The end of sacred authority and the genesis of amorality and disorder in igbo mini states

Dialectical Anthropology (2007) 31:263–288 DOI 10.1007/s10624-007-9025-6
Springer 2007 The End of Sacred Authority and the Genesis of Amorality and Disorder in Igbo Mini States JOHN ORIJI Department of History, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA, USA (E-mail: joriji@calpoly.edu) Abstract. This study examines the politico-religious structure of Igbo mini states and the diverse factors that led to the end of sacred authority and the moral codes of governance in the mini states since the pre-colonial period. The study provides some insights into the consequences of the desacralization of authority, and offers some suggestions that may be helpful in the preservation of ancient Igbo political institutions and the moral values associated with them. Keywords: Igbo, Amala, Okpara, Ezeala, Okonko, Ozo, Sacred authority The crises in Igbo society has continued to grow with increasing crescendo, reaching an alarming level in recent times. Hence, hardly a month passes without our hearing about litanies of woes among the Igbo and their Diaspora: Within the past 3 years, for example, four Igbo men in the US have brutally murdered their wives, and many others are being prosecuted for allegedly committing various abominable crimes.1 The situation in Nigeria is much worse. Governors and other members of the political class administering Igbo states have perfected the art of amorality and political banditry, leading to the deterioration of the economy, infrastructure and social services.2 As for the masses, they are almost on their own. The privileged ones among them are targeted by fraudsters (‘‘419ers),3 armed robbers, and murderers. The recent brutal and horrifying murder of the renowned anthropologist, Prof Victor Uchendu, is an exemplification of the growing insecurity in Igbo society, and the decline of its traditional morals values.4 Prof. Uchendu, during his famous 1995 Ahajioku Lecture, described ‘‘Ezi Na Ulo’’ (the extended family) as the ‘‘bedrock of Igbo civilization’’. Ironically, those who hatched the plot that led to his death were members of his extended family.5 This paper then seeks to examine the crises in Igbo society in an 264 JOHN ORIJI historical perspective to better understand why ‘‘the bedrocks of its civilization’’ are crumbling. The paper is divided into four sections: the first section discusses some methodological problems that contributed to the erosion of traditional Igbo institutions and values, while the second section examines traditional politico-religious structure of Igbo mini states, comparing it with those of other Nigerian ethnic nationalities to shed some light on their similarities and differences, and the period they began to diverge. The third section discusses the de-sacralization of authority in Igbo mini states, and the crises it created from the genesis of the Aro trade network to the modern period, while the fourth section concludes the study, offering solutions to some of the problems it raised. Methodological problems The synchronic approach Igbo specialists have contributed to the erosion of traditional institutions and values due to their methodology and analytic assumptions. Those of them who pioneered the study of Igbo society after the Aba WomenÕs War of 1929, were commissioned by the colonial administration to help in fashioning a better and more durable system of indirect rule for southeastern Nigeria.6 The pioneers then adopted the synchronic approach in their research, using evidences they derived primarily from their study of Igbo society in its modern setting to make extrapolations about its past history and culture. Because of their orientation, some of the pioneers assumed that the Igbo lived in ‘‘a stateless or acephalous society’’ that lacked an organ of law-arbitration.7 Thus when conflicts occurred, lineages simply allied against one another until an equilibrium was restored.8 Other synchnronists who studied Igbo society during the era of decolonization of Nigerian history and culture (1950s–1960s), to justify the quest for self-government, arrived at a different conclusion. They maintained that the Igbo lived in ‘‘a republican’’ or ‘‘democratic’’ society which was similar to modern Western societies, and some went on to stress the normative and idealistic features of traditional Igbo political system labeled as ‘‘Ohacracy’’ which placed emphasis on competition, individualism, egalitarianism, and the participation of all adult males in governance.9 These views have remained almost unchallenged for decades like a religious dogma perpetuated in academic works, the local media, magazines and other sources of popular history. IGBO MINI STATES 265 The diachronic approach Although the synchronic approach has been helpful in understanding the structure of modern Igbo society, yet as this study will show, it has many limitations. Igbo society is not static. It has undergone a lot of remarkable changes in its past history that contributed to the erosion of its ancient institutions and moral values leaving us with ‘‘modern Igbo culture’’ that is structurally different from the traditional one. Thus, as will be discussed, traditional Igbo society was highly stratified, including a hierarchy of hereditary office holders of a lineage group the Okpara,10 and village/village group or mini state, the Ezeala/Ezeani, priest of the earth-goddess; Okonko, Ozo and Ezeji titles based on achievement; statuses ranging from Amadi/Nwadiala or indigenes who had the right of citizenship to Ohu, slaves who had limited rights, the Osu, cult slaves, whose rights were much more circumscribed, and the Ume (low-cast groups) whose plights were similar to those of the ‘‘untouchables’’ of Hindu India.11 In addition, many of the synchronic studies failed to provide much insight into the holistic nature of Igbo cosmology, and the interconnectedness of their traditional politico-religious institutions. As this research will show, governance and the traditional Igbo system of jurisprudence were rooted in their religion. Hence offenses which polluted the ‘‘Earth’’, Ala/Ana, and the entire community, constituted ‘‘acts of abominations’’, iru ala/alu, which did not attract partisan lineage disputes. G. BalandierÕs views are then relevant to the Igbo case when he discussed the central role religion played in shaping the world view of all traditional societies: Every society links its own order to an order beyond itself, and in the case of traditional societies to the cosmos. Power is sacrality because every society affirms its desire to be eternal and fears a return to chaos as the realization of its death.12 This study will use Igbo cosmology to dispute the view that the Igbo were a stateless people. It will postulate that they lived in villages and village-groups that had defined borders (mini states), and a government with central organs of law-making, law-application and law-arbitration. ItÕs noteworthy that when in the 1960s, G. I. Jones reviewed M. Fortes and E. Evans-PritchardÕs work on political anthropology entitled, African Political Systems, he criticized the bookÕs typology for representing only two political systems based on extreme polarities: Mega 266 JOHN ORIJI states (kingdoms/empires) and stateless systems of foraging societies, ignoring middle level political systems like the Igbo mini states. Jones, in his conclusion, stated that: An Igbo village [village-group] possesses the requirements of a state in that it has some centralized administrative and judicial institutions, and cleavages of wealth and status corresponding to the distribution of power and status.13 JonesÕ views have been confirmed by the few existing micro studies of Igbo political systems, including Nwando AchebeÕs research in Nsukka area where women played active roles in governance as goddesses, priestesses and diviners.14 The micro studies aptly showed that political centralization in the Igbo mini states evolved under the aegis of their sacred authority holders. Sacred authority and political centralization in Igbo mini-states: the Igbo Ukwu example No one knows when sacred authority developed in Igbo mini states. But evidences derived from archeological studies, and a comparative analysis of other societies in Nigeria and the larger world suggest that it evolved during the Neolithic Revolution