Power: a Radical View, by Steven Lukes

Book Review Power: a Radical View ('Second Edition), by Steven Lukes. London: Palgrave, 2005. ISBN: 0-333-42092-6. Reviewed by Laurence Piper In 1974 Steven Lukes published Power: a Radical View (PRV). This brief but potent exploration of the concept of power was intended to be both theoretically sophisticated and empirically useful. In part, PRV was an attempt to expand the concept of power beyond the stunted version deployed by American 'pluralists' like Robert Dahl. In the spirit of'elite' theorists like C. Wright Mills, the rivals of the pluralists, Lukes advances the idea that power is not always public, but 'at its most effective when least observable'(l). This move opens the possibility that there is more to power relations than visible conflict between the opposing wants of different people. Indeed, Bachrach and Baratz hold that power is also exercised through agenda-setting where the powerful depend on the ignorance of rivals to avoid open conflict. To this 'second dimension' of power Lukes added a more radical 'third dimension': that power relations may exist where neither party is fully aware of the benefits or losses to their interests caused by their relationship. Thus Lukes famously states: 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests' (30). Lukes's account of power eschews any necessary connection between power and conflict, indeed between power and conscious intention. In so doing it opens the possibility of thinking about power as a system in which agents play out roles, the full effects of which they may not comprehend. Clearly such a conception of power is deeply attractive to many Marxist, feminist, indeed even nationalist, accounts of power relations faced with the problem of the compliance of the oppressed to domination. Of course as Tilley (1991) points out, there are many, less radical, and probably more common, reasons why domination persists, including covert rebellion, the multiple and contradictory interests of the subordinate, sufficient reward from the system, and the high costs of resistance. What Lukes helps with are forms of domination sustained by Theoria, December 2005 Book Review 119 ignorance and mystification; by some systematic miscomprehension ofthe way the world works. For the 'elite' theorist of American politics PRV provides a conceptual basis to critique the methodology of pluralist rivals. By reducing politics to incidents of observable conflict pluralists exclude deeper forms of power that might sustain elite rule. In addition, and more impressively, Lukes is able to offer a conception of power that accommodates liberal, reformist and radical theories of American politics. Thus for the liberal, interests are reducible to preferences, for the reformist they are reformulated as grievances, and for the radical they are simply interests, whether understood as 'objective', as capacities, as needs, or in other ways. That one conception of power can be consistent with so many various and conflicting theories is nothing less than awe-inspiring. If utility is any measure of conceptual importance, and it seems clear that it must be, then Lukes's conception of power is without peer. This much and more is confirmed by the second edition of PRV (PRV2). Written some 30 years later, PRV2 includes PRV, two new chapters and a fresh introduction. In addition to its length, PRV2 stands apart from most second editions in the extent of its revision. In some respects the book bears the mark of a mind perhaps no more brilliant than in the 1970s, but certainly more schooled in academic convention. Much of PRV 2 is about contextualising Luke's arguments in relation to other writers in the field, including Peter Morriss, Anthony Kenny, Peter Digesser and Michel Foucault. This contextualisation is extremely useful, especially for those new to these debates. However, it also reveals a marked lack of work in Lukesian vein. This raises a poignant question: if Lukes's conception of power is so brilliant then why is it so little used? One possible answer is that Lukes's insights into power came at the moment of the decline of 'radical' analysis and the beginnings of postmodernism. Hence, it is not for nothing that Lukes spends much of PRV2 deconstructing the various versions of power deployed by Foucault, reducing them to formulations either banal or useless. More on this below. For now, I would surmise that, although Lukes's work in PRV was dazzling, his timing was unfortunate. In addition to circling at dusk, the owl of Minerva also flew at a false dawn. In addition to adding context, PRV2 substantially refines the core argument of PRV In this respect Lukes makes three key moves. First he acknowledges that PRV, and for that matter PRV2, are about power over others, more especially power as domination. Lukes notes that 120 Book Review there is more to power than domination, and that power 'over others' can, at times, be a positive phenomenon. Thus in chapter two Lukes advances a revised definition of power in social life as the ability of actors 'to bring about significant effects' by 'furthering their own interests and/or affecting the interests of others, whether positively or negatively'(65). This is an insight that is both long overdue