable racial insults from opposing players. It was not uncommon for a racist pitcher to pitch balls on the inside part of the plate in an attempt to intimidate Jackie. Legend has it that when Robinson drew more than his share of racially charged inside fastballs, he would bunt the ball toward the first baseman, forcing the pitcher to cover first base. During his college years at UCLA, Jackie had been an All-American running back in football. Given the potential for a physical collision at first base, the pitcher would avoid this possibility and Jackie would be safe [18]. In the sport of baseball, it is certainly more acceptable to intimidate an opponent by brushing him off the plate with an inside fastball than it is to run over a fielder. Yet the vast majority who read this story today side with Robinson. Despite Robinson’s behavior going against the ethos, spirit, and respect of the game, serious baseball fans and nonfans alike support such behavior because it speaks to a greater moral good. That is to say, racial equality, though considered here in the limited context of baseball, is the domain of society at large. The immorality of racism is felt to be a far more important offense than the running over of a pitcher in a baseball game. The ethos of society and the general ‘‘real life’’ morality of humanity always trump the ethos and even the spirit of a sport. This principle exposes how our aforementioned theories are insufficient for determining proper moral conduct. For example, dueling to the death, prizefighting, and gladiator games were once acceptable. But when their societies came to see the barbarism and injustice of such competitions, the activities were outlawed [19]. No theory before this point has been capable of exposing the moral deficiency of sports that are themselves immoral—sports with a draconian ethos and barbaric rules designed with equally unconscionable spirit. Respecting such a sport could hardly be considered respectable. As such, there must be an additional requirement that an athlete’s behavior accord with not only the ethos, spirit, contract, or respect for the game, but it must be held up to the broader morality of society and humanity. Although our previous theories help contextualize the athlete’s conduct, there can be no substitute for general moral reasoning and judgment. Without exception, the ethics of ‘‘real life’’ trump ethical judgments within sports. Case #6—Charles Barkley and the moral institution of sports: why he is a role model and sports are teaching tools When asked why ‘‘Sir’’ Charles Barkley, renowned for his less-than-gentlemanly conduct, spat on an eight-year-old girl in the stands of an NBA game, S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 223 Barkley responded that he meant to hit a heckler, but because it was the fourth quarter and he was tired, his spit didn’t travel that far [20]. What are we to make of a professional sports star who proclaimed adamantly, ‘‘I am not a role model’’ [20]? Organized sports are being played by an increasing number of children at a very young age. Sports serve as a means of socialization and ethical education. They can be described as a microcosm of life, providing a safe venue to act out ethical dilemmas (Table 2). Although we have downplayed the status of rules as an adequate benchmark for judging moral conduct, they are integral to the structure of sports. By participating in sports, athletes, for the most part, agree to follow rules and are thus presumed to be acting morally. It is in this way that sports represent a just society, and it is in this way that great athletes are perceived as moral agents. Indeed, celebrity athletes are consciously and unconsciously ascribed great status by society. These athletes acquire such status using their sport’s good name as moral collateral and come to represent the internal values of their sport, such as justice and fairness (see Table 2). Professional athletes, especially in this age of television, cult of personality, and international competition, are ambassadors of society. When an athlete behaves in an unjust manner, whether on or off the field, we as a society have a right to judge. Whether he likes it or not, Charles Barkley is, ipso facto, as much a role model as he is a great basketball player. Our disappointment with the moral conduct of certain celebrity athletes is often accompanied by a feeling of betrayal, as if the player had pledged an oath to us that he would play and live according to high moral standards. Although this expectation of moral character may not be warranted, can it be justified? Sports are a part of our earliest socialization experiences and often play a pivotal role in our moral development. As John Wooden says, ‘‘Athletes should be good role models, but not heroes. A role model is someone that those who love you would want you to be like. A hero is just someone the general public holds up to acclaim. They are often different people’’ [9]. We agree that, although celebrity athletes need not be heroes, it is crucial that they serve as positive role models for sports to maintain their status as institutions of moral education. Those who love sports deserve nothing less. Table 2 Sports as a microcosm of life Rules Group Enforcer Frequency of observation Ramifications Sports Real life Cannot step out of bounds Competitors at a similar level Referee Nearly constant Minor (ball to other team) Cannot drive through a red light One’s local community Police officer Intermittent Major (serious injury) 224 S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 Sports may be viewed as institutions of moral education. Role models are critical to this end; thus all involved have a duty to preserve the integrity of their sport. Summary John Wooden once said, ‘‘Your reaction to victory or defeat is an important part of how you play the game. I wanted my players to display style and class in either situation—to lose with grace, to win with humility’’ [9]. 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