SOCIOLOGY | RESEARCH ARTICLE
Habitus, relexivity, and the realization of
intercultural capital: The (unfulilled) potential of
intercultural education
Andreas Pöllmann
Cogent Social Sciences (2016), 2: 1149915
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Pöllmann, Cogent Social Sciences (2016), 2: 1149915
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2016.1149915
SOCIOLOGY | RESEARCH ARTICLE
Habitus, relexivity, and the realization of
intercultural capital: The (unfulilled) potential of
intercultural education
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Received: 24 October 2015
Accepted: 29 January 2016
*Corresponding author: Andreas
Pöllmann, Instituto de Investigaciones
sobre la Universidad y la Educación,
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México, Circuito Cultural Universitario,
Coyoacán 04510, México, D.F., Mexico
E-mail: apollm@unam.mx
Reviewing editor:
Jamie Halsall, University of
Huddersield, UK
Additional information is available at
the end of the article
Andreas Pöllmann1*
Abstract: Nowhere does the need to appreciate a diverse range of diferent intercultural experiences appear more obvious than in the context of intercultural education.
Yet, in times of neoliberal hegemony over educational politics and policies, less socioculturally dominant and often more colloquial funds of intercultural knowledge risk to
sufer continued institutional marginalization and curricular obliteration. To counter
such forms of symbolic violence and to create learning environments that value a
wide range of processes of intercultural capital realization, intercultural education
needs to overcome ideas of “bad habitus” and “good relexivity”, for they prematurely discredit the value of people’s practical sense, while failing to problematize
the sociocultural contingency of their relexive capacities. In a critical appropriation
of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of human agency, the present article highlights the
reconcilability of relexivity and habitus, with a particular interest in processes of intercultural capital realization and the (unfulilled) potential of intercultural education.
Subjects: Education - Social Sciences; Multicultural Education; Political Sociology; Race &
Ethnic Studies; Social Class; Social Theory; Sociology & Social Policy; Sociology of Culture;
Sociology of Education; Sociology of Knowledge
Keywords: Archer; Bourdieu; habitus; human agency; intercultural capital; intercultural
education; neoliberal hegemony; reflexivity; recognition
Andreas Pöllmann
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
Andreas Pöllmann (PhD 2008, MA 2004,
Department of Sociology, University of Essex,
UK) is a full-time associate researcher at the
Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad
y la Educación of the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City and
adjunct professor at the Facultad de Ciencias
Políticas y Sociales of the same university. Previous
positions include a lectureship at City University
London (UK) and postdoctoral fellowships at the
Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (UNAM) and
the Karlsruhe University of Education (Germany).
Andreas Pöllmann has longstanding interests in
national and supranational identities, intercultural
relations, political sociology, cultural sociology, and
the sociology of education. His current research
focuses on links between formal education and
sociocultural inequalities in the realization of
intercultural capital, with a particular focus on
institutions of teacher education.
This article illustrates the importance of valuing
both intuitive and relexive forms of intercultural
learning. With the background of intensifying
processes of economic globalization and the
worldwide spread of neoliberal educational politics
and policies, it urges for inclusive forms of intercultural education that avoid uncritical celebrations of
relexivity, private initiative, and individual talent. At
the same time, it underlines the vital importance
of an intercultural education that recognizes a
wide range of less formally established funds of
intercultural knowledge. Throughout, the article
advocates a perspective that views processes of
individual development as closely related to the
respective contextual circumstances, with a particular interest in implications in terms of sociocultural justice.
© 2016 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution
(CC-BY) 4.0 license.
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1. Introduction
No doubt agents do have an active apprehension of the world. No doubt they construct
their vision of the world. But this construction is carried out under structural constraints.
