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Vassil VIDINSKY*
Dynamical Interpretation of Leibniz’s Continuum
Abstract
This dynamical interpretation of the continuum is based on a threefold
perspective. First, detailed differentiation of all standard realms of Leibnizian
Weltanschauung – (R real), (P phenomenal), (I ideal). Second, analysis of the
scope of the Law of Continuity famously formulated by Leibniz and mapping it
onto this (RPI) structure. Third, finding the precise place of dynamics and force in
this (RPI) continuum.
These perspectives (taxonomical, legislative and junctional) if put together lead to
a new understanding of monads’ role; and they are not taken anymore as a
discreet part of Leibnizian philosophy (as opposed to the ideal space and time),
but as dynamical continuum incorporating in itself both contiguity and continuity.
And in such a way they are both neutralizing and preserving the syncategorematic
phenomenal infinity. The main point is that force can be applied both to
perception and appetition of monads and by this we give the shortest Leibnizian
answer to the Zeno’s Dichotomy paradox – “force”. But what is more important,
such dynamical interpretation gives good schematic and systematic view of
Leibnizian mature philosophy. And it appears (as expected) that the thread out of
the Labyrinth of the Continuum is not only geometrical and physical, but
metaphysical too.
Key Terms
Leibniz, Law of Continuity, Continuum, Force, Monad, Syncategorematic,
Categorematic, Space, Time, Dynamics, Continuity, Contiguity, Zeno,
Dichotomy, Metaphysics, Perception, Appetite, Infinity.
Leibniz’deki Continuum’un Dinamik Bir Yorumu
Özet
Continuum’un dinamik olan bu yorumu üçlü bir perspektife dayanmaktadır. İlkin
Leibnizci Weltanschauung’un bütün standart gerçekliklerinin – (R gerçek), (P
fenomenal), (I ideal)- detaylı olarak ayrımlaştırılması. İkinci olarak, Leibniz
tarafından çok iyi bir biçimde formüle edilmiş olan süreklilik yasasının
kapsamının bir analizi ve onun bu (RPI) yapısının üzerine yerleştirilmesi. Üçüncü
*
Asst. Prof. at the Faculty of Philosopy, University of Sofia, Bulgaria.
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olarak ise bu (RPI) continuum’unda dinamiğin ve gücün tam olarak yerinin
belirlenmesi.
Eğer bu üç perspektif (sınıflayıcı, kural koyucu, ve birleştirici) bir araya getirilirse
monadların rolünün yeni bir kavrayışına yol açar; ve monadlar artık sadece
Leibnizci felsefenin sağduyulu parçaları olarak değil (ideal uzay ve zamana karşı
olarak), fakat hem bitişikliği hem de sürekliliği kendi içine katan dinamik bir
continuum olarak ele alınacaktır. Ve böylesi bir yolla onlar, syncategorematic
fenomenal sonsuzluğu hem etkisizleştirecek hem de muhafaza edecektir. Temel
husus, gücün, monadların algılarına ve iştihalarına uygulanabilir olmasıdır, ve
bununla biz, Zenon’un Dikotomi paradoksuna Leibnizci cevabın en kısasını
vermiş oluyoruz: “Güç”. Fakat daha da önemli olan şey, böylesi dinamik bir
yorumun, olgun Leibnizci felsefenin iyi şematik ve sistematik bir görünüşünü
vermesidir. Ve görünüyor ki (beklenildiği gibi), Continuum Labirentinden çıkış
yolu sadece geometrik ve fiziksel değil, fakat aynı zamanda metafizikseldir.
Anahtar Terimler
Leibniz, Süreklilik Yasası, Continuum, Güç, Monad, Syncategorematic,
Categorematic, Uzay, Zaman, Dinamik, Süreklilik, Bitişiklik, Zenon, Dikotomi,
Metafizik, Algı, İştiha, Sonsuzluk.
This paper is based on the recent scholarship and almost facet analysis by
Richard Arthur, Glen Hartz, Jan Cover, Samuel Levey, Timothy Crockett, and François
Duchesneau on Leibnizian continuum and philosophy. What I will try to do is a
selective conceptual summary, also some corrections, and of course one further step –
which I think changes the final perspective – a dynamical interpretation of the
continuum. This whole analysis is actually based on a threefold perspective. Here are
my main departing points:
First, we have to differentiate all the realms of Leibnizian Weltanschauung.
Second we have to trace what exactly is the scope of the Law of Continuity famously
formulated by Leibniz in 1704. And at the end we have to see what the precise place of
dynamics in such continuum is.
But because all these perspectives (taxonomical, legislative and junctional) are
interconnected within his philosophy (though changing until his mature thought), that’s
why my exposition will be rather systematical than chronological. On the other hand I
will try to make my idea as clear as possible and I will artificially divide the paper in
three sections; but keep in mind that systematicity of Leibniz’s philosophy is the
structural basis of my reading and the threefold paper division is propound only because
it is more economical and neat.
I. Weltanschauung – the three Leibnizian realms
As the old interpretation on Leibniz has put it “[he] splits the realm of the actual
into two domains: the realm of monads, the real world, which forms the object of study
of metaphysics; and the realm of the things of our everyday experience, the phenomenal
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world, which forms the object of study of the sciences in general, but pre-eminently of
physics.” [italics added]1. So we have the standard Rescher split: Monads [the real
world presented by metaphysics] and Things [the phenomenal world presented by
sciences]; which, I think, still governs modern interpretations but in a more subtle form.
But contemporary and recent scholarship is much more precise in its terminology
and analysis of Leibniz’s texts and thoughts. So we can advance one further division
which separates Leibnizian Weltanschauung in three. In this paper I will try to show
that the continuum problem is another crucial differentiation mark between these realms
of the world: (1) monads; (2) things; (3) space and time. The full argument for
separating them can be found in the detailed research by Hartz and Cover2 – I will recall
just 3 points from their conclusion:
(R) Monads have full and non-derivative reality (R).
(P) Only body – not every non-fundamental entity – is to be grounded on
monads; and to be grounded means that you are not real as monads but phenomenal (P).
