Essays in Philosophy
Volume 17
Issue 1 he Beautiful and the Good
Article 2
2-12-2016
How to Be a Moral Taste heorist
John McAteer
Ashford University
Follow this and additional works at: htp://commons.paciicu.edu/eip
Recommended Citation
McAteer, John (2016) "How to Be a Moral Taste heorist," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 2. htp://dx.doi.org/10.7710/
1526-0569.1541
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Paciic University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | htp://commons.paciicu.edu/eip/
How to Be a Moral Taste
Theorist
John McAteer
Ashford University
Abstract
In this paper, I attempt to recover an 18th Century approach to
moral theory that can be called Moral Taste Theory. Through
an exploration of 18th Century sources I define the
characteristics of moral taste theory and to distinguish it from
its closest rival, moral sense theory. In general a moral taste
theorist holds that moral judgments are analogous to aesthetic
judgments while a moral sense theorist holds that moral
judgments are analogous to physical sense perception. Francis
Hutcheson was a paradigmatic moral sense theorist, but I
argue that David Hume is best understood as a moral taste
theorist. If we do not understand the concept of moral taste,
we cannot understand 18th Century moral philosophy, and,
more importantly, we will miss out on an important source of
inspiration for 21st Century moral philosophy.
Essays Philos (2016)17:5-21 | DOI: 10.7710/1526-0569.1541
Published online: 12 February 2016. © John McAteer 2016
Contact author: filmphilosopher@gmail.com
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INTRODUCTION
n the 20th Century, David Hume’s moral theory was
variously been interpreted as noncognitivism, quasirealism, and even common sense realism. It is perhaps
more faithful to Hume’s own thought to categorize him as a
moral taste theorist. Yet 21st Century moral theory has no
such category. In this paper, I attempt to define the
characteristics of moral taste theory and to distinguish it
from its closest rival, moral sense theory. In the process, we
will not only understand the 18th Century British Moralists
a bit better, we will also see what the concept of taste has to
add to any discussion of morality.
I
To understand what moral taste theory is about, we begin
with Hume himself. Hume opens his most mature work of
moral philosophy, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles
of Morals, i by addressing himself to the 18th Century
debate between rationalism and sentimentalism: “There
has been a controversy started of late much better worth
examination, concerning the general foundation of morals;
whether they be derived from reason, or from sentiment”
(EPM 1.3). This debate, Hume says, is about whether we
can “attain the knowledge of” moral distinctions “by a
chain of argument and induction” or whether we must
experience “an immediate feeling and finer internal sense”
(ibid). As Hume characterizes it, what is at issue here is
whether moral distinctions are logically necessary and
hence “the same to every rational intelligent being” or
whether they are logically contingent because “founded
entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the
human species” (ibid). In the 20th Century historians
called the former group moral rationalists and the latter
group moral sentimentalists.
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Hume admits that he finds both sides “plausible” (EPM
1.9). Both sides capture an essential element of the
phenomenology of moral judgment. Rationalists point out
that moral judgments are, in 20th Century terms, cognitive:
moral judgments make claims about “what exists in the
nature of things” (EPM 1.5), claims that might be either
true or false. Sentimentalists, on the other hand, point out
that moral judgments are affective and conative: they are
matters of feeling and desire. Rationalists argue that if
morality were grounded only on “the standard of
sentiment” then, like other sentiments such as judgments of
beauty, morality would be noncognitive, merely a matter of
“taste” and hence not susceptible to the kind of rational
argument to which we standardly submit moral claims.
“Truth is disputable; not taste”, claims the rationalist
(ibid.). Sentimentalists reply that if morality were
discovered by “the cool assent of the understanding” (EPM
1.7), then morality would be nonconative, incapable of
moving us to action and unable “to regulate our lives and
actions” (EPM 1.8) as we expect it to. Hume concludes that
both sides seem correct: moral judgments seem both
cognitive and conative. Moral judgments are motives to
action while simultaneously being capable of rational
dispute. Hume says: “I am apt to suspect, they may, the one
as well as the other, be solid and satisfactory, and that
reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral
determinations and conclusions” (EPM 1.9).