(Bourdieu, 1989, p. 18)
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Since its conception, Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus has received a controversial reception
among theorists of human agency. Celebrated by some, rejected by others, but always pertinent to
both—whether as a conceptual building block and a complex idea worthwhile of constructive criticism and further theoretical development or as an antithetical scapegoat. In the latter (rather unfortunate) case, the concept tends to serve its scholarly detractors merely as a negative foil for their
own theoretical propositions.1 Margaret Archer, in particular, has become accustomed to delineating
her multidimensional idea of diferent cognitive forms of human relexivity2—and, more generally,
her morphogenetic vision of personal and sociocultural development—in stark contrast to Bourdieu’s
notion of habitus (Archer, 2007, 2010, 2012).
If viewed from a late Archerian perspective, habitus ultimately appears as little more than an increasingly irrelevant, if not entirely obsolete, anachronistic residual that, if anything, stands in the
way of auto-relexive “internal conversations” of “fractured” or otherwise “confused” late modern
individuals. Such a radical questioning of habitus—of its raison d’être so to speak—is as empirically
problematic as heuristically unsound (Adams, 2006; Akram & Hogan, 2015; Decoteau, 2015; ElderVass, 2007; Farrugia, 2013; Farrugia & Woodman, 2015; Fleetwood, 2008; Sayer, 2010). Most ironically, perhaps, the drastic outcasting of habitus becomes possible only from a view of human agency
in which habitus and relexivity feature as strictly distinct, unrelated, and irreconcilable parts of
dissimilar coins. A particularly tragic dimension to the irony of such crude antagonistic dichotomies—and one more or less explicitly woven into Archer’s morphogenetic approach—alludes to
value-laden phantasies about “bad habitus” and “good relexivity”.
This article departs from Archerian-type caricatures of habitus and relexivity as quintessentially
irreconcilable and diferentially valued dimensions of human agency, since they obscure their actual
interdependency and joint signiicance for contextually embedded human (inter)actions in general—and for processes of intercultural capital realization in particular. In order to make explicit right
from the beginning and productively work with a conception of human agency that reconciles people’s intuitive and relexive capacities within a Bourdieusian framework, the French sociologist’s idea
of habitus as “structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu,
1990, p. 53) requires some additional qualiication.
Concretely, for the purposes of the present contribution and as a suggestion for further conceptual
development, habitus shall be more speciically deined as structured psychosomatic structures that
emerge from the respective individual’s (more or less conscious) experiences in pertinent ields as
well as structuring psychosomatic structures that form the “operational basis” of his or her (inter)
actions. In other words, the respective psychosomatic structures are both product and producer of
contextually embedded practices. They mediate and “guide” the reception, memorizing, and processual generation of people’s sensory impressions and expressions.
Based on a spirit of critical appreciation according to which “an invitation to think with Bourdieu is
of necessity an invitation to think beyond Bourdieu, and against him whenever required” (Wacquant,
1992, p. xiv), the following discussion irst outlines a notion of human agency that embraces habitus,
relexivity, and practical sense as its co-deining and interrelated constituents. It then moves on to
illustrate the centrality of both relexive and intuitive elements of human agency in processes of
intercultural capital realization—within and beyond established forms of formal education. The next
section problematizes the sociocultural contingency of processes of intercultural capital realization,
with a particular focus on the (unfulilled) potential of intercultural education in times of neoliberal
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hegemony. The subsequent and inal section rearticulates the most important ideas by way of
conclusion.
2. Beyond “bad habitus” and “good reflexivity”
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Contrary to common misrepresentations, habitus “is not a fate, not a destiny” (Bourdieu, 2005,
p. 45). Combining “constancy and variation” (Bourdieu, 2000; p. 161), it “is as remote from creation
of unpredictable novelty as it is from simple mechanical reproduction of the original conditioning”
Bourdieu, 1990, p. 55). As “a product of history, that is of social experience and education, it may be
changed by history, that is by new experiences, education or training” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 45, original
emphasis). Habitus can, and in most cases will, contain a complex set of plural, historically contingent, and contradictory (sets of) dispositions.3 Even comparatively static and little complex varieties
of habitus do not constitute monolithic systems of ever-repetitive neurobehavioral mechanics.
