Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Ratner, B. D., P. Cohen, B. Barman, K. Mam, J. Nagoli, and E. H. Allison. 2013. Governance of aquatic
agricultural systems: analyzing representation, power, and accountability. Ecology and Society 18(4): 59.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06043-180459
Insight
Governance of Aquatic Agricultural Systems: Analyzing Representation,
Power, and Accountability
Blake D. Ratner 1, Philippa Cohen 2,3, Benoy Barman 3, Kosal Mam 3, Joseph Nagoli 3 and Edward H. Allison 3,4
ABSTRACT. Aquatic agricultural systems in developing countries face increasing competition from multiple stakeholders over
rights to access and use natural resources, land, water, wetlands, and fisheries, essential to rural livelihoods. A key implication
is the need to strengthen governance to enable equitable decision making amidst competition that spans sectors and scales,
building capacities for resilience, and for transformations in institutions that perpetuate poverty. In this paper we provide a
simple framework to analyze the governance context for aquatic agricultural system development focused on three dimensions:
stakeholder representation, distribution of power, and mechanisms of accountability. Case studies from Cambodia, Bangladesh,
Malawi/Mozambique, and Solomon Islands illustrate the application of these concepts to fisheries and aquaculture livelihoods
in the broader context of intersectoral and cross-scale governance interactions. Comparing these cases, we demonstrate how
assessing governance dimensions yields practical insights into opportunities for transforming the institutions that constrain
resilience in local livelihoods.
Key Words: accountability; Bangladesh; Cambodia; civil society; coastal zone management; environmental governance;
livelihoods; Malawi; Mozambique; power; social-ecological resilience; Solomon Islands; stakeholder representation; wetlands
INTRODUCTION
Aquatic agricultural systems in developing countries face
increasing competition from multiple stakeholders over rights
to access and use natural resources essential to rural
livelihoods. Competition for land, water, wetlands, and
fisheries resources spans sectors, from primary production
sectors to infrastructure development, and scales, from local
to international. There is therefore a pressing need to
strengthen governance to enable equitable decision making
amidst competition, building capacities both for resilience in
ecosystems and livelihoods, and for transformations in
institutions that perpetuate chronic poverty. In assessing the
factors that influence these aspects of resilience and
transformation in large social-ecological systems, governance
characteristics are not sufficient in themselves to explain
divergent outcomes. However, they play an influential role,
interacting with characteristics of the user groups and the
resource system (Ostrom 2009). Attributes of good
governance such as inclusive decision making, polycentric
and multilayered institutional arrangements, and strong
mechanisms of accountability helping ensure just distribution
of benefits, can be considered a foundation for diverse user
groups and other stakeholders to build capacities to manage
resilience (Lebel et al. 2006). Learning how to make
improvements in governance is especially important as the
demands of managing resource competition across sectors and
across geographic scales intensify (Dietz et al. 2003, Adger et
al. 2005, Wilson 2006).
Within the resilience literature, much of the reference to
governance has focused on the normative aspects, by signaling
the characteristics of “good governance” deemed consistent
with the maintenance of social-ecological resilience.
Relatively little attention, by contrast, has been given to the
mechanisms of governance, in other words the building blocks
that allow analysts to critically assess the positive and negative
attributes of a given governance context. There have also been
few practical applications, demonstrating how tools for
governance analysis can help build an understanding among
local actors of the possible pathways to change. We aim in
this paper to present an analytical research approach that will
address both these shortcomings. To achieve this we present
a framework to analyze the governance context for
development of aquatic agricultural systems, intended as a tool
to observe and compare differences across multiple cases and
as an aid to action research. For the purpose of iteratively
developing and refining an analytical framework such as this,
the case study approach is particularly well suited (Flyvbjerg
2006).