Hume argues that since moral judgment “renders morality
an active principle” (i.e., moral judgment moves us to
action), then “it is probable” that “the final sentence” of
moral deliberation is grounded in sentiment (ibid.). But
that’s not the whole story.
It is probable, I say, that this final sentence
depends on some internal sense or feeling,
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How to Be a Moral Taste Theorist | McAteer
which nature has made universal in the
whole species. For what else can have an
influence of this nature? But in order to pave
the way for such a sentiment, and give a
proper discernment of its object, it is often
necessary, we find, that much reasoning
should precede, that nice distinctions be
made, just conclusions drawn, distant
comparisons formed, complicated relations
examined, and general facts fixed and
ascertained. (ibid.)
Only passion and sentiment can move us to action, but we
still need reason to help direct our sentiments toward the
right objects. This point suggests to Hume an analogy with
aesthetic judgment: He says that “some species of beauty”
are indeed indisputable as the rationalists say.
Some species of beauty, especially the
natural kinds, on their first appearance,
command our affection and approbation;
and where they fail of this effect, it is
impossible for any reasoning to redress their
influence, or adapt them better to our taste
and sentiment. (ibid.)
If someone disagrees with you about whether a particular tree
or sunset is beautiful, it is hard to know what to say to them
that could change their judgment. But not all beauty is beyond
dispute in this way: “But in many orders of beauty,
particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ
much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a
false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and
reflection” (ibid.). When it comes to art, there is a difference
between good taste and bad taste, and rational discussion is
capable of moving us from the latter to the former. And this is
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Essays in Philosophy 17(1)
the way moral judgment seems to work, too: “There are just
grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this
latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual
faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human
mind” (ibid.). Therefore the sentimentalists are right that
action requires passion, but the rationalists are also right that
moral judgment is disputable.
Here the aesthetic concept of taste has allowed Hume to
bridge the gap between reason and sentiment by showing
how both are necessary. The “perception of beauty and
deformity” is clearly based on our embodied human
“constitution” (EPM 1.3). But we are not slaves to the
whims of sentiment. Our taste in art can be educated—
“corrected by argument and reflection” until our taste is no
longer “false” but has “a proper discernment of its object”
(EPM 1.9). Hume concludes that morality works the same
way such that moral goodness should be conceived as
moral beauty and moral judgment should be conceived as
moral taste.
As a predecessor of his view that moral judgment is
analogous to aesthetic judgment, Hume points to “the
elegant Lord Shaftesbury” who, Hume says “adhered to the
principles of the ancients” in seeing “morals as deriving
their existence from taste and sentiment” (EPM 1.4).
Sometimes Shaftesbury and Hume, along with Francis
Hutcheson, are said to be part of a philosophical tradition
called “moral sense theory”. ii I argue that this grouping is
misleading. The term “moral sense theory” as applied to a
tradition of moral epistemology whose main members are
supposed to be Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume seems
to be due primarily to the influence of D.D. Raphael. iii This
is not to say that Raphael invented the term “moral sense”,
but that he encouraged the use of that term to refer to a
particular epistemological theory—a unified tradition or
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philosophical school. This usage, I argue, obscures
fundamental differences between Hutcheson on the one
hand and Shaftesbury and Hume on the other. The latter
two thinkers are better thought of as moral taste theorists;
only Hutcheson was a moral sense theorist. In general a
moral taste theorist holds that moral judgments are
analogous to aesthetic judgments in that someone with
good moral taste has the acquired ability to discern and
appreciate morally relevant qualities through the skillful
use of perceptual and rational faculties. A moral sense
theorist, on the other hand, holds that moral judgments are
analogous to physical sense perception in that certain
information (viz., knowledge of the presence of moral
properties) enters the mind immediately when attention is
directed to the relevant objects.
