'Greek Law under the Romans'

Greek Law under the Romans Oxford Handbooks Online Greek Law under the Romans Georgy Kantor The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law (Forthcoming) Edited by Edward M. Harris and Mirko Canevaro Online Publication Date: Aug 2015 Subject: Classical Studies, Greek and Roman Law DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199599257.013.25 Abstract and Keywords This chapter deals with the impact of Roman legal institutions and political realities of Roman dominance on legal institutions in the Greek world, and with developments of Greek law within the imperial framework from the fall of Corinth to its last traces in late imperial legislation. It addresses in particular the specific characteristics of sources for Greek law in the Roman period, conflicts of jurisdiction between Greek poleis and imperial authorities, the law of personal status in the new imperial context and new developments in the law of property and obligation. The concluding sections deals with the demise of Greek law in late antiquity and its afterlife in late imperial legislation. Keywords: Citizenship, province, foreign judges, manumission, publication, constitutio Antoniniana, emphyteusis, hypallagma, Roman law This chapter is concerned with the impact of Roman rule on local law and jurisdiction in the Greek world and with the extent to which any specifically ‘Greek’ law of that period can be reconstructed from the comparatively meagre sources. It attempts to address problems in both substantive and procedural law, but does not discuss public law and institutions except insofar as they impacted on developments in private law or on individual legal disputes. I concentrate on the situation in the late Roman Republic and High Empire, and provide only a very brief overview of current research into local and provincial law in late antiquity and of the perennially controversial topic of the traces of Greek legal substrate in what is sometimes described as ‘Roman vulgar law’. It needs to be stressed that the field surveyed here is not coextensive with that of the ‘law in Greek-speaking provinces of the Roman east’. Legal traditions that cannot be termed Greek continued to exist in the Hellenized part of the empire throughout this period; examples include Jewish law, as seen in papyri (Oudshoorn 2007 for the interaction with Greek law) or the Talmud and possibly practised in diaspora courts in Asia Minor (Jos. AJ 14.235; 14.260), and Galatian law, about which we get some evidence in Gaius (Inst. 1.55) and Ulpian (Dig. 23.3.9.3). These do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. 1. Perspectives of study The variability and excellence of Greek laws continued to be advertised and celebrated well into the period of the High Empire. So, for instance, the famous sophist Polemo of Smyrna noted in his Physiognomics that newcomers— clearly other provincials, rather than Romans—settle among the Greeks (defined surprisingly as ‘the people of Argos, Corinth and other lands of theirs’) ‘out of a desire for their knowledge, their good way of life and their laws’ (Physiogn. 35, trans. R. Hoyland), while the Christian apologist Athenagoras stressed to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, possibly during their visit to Athens in 176 CE, that their subjects ‘follow many different customs and laws’ (Leg. 1.1, trans. W. R. Schoedel). Statements by Roman authorities confirm this picture of the continuing importance of local laws and the preservation of local jurisdictional privileges in the new imperial environment. At some point early in 138 CE, not Page 1 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans long before his death, the emperor Hadrian confirmed to the inhabitants of Naryka, a small and certainly not privileged settlement in Opuntian Lokris, that their community was indeed a city. His list of what made this community a polis, unique in our evidence from that period and perhaps based on their petition, includes the Narykians having ‘the laws of the Opuntians’ (IG IX2 .I.5 2018, l. 15), just as the citizens of Hadrian’s new foundation of Antinoopolis in Egypt used the laws of the Naukratians (WChr 27). At an even later date, Gordian III confirmed to the legal representative of the city of Aphrodisias in Caria previous imperial and senatorial decisions ‘concerning the laws of your native city’, including some residual jurisdiction over its own citizens (IAph2007, no. 8.100, remitting back to Aphrodisias a case from the city of Rome). Greek judicial offices were still occasionally mentioned in the third century CE (I.Straton. I 229, bl. A, ll. 1–8; I.Perge II 323, ll. 5–6). As late as the 150s CE foreign judges were still being sent from Sparta to poleis in Asia (SEG 11.491; 493; 496; 526; IG V I 819), although this does not prove that such positions were still functional, rather than mere empty titles adorning municipal careers. Even in the sphere of taxation, the council and people of Mesambria in Thrace could at a fairly late date invite resident traders to pay taxes ‘in accordance with the law and custom of the city’ (IGBulg I2 317, ll. 7–8, after 212 CE). At the same time, Roman jurisdiction and, increasingly, Roman law entered the Greek East almost from the outset of its provincialization in the second century BCE. Most cities in mainland Greece, the Aegean islands, and western Asia Minor became (in differing degrees) subject to the jurisdiction of Roman governors by the 120s BCE, when the system of the governor’s assize circuit was set up by Manius Aquillius in the new province of Asia. When the last surviving Mediterranean Hellenistic kingdom of any significance, Ptolemaic Egypt, became part of the empire in 30 BCE , its judicial system was wholly taken over by Rome, even though local law continued to be applied by the courts (Taubenschlag 1951) and judicial experts were consulted by Roman prefects (P.Oxy. II 237, col. VII, ll. 14– 15; XLII 3015, ll. 9–11). A few centuries later these developments were crowned by a universal grant of Roman citizenship in the so-called constitutio Antoniniana (issued by the emperor Caracalla in 212 CE and partially preserved in P.Giss. I 40), which arguably extended access to Roman legal tools to a previously unknown degree even if it did not immediately abolish local law and jurisdiction. It would, however, be methodologically unsound to consider this development pre-determined at an early stage of Roman rule; the intervening centuries had rich, varied, and in many aspects quite inscrutable legal history. The history of Greek (or, more generally, local) law under Roman rule has to be studied within this dichotomy between support and respect for ancestral laws and gradual encroachment of Roman jurisdiction and legal instruments in the spheres initially reserved for local communities (Fournier 2010 is now the most comprehensive study along these lines). Another dimension is provided by the study of mutual influences in the sphere of substantive law. The field of study was laid out in the great work of Mitteis (1891), which posed the questions that still remain central. It is still the unavoidable starting point for work on this subject and provides important insights both into legal thought and into court practice, but is outdated particularly on the epigraphic evidence (a more recent brief overview is provided in Modrzejewski 1993, also privileging the papyrological sources; for Egypt, Modrzejewski 1970 is fundamental; the problem is less perceptively revisited in Maehler 2005). The field is now being gradually covered by studies more regional in approach, such as Youni 2000, a development prompted by the greater understanding of the lack of uniformity in Roman provincial arrangements and a more nuanced approach to the problem of the ‘unity of Greek law’. 2. Sources and methodology Our sources for Greek law of the Roman period are in many respects substantially different from those for the Classical or even Hellenistic age and the tools for their study are not yet fully developed. There is unfortunately no systematic collection of Greek legal sources of the Roman period outside Egypt (Roman documents: Oliver 1989 and Famerie forthcoming; intercommunity arbitrations: Camia 2009; documents on asylia: Rigsby 1996; associations: Dittmann-Schöne 2010: 112–261) or dictionary of Greek legal terminology of the time (for some aspects of it, see Mason 1970; Avotins 1989; Anastasiadis and Souris 2000; Laffi 2013; Raggi 2013). They remain a major desideratum. A crucial question is to what extent changes in the nature of our sources reflect changes in the nature of legal system and in the prevailing attitude towards sources of law in that period. Literary tradition (notably Philostratus in Page 2 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans his Lives of the Sophists and Seneca the Elder, Suasoriae) preserves some anecdotal evidence about Greek judicial oratory of that period and a number of fragments from court speeches survive in Stobaeus’ Florilegia (Russell 1983: 13, for a checklist), but there is no information about substantive law in any of them. Is it a faithful reflection of the orators’ own emphasis? Even what can be glimpsed from the courtroom stories about jurisdiction and procedure tells us more about Roman proconsular courts than about any properly local institutions, which is of course in itself telling (note Artem. Oneir. 4.72; Luc. Demonax 16 for the second-century CE perceptions). The study of perceptions of, and popular engagement with, justice in the Roman period is a direction of research to which seminal contributions have been made recently: in this sphere petitions surviving in inscriptions and papyri (studied for Egypt by Kelly 2011) and the so-called ‘confession inscriptions’ from rural areas of Phrygia and Lydia (Chaniotis 1997; Chaniotis 2004) provide more abundant material than for any other period in ancient history. Much of it, however, relates to Roman law and justice rather than to anything that may properly be termed ‘Greek’ or ‘local’. Similarly, despite the development of the legal profession under the Roman influence and surviving practical interest in the pre-Roman legislation, which required at least some attempts to preserve it (two tendencies to which we shall return below), there is nothing to suggest that there existed any literature dealing in a systematic way with contemporary Greek legal institutions. There is some incidental evidence about law in the oratory of Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides, and Plutarch’s Precepts of statecraft (Mor. 798A–825F), written as advice to an aspiring politician from Sardis, addresses, inter alia, the court system. However, the only surviving work dealing with specific enactments at any length, Plutarch’s Greek questions (Mor. 291D–304F), is antiquarian and it is not entirely clear whether any rules discussed in it still had relevance in Plutarch’s own day. More can be seen through the eyes of the Romans. Cicero’s court speeches, notably the Verrines and the Pro Flacco, contain abundant information about Roman attitudes to local legal autonomy in Greek-speaking provinces and occasionally give glimpses of local legal institutions (for instance on temple manumissions at Eryx: Cic. Div. Caec. 55–56; Verr. II.3.86; II.3.92; II.5.141). Even more valuable for the study of local legal conditions in the Greek East are Cicero’s letters from the province of Cilicia during his governorship there in 51–50 BCE and Pliny the Younger’s correspondence with the emperor Trajan during his governorship of Pontus-Bithynia in 109–111 CE (Ep. 10.15–121). Their evidence, however, has important limitations: both Cicero and Pliny are interested in local conditions only insofar as they come within the area of their own responsibility and sometimes comment on local opinions and desire for autonomy with barely concealed disdain. The relative scarcity of local legislation after the first few decades of Roman rule is, potentially, more significant still. While honorific decrees continue to be issued and there are a number of legal texts inscribed or re-displayed in this period recording pre-Roman law (in some cases archaic, as with the Great Code of Gortyn), new measures in either substantive or procedural law remain isolated in the post-Sullan age: examples include the Chian decree on the law of inheritance (SEG 56.1002) or the Chersonesitan decree reforming judicial procedure (SEG 55.838), and, at Aphrodisias, the only case of local honours awarded to a lawgiver from that period (SEG 58.1175). Does this, however, reflect Roman restrictions on local legislative initiative? Arguments may be offered both for and against such a view. While there is an undoubted decline in the number of new legislative acts inscribed, particularly in comparison to the number of communications with Roman authorities put on stone or bronze, examples are known from as late as the third century CE (I.Mylasa I 605). The new epigraphic pattern may have had more to do with local legislation getting more mundane due to the pax Romana or local institutional conservatism than with its disappearance or curtailment as such. It is notable that evidence for Roman endorsement of local decisions is extremely limited, largely relates to the approval of honours decreed for the emperors or governors, and is often accompanied by statements about the lack of need to ask for it (Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 547–549). An important decree of the Council and people of Gazoros in Macedonia on the conditions of long-term lease of public land was sent to the local mnamon for archiving, ‘as the law prescribes’, without any reference to Roman endorsement (SEG 24.614, ll. 7–9, 158/9 CE; compare Syll.3 884 for a later settlement of this issue at Thisbe in Boiotia by a proconsular edict). On the other hand, well-attested Roman interest in upholding ‘ancestral laws’ of