We focus on developing country environments where aquatic
resources play a critical role in rural livelihoods, poverty
reduction, and food and nutritional security. Occurring “along
freshwater floodplains, coastal deltas, and inshore marine
waters,” these aquatic agricultural systems (AAS) “are
characterized by their dependence on seasonal changes in
productivity, driven by seasonal variation in rainfall, river
flow, and/or coastal and marine processes” (WorldFish Center
2011:2). By broadening the focus from individual production
sectors, i.e., fisheries, crop agriculture, livestock, aquaculture,
to integrated environmental, food production and livelihood
systems, the AAS perspective aims to bring greater coherence
1
WorldFish, 2Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, 3WorldFish Center, 4School of International Development, University of
East Anglia
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to attempts to govern these systems for their contribution to
food security and poverty reduction. The emphasis on
resilience of livelihoods to multiple stresses and shocks
demands a systems perspective in development planning and
implementation. It recognizes that building social, political,
and economic rights is an integral element of poverty
reduction, and a necessary foundation for efforts to build
resilience and adaptive capacity (Allison et al. 2011). Also, it
recognizes that in cases where current production systems are
failing to meet the needs of local resource users, more
fundamental transformations are needed (Walker et al. 2010).
We summarize a framework for analyzing the governance
context for AAS development, focused on three dimensions:
stakeholder representation, distribution of power, and
mechanisms of accountability. To demonstrate the utility of
such a framework, we present four case studies, addressing
protected riverine wetlands in northern Cambodia, seasonal
floodplain systems in Bangladesh, transboundary management
of Lake Chilwa in Malawi and Mozambique, and artisanal
marine fisheries in Solomon Islands. In each case, the
particular challenges of small-scale fisheries and aquaculture
development are presented in the context of broader
intersectoral and cross-scale governance interactions. These
cases highlight the formal and informal mechanisms that hold
decision makers accountable toward poor and marginalized
groups, including the role of bridging organizations that
improve communication across sectors and geographic scales,
and the role of civil society advocacy. We discuss the lessons
and challenges of strengthening cross-scale governance in
AAS in comparative perspective, including its contributions
to resilience and institutional transformation. In the
concluding section, we reflect on the benefits and limitations
of this analytical approach, and identify priorities for future
research to understand and strengthen governance of AAS
systems globally.
ANALYZING THE GOVERNANCE CONTEXT
Pursuing improvements in governance is not merely a
technical process involving choice among design options, but
a contested process of change, requiring deliberation over
societal goals and underlying values (Armitage 2008). It is
important, therefore, that the analytical framework used to
assess the governance context be critical rather than normative,
in the sense that the description and assessment of how things
are is distinct from the discussion of how things ought to be.
It should also be suitable for use across a diversity of sociopolitical settings, simple enough to be understood by the
resource users themselves, and therefore appropriate for use
in action research settings where the goal is to gain practical
insights that can be applied in successive cycles of learning,
action, and reflection. The accumulated experience of
integrating governance objectives into development
assistance over the last two decades confirms that many of the
most promising opportunities exist at local levels, requiring
deliberation over locally determined “best-fit” options as
opposed to “best practices” imported from other countries
(Carothers and de Gramont 2011). Learning from such local
innovations can also provide a foundation for policy reforms
and institution building at larger scales.
The governance context of AAS refers to the domain in which
people’s authority to use, manage, or otherwise influence
natural resources is exercised. This includes the formal legal
and institutional framework as well as the informal sets of
norms, social networks, and power relationships that guide
and constrain stakeholder interactions with one another and
with the natural environment. To capture this context,
approaches such as adaptive governance (Olsson et al. 2006)
and interactive governance (Kooiman et al. 2008) take a broad
perspective, comprising multiple stakeholders, not only
government, and their interactions across system scales. Our
framework builds on those foundations. For our purposes,
however, the shortcoming of these approaches is that they are
primarily oriented toward theory-building and expert analysis
in reference to fairly abstract ideals such as “polycentric
institutions that are nested, quasi-autonomous units operating
at multiples scales” (Olsson et al. 2006) or a composite
evaluation of “governability” for particular resource systems
(Kooiman et al. 2008). This makes them difficult to adapt for
collaborative assessments and action planning with local
stakeholders. As Leach et al. (2010) point out, a reliance on
expert analysis oriented by preconceived ideals of good
governance entails a “danger of simply upholding dominant
‘expert’ views and supporting those in power, marginalizing
the perspectives and priorities of the poor” (Leach et al.
2010:90-91).