Importantly, however, while habitus can be(come) more or less lexible, it is per se non-relexive.
As much as it makes no analytical sense to construe habitus itself as relexive,4 it is problematic to
extrapolate its operational limits beyond the level of individual agency. Diferent individuals may
share certain “judgments of taste” according to their particular class of habitus (Bourdieu, 1984), but
a social class itself does not have a habitus. In a similar vein, diferent individuals’ feelings of
national attachment may show important intersubjective similarities or overlaps (Pöllmann, 2008,
2009, 2012) that—while possibly indicative of a certain national culture or prevailing national
doxa—do not form the habitus of a particular nation. The same logic applies to dubious notions of
“family habitus” and “institutional habitus” that, in fact, allude to forms of group ethos, collective
spirit, or other doxai—as Atkinson (2011) so convincingly demonstrates.
Crucially, habitus does not stand in diametrical contrast to relexivity. As a psychosomatic receptor, memory, and generative matrix, it both evolves from and mediates relexive as well as intuitive
contextually embedded practices. Depending on the respective ield conditions, and at diferent
points in time and space, “the same individual may be highly relexive with regard to some aspects
of his or her behavior, but strongly driven by social conditioning with regard to others” (Elder-Vass,
2007, p. 342). The resulting complexity of diferent (contextually variant) expressions of human
agency can be imagined as oscillating between two ideal-typical poles: practical sense and
relexivity.
Within this model of human agency, the notion of practical sense comprises intuitive ways of acting, feeling, perceiving, and thinking that—while not exclusive of habituated relexivities and relexive relexes—distinguish it from more conscious and mindful deliberations or forms of relexivity. As
a “natural” extension of habitus, practical sense implies an intuitive familiarity with the ield conditions in (relation to) which it operates—“a feel for the game in the sense of a capacity for practical
anticipation of the ‘upcoming’ future contained in the present” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 66).
The notion of relexivity, on the other hand, inherently implies a certain degree of conscious
awareness and a critical distance from the respective object(s) of relection. Even so, however,
relexive human agency is never purely relexive—at least in the sense that it always and necessarily
depends on habituated processes of recognition, memorization, and articulation. Clearly, not every
neurological stimulus, psychosocial memory, or cognitive cerebral function that underlies and
shapes the unfolding of an individual’s “relexive deliberations” can itself be fully relexive; if it were
so, it would lead to an eternal self-referential regress and, ultimately, to the end of socioculturally
engaged practice.
As much as it appears unwise to equate a practical intercultural sense hastily with dull routines or
primordial sociocultural habits, it seems reasonable to view claims to the emancipatory (pedagogic)
potential of relexive deliberations critically in terms of their sociocultural and ideological origins and
interests (Adams, 2003; Atkinson, 2010; Caetano, 2015). Even if “relexivity is often portrayed as a
strategy for fostering intercultural competence and tackling ethnocentrism, it should not be
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assumed that it always has a benign impact or leads to critical distance from one’s own standpoints”
(Blasco, 2012, p. 485).
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Ultimately, the relative interpersonal and sociocultural relevance of both relexivity and practical
sense—far from constituting a hermetic ontological given—always emerges in (relation to) the concrete situation and context in which human (inter)actions actually take place. An invitation to engage in an open relection about diferent conceptions of race, racialized identities, and forms of
racism, for example, might well feel more appropriate in a seminar at college or university than at
the onset of a casual encounter between individuals of actual or perceived diferences in racial
background.
While Bourdieu’s work is replete with references to the complexity and situationality of human
agency, it is fair to say that it tends to underestimate the range, plurality, and frequency of “ordinary” people’s relexive practices (Lahire, 2011; Mouzelis, 2007; Noble & Watkins, 2003). On the other
hand, and in welcome contrast to less contextually embedded approaches to the study of human
agency, his conceptual framework reminds us of the vital importance to conceive the development
of people’s relexive capacities as closely related to their positions within ields of struggle over
(symbolic) power.