(I) Space and time are abstract entities (derived directly from phenomenal world
and accessible by thought) and being abstract is a feature of ideal (I) things.
This (R)-(P)-(I) structure is hierarchical in such a way that every state is
grounded on its left-standing realm. The analysis of Hartz and Cover covers mainly the
connection between the phenomenal and ideal world, the monads are left out of the
dynamical picture although they are important structural part in their paper too3.
So we have 3 different realms – (R) substantial, (P) quasi-substantial and (I) res
mentalis4. Hartz and Cover interpretation is really strong and profound, but because the
task they had defined was limited they didn’t present a full analysis on the scope of the
continuity, although it was central issue for the differentiation between (P) and (I).
What I would like to do here is to map the Law of Continuity on this structure5 – this
will make the distinction clearer but will bring further questions.
1
2
3
4
5
Nicholas Rescher, Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy (Totowa: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1979) 65.
Glenn A. Hartz and J. A. Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," Noûs 22,
no. 4 (1988).
Their concentration on P-I connection and differentiation is inevitable and logical – clarifying
this relation is paper’s main message and contribution. But Hartz and Cover wrote: “We
believe it is possible to complete a ‘reduction’ of space and time to monads; doing so requires
the use of purely Leibnizian materials to show how ideal space and time are related, via the
intermediate level of phenomenal bodies, to features of monads. But that is a separate
project.” Well, partially I want to add several steps to this separate and more complete
reading.
Hartz and Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," 503-04.
Timothy Crockett noticed that Leibniz is applying the Law of Continuity on these three
levels, but still maintained that there are “two notions of continuity” following the twofold
actual-ideal division – Timothy Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics,"
Philosophical Studies 94, no. 1-2 (1999): 119-20. Compare his interpretation with Levey’s
historical analysis on the two types of continuity: “potentiality” and “connectedness” –
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II. Law of Continuity in (P)-realm and (I)-realm
We have three different realms; but what is the implication of the legislative part
of Leibnizian philosophy on them? I mean – what is the scope of the famous Law of
Continuity on those realms and how does it work in ideal, phenomenal and real world?
And if it is universal and covers everything is it one and the same law actually or it is
limited and does have exceptions?
Let me start with the law itself, formulated in New Essays on the Human
Understanding (1704); Leibniz states that there are nowhere leaps: “Nothing takes place
suddenly, and it is one of my great and best confirmed axioms that nature never makes
leaps [la nature ne fait jamais des sauts]. I call this the Law of Continuity” 6.
So instead of stages we have continuous degrees; this is a straightforward and
clear statement but the problem is that on the other hand we have exactly the opposite
statements by the same Leibniz: “Matter is not continuous but discrete, and actually
infinitely divided” (to De Volder, 11 Oct, 1705)7; “In actuals there is only discrete
quantity” (to De Volder, 19 Jan, 1706)8. More than 10 years earlier Leibniz wrote to
Foucher: “Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not, I do not say
divisible, but actually divided; and that consequently the least particle ought to be
considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures”9 and he said to Sophia
that matter only appears to us to be continuum, just as does actual motion10; this is
because matter is a discrete quantity and “the mass of bodies is actually divided in a
determinate manner, and nothing in it is precisely continuous”11 and things move from
one state to the next closest state12 and so on, and so on and even more...
Reading such contradictory passages Russell made his witty remark: “In spite of
the law of continuity, Leibniz’s philosophy may be described as a complete denial of
the continuous”13. In a forthcoming paper Richard Arthur is showing that if you
introduce the idea of syncategorematic infinity incompatibility between these various
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Samuel Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz," Philosophical Studies
94, no. 1-2 (1999).
Gottfried Leibniz, "Die Philosophischen Schriften Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz," in OLMS
Paperbacks (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1965), V, 49. Even earlier (April 3rd, 1699) he
had already written to De Volder that no transition occurs by a leap – “nullam transitionem
fieri per saltum” Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 168.
„Revera materia non continuum sed discretum est actu in infinitum divisum…“ Leibniz,
"Gp," ІІ, 278.
„In Actualibus non esse nissi dicretam Quantitatem…“ Ibid., ІІ, 282.
“Ainsi je crois qu’il n’y a aucune partie de la nature qui ne soit, je ne dis pas divisible mais
actuellement divisée, et par conséquent la moindre parcelle doit être considérée comme un
monde plein d’une infinité de créatures différentes” Ibid., І, 416.
“It is our imperfection and the shortcomings of our senses that make us conceive physical
things as mathematical entities, in which there is indeterminacy” Ibid., VІІ, 563.
Ibid., VII, 562.
„d'un estat à l'autre prochain” Ibid., VІІ, 564.
Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an Appendix of
Leading Passages (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press/Macmillan, 1900)
111.
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statements is only apparent. So Arthur is exonerating Leibniz from Russell’s criticism
and at the end of his analysis he says: “All naturally occurring transitions are continuous
in that the difference between neighboring states is smaller than any assignable. This
means not that there exists a least difference, but that for any assignable finite
difference, there exists a smaller one. Thus there is a true continuous transition, even
though the states themselves and all assignable differences between them are actually
discrete.” [italics added]14.
But still it sounds like a puzzle, like a labyrinth – what kind of solution is
Arthur’s? Let me summarize everything in a few words to show more clearly the
paradox: we have different statements in Leibniz which Russell claims that contradict
each other and Arthur just puts them together – “continuous neighboring states” or
“continuous transition of actually discrete states”15. Is this a real solution to Russell’s
attacks? And what is this ‘syncategorematic’ here for?
Categorematic vs. syncategorematic
The idea about syncategorematic interpretation of Leibniz is brought maybe for
the first time by Ishiguro16 in 70’s and it is getting more and more powerful. But if we
want to understand her or Arthur’s defense and the validity of their interpretation we
have to start from defining the notions of ‘categorematic infinity’ and ‘syncategorematic
infinity’, i.e. Arthur’s:
(C) categorematic – there exists some <y> which is greater than any finite
number <x>; or there is a prime greater than every finite prime.
