17th and 18th century Philosophy

Ein Gemeinplatz der modernen Ästhetik besteht darin, dass sich die Produktivität des Künstlers einem entfesselten Gebrauch seiner Einbildungskraft verdankt. Nach dieser Vorstellung kann der Künstler neue Werke hervorbringen, weil er sich der assoziativen Kraft seiner Einbildungskraft überlässt. Als eine historische Quelle für die Auffassung, dass der Künstler in der Verwendung seiner Einbildungskraft von zwingenden Regeln frei ist, wird dabei oft Kants Genietheorie des Künstlers angesehen. Kant wird damit als Opponent der Regelpoetik Gottscheds und Vorbereiter der Genieauffassung der Romantik wahrgenommen. Tatsächlich stellt die Auffassung, dass das künstlerische Genie seine Einbildungskraft frei von begrifflichen Zwängen ausübt, einen wichtigen Teil von Kants Theorie der schönen Kunst dar. Wie sich jedoch leicht feststellen lässt, schreibt Kant dem schöne Kunst hervorbringenden Genie keine absolute Freiheit im Gebrauch der Einbildungskraft zu. Im Folgenden beschäftige ich mich mit den Beschränkungen, denen die Einbildungskraft des Genies trotz der ihr zugeschriebenen Freiheit laut der Kunsttheorie der Kritik der Urteilskraft unterworfen ist.

The Theses LVI belong to a series of hitherto unpublished early manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that were acquired by the University of Leiden in 1864. It is not certain when the Theses were written, but preliminary research on the physical manuscript and the sources cited indicate two possible windows. The first is around 1602-1605, that is roughly at a time when Grotius was also working on his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Iure Praedae Commentarius). The second dating places the genesis of the manuscrbipt around 1613-1615.
In the context of Grotius’ writings, the Theses LVI assume an important position for several reasons: They raise questions about state formation, the duty of citizens to the state and the right of political resistance in far greater detail than in any other work of the celebrated Dutch humanist. The Theses LVI also feature important reading notes that yield priceless insights into the sources that Grotius directly consulted and their influence on his ideas. The manuscript grants modern scholars a unique glimpse into the working mind of its author. Evidence points not only to the ferocious haste with which Grotius wrote his works, but also the occasional sloppiness of his reading and research habits."""

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Fundamental Political Writings includes the Social Contract, Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, and “Preface to Narcissus.” Each text has been newly translated, and includes a full complement of explanatory notes. The editors’ introduction offers students diverse points of entry into some of the distinctive possibilities and challenges of each of these fundamental texts, as well as an introduction to Rousseau’s life and historical situation, from his early years in Geneva to his final years in relative solitude. Each text is accompanied by images from the original editions. The volume also includes annotated appendices that help students to explore the origins and influences of Rousseau’s work, including excerpts from Hobbes, Pascal, Descartes, Mandeville, Diderot, Voltaire, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Joseph de Maistre, Kant, Hegel, and Engels.

Hume’s Letter from a Gentleman is an important document for Hume
scholarship because, among other things, it serves as a useful tool for the
interpretation and analysis of Hume’s philosophical intentions in the Treatise. The Letter itself, however, raises several difficult problems of interpretation. One of the most important of these concerns the identity of Hume’s “accuser“-the author of A Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality &c., to which Hume is responding in the Letter. Clearly the interpretation of the Letter, and its relevance to the Treatise, will vary
depending on who is identified as the source of the accusations against Hume, and what is made of this person’s motivation and philosophical
commitments. The immediate difficulty is that the Specimen is presented anonymously, and thus conjectures must be made about the author on the
basis of available evidence.

This chapter discusses the relation between Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference in ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, the views of eighteenth-century German authors who wrote on syllogism, and the conception of metaphysics that Kant developed in 1762-1764. Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even though they are not as independent from the intellectual context as Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism are not primarily motivated by polemical purposes. They are strongly influenced by his views on the method of metaphysics.

Hobbes’s political philosophy starts from a number of premises that are supposed to be self-evident, supplemented by various observations from experience. These statements are examined critically and in their interrelatedness in order to find out to what extent Hobbes provides a convincing system of thought. The importance of the basis of man’s actions, his self-interest, is inquired, since it serves as the basis of his practical philosophy. After this, Hobbes’s views on ‘moral’ notions are expounded. As it turns out, Hobbes maintains a number of concepts that have such a connotation, but interprets these in a specific way. The article is concluded with a modest systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s main thoughts in practical philosophy.

Spinoza is known for his radical views on freedom. In this article, it is explored to what extent this reputation is justified. He integrates human actions in the necessary development of the universe and seems to leave no room for human freedom. The position of God is relevant, since it is Spinoza’s starting-point in general and appears to require an intricate conception of freedom; it may be demanded whether this can be clarified. In the case of man, the difficulty lies primarily in the degree to which Spinoza takes his own characterization of necessity seriously; there seems to be an inconsistency here. The final section provides a possible way out of this conundrum, by focusing on the possible basis of an action.

