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Alternative Perspectives on Independence of Directors
Brennan, Niamh; McDermott, Michael
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2004-07
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Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12 (3): 325336
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Alternative Perspectives on Independence of Directors
Niamh Brennan* and Michael McDermott
(Published in Corporate Governance: An International Review,
12 (3) (July 2004): 325-336)
* Address for correspondence: Prof. Niamh Brennan, Quinn School of Business, University College Dublin,
Belfield, Dublin 4. Tel. +353-1-716 4707; Fax. +353-1-716 4767; email: Niamh.Brennan@ucd.ie
Abstract
This paper examines the issue of independence of boards of directors and non-executive
directors of companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange. Based on information published in
annual reports, the study found that most Irish listed companies were complying with the
Combined Code’s recommendations for a balanced board structure, albeit with only 60 per
cent having majority-independent boards. The study found a lack of consistency in interpreting the definition of “independence”, a lack of disclosure of information and, by applying
criteria generally regarded as prerequisite to independence of non-executive directors, certain
situations which imposed upon their independence.
Keywords: Director independence, Higgs Report, Irish plcs
Introduction
The role of non-executive directors has changed significantly since the Cadbury Report
(1992) highlighted the particular contribution that independent directors can make to the
governance process. McKinsey & Company (2002) highlights that investors believe
companies should create more independent boards and achieve greater boardroom
effectiveness through better director selection, more disciplined board evaluation processes
and greater time commitment from directors. The objective of this study is to examine the
issue of independence, both at a board level and individual non-executive director level, for
all companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange, using information disclosed in company
annual reports.
Regulatory framework
The Irish Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange regulations are for the purposes of
this paper identical. Responding to public concerns in relation to creative accounting, high
profile company failures and a lack of confidence in external auditors, a number of reports
attempted to improve the standard of corporate governance, culminating in the Combined
Code (London Stock Exchange, 1998). In April 2002, the UK Department of Trade and
Industry launched a review on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors including
“independence” of non-executive directors, following a number of corporate debacles where
board effectiveness has come under the spotlight. The resulting Higgs Report (Higgs, 2003)
was published in January 2003. To the extent that the Higgs Report is adopted in the Listing
Rules, it will have an effect equally in Ireland and in the UK.
This study examines compliance of companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange with the
recommendations of the Combined Code and with those of the Higgs Report in respect to
board structure and issues related to independence of non-executive directors. Although the
research was carried out in July 2002, prior to publication of the Higgs Report in January
2003, it anticipated many of the Higgs recommendations on independence of directors. This
allowed the results to be assessed subsequently against the Higgs recommendations. The
examination reveals an array of definitions for and interpretations of “independence”.
1
Literature review
Independence of boards of directors
The extent to which boards and non-executive directors are independent varies depending
upon business or personal associations with senior management (Mace, 1986; Patton and
Baker, 1987). As a consequence, no common consensus exists as to a unique definition for
independence.
Arguably, improvements in the independence of corporate boards ought to yield
improvements in corporate performance. Independent directors are expected to be more
effective in monitoring managers, thereby reducing the agency costs arising from the
separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers) in day-to-day company
management. Empirical evidence challenges the conventional wisdom that board
independence produces better corporate performance (Bhagat and Black, 1997, 2002), stating
that there is no evidence that companies with more independent boards perform better than
other companies. Studies of outsider ratios and corporate performance have produced
correlations ranging from positive (Pearce and Zahra, 1992) to negative (Beatty and Zajac,
1994). Some studies have found zero or near-zero effects (Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994).
Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship between the proportion of independent
directors and corporate performance. Further doubt was cast by two UK studies (Vafeas and
Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999) which failed to find a relationship between the
proportion of non-executive directors and corporate performance. Other research has reported
that a higher ratio of executive, not outside directors, is associated with higher R&D spend
(Baysinger et al., 1991), greater likelihood of CEO dismissal in times of financial crises
(Ocasio, 1994) and higher firm performance (Pearce, 1983). These studies argue that
executive directors, who have access to fuller information about their companies, are in a
better position than outside directors to make decisions about critical areas of operation and
performance.