By contrast, the framework we outline here is more practiceoriented and intended to be simple and adaptable enough to
be used jointly with local stakeholders for analyzing the
governance context of a given social-ecological system (SES)
and the pathways to influencing change within this. As such
it also aims to avoid the “essentialist” message of the good
governance agenda, adopting a practical orientation concerned
less with abstract ideals of system design, working instead to
identify pathways to influence change toward “good enough
governance” (Grindle 2011). “Given the limited resources of
money, time, knowledge, and human and organizational
capacities,” writes Grindle (2011:S199), “practitioners are
correct in searching for the best ways to move towards better
governance in a particular country context.” Moreover,
because we focus on guiding questions for analysis rather than
predefined goals, a collaborative application of the framework
can enable dialogue over locally relevant priorities for
resilience and adaptation.
In identifying the dimensions for governance analysis, we
draw on the critical strain of research that has grappled
empirically with the outcomes of governance reform efforts
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in areas including forests, water, and climate change
adaptation (e.g., Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Ribot 2002, Lemos
and Agrawal 2006). This research is oriented by several key
observations. First, who is involved in or influences decision
making has significant bearing on the content of decisions and
their equity. Second, power is multifaceted, requiring attention
to shifts in different aspects of decision-making authority
among actors. Third, the outcomes of such shifting
relationships of power depend critically on mechanisms of
accountability, both formal and informal.
Our analytical framework therefore focuses on these three
distinct dimensions:
●
Stakeholder representation: Which actors are represented
in decision making and how?
●
Distribution of authority: How is formal and informal
authority distributed with regard to decisions over
resource access, management, enforcement, dispute
resolution, and benefit sharing?
●
Mechanisms of accountability: How are power-holders
held accountable for their decisions, and to whom?
These three dimensions of representation, authority, and
accountability combine to characterize the governance
context; understanding one without the others gives an
incomplete picture and therefore yields little insight into
pathways for change. For example, decentralization reforms
(a redistribution of authority) that increase local government
responsibility for common-pool resource management, while
neglecting to provide channels for community voice
(stakeholder representation) and systems of redress in the case
of abuse of power (mechanisms of accountability) may create
incentives for elite capture rather than equitable or sustainable
management (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). In Figure 1, we
provide key questions to help orient analysis of each of these
three dimensions of governance, and highlight issues of
particular concern that often merit attention in developingcountry AAS specifically.
Analysis along these three dimensions also allows
practitioners to conceptually separate an assessment of the
governance context from an evaluation of outcomes, including
resilience and adaptability (Ratner et al. 2013). Resilience is
defined as the capacity “to absorb disturbance and reorganize
while undergoing change so as to retain essentially the same
function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al.
2004). For the purposes of this discussion, we are principally
concerned with resilience in the ecosystem characteristics that
contribute to sustainable livelihoods in AAS, as well as
resilience of those livelihoods to shocks and stresses, whether
economic, political, social, or environmental. These include
chronic stresses such as resource extraction that degrades soil
quality or fish abundance, for example, or competition among
users across different sectors, such as infrastructure
development, energy production, or tourism, as well as shocks
such as cyclones, drought, disease epidemics, civil conflict,
or spikes in the price of foods and fuel.
Adaptability is “the capacity of actors within a system to
influence resilience” (Walker et al. 2004). Here we are
concerned with adaptive capacity across multiple levels, from
households to the institutions of market, state, and civil society
at local, national, and international scales. Because
developing-country AAS are generally characterized by
intensifying competition, the ability to manage this
competition equitably is a central feature of effective
governance. However, we also recognize that improving
livelihoods requires confronting institutions and structures
that perpetuate social exclusion, vulnerability, and poverty.
Examples include gender discrimination, along with exclusion
from decision making of certain ethnic groups, classes, castes,
or economic groups such as artisanal fishers or nomadic
pastoralists. Although these power structures may have deep
cultural and historical roots, they are also reflected in current
governance processes and institutions. In this respect,
intentional transformation of governance institutions may be
a necessary step toward the longer term goal of resilient
livelihoods.
While maintaining this distinction between context and
outcomes, the framework nevertheless enables practitioners
to address the questions that have animated research concerned
with institutional design for resilience in SES. Lebel et al.
(2006), for example, propose three pairs of “positive
attributes” of governance deemed essential to building the
capacities of stakeholder groups to manage resilience.
Inclusive and deliberative decision making, with effective
debate, room for dissent, and mechanisms for negotiation, are
attributes of stakeholder representation. Polycentric and
multilayered institutional arrangements characterize particular
aspects of distribution of authority. Lines of downward,
upward, and horizontal accountability describe the
mechanisms of accountability as they function in practice,
while just distribution of benefits and involuntary risks (social
justice) can be considered an outcome of these mechanisms
functioning well.