which had started in parts of Igboland by 2,990 B.C.15 As part of the Nok Complex (900BC–200AD), the oldest iron-using culture of West Africa, the Igbo had started to develop a more complex civilization including mini states, as they shifted from foraging to agriculture. The major gods and their priests involved in governance were associated with their agrarian environment. Igbo-Ukwu, a town ruled by a priestly chief during the 9th/10th century AD, provides the earliest example of the advanced skills the Igbo had attained not only in metal-working but in statecraft. Thus after evaluating the bronze-artifacts of Igbo-Ukwu, J. Iliffe concluded that they were manufactured from local metals with ‘‘a superb technical skill that was both distinctive and unarguably unequalled elsewhere in the world at the time’’.16 Similarly, T. Shaw who carried out the Igbo-Ukwu excavations was so highly impressed with the antiquity of its complex politico-religious organization that he opined that the town had: A highly developed and sophiscated level of social organization… We appear to have [in Igbo-Ukwu] evidence of a centralized IGBO MINI STATES 267 authority… some hundreds of years before the earliest dynasty in Benin.17 The evolution of common moral codes of governance and civil order Although little is known about the politico-religious structure of IgboUkwu, research done in neighboring communities and other places affirms the antiquity of mini states in the Igbo hinterland. As in IgboUkwu, other Igbo mini states were headed by their sacred authority holders. Surely, the mini states varied in terms of their socio-political structure. A few, in the mid-cross River basin were, and are still characterized by the double descent system, and some lack ‘‘ofo’’, the ancestral symbol of authority found in most parts of the Igbo culture area.18 But a majority of Igbo people, the northern (Onitsha) and southern (Owerri) Igbo studied by D. Forde and G.I. Jones, and located in what Uchendu called ‘‘Umunna kinship belt’’, are patrilineal.19 Among them, there are two noticeable variations in their socio-political structure. The first variation is found in the four riverine or Oru communities on the Niger studied by I. Nzimiro and others. They developed into mega states with more complex bureaucracies comprising not only kings and other influential men, but also powerful women like the queen mother, Eze Nwanyi, the Umuada, and wealthy traders who played active role in the administration of the state.20 Their socio-political structure is similar to those of some Western Igbo communities which had their kings and their advisory council, and the Omu or ‘‘female counterpart of the king’’ and other female office holders.21 The second variation which is the primary focus of this study, are the rest of the Igbo communities in the ‘‘Umunna kinship belt’’22 who constitute over 80% of the total Igbo population living in the Isuama-Orlu and NriAwka axis, the Okigwe-Awgu-Udi and Nsukka escarpment, and southern Igbo communities of Owerri, Mbano, Obowo, Mbaise, Umuahia, Aba-Ngwa and Ukwa areas. They also include the IkwerreEtche, Ahoada, Oguta, Egbema and the other communities. People in the ‘‘Umunna kinship belt’’ lived primarily in mini states. Their cosmology which has been documented in detail in the intelligence reports and the works of various researchers, indicate that they shared common religious codes of governance and moral order.23 The commonality of the codes and the religious institutions supporting them, suggest that they were derived from a common fund of ideas which the 268 JOHN ORIJI Igbo replicated as they migrated from their core areas to other parts of the present territory they occupy. A study of the codes and the institutions at the lineage and mini state/territorial levels of authority is enlightening. Sacred authority and moral codes at the lineage- or kinship level Although the family was and continues to be the center of socialization in Igbo mini states, lineage groups comprising families that descended from a common agnatic ancestry, the Umunna, constituted the basic unit of their political organization or what Uchendu described as ‘‘corporate aggregate’’ in that ‘‘they are capable of taking group action’’.24 The head of each lineage group and its oldest male member, the Okpara who held its ancestral staff of office, the ofo, was also the custodian of its Njoku/Ahajoku, the god of yams. He was also called ‘‘Onye nwe ezi’’ the owner of the compound, and recognized as the representative of the ancestors (Ndiche) on earth.25 The power of the Okpara is embodied in traditional Igbo cosmology which entrusted him with the responsibility of maintaining a ritual balance between the ancestors, Ndiche who dwelled in the world of spirits (ala muo), and their living kinsmen. The Ofo which symbolized justice and equity, helped the Okpara to carry out his functions effectively. As a ‘‘two-edged sword’’, ofo rewarded the Okpara with long life and prosperity if he led an upright life, did justice to his kinsmen, and offered periodic sacrifices to the ancestors. His kinsmen would also be blessed with abundant yams if they maintained the moral codes of their ancestors, and supported the Okpara during the annual new yam festival, honoring the yam deity and the ancestors, Ahajioku, iri ji. But if the Okpara failed in his duties and abused his office, ofo would kill him. His kinsmen would suffer a similar fate if they violated the moral laws of the ancestors. Their yams would not grow, and famine, drought and poverty would add to their misery and suffering. Once these calamities occurred, the Okpara consulted traditional medicine men and diviners, dibia to ascertain their roots, and offer necessary sacrifices to assuage the anger of the ancestors.26 In a society where yams, ‘‘the king of all crops’’ constituted their staple, the Igbo showed deep loyalty to Njoku and Ndiche, and as C. Coursey maintained, they became probably ‘‘the most enthusiastic yam cultivators in the world’’.27 Yam cultivation promoted hard work and competition, and successful cultivators acquired the Ezeji or Duruji IGBO MINI STATES 269 title (chief of yams) after they been initiated into the association of yam farmers (otu ndi ezeji). In addition to his politico-religious functions, the Okpara was the judicial head of his lineage group. As the ofo-holder, he presided over the meetings of family heads during which they made laws on marriage, birth and death ceremonies and settled disputes among their kinsmen arising from feuds, inheritance and succession. The Okpara relied on the threat of cursing an offender with the wrath of the ancestors to enforce their decisions. Young men were also used as an executive arm of governance. At times, Umuada (married and unmarried daughters of the lineage) were invited to discipline an offender. The Umuada were greatly feared because they were responsible for performing some rituals considered necessary for joining the ancestors after death. They could refuse to carry out this ritual, leaving the offenderÕs spirit to wander aimlessly and ceaselessly on earth.28 The mini state/territorial level: the centrality of Ala in Igbo cosmology and in the evolution of Igbo moral laws of governance and civil order The politico-religious organization of the Igbo mini states and their codes of governance and civil order acquired greater complexity at the mini state/territorial level. Each mini state was headed by the oldest male member of its senior lineage whose ancestors were said to have been the progenitors of the community. As already noted, the head of the senior lineage was the priestly chief of Ala/Ana/Ani (the goddess of the land, agriculture and fertility), called Ezeala/Ezeana. He was also called ‘‘Onye nwe ala’’ (lit. the owner of the land) by virtue of the fact that his ancestors founded the community, and had ritual rights over its land.29 As the priestly chief of Ala, the Ezeala held ofo Ala, the staff of office of Ala, and her symbol of justice performed functions similar to that of Okpara but at higher and broader level. The shrine of Ala for example, was located at the center of each village square (amaukwu) which constituted its politico-religious and commercial center. The strategic location of Ala served two major functions. Firstly, it helped the Igbo to form a territorial political community or mini states that