subject communities, on which more below, undoubtedly could stifle local legislative initiative. Furthermore, fiscal and peace-keeping concerns could intervene. A letter of Trajan concerning the right of association in the ‘treaty city’ of Amisos in Bithynia could arguably be interpreted as endorsing local legislation as it was guaranteed by the treaty, but not new additions to it Page 3 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans (Plin. Ep. 10.93, with Jones 1940: 132, a controversial interpretation). It is perhaps suggestive that local regulations about religious matters provide an exception to the general scarcity of evidence for local legislative initiative (Fernoux 2011: 296–301, for examples from Ephesos, Miletos, and Stratonikeia in Karia). It is not surprising that this would be the area in which the Roman government left most autonomy to Greek communities. The role played by Roman decisions themselves is also worth examining. Many of them (for example the lex Pompeia in Pontus-Bithynia, the lex Rupilia in Sicily or Cicero’s edict in Cilicia, or the edict of Tiberius Iulius Alexander in Egypt) were, at most, to use Ernst Schönbauer’s (1937) useful distinction of Reichsrecht, Volksrecht, and Provinzialrecht, ‘provincial’ law rather than Roman law, and could owe much to local laws and customs, while some specifically address local rules. Note in this latter category, for instance, the reform of civic calendars in Asia proposed by the proconsul Paullus Fabius Maximus to the provincial koinon (RDGE 65, c.9 BCE), the edict of the proconsul C. Popillius Carus Pedo confirming court holidays for the month of Artemision at Ephesos (I.Eph. Ia 24, c.162/3 CE), reforms to city councils in Lycia brought about by Quintus Veranius in 43 CE (BE (2013) no. 398), or reform of long-term leases law at Thisbe (Syll.3 884, post-212 CE). The earliest example is provided by ‘the laws of the Thessalians’, given to them by Titus Quinctius Flamininus in 196 or 194 BCE (IG IX.ii 89b, ll. 15–18, Narthakion; Livy 34.51.6). One specific category comprises the plentiful Roman decisions reforming, sometimes substantially, the rules and the schedules of Greek festivals and the rights of athletes and artists. The most notable example is the recently published letters of the emperor Hadrian from Alexandria Troas, which instituted wholesale reform of the Panhellenic festival calendar (SEG 56.1359 = An. Ép. (2006) no. 1403). This area of law is undoubtedly Greek, rather than Roman, and, moreover, by its very nature common to the whole Greek-speaking world (for possible Greek influence in this sphere in Roman juristic literature, Jakab 2012). It takes its force, however, from Roman authority, and, Hadrian’s letters show, continuity with pre-Roman tradition can never be taken for granted. Texts of regulations enacted in the Hellenistic period but copied under the Roman Empire raise further questions. Examples include the astynomic law of Pergamon (SEG 13.521, new edition in Saba 2013 age of Hadrian) or the Seleucid ‘inheritance law of the registry office’ (extract in P.Dura 12, c.225–250 CE) or, going beyond what is strictly Greek, the Demotic law code from Hermopolis West (P.Mattha; Greek translation of c.150–200 CE in P.Oxy. XLVI 3285). Were these recorded on stone or copied out by scribes because they were still used as the law of the land, or for antiquarian and ideological reasons? After all, the Roman jurist Gaius could write a commentary on the Twelve Tables in the Antonine period and the Justinianic compilers could take excerpts from it four centuries later without any implication of continuing practical relevance. Egypt provides clear instances of Ptolemaic prostagmata alluded to in legal practice under the Romans (C.Ord.Ptol. All. 114–123; add. All. 124; note also P.Oxy. LXXVI 5096 for a seemingly practical collection of excerpts) and the Gnomon of Idios Logos both quotes Ptolemaic regulations and refers to royal prostagmata as one of its sources (BGU V 1210, l. 108 = P.Oxy. XLII 3014, l. 11). At the other end, however, the ‘Great Code’ at Gortyn (see Maffi this volume) was re-displayed in the Trajanic Odeion in archaic spelling and boustrophedon, hardly a practical choice. Nor should we discount the possibility of even very archaic (and not necessarily very reliable) texts being used as evidence in Roman courts, rather than being valid by themselves (Tac. Ann. 3.60–63; 4.14 on the senatorial review of asylia rights in 22 and 23 CE; I.Tralleis 3 with Thonemann 2009: 390–393 for a slightly confused Roman period reinscription of a grant of asylia rights from the reign of Artaxerxes III). The case discussed by Thonemann (even if the stone-cutter had difficulties with Aramaic numerals in the original document) in fact inspires some confidence in the ability of legal experts and communities in the imperial age to access genuine documents of the pre-Roman period and, furthermore, in the genuineness of legal texts available to us. Other instances are also suggestive; a particularly striking example is provided by P.Vindob. Tandem 1, an early third-century CE private copy of a letter of Ptolemy II Philadelphos to officers stationed in the Herakleopolite nome. An especially significant role in the preservation of pre-Roman rulings appears to have been played by the temples. At Baitokake in Syria, for instance, a bilingual inscription includes privileges of the local temple of ‘Heavenly Zeus’ from the Seleucid king Antiochus through Augustus to Valerian (IGLS VII 4028), while at Pessinous a series of Attalid decisions was inscribed towards the end of the first century CE (I.Pessinous 1–7, with Haensch 2009: 282, for both of these cases) and at Nysa in 1 BCE a certain Artemidoros, son of Demetrios, restored to the record office the privileges of the temple of Pluto and Kore, including a letter of the king Seleucus (Syll.3 781). A note of caution is needed, though: forgery was by no means unknown (Syll.3 810 = Oliver 1989, no. 34, letter of Page 4 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Nero to Samos, 55 CE; Plin. Ep. 10.65.3) and conceivably genuine grants of asylum rights from the Persians and Hellenistic kings were presented to the Senate alongside references to Hercules and Teucer in 22 CE. Roman authorities were presumably equally unable to check grants from Hercules and from Cyrus the Great for authenticity and Greek temples, just like mediaeval monasteries, were perfectly capable of producing, in order to confirm their rights, documents which they assumed should have existed. It is, however, important to recognize that even forgeries, insofar as they were used in legal disputes and transactions, are an important testimony for the history of Greek law in this period: what matters from this perspective is not whether a certain grant was made by a Persian satrap but whether the litigants and judges believed that it had been. Both Roman and local authorities demonstrated, at least occasionally, some concern for preserving local legal deeds in proper order (SEG 33.1177, edict of Q. Veranius from Myra in Lycia, 43 CE; IG XII.iv.1 84–85, decrees of the city of Kos, first century BCE or CE, with Harter-Uibopuu 2013: 274–280; I.Eph. Ia 14, setting up of a civic antigrapheion) and publication of local enactments on stone and bronze continued (Fernoux 2011: 243–244, for a checklist of publication clauses in decrees). The occasional publication on stone of detailed minutes of meetings (SEG 21.505; 506; 43.864: the Athenian Areopagus; 38.1172: an urban subdivision of the polis of Tralleis; IG II2 1035, l. 3: a record of vote in the Athenian assembly) illustrates archival practices and provides a glimpse of decision-making processes. Roman influence is betrayed by occasional references to the acta (using the Latin term, transliterated into Greek) of the local boule (P.Babatha 12, Petra; SEG 54.1056, line 4; 1059, line 4, Aphrodisias). The parallel role of provincial archives in the preservation of local documents is emphasized by a list of contributions to the grapheion of the province of Asia at Ephesos by Asian poleis, arranged by Roman assize districts (I.Eph. Ia 13 = SEG 37.884, Flavian period; a possible counterpart in IG IV 1605, Corinth, reign of Hadrian). There is particularly abundant evidence for the archiving of manumission acts and funerary fines (Harter-Uibopuu 2013; for archives in the earlier period see Faraguna this volume). The case of fines for grave violation, however, shows the necessity of caution. It is unclear what, if any, legal standing the particular sums given in inscriptions have, the bodies to which the fines were payable vary widely, and deposition of these provisions at Roman provincial archives (TAM III.i 657, ll. 10–11, Termessos; TAM V.i 423, ll. 11–12, Kollyda in Lydia; IGRR IV 1181, ll. 22–23, Aigai in Mysia) or archives ‘of other cities’ (SEG 40.1064, ll. 13–14, Saittai in Lydia) suggests attempts to vary enforcement strategies. None of this material survives, beyond what is inscribed on the graves themselves, and calculations by G. P. Burton (2002) showing the unrepresentative character of surviving Roman imperial documents apply with even greater force to civic and private legal documents from this period. It was an age of written law, and literacy, while confined to a minority of the Greek population, was abundantly present in all spheres of legal transactions (see Mitteis 1891: 401–498 and Meyer 2004 for the crucial debate on the Hellenistic or Roman origin of ‘dispositive’ legal documents in the eastern Mediterranean). Our surviving texts can represent no more than a tiny percentage of what was generated even by a single Greek community of any significance over a single imperial reign. A related kind of problem is presented by the very uneven geographic distribution of our evidence. Whereas from Roman Egypt (and to a lesser extent the desert fringes of the Levant and Mesopotamia) a wealth of private legal documents survives on papyrus and occasionally parchment (Rupprecht 1994: 94–153, for orientation), nothing comparable exists for Achaia, Macedonia, the main Greek cities of Syria, the provinces of Asia Minor, Sicily, or Cyprus. Occasional contracts that made their way to Egypt (note P.Turner 22; BGU III 887; 913; P.Mich. VII 442; IX 546; P.Oxy. XXXVI 2771; L 3593; 3594, and a wax tablet from Ravenna, SB III 6304 = FIRA III 134) provide only isolated glimpses. The kinds of information about private law preserved in inscriptions are limited by the conventions of epigraphic culture: whilst our information concerning manumissions, wills, trust foundations, and questions of land ownership is relatively plentiful, our understanding of the law of obligations is much more limited. Outside Egypt, evidence for procedural law, although also far from complete, is invariably more plentiful than for substantive law, particularly for the imperial period. The most important recent study of law in mainland Greece and Asia Minor (Fournier 2010) accordingly limits itself to the law of procedure. Nor is there any place in the eastern Mediterranean except Egypt and (if one takes Talmudic evidence into account) perhaps Judaea, for which one can form a comprehensive picture of local legal conditions. Page 5 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans For a long time the debate has accordingly been dominated by the question of the applicability of Egyptian data to the study of Greek law elsewhere and more generally of the acceptability of generalizations based on evidence from different communities. Egypt, where civic institutions were absent through most of the country and even Alexandria did not have a city council till the age of Septimius Severus, was obviously in many respects unlike the rest of the Greek East, particularly when the special status of the inhabitants of the chora is taken into account. Gradually, however, as is the case with many related problems in Roman history, the debate is moving towards recognition both of some important similarities in approach across the Greek East and of the uniqueness of each individual province. Pontus-Bithynia with its civic institutions modelled on the Italian by the lex Pompeia, Lycia with its uniquely empowered koinon, entrusted not only with policing the peace but even with provincial customs collection (SEG 57.1666, cf. in general Knoepfler 2013), and Achaia, object of particular attention from classicizing Roman rulers, were hardly less unique than Egypt. At the same time, earlier activities of Hellenistic kings and of ‘foreign judges’ (Magnetto this volume), as well as the development of Mediterranean trade, should have contributed to the emergence of a legal koine even before the appearance of Rome on the stage (see also general observations on the ‘unity of Greek law’ by Canevaro and Harris in the introduction this volume). Striking similarities in documentary habits across the Greek East reinforce this impression. It is clear that the need to argue cases in Roman courts favoured these homogenizing tendencies. The survival of certain elements of Greek law in late antiquity can sometimes be traced through Roman and early Byzantine legal and para-legal collections, whose evidence applies a fortiori to the earlier period. Despite the attempts of Justinianic compilers to iron out local peculiarities, there are multiple references to them (and occasionally even to unambiguously Greek institutions, such as regulations concerning citizenship of Ilion in Dig. 50.1.1.2 or the rescript of Diocletian and Maximian concerning the institution of apokeryxis in CJ. 8.46.6; see on the latter Wurm 1972: 79–95; Modrzejewski 2014: 332–336) in the Digest and the Code of Justinian. More material may be preserved in the sixth-century treatise on rules regulating construction by Julian of Ascalon: he deals with different rules about the responsibility of landlords for repairs in a shared building at Caesarea and Ascalon (Jul. Asc. 35.2) and