(S) syncategorematic – for any finite number <x> there is a number <y> greater
than it; or for every finite prime there is a greater prime17.
As Arthur points out there many cases where a mistake can be done by assuming
that categorematic and syncategorematic infinity are one and the same; in other words
14
15
16
17
Richard T. W. Arthur, "„A Complete Denial of the Continuous”? Leibniz's Law of
Continuity," in Synthese (forthcoming), 33.
We can trace the same issue in Crockett’s proposal that there are things structurally
continuous (S-continuous) and discrete (non M-continuous) but there’s nothing discontinuous
– Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 132. Or even more literally
paradoxical: discreteness of motion does not entail that motion is an aggregate of discrete
states – Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 133.
The base for Arthur’s interpretation is the parallel which he makes between Leibniz’s
contradictory remarks about continuity and identical contradictory remarks on the
infinitesimals. Arthur cites Ishiguro because she already had showed that the solution about
the later contradictions lies in differentiation between syncategorematic and categorematic
infinity, so Arthur tries to make a parallel solution: “Just as an actual infinity of terms can be
understood syncategorematically as more terms than can be assigned a number, without there
being any infinite numbers, so too the infinitely small can be given a syncategorematic
interpretation by means of the Law of Continuity, without there existing any actual
infinitesimals” – Arthur, "„A Complete Denial of the Continuous”? Leibniz's Law of
Continuity," 33.
Ibid., 7-8.
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it’s a fallacy to say that (C) “there is a prime greater than every finite prime” = (S) “for
every finite prime there is a greater prime”. And the fallacy is quantifier shift fallacy18.
The point is almost clear, but I want to make a small correction and to offer a
visual metaphor: because in (S) we have Archimedean axiom (as Leibniz knew), so we
don’t have biggest or smallest number and as a result the infinity is not number at all,
that’s why we can picture this by “ellipsis”: […]. And (C) is not that we have greater
number, as Arthur formulated it, but we have greatest, so we can picture it as “full stop”
[.] – and it is now getting clear why (S) can be treated as infinity and why (C) is not so
suitable for Leibniz... Of course I have to be more precise in this case and write “not so
suitable for Leibniz after 1676”; because before 1676 he made several attempts to grasp
the continuum through categorematic infinity, using indivisible points, unassignable
gaps, infinitesimal lines… The difference between (C) and (S) will be even clearer if we
compare them in a simple scheme.
Early categorematic solutions
In another very interesting forthcoming paper19 Arthur traces the elusive
development of Leibniz’s early thought on the status of the actually infinitely small in
relation to the continuum. He distinguishes three different categorematic stages prior to
167620. From conceptual point of view they can be regarded not only as stages (which
are abandoned one by one by Leibniz) but also as different perspectives towards the
continuum problem. I will only summarize them in a scheme, because they do not have
direct connection with my dynamical interpretation:
Leibniz’s categorematic solutions. Mainly based on Arthur’s paper
Table 01
Level
A. Metaphysical
B. Physical
C. Mathematical
Period
Pre-1670
1670-71
1672-75
Common
ground
Francisco Arriaga,
Kalam;
Hobbes
Sextus Empiricus, Hobbes
Main
notions
Void
Parts (partes);
Lines (linea);
(quietulas; esse nihil)
Endeavor (conatus)
Endeavor (conatus)
the continuum consists
of assignable points
separated by
unassignable gaps;
the continuum is composed
of an infinity of indivisible
points, or parts smaller
than any assignable, with
no gaps between them;
a continuous line is composed
of infinitely many infinitesimal
lines, each of which is divisible
and proportional to an element
(conatus) of a generating
motion at an instant;
Arthur’s
definition
18
19
20
It is a very original and clear difference, Ibid., 8.
“From Actuals To Fictions: Four Phases in Leibniz’s Early Thought On Infinitesimals” will
appear in Studia Leibnitiana.
Another interesting analysis on Leibniz’s changing thought during these years is Levey,
"Matter and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz".
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Explanation
(1) Continuity of
motion is interrupted
by unassignable
intervals of rest – times
smaller than any given.
(2) Bodies are
continually (re)created.
(1) Continuum is
composed of infinitely
small indivisibles, defined
as parts which have
magnitude, but no
extension;
(1) Continuum is composed of
infinitely small extended
indivisibles, defined as parts
which have magnitude
proportional to the conatus of
the generating motion;
(2) Continuity of motion is
established through its
composition out of conatus
or endeavours
(3) Leibniz attempts to
distinguish minima (having
zero magnitude) from
indivisibles (having zero
extension);
Inverted version of Zeno’s
Dichotomy argument
Diagonal paradox by Sextus
Empiricus
De rationibus motus
Theoria Motus Abstracti
De minimo et maximo
(1669-70)
(1671)
(1672-73)
Leibniz’s
argument
Sources
Letter to Thomasius
(April 30th, 1669)
As we can see Leibniz made several attempts to solve the continuum puzzle
within itself, looking for different types of compositional indivisibles. And finally he
couldn’t find any categoremacity in this phenomenal world, which immediately made it
“dependent on”. This is my first step towards the dynamical interpretation of the
continuum.
Final syncategorematic solution
After 1676 Leibniz realized that the mathematics cannot provide categoremacity
too (for any phenomenal realm), because there is no such thing as infinite number; and
by number he meant something that can unite multiplicity. So here is the analogous
scheme about the syncategorematic solution proposed by Leibniz.
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Leibniz’s syncategorematic solution. Mainly based on Arthur’s paper
Table 02
Level
A. Mathematical
Period
After 1676
Common
ground
Archimedes
Main notions
Infinitesimals are fictions (fictionem)
Arthur’s
definition
„infinitesimals are fictitious entities, which may be used as compendia loquendi to
abbreviate mathematical reasoning; they serve as a shorthand for the fact that finite
variable quantities may be taken as small as desired, and so small that the resulting
error falls within any preset margin of error”
Explanation
(1) If infinitesimals are fictitious entities that mean that you cannot use the ideal
mathematical realm as continuum unity. Infinitesimals are just abstractions which
cannot unite physical aggregates.