Before Raphael, there was some precedent for talking about
“the moral sense theory”, iv but the more common term was
L.A. Selby-Bigge’s “sentimentalist school”. Selby-Bigge
does use the term “moral sense theory” in the introduction to
his anthology British Moralists, v but he limits its application
to Hutcheson, using the term “sentimental theory of the
moral faculty” (in contrast to “intellectual theory of the
moral faculty”) for the broader tradition. This is closer to the
way the terms were used in the 18th Century. Adam Smith is
one of the clearest thinkers on this point during the period.
Smith is careful to distinguish Hutcheson’s “moral sense”
theory which posits “a peculiar power of perception” from
the theory that virtue is “recommended to us … by some
other principle in human nature, such as a modification of
sympathy, or the like” (TMS VII.i.4, p. 266). He calls the
latter view “the theory of moral sentiments” and clearly has
in mind as paradigm proponents of this view not only
himself but also Hume, his contemporary and friend. vi While
Hume does use the term “moral sense” in the heading of
Treatise 3.1.2 “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral
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sense”, this is not his preferred term. vii He only uses that
term in one other place in the Treatise (T 3.3.1.25)—the
very same section in which he says moral judgment
“proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain
sentiments of pleasure and disgust” (T 3.3.1.15). By the time
he wrote the second Enquiry, Hume is careful to avoid the
misleading term “moral sense” altogether, using the more
accurate term “moral sentiment” (as, for example, in the title
to the first Appendix).
Both Stephen Darwall and Michael Gill have warned us
against the misleading nature of Selbe-Bigge’s sentimentalist/rationalist distinction. viii I suggest a similar
wariness with regard to Raphael’s blanket use of the term
“moral sense”. Writing after the advent of rational
intuitionism, Raphael wanted to reassess the concept of an
empirical faculty of moral sense with the agenda of
demonstrating the superiority of a non-empirical faculty
such as the one posited by intuitionists like G.E. Moore. In
The Moral Sense he takes the issue in moral epistemology
to be this: “When I judge that I ought to do a certain action,
do I make this judgment on the basis of knowing, or of
feeling, or of sensing something?” (p. 1). Later he makes
clear that he recognizes only two alternatives in moral
epistemology: “sense or feeling” on the one hand and
“reason or knowledge” on the other (p. 2). If my arguments
here are successful, then taste will emerge as a third
alternative alongside reason and sense—a via media, in
fact, to bridge the other two alternatives. In order to
account for both the cognitive and conative aspects of
moral judgment, there must be, as Hume puts it in the first
Appendix to An Enquiry Concerning the Principals of
Morals, “some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you
may please to call it, which [both] distinguishes moral good
and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other”
(EPM Appx 1.20, my emphasis).
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Since my distinction between moral taste theory and
moral sense theory is not a standard distinction in the
literature on the British Moralists, a few words of
clarification are in order. In general, moral sense theory is
the view that posits an innate faculty for detecting moral
properties. There are three essential features of moral
sense theory. ix First, the moral sense is a special faculty of
the mind, usually conceived of as distinct from reason. x
Second, the moral sense is instinctive. Just as all healthy
human beings are born with senses of sight, hearing, etc.,
so human beings are born with a fully functioning moral
sense. Far from being necessary, education generally hurts
our ability to make correct moral judgments. For example,
Hutcheson thinks that we would all naturally agree in our
moral judgments except that some of us have received bad
philosophical education thus corrupting our ability to
understand what our moral sense is telling us. xi Third, and
most importantly, the moral sense is cognitive and/or
affective, but not conative. Like our other senses, the
moral sense delivers information and feelings into the
mind. We may or may not then feel a desire to pursue or
avoid the object of our perception. But whether or not we
do feel such a desire, that desire is distinct from the
perception itself.