his rules on irrigation and tree-planting may have at least some relation to Greek law (Saliou 1996: 118–132). A Byzantine collection of Rhodian sea-law claims to be based on the work of a commission at the time of Tiberius (or Claudius?) which had ‘carefully sought out in Rhodes and imparted all matters relating to those who sail on ships … and to deposits of capital and partnerships, and to purchases and sales of ships, and works of shipbuilding, and to deposits of gold and silver and of various goods’ (trans. Ashburner 1909: 120, with detailed commentary bringing out discrepancies of its rules with Roman law of the Corpus iuris). This example, however, illustrates the difficulties inherent in using this material. Rhodian law was recognized by Roman jurists and the emperor Antoninus Pius (Dig. 14.2) as the law of the sea, much like the ‘Laws of Oleron’ in medieval England. How much of the material included in Byzantine collections actually goes back to the days of Rhodian mastery over the Aegean? The prologue listing endorsements from Roman emperors is a jumble, and there is little reason to assume that the main body of the rules fared much better. It is nonetheless significant that collections of rules recognizably different from Roman imperial legislation, to which local origin was ascribed, continued to circulate at a late date, even if only in specific areas of law. 3. Conditions of jurisdiction Unsurprisingly, the area of law most immediately affected by the establishment of the Roman provincial system was the exercise of justice in Greek communities. While no clear policy of imposing substantive Roman law was implemented until very late in the day, the judicial system was seen by Roman authorities as an appropriate subject for regulation, even where it was not taken over. The immediate consequence of provincialization was the replacement of royal justice, where it existed (as in kingdoms of Asia Minor, Macedonia, Syria, or Egypt) by the judicial circuit of the Roman governor (assize circuit: Fournier 2010: 41–98 for Greece and Asia Minor; Guerber 2009: 303–323; Roman governors taking over the functions of royal justice in the Nabataean kingdom: Cotton 1993: 107). While the geography of the assize circuit in the province of Asia was connected to Attalid administrative divisions, as seen in the sites of cistophoric mints and countermarking authorities, the institution itself was new and does not display any noticeable continuity with Page 6 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans the Attalid judicial system (Fournier 2010: 63–64; Kantor 2014). In other provinces (for example in Achaia or LyciaPamphylia) no link to the pre-conquest administrative system is discernible. Use of the Roman two-stage system in private law procedure (where establishment of the facts of the case was delegated by a magistrate to a specially appointed judge at the so-called apud iudicem stage, usually under a formula setting out the legal parameters) nonetheless allowed some local input at this level too. In Egypt (Seidl 1973: 93–128; Kelly 2011: 75–122; illustrative documents in Keenan, Manning, and Yiftach-Firanko 2014: 470–540) the judicial system was wholly taken over by provincial authorities, a model which could perhaps have been emulated for a time in the regions where polis justice had previously been thin on the ground, such as Cappadocia or Thrace. The natural reading of the first and fourth edicts of Augustus from Cyrene (SEG 9.8, ll. 1–39; 63–72) is that prior to his interventions all capital jurisdiction and at least private law jurisdiction between Greeks from different communities was in the hands of the governor, with no guarantee that Greek judges would be granted to the litigants. The Augustan edicts altered this state of affairs, with the fourth guaranteeing appointment of Greek judges in private law cases between Greek litigants, and the first establishment of a court including Greek judges in capital cases. Elsewhere, the range of both general jurisdictional regulations for particular provinces and of jurisdictional privileges of individual communities was considerable (for two different views of the degree of uniformity emerging in Roman jurisdictional arrangements, Fournier 2010: 263–501 and Kantor 2010). The evidence does not allow one to generalize from rules for any single province, particularly under the Roman Republic; while it is true that adjudication by Greek judges in trials between Greeks of different communities and the retention of some form of civic jurisdiction over local citizens was often seen as desirable, the ways in which it was implemented differed and it doubtful whether this was a universally guaranteed right even after Augustus. In Sicily, the so-called lex Rupilia of 131 BCE assured the appointment of Sicilian judges by the governor in all private law cases where a Sicilian was a defendant, and the hearing of trials between fellow citizens of one community in their local courts ‘by their own laws’ (Cic. Verr. II.2.32)—more substantial privileges than those granted by Augustus to Cyrene. It is clear from Cicero’s evidence that in the important provinces of Asia and Cilicia during the late Republic the use of Greek judges in private law trials between Greeks was only guaranteed in the jurisdictional edicts of individual governors, his mentor Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex in the 90s BCE and Cicero himself in 51 BCE (Cic. Att. VI.1.15; compare annual renewal of the exemption of the members of the Ephesian gerousia from judicial summons to the assize court by the proconsul in 29 to 31 CE, SEG 43.765–767, and see below on Cicero’s term peregrini iudices). In the imperial period, provincial courts with involvement of local judges are known in the provinces of Cyrenaica (SEG 9.8, see above), Asia (I.Didyma 272, l. 19; Phil. VS 1.22.524), Pontus-Bithynia (Plin. Ep. 10.58.1; Dio Chrys. Or. 40.10), and Achaia (IG V I 541, ll. 17–19; SEG 58.330), but except for Cyrene neither their composition nor their precise sphere of competence is known. The competence of polis courts in the Roman period has traditionally been discussed within the Mommsenian dichotomy of ‘free communities’ (ciuitates liberae) and ‘subject communities’ (the usual, if not entirely accurate, translation of ciuitates stipendiariae). It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that these two categories were not mutually exclusive (the majority of the ‘free cities’ paid Roman stipendium while exemption from tax was granted to some cities not privileged jurisdictionally). Furthermore, just as wide variety of arrangements existed at the provincial level, so the jurisdictional privileges of more favoured communities could vary substantially (Fournier 2010: 397–501; Kantor 2010; Laffi 2010a; for a most recent overview of city statuses in the imperial period, Guerber 2009, rightly emphasizing the continuing practical significance of the ‘free city’ status). The most detailed surviving statement concerning the division of responsibility between Roman courts and the courts of a privileged community comes from the Roman treaty with the Lycian league of 46 BCE (SEG 55.1452, ll. 32–43, with Sánchez 2007). It establishes for the Romans and the Lycians a strict ‘home forum of the defendant’ rule in regard both of courts and of laws used, but importantly does not deal with Lycian jurisdiction over citizens of other poleis. The arrangements of the treaty with Mytilene were perhaps along the same lines, but their fragmentary state does not allow further precision (IG XII II 35 = RDGE 26, with Sánchez 2007: 380–381); a senatorial decree from Sardis (SEG 52.1175) is perhaps a fragment of another similar text. On the island of Chios, a senatorial decree of 80 BCE, confirmed under Augustus, made even resident Romans subject to Chian laws (RDGE 70, ll. 17–18) and thus presumably Chian courts, while at Colophon, in the early years of the province of Asia, local residents (not only citizens) were protected from judicial summons to provincial courts regardless of whether they were plaintiffs or defendants, even in cases involving Romans (SEG 39.1244 = ISE III 178, col. I, ll. 37–39; 42–44, Page 7 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans with Ferrary 1991). By contrast, at Aphrodisias in Karia local citizens were protected from summons to Roman courts, even when outside their city (IAph2007, no. 8.27, ll. 46–48), but at least by the age of Hadrian resident non-citizens were guaranteed trial ‘under Roman law and in the province’ (IAph2007, no. 11.412, l. 9). At Termessos in Pisidia restoration of ‘their own laws’ by the lex Antonia de Termessibus in 68 BCE (CIL I2 589 = RS 19) does not seem to have included any jurisdictional guarantees at all. A number of free cities were also seats of the governor’s assizes (Panormos: Cic. Verr. II.2.63; II.5.16; Alabanda: Plin. NH 5.109; other assize centres in Asia: SEG 39.1180, ll. 91/92). Conflicting sets of jurisdictional privileges could be one of the vehicles for increasing the role of Roman arbitration (Kantor 2010). The exact local obligations of citizens of privileged communities resident elsewhere remained an issue even after 212 CE (La Carie II 149 = Oliver 1989: no. 268, Herakleia or Apollonia on Salbake, 215 CE ). In the words of Rigsby (1996: 19), ‘Roman decisions supplanted Greek public opinion as the source of civic status’. Particular complications could be created by individual grants of Roman citizenship or individual rights of recourse to Roman courts (Ferrary 2005; Raggi 2006 for the definitive edition of the key document; Fournier 2012: 85–88; the right of recourse to Roman courts was granted by Vespasian to doctors and teachers, underscoring its continuing relevance even when Roman citizenship was granted more widely: Oliver (1989) no. 38, ll. 13–14). These privileges could still be maintained in the second and even third centuries CE, as the confirmation of Aphrodisian privileges by Gordian III (IAph2007, no. 8.100) demonstrates. It is probable that with the passage of time they were interpreted in a narrower sense: it is, for instance, unclear whether the restriction of Aphrodisian jurisdiction over resident foreigners is original or a Hadrianic clarification of a loophole in the original set of privileges. It is worth noting that as early as the first century BCE Hermogenes, son of Hephaistion, was honoured at Aphrodisias for successfully representing the city in ‘contests’ before the governors (although this might have been prior to the grant of Aphrodisian privileges, or in cases involving Roman citizens: SEG 54.1020, ll. 14–18). A funerary inscription of the second century CE (SEG 54.1059) speaks of the involvement of the governor and the imperial fiscus in collecting funerary fines at a date when governors were still formally prohibited from entering Aphrodisias. It is, nonetheless, extremely significant that the privileges first granted in the period when ‘free’ Greek cities still retained independent military significance as the allies of Rome were reconfirmed in fossilized form towards the end of the Severan period. Unlike the purely antiquarian renewals of treaties with Italian cities (ILS 432; 5004) there is no doubt that the letter of Gordian III had a practical purpose. It is usually assumed (already by Mitteis 1891: 88) that even ‘free communities’ surrendered capital jurisdiction to the provincial authorities relatively early, but our evidence is insufficient and occasional glimpses suggest that it was not formally abolished. In the reign of Hadrian or Antoninus Pius, the celebrated sophist Polemo advised his compatriots at Smyrna to leave cases of murder, sacrilege, and adultery to the proconsular court, but jealously guard their jurisdiction in other kinds of cases (Phil. VS 1.25.532). Polemo’s advice gives no indication that he was warning his fellow citizens against anything illegal, which suggests that local capital jurisdiction at Smyrna had not been yet abolished in the Antonine age, despite it being an assize centre, but at the same time shows how prudence could prevent even a privileged polis from exercising its rights. The latest known example of capital jurisdiction actually exercised by the Athenian Areopagus (a court whose ancient reputation should have ensured its longer existence) is seen in a forgery case of 18 CE (Tac. Ann. 2.55.2; for the Republican period, cf. Val. Max. 8.1.amb.2). There is some evidence in Lucian that may suggest—insofar as it is not taken over from an earlier tradition—that it retained jurisdiction over the cases of injury and andrapodismos (Fournier 2010: 145–146). Elsewhere the evidence is meagre and often inconclusive: Plutarch, Cim. 1.2–2.3 mentions a death sentence passed at Chaironeia in the immediate aftermath of the First Mithridatic War, when the legal situation had perhaps not yet settled down; SEG XI 974 (with Fournier 2010: 496–497) may speak of local capital jurisdiction at Sparta in the age of Augustus; Ach. Tat. 7.1.3 cannot be accepted as a testimony for local capital jurisdiction at Ephesos in the second century CE. It is probable that communities deprived of their ‘free’ status for ‘murdering Roman citizens’ condemned them to death in local courts, which would imply continuation of a limited form of local capital jurisdiction (C.D. 54.7.6; Tac. Ann. 4.36.2: Kyzikos in 20 BCE and 25 CE; Plut. Mor. 815D: Thessaly under Augustus; C.D. 60.17.3–4: Lycia in 43 CE; C.D. 60.24.4: Rhodes in 44 CE). Expulsion from the city for resident foreigners or loss of citizenship was perhaps a more widely used punishment, even in less privileged poleis: it could be established as a punishment at Kyzikos in 38 CE for speculation in the agora (Syll.3 799, lines 14–26, with Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011: i. 201–202) and the addressee of Plutarch’s On exile (Mor. 599A–607F), expelled from Sardis, appears to be under a local, rather than