By focusing on the underlying dimensions or ‘building blocks’
of governance rather than a select set of positive attributes, the
framework proposed here provides a simple toolkit readily
applied in collaboration with local stakeholders to assess the
governance context in relation to locally defined goals of
resilience or institutional transformation. By first describing
the governance context as it exists now, the framework is
designed to help structure dialogue to identify obstacles and
opportunities for transforming governance in positive
directions. For each of the three dimensions, both formal and
informal mechanisms typically function in parallel (see Figure
2 for illustrations). Analysis must focus on how decision
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Fig. 1. Key questions and considerations in analyzing the governance context for development of aquatic agricultural
systems.
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Fig. 2. Examples of formal and informal mechanisms for three dimensions characterizing the governance context for
development of aquatic agricultural systems. Adapted from Ratner and Allison (2012).
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making works in practice, which may diverge significantly
from how it is meant to work in principle (Carothers and de
Gramont 2011). In describing mechanisms of representation,
for example, partners should consider both formal
mechanisms such as community representation in
management committees, or local or regional bodies of
government, along with informal mechanisms stakeholders
use to represent their interests, such as social networks or
advocacy organizations. Evaluating distribution of authority,
likewise, calls for attention to both formally allocated
authority, such as those granted to decentralized agencies of
government, and powers assumed in practice. This would be
the case, for example, when farmer cooperatives or local
religious bodies regularly play a role in mediating decisions
on resource access or environmental conflicts even if not their
principal function.
Regarding mechanisms of accountability, formal channels
such as the courts need to be considered alongside informal
mechanisms such as civil society movements and the media.
Rather than look at written laws and regulations alone, analysts
need to examine the extent to which these are enforced, and
whether they are applied equally or with bias against certain
social groups. Even in places where informal, local
enforcement mechanisms have historically functioned well
without intervention of the state, increasing competition over
valuable resources is placing growing importance on crossscale governance interactions (Thorburn 2000, Dietz et al.
2003, Berkes 2006). Governance institutions at higher levels
may reinforce, undermine, or even destroy governance
institutions specific to a focal SES (Ostrom 2009).
CASE STUDIES
We present four developing country case studies, employing
the framework to analyze the governance context for AAS
development in diverse ecological and socio-political settings.
In an iterative process, we have used the framework to help
organize the empirical work, with the cases providing a test
to improve the coherence and utility of the framework,
illustrating practical implications of efforts to analyze and
improve stakeholder representation, distribution of authority,
and mechanisms for accountability. Each case is focused on
an initiative that seeks to improve the governance of aquatic
agricultural systems and is part of an ongoing, long-term
collaboration between WorldFish and partners in a
multifaceted program of action research and capacity building
(WorldFish Center 2011) to strengthen resilience of local
livelihood systems. As typical of the action research approach
(Whyte 1984), the goal of these initiatives is not only to
understand the constraints to livelihood resilience but also to
actively work with local partners to address these. The
selection of cases is therefore purposive (Patton 1990), aiming
to benefit from the depth of knowledge created by these
relatively long-term engagements, the experience of one or
more of the coauthors as a locally engaged researcher-
practitioner, as well as to illustrate geographic and issue
diversity. The case studies include descriptions of broad
governance trends and characteristics as well as the more
specific outcomes of collaborative efforts, in addition to
insights concerning challenges that have not yet been
addressed (see summary in Table 1). As these are all worksin-progress, the intention is not to describe ultimate outcomes
but rather to illustrate the types of practical insights the
framework can yield and the ways this can contribute to
collaborative planning efforts.
Strengthening community voices for conservation in the
wetlands of Stung Treng, Cambodia
The first case study is focused on actions at a very local scale.
The Stung Treng Ramsar site is a protected wetland along
some 40 km of the Mekong River mainstream in northeastern
Cambodia. Recognized internationally for its unique
biodiversity value, the area is also a source of livelihood for
20 villages, which depend on the floodplain and riverbanks to
cultivate rice and other food crops. Subsistence fishing is the
second major livelihood activity, and in the dry season attracts
villagers from distant areas.