On the other hand, the contrasting executive-dominated board is seen as a device for
management entrenchment; there have been calls for boards to have a “substantial majority”
of independent directors. Yet there are numerous anecdotes where apparently independent
2
boards have not prevented shareholder wealth destruction, (e.g. Enron had 15 so-called
“independent” directors on its 17-member board) (Paltrow, 2002; United States Senate,
2002).
Independence of non-executive directors
Proponents of board reform have long advocated non-executive director representation as a
means of increasing the independence and effectiveness of boards (Bacon and Brown, 1973;
Dayton, 1984; Waldo, 1985). However, defining “independence” and applying appropriate
criteria to selecting non-executive directors is a question of judgement. What one person
considers independent, the next person may not.
A UK survey (KPMG, 2002) of views on independence found that directors should not:
•
Represent a specific shareholder or other single interest group (96 per cent);
•
Participate in company share option or performance-related remuneration schemes (93
per cent);
•
Have conflicting or cross directorships (89 per cent); or
•
Have significant financial or personal ties to the company or its management which could
interfere with the director’s loyalty to shareholders (96 per cent).
Furthermore, far more respondents considered directors not to be independent where they had
been employees for more than five years (64 per cent). By contrast, only 25 per cent of
respondents considered directors to lose their independent status when they had served as a
director for more than five years.
Interlocking directorates
Several theories on the influence of interlocking directorates on corporate behaviour have
been proposed. Interlocking directorates may:
(i) be a mechanism for collusion and cooperation (e.g. Koenig et al., 1979; Burt 1983);
(ii) enable companies to control, or monitor others (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Mizruchi,
1982; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994); and
(iii) be a source of information on business practices (Useem, 1984; Davis, 1991;
Haunschild, 1993).
3
Despite the range of studies, research has produced contradictory results on the issue of
whether interlocking actually affects companies (Palmer et al., 1995; Fligstein, 1995). Some
research found positive effects of interlocking on company profits (e.g. Burt, 1983), while
others found negative effects (Fligstein and Brantley, 1992). Fligstein and Brantley argue that
interlocks do not influence a company’s strategic choices.
Because of Ireland’s small size and close-knit business community, it might be expected that
there is a strong, closely connected network. Possibly because of features of Ireland’s largest
250 companies (large number of foreign and private companies, only 14 per cent of sample
comprising plcs), networks of interlocking directorates were relatively sparse compared with
other countries (MacCanna et al., 1999).
Remuneration of non-executive directors
Recent research indicates that remuneration for outside directors has significantly increased,
largely due to the growth of stock-based compensation (Oppermann, 1997; Perry, 1999;
Schellhardt, 1999). Perry documented that, for firms with independent boards whose outside
directors receive stock options, the probability of CEO dismissal increases the more poorly
the firm performs.
Bryan et al. (2000) studied the relationship between a set of company characteristics and
outside director compensation, and concluded that outside board members are paid
increasingly in a manner to mitigate agency problems (i.e. are paid increasingly in the form
of shares and share options, and less in cash). They concluded that outside board
compensation packages are designed largely around agency-cost reduction, arising from
management oversight and control that is separate from ownership.
Independence of boards of directors – sub-committees
Many companies have adopted the monitoring sub-committee structure, which allows for a
more detailed involvement of the non-executive directors in representing the interests of the
shareholders. Klein’s (1998) research on board committee structures states that independent
4
directors can only perform the monitoring function if they are embedded in the appropriate
committee structure. However, both a US study (Klein, 1998) and a UK study (Vafeas and
Theodorou, 1998) concluded that board subcommittee structures had no effect on corporate
performance.
Nomination committees bring an objective approach to director selection (Bostock, 1995),
and its presence signals to the market the company’s attitude to board independence.
One of the doubts relating to the Cadbury Report (1992) was the assumption that the
objectivity of the remuneration committee would control excessive executive pay. These
doubts were reinforced by empirical research which showed that chief executives receive
higher pay in firms which operate a remuneration committee, and not the reverse (Main and
Johnston, 1993).