Roman sentence. Attempts to introduce new Page 8 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans legislation about capital punishment were, as far as we can tell, very limited: while we have a number of documents detailing fines for citizens or corporal punishments for miscreant slaves, the decree from Kyzikos is unique in its period. There is some evidence that a system of appeal to Roman courts from the courts of free cities developed in the imperial period (Fournier 2010: 520–524), notably at Sparta for cases in excess of (according to one interpretation) 900 denarii (IG V.i 21) and at Athens where a long series of decisions of Marcus Aurelius on appeal from local courts survives (SEG XXIX 127, plaque II). However, a letter of Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, the proconsul of Asia under Claudius, to Kos, reinforcing the governor’s scrutiny of appeals to the emperor and introducing security of 2,500 denarii for each appeal (IG XII.iv.1 261), more plausibly deals with appeals against the decisions of Roman courts. It is doubtful at what date, if any, a uniform system was implemented, though it seems natural to suppose that the emperor’s (but perhaps not the governor’s) wishes would in practice override the privileges of local courts, particularly if those were to be confirmed for the future and put aside only for this occasion (compare Plin. Ep. 10.47–48). It is a natural assumption that the jurisdiction of communities which did not have free status was less extensive (Plin. Ep. 10.93 draws an explicit contrast), but in general we lack the evidence to determine its exact boundaries. It is significant that Hadrian’s comprehensive letter to the international synodos of the Dionysiac artists directed them to local courts in accordance with the law of each place for redress of grievances (SEG LVI 1359, lines 54– 55); most of these would undoubtedly be courts of subject cities. It is probable that at least in some provinces competence of city courts over resident non-citizens was restricted in the imperial period, as it was at the newly established city of Parthikopolis in the Strymon valley, where a limit of 250 denarii on the value of cases was established (IGBulg IV 2263 = Oliver 1989, no. 156, ll. 12–14, 158 CE) . In contrast to municipal charters in Italy and Spain, however, there is no evidence that such restrictions extended to litigation between local citizens. Arguably, insofar as we are dealing with litigation between two local citizens, what was at stake was not the upper limit of city jurisdiction, but a guarantee that the case will be remitted to local courts if brought before the governor, which was granted in Sicily by the lex Rupilia, but was lacking in Asia Minor during the late Republic and perhaps elsewhere. 4. Judicial institutions and the law of procedure Evidence for judicial institutions and their personnel is considerably more abundant, even if yet again fragmentary and often coming only from the cursus of local honorands. No immediate break with the Hellenistic period at the civic level is revealed. Popular courts, where they had not already been displaced as higher courts by ‘foreign judges’, continued to function for a time. Besides the Athenian dikasteria (still attested in some form under Marcus Aurelius: SEG XXIX 127, plaque II, lines 8, 68, and 75; perhaps also Lucian, Timon 51), we get evidence about the courts on Rhodes down to the 70s CE (Cic. Rep. 3.48; [Sall.] ad Caes. 2.7.12; Dio Chrys. Or. 31.102, with Fournier 2010: 185–204), and at Chersonesos in Tauris a decree reforming the court system for private law cases was passed perhaps as late at the early second century CE (SEG 55.838, cf. BE (2013) no. 312). Importantly, at Chersonesos, the reform established a procedure of rejection of judges by parties to the case seemingly based on the Roman reiectio, while in other respects retaining a fairly old-fashioned system of large panels of judges selected by lot for disputes over relatively small amounts of money (even the largest court size, 15 men, is reserved for the cases from just 60 denarii), rather exceptional at such a late date. The northern shore of the Black Sea was not under direct Roman rule, and this is not the only example of institutional conservatism there (one may note, for example, late attestations of proxeny grants); in this case, however, it is curiously combined with Roman elements. This illustrates the possibility of Roman influence in the procedural sphere extending beyond the mere intervention of provincial authorities (compare a possible adaptation of the Roman sortitio iudicum in preannexation Lycia: TAM II 508, lines 26–27). If this was happening outside the boundaries of direct imperial rule we should a fortiori expect the same in subject communities, but unfortunately there is very little evidence for the procedural minutiae of civic courts in the Roman period. A better attested pattern of change was perhaps driven at least as much by social change in the Roman age poleis as by any direct Roman intervention (though some role needs to be assigned to provincial statutes regulating civic institutions: SEG 50.1211, l. 13, Asia; Plin, Ep. 10.79, Bithynia; Strabo 10.4.22.484C, Crete; SEG 38.1462, ll. 92 and 111, Lycia), and in this respect, Chersonesos was behind the curve. While evidence for local judicial institutions is scattered and we cannot form a detailed picture for most cities (Fournier 2010 offers case studies on Athens, Page 9 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Sparta, Rhodes, and Mylasa, all of them, unsurprisingly, privileged communities), it strongly suggests the increasing judicial role of the Council and decreasing role of dikasteria in this period (Fournier 2010: 246–251). As stressed by Fournier, Hadrian’s list of essential institutions of a polis in his letter to Naryka does not include the law courts. In a well-attested instance, although the Areopagus at Athens was traditionally associated with the exercise of justice, the Council of the Five Hundred also acquires a jurisdiction of its own (Oliver 1970: 64–65, who also discusses the survival of dikasteria; Fournier 2010: 157–159). The most detailed body of evidence for this new role of city councils is provided by Cicero’s Verrines for Sicily during the late Republic (Mellano 1977). Evidence for trials in popular assemblies (in particular, Luc. Peregr. 10, Parion; Apuleius, Met. 2.21, Larisa, and 3.1, Hypata) is unreliable; their legislative functions in the judicial sphere continue to be attested, however (Fernoux 2011: 334– 345). As regards punishment of petty crime and other more routine cases, city officials could often impose fines and minor punishments (Dmitriev 2005: 130). This function is particularly emphasized by the development across the eastern Mediterranean, in the second century CE, of the office of eirenarchoi, entrusted with care of public order at the civic level and policing the countryside (Brélaz 2005). A recently published inscription (SEG 56.1493, Akmoneia) confirms the evidence of Aelius Aristides (Or. 50.72) and of late imperial legislation (CJ. 10.77) that Roman governors were involved in their selection. This shows both the difficulty of drawing strict distinction between ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ institutions in this period and the readiness of the imperial administration to harness local resources to do its tasks, a pattern replicated elsewhere in the judicial system (see on ‘foreign judges’ below). This need not exhaust the possibilities for local administration of justice. For instance, an inscription from Pogla in Pisidia speaks of otherwise unattested topika dikasteria at the village level (IGRR III 409), while at Ephesos towards the end of the Antonine age, Iulius Proculus, a scion of a consular family and the agonothete at the Artemisia, was honoured by ‘a sacred court’, to hieron dikasterion (I.Eph. IV 1103), presumably an adjudicatory panel for that festival. Such glimpses, however, remain tantalizingly isolated. At the inter-city level, federal courts (metapempta dikasteria), perhaps on the ‘foreign judge’ model, survived in Lycia into the Antonine age (I.Opramoas bl. 2D, ll. 10–12; TAM II 915, l. 6; F.Xanthos VII 86, bl. H, l. 5). In Greece in the principate of Tiberius the resolution of a territorial dispute between the cities of Metropolis and Kierion was delegated by the Roman governor Poppaeus Sabinus to the court of the Thessalian koinon, where 298 votes were given for Metropolis, 31 for Kierion, and 5 were invalid (IG IX II 261). The governor’s ratification of the court’s decision in this case, and the involvement of Roman governors at some stages of the dispute between Kaunos and Kalynda (our only testimony for the Lycian metapempta dikasteria actually passing a judgement in the provincial period; F.Xanthos VII 86), imply a desire to control administration of justice at this level more tightly. Marcus Aurelius heard appeals from the court of the archon of the Panhellenion, which dealt with disputed elections to that body (SEG 29.127, plaque II, ll. 15–20). It is in this context that we must view the survival of the Hellenistic judicial institution of ‘foreign judges’ (cf. Magnetto this volume). Abundant evidence exists for their continued role in the administration of justice in mainland Greece and to an even greater extent in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands during the late Republic, both in resolving individual disputes and in settling controversies between communities. Of particular interest is the treaty between Sardis and Ephesos of 97 (or 94) BCE, facilitated by the proconsul Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex (new edition in Laffi 2010b, bl. III, ll. 4–30), which not only provided for the ‘forum of the accused’ rule between the two communities, but also provided a procedure for selecting a third city to arbitrate between the parties to the treaty (Laffi 2010b: 84–89). This is, however, followed by a considerable gap in our record until evidence re-emerges towards the end of the first century CE. With the exception of the Lycian metapempta dikasteria, whose existence was clearly uninterrupted, the latest firmly dated piece of evidence for the continued use of ‘foreign judges’ prior to the gap is a mention of peregrini iudices in Cicero’s description of his Cilician edict of 51 BCE (Cic. Att. VI.1.15). Neither can uncontroversially be interpreted as ‘foreign judges’, but this is still on balance the most probable explanation (cf. BE (1944) no. 171, for the view taken here). Epigraphic evidence from the 90s CE onwards is relatively plentiful again, particularly at Mylasa and Sparta, where it shows a wide network of judicial missions to different communities (to the list in Fournier 2010: 607–609, add SEG 54.1103 from Mylasa), and Plutarch (Mor. 493A–B) uses appeals to foreign judges as a simile, which suggests that his audience was well aware of the institution. Page 10 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Are we dealing simply with changes in epigraphic culture and chances of survival (local circumstances explaining the Mylasan and Spartan series of honorific inscriptions), which hide the survival of ‘foreign judges’ as a routinely working institution? Or does the evidence show a revival connected with the newly found interest in syngeneia relationships and with the general cultural tendencies of the age of the Second Sophistic? There are reasons to argue that the development of Roman jurisdiction was bound to put former inter-polis structures of arbitration out of business (Fournier 2010: 536–543). A useful parallel may be drawn with the gradual disappearance of proxeny from our epigraphic record in this period, which a seminal new study connects with the decline of peer-polity interaction and Rome’s new role as arbiter of inter-polis relations (Mack 2015: ch. 5). The institutional reality may, however, have been somewhat more complex. In c.120–115 BCE, foreign judges from Andros were sent to Adramyttion ‘by Gnaeus Aufidius, son of Gnaeus, the propraetor’, Roman governor of Asia (IG XII.v 722, ll. 6–7). The treaty between Sardis and Ephesos three decades later has been plausibly connected with Scaevola Pontifex allowing the Greeks of Asia to use peregrini iudices (and Greek law) in their disputes, presumably those which came up to the governor’s court (Laffi 2010b; Cic. Att. VI.1.15). It seems that this provision, later emulated by Cicero in Cilicia, refers to the use of ‘foreign judges’ (Fournier 2010: 308–312, for alternatives), mediated through the Roman governor, who followed in this regard the example of Hellenistic kings and their representatives (compare I.Magnesia 90; I.Erythrai 116; I.Priene 59). If this is so, the difference between ‘foreign judges’ and a panel of iudices dati appointed by a Roman magistrate from another Greek community could become increasingly academic, though no doubt it would make a difference if personal decisions about the appointments were in the hands of a nominated third city rather than the governor himself. An interesting comparandum is the surviving judgment of Titus Flavius Eubulus, a iudex datus appointed by the governor of Achaia in a dispute over landed property between Memmius Antiochus (a Roman citizen) and the city of Daulis in 118 CE (IG IX.i 61). The practice of appointing Greek judges from a ‘neutral’ community could well have continued and indeed be reinforced in the Augustan reforms of provincial jurisdiction, but the more oldfashioned and (perhaps) prestigious terminology came back into use only in the age of the Second Sophistic. This is not necessarily precluded by the fact that ‘foreign judges’ in the Roman period testimonies frequently come from one province to another. It is very doubtful whether Andros was part of the province of Asia before the mid-second century CE (An. Ép. (2009) no. 1373), and Valerius Maximus could assume