Since 2005, WorldFish and partners have facilitated a villagebased action research initiative working to build local
commitment to protect Stung Treng resources, and engaging
local government and the media to promote community
livelihoods. The initiative, known locally as Salaphoum,
addresses a deficit in local stakeholder representation in
decision making and downward accountability of local
government. Salaphoum supports four communities to collate
and document local knowledge of environmental resources
such as fish species, their habitats and migration patterns, and
fishing gears and practices (Salaphoum 2009). Subsequently
community-produced media are developed as tools for
advocacy. To date, this initiative has influenced the
designation of fish habitats for protection and formed a
network among neighboring communities to protect fisheries
resources. An outcome evaluation shows that villages in the
area now share information much more effectively, troubleshoot shared problems such as deterring illegal fishers, and
engage in collective action such as joint patrols between
neighboring community fisheries (Halpern et al. 2010). The
effort has also improved women’s representation in decision
making. In one instance, a community researcher credits her
selection as chief in part to the skills she gained through the
research collaboration (Salaphoum 2009).
Legal and administrative reforms have also increased the
scope for community-based resource management in recent
years, but overlapping authority and limited government
capacity pose serious constraints. In this section of the river,
the Fisheries Administration and NGOs have supported
establishment of 21 community fishery organizations with
authority to manage fisheries resources in public fishing
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Table 1. Key observations from case studies. Outcomes of action research are shown in italics.
Case
Action research
initiative
Stakeholder representation
Distribution of authority
Accountability mechanisms
Cambodia
“Salaphoum”
initiative builds
local
commitment to
resource
protection and
capacities for
collaboration
Historically low representation of
local stakeholders in provincial- and
national-level decision making.
Decentralization reforms have
increased the scope for communitybased resource management.
Village-based research network helps
communities document
environmental change and resource
use, and subsequently influence
conservation management and
planning.
Melandi Fishers Society (MFS)
members lacked representation in
production management, conflict
resolution, and benefit sharing.
Research highlights misfit between
resource use rights and responsibility
for protection.
Decentralization reforms introduce
democratically elected commune
councils, intended to represent local
development priorities and call on
services of line agencies.
Bangladesh
Malawi/
Mozambique
Solomon
Islands
Research collaboration improves
capacity of commune councils to
respond to local constituencies.
Local government authorities and the
Local communities organized under
the MFS gained legal access rights but fisheries department had weak lines of
in practice the resource was captured
accountability to local communities.
by local elites.
Strengthened capacity of MFS
leadership and local authorities,
Establishing accountability of local Improved advocacy roles by local
agencies/support providers
combined with renewed activism by
authorities and support agencies
(supporting marginalized households members, improved responsiveness
through action research made the
toward needs of poor households.
organization more representative,
to assert their resource use rights)
stopped elite resource capture and
including landless households, and
convinced better-off fishers to invest incursion by outsiders in illegal
fishing.
in community-based efforts.
Lake Chilwa
Official data underestimated the
Parallel systems aligned with local
Lakeshore communities lack basic
Basin Climate
number of people involved in fishing, chiefdoms and national government
services, reflecting a historically
Change
processing, and trade.
sometimes conflict over authority to
limited responsiveness of government
Adaptation
set and enforce rules.
and private sector to local priorities.
Program
Participatory monitoring of fish
promotes
catch and distribution of benefits has Research highlights challenges of
Participants in the fish value chain are
strengthened
motivated greater local participation resolving competition and disputes
demanding more accountability from
stakeholder
to influence management plans.
between management authorities,
government and private sector actors.
engagement in
negotiating competing resource uses
resource
across sectors, and enabling
planning across
transboundary collaboration between
the watershed
authorities of Malawi and
Mozambique.
SILMMA
Historically low representation of
Historically low capacity to implement Community groups reliant on support
network aims to local stakeholders in national-level
marine resource management in rural received via their partners, with only
increase
policy decision making.
areas, exacerbated by difficulties
one or two representatives from each
interagency
resolving state and traditional controls, community in national level or other
dialogue and
SILMMA network facilitates local
i.e., constitutionally protected
meetings.
representation of representation at national and
customary tenure.
local
international meetings discussing
Research highlights that mechanisms
management,
local issues and national policies for SILMMA approach clarifies local
are required to ensure representation is
NGO and
marine resource management.
management authority and supports
accountable to all sectors of the
government
state institutions to complement
community to ensure interests are
authorities
customary management in areas such effectively and fairly represented.
as enforcement and dispute resolution.