Moral taste theory is the view that moral judgments are
analogous to aesthetic judgments in that someone with
good taste has the acquired skill of discerning and
appreciating certain qualities. Hence to speak of moral taste
is to imply the existence of moral beauty. Moral sense
theory, on the other hand, may, but need not, involve such a
commitment to moral beauty. Moral taste theory contrasts
with moral sense theory in each of the three essential
features mentioned above. First, judgments of moral taste
make use of our ordinary perceptual and rational faculties;
they do not require any special faculty of the mind. Second,
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Essays in Philosophy 17(1)
good moral taste is acquired, not instinctive. Good taste is
the product of education. And third, the faculty of moral
taste is simultaneously cognitive and conative, both
detecting the presence of virtue and vice and motivating us
to pursue or avoid them. The person with good moral taste
is both good at knowing what to do and generally inclined
toward doing the right thing—and these facts are both
grounded in the same source in the moral taste. This last
point will become clear as we explore the concept of taste
in the next few pages.
When we speak of “taste” in art or ethics, we are, of
course, using a metaphor drawn from our physical ability
to detect flavors of food. xii In its metaphorical use “taste”
is primarily an aesthetic term referring to the faculty of
discernment and appreciation of aesthetic properties.xiii
When the metaphorical use of the term “taste” first rose to
prominence in the 18th Century—the era George Dickie
referred to as “the century of taste” xiv—it had a number of
connotations all of which suggested some sort of
evaluation involved in judgments of taste. The concept of
taste was taken variously to have reference to objective
value (as in “good taste”) and to have reference to
subjective value (as in the phrase “a matter of taste”). This
subjectivity could be taken individually or culturally as
when writers of the period would refer, for example, to
“European” or “modern tastes” in contrast to “Greek” or
“ancient tastes”. (We will see below how the philosophers
of taste might consistently affirm both the objectivity and
the subjectivity of taste.) Moreover, to say that someone
has, to use Hume’s term, a “delicate taste” is to ascribe a
virtue to that person. A person with delicacy of taste has
the valuable ability, analogous to a wine taster, to discern
the presence of qualities unnoticed by other observers.
The analogy with physical taste suggests evaluation in that
physical taste is a universal faculty of human nature. If
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How to Be a Moral Taste Theorist | McAteer
taste is part of the natural human physiological or
psychological makeup, then all properly functioning
human beings have the faculty taste. In other words, since
aesthetic taste is analogous to a physical sense, then
blindness to aesthetic properties should be seen as no less
a disability than literal, physical blindness. At the same
time taste was standardly thought to be an educable
faculty as seen in the locution “an acquired taste”.
It may be difficult at first to understand how taste can be
both objectively normative and subjectively relative. A full
explication of this point is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here let me suggest that the answer will have to do with
intersubjectivity. To call something an intersubjective
reality is to distinguish it both from objective and
subjective reality. Something is objective if it is mindindependent, i.e., if it exists independently of all mental
representation. Something is subjective if it is individually
mind-dependent, i.e., if it exists only in one person’s
experience and is hence relative to that person’s individual
point of view. Something is intersubjective if is collectively
mind-dependent, i.e., if it exists in a group of people’s
experience such that it is relative to what Hume will call a
“common” or “general” point of view. Take, for example,
the claim that a particular object is red. If this statement is
interpreted as a claim to objective reality, then it means (on
a Lockean analysis, updated according to current
understandings of physics) that the object has an atomic
structure that reflects light of a certain wavelength. An
object’s color conceived thusly is something a blind person
would be able to know if given certain facts about the
object’s physical structure. But if the statement is
interpreted as a claim to subjective reality, then it means
that the speaker is having on this particular occasion a
certain qualitative experience—regardless of whether
anyone else (or even the same speaker at a different time)
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would have that experience. This is an entirely private
experience and is relative to the idiosyncrasies of the
perceiver’s point of view. For example, the perceiver might
be colorblind or be wearing rose-colored glasses. Finally if
the statement is interpreted as a claim to intersubjective
reality, then it means that the object would generate a
certain qualitative experience in a perceiver under sociolinguistically standard circumstances. In other words,
anyone who uses the word “red” the way we do, has
properly functioning perceptual faculties that operate the
way ours do, is perceiving the object under lighting
conditions we consider normal, etc. will judge this object to
be red.