Paragraph D3.1 of the 1988 Combined Code states that the audit committee should have “at
least three directors, all non-executive, with written terms of reference . . .” and “The
members of the committee...should be named in the report and accounts”. Business and
academic press have persistently focused on audit committee composition as an important
determinant of quality financial reporting (Vicknair et al., 1993), and there is widespread
agreement that audit committees should consist of independent directors to oversee the
financial reporting process (Beasley, 1996). However, even independent audit committees do
not always function as desired. As revealed in the case of Elan (see Pierce (2003) for a discussion of this case) and Allied Irish Banks plc (see McNee (2002) for a discussion of this
case), the existence of a properly constituted audit committee did not guarantee that nonexecutive directors would identify/act on either internal control weaknesses or unusual
accounting policies. As observed with Enron’s audit committee, there was little incentive to
perform their oversight responsibilities. Three of the six committee members lived outside
the country, and the remaining three members received financial payments from Enron, suggesting their independence from management was limited. The audit committee chairman
had held the position for 15 years, suggesting his independence could have been sacrificed by
his long involvement with Enron.
5
Research questions and methodology
The objective of the research is to assess the extent of the independence of boards of directors
of companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange in the impartial undertaking of their
responsibilities. The research reviews independence from two perspectives:
(i) the first part examines the independence of boards of directors and board subcommittees
by analysing board compositions as disclosed in the annual reports;
(ii) the second part examines the independence of individual non-executive directors by
analysing disclosures in the annual reports, and applying specific determinants generally
regarded as prerequisites for an independent director.
Nine research questions are examined:
Independence of boards
1. What is the proportion of non-executive directors to executive directors on Irish plc
boards?
Independence of individual directors
2. How many non-executive directors have previously held executive roles in the company?
3. How many non-executive directors have previously had relationships with the external
auditors of the company?
4. How many non-executive directors have previously had business relationships with the
company?
5. How many immediate family connections are there between non-executive directors and
management? A “family association” includes a director’s spouse, parents, children,
mothers-and fathers-in-law, sons- and daughters-in-law, brothers- and sisters-in-law.
6. How many non-executive directors have held their positions for more than nine years?
7. How many non-executive directors serve on boards of other companies with common nonexecutive directors?
8. How much are non-executive directors paid by way of fees?
6
Independence of board sub-committees
9. To what extent have companies established audit, remuneration and nomination committees in accordance with recommended best practice of the 1998 Combined Code?
Population and sample
The population consists of all 81 companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange on 17 July
2002 (70 fully listed, 11 listed on the Exploration Securities Market/Developing Companies
Market). One company had to be excluded from the research due to difficulty in obtaining a
copy of the company’s annual report, leaving a sample of 80 plcs.
Data collection
Information was collected from the published annual reports. Of the 80 annual reports
included in the study, 68 related to fiscal year 2001, three related to year 2002 and nine
related to year 2000 (details are available from the authors on request). There were no relevant changes in corporate governance regulations, nor were there any other notable
differences between the years (although it could be argued that the Enron scandal which
came to light in late 2001 may have had some impact on the three 2002 annual reports).
Results
Independence of boards of directors
Table 1 shows that of the 749 directors’ biographies studied, 460 (61 per cent) were nonexecutive directors and 289 (39 per cent) were executive directors.
7
Table 1: Analysis of board of directors – by percent of non-executive directors
Non-executive directors (%)
91–100
81–90
71–80
61 –70
51–60
33 –50
Less than 33
Average
Total
No.
Average number
Average
Companies
of executive
number of
directors
non-executive
directors
4
0.8
12.8
3
2.0
10.3
14
2.2
7.1
13
3.7
7.1
14
3.9
5.4
30
4.6
3.6
2
4.5
1.5
3.6
5.8
80
289 (39%)
460 (61%)
Total
13.5
12.3
9.3
10.8
9.4
8.2
6.0
9.4
749 (100%)
Board size was an average 9.4 directors, of which 5.8 were non-executives. The Higgs Report
was published in January 2003 after the research in this paper was conducted. It recommends
(A3.5) that at least half the board (excluding the chairman) should comprise independent
non-executive directors. Although first indications suggested that Irish listed companies were
weighted towards majority-independent boards, further analysis showed 32 (40 per cent)
companies did not have majority-independent boards. Two companies failed to reach the
Combined Code recommendation of having a one-third quota of non-executive directors,
while five companies had exactly the one-third quota. At the other extreme, seven boards had
greater than 80 per cent non-executive director representation, of which, surprisingly, none
were financial institutions. Four boards had supermajority independent boards, i.e. only one
executive director with all remaining directors being non-executive.