transcended the lineage group level. Hence members of a mini state who owe the same ritual allegiance to Ala, saw themselves as kinsmen, and were obliged to observe her laws on homicide, stealing of farm crops and other taboos. It is significant 270 JOHN ORIJI that inhabitants of a mini state or umunna usually claimed to be kinsmen, even though biologically, they may not descend from a common single ancestor. Kinship among the Igbo at the mini state level is then largely a fictive concept, or what Jones called ‘‘a myth’’ meant to ‘‘provide a validation of a charter, for particular beliefs or institutions’’.30 Ala surely served as a major integrative institution among lineages groups of a mini state whose ancestors settled in the community at varying periods in its history.31 Secondly, the location of Ala affirms her centrality in Igbo cosmology. Hence she was believed to be ‘‘the nearest dearest of all the deities’’. In an agricultural society concerned with fertility of humans, plants and animals, the importance of the earth-goddess and her priest cannot be overemphasized. Consistent efforts were, therefore, made to appease Ala, and her priest had to carry out ritual propitiation ceremonies of the goddess on every market day of the four-day Igbo week, ize muo. The annual communal ceremony honoring Ala, or emume ala, was the most important festival in each mini state, and during the occasion, laws of Ala were recounted by the Ezeala and other elders.32 It is noteworthy that Ala was the only deity whose symbol was enshrined in Igbo societies from the compound, ala ezi to the mini state levels.33 The paramouncy of Ala in Igbo cosmology, and the dominant role she played in defining the moral codes of governance and political order have been noted by Uchendu, P. A. Talbot, G.H. Jones and many others.34 C. K Meek was then right when he stated that: Ala was the fountain of human morality, and in consequence, a principal legal sanction. Homicide, kidnapping, poisoning and stealing, adultery and all offenses against Ala must be purged by rites to her. Ala [deprives] evil men of their lives, and her priests [are] the guardians of public morality. Laws [are] made in her name and by her oaths [are] sworn. Ala [is] in fact the unseen president of the community.35 Ala served other legal functions. As an example, boundaries of lineage and village lands were demarcated with mounds or perennial trees representing her, and it was a taboo for anyone to destroy them. It is noteworthy that laws of Ala were not confined to only humans. They encompassed the lower animals that thrive on earth: Thus if a goat climbs on to the roof of a house it is regarded as having committed an offence against Ala and is, or was in olden days… [killed]… A cock that crows at [odd hours] or a hen that IGBO MINI STATES 271 lays at night in an open space is killed… It is ordained that a hen which hatches out a single chicken shall be deprived of its life… Similarly a cow which bears two calves must be taken out of the community.36 The laws of ala were made in the village square by Amala, (council of elders) comprising the Ezeala who presided over its meetings, the Okpara, Ezeji, Okonko (southern Igbo) and Ozo (northern Igbo) titled men and other adult male members of the community. The important laws they made were ratified with ofo Ala, giving them a sacerdotal sanction. Their violation was, therefore, regarded as the worst crime an individual could commit in Igbo society, iru ala/alu. The crime threatened the ritual balance of the entire community, and necessary measures were taken to ensure that the offender propitiated Ala to avoid arousing her wrath. The fate of Okonkwo in C. AchebeÕs Things Fall Apart is enlightening. In spite of the fame he had attained in Umuofia, Okonkwo was held responsible and liable for violating the taboos of Ala by beating his junior wife during the ‘‘week of peace’’ in honor of Ala. In addition, for ‘‘polluting the earth’’ by killing a kinsman accidentally during a funeral ceremony, Okonkwo and his family had to go in exile to his maternal home for 7 years, and his compound and yams were destroyed. OkonkwoÕs example clearly illustrates that the Igbo had a complex system of jurisprudence that did not attract partisan lineage conflicts and debates.37 Admittedly, Amala was responsible for governance. But the voices of its members did not carry equal weight. Its meetings were dominated by the elders who were versed in oratory, idioms and customary laws. Thus when important decisions were to be made, the elders retired, izuzu to reach a consensus before voicing their decisions to Amala. Surely, young men expressed their views, but Amala was largely a training ground for them to acquire experience and wisdom, and master the complex jurisprudential system of their community. Young men of the junior age grades, ogbo, served as the executive arm of Amala. The Amala had other sources of coercion including curses. They could threaten a recalcitrant offender with invoking through the Dibia, (herbalists and diviners), the wrath of Kamanu, the god of rain, lightening and thunder to strike the individual with thunder. Sometimes, in the Orlu, Owerri and Ngwa axis, the Ezeala made use of the Osu, cult slaves of Ala, also called ‘‘ndi oga ozi muo’’, the messengers of Ala, in meeting some emergencies. Thus, if a bloody feud broke out in the community, the Ezeala dispatched them with palm fronds (a symbol of peace) to 272 JOHN ORIJI summon the combatants to the village square to arrange a truce. Once the Osu arrived, the fighting stopped because it was a sacrilegious act to harm them or spill their blood.38 Taboos & rewards of office The authority holders observed many taboos meant to uphold the sanctity of their office, and distinguish them from common people. The Ezeala for example, was forbidden to eat some carnivorous animals considered unholy, including snakes and rabbits. It was also a taboo for him to eat, drink and engage in other activities openly to ensure that that his humanity would not be betrayed. Their taboos also forbade the Ezeala in carrying out menial activities like climbing and harvesting palm trees, or tapping the raffia palm wine tree.39 Because their ritual functions excluded them from mundane economic activities, the Ezeala and Okpara had to rely on the diverse sources income associated with their office. The Okpara for example, had usufrutuary rights over the large ancestral land of his lineage group attached to his office, Ohia Ofo ukwu. He was responsible for sharing parts of it to family heads during the farming season. In addition, the Okpara received tributes (ihu) of material goods such as yams, palm wine, chickens and goats given to him by adult male members of his lineage as sacrificial offerings during the Ahajoku festival. The Okpara also received tributes of free labor from his kinsmen during each orie day of the four-day week, oru orie, the yield of palm wine from their, raffia palms on the same day, ngwo orie, and the parts of the animal, they killed during festivals or while hunting such as the neck, heart and liver, ihu.40 Similarly, the Ezeala who also was the head of his lineage, received similar tributes from his kinsmen. But he had more resources. The Okpara and other leading elders offered sacrifices to Ala through him during the annual worship of the goddess. The offerings include the Osu, chickens, goats, and yams. The Ezeala received periodic gifts from immigrants he gave land to settle, and sacrificial offerings from those who had violated the taboos Ala, or individuals seeking her blessings. In some places, the Ezeala, when the need arose, had the right to demand, sacrificial offerings from affluent members of his community, ida aja.41 But the Ezeala and Okpara did not accumulate wealth exclusively for themselves. They were the redistributive centers of their community. Elders and others who visited them, were offered palm wine, meat, and IGBO MINI STATES 273 other edible items free. They protected the interests of their kinsmen when their rights were violated by outsiders, and helped the younger generation in words of Uchendu in ‘‘getting up’’.42 Traditional Igbo political systems compared with other Nigerian societies In spite of little variations, traditional Igbo political system was similar to those other Nigerian ethnic nationalities when agriculture was their dominant economic