On this scheme 18th Century rationalist John Balguy is
giving an objective account of beauty when he says that
“all Beauty, whether Moral or natural, is to be reckoned
and reputed as a Species of Absolute Truth; as resulting
from, or consisting in, the necessary Relations and
unchangeable Congruities of ideas”. xv Most other 18th
Century philosophers, however, thought of aesthetic
judgments as qualitative experiences of pleasure. On our
classification, then, taste would be for these philosophers
either subjective or intersubjective. Hobbes is claiming that
moral judgments are subjective when he writes that
“whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire;
that is it, which he for his part calleth Good” so that the
“words Good, Evil, and Contemptible, are ever used with
relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing
simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good
and Evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects
themselves” (Leviathan 1.6, p. 39). xvi Moral properties are
not in the objects themselves but are in the individual’s
mind relative to his or her desires. xvii Hutcheson and Hume
are claiming that moral facts are intersubjective when each
of them compares moral facts (in somewhat different ways)
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to secondary qualities like color. xviii For these philosophers
moral facts are not in an individual’s mind but are relative
to a social practice of attributing moral qualities to things.
If judgments of taste are intersubjective in this way, then
they could be essentially subjective experiences while still
having a normative standard which has a kind of objectivity
in that it is not relative to any individual person’s thoughts,
feelings, or desires. Moreover, cultural relativity could be
explained with reference to various cultures’ different ways
of specifying the intersubjective standard conditions of
moral perception. In other words, we could affirm that
moral judgment is a “matter of taste” without denying that
there is such a thing as “good taste”—moral judgment
would not be merely a matter of taste. Both moral sense
theory and moral taste theory can appeal to the
intersubjectivity of moral judgment, but they generally do
so in significantly different ways.
The last, and most important, connotation of the term
“taste” is that taste is supposed to be a motivational faculty.
As mentioned above, the analogy with taste implies a
conative element. This is the key distinction between moral
sense theories and moral taste theories. While the senses
are often understood (especially by early modern British
empiricists) as purely cognitive, the analogy with taste
implies both cognitive and conative elements. Not only
does good taste allow us to discern information about
aesthetic properties, good taste is also a desire to
experience those properties. The element of motivation
comes out in the locution, used by both Shaftesbury and
Hume, “to have a taste for X”. This locution is equivalent
to a more common one: “to have a relish for X”. As the
synonym “relish” suggests, to have a taste for something is
to desire it, i.e., to be motivated to pursue it.
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In 20th Century terms, moral sense theory is compatible
with motivational externalism while moral taste theory is
committed to motivational internalism. Internalism is the
view that motivation is “internal” to moral judgment, a
claim that needs explication. As a first approximation, let
us say that internalism is a family of views each of which
holds that there is (some sort of) necessary connection
between moral properties (or facts) and an agent’s
motivation. Externalism, then, is the family of views
according to which any connection between morality and
motivation is contingent. xix As they stand, these definitions
are rather vague. To make them more precise, we need
some help from distinctions drawn by Stephen Darwall.
The above definition of internalism is broad enough to
include the view that judging an action to be morally
obligatory causes a motive to do it. On this view,
“although motive is in no way intrinsic to ethical facts
themselves, it is a necessary consequence of perceiving or
knowing them”. xx Knowing an ethical fact and being
motivated to act on that knowledge always go together on
this view, but this correlation is logically contingent.
Knowledge and motivation remain distinct states of affairs.