A critical edition of all of the philosophically important material from the correspondence between the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and his two royal patronesses, Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-1714), and her daughter, Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia (1668-1705). In this correspondence, Leibniz expounds in a very accessible way his views on topics such as the nature and operation of the mind, innate knowledge, the afterlife, ethics, and human nature. The correspondence also contains the only known philosophical writings by Sophie and Sophie Charlotte, and thus provides a valuable insight into their views and concerns, as well as throwing light on their characters. The texts are accompanied by a substantial introductory essay which sets the context for the correspondence and analyzes its main philosophical themes.

Although its origins stem from theological debates, the general will would ultimately become one of the most celebrated and denigrated concepts emerging from early modern political thought.  Jean-Jacques Rousseau would make it the central element of his political theory, and it would take on a life of its own during the French Revolution before being subjected to generations of embrace or opprobrium.  James Farr and David Lay Williams have collected for the first time a set of essays that track the evolving history of the general will from its origins to recent times.  These essays include attention to the general will’s theological, political, formal, and substantive dimensions with a careful eye to the concept’s virtues and limitations as understood by its expositors and critics, among them Pascal, Malebranche, Locke, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Constant, Tocqueville, Adam Smith, and John Rawls.

ÖZET
17. Yüzyılla birlikte “ruh” kavramı yerine ekseriyetle “zihin” (mens) kavramının ikame edildiğini görmekteyiz. Klasik anlamda, farklı töz anlayışlarına rağmen, insan söz konusu olduğunda bedenin karşısına ya da yanına konulan ve insanın cisimsel olmayan yönünü ifade eden “ruh”, sahip olduğu tüm özellikleriyle (ontolojik, epistemolojik ve aksiyolojik) modern anlamda “zihin” olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Modern felsefenin kurucuları
arasında zikredilen Spinoza da insanın cisimsel olmayan yanını ifade etmek için, “ruh” yerine “zihin” kavramını genellikle tercih etmiş ve birkaç yerde de birini diğerinin yerine kullanmıştır. Spinoza’nın Tanrı merkezli felsefesinde, insan zihin ve bedenden oluşur. İnsan zihni, Tanrı’nın bilinen iki sıfatından biri olan “düşünce” (res-cogitans) sıfatının bir tezahürü ya da değişimi olurken, insan bedeni Tanrı’nın bilinen diğer sıfatı olan “yer kaplama”nın (res-extansa) bir tezahürüdür. Tanrı gerçek anlamda tek töz olduğu için ve bilinen iki sıfatı da bu tek tözü nitelediği için, bu iki sıfatın tezahürü olarak insanda yer alan zihin ve beden farklı tözler olmayıp aynı tözü farklı şekilde ifade eden paralel, bir ve aynı şeydir.
İnsan zihni, bir yandan bedenin dışarıdan aldığı etkileri (affectus), diğer yandan da bedenin kendi içsel yapısından aldığı etkileri alarak fikirler (ideas) oluşturur. Zihin fikirler oluştururken, daha önce edindiği deneyimlere, fikirler arasındaki bağlantılara, mantıksal çıkarımlara ve duygulara bağlı olarak yeniden eyleme geçme gücünü, sahip
olduğu “anlama yetisi”, “hayal yetisi” ve “hafıza yetisi” sayesinde gerçekleştirir. Zihin bir yandan bedenden aldığı etkilerle ve bu etkiler neticesinde meydana gelen duygularla kendi varlığını sürdürürken, diğer yandan tüm bu etkilerden doğan fikirleri, sahip olduğu yetilerin de yardımıyla yeniden düşünür. Zihin, daha önce edindiği fikirler üzerine tekrar düşündüğünde, düşüncesinin nesnesi artık bu ilk fikir olur ve zihin böylelikle “fikrin fikri”ne (ideas of
ideas) ulaşarak yeni bir fikir daha meydana getirir. Bu “fikrin fikri” olan ikincil fikirler, “bilinci” (conscious/ness)
meydana getirir. Spinoza’da bilinç, zihin-beden paralelinde meydana gelen etkiler ve bu etkilerin taşıyıcısı olan yetiler sayesinde zihnin ulaştığı fikirler üzerine bir tür reflexif düşüncesi demektir. Zihnin bilişsel yönünü ortaya koyan bu reflexif düşünce, öncelikli olarak zihin ve bedenin diğer zihin ve bedenlerle karşılıklı etki alış-verişinden kaynaklanır.
Biz bu çalışmada ontolojik doğasına referansla insanda zihin ve bedenin nasıl bir ortaklık inşa ettiğini, birinin diğerine paralel olmasının ne anlama geldiğini tartışacağız. Spinoza’nın düalizm eleştirisi üzerine yükselen monist töz anlayışı, onun ontoloji, epistemoloji ve değer ya da etik alanlarına dair görüşlerini tamamen şekillendirmiştir. Her şeyden önce Spinoza zihin ve bedeni aynı hakikati farklı şekillerde ifade eden bir ve aynı şey olarak görür. Biz burada zihin ve bedeni bir ve aynı olarak görebilmemizi sağlayan temel zeminin Spinoza tarafından nasıl inşa edildiğini ortaya koymaya çalışacağız. Bu temel zeminde, Spinozacı felsefenin pratik yönünü şimdilik erteleyerek meseleyi ontolojik çerçeveden ve ontoloji ile epistemolojinin bir arada olma zorunluluğu gereği epistemolojik çerçeveden inceleyeceğiz. İncelememizde, zihin ile beden arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl bir ilişki olduğu, zihnin bedeni bilme imkânın ne olduğu, bedende etkilerin, zihinde fikirlerin nasıl meydana geldiği, zihin ve bedenin tabi olduğu bir “varoluş süreleri”nin olup olmadığı gibi temel sorulara yanıtlar aranacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Zihin, Beden, Paralelizm, Duygulanış/Etkileniş, Fikir, Zihnin Sonsuzluğu