activity. Their highest political communities, the mini states, villages and village-groups were headed by priestly chiefs of the earth-goddess. The Efik-Ibibio neighbors of the Igbo for example, lived in mini states headed by their Obong, the priestly chief of fertility. Similarly, Ijo fishing villages were administered by their priestly chiefs of fertility (Amayanabo). It is also noteworthy that before the establishment of the Oduduwa dynasty between the 12–13th centuries AD, Yoruba politico-social organization was centered around mini states headed by their priestly chief of agriculture, the Ogbene. The Hausa, example is equally enlightening in that it showed that by the 15th century, they were still organized in mini states headed by the Sarkin Noma, the chief of farming.43 Divergent political systems in view of the trans Saharan and trans Atlantic trades Although there were many reasons why the Igbo political system began to differ and diverge from those of other Nigerian ethnic groups, geographical location and accessibility to the resources associated with the trans Saharan and trans Atlantic trades offer some valuable clues to the puzzle. Depending on the location of the mini states, the global trades helped in enriching their authority holders, enhancing their status. It also provided them with superior weapons to conquer their neighbors, and establish mega states with more elaborate bureaucracies. One might then question the common assumption that the few mega states found in Igbo area located on the Niger River and its branches such as Onitsha, Aboh and Oguta were simply ‘‘intrusive cultures’’ from the Benin empire. These states were located on a zone of intercommunication, and from the 17–19th century when they began to expand, their rulers had direct supply of weapons from European traders that facilitated their conquests, and even helped them to repulse the intrusion of Benin into 274 JOHN ORIJI their domain. It is noteworthy that emigrants from the ‘‘Benin empire’’ infiltrated over time into western Igboland, and parts of the hinterland, including Ahoada, Akwete and Ohafia, yet these mini states were not transformed into mega states.44 The Nigerian historian, J. Atande aptly summarized when and how the mini states were transformed into mega states: The efflorescence of mega states, and therefore, of traditional monarchs [in Nigeria] came in the period 1400–1800. The period saw the transformation of Kanem-Bornu empire, the making of Hausa states, the rise of Oyo Empire, the emergence of Nupe Kingdom.. [and] the expansion of the Benin kingdom.. The period also saw the beginning of transformation of Ijo fishing villages into kingdoms.45 Unlike their counterparts in other parts of Nigeria, the politicoreligious heads of Igbo mini states were not involved in the slave trade. In fact, the taboos of their office forbade them from engaging in slave wars, kidnappings and other forms of social violence that they considered as sacrilegious acts against Ala. Oral traditions of the Nri claim that Enwelana, their priestly chief cursed Okolie Ijeoma, the leading Aro slave trader and Abam warriors in his area for their nefarious activities.46 Heads of minis states of Egbu, Mbieri and other communities banned the Aro from settling in their communities. The authority holders of the Ngwa mini state of Ikem Elu were so outraged by the slave traders that their young men had to throw stones and other dangerous weapons at them while they were crossing the area. Hence the mini state is popularly called today ‘‘Ndi Olumbe’’, lit. those who throw stones.47 Details of the Aro trade net work need not concern us here since much has been written about it by researchers.48 The Aro were able to dominate the slave in the hinterland due to the raids of their Abam warriors, and through the judicial process in that those found guilty by their oracle, Ibini Ukpabi, were sold into slavery. The Aro also propagated the Ekpe/Okonko title society among the southern Igbo, allying with its leading members who offered hospitality to them, as well as slaves and other goods they needed in exchange for guns, tobacco, cloth and other commodities.49 Similarly, the Aro allied with some Ozo titled men and Ogaranya, wealthy men of northern Igboland who played similar roles like the Okonko leaders, and at times, used the Abam to raid rival communities.50 IGBO MINI STATES 275 The Aro trade network had contradictory impacts in the hinterland. On one hand, the network served as an integrative mechanism linking many communities to the international slave trade. On the other hand, the network constituted a disintegrative force in communities the Aro and Abam raided and occupied, since those who survived their incursions, fled and settled elsewhere. The refugees, were therefore, physically and spiritually displaced. In addition, in mini states where Okonko leaders and Ozo title holders were not incorporated into the state structure, the title holders, and newly rich disrupted the existing political system, and at times weakened the powers of the Ezeala and other authority holders.51 Sacred authority holders late 19th century to 1930s In spite of the slave trade and the transformations it brought in some communities, the sacred authority holders continued to fulfill their politico-religious functions until the colonization of the Igboland after its conquest (1900–1902). Women in the mini and mega states also lost the political power they had exercised in Igbo society, and the only woman appointed a Warrant Chief was Ahebi Ugbabe of Enugu Ezike in Nsukka area.52 Similarly, British rule marked the end of the Aro trade net work since the colonial government enforced the policy of ‘‘free trade’’ after appointing Warrant Chiefs to administer the area on their behalf. The appointment of warrant chiefs and the beginning of the end of sacred authority The genesis of colonial rule heightened the decline of the institution of sacred authority in Igboland and the Ibibio-Efik region because those who were appointed Warrants Chiefs, lacked traditional legitimacy. A. Afigbo and others have noted how the exigencies of the colonial situation led to the creation of the new chiefs.53 The authority holders in many places, were intensely suspicious of the intentions of the British after they had organized their young men called ‘‘warriors’’ to resist the invaders. Fearing reprisals, they hardly presented themselves to the British as heads of their mini states. Some even thought they would be sold into slavery or banished like their kinsman, King Jaja of Obopo and subjected to other indignities. In Okigwe town and the Umuariam community of Obowo, those appointed Warrant Chiefs were respectively, the domestic servant of a town crier, and a ‘‘social misfit’’ who 276 JOHN ORIJI had escaped from Azumini traders after he had been sold into slavery. In Ihiala area, one Okereke Udensi, a stranger who had helped the British to disarm the town, was rewarded with a warrant to administer the community.54 A similar problem existed in the Ngwa region studied by the present writer. For example, when the British expeditionary forces arrived in Ovungwu community in Isiala Ngwa, they met the Amala holding their weekly meeting. The British then wanted to know who among them was the chief of the community was. As they were doubtful of the intentions of the invaders, the elders quickly conferred among themselves, and nominated as their chief, one Ochonu, a refugee who had fled to his maternal village in Ovungwu after committing homicide in his own community. Others appointed Warrant Chiefs in the Ngwa area included ‘‘warriors’’ such as Oriaku of Owerrinta and Nzewata Otutu whom authority holders had sent to Akwete, a British military and administrative outpost, to survey ways and means of negotiating a truce with the invaders. The British, however, appointed them Warrant Chiefs, thinking that they were the heads of their communities.55 The function of warrant chiefs and the secularization of laws The exclusive rights of governance given to the Warrant Chiefs after their appointments helped in undermining the authority of heads of the mini states, the Amala, women and the sacred laws of governance and civil order associated with them. Thus as an example, the traditional executive organ of government was considered irrelevant to the new order. The Warrants Chiefs, and their Headman ‘‘Uduman’’ who were often dreaded for their ruthlessness, served as the executive organ of government, and they were given new functions including, maintenance of roads, and recruitment of forced labor for building rail lines and government guest houses. In addition, the Warrant Chiefs performed judicial functions for the government in the Native Courts where they arbitrated disputes. They also had their own private and unofficial courts which helped in weakening the traditional organs of law-making and arbitration. More importantly, the laws the Warrant Chiefs administered were descralized in keeping with the British common law and ideas of justice. Laws were then stripped off their religious roots, and the propitiation ceremonies of Ala and other gods were forbidden even when acts of abomination were committed.56 IGBO MINI STATES 277 Christian evangelism and the corrosion of traditional authority Christian missionaries, who had started to establish churches in the hinterland after the British military incursions, welcomed the secularization of customary laws, and the end of what they regarded as ritual sacrifices to pagan gods. But as the missionary evangelism gathered momentum, there emerged some fanatics among the new coverts who believed they had the divine calling to destroy every institution of paganism, including those associated with governance. C. Achebe has in Things Fall Apart aptly described how in parts of northern Igboland, the rivalry between those who stood for the old order and fanatic evangelicals would contribute to the chain of events that led to the tragic death of Okonkwo.57 A similar conflict existed in southern Igboland between the Village Council and Okonko on one hand, and the evangelicals on the other, especially, after the spread in 1915 of the iconoclastic Garrick Braide religious movement from the eastern Niger Delta to the hinterland that led to the destruction of ancestral shrines, burning of Okonko houses and other acts of sacrilege. Authority holders responded by banning those involved from farming in their communal land, and harvesting its oil palm trees, and even nominated them for forced labor on Sundays. Okonko leaders dispatched their executive arm to burn Christian churches and punish the evangelicals. The situation was so tense that the Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Nigeria had to tour the affected areas in 1921 to seek a reconciliation.58 But the conflict continued till the Aba WomenÕs War of 1929.59 The Aba WomenÕs War of 1929 The Aba WomenÕs War was precipitated by the rumor that women would be taxed during the hyperinflation of the 1920s. But its major cosmological driving force lay in the de-sacralization of existing indigenous laws and the destruction of the shrines of Ala and other ancestral gods. The unusual solidarity and frenzy the women displayed during the war, stemmed not only from their loss of political and economic power, but also from the fact that they believed that womanhood embodied the productive forces of Ala, and were naturally, the moral guardians and defenders of her taboos. Women were therefore, morally outraged by the new forces of change that undermined the existing order, and upset the ritual equilibrium in their society.60 It is noteworthy that before the WomenÕs War, a millenarian religious movement meant to purify society and restore its traditional values had spread to Okigwi, Bende, and Ikot Ekpene and Uyo Divisions and other 278 JOHN ORIJI parts of the hinterland where women rose in protest. Women in the Owerri Nta axis who masterminded the WomenÕs War in Aba had a few weeks earlier, marched to the town to protest against prostitution and other vices that debased womanhood.61 But when they later returned to Aba to protest against taxation, and two of them were killed accidentally by a British medical officer driving to work, the women began to blame all the woes of their society on the ‘‘white man’’. They looked at the past with some nostalgia, and demanded that: All white men should [return] to their country so that the land in this area might remain as it was many years ago before the advent of the white man.62 The WomenÕs War called the attention of the colonial government to the problems created by the ‘‘policy of indirect rule’’. The government then set up the Aba Commission of Inquiry to probe the roots of the revolt, and make recommendations for carrying out some administrate reforms. The Commission blamed the revolt on the untraditional method used in appointing the Warrant Chiefs: By Ibo custom every town has a head usually known as the Onye Ezeala, but except in Okigwe and to some extent in Ahoada, these native heads have been ignored as central Authorities … In Aba Division…almost every town has its Onye Ezeala who is recognized by the whole community and it seems a retrograde step to ignore the central authority in favor of a large number of minor authorities.63 Based on the report of the Commission, the government decided to abolish the Warrant Chief System, and fashion a policy that would involve heads of the mini states in the new local administrative system they established after the WomenÕs War centered on Native Authority Councils and Native Courts. From the warrant chiefs to native authority councils: the packed courts system ‘‘Eze Bari’’ of the 1930s–1940s, and the emergence of the literate elite An era of intense change, and individualism and emphasis on western education The government took measures to appoint heads of mini states to the Native Authority Councils and Native Courts. For example, District IGBO MINI STATES 279 Officers publicized the new policy in their areas of jurisdiction, and those involved were asked to report on a particular day for appointment. The efforts of the government, however, were quite unsuccessful for diverse reasons. The rapid pace of change, and nearly three decades of misrule of the Warrant Chiefs had helped in weakening the authority of the Amala, and heads of the mini states who were increasingly seen as ritual head of their communities. Their positions in the newly created administrative system, were taken over by a category of people who had obtained basic education in primary schools, ‘‘the literate elite’’ comprising some former Warrant Chiefs, retired court clerks and interpreters and others versed in the manipulation of the colonial bureaucracy. The impostors among them stated that they were the Ezeala of their communities, while others stressed their skills in literacy to justify their claims. In addition, many heads of mini states refused to show up for appointment, arguing that they did not want to serve as ‘‘messengers of the white man’’, and be associated with corruption, and other abuses of the colonial bureaucracy that would violate their taboos of office.64 The new system, however, soon became ineffective and dysfunctional because it was over packed with many false claimants, called Eze Bari, lit. ‘‘everybody is a chief’’, euphemism for mob rule. The failure of the new systems was heightened by the emergence from 1930s–1940s, of a new force, ‘‘the educated elite’’ including retired civil and public servants, and others who had acquired Western education up to high school level. The educated elite assailed the ‘‘Eze Bari’’ system, claiming that they had ‘‘more knowledge of the white manÕs system’’, and were therefore ‘‘the best men’’ to run the colonial bureaucracy. To further justify their claim as the ‘‘de facto’’ rulers of their communities some of them stressed the popular slogan ‘‘Igbo enwe Eze’’, lit. the Igbo donÕt have chiefs/kings.65 Based on their protests, and the inadequacies of ‘‘Eze Bari’’ system, the colonial government abolished and replaced it with the ‘‘Best Man Policy’’ of 1940s marking the introduction of elective local government councils. The educated elite and ‘‘The Best Man’’ policy 1940s–1950s The interests of the educated elite were fully protected when literacy and ability to speak English were officially adopted as major criteria for contesting local government elections. They were then able to dominate local councils, native and clan authorities and other administrative 280 JOHN ORIJI organs established during the 1940–1950s. The era of elite dominance gained greater momentum during the 1950s–1960s when efforts were made to prepare Nigeria for self-government and independence. By then, the number of