Most versions of the moral sense theory (including
Hutcheson’s) fall into this category. But Darwall reserves
the term internalism for views according to which having a
(certain kind of) motive to do something is what its
rightness consists in. On this view “the existence of
motive, perhaps of a certain kind or under certain
circumstances, is (at least part of) what it is for a normative
proposition to be true”. xxi The process of practical
deliberation results in an unqualified motive, and the
existence of that motive constitutes normative moral
obligation. Only on the latter view is motivation truly
internal to moral judgment, rather than simply
accompanying moral judgment. And this is how moral taste
theory conceives of moral judgment. According to moral
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taste theory, engaging in moral judgment involves a
process of aesthetic discrimination which, for the person of
good moral taste, results in a motive to pursue or avoid a
state of affairs, and that motivation itself is what constitutes
the value of the state of affairs, because the morally
beautiful action or character trait just is the action or trait
which would be attractive to the person of good moral
taste. Thus motivation is internal (in Darwall’s sense) to
judgments of taste.
To summarize the complex set of evaluational connotations
which the term “taste” would suggest to contemporaries of
Shaftesbury and Hume, aesthetic taste was thought to be:
(1) an aesthetic faculty directed at beauty, whether of body
or soul; (2) a natural xxii faculty in analogy to physical taste;
(3) a motivating faculty as in “having a taste (or relish) for
X”; (4) an educable faculty as in “an acquired taste”; (5) a
descriptively evaluable faculty as in “delicacy of taste” (6)
a normatively evaluable faculty as in “good taste”; (7) a
subjective faculty as in “a matter of taste”; (8) a culturally
relative faculty as in “European tastes”. The general
features of moral taste theory which allow these seemingly
contradictory connotations to be made consistent are moral
taste theory’s commitment to motivational internalism and
the intersubjective theory of rationality.
NOTES
i
I say that EPM is Hume’s “final work of moral philosophy”, because,
after writing EPM, Hume turned his attention, with the exception of
revising Treatise Book 2 as A Dissertation on the Passions, to history
and political theory. While Hume continued revising EPM the rest of
his life, he never wrote a new work on ethics.
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ii
For a recent example of this view, see James Baille’s Hume on
Morality (Routledge, 2000): “Philosophical taxonomists usually
classify Hume as a moral sense theorist. This tradition originates with
Lord Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury),
although its influence on Hume came primarily from the writings of
Francis Hutcheson” (p. 15-16).
iii
See Raphael’s The Moral Sense (Oxford University Press, 1947) and
his anthology British Moralists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
iv
See James Bonar’s Moral Sense (Macmillan, 1930), p. 9
v
Selby-Bigge, L.A. British Moralists (Oxford University Press, 1897),
Vol I, p. xlii
vi
The primary distinction Smith is making is whether moral judgments
are made by a “peculiar faculty” or simply by our ordinary feelings and
sentiments (TMS VII.iii.3.2-3, p. 321; cf. III.iv.5, p. 158).
vii
Hume seems to use the term “moral sense” interchangeably with
terms such as, for example, “conscience, or a sense of morals” (T
3.1.1.10), “sense of morality” (T 3.1.1.20), “sense of virtue” (T
3.1.2.3), “sentiment of morality” (T 3.1.2.8), “sentiment of right and
wrong” (T 3.2.2.23), “moral sentiments” (T 3.2.6.3), “sentiment of
approbation” (T 3.2.6.4), “sentiments of virtue” (T 3.3.1.21), “taste in
morals” (T 3.2.8.8n80), “moral taste” (T 3.3.1.15), etc.
viii
See Darwall’s The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 20-1 and Gill’s “Shaftesbury’s
Two Accounts of the Reason to Be Virtuous” in Journal of the History
of Philosophy 38:4 (October, 2000), p. 529n1.
ix
Perhaps no single definition could capture the way all historians use
the term “moral sense theory”, but I claim that my analysis here
identifies three features common to the most widely used definitions of
moral sense theory. I draw especially from Chapter 1 of D.D. Raphael’s
The Moral Sense and Selby-Bigge’s Introduction to his anthology
British Moralists.
x
Actually, the only reason the moral sense would have to be conceived
as distinct from reason is if the moral sense theorist was committed to
empiricism and wanted to avoid positing innate ideas of good and evil.