The Higgs Report recommends (A3.1) that boards should not be so large as to become
unwieldy, but that they should be of sufficient size in relation to having available the appropriate balance of boardroom skills and experience. Average board size of 9.4 directors ranged
from 26 directors down to three. Non-executive directors ranged from 24 to one, with an
average of 5.8 non-executive directors. Of the five largest boards, three were former cooperatives. Five boards did not have the recommended minimum quota of three nonexecutive directors, while 55 (69 per cent) boards had between three and six non-executive
directors (Table 2).
8
Table 2: Analysis of board of directors – by number of non-executive directors
No. of non-executive
directors
More than 12
11–12
9 –10
7–8
5 –6
3–4
1–2
Total
No.
Companies
4
6
6
4
21
34
5
80
Average
number of
executive
directors
5.0
3.0
4.3
4.3
3.6
3.4
3.4
3.6
Average
number of nonexecutive
directors
17.3
11.3
9.5
7.3
5.4
3.4
1.6
5.8
Total
22.3
14.3
13.8
11.5
9.0
6.8
5.0
9.4
Independence of non-executive directors
The Cadbury Report (1992) recommends that boards should include high-calibre directors.
Although the Stock Exchange listing rules/yellow book requires biographical information on
non-executive directors to be disclosed in annual reports (that requirement was dropped in
1999), biographical information on directors was provided by all 80 companies, varying from
very basic to providing much seemingly unwarranted information. For example, Rapid
Technology Group plc say of one of its directors that he “has extensive commercial
experience and is a director of a number of companies in the computer software industry and
other areas of Irish business” and of another that he “brings sales, service and operational
experience to the board. He is a non-executive director of three other early stage software
companies”. Barlo Group plc describes all of its non-executive directors as being “a director
of a number of other companies”.
Non-executive directors with former executive responsibility
The Higgs Report suggests that a non-executive is not independent if s/he is a former
employee or had any other material connection within the previous five years. Table 3
identifies 41 (9 per cent) non-executive directors as former executives of the company. Three
non-executive directors had retired more than five years, 27 had retired within five years and
the retirement period for 11 former executives could not be ascertained due to insufficient
information.
9
Table 3: Analysis of non-executive directors with former
executive responsibility
No. Directors
419 (91%)
No former executive responsibility
Former executive responsibility:
- retired more than five years
- retired within five years
- insufficient disclosure
Total
3
27
11
(9%)
41
460 (100%)
Non-executive directors with auditor associations
The Higgs Report recommends (A3.4) that a person is not an independent director if s/he has
(within the last three years) a material business relationship with the company either directly,
or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship
with the company. This would include company external auditors. Four non-executive
directors were identified as being former employees of the external auditors, and all four
directors were members of their audit committees. The role of the audit committee is to
ensure that an appropriate relationship exists between auditors and management, and as the
annual reports did not indicate the time lapsed since employment was terminated with the
audit firm, independence of these non-executive directors could not be determined.
Non-executive directors with business associations
Most companies provided details of solicitor and stockbroking firms retained by the company. This disclosure is not comprehensive and the research could only be completed to the
extent of the information provided. For example, some stockbroking firms were known to
have non-executive representation on the plc boards, yet the annual reports did not disclose
the company’s stockbroking affiliations (although it is accepted that this information could
have been obtained from other sources). The research identified a number of boards where
non-executive directors were current or former employees of solicitor and stockbroking firms
or other businesses associated with the company. The annual reports did not indicate the time
lapsed since the four non-executive directors terminated employment with their former
business.
10
Non-executive directors with family associations
A person who has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior
employees does not qualify as an independent director under the Higgs Recommendations
(A3.4). A total of 11 non-executive directors representing six boards were identified as
having immediate family associations with executive director(s) of the company.
Non-executive directors with more than nine years of service
The Higgs Report (A7.3) recommends that non-executive directors serving nine years or
more should be subject to annual re-election. For purposes of measuring independence of
non-executive directors, this study has adopted this recommendation and considers board
service beyond nine years (i.e. three ¥ three-year terms) as an encumbrance to independence.
Of the 460 non-executive directors, Table 4 shows that 64 (14 per cent) were identified as
serving for periods longer than nine years, with one company accounting for the largest share
with eight long-serving directors on its board. Service periods of 123 (27 per cent) nonexecutive directors could not be determined due to insufficient disclosure.