Notwithstanding the analytical force of Bourdieu’s ield theory (Bourdieu, 1985a, 1993; Wacquant,
1989) and the importance to highlight the intimate relationship between pertinent ield conditions
and people’s habitus, a broader conception of salient contextual conditions would place more emphasis on people as both positioned within pertinent ields and their acting and interacting elements. After all, a ield can be(come) pertinent not only “as a network, or a coniguration, of objective
relations between positions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97), but also as a frame for interpersonal and social relations5—including those that lie at the heart of processes of intercultural capital
realization.
3. Processes of intercultural capital realization6
“Intercultural capital can be realized in terms of (a combination of) awareness, acquisition, and application” (Pöllmann, 2013, p. 2). Processes of acquisition and application can be more or less intuitive or relexive, direct (e.g. in the course of international student exchange programs) or indirect
(e.g. via books, television, or the Internet), iterative or continuous, inclusive or exclusive, enabled or
constrained. In all their empirical complexity, however, they are always intimately—albeit not necessarily explicitly—linked to (diferent) cultures, that is, “pervious, evolving, more or less consciously
learned, and more or less closely “shared” frames of perception, thought, and (inter)action that are
both shaped by and shape their (histories of) objectiication and institutionalization” (Pöllmann,
2013, p. 1).
With the background of increasing global interconnectedness, intercultural capital constitutes not
only an evermore important economic asset and a vital interactional resource, but also a key marker
of sociocultural distinction (Pöllmann & Sánchez Graillet, 2015). First and foremost, those at the
margins of pertinent ields, whose sociocultural positioning does not “favor a habitual, efortless,
and largely taken-for-granted embodiment of highly prized and widely convertible intercultural capital,” (Pöllmann, 2013, p. 5) rely on a socially just and culturally inclusive intercultural education that
enables and oicially recognizes a wide range of both intuitive and relexive forms of intercultural
learning. After all, the degree of objectiication in and through institutions “guarantees the permanence and cumulativity of material and symbolic acquisitions which can then subsist without the
agents having to recreate them continuously and in their entirety by deliberate action” (Bourdieu,
1990, p. 130).
The relative exchange value of individually embodied reservoirs of intercultural capital depends
fundamentally on the realities and potentialities of their objectiication and institutionalization within pertinent educational, sociocultural, and political ields. Those already favorably positioned within
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such ields of struggle for (symbolic) power—by having access to inluential and well-resourced family networks, by social class privilege, and/or by membership in dominant ethno-cultural, religious or
other groups—will meet no major obstacles in applying their respective intercultural capital acquisitions. On the contrary, those less favorably positioned will have to challenge the status quo and by
implication the dominant doxa of taken-for-granted and oicially established (symbolic) hierarchies
of diferentially valued capital resources (Pöllmann, 2013).
When talking about diferentially valued capital resources, it is worth considering Yosso’s (2005)
cautioning that Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital has frequently been (mis)used to construct
and justify illusive imageries of cultural inferiority and superiority. Yet, while misrepresentations of
that kind are still alive and well, they have long been unmasked as blatantly distorting the famous
French sociologist’s academic contributions and public interventions (Harker, 1984; Swartz, 1997;
Wacquant, 2004). Indeed, in times of neoliberal hegemony over educational politics and policies (Hill
& Kumar, 2009; Hursh, 2007; Klees, 2008; Plehwe, Walpen, & Neunhöfer, 2006; Torres, 2009),
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework ofers an alternative vision that complements rather than contradicts other critical approaches to the study of sociocultural inequalities and the (re)production of
privilege, (symbolic) power, and (symbolic) forms of domination.