Communitybased fish
culture
initiatives on
private and
publicly owned
floodplain lands
with multiple
beneficiaries
grounds. Under the protected areas law (RGC 2008a),
management of the Ramsar site falls under the authority of the
Ministry of Environment. The local fisheries and environment
offices are poorly staffed and financed, and have difficulty
monitoring the area partly because of high travel costs. Local
officers have low wages and limited downward accountability,
reporting not to local government but directly to the national
ministries. As a result, some local officers reportedly levy
informal fees from resource users, justified as supporting the
cost of their operations.
One of the most significant obstacles to improving
enforcement is distribution of authority, in particular, the
misfit between resource use rights and responsibility for
protection. According to the fisheries law (RGC 2006),
outsiders enjoy the same use rights as local community
members, provided they follow local management rules.
However, when outsiders violate these rules, there are few
avenues of recourse for community fishery leaders, who do
not have the authority to apprehend offenders, only to report
them. Outsiders are not subject to the same social sanctions
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that act as deterrents for community members, and in many
cases they employ large-scale and sophisticated fishing gear,
sometimes financed by powerful interests (Halpern et al.
2010).
Meanwhile, decentralization reforms outlined in the law on
subnational administration (RGC 2008b) are introducing new
opportunities to improve accountability. Local government
units have typically been more responsive to local needs than
fisheries and environment officers accountable to the central
line ministries; however, they often lack the resources to
provide much support. By allocating fiscal resources to local
planning committees at commune, district, and provincial
levels, the decentralization reforms should in principle help
address this gap (Mam 2009). In most places, however, natural
resource management has received low priority in commune
planning processes in most places because of the immediate
need for physical infrastructure and limited capacity in local
government units. Salaphoum action research has helped to
raise the profile of natural resource management concerns
critical to local livelihoods with the commune councils,
leading, for example, to actions that integrate protection of
fisheries and flooded forests as priorities in Commune
Investment Plans. At the same time, by involving national
agencies, the initiative has helped strengthen their
responsiveness to local priorities. In this example, assessing
the governance context helped identify gaps in the
implementation of decentralization reforms and corresponding
opportunities to improve the representation of local voices in
development planning and accountability of government
authorities to local priorities for resource management.
Expanding resource access through community-based
fish culture in seasonal floodplains, Bangladesh
The second case illustrates the interplay of stakeholder
representation and accountability mechanisms in affecting
livelihood outcomes under changing forms of resource tenure.
Bangladesh has one of the largest inland fisheries in the world,
with nearly 4.6 million ha of inland waters, yet intensive
harvesting and land use change have reduced yields from
natural floodplain fisheries. Augmenting natural productivity
through fish culture is an important tool for strengthening the
rural economy (Dey and Prein 2006). Although past fish
culture interventions increased production, they have also
resulted in fishers losing access rights (Haque et al. 2011),
with negative effects on income of poor households (Toufique
and Gregory 2008). For example, in some cases public
floodplains leased to fisher groups are appropriated by
influential people, with the benefits from fish culture accruing
only to a few members.
Although there are various initiatives to introduce fish culture
in privately owned floodplains through contracts between
landowners and individual entrepreneurs, initiatives to bring
public and privately owned floodplains under community-
based systems with multiple beneficiaries are less common.
In part this is because the approach is more demanding in its
requirement for equitable institutions to balance the interests
of fishers, landowners, and the landless (Haque et al. 2011).
During 2005-2010, an initiative supported by the CGIAR
Challenge Program on Water and Food experimented with
such an approach, working both in publicly owned and
privately owned floodplains (Joffre and Sheriff 2011).
The case of Beel Mail in Mohanpur at Rajshahi, a seasonal
water body formed on publicly owned floodplains, illustrates
the sharp divergence between distribution of authority in law
and in practice. Local communities organized under the
Melandi Fishers Society (MFS) gained legal access rights to
the water body for a three-year period by participating in an
auction, but in practice they were often excluded because the
resource was captured by economically and politically
influential local people. MFS members lacked representation
in decisions regarding production management, conflict
resolution, and benefit sharing. Elite capture of the Beel Mail
floodplains stemmed from a serious lack of accountability in
several respects: MFS was a weak institution with little internal
commitment among its members; its leaders were influenced
by local elites who captured the floodplains with token
payments; and local government authorities and the
Department of Fisheries, had weak lines of accountability to
local communities.