(2) Our phenomenal realm cannot be dependent on our ideal realm.
Leibniz’s
argument
No infinite number or infinite whole
Sources
Pacidius Philalethi (1676)
Numeri infiniti (1676)
This was Leibniz’s final solution about geometrization of the continuum. That
means – mathematics cannot provide the needed independence (categorematicity) for
our phenomenal realm. This will lead us closer to his final systematical (neither purely
idealist, nor materialist) account. But let me go ahead and deep in this syncategorematic
solution.
Syncategorematic continuum vs. Ideal continuum
Quite often syncategorematic infinity is defined as potential and categorematic
infinity as actual. Exactly here lies the important change and paradox which we are
revealing in Leibniz, because he is talking about actual syncategorematic infinity. What
does this concept mean?
On one hand it is actual and for Leibniz that meant finite; because there is no
such thing as infinite number (numbers are either even or odd – 1, 2, 3, 4…)21; but on
the other hand it is syncategorematical, which means infinite (there is always more to
count and there are everywhere middle terms). So what we have here is exactly what
both Russell and Arthur noticed from different perspectives – we have strange mixture
21
“… infinity, that is to say the accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, properly
speaking, not a whole any more than infinite number itself, whereof one cannot say whether it
is even or uneven.” Theodicy §195, Leibniz, "Gp," VІ, 232.
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between actual division and infinity of the division. But do we have real continuum
than? Russell will say no, Arthur, I think, will say yes. But I claim that Russell would be
right though he didn’t understood Leibniz’s point and Arthur would be partially wrong
though he got the path out of the labyrinth. Here is my explanation of this obscure
answer:
The phenomenal world is discrete and Leibniz said it many-many times – every
interpretation starts and should start with this22. But on the other hand between every
two things and states there are always more and more. Than he added that the margin of
error between “continuous” circle and infinitely-sided “discrete” body is almost null.
But this is not ontology anymore; it is part of his epistemology and of course the error
is null in exactly the same way as matter appears to be continuous. The discreetness is
so dense that the error between continuous (circle) and non-continuous (body) is
unassignable. We can check another interesting example: “we know that a given ellipse
approaches a parabola as closely as desired, so that when the second focus of the ellipse
is removed far enough away from the first focus, the difference between the ellipse and
the parabola becomes less than any given difference, since then the radii from that
distant focus differ from parallel lines by an amount as small as desired”23. So when
Arthur and Leibniz talk about assignability they are only within the discourse of
epistemology. But from ontological perspective there is discreetness to infinity in the
matter – the more it is actually divided the less it is really continuous. The phenomenal
world is dense contiguum and not real continuum – “Contiguous things are those
between which there is no distance”24. We have only syncategorematicity (infinite
actual density) which is different from the continuum of space and time where we don’t
have any discreetness only the whole itself and the division in this ideal realm would be
derivative and possible: “But space and time taken together constitute the order of
possibilities of the one entire universe, so that these orders – space and time – relate not
only to what actually is but also to anything that could be put in its place, just as
numbers are indifferent to the things which can be enumerated”25.
So, I think we have to keep the difference between (P)-realm continuum and (I)realm continuum in order to understand further distinctions between the phenomenal
22
23
24
25
I am not convinced that we have to make such artificial differentiation as Crockett did:
discreetness (different things) is not discontinuity (having gaps) – Crockett, "Continuity in
Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics.". Especially if having such remarks by Leibniz: “in order to
have a variety of boundaries arising in matter a discontinuity of the parts is necessary” [italics
added] – Gottfried Leibniz, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften Und Briefe,"
(Darmstadt/Leipzig: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1923-...), VІ-2, 435. And one comment from Levey:
“[matter] is not continuous but discrete; its parts are strictly discontinuous” – Levey, "Matter
and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz," 83-84.
Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-4, 2032.
Ibid., VІ-3, 94; translation in – Gottfried Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings
on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686, ed. Daniel Garber and Robert C. Sleigh, trans.
Richard T. W. Arthur, The Yale Leibniz (Yale: Yale University Press, 2001) 19.
Leibniz, "Gp," ІV, 568.
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and ideal, between matter and space, between motion and time, between parts and the
whole26…
Let’s make a quick summary: the Law of Continuity works within phenomenal
world in such a way that it manifests itself as syncategorematical where contiguous
approaches continuum (and the differentiating error between them is null) but still there
is a difference between this phenomenal world and the realm of abstract space and time.
The difference is smaller than any assignable, says Leibniz, but from fundamental level
we can state the difference with his own words: “In actual, single terms are prior to
aggregates, in ideals the whole is prior to the part” (to Des Bosses, 31 July, 1709)27. Of
course you cannot assign such a qualitative difference, but you can state it. So what we
see are syncategorematically infinite aggregates, not wholes, and aggregates are
fundamentally discrete (though actually infinitely divided and approaching continuity).
Such an unassignable error is quite close to Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles. We can
use now this famous principle as a test-question: is it one and the same case to have a
syncategorematically-sided body and continuous circle? If we talk about quantity – yes.
But if we talk about quality – no. One thing can approach the other only if we keep this
difference; and only than abstract mathematics can measure our phenomenal world.
And when we think about fundamentals is not about usability and errors, but it is about
priority: „Matter is not continuous but discrete, and actually infinitely divided, though
no assignable part of space is without matter. But space, like time, is something not
substantial, but ideal, and consists in possibilities, or in an order of coexistents that is in
some way possible. And thus there are no divisions in it but such as are made by the
mind, and the part is posterior to the whole. In real things, on the contrary, units are
prior to the multitude and multitudes exist only through units” [italics added]28.
Than why dealing so much with phenomenal if we have an ideal realm? Because
extension is prior to space, as duration is prior to time. Space and time derive from
phenomenal world and the (P)-realm is the foundation of the (I)-realm. It seems that
syncategorematic continuum (parts prior the whole) is the foundation of abstract
continuum (whole prior the parts)29. How is it possible?