Contributions from the realms of Critical Pedagogy (Freire, 1970, 1973; McLaren & Kincheloe,
2007) and Critical Race Theory (Crenshaw, 2002; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012; Solorzano & Yosso,
2001)—as well as notions of “funds of knowledge” and “community cultural wealth” (Moll, 2005;
Moll, Amanti, Nef, & Gonzalez, 1992; Rios-Aguilar, Kiyama, Gravitt, & Moll, 2011; Vélez-Ibañez &
Greenberg, 1992)—could be usefully reconciled with Bourdieu’s (1986) forms of capital. In fact, the
constructive reconciliation of the respective approaches may well be vital to the advancement of
(symbolic) struggles for the recognition of a wider range of more or less consciously internalized intercultural knowledge and skills—and of the diferent contexts in which they are acquired (e.g. in
bicultural families, in multicultural neighborhoods, in schools and universities with diverse student
populations, or as a result of voluntary or forced migration).
Direct in situ intercultural experiences can ofer particularly “context-intensive” opportunities for
intercultural learning. When based on physical rather than virtual movement across cultures, such
personal experiences can lead to insights into what it feels to be (perceived as) the “Other” that
may—especially in cases where they coincide with changes in the relative currency value of hitherto
embodied capital resources—challenge and gradually modify existing receptive, memorial, processual, and generative psychosomatic structures. The respective alterations in habitus can “interrupt”
both long-accustomed practical sense and taken-for-granted ways of being relexive, possibly stimulating new forms of relexive intercultural awareness and a renewed feel for the intercultural game.
It is worth noting that Bourdieu himself concedes the possibility of habitus crises through encounters with new or signiicantly altered ield conditions (Bourdieu, 1990, 2000). But it has to be made
more explicit than in (what seems to follow from) his work that such habitus crises do not merely,
nor on many occasions primarily, involve agents who ind themselves confronted with new objectiied structural conditions (e.g. institutions and laws). Instead, it is largely through contact and interaction with other individuals or groups where they get to feel the power of new structural forces—as,
for example, in the case of international migrants who ind themselves immersed in a world of new
linguistic, ethno-racial, religious, or sociocultural majority backgrounds.
There is indeed good reason to believe that direct intercultural interactions should play a vital part
in the development of both a practical intercultural sense and a critical intercultural relexivity. After
all, “the more experience of other cultures a learner has, the more easily they will see the relativity
of their own culture or cultures” (Byram, 2003, p. 65). Paradoxically, however, in the realms of schooling and school management, the pedagogical signiicance of extracurricular and often more habitual forms of intercultural learning still tend to be underestimated and negatively contrasted with the
transmission and relective analysis of predesigned curricular contents. To be sure, the point here is
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not to discredit the latter—whose didactic signiicance has been tried and tested for decades and
centuries—but to problematize their widespread predominance as counterproductive to a more holistic realization of intercultural capital and the development of socioculturally just and inclusive intercultural learning environments.
4. Realizing intercultural capital through intercultural education: prospects and
limitations
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Pedagogical action can […], because of and despite the symbolic violence it entails, open the
possibility of an emancipation founded on awareness and knowledge of the conditionings
undergone and on the imposition of new conditionings designed durably to counter their
efects. (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 340)
Schools, colleges, and universities hold, no doubt, the potential for facilitating both relexive and
intuitive forms of intercultural learning. They can pave the way for intercultural dialog through diverse and inclusive institutional arrangements. They may ofer opportunities for cross-cultural mobility to those who cannot draw on supportive family networks, whose voluntarily adopted or
externally ascribed group memberships may place them at the margins of mainstream society, or
who might face otherwise unfavorable circumstances. However, as much as institutions of formal
education can inform and enable, they can also feed into the naïve assumption that the legal provision of formal equality alone would suice to guarantee “identical educational opportunities”—with
the (unintended) result of cementing existing sociocultural inequalities under the veil of an “unbiased meritocracy” (Bourdieu, 1974; Bourdieu & De Saint Martin, 1974; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).