and widely held. In affirming the positive moment to 'power over' Lukes compensates for a glaring omission in PRV — an omission which probably cost him disciples of the kind that flocked to Foucault. Lukes's second move involves the recognition that 'power over' whether positive or negative, is social power, and as such, a sub-set of power more widely conceived. In making this distinction Lukes explicitly follows Spinoza's differentiation between potestas and potentia. Potestas is equivalent to social power, referring to 'being in the power of another' (73). Potentia signifies the power of things in the natural world, but also of humans 'to exist and act'. In hnef,potestas amounts to 'power over' whereas potentia amounts to 'power to', and the former is thus a sub-set of the latter. For the rest of PRV2 Lukes unpacks the concept of domination, understood as one type of potestas. He leaves the notion of potentia largely unexplored, embracing a version of John Locke's definition of power as 'being able to make or to receive any change, or to resist it' (ibid). This, Lukes continues, implies that power is better understood as a 'dispositional' concept: it is a capacity. One thing that strikes me about this line of reasoning is that while the general definition of power is commonsensical, it is of limited utility by itself Until the meaning of action is unpacked in relevant contexts, the concept remains of little analytical use. Thus Aristotle talks of the difference between natural powers, like the power of fire to burn wood, and powers which can be exercised at will, such as choosing not to vote. Kenny adds that there are also human powers which are 'passive' such as someone speaking a language I understand — it is simply not in my power not to understand it. The point here is that the meaning of 'power as acting' needs explication, in these cases in respect of both the natural and social worlds, and in respect of intentionality. The parent concept needs contextual children. Lukes's third main move in PRV2 is to defend his conception of power as domination against rival views. Key here is Foucault's work, especially given his reputation for unpacking the mechanisms of compliance. Lukes argues that Foucault's conception of power follows two distinct paths. The first path, evident in earlier works such as Book Review 121 Discipline and Punish and the History of Sexuality, paints a picture of power as all-pervasive, as repressive and productive, to the extent of constituting the very self-understanding of subjects. This conception of power leaves no room for agency; it effectively resembles a 'structuralist commitment to determinism' (95). For Lukes, Foucault's subsequent writings on governmentality strike a more voluntaristic note. Governmentality refers to rationalities of rule: styles of reasoning embodied in governing practices; conceptions of the person they seek to inculcate; techniques individuals employ to induce virtuous habits and fashion their characters; and lastly, the ways in which these elements are aligned with one another. Notably Foucault sees these as applying to 'individuals in their liberty', with the subject constituting the self in active fashion by the practices of the self (97). With this answer Lukes sees the ultra-radicalism of Foucault dissolving into sociological commonplace: individuals are socialized into roles and practices that are socially given, the internalize them and experience them as freely chosen, indeed their freedom may be the fruit of regulation — the outcome of discipline and controls. Having argued that Foucault's conceptions of power reduce to either an ultra-radical denial of agency or an obscure restatement of received opinion, Lukes proceeds to explore the theoretical implications of domination in respect of the related issues of freedom and interests. This discussion deepens some of the already impressive argument of PRV by meshing Lukes conception of domination with a variety of theories. In respect of freedom Lukes considers constructions from 'negative liberty' to the Aristotelian idea of phronesis. In respect of interests, he undertakes a brilliant survey that includes the capabilities approach of Nussbaum and Sen, identity issues and Taylor's recognitional domination. To my mind this discussion redeems the utility of Lukes's account in engaging the many issues and themes made fashionable by Foucauldians and postmodernists whilst retaining a far too rare conceptual coherence. Lukes describes his account of power as 'essentially contested' because of its theoretical plurality, implying it might be a weakness. It is in fact Lukes's greatest strength. The first edition of Power: a Radical View was a small masterpiece. The second edition greatly improves it. Dr Laurence Piper is senior lecturer in the School of Politics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg. A graduate of Cambridge University with a PhD in Zulu nationalism, he has published 122 Book Review on nationalism, the IFP and KwaZulu-Natal politics. More recent research interests concern elections, participation and democracy, especially in South Africa. Email: piper@ukzn.ac.za REFERENCE Tilley, C. 1991. 'Domination, Resistance, Compliance and Discourse', Sociological Forum, 6(3): 593-602.