that a proconsul of Asia remitted a case to the Areopagus (Val. Max. 8.1.amb.2). What did eventually disappear, however, and with (if the theory of centrality of the delegation procedure to legal autonomy of subject communities is correct) profound consequences for the balance of Roman and local law, was the ability of the proconsul to delegate jurisdiction in capital cases. The edict of Mucius Scaevola, as imitated by Cicero, guaranteed that trials between Greeks should be conducted according to their own laws (sues legibus). This, however, was clearly not the case under Appius Claudius, Cicero’s predecessor in Cilicia, and Cicero’s summary of the Sicilian lex Rupilia (Cic. Verr. II.2.32) only refers explicitly to judgment according their own laws in the case of disputes between citizens of the same community. In the case of communities that were not specifically privileged in the sphere of jurisdiction, the question of law applied by the provincial courts (including here Greek judges acting on the proconsul’s mandate) is a crucial one: if Greek law was, to use the modern ‘conflict of law’ terminology, ‘recognized’ but not necessarily ‘enforced’ at the provincial level, the impact on the law of property and contract would be obvious. Roman judicial procedure allowed considerable flexibility in incorporating local institutions within its framework. The procedure of empowering the judges to use local law at the apud iudicem stage of the provincial process could in some cases be similar to the formula approved by a governor of Hispania Tarraconensis under Hadrian for the resolution of disputes over water rights according to a local enactment endorsed by him (An. Ép. (2006) no. 476, col. III, ll. 38–43; compare, for the Republican period, CIL I2 .ii.4 2951a). Elsewhere, a wider range of legal authorities had to be taken into account by the judges. A crucial piece of evidence is provided by the recently discovered decrees of the city of Demetrias and the koinon of the Magnetoi for a delegation of foreign judges from Messene, which explicitly state that the judges acted in accordance with ‘the decrees/judgements of the Romans and the laws’ (preliminary publication in Bardani 2013: 82–116 no. 7, ll. 54–55 and 70). The wording is close to Hellenistic terms of reference for foreign judges referring to the royal diorthomata or diagrammata (for example Gonnoi 2.93A, line 10; I.Iasos 82, lines 45–46; CPJ I 19, lines 40–45) and implies a mix of Greek and Roman rules used in adjudication. Page 11 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans What applied in a panel of foreign judges would a fortiori be relevant in the governor’s court itself. Furthermore, the use of Roman rules would gain additional momentum with the spread of individual grants of Roman citizenship from the first century BCE (see below). It would be wrong to underestimate the impact of that. As Kelly has conclusively demonstrated for petitions from Roman Egypt, ‘far from purely being the last resort of the desperate, used only when all other mechanisms of dispute resolution had failed’ (Kelly 2011: 285), resort to the legal system could be used from an early stage of a dispute to shape the eventual settlement. What law could be used in the courts would be of paramount importance in this context. Further problems, regardless of the judges’ intentions, could be presented by establishing the law with certainty, if a decision to apply local rules was taken: the litigants could well be presenting their case to the governor outside their own assize district (Cic. Verr. II.1.70–76; Plin. Ep. 10.81.4; Arist. Or. 50.78; 50.85; 50.89; 50.96; MAMA IX 13; for Cyprus being an exception, Cic. Att. V.21.9), and in any case Roman magistrates could easily profess ignorance even of Roman law (Plin. Ep. 10.96). A new development of the Roman period was the professionalization and growing significance of legal experts (nomikoi), modelled at least to some extent on Roman iuris periti. While in the first century CE Strabo (12.2.9.539C) still viewed them as a Roman phenomenon, in the High Empire they are widely attested across the eastern Mediterranean (Jones 2007, to whose checklist add Iulius Dionysios, I.Eph. VI 2026, and Apollonios, I.Eph. VII 3123, at Ephesos; Lucius Vitellius Bassus, a member of a prominent Milesian family, I.Milet. II 887; and perhaps Nestor from Laranda in Lycaonia, SEG 42.1265; for Phrygia, Kantor 2013: 150–152; for legal representatives of the cities, Fournier 2007). These experts could be both consulted by the governors on points of local law and used by local litigants to gain knowledge of Roman enactments, thereby facilitating the homogenizing tendencies in substantive law (Kantor 2009). They often belonged to the educated elite of the cities and had considerable achievements in other cultural pursuits: for instance, a head of the Mouseion at Smyrna was elected for his ‘expertise in laws’ (IGRR IV 618), while a pupil from Amisos at the same Mouseion was commemorated as ‘knowledgeable in laws and geometry’ (I.Smyrna 893). Some had achieved high office in their cities, most notably a stephanephoros at Smyrna (I.Smyrna 372). The new profession clearly formed an accepted part of both institutional and cultural landscape, a significant fact in our overall assessment of the role of legal knowledge in dispute resolution and social relations. It is to their activities that we should ascribe the continuing circulation of legal documents from the pre-Roman period (see above). Parallels from elsewhere in the Roman Empire show the significance of local elite retaining its role in interpreting the law for the survival of local legal tradition under the Romans (compare Goodman 1987: 239–247 on Gaul and Judaea). 5. Citizenship, freedom, and personal status That laws about personal status are particularly resilient is a well-known phenomenon, and in the status-bound and highly hierarchical society of the Roman Empire conservatism in this sphere of law is to be expected, perhaps all the more so when socio-economic conditions favoured increased social mobility and migration. The difference in jurisdictional and taxation rights of individual communities should have reinforced this tendency in Greek cities. How much this institutional and formal conservatism affected social trends or, indeed, hid legal changes behind the façade of respect for tradition is, of course, an entirely different question (Kunnert 2012 for the evolution of one of the aspects of citizenship). The law about manumission and the status of freed slaves is a case in point. Most of our epigraphic evidence would suggest that the grant of citizenship to freedmen, a notable feature of Roman ciuitas, remained as unusual in the Greek world as it was when commended to the city of Larisa by the celebrated letter of Philip V in August 215 BCE (Syll.3 543, ll. 31–34). In one well-known example, a list of categories of city-inhabitants receiving cash handouts at Syllion in Pamphylia, freedmen who had received Roman citizenship after manumissio uindicta were listed as ouindiktarioi rather than Rhomaioi (IGRR III 801–802, cf. Gagliardi 2006: 132–133), yet also distinguished from the rest of the apeleutheroi. It is clear that the idea of freedmen proceeding straight to citizenship (especially to the privileged status of Roman citizenship) continued to be seen as disturbing social hierarchies at Syllion. At Termessos, a certain Abaskantos is explicitly called on his tomb apeleutheros kai paroikos (TAM III 214). His father, a slave of the Roman citizen Claudius Epictetus, was also buried in the city (TAM III 215), confirming his local origin Page 12 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans and thus the non-citizen status of common freedmen. Non-enfranchised resident foreigners remained a significant feature of the Greek poleis into the imperial period (25 texts on paroikoi and xenoi assembled by Gagliardi 2006: 121–130; note for example IGBulg I2 58, l. 5, for explicitly distinguishing between the xenoi and the resident Rhomaioi) and their status attracted the attention of Roman jurists (Pomponius, in Dig. 50.16.239.2). It is into that category that Greek freedmen disappear, largely without any epigraphic trace. Strikingly, when a Roman citizen, Phaenia Aromation, made it a condition of her major benefaction in 42 CE to Gytheion that the polis was to take care of her freedmen, she resorted to the Greek institution of parakatatheke (SEG 13.258, ll. 48–58, with Harter-Uibopuu 2004); she did not rely on their status as Roman or Latin citizens to protect them. Institutional conservatism regarding manumission law is also demonstrated by the widespread survival of manumission by offering the freedman’s services (paramone) as a gift to a sanctuary or a religious community (cf. Lewis this volume for its earlier history; Ricl 2001; Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011: i. 378–398). This is attested in the Roman period in Phrygia (SEG 45.1748 for a dossier of texts from the sanctuary of Apollo Lairbenos), in Macedonia (above all the documents assembled in I.Leukopetra), at Delphi (Hopkins 1978: 133–171), in Phokis (Fournier 2010: 358–364), on Euboea (Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011: i. 380), at Eryx in Sicily (Cic. Div. Caec. 55–58) and elsewhere. At Chaironeia in Boeotia it may have developed in the Roman period (SEG 58.436 and Grenet 2014 for the latest contributions to the chronological debate, coming to different conclusions), suggesting that the conservatism could in some cases be more apparent than real. It is apparent from the details of the case of Agonis, who was, as Cicero relates, manumitted through the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Eryx, that the distinction between slaves manumitted by ‘consecration’ and hierodouloi could be as disputed in Roman courts as it is among modern legal scholars. Nonetheless, the practice continued, at least in Phrygia (SEG 45.1725–1731) and Macedonia, even after the constitutio Antoniniana. At the sanctuary of Indigenous Mother of Gods at Leukopetra the majority of manumissions acts post-date Caracalla’s edict, the latest dated to 313 CE. What is more, after 212 CE the practice was specifically endorsed by the provincial authorities, as shown by the formula ‘according to the decision of (Marcus Ulpius) Tertullianus Aquila’ (kata ten apophasin Tertullianou Akula), attested until at least October 244 (I.Leukopetra 100, ll. 11–12; I.Leukopetra 105 might be of an even later date; for another post-212 example, compare SEG 46.745, sanctuary of Enodia). The use of a newly developed formula shows the vitality of the institution: this is not simply a case of persistence of old terminology in scribal usage. Other local forms of manumission clearly continued to exist. In the best attested case, Thessalian manumission records down to the third century CE include a standard clause ‘in accordance with the law’, kata ton nomon (SEG 56.621, Atrax; 56.649, Olosson, for some recent examples from the principate of Augustus), or in later texts ‘the laws’, tous nomous. The expression must refer to local legislation on the status of manumitted slaves (Helly 1976; Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011: i. 398–404), arguably also imposing the duty of paramone towards former masters. The same formula is known earlier in the Roman period at the Arkadian Orchomenos (IG V II 345, l. 2). It is a sobering thought, however, that the payments collected from Thessalian slaves on manumission might have been modelled on the Roman 5% liberty tax (uicesima libertatis) as early as 196 BCE (Zelnick-Abramowitz 2013: 55–70). The difference between Greek and Roman law concerning the services required of the freedmen was recognized and accepted by Roman jurists. A second-century CE fragment from a treatise on manumissions (sometimes ascribed to the famous Gaius) observes that although freedmen of peregrini do not have Latin status, ‘the praetor does not allow the one who is manumitted to be a slave, unless it is otherwise provided in foreign law (nisi aliter lege peregrina caueatur)’ (fragm. Dositheanum 12, in FIRA II, p. 620). Wider recognition of local dependent statuses is revealed by Varro’s mention of the obaerarii (perhaps ‘serfs’) ‘in Asia, Egypt and Illyricum’, a status which he claims is obsolete among the Romans (Varro, RR 1.17.2), and by the attempts of Pliny the Younger to resolve the knotty issue of the status of threptoi, ‘foundlings’ (Plin. Ep. 10.65; for the meanings of the term in documentary sources, MAMA IX, pp. lxxiv–lxxvi, and Ricl 2009). This outwardly conservative legalism needs to be set against the letters of Marcus Aurelius to the Athenians, which not only show that the need to prove three generations of free status as a requirement for membership of the Areopagus and the Council of the Five Hundred was regularly flouted, but also introduce a reform banning henceforward any first-generation freedmen from obtaining membership (SEG 29.127, plaque II, ll. 57–102). In addition to being a fairly radical reform introduced on Roman initiative, though still belonging to the history of Greek Page 13 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans rather than Roman law, it also serves to demonstrate how misleading—or, arguably, provincial—evidence from provincial backwaters like Termessos and Syllion could be. At the same time, however, the emperor’s decision is driven by the concerns about the Athenian prestige and therefore by a (Roman) vision of an ideal Athens and Athenian law. This vision could be constructed and could (as was the case with Hadrian’s letter to Naryka) owe more to the reading of literature than of law, but it is undeniably connected with the wider pattern of declared respect for ‘ancestral law’ and helps us to understand it. In a further contradiction, ‘the right of the people to bestow its own favours, if it chooses to admit anyone to citizenship’ ([Dem.] 