Lamentably, global trends toward the commodiication of education—and the respective economistic logic and business interests involved—tend to privilege entrepreneurial skills, private initiative, and cognitive forms of (economically viable) instrumental relexivity over cooperative forms of
learning and the vision of a more just and socioculturally inclusive world (Dewey, 1916; Freire, 1998;
Giroux, 1988, 2012; Matthews & Sidhu, 2005; McLaren, 1999). Worse still, the commodiication of
education contributes to the marginalization of already vulnerable individuals and groups (Apple,
2001; Connell, 2013; Giroux, 2004; McLaren, 2005). The collection of tuition fees and the lack of appropriate compensatory maintenance grants, for example, aggravate the situation of those students who are, due to their unfavorable sociocultural positioning, already less likely to achieve
higher levels of formal education in general, and of highly convertible varieties of intercultural capital in particular.
In one way or the other, neoliberal ideologies of educational mercantilization have made it a pervasive and enduring fashion to lay the burden of responsibility for personal successes and failures
almost entirely on the individual—on his or her motivations, deliberations, and willful eforts.
However, as much as it is necessary to stimulate the creative power of relexive practice and to
highlight the value of motivating individuals to maximize their potential, it is important to avoid
uncritical celebrations of private initiatives. For it should not be forgotten that the realization and
realizability of people’s personal capital resources depend to an important extent on circumstances
that are beyond their (direct) control (Pöllmann, 2013). Without a critical consideration of the respective ield conditions, the promotion of people’s creative potential and relexive capacities—
which is supposed to lead to (a sense of) empowerment—in fact risks fueling unrealistic expectations
in the face of adverse contextual circumstances and, by implication, feelings of guilt and
self-blame.
The point here is certainly not to accuse everyone involved in what goes more or less explicitly
under the banner of “neoliberal education reform” of scrupulous economic motivations and capitalist self-interests. Many calls for individual initiative, deliberate action, and a spirit of enterprise—
neoliberal or else—undoubtedly have the very best intentions at heart. But good pedagogical
intentions alone are not enough—at least in the sense that their expected individual-level efects
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cannot be meaningfully separated from structural injustices in pertinent educational and sociocultural environments (Banks, 2008; Cummins, 2000; Gorski, 2008; Olneck, 2000).7
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Meanwhile, past decades testify to a seemingly inexorable academic hype about the pervasive
quasi-inevitable emergence of increasingly volatile and less homogenous structural conditions and
forces on the one hand, and the growing signiicance of relexive individuality on the other (Archer,
2007, 2014; Beck, 1992; Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Castells, 1996; Giddens, 1991, 1992; Lash,
1999). In times of intensifying processes of economic globalization, it is no doubt tempting to proclaim a new age of relexivity as Margaret Archer has done in her recent book on The Relexive
Imperative in Late Modernity (Archer, 2012). But in failing to duly engage with the sociocultural conditions that are likely to enable or constrain people’s relexive capacities, Archer’s “narrative of social
change becomes uncritically optimistic, unable to understand the material inequalities which continue to structure late modern subjectivities” (Farrugia & Woodman, 2015, p. 2).
To be sure, many parts of the world have seen a rising demand for a lexible and adaptable workforce, creating a climate in which workers need to invest a great deal in (the renewal of) their qualiications and skills. However, whether and to what extent such an economic climate implies businesses
that desire to employ relexive workers, who critically interrogate their situation beyond the range of
(technical) relections required to carry out their job eiciently, poses an open question that too often
remains unanswered. At the very least, instead of rushing into uncritical celebrations of relexivity, it
would appear sound to recognize that “relexive action is not always associated with morphogenesis,
nor does habitual action remain doomed to reproduce the social order” (Decoteau, 2015, p. 9).
If it is generally advisable to think beyond notions of “good relexivity” and “bad habitus”, it is vital
to do so within intercultural education. Consider, for instance, the learning of non-native languages,
which arguably plays a crucial part in the development of any more substantial intercultural literacy
(Burck, 2005; Byram & Risager, 1999; Fuss, Garcia-Albacete, & Rodriguez-Monter, 2004; Starkey &
Osler, 2003). Yet, when limited to classroom-based deliberations about vocabulary, grammar, and
syntax, it contributes comparatively little to the development of a critical intercultural awareness—
and less to the generation of a practical intercultural sense (Byram, 2008).