Table 4: Analysis of non-executive directors – years service
Years of service
Up to 9
10–15
16–20
21–25
26 +
Insufficient disclosure
Total
No. Directors
(59%)
273
39
8
8
9
64
123
460
(14%)
(27%)
(100%)
Interlocking directorates
With Ireland’s small and close-knit business community, networking is often considered
necessary for career advancement. However, comparison with other countries shows a comparatively lower occurrence of multiple directorships (MacCanna et al., 1999). Interlocking
of directorships was not as frequent as might be expected, probably due to the composition of
Ireland’s top 250 companies including semi-state companies (with political appointments)
11
and multinationals (with directors who would be less integrated into Irish business networks).
Recommendation A3.4 of the Higgs Report refers to cross-directorships or significant links
with other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies as impeding
independence. The analysis highlighted only six situations of interlocking directorates of
various degrees.
Fees for non-executive director services
The Cadbury Report (1992) recommends (4.13) that in order to safeguard their independence,
non-executive directors should not participate in share option schemes, and their service as
non-executive directors should not be pensionable by the company. The Higgs Report states
(B1.7) that remuneration in share options should be avoided for non-executive directors.
Most companies comply with these recommendations. A few companies grant share options
to non-executive directors, but this is the exception rather than the rule.
Fees varied according to company size, rank of non-executive chairman, non-executive
deputy chairman and non-executive director, and additional fees were also paid for board
sub-committee duties. Generally, financial institutions and companies with larger boards
made up the bulk of the above-average paying Irish-listed companies. Six companies did not
disclose individual director’s remuneration, opting only to disclose total amounts.
Most non-executive directors received fees for their board service. A number of nonexecutive directors only received a small fee/no fee due to having served on the board for
only a portion of the year. Of the 14 non-executive directors who received fees (i.e. excluding
other remuneration) in excess of €100,000, six were with UK-registered companies and five
were chairmen of Irish financial institutions.
The Cadbury Report (1992) stated that non-executive director fees should “recognise their
contribution without undermining their independence”. Table 5 shows that of the 57 directors
1
who received fees above €50,000, 32 were with Irish-registered companies, while five of the
six highest paid Irish non-executives were chairmen of financial institutions. The Higgs
Report (2003, p. 56) states that the average remuneration of a FTSE-100 non-executive
12
director is £44,000 p.a., and for FTSE-350 non-executives it amounts to £23,000.
Appropriateness of fee levels is subjective but, on average, fees paid by Irish plcs to nonexecutives appear to be comparatively lower than their UK equivalent. This may be partly
due to the lower size of plcs in Ireland compared with the UK. As recommended by the
Cadbury Report (1992), most companies excluded non-executive directors from share option
schemes and company pensions.
Table 5: Analysis of companies – non-executive directors’ fees
Average fees per company
More than €70,000
60,001–70,000
50,001–60,000
40,001–50,000
30,001–40,000
20,001–30,000
Up to €20,000
Insufficient disclosure
Total
No.
Companies Average fees per director
3
More than €250,000
1
100,001–250,000
4
50,001 – 100,000
10
25,001 – 50,000
12
Up to €25,000
18
26
6
Insufficient disclosure
80
Total
No.
Companies
4
10
43
161
222
20
460
The Higgs Report recommends (A4.8) that no individual should chair the board of more than
one major (FTSE-100) company. Non-executive directors should undertake that they have
sufficient time for the position, taking account of their other commitments. In this context, a
total of 37 non-executive directors hold directorships with two or more Irish plcs, with three
non-executive directors each holding four directorships with total fees of €189,000, €156,000
and €220,000, respectively.
In addition to board fees, 71 non-executive directors also received fees for consulting and
other services. Table 6 shows that 11 directors received payments greater than €100,000 for
13
additional services provided by the individual to the company, of which seven were associated with two companies.
Table 6: Analysis of non-executive directors’ other
remuneration
No. Directors
2
9
5
5
50
71
More than €250,000
100,001 – 250,000
50,001 – 100,000
25,001 – 50,000
Up to €25,000
Total
Independence of boards of directors – sub-committees
Of the 80 sample companies, Table 7 shows that 41 (51 per cent) had separate audit, remuneration and nomination committees. A further 21 (26 per cent) companies had audit
and additional services provided by the individual to the company, of which seven were
associated with two companies.