Thus moral sense theory is closely related to rational intuitionism.
Frankena suggests that intuitionism is the broader category that can be
subdivided into rational intuitionism and moral sense theory, conceived
as empirical intuitionism. See William Frankena, “Hutcheson’s Moral
Sense Theory” Journal of the History of Ideas 16:3 (June 1955), p. 357.
Raphael makes a similar suggestion The Moral Sense, p. 2-3. But one
could just as easily say that moral sense theory is the broader category
that should be subdivided into empirical moral sense theory and
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rationalist moral sense theory (i.e., intuitionism). Mackie sees the
distinction between intuitionism and moral sense theory in a slightly
different way. He focuses on the question of whether our “faculty for
drawing moral distinctions” detects “qualities” that are “objective” or
“subjective”. See J.L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory (Routledge,
1980), p. 33. At one point he suggests that moral sense theory is the
“subjective interpretation” of the analogy between moral judgment and
perception, while intuitionism is the “objective” interpretation (p. 33).
At another point he suggests that “moral sense” theory is the name of
the genus whose “objectivist” species is “intuitionism” and whose
subjectivist species is “sentimentalism” (p. 72).
xi
See Hutcheson Inquiry II.iv. Compare Inquiry I.vi in which
Hutcheson claims that diversity in aesthetic judgment is entirely due to
psychological associations that prevent us from having pure
experiences of the objects in question.
xii
For a nice discussion of the metaphorical use of the term “taste” in
philosophical aesthetics, see Carolyn Korsmeyer, Making Sense of
Taste: Food and Philosophy (Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 38-45.
xiii
The Oxford English Dictionary gives this as the relevant definition
of “taste”: “Mental perception of quality; judgment, discriminative
faculty”. Compare this sub-definition which limits taste to the aesthetic
realm: “The sense of what is appropriate, harmonious, or beautiful; esp.
discernment and appreciation of the beautiful in nature or art; spec. the
faculty of perceiving and enjoying what is excellent in art, literature,
and the like”. See The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed. by J.A.
Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner (Oxford, 1989).
xiv
Dickie, George. The Century of Taste: The Philosophical Odyssey of
Taste in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 3
xv
Balguy, John. “Foundation of Moral Goodness” in British Moralists,
ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Vol II, (Oxford University Press, 1897) p. 71n1.
xvi
References to Hobbes are to Richard Tuck’s Revised Student Edition
of Leviathan (Cambridge, 1996), cited by part and chapter numbers.
xvii
Note that ultimately Hobbes does think there can be a common rule
of good if the sovereign brings it about through legal sanctions.
Nevertheless this common rule is a human construction that is not
“taken from the nature of the objects themselves”.
xviii
See, for example, Hutcheson’s Inquiry I.i.17 and Hume’s Treatise
3.1.1.26.
xix
The terms internalism and externalism originally derive from W.D.
Falk “‘Ought’ and Motivation” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society (1947-8): 111-38, and William Frankena “Obligation and
Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy” in A.I. Melden Essays on
20
Essays in Philosophy 17(1)
Moral Philosophy (University of Washington, 1958). Other important
discussions include Thomas Nagel The Possibility of Altruism
(Princeton, 1978), and Bernard Williams “Internal and External
Reasons” in Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981). The version of the
distinction I use follows Stephen Darwall, “Internalism and Agency”
Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992), 155-74, which refines earlier
distinctions made in Darwall’s Impartial Reason (Cornell, 1983), pp.
51-61. Darwall’s key advance is to distinguish between views which
posit a moral judgment/motivation connection and those views which
posit a moral fact/motivation connection.
xx
The British Moralists and the Internal Ought, p. 10
xxi
Ibid., p. 11
xxii
By “natural” in this context, I mean it only in the 18th Century sense
as that which is grounded in human nature, leaving open the 20th
Century question of whether moral properties are non-natural in the
sense of G.E. Moore.
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