It matters greatly what types of embodied intercultural capital schools, colleges, and universities
recognize as legitimate and worthy of oicial certiication (i.e. as worthy of being transformed into
institutionalized intercultural capital). Consider, for example, how educational systems “directly
helped to devalue popular modes of expression, dismissing them as ‘slang’ and ‘gibberish’ […] and to
impose recognition of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 49)—that is, more precisely, the
(arbitrary) legitimization of the dominant language. To counter such forms of symbolic violence and
to create learning environments that empower students of diverse sociocultural backgrounds and
with diferent capital resources (or funds of knowledge), intercultural education needs to:
• Enable and value a wide range of relexive and intuitive processes of intercultural capital
realization
• Question dominant notions of relexivity and practical sense
• Combine classroom-based instruction with opportunities to gain less formalized irsthand intercultural experiences
• Dislocate habitus through cross-cultural mobility
To be sure, these recommendations need to be read in relation to the respective sociocultural and
political ield conditions at hand. But in spite of their contextual contingency, they may serve as
orientation in scholarly, institutional, and public debates over the oicial recognition and valuation
of diferent empirical varieties of intercultural capital. To emphasize anew how such endeavors may
draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual legacy; this would appear to be a itting moment to revisit
some of the central points raised in the course of the present article by way of conclusion.
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5. Conclusion
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Contrary to persistent misperceptions, habitus is neither diametrically opposed to nor irreconcilable
with relexivity. As a psychosomatic receptor, memory, and generative matrix, it both evolves from
and mediates relexive as well as intuitive contextually embedded practices. While undoubtedly
forming a constitutive part of human agency, it by no means implies “the fate that some people read
into it. Being the product of history, it is an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected
to experiences” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 133; original emphasis). Depending on the nature of
personal experiences within (diferent) cultures and ields of struggle for (symbolic) power, an individual can acquire new relexive and new intuitive funds of intercultural knowledge that he or she
may previously not have known of and perhaps considered as unknowable or not worth knowing.
To be sure, unknowing can include genuine forms of not knowing (Thrift, 1996)—in the sense of
being unable to know at a particular time and in certain cultural and geopolitical contexts. Many
times, however, meanings and knowledge are accessible through conscious relexive investigations
or more accidental intuitive discovery—both of which are mediated by the respective individual’s
habitus—and both of which can be substantially enabled or constrained by ields of formal education and the broader sociocultural environment. Schools, colleges, and universities, for example,
may or may not provide opportunities for the kind of habitus dislocations through cross-cultural
mobility that are likely to stimulate the development of students’ intercultural relexivity and practical intercultural sense.
Nowhere does the need to appreciate a diverse range of diferent intercultural experiences appear
more obvious than in the context of intercultural education. Yet, in times of neoliberal hegemony
over educational politics and policies, less socioculturally dominant and often more colloquial funds
of intercultural knowledge risk to sufer continued institutional marginalization and curricular obliteration. It is within this broader context of (symbolic) domination that often unsuspected pedagogical preferences for (allegedly) relexive knowledge acquisitions over alternative and less formally
established forms of learning need to be subjected to critical scrutiny. After all, such pedagogical
preferences do not merely relate to questions of didactic method or educational esthetics, but are
likely to afect students’ chances of intercultural development and of getting their particular personal intercultural experiences and skills oicially recognized or not.
If the aim is to achieve more genuinely enabling intercultural learning environments, institutional
support needs to go beyond legal guarantees of formal equality and toward concrete measures to
value a wide range of both intuitive and relexive intercultural funds of knowledge—including those
informally acquired at the “margins” of dominant sociocultural institutions and groups. It is high
time to overcome ideas of “bad habitus” and “good relexivity”, for they prematurely discredit the
value of people’s practical sense, while failing to problematize the sociocultural contingency of their
relexive capacities.