Syncategorematic infinity – a well-founded phenomenon
Before going to junctional part of this paper let me be clear on one more point –
the division (or cut) does not produce this phenomenal world; the division is only a
26
27
28
29
Jus remember that space and time are “are perfectly uniform and arbitrarily divisible” [italics
added] – Hartz and Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," 499.
“In actualibus simplicia sunt anteriora aggregatis, in idealibus totum est prius parte” –
Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 379.
”Revera materia non continuum sed discretum est actu in infinitum divisum, etsi nulla pars
spatii assignabilis materia vacet. At spatium, ut tempus, non substantiale est quiddam, sed
ideale, et in possibilitatibus seu ordine coexistentium utcunque possibili consistit. Itaque
nullae ibi divisiones nisi quas mens facit, et pars toto posterior est. Contra in realibus unitates
multitudine sunt priores, nec existunt multitudines nisi per unitates“ – Ibid., ІІ, 278-79.
If we put it this way it is clear that something is missing – both in epistemological and in
ontological domain. And what is missing is the real world, the (R)-realm.
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manifestation of its infinity and a differentiation between the first and second matter.
But what makes or produces the phenomenal realm is the connection of its infinite parts,
which put together make aggregates. So if left alone the syncategorematic infinity
would lead to dissociation. And here we can see once more the difference between the
(I)-realm and (P)-realm. In the abstract realm there is no dissociation, because we have
the whole as its basis and the division (or the cut) just discloses its a priori continuity.
Leibniz even wrote that in ideal realm “the notion of the whole is simpler than that of
fractions, and precedes it” [italics added]30. But for phenomenal realm we need
something else which will neutralize and preserve its syncategorematic infinite division
– it cannot be (an abstract) space, because Leibniz is relationist and do not use space
and time as substratum. Concerning this frenetic division (that I claim would lead to
dissociation) Leibniz wrote to Foucher (1693): “Thus I believe that there is no part of
matter which is not, I do not say divisible, but actually divided; and that consequently
the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of infinity of different
creatures”31. This thought is already conceptualized in Theory of concrete motion
(1670-1671) where he famously stated that every atom will be of infinite species
[quaelibet atomus erit infinitarum specierum] and there are worlds within worlds to
infinity [mundi in mundis in infinitum]32 and within every fold in the fold there is
another endlessly folded world. What makes this split (approaching continuum)
tenable? How it doesn’t fall apart – I mean both the phenomenal world and Leibniz’s
conception?
Or we can state it as Stuart Brown: “[the problem is] how anything that is
extended in space or time can be real if each of its parts is further divisible ad
infinitum”33. If we are looking for reality we have to switch the realm. So its time to
analyze the real world, because if we want to make consistent continuum theory we
have to apply the Law of Continuity to all the realms of the Leibnizian Weltanschauung.
III. Dynamics – the (R)-realm
Up to now we left (R)-world somehow out of the picture. So what are the
characteristics of this realm? Immediate, short answer: these are the characteristics of
the monads themselves34.
30
31
32
33
34
Letter to Electress Sophie (31 Oct, 1705) – Leibniz, "Gp," VІІ, 562.
Ainsi je crois qu'il n'y a aucune partie de la matiere qui ne soit, je ne dis pas divisible, mais
actuellement divisée, et par consequent, la moindre particelle doit estre considerée comme un
monde plein d'une infinité de creatures differentes – Ibid., І, 416. Or: “There is an infinity of
creatures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the actual division of the continuum to
infinity.” Theodicy §195, Leibniz, "Gp," VІ, 232.
Leibniz, "Gp," ІV, 210. The influence by Robert Hook’s Micrographia is obvious.
Stuart Brown, "The Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Background," in The Cambridge
Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
51.
As Garber showed there are at least two metaphysical strains in Leibniz ontology. I will stick
to the more popular one up to now, the monadological – Daniel Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and
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Monads – step out of the Labyrinth, step into the Continuum
As Arthur have stated: “In this wider sense, the continuum problem is: what (if
any) are the first elements of things and their motions?”35 So let me go through these
first elements and Leibniz’s Monadology. Because it is a well-known territory I will
make just a very brief summary of the most important parts for the continuum problem.
1. Monads36 are simple substances and they are entering compounds (#1) [qu'une
substance simple, qui entre dans les composés] and because they are simple they have
no parts, neither extension nor form nor shape nor divisibility (#3). So what we have
here is not only a definition of a monad but these are the basic characteristics of the
principle of the continuum.
On the other hand monads are well-determined and different (qualitatively
discrete) from each other (#8-9) which is the principle of discontinuity.
So we have already two sides of the monad themselves – indivisibility and
discreetness. This differentiates them both from (P) and (I) realms.
2. Further on (#10) Leibniz writes that every created being, and consequently the
created monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each
[et même que ce changement est continuel dans chacune]. And the source of this
continuity is monad’s internal principle [d'un principe interne] (#11) which he will call
“l’appetit” (#15). This is the first side of the continuum.
And the second is “la perception” (#14) which involve and represents a
multiplicity in the unit (#13) – which is exactly what we were looking for in
syncategorematic continuum.
And again we have two sides – we have the principle of continuous change and
we have the principle of multiplicity in unity37. Both sides work together, because
Leibniz realized that every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and
something remains unchanged (#13) – that’s the real secret of continuity.
The appetition is the principle of change from one perception (multiplicity in
unity) to another (multiplicity in unity) (#15). So we have the variety of all particular
changes existing only eminently (#38) (as a source) in the primary unity [l'unité
primitive] (#47). And in this original simple substance [la substance simple originaire]
there is a continuous force (#48)38…
35
36
37
38
Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 293-98.
Richard T. W. Arthur, "Cohesion, Division and Harmony: Physical Aspects of Leibniz's
Continuum Problem (1671-1686)," Perspectives on Science 6, no. 1-2 [Leibniz and the
Sciences] (1998): 110.
I will use mainly Jonathan Bennett’s and Robert Latta’s translations.
In this systematical interpretation appetition will produce in phenomenal realm all timerelations and the perception will produce all spatial relations. So we can abstract them further
in ideal realm as Time and Space.
