17th and 18th century Philosophy

The Theses LVI belong to a series of hitherto unpublished early manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that were acquired by the University of Leiden in 1864. It is not certain when the Theses were written, but preliminary research on the physical manuscript and the sources cited indicate two possible windows. The first is around 1602-1605, that is roughly at a time when Grotius was also working on his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Iure Praedae Commentarius). The second dating places the genesis of the manuscrbipt around 1613-1615.
In the context of Grotius’ writings, the Theses LVI assume an important position for several reasons: They raise questions about state formation, the duty of citizens to the state and the right of political resistance in far greater detail than in any other work of the celebrated Dutch humanist. The Theses LVI also feature important reading notes that yield priceless insights into the sources that Grotius directly consulted and their influence on his ideas. The manuscript grants modern scholars a unique glimpse into the working mind of its author. Evidence points not only to the ferocious haste with which Grotius wrote his works, but also the occasional sloppiness of his reading and research habits."""

Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, a landmark in intellectual history, is a curious text. Originally intended as a collection of all errors, it became an encyclopedia of everything, enfolding rampantly growing footnotes that commented on every imaginable topic. Instead of looking at Bayle's theoretical statements in the Dictionnaire, I explore Bayle's writing practice, his critical method and his practice of forming judgments. A close study of the textual, paratextual and contextual characteristics of the first entry of the Dictionnaire (the entry "Abaris") allows me to find out how Bayle made up his mind at every stage during a contemporaneous controversy on divination. In this way, we are able to see Bayle's mind in action while he is judging the contradictory information he receives and the to-and-fro movement of changing opinions he is confronted with. Th is examination yields new insights to Bayle's practical attitudes towards key issues in his oeuvre, including scepticism, rationalism, superstition and tolerance. At the same time, the article clarifies how Bayle was involved in the Republic of Letters and how he related to his local context in Rotterdam.

Hume’s Letter from a Gentleman is an important document for Hume
scholarship because, among other things, it serves as a useful tool for the
interpretation and analysis of Hume’s philosophical intentions in the Treatise. The Letter itself, however, raises several difficult problems of interpretation. One of the most important of these concerns the identity of Hume’s “accuser“-the author of A Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality &c., to which Hume is responding in the Letter. Clearly the interpretation of the Letter, and its relevance to the Treatise, will vary
depending on who is identified as the source of the accusations against Hume, and what is made of this person’s motivation and philosophical
commitments. The immediate difficulty is that the Specimen is presented anonymously, and thus conjectures must be made about the author on the
basis of available evidence.

In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several scholars take Kant's statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant's views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz's. This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant's views on the origin of intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz's. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz.

A critical edition of all of the philosophically important material from the correspondence between the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and his two royal patronesses, Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-1714), and her daughter, Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia (1668-1705). In this correspondence, Leibniz expounds in a very accessible way his views on topics such as the nature and operation of the mind, innate knowledge, the afterlife, ethics, and human nature. The correspondence also contains the only known philosophical writings by Sophie and Sophie Charlotte, and thus provides a valuable insight into their views and concerns, as well as throwing light on their characters. The texts are accompanied by a substantial introductory essay which sets the context for the correspondence and analyzes its main philosophical themes.

This dynamical interpretation of the continuum is based on a threefold perspective. First, detailed differentiation of all standard realms of Leibnizian Weltanschauung – (R real), (P phenomenal), (I ideal). Second, analysis of the scope of the Law of Continuity famously formulated by Leibniz and mapping it onto this (RPI) structure. Third, finding the precise place of dynamics and force in this (RPI) continuum.
These perspectives (taxonomical, legislative and junctional) if put together lead to a new understanding of monads’ role; and they are not taken anymore as a discreet part of Leibnizian philosophy (as opposed to the ideal space and time), but as dynamical continuum incorporating in itself both contiguity and continuity. And in such a way they are both neutralizing and preserving the syncategorematic phenomenal infinity. The main point is that force can be applied both to perception and appetition of monads and by this we give the shortest Leibnizian answer to the Zeno’s Dichotomy paradox – “force”. But what is more important, such dynamical interpretation gives good schematic and systematic view of Leibnizian mature philosophy. And it appears (as expected) that the thread out of the Labyrinth of the Continuum is not only geometrical and physical, but metaphysical too.

This chapter discusses the relation between Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference in ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, the views of eighteenth-century German authors who wrote on syllogism, and the conception of metaphysics that Kant developed in 1762-1764. Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even though they are not as independent from the intellectual context as Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism are not primarily motivated by polemical purposes. They are strongly influenced by his views on the method of metaphysics.

Ein Gemeinplatz der modernen Ästhetik besteht darin, dass sich die Produktivität des Künstlers einem entfesselten Gebrauch seiner Einbildungskraft verdankt. Nach dieser Vorstellung kann der Künstler neue Werke hervorbringen, weil er sich der assoziativen Kraft seiner Einbildungskraft überlässt. Als eine historische Quelle für die Auffassung, dass der Künstler in der Verwendung seiner Einbildungskraft von zwingenden Regeln frei ist, wird dabei oft Kants Genietheorie des Künstlers angesehen. Kant wird damit als Opponent der Regelpoetik Gottscheds und Vorbereiter der Genieauffassung der Romantik wahrgenommen. Tatsächlich stellt die Auffassung, dass das künstlerische Genie seine Einbildungskraft frei von begrifflichen Zwängen ausübt, einen wichtigen Teil von Kants Theorie der schönen Kunst dar. Wie sich jedoch leicht feststellen lässt, schreibt Kant dem schöne Kunst hervorbringenden Genie keine absolute Freiheit im Gebrauch der Einbildungskraft zu. Im Folgenden beschäftige ich mich mit den Beschränkungen, denen die Einbildungskraft des Genies trotz der ihr zugeschriebenen Freiheit laut der Kunsttheorie der Kritik der Urteilskraft unterworfen ist.

This chapter outlines Kant’s account of empirical concept formation and discusses two objections that have been advanced against it. Kant holds that we form empirical concepts, such as colour concepts, by comparing sensory representations of individuals, identifying shared features, and abstracting from the differences between them. According to the first objection, we cannot acquire colour concepts in this way because there is no feature that all and only the instances of a given colour share and the boundary between colours is conventional. According to the second objection, assuming that all instances of a given colour share certain features, we can identify them only if we already possess a concept of that colour. None of the two objections is convincing as it stands. Kant can offer replies to both objections that are consistent with his views and with empirical evidence concerning the perception and representation of colours.