As much as it is desirable to conceive the potential for relexive practice as germane to all humankind, it is deceitful to take its realization and realizability for granted. Uncritical celebrations of relexivity—fueled by ignorance toward the particular ield conditions that may enhance or inhibit its
development—distort systematic forms of sociocultural inequality, marginalization, discrimination,
and disadvantage, while exaggerating the explanatory weight of (alleged) diferences in private initiative, introspective capacities, and individual talent. Bourdieu’s legacy continues to provide invaluable inspiration to counter such voluntaristic reductionism and the symbolic violence it entails.
Funding
The author received no direct funding for this research.
Author details
Andreas Pöllmann1
E-mail: apollm@unam.mx
1
Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la
Educación, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,
Circuito Cultural Universitario, Coyoacán 04510, México, D.F.,
Mexico.
Citation information
Cite this article as: Habitus, relexivity, and the realization
of intercultural capital: The (unfulilled) potential of
intercultural education, Andreas Pöllmann, Cogent Social
Sciences (2016), 2: 1149915.
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Cover image
Source: Author.
Notes
1. Ironically, while Bourdieu’s notion of habitus continues
to inspire creative research around the world, its most
radical and unforgiving critics still appear as repetitive
and alarmed as ever—albeit that they are noteworthy mostly for their strikingly selective and supericial
reading of the proliic French sociologist’s empirically
grounded contributions to social theory. Alexander’s
(1995) critique continues to stand out as a particularly
presumptuous misrepresentation of Bourdieu’s conceptual intentions.
2. Margaret Archer distinguishes between communicative relexivity, autonomous relexivity, meta-relexivity,
and fractured relexivity—all of which she construes
as involving (important degrees of) meditative internal
conversations on behalf of the respective individual
agents (Archer, 2003, 2007, 2012).
3. After all, “the mobilisation of skills and dispositions in a
speciic interaction situation is hardly ever unproblematic” (Mouzelis, 1991, p. 198)—as, for example, evidenced
by research that reveals “considerable inconsistency of
behavior across situations and between verbal measures of a disposition and speciic nonverbal behaviors”
(Ajzen, 2005, p. 39).
4. Sweetman’s (2003) idea of a “relexive habitus”, for
example, can and has been critiqued for conlating
distinct dimensions of human agency (Archer, 2012).
It is, however, worth recalling that the present article
attempts to overcome such conlations not by rejecting
any possibility of reconciliation between habitus and
reflexivity—as Archer does—but by analytically locating
the latter (together with the notion of practical sense)
as integral extensions of the former.
5. Given “that the truth of [… a particular] interaction is
never entirely contained in the interaction” (Bourdieu,
1977, p. 81) itself, and that diferent (groups of) interactants often hold unequal shares in (symbolic) power, the
conceptual incorporation of relationships between people
constitutes a valuable extension rather than a viable
alternative to “Bourdieusian ield theory”. Undeniably,
the latter—and particularly its recurrent emphasis on
homologies “between the space of positions and the
space of dispositions” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 157)—has generated abundant (and often legitimate) criticism. Rather
unfortunately, however, most of the more radical rejections of any (partial) duality between psychosomatic and
objectiied structures have tended to ignore Bourdieu’s
timely and explicit cautioning that “one must be careful
not to treat homology of position, a resemblance within
diference, as an identity of condition” (Bourdieu, 1985b,
p. 737).
6. In the present article, the expression “processes of
intercultural capital realization” serves as shorthand
for “processes of realization of embodied intercultural
capital”. Moreover, when mentioned without qualifying
adjective, “intercultural capital” stands for “embodied
intercultural capital”.
7. For instance—as experiences from the realm of bilingual
and intercultural education in Mexico’s indigenous communities illustrate—even well-meaning governmental
programs and initiatives can struggle signiicantly under
the weight of (their own involvement in) systematic
inequalities and asymmetric distributions of (symbolic)
power (Fuentes-Morales, 2008; Hamel, 2008; Pöllmann
& Sánchez Graillet, 2015; Stavenhagen, 2015).
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