Table 7: Analysis of board sub-committees
Audit
Remuneration
Nomination
No. companies
Committee
Committee
Committee
41
C
C
C
21
C
C
NC
1
C
PC
C
1
C
PC
NC
1
C
NC
NC
4
PC
C
C
3
PC
C
NC
2
PC
PC
NC
1
NC
C
C
1
NC
C
NC
1
NC
PC
NC
3
NC
NC
NC
Total = 80
C=Full compliance
PC=Part compliance (i.e. less than requisite committee members or includes
executive director).
NC= No committee
14
Independence of boards of directors – sub-committees
Of the 80 sample companies, Table 7 shows that 41 (51 per cent) had separate audit, remuneration and nomination committees. A further 21 (26 per cent) companies had audit and
remuneration committees, but did not have a separate nomination committee for reasons
varying from board size to believing that the entire board of directors was a more appropriate
forum to nominate and ratify appointments. Finally, although a number of companies did not
have a nomination/remuneration/audit committee, there were three companies which did not
have any of these sub-committees.
Nomination committee
The Combined Code advocates that, unless a board is small, a nomination committee should
be established, and leaves the definition of a “small board” open to interpretation. Thirtythree (41 per cent) companies elected not to establish a separate committee, which included
significantly capitalised companies, stating their preference for the board as a whole to
function as the nomination committee.
Remuneration committee
Four companies had no remuneration committee, while five companies had executive director
involvement on the committee. In a number of cases the function of both the remuneration
and nomination committees was rolled into one.
Audit committee
Six companies had no separate audit committee, and referred such audit duties to the full
board of directors. Five companies had executive director involvement on the audit committee, while five companies were unable to meet the quota due to having less than three nonexecutive directors on the board.
Independence of non-executive directors
The level of biographical disclosure to assess director’s independence varied from providing
inadequate to providing unwarranted information. In addition, insufficient disclosure was
another concern. Tables 3, 4 and 5 have already shown incidences of insufficient disclosure,
15
which are summarised in Table 8. Table 8 also shows other incidences where insufficient
disclosure was found of prior auditor/business relationships not disclosed in the annual report
but known (mainly from the financial press) to exist. The insufficiency of data does not
permit a full assessment of independence, and the study could only be completed to the
extent of information provided. It is difficult to systematically assess the extent to which data
were not disclosed that should have been disclosed by companies, without having in-depth
knowledge of the 80 firms in the research. However, a total of 162 instances of insufficient
disclosure were found. The analysis also shows the number of insufficient disclosures per
company. There were 19 companies (24 per cent of the sample) that had more than three
insufficient disclosures per company. There were 127 insufficient disclosures in respect of
these 19 companies, i.e., nearly seven per company. These 19 companies are so inadequate in
their disclosures that it begs a question about the value of a non-mandatory Code.
Table 8: Companies with insufficient disclosures
No. insufficient
disclosures
More than 3
3 insufficient
disclosures
2 insufficient
disclosures
1 insufficient
disclosures
Zero
Total
No.
companies
Former
executive
responsibility
Auditor
association
Business
association/
affiliation
Years of
board service
Number of insufficient disclosures
1
1
102
1
1
12
NED
fees
14
6
Total
19
7
9
1
4
1
1
1
5
8
6
-
1
1
4
6
44
80
11
4
4
123
20
127
21
162
In some cases, the biographical information clearly revealed circumstances which would
conflict with conditions for independence currently being recommended by the Higgs Report.
These were discussed earlier in the context of Tables 3 and 4. All such cases are brought
together in Table 9 to show the extent to which companies at the time of the research were
not observing one or more of the Higgs Report recommendations on independence. For the
80 companies in the sample, a total of 115 instances of non-observance were found. There
were seven companies with more than three breaches each, totalling 48 breaches (i.e. nearly
16
seven breaches per company). Again this begs the question: how proactive is the Irish Stock
Exchange in ensuring high standards of compliance with its Combined Code? Is it to the
advantage of the market that the comply-or-explain aspects of the voluntary combined code
operate in the absence of any regulatory oversight? Is the Irish Stock Exchange more tolerant
of breaches of the Combined Code than, for example, its near neighbour the London Stock
Exchange?