59.13) was precisely the area of law which could not be left unregulated by Roman imperial authorities, a paradox shared with many other areas of the law. The patchwork of community and personal privileges now guaranteed by Rome across the Mediterranean made it inevitable that, just as legislation was occasionally passed to prevent fraudulent claims to Roman citizenship, Rome would attempt to restrict and check the numbers of those who could claim other privileged statuses. Athens was prohibited by Augustus from selling citizenship (C.D. 54.7.2), the lex Pompeia in Pontus-Bithynia prohibited double citizenship between cities within the province (Plin. Ep. 10.114.1–2). Even closer supervision was established by the lex Antonia de Termessibus, which restricted the right ‘to use their own laws’ to those who had become citizens of Termessos by 1 April 72 BCE and their descendants (RS 19, col. I, ll. 1–8), while in the imperial period Septimius Severus and Caracalla empowered the governor of Moesia Inferior to check all grants of citizenship at Tyras (IOSPE I2 4, ll. 23–28). In the case of Tyras, ‘profits of Illyricum’ were alleged as the reason for restrictions, but there must have been other factors—honour, too, was a currency to be tightly controlled, and jurisdictional issues were complicated. Could, for instance, a holder of double citizenship between Smyrna and Aphrodisias avail himself of Aphrodisian privileges? We need not, however, overestimate the effectiveness of Roman control and the impact it had on Greek citizenship laws, at least before 212 CE. An epigram of Automedon of Kyzikos (AP XI.319) ridicules the Athenians for cheap sale of citizenship rights decades after Augustus’ ban on it, and by the time of Pliny the Younger Pompey’s prohibition had long been dead letter in Bithynia (for example Dio Chrys. Or. 41.10; cf. Jones 2012 and Fernoux 2012). Nor should we assume that the attempts to regulate were universal, though it is of course often difficult to distinguish between absence of regulation and its lack of effectiveness. At the privileged and ‘free’ city of Delphi, grants of citizenship, both purely honorary and the supposedly more substantial type, with bouleutic status, continue well into the second century CE (Choix d’inscriptions de Delphes 224; 243–244; 250 for some examples). Indeed, the restrictions put on Tyras suggest that, at least in this fringe of the empire, polis control over citizenship rights had been going on much as before in the Severan period: it is of course possible that such restrictions were more effective or applied earlier in the provinces of the interior. In Lycia, an exceptional region in many respects, the unique formula politeuomenos kai en tais kata Lykian polesi pasais continued to be employed in the Antonine period, when it appears for example in the collection of honours to Opramoas (I.Opramoas, passim, with Kokkinia 2012; for the sympoliteia of the ethnos of the Lycians in the Hellenistic period, SEG 18.570, ll. 54–59), and Roman citizenship is curiously treated in inscriptions as a kind of isopolity (for instance, TAM II 213, l. 2; II 288, l. 5; II 291, ll. 3–4). The special position of the resident and enfranchised Rhomaioi elsewhere is much more clearly expressed, though it is interesting to know that in the age of Cicero Roman citizens were still prohibited from acquiring land property at Segeste (Cic. Verr. II.3.93), which indicates some strict rules on the incompatibility of the two citizenships. A development of this period undoubtedly connected with Roman policy is the assimilation of different ethnic groups within provincial populations, with the possible exception of Jews, under the common name of ‘Greeks’ (Ferrary 2001). Thus we no longer hear, in a legal sense, of the Phrygians or Lydians, all now members of the ‘koinon of the Greeks of Asia’ (contrast the confirmation to Sardis of ‘the laws which the Lydians used of old’ by Alexander the Great, Arr. Anab. 1.17.4; for a sarcastic treatment of the new convention, Cic. Flacc. 17), or of the Elymian, Sikel, or even Punic communities in Sicily (Amm. Marc. 30.4.12 for a clearly ironic reference to antiquarian jurists familiar with laws of the Sicani). As Strabo emphasizes in a classic passage (13.4.12.628C), Roman provincial boundaries and institutions ignored traditional ethnic divisions. While it can be argued that they did not disappear and may have been even given some degree of recognition in the administrative reorganizations of the Antonine period, this, together with institutional features forcing litigants to travel, should have encouraged the process of legal homogenization (Kantor 2013). Egypt, with its sharp distinction between citizens and the inhabitants of the chora, would have formed one important exception for most of this period (Delia 1991 for Page 14 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Alexandria and Malouta 2009 for Antinoopolis). It is in fact this treatment of all Greek-speaking communities as ‘Greek’, building on the expansion of Greek language and culture in the Hellenistic period, that allows us to speak of much that is treated in this chapter as ‘Greek’ law. While undoubtedly both non-Roman and compatible with the Greek tradition, the law of the Lycians or the manumission customs at the Elymian sanctuary at Eryx were, at least to some extent, of indigenous rather than Greek origin. The ‘Greek’ perspective is, however, valid with regard to contemporary perspective (even beyond Greek legal influences as such: note for example Knoepfler 2013 for the Achaian model possibly imitated in Lycia). Even the more restricted membership of the Hadrianic Panhellenion included a number of poleis whose claim to Greek origin was tenuous at best. The law more obviously standing outside the Greek tradition could of course be treated differently (note Strabo 12.5.1.567C on the tribal judicial system of the Galatians before 86 BCE) , but it is notable that even the strikingly archaic ‘law-singers’ of Cappadocia could be said to use ‘the laws of Charondas’ (Str, 12.2.9.539C). A further development with important legal implications is the emergence is some cases of formally recognized or declared ‘provincial’ (as opposed to polis) identity. With the possible exception of Lycia, where the boundaries of the historic ethnos were coterminous with the Roman administrative area, this need not be exaggerated. Nonetheless, Roman legal texts occasionally deal with rules specific not to individual poleis but to whole provinces, as in the case of the rule giving inhabitants of the province of Pontus the citizenship of their mother (Celsus, in Dig. 50.1.1.2) or of Gaius’ discussion (Inst. 1.193) of the guardianship of women in ‘the law of the Bithynians’. It is notable that associations of people with common provincial origin outside their province of origin are frequently attested (for example collegium Galatarum, IDR III.3 234; coll. Pontobithynorum, IDR III.5 153), and sometimes we even get trade associations united by operating in the same province (for example OGIS 472 = I.Didyma 107, line 1: hoi apo tes Asias tekhneitai). 6. Developments in the law of property and obligations The key question is to what extent and until when—given the jurisdictional context delineated above—we can speak of Greek legal system(s) as continuing an existence in legal practice wholly distinct from the Roman. While, as has been argued above, the category of ‘provincial law’ is a useful analytical tool, there was arguably no coherent body of private law in any province (Modrzejewski 1970: 339). Cicero’s description of his own provincial edict makes it certain that the governor’s edict on arrival did not perform that role, and Pliny the Younger’s jurisdictional practice involved evaluating the authority of local laws and customs, judicial precedents under the earlier proconsuls, and imperial constitutions, sometimes irrelevant to Bithynia itself. A variety of rules of Greek, Italian, or provincial origin could be applied in a given case, as we have seen in the case of foreign judges at Messene or in the case of xenoi at Aphrodisias under Hadrian. The great jurist Salvius Iulianus, commissioned by Hadrian to codify the praetor’s edict, advised applying ‘the law which is used in the city of Rome’ (Dig. 1.3.32 pr.) where a local rule could not be established. The decision of the consuls in the dispute between the sanctuary of Amphiaraos at Oropos and the Roman tax-collectors gives us a flavour of this pick-andchoose approach at an earlier date (Syll.3 747 = RDGE 23, 73 BC). It is also a possibility that, in Egypt, references to astikoi nomoi are to Roman rather than Alexandrian law, even though it was applied in cases not involving the Romans (Modrzejewski 1970: 336; 2014: 265; for a different view, Taubenschlag 1955: 17–19; cf. Yiftach-Firanko this volume), and in the ‘new province of Arabia’ Greek copies of the Roman actio tutelae were made for a local litigant (P.Babatha 28–30, compare Gaius, Inst. 4.47). What was applied in a provincial court could hardly be termed a ‘legal system’ in most cases, regardless of whether the Roman law or Greek law of particular poleis could be treated as such (for rules applied in Egypt, Taubenschlag 1951). While it is possible and often useful to view the situation through the prism of modern ‘conflict of law’ (Cotton 2007) or ‘legal pluralism’ theories (Tuori 2007, Kantor 2012 and Humfress 2014), the reality, especially at the practical level, appears messier and it would not always have been possible to assign a specific rule to one system or the other. There is no doubt, however, that a hierarchy of authorities applied and that common Roman jurisdiction provided an additional boost to homogenizing tendencies in the legal sphere (Kantor 2012). Modern work on ‘mixed legal systems’, which has now become topical in the context of EU law, might also provide a useful perspective (Zimmermann 2001). Page 15 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans It is well attested that provincial authorities continued to maintain an interest in the legislation and legal instruments of the pre-Roman period (see above, ‘Sources and methodology’, for their survival and the reliability of our sources) or were led by petitioners and litigants who continued to base their claims on them. The date of the creation of the province never served as a ‘limit of legal memory’, as the accession of Richard the Lionheart does in English common law. This stance continued to be reaffirmed by the emperors into the second century CE. One well-known example is Hadrian’s instructions to the proconsul of Asia in 125/6 CE to enquire into the size of kleroi as established by the Hellenistic kings in order to resolve a dispute concerning the lands of the temple of Zeus at Aizanoi (MAMA IX P2, ll. 3–6, cf. now Nörr 2012; compare Roman interest in the unusual units of measurement in the former royal land at Kyrene: Corpus Agrimensorum Romanorum, p. 88.33–36 Campbell). The borderlines between the recording, enacting, and interpreting of Greek law by provincial authorities are difficult to draw, however. Going beyond the problems of detecting forgery and procuring expert advice, discussed above, construction of law by imperial authorities is a well-known phenomenon in modern legal history and anthropology, most famously explored in Sally Moore’s seminal study of 1986, Social facts and fabrications: ‘customary’ law on Kilimanjaro, 1880–1980. It is plausible that Rome followed the same route as the modern empires did. A case in point might be the reinterpretation of asylia rights, from the honorific ‘neutralization’ of a city-state, to the territorially restricted ‘right of asylum’ in the Roman period (Rigsby 1996: 22–29). In Egypt, the nomos or nomoi ton Aigyption, the term applied from the second century CE onwards to the law used by the inhabitants of the chora, merged Egyptian Demotic and Greek elements and included Roman innovations and re-interpretations. To quote a now classic study, ‘provincial judges were ready to respect the local law, even to fill the gaps, resolve contradictions or reduce the extravagances according to the scale of values supplied for them by their own law, provided they knew at least the elementary principles. The difference between Greek origin and Egyptian origin escaped them: they did not follow a course of juristic papyrology at the Sorbonne!’ (Modrzejewski 1988: 396, my translation). In this context new developments in Greek law at a provincial level may often have been promulgated or at least endorsed by the provincial authorities, precisely for the reason of filling the gaps, without becoming part of any explicitly ‘Roman’ law. Nor did all of the new developments betray any Roman influence. A good example is provided by the rules concerning real securities. As conclusively shown in a recent study (Alonso 2008; Alonso 2010), in contrast to the Roman law rule which gave the creditor (in the contract of pignus) a real right different from ownership over the debtor’s property, and thus left the owner’s rights undiminished, the contract of hypallagma, known in Egyptian papyri, banned the debtor from disposing of the property. The first firm attestation of the term hypallagma in this sense is dated to 13 BCE, and the bibliotheke enkteseon, the archive used in Roman Egypt for the enforcement of these contracts, first appears in our evidence in 72 CE (BGU I 184, cf. Wolff 1978: i. 48–49; ii. 222–255), while its predecessor, demosia bibliotheke, was probably established only in c.53 CE (P.Mich. IX 539; 540). In some instances, however, Roman influences are undeniable, as for instance in the restriction of the rate of interest in Egypt to 12% (SB XII 10786 = Keenan, Manning, and Yiftach-Firanko 2014: no. 5.3.2; the same rule was applied by Cicero’s proconsular edict in Cilicia) or the appearance of the rules of the aedilician edict on latent defects in slave sale contracts (P.Turner 22, Side, 142 CE; FIRA III 133, Side, 151 CE; BGU III 913, Myra, 206 CE; P.Mich. IX 546, Pompeiopolis, 207 CE; P.Dura 28, Dura-Europos, 243 CE). As stressed by Pringsheim (1950: 490) these deeds have an ‘almost completely Roman form of warranty’, which he interestingly does not find attested in Egypt. However, they refer to it as ‘a certain law’ (nomos tis) and combine it with unmistakably Greek institutions, such as the presence of a bebaioter as guarantor. Do these contracts belong to Greek or Roman law, and are we to ascribe the appearance of the edictal rules to the merchants’ desire for superabundant caution, local legislation emulating Rome (and referred to as a nomos), or the promulgation of the aedilician edict by the provincial authorities? Is it pertinent that the contracts from Lycia-Pamphylia including this clause all come from the period when it was a public province and the edict was promulgated there by the quaestors (Gaius, Inst. 1.6)? This is not to say that in particular aspects of law a consistent use of certain forms and instruments cannot be discovered and the traditional deductive approach of legal scholarship cannot provide insights, as long as its limitations are recognized and we do not confuse our deductions from legal documents with the system of the pandectists. The law of the papyri, with its wealth of evidence on individual transactions, lends itself particularly well to this approach (Taubenschlag 1955, Seidl 1973, and Wolff 1978, including also the Ptolemaic period, are still the most comprehensive general introductions; Yiftach-Firanko 2009 and in this volume for a guide to more recent Page 16 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans studies). With the exception of Egypt, however, the state of our evidence makes it difficult to assess how universal the new rules appearing in this period were, even within a single province. Pringsheim’s (1950) attempt to give a synoptic study of a particular part of Greek law across the eastern Mediterranean, based in large part on sources of the Roman period sources, has not been emulated since. Finley’s (1966) controversial attack on the concept of the ‘unity of Greek law’ was a reaction to Pringsheim’s approach and like many of Finley’s methodological critiques, had a stifling effect on the discipline. With greater understanding of the underlying unity of forms and concepts in many aspects of pre-Roman Hellenistic law the interest in treatments not limited to individual poleis is again growing: Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (2011) now provides a guide to the problems in the law of persons, property, and obligations (vol. 3, dealing with procedural law, is forthcoming) and Cassayre (2010) provides a general study of the legal systems of the Hellenistic poleis. The example of the second-century emphyteusis decree from Gazoros (SEG 24.614, cf. Youni 2000: 204–205) shows the continuing importance of local initiative, where it could be taken. The respect for ‘ancestral laws’ expected from Rome by more privileged communities of the Greek East (for example I.Pergamon 413, ll. 4–6; I.Kaunos 142, ll. 8–10; SEG 51.1832, bl. A, ll. 23–24; Jos. AJ 14.235; cf. Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011: i. 96–103 on some of the terminology involved) should have counterbalanced to an extent the reference made by governors and ‘foreign judges’ to Roman law. Legal documents from the post-Augustan period, in particular plentiful wills and foundations, will repay much further study from this angle. 7. Aftermath This survey deliberately eschewed a detailed chronology of legal change for most of the vast period that is covered here. While tendencies can be traced, particularly in the area of jurisdiction and procedural law, most hypotheses pinning particular developments to specific moments in political or intellectual history of the Greek East under Rome remain tentative at best. Was the situation different following the extension of Roman citizenship to almost the whole free population of the empire (with the not wholly explained exception of the dediticii) by a constitutio of the emperor Caracalla in 212 CE? (P.Giss. I 40, ll. 1–26 = Oliver 1989, no. 260, preserves either the constitutio itself or a follow-up document.) Was this the end of the road for Greek law, except in some isolated enclaves at the imperial border, such as the Bosporan kingdom? Attempts to construe this act as substitution of Roman imperial law for local laws and customs were, as a recently published papyrus shows, made almost from the outset. An authenticated copy of a petition of a certain Aurelia Diogenis to the prefect Marcus Aedinius Iulianus on 14 November 223 tries to argue that a will she disputes is ‘illegal and pointless’ on the basis of ‘the law of the Romans (ho nomos tōn Rōmaiōn)’ since ‘we are citizens’ now (P.Oxy. LXXIII 4961, ll. 75–78, trans. J. D. Thomas). Some effects were visible, if not immediately, at least very soon: in Egypt, for instance, in the sphere of family law the long-standing institution of sibling marriage disappears and Roman system of guardianship of minors begins to be attested (for these much-discussed issues, A. Arjava, in Keenan, Manning, and Yiftach-Firanko 2014: 176–177, provides an up-to-date introduction). Outside Egypt, in a well-documented case of Termessos in Pisidia, we get transliterations of the Roman term (heres) extraneus (TAM III.i 481, l. 2; 541, l. 3; 608, l. 3) and references to the ‘right of three children’ (TAM III.i 383, l. 1; 482, l. 1; 669, ll. 1– 2; 705, l. 1; 714, ll. 1–2; SEG 41.1270, l. 1) within the first enfranchised generation. It is equally clear, however, that Roman policy initially was not to abrogate local law. Caracalla’s edict itself emphasized that citizenship is granted ‘with [the rights of communities] remaining unimpaired’ (P.Giss. I 40, ll. 8–9, as restored by Oliver on the basis of AE (1971) no. 534; on this ‘safeguarding clause’, see now Modrzejewski 2014: 319–323), and, as has been seen above, some communities’ legal privileges continued to be confirmed for several decades after 212 CE. The picture which we get from the well-attested case of Aphrodisias is certainly not one of local law being reduced to the status of mere consuetudo, ‘custom’. Free status could still be celebrated by some cities as late as the reign of Gallienus (Guerber 2009: 490), and a letter of that emperor (I.Smyrna II.i 604 = Oliver (1989) no. 287) charges city magistrates, and not provincial officials, with protecting the property of Roman senators at Smyrna. This implies that the former possessed some kind of jurisdiction over what could have been fairly substantial sums even in the 260s CE. It is also certain that the enfranchisement of Greek cities did not mean the disappearance of traditional polis Page 17 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans institutions and their replacement by a ‘Romanized’ municipal model (as seen, for example, in the Flavian municipal charters in Spain). Eponymous archons continue to be attested at Athens until Nikagoras the Younger in 485 CE, as good a date as any for the death of the Greek polis (Marin. V.Procli 36, cf. PLRE II: 780 s.v.; the last epigraphically attested archon is Phaidros, son of Zoilos, IG II2 .5 13293, early fifth century CE). Even at the federal level, the koinon of the Magnetoi is still attested in 283 CE (Syll.3 896) and the Achaian league in 257 CE (Syll.3 893), though there is no evidence that any koina continued to function beyond the tetrarchic period. The process by which Greek private law lost its independent standing was quicker than the dissolution of the traditional civic framework. By the 290s, Menander Rhetor was able to state bluntly and sweepingly in his advice on panegyrics to cities that ‘the topic of laws is of no use, since we conduct public affairs by the common laws of the Romans’ (Men. Rhet. p. 363.11–12 Spengel, trans. D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson, with Modrzejewski 1982). This loss was no doubt driven in part, even before 212 CE but afterwards at an accelerated rate, by the process which Fournier aptly calls ‘inflation of the procedures’ (Fournier 2010: 573–591). Other contributing factors could have included the temporary breakdown of the central Roman authority in the East after the defeat of Valerian in 259 CE, which seems to have interrupted the tradition of reconfirming polis privileges, and the ever increasing accessibility of Roman justice (note Robert, Hell. 4 (1948): 35–126 for Greek inscriptions praising late antique governors for their performance in that sphere). The process was haphazard and uneven, just like the establishment of the provincial network of jurisdictions and privileges in the early years of Roman rule. The discussion about the exact extent of the influence of the Greek legal tradition after that process was complete has been going on since the creation of the field by Mitteis’s epoch-making monograph (1891). Two interconnected questions need to be considered separately: recognition of local customs, consuetudines, in judicial context, particularly in the areas not covered by written law (Dig. 1.3.32 is a classic passage, now discussed by Humfress 2011; for access to local privileges via juristic literature, I.Eph. II 217, with Kantor 2009), and the influence of Greek law on Roman imperial law as stated in imperial legislation and the great codifications of Theodosius II and Justinian. While it is widely accepted that local custom continued to play a role, details, beyond what is provided by a few passages in the Digest, are often difficult to pinpoint, though it is natural to assume that as long as the traditional polis offices continued to exist, local custom would, to some extent, be accepted in the system of appointment to those and in the distribution of financial burden among the local elites. One may note, for instance, a different age threshold for the membership of the city boule at Nikomedeia in Bithynia (Dig. 50.2.11) or exemptions from judicial summons provided by the harvest ‘according to the custom of each place’ (Dig. 2.12.4): these particular rules have passed into imperial legislation, but it can be assumed that many of the ‘customs’ given recognition by the courts remain under the radar for us. The manumission inscriptions from Leukopetra (above) show the exceptions which could be made even in the fundamental issues of manumission law. A further window into the survival of local legal traditions is provided by its re-emergence in post-Roman contexts. Mitteis (1891: 313–356) was impressed by Hellenistic influences on the inheritance law in the Syro-Roman lawbook (definitive edition in Selb and Kaufhold 2002), which is assumed to go back to the fifth century CE, but continued to circulate in Syriac at a much later date, and persuasive arguments have been offered for the survival of paramone in Islamic law (Crone 1987 is thought-provoking on more than this). Some more specific areas, such as Rhodian maritime law, have been addressed in the section on sources above. Institutions declared valid for the whole empire by the central authority formed only a subset of these legal traditions. The late imperial legislation (CJ. 5.1.5) accepted the institution of arrha (earnest), particularly at betrothal (Mitteis 1891: 265–296; Taubenschlag 1955: 408–411, for Egypt; P.Oxy. I 140 for a sixth-century reference to the nomos arrhabonon, presumably of local origin), and the rules for long-term lease, emphyteusis, for which the city of Gazoros was still legislating on its own in the Antonine period (see above), were settled by the emperors from the age of Constantine (CJ. 4.66; 11.63; C.Th. 5.15; IJ. 3.24.3). There is an ongoing debate among Roman law scholars concerning the extent to which some of the Greek influence arrived via the interpolations in the Justinianic codification (for a much earlier adaptation of a Greek form of real security at Rome, Harris 2012), but at the very least we can see Greek law continuing a posthumous existence within a new legal system. The importance of that as the centre of the empire’s gravity moved to the Greek East is undeniable, but the Roman framework is equally important: as we have seen above, legal rules acquire new meaning within a different interpretative tradition. With the Basilica (the Greek version of the Justinianic codification, with accompanying scholia; edition by Scheltema and van der Wal 1955–88 is a landmark), the Paraphrasis institutionum of Page 18 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Theophilus (a sixth-century Greek lecture course on Justinian’s instititution, edited and translated by Lokin et al. 2010), the Digest translation of Dorotheus (Brandsma 1996), and the whole wealth of Hellenophone legal literature around Justinian’s codification opens a new chapter in the history of law in the Greek East. It cannot be understood outside the whole history of Roman jurisprudence (for an introduction to the sixth-century CE legal developments, Lokin and Stolte 2011; for introduction to sources, van der Wal and Lokin 1985—like all the works referred to in this paragraph, products of the flourishing Groningen school of Byzantine law) and falls outside the remit of this volume. Bibliography Alonso, J. L. (2008), ‘Alpha and omega of hypallagma’, JJP 38: 19–51. Alonso, J. L. (2010), ‘The bibliotheke enkteseon and the alienation of real securities in Roman Egypt’, JJP 40: 11– 54. Anastasiadis, V. I., and Souris, G. A. (2000), An index to Roman imperial constitutions from Greek inscriptions and papyri, 27 BC to 284 AD. Berlin and New York. Ashburner, W. (1909), The Rhodian sea-law. Oxford. Avotins, I. (1989), On the Greek of the Code of Justinian. Hildesheim. Bardani, V. (2013), Τιμὲς Μεσσηνίων δικαστῶν. Ἐπιγραφικὲς συμβολὲς στὴν ἐξέταση τοῦ θεσμοῦ τῶν ξενικῶν δικαστηρίων. Volos. Brandsma, F. (1996), Dorotheus and his Digest translation. Groningen. Brélaz, C. (2005), La Sécurité publique en Asie Mineure sous le Principat (Ier–IIIème s. ap. J.