educated elite increased rapidly, especially, university graduates trained in local universities and overseas. Eastern regional government and the crises of chieftaincy in Igbo mini states (1950s–1960s) The Eastern Regional Government was concerned about the crises of Chieftaincy in the Igbo mini states as the country marched towards independence. There were claims and counter claims, and as before, some members of the educated elite argued that ‘‘Igbo enwe Eze’’. To resolve the problem, and keep pace with both northern and western regions which had established Regional House of Chiefs, the Eastern Regional Government appointed in 1957, G. I. Jones, an anthropologist versed in Igbo society as the chair of a commission of inquiry to advise the government on the status of chiefs in the region. But there were strings attached to the mandate of the commission meant to protect the interests of the educated elite: it was required in making its recommendations to pay attention on ‘‘how to integrate traditional institutions into a modern, Western-style political and judicial system’’.66 Jones was aware of the difficult task given to his commission at a time traditional institutions had been corroded. He then distinguished between two types of authority that existed in the Igbo area comprising the ‘‘de jure rulers’’ or sacred authority holders whose influence and power had declined, and ‘‘de facto rulers’’ or the educated elite who monopolized the colonial administrative system. Jones then ruled in favor of the ‘‘de facto rulers’’, and recommended that Chiefs be divided into three categories with the 1st class one constituting the Regional House of Chiefs, those in the 2nd and 3rd categories should serve at the County and Local Government levels respectively. The government accepted his recommendations, and recognized chiefs to be paid salaries at level they served.67 Chieftaincy 1960s to present: from the educated elite to the newly rich and ‘‘419ers’’ The recommendations of JonesÕs commission helped in defining the institution of chieftaincy in Igboland till the military coup of January 15, IGBO MINI STATES 281 1966, leading to the end of the first republic and the abolition of the various categories of Chiefs. Efforts made in the 1970s–1980s after the Nigerian civil war and periods of military rule to revive the ‘‘traditional’’ system of chieftaincy by allowing communities to elect/appoint their own chiefs were unfruitful. By then, the oil boom had produced the newly rich who successfully used their wealth to undermine the power of the educated elite. It is not surprising that a majority of those who emerged to be chiefs or ‘‘Traditional Rulers’’ were businessmen and rich merchants. Their rank has swollen in recent times by the ‘‘419ers’’ who currently constitute a majority of the ‘‘Traditional Rulers’’ recognized by government since 1999 in some of the Igbo States, especially Abia State. Before their appointment, the chiefs-to-be were charged fees by government, and later given certificates of recognition as ‘‘Traditional Rulers’’ or heads of their new ‘‘Autonomous Communities’’ without clear boundaries. Cases are known where a single village is carved into two autonomous communities, and two ‘‘419ers’’ from the same lineage group are appointed their ‘‘Traditional Rulers’’. Soon, the new chiefs get involved in protracted boundary disputes, and also join their counterparts in serving as ‘‘mouth organs’’ of the government, and in the fierce and ruthless struggle in picking up the crumbs that fall from the tables of those in power. The atomization of Igbo communities and the reckless politicization of chieftaincy are manifestations of the crises of modern Igbo society. Achebe rightly noted that during colonialism, Things Fell Apart, but today one can safely that Things Have Fallen Into Pieces. Suggestions and conclusion This study began with disputing some of the synchronic assumptions about traditional Igbo society. It examined the roots of sacred authority in Igbo mini states, discussing their moral codes of governance and civil order. It went on to analyze the changes sacred authority underwent from the era of the slave trade to the present time. The earliest noticeable changes occurred during the slave trade when the Aro trade network upset the existing authority in some communities. More formidable changes, however, occurred during the first three decades of colonialism when the Warrant Chiefs, Christian evangelicals and urbanization helped in corroding the power of the sacred authority holders. Efforts made after the Aba WomenÕs War by the colonial administration to revive and strengthen the power of the sacred 282 JOHN ORIJI authority holders, failed largely due to emergence of the literate elite. The literate elite were later replaced by the educated elite who used the slogan, ‘‘Igbo enwe eze’’ to justify their dominance of the colonial bureaucracy. By the 1950s as evidenced by the JonesÕ commission, the educated elite emerged as the leading chiefs of the Igbo area. The situation did not change much until the 1970s when the educated elite was displaced by the newly rich and ‘‘419ers’’. Ironically, the educated Igbo elite are concerned about the dominant role the newly rich and ‘‘419ers’’ are playing in their society. They are critical of the ‘‘Traditional Rulers’’ for lacking traditional roots, and for their greed and unscrupulousness in serving as mouth organs of the government.68 The educated elite, however, needs to remember that their own class have had its own era of dominance. They like those who displaced them, stressed the modern traits of their society, and argued for their convenience that the Igbo had no sacred authority holders or chiefs in the past. The educated elite has, therefore, contributed to the crises in Igbo society by creating misleading images of its past. The situation in Igbo area continues to deteriorate the Ahajioku festival and the worship of Ala are things of the past, and in many places, the shrines of the goddess and other deities have crumbled due to forces of modernism. Currently, Igboland is once more experiencing intense missionary evangelism, and one can count up to fifteen churches in major streets in some of the urban centers. Urbanization has grown almost by geometric progression, attracting diverse categories of people in the modern and more materialistic sector who are no longer tied to the soil, including merchants, petty traders, factory owners and their workers, civil servants and others. These developments have created a new Igbo society that runs the risk of facing the extinction of its traditional institutions and their moral codes governance and civil order. S. Ottenberg has argued that the Igbo are much more adaptable to changes than other Nigerian ethnic nationalities.69 His is quite right bearing in mind that many Igbo people have remained unconcerned as their traditional politico-religious institutions crumble. Even if it is desirable, it may not be possible to revive the institutions. But much can be learned from the wisdom and knowledge their custodians have accumulated over many millennia. The need to study them is much more pressing during this era of globalization and cultural identity. The Igbo and their identity will be in jeopardy if they do not find ways and means of integrating the ideas they are acquiring from the modern world into a way of life that is rooted in their traditional values. IGBO MINI STATES 283 Notes 1 For a review of the problems of the Igbo Diaspora in the US, see Chika Onyeani, OguhebeÕs Sadism and African Culture. In: African Sun Times, 16, 44(Oct 27–Nov. 2, 2006), afrstime@aol.com 2 The situation in the Igbo area is not much different from other parts of Nigeria excepting that the wave of violent crimes, and the depth of corruption at all levels of governance are almost unsurpassed. For example, the Economic & Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) indicted all Igbo Governors for corruption. The Igbo States also produced the most corrupt of all the Governors in the country: in the words of the Chairman of EFCC ‘‘Abia is number one not because it number one alphabetically but because one of the biggest cases of stealing, money laundering, diversion of funds against Governor Kalu. The Governor used his mother, daughter, wife and brother to divert N35 billion to build his business empire..’’ see A. Daniel and A. Momoh, Ribadu Lists Corruption in High Places. In: Guardian Newspapers. Lagos, Sept 29, 2006 www.ngrguardiannews.com/new/article01 3 Fraudsters are called ‘‘419ers’’ in Nigeria. Their name is derived from decree 419 proclaimed by general Sami Abacha (1994–1998) who made a fruitless attempt to end their crimes. The rate of crime has also increased amongst the citizenry. Armed robbers paralyzed economic activities in the commercial town of Aba in May 2006, robbing banks and other commercial centers and killing some of their workers and policemen. Similar violent robberies have been reported in Owerri, Umuahia, Onitsha and other places. Igbo traders traveling abroad have helped in spreading the crime overseas. For example, a 19-year-old Igbo young man, Iwuchukwu Tochi was hanged in Singapore Feb 5, 2007 for cocaine smuggling, see A. Limkara, A Hanging in Singapore, USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com 4 In addition to Prof. Uchendu (Jan. 1, 1930–Dec 7, 2006). Prof. C. Ikoku, former Vice Chancellor, University of Nigeria, Victor Nwankwo and many others have also been murdered. Recently, Emeka Anyegbunem, an Igbo undergraduate at the University of Jos has been charged to court for murdering Prof. Jonnie Onyeka, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University (an Igbo) see J. Olatunji. Student Faces Trial Over Murder of Deputy VC. The Nigerian Tribune. Abuja, May 9, 2007 http:// odili.net/news/source/2007/may/9//577.html 5 V.C. Uchendu. Ezi na Ulo: The Extended Family in Igbo Civilization. The 1995 Ahiajioku Lecture, Igbo Language Center, Owerri, pp. 1–57 http://ahiajoku.igbon et.comeo. I called Prof. UchenduÕs son in Port Harcourt to sympathize with the family on his fatherÕs death, and he told me the prime suspects arrested by the police are two young men from their compound who have been involved in violent robbery and other crimes. Prof Uchendu was against their nefarious activities which were soiling the name of their family. The suspects decided to eliminate him before his coronation as the Traditional Ruler of their community, Nsirimo, fearing that they would be in trouble after his enthronement. 6 For the works of some of the pioneers, see C. K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe. London: Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 91–92 and M. Green. Igbo Village Affairs. London: Thomas Nelson, pp. 139–146. For insightful critiques of the synchronic approach in studying Igbo history, see R. Stevenson. Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 192–193, and J.N. Oriji. Ngwa History: A Study of Social and Economic Changes 284 JOHN ORIJI in Igbo-Mini States in Time Perspective. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Co. 1998, pp. 3–6. 7 For example, see R. Horton. Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa in J. F. Ajayi and M. Crowther eds. History of West Africa vol. 1, New York: Longman, 1972, pp. 78–119, and D. Northrup. Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Developments in Southeastern Nigeria. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 155–188. 8 Horton op. cit. 86–97. 9 For ‘‘Ohacracy’’ see E. Njaka. Igbo Political Culture. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.These features are not unique to the Igbo society. The Yoruba and other Nigerian societies are also competitive, placing emphasis on hard work and achievements. 10 Okpara and Ada are respective names given to the oldest male and female members of a family. Okpara is also the name of the head of a lineage group, and its oldest male member. Uchendu (1995, 28) is right when he argued that ‘‘seniority by birth order in the lineage is the normal basis for Opara [Okpara] and Ada statuses’’. As for Ezeala (priest of the earth-goddess), he is the head of the senior lineage that founded the community. The offices of the Okpara of the lineage group and the Ezeala are associated with complex rituals, and each of them had their respective deputies, the Osota Okpara and, the Osota Ezeala, who were their next oldest kinsmen. Their deputies assisted them in sacrificial offerings, and thereby learned the incantations, recitations and other mystical codes of worship. The deputies were also groomed to succeed the incumbent office holders when they passed away. The ritualization of these offices made them sacred and hereditary, and it is unlikely that they were competitive in the past, excepting in communities where the emergence of wealthy merchants and others engaged in long-distance trade upset the existing political status quo. Even in such communities like Bonny, the traditionalists resisted the efforts of Jaja of Opobo in usurping the throne, although he had emerged as the wealthiest merchant of the town during the middle of the 19th century, and his Igbo supporters constituted over 60% of the powerful members of the ruling council. My own research shows that the hereditary system still thrives in a few Igbo communities like Akwete, Egbu and Egbema. 11 For social stratification in Igbo society, see Uchendu (1995). Ezi na ulo: The Extended Family in Igbo Civilization. The 1995 Ahiajoku Lecture, Igbo Language Center, Owerri, pp. 21–24, http://ahiajoku.igbonet.comeo. 12 G. Balandier. Political Anthropology. New York: 1972, p. 101. 13 G. I. Jones. The Trading States of the Oil Rivers. London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 5. 14 Nwando Achebe. Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority in Northern Igboland, 1900–1960. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2005, pp. 53–230 and J. N. Oriji (1998), pp. 27–35. 15 D. Hartle. The Framework of Pre-history in Igboland. A Paper Presented at a Workshop on the Foundations of Igbo Civilization, Institute of African Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1980, p. 49. 16 J. Iliffe. Africans: The History of a Continent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 50. 17 T. Shaw. ‘‘The Significance of Igbo-Ukwu and Future Archeological Research in Southeastern Nigeria in Ikenga’’. Journal of African Studies I, I (1972), p. 3. IGBO MINI STATES 18 285 Uchendu, op.cit 1995, pp. 30–32. D. Forde and G. I. Jones. The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples of Southeastern Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 39. 20 I. Nzimiro. Chieftaincy and Politics in the Four Niger States. London: Frank Cass, 1970, Sabine Jell-Bahlsen. ‘‘Female Power: Water Priestesses of the Oru Igbo’’. In: Obioma Nnameka (ed.), Sisterhood, Feminisms and Power. Lawrenceville, NJ: African World Press, 1998, pp. 101–131 and G. Chuku. Igbo Women and Economic Transformation in Southeastern 1900–1960. New York: Routledge, 2005. 21 K. Okonjo. WomenÕs Political Participation in Nigeria in E. C. Steady ed. The Black Woman Cross-Culturally. Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Publication Co. 1981, pp. 98–100. 22 Uchendu op.cit., pp. 30–31, argues that the belt includes the entire Igbo area excluding the eastern section of the mid Cross River basin. The present writer has carried out extensive research on the origins of many of the communities in the Umunna kinship belt, see J. Oriji, Traditions of Igbo Origin. New York: Peter Lang, 1994. 23 For Igbo cosmology, and the dominant role the senior lineage of the founders played in society see A. Shelton. Nsukka-Igala Borderland: Religion and Social Control in Indigenous African Colonialism. Albany: State University of New York, 1971 p. 49, V. Moult. Intelligence Report on the Oguta Native Court Area. Enugu: Nigerian National Archives, 1932, p. 15, C. T. Ennals, Intelligence Report on the Ndokki Clan. Enugu: Nigerian National Archives, 1934, p. 238 and J. G. Allen Intelligence Report on the Ngwa Clan vol. I. Enugu: Nigerian National Archives, 1933), p. 21. 24 Uchendu op.cit., pp. 22–25. 25 V. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1965, pp. 39–41 and J. N. Oriji (1998) pp. 27–35. 26 Ibid. 27 D. G. Coursey. Yams: An Account of the Origins, Cultivation and Utilization of the Useful Members of the Diascoreacae. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 18. 28 M. Olisa. ‘‘Political Culture and Stability in Igbo Society’’. The Conch, iii, 2 (1971), pp. 21–22 and J. N. Oriji. ‘‘Political Authority in Igbo Society’’. Odu: A Journal of West African Studies, 29 (Jan 1986), pp. 73–74, Uchendu, op.cit. (1965), p. 42 and (1995) p. 29 and N. Achebe (2005) pp. 167–168. 