Leibniz concluded in Nature Itself (1698): “not only is everything that acts an individual
substance, but also every individual substance acts continuously…”, translation by Jonathan
Bennett, Early Modern Texts (2004 [cited 29 Feb 2008]); available from
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At the end we can say that the monad is foundation of the syncategorematic
continuum in its reality and principle. It neutralizes it, being simple continuum
(monad); and preserves it, being more than one (monads). Monad vs. monads, or better
to say monad and monads. It is the only way phenomenal infinity can be sustained. And
so the Law of Continuity.
The science of dynamics
So it seems that the force is somehow very important for this interpretation – it
unites and makes things dynamically continuous. There are many articles and analysis
on the notion of Leibniz’s force, so I will not make even a summary here, but I will pick
up just some very basic and important facts about the formation of the concept39. Of
course I will not talk about force only in a strict physical sense40, but nothing in my
thesis violates recent scholarship conclusions on Leibniz’s scientific thought.
A. In De usu Geometriae (1676) he wrote: “Only Geometry can provide a thread
for the Labyrinth of the Composition of the Continuum, of maximum and minimum,
and the unassignable and the infinite, and no one will arrive at a truly solid metaphysics
who has not passed through that labyrinth.”41. It is true that formulating the problem of
continuum goes through analysis of infinity but the solution of the mature Leibniz is not
only within the domain of the geometry. He gave up explaining everything with size,
shape and motion (where geometry is quite strong) and decided to introduce the notion
of force together with a whole new science – dynamics, which “treats force and the
metaphysical entities”42. Furthermore in “Motion is not something absolute” (1686) he
states: “And indeed each substance is a kind of force of acting, or an endeavor to
39
40
41
42
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com. After 7 years he wrote to Electress Sophie (31 Oct, 1705)
about “entelechies or primitive forces […] are the source of everything” – Leibniz, "Gp," VІІ,
565, translation by Lloyd Strickland, Leibniz Translations (Feb 2008 [cited 29 Feb 2008]);
available from http://www.leibniz-translations.com. And finally in Principles of Nature and
Grace, Based on Reason (1714) he said: “a substance is a being that is capable of action”,
translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts.
Leibniz’s development of this notion is a slow and many-faced. Very good introduction –
where interactions between mechanics, scholasticism and dynamics are differentiated – is
Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy.". For a different short analysis of force’s historical
development, see François Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and
Dynamica De Potentia," Perspectives on Science 6, no. 1-2 (1998).
Force is highly technical term which governs various laws, as Duchesneau writes: “Force is
presented as a theoretical concept exceeding the intelligibility of geometrical concepts. And
this new concept is presumed to own considerable regulative power for unifying the various
empirical laws” Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and Dynamica
De Potentia," 81. But on the other hand it is a pure metaphysical notion and as such it can be
interpreted as a form, as did Leibniz.
Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686
xxiii.
Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 284. For example in “Discourse on Metaphysics”
(1686), §18 he says: “Now, this force is something different from size, shape, and motion, and
this shows us that - contrary to what our moderns have talked themselves into believing - not
everything that we can conceive in bodies is a matter of extension and its modifications”,
translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts.
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change itself with respect to all the others according to certain laws of its own nature”
[italics added]43, so we have to introduce a science which will combine forces,
substantial forms and their measurement. I think that there is a connection between
abandoning the early categorematic conceptions of the continuum (before 1676) and
abandoning geometry as the only key solution for the labyrinth of the continuum.
B. In Lettre sur la question, si l’essence du corps consiste dans l’etendue (18
June, 1691) published by Leibniz in the Journal des Savant he says: “All of this shows
that there is in matter something else than the purely Geometrical, that is, than just
extension and bare change. And in considering the matter closely, we perceive that we
must add to them some higher or metaphysical notion, namely, that of substance, action
and force; and these notions imply that anything which is acted on must act
reciprocally, and anything which acts must receive some reaction; consequently, a body
at rest should not be carried off by another body in motion without changing something
of the direction and speed of the acting body” [added italics]44. Here we can see not
only the notion of force to be introduced but already the differentiation of the forces
themselves – active (act on) and passive (act reciprocally). We can say that the drive –
active force – is analogous to monad’s appetite (that which is principle of change) and
resistance – passive force – is analogous to monad’s perception (that which unites
multiplicity)45.
C. And 3 years later in his article On the Correction of Metaphysics and the
Concept of Substance (published in Acta Eruditorum, March 1694) Leibniz mentions
for the first time in print the notion dynamica as a new science on force: “…the concept
of forces or powers, (which the Germans call Kraft and the French la force), and for
whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the strongest light
to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance”46.
D. Finally in 1695 was published Specimen Dynamicum (in Acta Eruditorum) –
which presented the metaphysical foundations of the dynamics and the foundations of
posthumously published Dynamica de potentia et legibus naturae corporae. In
43
44
45
46
Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-4, 1638; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum:
Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 333.
Or we can see another definition of dynamics: “I judged that it was worth the trouble to
muster the force of my reasonings through demonstrations of the greatest evidence, so that,
little by little, I might lay the foundations for the true elements of the new science of power
and action, which one might call dynamics.” – Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in
the Phoranomus and Dynamica De Potentia," 84.
Interpretation on letter to De Volder – Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 170. It can be compared with this
excerpt from “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” (1714): “The qualities of a
monad must be its perceptions; a perception is a representation in something simple of
something else that is composite. And a monad’s actions must be its appetitions, which are its
tendencies to go from being in one state to being in another, i.e. to move from one perception
to another; these tendencies are the sources of all the changes it undergoes” [italics added] –
Bennett, Early Modern Texts.
“…notionem virium seu virtutis (quam Germani vocant Krafft Galli la force) cui ego
explicandæ peculiarem Dynamices scientiam destinavi, plurimum lucis afferre ad veram
notionem substantiæ intelligendam” “De primæ philosophiæ emendatione et notione
substantiæ” – Leibniz, "Gp," ІV-469.