Mind’s Body, Body’s Mind: The Ontology of Spinozist Parallelism

Abstract

With the 17th century, commonly, we see that the concept of "mind" has been replaced by the concept of "soul". In the classical sense, despite the different conceptions of substance, when it comes to human, the "soul", which is placed against or adjoined to the body and expresses the non-corporeal aspect of the human, appears as the "mind" in the modern sense with all its features and means (ontological, epistemological and axiological). Spinoza, who is mentioned among the founders of modern philosophy, generally preferred the concept of "mind" (mens) instead of "soul" (anima) to express the non-corporeal side of man and used one in place of the other in a few places. In Spinoza's God-centered philosophy, man consists of mind and body. The human mind is a manifestations or appearance of the "thought" (res-cogitans), one of the two known attributes of God, while the human body is a manifestation of the other known attribute of God, "extension" (res-extansa). Since God is literally a single substance, and since both known attributes qualify this single substance, the mind and body in man as the manifestation of these two attributes are not different substances, but are parallel, one and the same thing, expressing the same substance differently.
Human mind, on the one hand, constitute ideas by taking the effects of the body, which are receives from the outside and on the other hand, receives the effects of the body, from its own internal structure. While the mind constitute ideas, its realization of its power to act again, depending on the experiences, which it has acquired before, the connections between the ideas, logical inferences and emotions, thanks to its faculties, "intellect", "imagination" and "memory". While the mind preserve its being with the effects it receives from the body and the emotions that occur as a result of these effects, on the other hand, it rethinks the ideas arising from all these effects with the help of its faculties. When the mind rethinks on the ideas it has acquired before, the object of its thought becomes this first idea, and the mind thus creating a new idea, that is "ideas of idea". These "ideas of the idea", which is econdary ideas, form the "conscious-ness". In Spinozas thought, consciousness is a kind of reflexive thought on the ideas that the mind reaches thanks to the effects that occur in the mind-body parallel and the faculties that are the carrier of these effects. This reflexive thought, which reveals the cognitive aspect of the mind, primarily originates from the mutual ex-change of action of the mind and body with other mind and bodies.
In this study, we will discuss how human mind and body build a unity in humans, with reference to their ontological nature, and what it means to be one parallel another. Spinoza's monist conception of substance, rising on his critique of dualism, completely shaped his views on ontology, epistemology, and the fields of value or ethics. Become morething, Spinoza sees mind and body as one and the same thing expressing the same truth in different ways. Here we will try to study how the basic ground that enables us to see mind and body as one and the same thing was built by Spinoza. On this basis, we will postpone the practical aspect of Spinozian philosophy for the time being, and we will examine the issue within the ontological framework and the epistemological framework, that is due to the ontology and epistemology one bound to another. In our examination, answers will be sought to basic questions such as what kind of a relationship between the mind and body is; what is the possibility of the mind to know its body; how occur, the effects in the body, and the ideas in the mind; and whether there is a "duration existence" that the mind and body are subject to etc..
Keywords: Mind, Body, Parallelism, Affections, Ideas, Infinity of Mind