29 For example, see J.G. Allen (1933) p. 21 and Oriji (1986) pp. 75–76. 30 G. I. Jones. The Background of Eastern Nigeria History, vol. I Oral Traditions. New Haven: Human Relations Files Inc. 1988, p. 5. A. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde. African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. London: Oxford University Press, 1964, encountered similar problems dealing with kinship concepts in some African societies. Typologies based on kinship, race, class and other variables, are largely constructed to offer some insights into a complex phenomenon. They are not rigid classifications that provide exclusive holistic analysis of the phenomenon. My own research in southern Igbo (Owerri Igbo) and parts of northern Igboland has shown that before the colonial period, there is hardly any Igbo village that had not been settled by immigrants. Surely, members each lineage group (umunna) may trace their genealogy to hundreds of years ago, but collectively, it is a myth to assume that an entire village descended from a single common ancestry. In fact, in some Igbo 19 286 JOHN ORIJI villages in Owerri, Mbaise, Ngwa and other places, where Ofo ala was not used to integrate later immigrants, people still marry others in the same village unrelated to their kin group. Like ‘‘race’’ the concept of Umunna at the village level is not a scientific concept, but a social reality. Some Igbo people in Lagos for example, sometime ago, formed the ‘‘Umunna Social Club’’ to socialize and help their members. But that does mean that members of the club descended from a single ancestor. Umunna is a flexible concept whose meaning depends on its usage. 31 P. A. Talbot. The Peoples of Southern Nigeria vol. I. London: Frank Cass, 1923, p. 43. 32 Allen (1933) p. 15, and Oriji (1998), pp. 33–34. 33 W. Horton. ‘‘God, Man and the Land in a Northern Ibo Village-Group’’. Africa xxvi (1956), p. 23. 34 Uchendu op.cit., (1965), pp. 42–45, P. Talbot. Nigerian Fertility Cults. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927, pp. 10–27 and G. H. Jones. The Earth- Goddess: A Study of Native Farming on West Africa. London: Longman and Green, pp. 6–7. 35 Meek (1937), p. 25. 36 Ibid. pp. 30–31. 37 C. Achebe. Things Fall Apart. Oxford: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 2000, pp. 21–22 and pp. 85–88. 38 Allen (1933), p. 15 and Oriji (1986), p. 75. For a more detailed study see Igboland, see J. Oriji. Sacred Authority in Igbo Society in Extrait des Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 68,I (Paris, 1989), pp. 113–122. 39 Allen (1933) p. 15 and Oriji (1989) p. 119 and (1998) p. 29. 40 Uchendu (1965) p. 40. 41 Oriji (1986), p. 76 42 Uchendu (1965). pp. 34–38. Uchendu distinguished between earlier and modern patterns of getting up. Although he did not specifically mention the authority holders, but based on my own research, there is little doubt that they played a crucial role in assisting young men of their lineage group to get up by helping them to marry, providing them land to build their houses and farm etc. 43 For the Ijo example, see R. Horton. From a Fishing Village to City-State: A Social History of New Calabar in M. Douglas and P. Kaberry (eds). Man in Africa. London: Navistock publications, 1969, pp. 37–58. For the Yoruba example see, R. Smith. Kingdoms of the Yoruba. London: London University Press, 1969, pp. 110 and the Hausa example, see A. Smith. Some Considerations Regarding the Formation of States in Hausaland in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria v, 3 (1970), pp. 335–337. 44 For Igbo communities where emigrants from ‘‘Benin empire’’ settled see Oriji. Traditions of Igbo Origin op. cit. pp. 78–90. 45 J. Atande. ‘‘Historical Evolution of Traditional Rulers and Institutions in Nigeria up to C. 1900’’. In: The Role of Traditional Rulers in the Governance of Nigeria. Ibadan: Institute of African Studies, 1984, p. 6. For the transformation of Nigerian mini to mega states see also T. Falola. The History of Nigeria. Westport: reenwood Press, 1999 pp. 17–38. 46 J.N. Oriji. ‘‘Igboland, Slavery and the Drums of War and Heroism’’. In: S. Diouf (ed.) Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003, pp. 121–131. 47 Ibid. IGBO MINI STATES 48 287 For example, see F. Ekejiuba. ‘‘The Aro Trade System in the 19th Century’’. In: Ikenga: Journal of African Studies I, I (1972), pp. 11–26, J.N. Oriji. ‘‘Slave Trade, Warfare and Aro Expansion in the Igbo Hinterland’’. In Geneve-Afrique xxiv, 2 (1986), pp. 108–118 and J. Noku. ‘‘Oral Tradition and the Material Culture of the Atlantic Slave Trade as Historical Evidence: The Aro and the Bight of Biafra Hinterland’’. In: C. Korieh and F. Kolapo eds. The Aftermath of Slavery: Transitions and Transformations in Southeastern Nigerian History. Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007, pp. 136–157. 49 Oriji (2003) p. 124 and (1986) pp. 107–112. 50 E. Isichei. A History of Igbo People. (London: The Mackillan Press Ltd. 1976, pp. 102–107. 51 Allen op.cit p. 41 Oriji (1986), p. 79. 52 N. Achebe (2005), pp. 206–217. 53 A. Afigbo. The Warrant Chiefs. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1972, H. Gailey. The Road to Aba. London: University of London Press, 1971 and J.N. Oriji. Igbo Women From 1929–1960 in West African Review (2000) pp. 1–11 http://www.africareresource.com/war/vol2.1/oriji.html 54 Afigbo (1972) pp. 70–73. 55 Oriji (1996), pp. 74–75. 56 Oriji (1986) pp. 82–83. 57 C. Achebe (2000) pp. 101–148. 58 O. Kalu. ‘‘Missionaries, Colonial Government and Secret Societies in Southeastern Nigeria’’. In: Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 9, I (1977), pp. 77–90, F. Ekechi. Tradition and Transformation in Eastern Nigeria: A Socio-Political History of Owerri and its Hinterland 1902–1947. Kent: Kent University Press 1989 pp. 60–90 and Oriji (1998), pp. 78–80. 59 J.N. Oriji. ‘‘The Igbo WomenÕs War’’. In: B. Thomas (ed.). Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism Since 1450. Detroit: Gale Group, Inc./Macmillan, 2007, pp. 1–6. The WomenÕs war was not fought only in parts of Igboland belonging to Owerri Province, but in Ikot Ekpene and Uyo Divisions of Calabar Province. 60 For an insightful discussion of these developments, see O. Echewa. I Saw the Sky Catch Fire. New York: Penguins Books Ltd. 1993. 61 Ibid. 62 S. Leith-Ross. African Women: A Study of the Igbo of Nigeria. London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1939, p. 38. 63 Government of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Aba Commission of Inquiry. Lagos: Government Printer, 1930, p. 31. 64 Allen, op. cit. vol. I p. 69, Oriji (1998) pp. 85–86 and A. Harnet-Sievers. ‘‘Igbo Traditional Rulers: Chieftaincy and the State in Southeastern Nigeria’’. In: Afrika Spectrum (Hamburg) 33, I (1998) pp. 57–70. 65 Ibid. The assertion, ‘‘Igbo enwe Eze’’ is correct if one is thinking of a single chief/ king who ruled the entire Igbo area. The same can be said of the Yoruba, Hausa and other large ethic nationalities before the genesis of the trans-Saharan and transAtlantic trades. But the assertion is definitely untrue if it is applied to Igbo mini states because they had their priestly-chiefs (Ezeala), and other title holders including Ezeji, and Eze Okonko. The concept ‘‘eze’’ is certainly indigenous to the Igbo language. 66 Harnet-Sievers (1998), p. 5. 288 67 JOHN ORIJI G. I. Jones, ‘‘Chieftaincy in the Former Eastern Region of Nigeria’’. In: C. Crowder and M. Ikime (eds.) West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, pp. 312–324 and ‘‘Report of the Position, Status and Influence of Chiefs and Natural Rulers’’. In: The Eastern Region of Nigeria. Enugu: Government Printer, 1957. 68 For some of these criticisms see Ebere Nwaubani. ‘‘Chieftaincy among the Igbo: A Guest on the Center-Stage’’. In: International Journal of African Historical Studies 27, 2 (1994) pp. 347–371, A. Nwankwo. ‘‘Identity, Consciousness and Affirmation: The Igbo Nation and the Future Possibilites of the Nigerian State’’. Keynote Address, Annual Igbo Day Celebration Organized by The World Igbo Congress, Washington D.C. 1996, p. 16 and C. Achebe. The Trouble With Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985, p. 48. 69 S. Ottenberg. ‘‘Ibo Receptivity to Change’’. In: W. Bascom and M. Herskovits eds. African Cultures: Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 130–143.