Table 9: Companies not meeting Higgs’ independence standards
No. nonobservations
More than 3
3 insufficient
disclosures
2 insufficient
disclosures
1 insufficient
disclosures
Zero
Total
No.
companies
Former
executive
responsibility
Business
association/
affiliation
Family
associati0ns
Number of non-observations
8
6
2
-
7
6
6
4
13
7
-
23
10
31
80
27
Board service
> 9 years
Total
28
12
48
18
3
16
26
3
2
8
23
13
11
64
115
Summary and conclusions
The topic of independence has been widely discussed and debated in recent times, yet there
has never been agreement on what constitutes an independent director. This paper examines
the issue of independence of boards of directors and non-executive directors of companies
listed on the Irish Stock Exchange and refers to the recommendations made in the Higgs
Report in the UK.
The study finds that only 48 (60 per cent) companies had majority-independent boards. Board
size at 9.4 directors is below the UK average of between 12 and 13 members (Conyon, 1994;
Bostock, 1995). This trend extends to the monitoring sub-committees where only 41 (51 per
cent) companies complied with the recommendations for separate audit, remuneration and
nomination committees. The Cadbury Report (1992) refers to the audit function and its
objectivity and effectiveness as the cornerstone of corporate governance, yet only 65 (81 per
17
cent) companies consider it appropriate to establish a separate audit committee, suggesting
anecdotal evidence that some Irish companies pay only “lip service” to the recommendations.
Non-availability of information was a serious drawback to the research. In total, 162
instances of insufficient disclosure were found, with 19 (24 per cent) companies contributing
127 (78 per cent) of the non-disclosures.
Results indicate that Irish plcs have a long way to go to fully comply with the Higgs
recommendations on independence of non-executive directors. Only 31 (38 per cent)
companies had full Higgs-independent boards. The remaining 49 companies did not meet the
Higgs definitions of independence 115 times. Of these, there were seven problem companies
that did not meet the Higgs independence standards 48 times (i.e. almost seven times per
company). Thus, there is a lack of agreement as to what constitutes an independent director.
The definition of an independent director requires clarification to prevent misinterpretation.
The Higgs Report (2003) is a welcome move in this direction.
Implications for policymakers
The lack of compliance by some companies with some of the provisions of the Combined
Code highlights the limitations of using non-mandatory codes. It is likely that problem
companies, most in need of following best practice, are least likely to adopt non-mandatory
provisions.
There is a need for greater consistency in information being disclosed in the annual reports.
This does not infer that more information is required, but rather specific information on both
executive and non-executive directors should be made explicit to prevent ambiguity.
Limitations of the research
Several limitations of the study should be acknowledged.
•
The sample comprising Irish listed companies contains a very diverse group of
companies and it is questionable whether they should be treated on an equal basis. Firms
vary considerably, notably in terms of size/market capitalisation. In reality a small
18
number of companies comprise approximately 70–80 per cent of market capitalisation.
•
The comprehensiveness of information provided in the annual report may be
questionable. Companies may be reluctant voluntarily to divulge proprietary information.
However, without specific disclosure requirements, the annual report may remain an
interesting rather than an influential document.
•
This study concurs with the popular press that business or personal associations can
impede board independence. Conversely, other studies (Westphal, 1999) suggest that in
fact board effectiveness, and ultimately firm performance, can be enhanced by close
relationships with management. Thus, rather than dividing directors into insiders and
outsiders, a company can benefit by using team development techniques to develop a
cohesive and effective board.
As regulators look to strengthen the role and responsibility of the independent director in
overseeing and policing the conduct and behaviour of management, perhaps it is the rationale
behind the behaviour that needs to be better understood. Principles and codes of corporate
practice influence the behaviour of boards of directors, but it was investors’ relentless desire
for double-digit earnings growth that had the greater influence on their behaviour. As the
level of interest in honesty, transparency and corporate governance rises in proportion to the
number of corporate disasters, so too must the markets and investment community come to
admire these same qualities.
Note
1. The Euro/sterling exchange rate between August 2001 and March 2002 (period of many
annual reports) ranged from €1 = £1.55 to 1.64. Thus, €50,000 is equivalent to
approximately £30,000/£32,000.
19
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Niamh Brennan is Academic Director of the Institute of Directors Centre for Corporate
Governance at University College Dublin (www.corporategovernance.ie).
Michael McDermott is Director of Finance, Digital Hub Development Agency and an MBA
graduate of University College Dublin.
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