This dynamical interpretation of the continuum is based on a threefold perspective. First, detailed differentiation of all standard realms of Leibnizian Weltanschauung – (R real), (P phenomenal), (I ideal). Second, analysis of the scope of the Law of Continuity famously formulated by Leibniz and mapping it onto this (RPI) structure. Third, finding the precise place of dynamics and force in this (RPI) continuum.
These perspectives (taxonomical, legislative and junctional) if put together lead to a new understanding of monads’ role; and they are not taken anymore as a discreet part of Leibnizian philosophy (as opposed to the ideal space and time), but as dynamical continuum incorporating in itself both contiguity and continuity. And in such a way they are both neutralizing and preserving the syncategorematic phenomenal infinity. The main point is that force can be applied both to perception and appetition of monads and by this we give the shortest Leibnizian answer to the Zeno’s Dichotomy paradox – “force”. But what is more important, such dynamical interpretation gives good schematic and systematic view of Leibnizian mature philosophy. And it appears (as expected) that the thread out of the Labyrinth of the Continuum is not only geometrical and physical, but metaphysical too.

According to a dominant view in the scholarly literature, Musschenbroek is to be considered a follower of Newton’s methodology, i.e. as a natural philosopher who, although he occasionally departed from Newton’s doctrines, aligned himself to Newton’s methodological views. Few scholars have, however, explained in full detail what it means to claim that Musschenbroek followed Newton’s method. The purpose of this essay is to get more grip on this matter.

Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, a landmark in intellectual history, is a curious text. Originally intended as a collection of all errors, it became an encyclopedia of everything, enfolding rampantly growing footnotes that commented on every imaginable topic. Instead of looking at Bayle's theoretical statements in the Dictionnaire, I explore Bayle's writing practice, his critical method and his practice of forming judgments. A close study of the textual, paratextual and contextual characteristics of the first entry of the Dictionnaire (the entry "Abaris") allows me to find out how Bayle made up his mind at every stage during a contemporaneous controversy on divination. In this way, we are able to see Bayle's mind in action while he is judging the contradictory information he receives and the to-and-fro movement of changing opinions he is confronted with. Th is examination yields new insights to Bayle's practical attitudes towards key issues in his oeuvre, including scepticism, rationalism, superstition and tolerance. At the same time, the article clarifies how Bayle was involved in the Republic of Letters and how he related to his local context in Rotterdam.

This essay clarifies Patrick Riley’s account of G. W. Leibniz by placing Leibniz’s moral and political doctrines in historical perspective. By understanding Leibniz’s practical philosophy as a solution to the same problems confronted by Thomas Hobbes, one can appreciate the originality and appeal of Riley’s Leibniz — with its emphasis on benevolence and Platonic ideas. By drawing attention to Leibniz’s practical works, Riley has resurrected an important voice in the history of political thought that had been long neglected. The essay concludes with some personal remarks about Riley’s own Leibnizian charity.

In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several scholars take Kant's statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant's views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz's. This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant's views on the origin of intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz's. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz.

This chapter outlines Kant’s account of empirical concept formation and discusses two objections that have been advanced against it. Kant holds that we form empirical concepts, such as colour concepts, by comparing sensory representations of individuals, identifying shared features, and abstracting from the differences between them. According to the first objection, we cannot acquire colour concepts in this way because there is no feature that all and only the instances of a given colour share and the boundary between colours is conventional. According to the second objection, assuming that all instances of a given colour share certain features, we can identify them only if we already possess a concept of that colour. None of the two objections is convincing as it stands. Kant can offer replies to both objections that are consistent with his views and with empirical evidence concerning the perception and representation of colours.

From the public burnings of the Social Contract occurring immediately following its publication, to Isaiah Berlin's condemnation of Rousseau as "the most sinister and most formidable enemy of liberty in the whole history of modern thought," Jean-Jacques Rousseau has rarely held universal favor among his commentators. The most common charge against him was, and remains, that he provided the essential philosophic tools for the modern tyrant. While this position has numerous and illustrious advocates, I argue that it fails to take into account the whole of Rousseau's thought. Specifically, it ignores his extensive attention to the problem of political power and his attempts to control it with checks and balances. In focusing on Rousseau's specific proposals in his Government of Poland, it is evident that the purpose of his system is to prevent tyranny, rather than to promote it.

Kant’s response to skepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian skepticism and locate Kant’s response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects of this response. The first is that Kant’s response to Pyrrhonian skepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume’s skepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian skepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian skepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic.

Over the last years, some of Spinoza studies have shifted to a consideration of the relational character of his ethics by focusing on the notion of autonomy. This concept is foreign to Spinoza's vocabulary. Therefore, I will attempt to explain what Spinozan relational autonomy is and its connection with the most important ethical concept in his philosophy: freedom. Following considerations about Spinozan freedom, I claim that it entails a relational character and that, for this reason, it is equal to relational autonomy. We are free when our joint action is based on adequate ideas of what we have in common with others.