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In our haste to explain away the 2008 crisis, we have tended to put all the blame on bankers and regulators. This simplification, while soothing, might be just as misguided as Germans’ or Austrians’ tendency in the 1920s and 1930s to put the blame on France and Britain for their economic difficulties, or later for World War Two. Crises are the stuff of legend, but we should find other ways to cope with them.
The essay seeks to answer the question of who is predominantly to blame for financial crises. In doing so, the essay explores the nature of global finance, describes what a financial crisis is, and examines the 2008 financial crisis and neo-liberal economic policies.
Economic Record, 2019
A Great Deal of Ruin: Financial Crises since 1929, 2019
History, economics, and finance are used to analyze financial crises since 1929. Part I begins with a taxonomy of financial crises and discussion of seven risk factors often observed prior to a crisis. It continues with a narrative history of modern economic growth since the first wave of globalization and a description of the frequencies and types of crises during each of the four major eras. Part 2 consists of five case studies with international reach that shaped understanding of the problems of financial crises and economic instability. The Great Depression of the 1930s is the first case study, followed by an examination of the Latin American Debt Crisis and a discussion of banking, currency, trade, and inflation crises that emerged nearly simultaneously. In the 1990s, the sudden and surprising development of crises in a group of successful Asian economies showed that good institutions and competent economic management are not always sufficient for crisis avoidance. The Subprime Crisis and its development into a debt crisis in the Eurozone are the subjects of the last two case studies. Part 3 offers eight lessons from these cases, with a heavy emphasis on lessons taken from the Subprime and Eurozone crises. Introduction The cost of a financial crisis far exceeds most people's expectations, even though they are surprisingly common. Crises are a regular part of market economies and more than 500 have been identified by the IMF as occurring between 1970 and 2011. They are currently impossible to predict, although risk reduction, and crisis mitigation are possible within the current state of economic understanding. Economics must be supplemented with finance and history, however, if it is to provide a complete picture of financial crises. Economic models and categories are essential but without a deeper dive into finance, the institutional characteristics of assets are ignored and the manner in which asset trades pose potential risks to the system is glossed over. Similarly, historical context makes clear the importance of power, deceptive practices, legal constraints and information limitations. The Introduction introduces the plan of the book and describes the general approach.
Renewal , 2019
Adam Tooze's Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (2018) is a hugely significant retrospective on the politics and economics of the past decade. Although written from a perspective sympathetic to the left, it centres on two areas-the daily operations of international finance, and the shifting configurations of global geopolitics-that still confuse and alienate socialist thinkers and movements. Crashed will already be familiar to many readers, and it has already attracted a huge range of reviews. Here, we gather three perspectives on the book's central arguments, and how they differ from other dominant analyses of our current moment.
A system, if it is to survive any significant length of time, must be prepared for legitimation crises. In other words, it must be prepared to explain (away) its own failures. For sometimes it is clear to all those enveloped in its matrices of determination that something went wrong, that the system itself failed to do whatever it was supposedly supposed to do. It is with this in mind that I decided to probe into the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. This crisis, which “began” in 2007, sent shock waves throughout the global economy and will likely continue to do so for quite some time. The epicenter (of causes, if not effects) of this crisis is the United States. For this reason, along with the privileged position that the US currently holds as global hegemon, I felt it appropriate to focus on how the US government decided to deal with the crisis of legitimacy haunting the financial system, and to a lesser degree the capitalist world-system, after the collapse of the housing market, the subsequent bailout of the “banks,” and the “loss” of approximately thirteen trillion dollars of wealth in the US alone.
International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478), 2015
Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research, 2014
2009
The financial turmoil that originated in 2007 and developed into an unprecedented crisis battering financial and real markets is the latest manifestation, on a grand scale and with new attributes, of a welldefined pathology in the process of market liberalization and integration in the post-Bretton Woods era. At the root of the crisis lies a fundamental inconsistency between financial globalisation
Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research, 2014
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