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Specimen Dynamicum Leibniz presented systematic study on primitive force and its
relation to the substantial forms; its priority to extension and that it is a definition of
‘substance’ (#2), its division of active, passive, primitive, derivative (#6-7), dead, live
(#12), total, partial (#13) their measurement (#30) and so on... Further more he stated
there: “In conformity with the Law of Continuity, which rules out jumps, rest can be
considered as a special case of motion - that is, as vanishingly small or minimal motion
- and equality can be considered as a case of vanishingly small inequality” 47. Motion is
the effect of force – so there is continuity in effects because there is continuity in the
force itself. Effects are part of the phenomenal realm (P) and primitive forces are
constituents of the real realm (R).
One more remark; it is well known that Leibniz incorporated Hobbesian conatus
(endeavour) in his terminology48 and embraced dynamics as after-Cartesian solution to
some Cartesian problems (as conservation of quantity of motion). So we can schematize
the appearance of force as: there is no mechanical solution to the continuum problem,
so we need a dynamical one.
(R)-(P)-(I) and the Law of Continuity
Let me make one final stroke by interconnecting the three realms: space and time
are abstractions from the phenomenal world. But what has this phenomenal world in
itself that can be abstracted in a form of continuum in the ideal realm? It has monadic
substratum, it has substratic unities, so from phenomenal realm we abstract its real
characteristics to make an ideal realm. In a letter to Arnauld (April 30th 1687) Leibniz
postulated one crucial axiomatic statement which is “[an] identical proposition which
varies only in emphasis: that what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either”49.
Oneness (unity) is our final step and it is clear why Leibniz decided to use exactly the
word “monad” as a constituent of the (R)-realm.
Let me make an overall summary of the continuum in his Weltanschauung.
47
48
49
Translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts.
For more details, see Howard Bernstein, "Conatus, Hobbes, and the Young Leibniz," Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science 11, no. 1 (1980) and Alan Gabbey, "Force and Inertia in
Seventeenth-Century Dynamics," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 2, no. 1
(1971).
Gottfried Leibniz and Arnauld, The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. R. C. Sleigh, Jr,
trans. H. T. Mason, The Philosophy of Leibniz - Fourteen of the Most Important Books on
Leibniz's Philosophy Reprinted in Fifteen Volumes (New York/London: Garland Publishing,
1985) 121. “… ce qui n'est pas véritablement un estre, n'est pas nan plus véritablement un
estre.” – Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 97.
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Realm
(R)
Real
(P)
Phenomenal
(I)
Ideal
Knowledge
Metaphysical
Physical
Mathematical
Constituents
Monads
Bodies/Aggregates
Perception and Appetite
Matter and Motion
Space and Time
Dynamical
Syncategorematical
Pure abstract
Characteristics
51
Type of continuity
Law of continuity
There is a force.
Features
Unity of contiguity
(uniqueness) and
continuity (change).
Number of
boundaries between
things
2 – (monads are different);
0 – (monad is
undividable)
54
There’s always a
52
middle term .
Contiguity to infinity
53
(dense) .
2 – each thing has its
Figures
50
There’s a whole.
Continuity to infinity.
own boundary .
0 – interiorly
unbounded.
55
Domain
Sufficient reason
(unity of actual and
possible).
Actual.
Possible.
Priority
Monad is prior to both part
and the whole.
Part is prior to the
whole.
Whole is prior to the
part.
Simplest
One is simpler.
Part is simpler.
Whole is simpler.
Infinity: Compendia
loquendi
Mirror
Fold
Infinitesimal
[Visual metaphor]
[.]
[…]
[O]
Key
One
Part
Whole
Now we can demonstrate the unity of the Law of Continuity. It seems that we
have three different types of continuum (R)-(P)-(I), but actually it is only one: real,
50
51
52
53
54
55
Figures, but maybe not numbers; see Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics,"
134. and compare it with Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz," 87.
These can be regrouped in two analogous chains: Perception-Matter-Space and AppetiteMotion-Time. For example in Nature Itself (1698), §11 Leibniz locates the notion of primary
matter in passive force – Bennett, Early Modern Texts.
When formulated, Leibniz’s Law of Continuity was explained as: there is always something
in between during any change from small to large (or vice versa).
This is Crockett’s “structural continuity” – Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature
Metaphysics," 128. But, of course (though it resembles the ideal realm), there is no parallel to
his “metaphysical continuity” because it is based on density which doesn’t make sense
applied to figures and numbers – Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics,"
130.
We cannot talk about real boundaries in the (R)-realm.
“For by the very fact that the parts are discontinuous, each will have its own separate
boundaries [terminos]” – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-2, 435. So the number of boundaries in the whole
world will be always even. As Levey wrote: “discontinuous things, by contrast with
continuous ones, are those whose boundaries are two.” – Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts
of Continuity in Leibniz," 84.
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phenomenal and ideal altogether – (RPI). It is a one whole with parts, multiplicity
united by force. And I am not talking about the World itself, only about the law, (it
would have been incorrect to state that the world has its own monad or soul)56. I am not
claiming that there are no differences between the realms – exactly the opposite –
because there are differences the Law of Continuity is recursive and the engine of this
recursion is the force.
IV. Conclusion
“In actual bodies there is only discrete quantity, that is, a multitude of monads or
of simple substances, though in any sensible aggregate or one corresponding to
phenomena, this may be greater than any given number. But a continuous quantity is
something ideal which pertains to possible and to actualities only insofar as they are
possible. A continuum, that is, involves indeterminate parts, while on the other hand,
there is nothing indefinite in actual things, in which every division is made that can be
made. Actual things are compounded as is number out of unities, ideal things as is a
number out of fractions; the parts are actually in the real whole but not in the ideal
whole. But we confuse ideal with real substances when we seek for actual parts in the
order of possibilities, and indeterminate parts in the aggregate of actual things, and so
entangle ourselves in the labyrinth of the continuum and in contradictions that cannot be
explained. Meanwhile the knowledge of the continuous, that is, of possibilities, contains
eternal truths which are never violated by actual phenomena, since the difference is
always less than any given assignable amount.” [italics added]57.