-C.): institutions municipales et institutions impériales dans l’Orient romain. Basel. Burton, G. P. (2002), ‘The Roman imperial state (A.D. 14–235): evidence and reality’, Chiron 32: 249–280. Camia, F. (2009), Roma e le poleis: l’intervento di Roma nelle controversie territoriali tra le comunità greche di Grecia e d’Asia Minore nel secondo secolo a.C. Athens. Cassayre A. (2010), La Justice dans les cités grecques: de la formation des royaumes hellénistiques au legs d’Attale. Rennes. Chaniotis, A. (1997), ‘“Tempeljustiz” im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien: Rechtliche Aspekte der Sühneinschriften Lydiens und Phrygiens’, in G. Thür and J. Velissaropoulus-Karakostas (eds.), Symposion 1995. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte. Cologne: 353–384. Chaniotis, A. (2004), ‘Under the watchful eyes of the gods: aspects of divine justice in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor’, YCS 31: 1–43. Cotton, H. M. (1993), ‘The guardianship of Jesus son of Babatha: Roman and local law in the province of Arabia’, JRS 83: 94–108. Cotton, H. M. (2007), ‘Private international law or conflict of laws: reflections on Roman provincial jurisdiction’, in R. Haensch and J. Haenrichs (eds.), Herrschen und Verwalten: Der Alltag der römischen Administration in der hohen Kaiserzeit. Cologne: 234–255. Crone, P. (1987), Roman, provincial and Islamic law: the origins of Islamic patronate. Cambridge. Delia, D. (1991), Alexandrian citizenship during the Roman Principate. Atlanta. Dittmann-Schöne, I. (2010), Die Berufsvereine in den Städten des kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasiens. Regensburg. Dmitriev, S. (2005), City government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor. New York and Oxford. Famerie, E. (forthcoming), Documents officiels de la République romaine et du Principat d’Auguste (212a–14p). Page 19 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Paris. Fernoux, H.-L. (2011), Le demos et la cité: communautés et assemblées populaires en Asie Mineure à l’époque imperial. Rennes. Fernoux, H.-L. (2012), ‘À propos de Pline le Jeune, Lettres, X, 114–115’, in Heller and Pont 2012: 267–284. Ferrary, J.-L. (1991), ‘Le Statut des cités libres dans l’empire romain à la lumière des inscriptions de Claros’, CRAI: 557–577. Ferrary, J.-L. (2001), ‘Rome et la géographie de l’hellénisme: réflexions sur “hellènes” et “panhellènes” dans les inscriptions d’époque romaine’, in O. Salomies (ed.), The Greek East in the Roman context. Helsinki: 19–35. Ferrary, J.-L. (2005), ‘Les Grecs des cités et l’obtention de la ciuitas Romana’, in P. Fröhlich and C. Müller (eds.), Citoyenneté et participation a la basse époque hellénistique. Geneva: 51–75. Finley, M. I. (1966), ‘The problem of the unity of Greek law’, in Atti del I Congresso Internazionale della Società del Diritto. Florence: 129–144. Fournier, J. (2007), ‘Les syndikoi, représentants juridiques des cités grecques sous le Haut-Empire romain’, CCG 18: 7–36. Fournier, J. (2010), Entre tutelle romaine et autonomie civique: l’administration judiciaire dans les provinces hellénophones de l’Empire romain (129 av. J.-C.–235 apr. J.-C.). Athens, BEFAR 341. Fournier, J. (2012), ‘L’Essor de la multi-citoynneté dans l’Orient romain: problèmes juridiques et judiciaires’, in Heller and Pont 2012: 79–98. Gagliardi, L. (2006), Mobilità e integrazione delle persone nei centri cittadini romani: aspetti giuridici, vol. i. Milan. Goodman, M. (1987), The ruling class of Judaea: the origins of the Jewish revolt against Rome a.d. 66–70. Cambridge. Grenet, C. (2014), ‘Manumission in hellenistic Boeotia: new considerations on the chronology of inscriptions’, in N. Papazarkadas (ed.), The epigraphy and history of Boeotia: new finds, new perspectives. Leiden: 395–442. Guerber, E. (2009), Les Cités grecques dans l’Empire romain: les privilèges et les titres des cités de l’Orient hellénophone d’Octave Auguste à Dioclétien. Rennes. Haensch, R. (2009), ‘Die Städte des griechischen Ostens’, in R. Haensch (ed.), Selbstdarstellung und Kommunikation: Die Veröffentlichung staatlicher Urkunden auf Stein und Bronze in der Römischen Welt. Munich: 173–187. Harris, E. (2012), ‘Hypotheca in Roman law and ὑποθήκη in Greek law’, in B. Legras (ed.), Transferts culturels et droits dans le mond grec et hellénistique. Paris: 433–441. Harter-Uibopuu, K. (2004), ‘The trust fund of Phaenia Aromation (IG V,1 1208) and Imperial Gytheion’, Studia Humaniora Tartuensia 5: <http://www.ut.ee/klassik/sht/2004/harter-uibopuu1.pdf>. Harter-Uibopuu, K. (2013), ‘Epigraphische Quellen zum Archivwesen in den griechischen Poleis des ausgehenden Hellenismus and der Kaiserzeit’, in M. Faraguna (ed.), Archives and archival documents in ancient societies. Trieste: 273–305. Heller, A., and Pont, A.-V. (eds.) (2012), Patrie d’origine et patries électives: les citoyennetés multiples dans le monde grec d’époque romaine. Bordeaux. Helly, B. (1976), ‘Lois sur les affranchissements dans les inscriptions thessaliennes’, Phoenix 30: 143–158. Hopkins, K. (1978), Conquerors and slaves. Cambridge. Page 20 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Humfress, C. (2011), ‘Law and custom under Rome’, in A. Rio (ed.), Law, custom and justice in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages. London: 23–47. Humfress, C. (2014), ‘Thinking through legal pluralism: “forum shopping” in the later Roman Empire’, in J. Duindam, J. Harries, C. Humfress, and N. Hurvitz (eds.), Law and empire: ideas, practices, actors. Leiden: 225–250. Jakab, E. (2012), ‘Geld und Sport. Rezepzion griechischer Topoi in der römischen Jurisprudenz?’, RIDA 59: 93–125. Jones, A. H. M. (1940), The Greek city from Alexander to Justinian. Oxford. Jones, C. P. (2007), ‘Juristes romains dans l’Orient grec’, CRAI: 1331–1359. Jones, C. P. (2012), ‘Joys and sorrows of multiple citizenship: the case of Dio Chrysostom’, in Heller and Pont 2012: 213–219. Kantor, G. (2009), ‘Knowledge of law in Roman Asia Minor’, in R. Haensch (ed.), Selbstdarstellung und Kommunikation: Die Veröffentlichung staatlicher Urkunden auf Stein und Bronze in der Römischen Welt. Munich: 249–265. Kantor, G. (2010), ‘Siculus cum Siculo non eiusdem ciuitatis: litigation between citizens of different communities in the Verrines’, CCG 21: 187–204. Kantor, G. (2012), ‘Ideas of law in Hellenistic and Roman legal practice’, in P. Dresch and H. Skoda (eds.), Legalism: anthropology and history. Oxford: 55–83. Kantor, G. (2013), ‘Law in Roman Phrygia: rules and jurisdictions’, in P. Thonemann (ed.), Roman Phrygia: culture and society. Cambridge: 143–167. Kantor, G. (2014), ‘Roman legal administration in the province of Asia: Hellenistic heritage vs. innovation’, in J. Dubouloz, S. Pittia, and G. Sabatini (eds.), L’Imperium Romanum en perspective: les savoirs d’empire dans la République romaine et leur héritage dans l’Europe médiévale et moderne. Besançon: 243–268. Keenan, J. G., Manning, J. G., and Yiftach-Firanko, U. (2014), Law and legal practice in Egypt from Alexander to the Arab conquest: a selection of papyrological sources in translation. Cambridge. Kelly, B. (2011), Petitions, litigation, and social control in Roman Egypt. Oxford. Knoepfler, D. (2013), ‘Un modèle d’une belle république fédérative? Montesquieu et le système politique des Lyciens, de la genèse de l’Esprit des lois aux découvertes épigraphiques les plus récentes en Asie Mineure méridionale’, Journal des savants: 111–154. Kokkinia, C. (2012), ‘Opramoas’ citizenship: the Lycian politeuomenos formula’, in Heller and Pont 2012: 327–340. Kunnert, U. (2012), Bürger unter sich: Phylen in den Städten des kaiserzeitlichen Ostens. Basel. Laffi, U. (2010a), ‘Cittadini romani di fronte ai tribunali di comunità alleate o libere dell’Oriente greco in età repubblican’, in D. Mantovani and L. Pellechi (eds.), Eparcheia, autonomia e civitas Romana: studi sulla giurisdizione criminale dei governatori di provincia (II sec. a.C.–II. d.C). Pavia: 3–44. Laffi, U. (2010b), Il trattato fra Sardi ed Efeso degli anni 90 a.C. Pisa. Laffi, U. (2013), In greco per i Greci: ricerche sul lessico greco del processo civile e criminale romano nelle attestazioni di fonti documentarie romane. Pavia. Lokin, J. H. A. et al. (2010), Theophili antecessoris paraphrasis institutionum. Groningen. Lokin, J. H. A., and Stolte, B. H. (2011), Introduzione al diritto bizantino da Giustiniano ai Basilici. Pavia. Mack, W. (2015), Proxeny and polis: institutional networks in the ancient Greek world. Oxford. Maehler, H. (2005), ‘Greek, Roman, and Egyptian law’, JJP 35: 121–140. Page 21 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Maganzani, L. (2007), ‘Juridiction romaine et autonomie locale dans les provinces au dernier siècle de la République’, RHDFE 85: 353–373. Malouta, M. (2009), ‘Antinoite citizenship under Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, 130–161’, BASP 46: 81–96. Mason, H. (1970), Greek terms for Roman institutions: a lexicon and analysis. Toronto. Mellano, L. D. (1977), Sui rapporti tra governatore provinciale e giudici locali alla luce delle Verrine. Milan. Meyer, E. A. (2004), Legitimacy and law in the Roman world: tabulae in Roman belief and practice. Cambridge. Mitteis, L. (1891), Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs. Leipzig. Modrzejewski, J. (1970), ‘La Règle de droit dans l’Égypte romaine (état des questions et perspectives de recherches)’, in Proceedings of the XIIth International Congress of Papyrology. Toronto: 317–377. Modrzejewski, J. (1982), ‘Ménandre de Laodicée et l’édit de Caracalla’, in J. Modrzejewski and D. Liebs (eds.), Symposion 1977: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte. Cologne: 335–363. Modrzejewski, J. (1988), ‘La Loi des Égyptiens: le droit grec dans l’Égypte romaine’, in Proceedings of the XVIII International Congress of Papyrology, vol. ii. Athens: 383–399. Modrzejewski, J. (1993), ‘Diritto romano e diritti locali’, in A. Schiavone (ed.), Storia di Roma, vol. iii.2. Torino: 985– 1009. Modrzejewski, J. (2014), Loi et coutume dans l’Égypte grecque et romaine. Warsaw. Nörr, D. (2012), ‘Der Kaiser und sein Interpret. MAMA IX p. xxxvi sq. Dossier über den ager Aezanensis Iovi dicatus’, ZRG 129: 314–363. Oliver, J. H. (1970), Marcus Aurelius: aspects of civic and cultural policy in the East. Princeton. Oliver, J. H. (1989), Greek constitutions of early Roman emperors from inscriptions and papyri. Philadelphia. Oudshoorn, J. (2007), The relationship between Roman and local law in the Babatha and Salome Comaise archives. Leiden. Pringsheim, F. (1950), The Greek law of sale. Weimar. Raggi, A. (2006), Seleuco di Rhosos: cittadinanza e privilegi nell’Oriente greco in età tardo-repubblicana. Pisa. Raggi, A. (2013), ‘Il lessico dei privilegi fiscali nell’Oriente greco tra età ellenistica e romana’, Studi ellenistici XXVII: 163–173. Rhodes, P. J. with Lewis, D. M. (1997), The decrees of the Greek states. Oxford. Ricl, M. (2001), ‘Donation of slaves and freeborn children to deities in Roman Macedonia and Phrygia’, Tyche 16: 127–160. Ricl, M. (2009), ‘Legal and social status of threptoi and related categories in narrative and documentary sources’, in H. M. Cotton et al. (eds.), Between Hellenism and Islam. Cambridge: 93–114. Rigsby, K. J. (1996), Asylia: territorial inviolability in the Hellenistic world. Berkeley. Rupprecht, H.-A. (1994), Kleine Einführung in die Papyruskunde. Darmstadt. Russell, D. A. (1983), Greek declamation. Cambridge. Saba, S. (2013), The Astynomoi law from Pergamon: a new commentary. Heidelberg. Saliou, C. (1996), Le Traité d’urbanisme de Julien d’Ascalon: droit et architecture en Palestine au VIe siècle. Paris. Page 22 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Sánchez, P. (2007), ‘La Convention judiciaire dans le traité conclu entre Rome et les Lyciens’, Chiron 37: 363–381. Scheltema, H. J., and van der Wal, N. (1955–88), Basilicorum libri LX, vols. 1–8. Groningen. Schönbauer, E. (1937), ‘Reichsrecht, Volksrecht und Provinzialrecht’, ZRG 57: 309–355. Seidl, E. (1973), Rechtsgeschichte Ägyptens als römischer Provinz. Sankt Augustin. Selb, W., and Kaufhold, H. (2002), Das syrisch-römische Rechtsbuch, vols. 1–3. Vienna. Taubenschlag, R. (1951), ‘The Roman authorities and the local law in Egypt before and after the C.A.’, JJP 5: 121– 141. Taubenschlag, R. (1955), The law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the light of the papyri, 332 B.C.–640 A.D. , 2nd edn. Warsaw. Thonemann, P. J. (2009), ‘Estates and land in early Hellenistic Asia Minor: the estate of Krateuas’, Chiron 39: 363– 393. Tuori, K. (2007), ‘Legal pluralism and the Roman empires’, in J. W. Cairns and P. J. du Plessis (eds.), Beyond dogmatics: law and society in the Roman Empire. Edinburgh: 39–52. van der Wal, N., and Lokin, J. H. A. (1985), Historiae iuris graeco-romani delineatio: les sources du droit byzantin de 300 à 1453. Groningen. Velissaropoulos-Karakostas, J. (2011), Droit grec d’Alexandre à Auguste (323 av. J.-C.–14 ap. J.-C.), vols. 1–2. Athens. Wolff, H.-J. (1978), Das Recht der griechischen Papyri Ägyptens in der Zeit der Ptolemaeer und des Prinzipats, vols. 1–2. Munich. Wurm, M. (1972). Apokeryxis, Abdicatio und Exheredatio. Munich. Yiftach-Firanko, U. (2009), ‘Law in Graeco-Roman Egypt: Hellenisation, fusion, Romanisation’, in R. Bagnall (ed.), Oxford handbook of papyrology. Oxford: 541–560. Youni, M. (2000), Provincia Macedonia: Θεσμοί ιδιωτικού δικαίου στη ρωμαιοκρατούμενη Μακεδονία. Athens. Zelnick-Abramowitz, R. (2013), Taxing freedom in Thessalian manumission inscriptions. Leiden. Zimmermann, R. (2001), Roman law, contemporary law, European law: the civilian tradition today. Oxford. Georgy Kantor Georgy Kantor, St. John’s College, Oxford. Page 23 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015 Greek Law under the Romans Page 24 of 24 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 01 October 2015