This is a really good resume by Leibniz. It is obvious he is talking only about
two types of realm (actualities vs. possible), although he is much more precise when
further differentiating real from phenomenal. By this citation we can assume that
monadic level has the same type of syncategorematic structure as the matter itself, but
what I wanted to show is that within the realm of monads next to their “discreetness”
lies the principle of continuous change and the principle of oneness (simple substances)
– what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either. This is the difference between
56
57
In De mundo praeseti (1684-1686) Leibniz wrote: “The aggregate of all bodies is called the
world, which, if it is infinite, is not even one entity, any more than an infinite straight line or
the greatest number are. So God cannot be understood as the World Soul: not the soul of a
finite world because God himself is infinite, and not of an infinite world because an infinite
body cannot be understood as one entity [unum Ens], but that which is not one in itself [unum
per se] has no substantial form, and therefore no soul.” – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-4, 1509. More
about this in Gregory Brown, "Leibniz’s Mathematical Argument against a Soul of the
World," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13, no. 3 (2005). But this can be
compared with his earlier thoughts in On the Secrets of the Sublime (1676): “[God] exist as a
whole soul in the whole body of the world” – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-3, 474; translation from
Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686
48.
Leibniz in a letter to De Volder (19 Jan, 1706) – Brown, "Leibniz’s Mathematical Argument
against a Soul of the World," 468; Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 282. My claim is stronger than what we
see here in the last sentence. It’s not only about this epistemologically unassignable error, but
it is because there is multiplicity in unity and unity of the multiplicity.
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syncategorematical and dynamical continuum which I tried to present – introduction of
the force. As Leibniz said “The cohesiveness of bodies is the quantity of force needed to
destroy their contiguity” [italics added]58.
The same force which keeps together the unity of the world is the force to grasp
the multiplicity in unity (in our mind and in reality) and it is the force which sustains
syncategorematic continuum by making it one. And the same force, abstracted, can
produce the ideal Space (by monads’ perception) and ideal Time (by monads’
appetite)59; and in the opposite direction to reduce them via phenomenal world to the
monads themselves. And the same force makes this world dynamical and thinkable. So
the solution of the continuum problem cannot be plainly mathematical (ideal), and it
cannot be plainly physical (phenomenal), but it can be both… and united by one (real)
metaphysical principle. And even the historical period – Baroque – is always
syncategorematically folded, as Deleuze said: “the characteristic of the Baroque is the
fold that goes on to infinity”60. But if the fold should be one it needs a deeper dynamical
level. So in Leibnizian world each doubling in itself is dynamical, syncategorematical
and geometrically ideal.
We can make another (this time epistemological) parallel; Leibniz wrote in
Contingency (1686) that every analysis of a contingent proposition continues to infinity
– you have a cause for the cause for the cause for the cause… so you will never have a
complete demonstration. But on the other hand there is always an underlying complete
and final reason for the truth of the proposition (only God completely grasps it, as being
the only one who can whip through the infinite series in one stroke of the mind)61. And
so contingent cause is contiguously continuous and sufficient reason is dynamically
continuous.
So at the end we should have only one Law of Continuity which corresponds to
the three different realm structures. Which means that continuity will have 3 different
structural manifestations but the law is one and the same – so even here we have
multiplicity in one unity? The Law itself is meaningful only applied in (RPI) together
and this is a subtle hint against the recent scholarship debate about “Was Leibniz an
58
59
60
61
Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-3, 94; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings
on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 19. Sometimes the influence of Descartes is still
visible when Leibniz is talking not about force, but about motion as in On the Secrets of the
Sublime (1676), but the idea is similar: “Matter is a discrete being [ens discretum], not a
continuous one; it is only contiguous, and is united by motion or by a mind of some sort.”
[italics added] – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-3, 474; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the
Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 47.
Compare this with the hint given by Garber: “extension, is properly speaking, a direct
consequence of the properties bodies have by virtue of which they resist penetration by other
bodies” – Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 291. But than Garber is puzzled by the
diagram from 1715 in the letter to De Bosses where primitive forces are only in this part of
the (R)-realm which is substantia composita – Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 506. And I am not sure why
Garber expects them “on the other side of the chart, in the characterization of
semisubstances”… – Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 298.
Gilles Deleuze, "The Fold," Yale French Studies 80 (Baroque Topographies:
Literature/History/Philosophy) (1991): 227.
Bennett, Early Modern Texts.
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idealist?”, because what is most important in Leibniz dynamics about continuity… is
the reciprocity (RPI) of force, the reciprocity (RPI) of unity-multiplicity pair which is a
pair connected by force62.
Leibniz and Zeno – the last words
Of course, we cannot deal with the continuum problem non-mentioning Zeno,
though there was no time, nor space, nor motion to include him in this paper. Still I
would like to add one short question and even shorter answer. I was thinking can we
illustrate the Leibniz solution to the continuum problem by re-reading for example
Dichotomy as a dialogue and giving it a possible Leibnizian answer.
Zeno: – That which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage (1/2)
before it arrives at the goal (1). And than if you pick the half-way stage (1/2) as your
new goal you must first arrive at its half-way stage (1/4). And so on, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32…
to infinity. So how is it possible, dear Leibniz, to overcome that infinity?
Leibniz: – By force, Zeno, by force…
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTHUR, Richard T. W. (1998) "Cohesion, Division and Harmony: Physical Aspects of
Leibniz's Continuum Problem (1671-1686)." Perspectives on Science 6, no. 1-2 [Leibniz and the
Sciences] 110-35.
ARTHUR, Richard T. W. "“A Complete Denial of the Continuous”? Leibniz's Law of
Continuity." In Synthese, 36, forthcoming.
ARTHUR, Richard T. W. "From Actuals to Fictions: Four Phases in Leibniz’s Early
Thought on Infinitesimals." In Studia Leibnitiana, 32, forthcoming.
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I can’t resist abbreviating “reciprocity” as RPI: (a) concerning etymology of “reciprocal” (recus + -procus + -ity) and (b) concerning the systematicity of Leibnizian Weltanschauung.
Dynam ical I nt erpret at ion of Leibniz’s Cont inuum
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