The CGIAR initiative convened dialogue between the
Department of Fisheries and other stakeholders, facilitated
MFS meetings, helped restructure leadership selection
processes and built organizational capacity, e.g., financial
accounting and reporting. These forms of support led to a
significant improvement in representation and accountability
within the MFS, alongside improvements in downward
accountability of local government authorities and support
agencies. As more MFS members became actively involved
in floodplain management, its leaders gradually became more
accountable to members in assigning roles, assuring
distribution of benefits, and maintaining active linkages with
other local agencies to improve delivery of services. MFS
increased its capacity and activity in advocating for
community rights and communicating with local government,
as well as negotiating and resolving conflicts. Elite capture
was effectively stopped, with many withdrawing their claims
on the resource, while those local elites who remained
involved became active members of the MFS, providing
financial and technical support to fish culture and
management, and influencing government and private sector
institutions to support community efforts. Illegal fishing by
outsiders has ceased, and local landless households have
benefited by harvesting small, nonstocked species. Harvests
of both stocked and nonstocked fish have more than doubled,
with a similar rise in income (Joffre and Sheriff 2011).
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This experience is notable for its success in addressing the
problems of weak downward accountability and elite capture.
Researchers engaged in the initiative built on many years of
prior collaboration with the government to diagnose the
stakeholder relationships and institutional dynamics, and learn
from the outcomes of prior efforts. Key insights included the
importance of supporting marginalized households to assert
their rights to resource use and the value of engaging relatively
better-off fishers in community-based efforts, which
generated economic gains and encouraged others to participate
(Haque et al. 2011). Where there was strong stakeholder
representation from a diversity of user groups, including
women and landless households, effective linkages with local
government, and accountability mechanisms to ensure
equitable distribution of benefits, similar results were achieved
on privately owned floodplain lands. Where these governance
features were lacking, outcomes were far less successful. At
a floodplain at Pirgonj in Ranpur, for example, participation
of members was far less consistent and leaders lacked an
orientation toward consensus building, had less extensive
networks with local institutions, and were less able to negotiate
with local authorities and fisheries officers. As a result, the
collective management institutions were both less accountable
to their members and less effective at fostering accountability
from local government and private landowners. Complaints
over lack of transparency on the use of investment funds and
disputes over distribution of benefits eventually stymied the
initiative (Haque et al. 2011, Joffre and Sheriff 2011).
Navigating intersectoral competition in the Lake Chilwa
basin, Malawi and Mozambique
The next case illustrates the challenge of managing resource
competition amidst parallel authorities at multiple scales, and
some of the strategies that can build accountability toward
local resource users. Lake Chilwa lies in southeastern Malawi,
spanning the border with Mozambique. A shallow, enclosed
lake with a surrounding reed belt and a seasonally flooded
plain, it is one of Africa’s most productive lake fisheries (Njaya
et al. 2011). The basin provides fertile land for over 1.6 million
people in Malawi growing mostly rice in the wetlands and
maize in upland areas. The relatively high population density
(NSO 2008) is driving the expansion of cropland to marshes,
forests, and other marginal areas. The lake’s fish production
is directly influenced by deforestation, upland agriculture, and
soil erosion within the catchment that deposits phosphorous
and other pollutants, as well as urban waste runoff from Zomba
City (Government of Malawi 2000). The lake and its marshes
also form an internationally significant wetland ecosystem,
designated a protected Ramsar site.
An important feature of local governance is parallel systems
of authority aligned with local chiefdoms and national
government. Traditional management strategies involve a
fishing calendar based on taboos and myths respected by the
Lomwe, Yao, and Nyanja ethnic groups. These traditional
management systems, although modified, are still being
practiced in small, cohesive communities as found in the
islands of Lake Chilwa (Chisi and Njalo) as well as Lake
Malawi (Mbenji). In parallel, the Malawian government
instituted a centralized system, with Department of Fisheries
as the sole fishery management authority. However, in 1995,
after the lake dried out and the fishery was temporarily
depleted following a periodic drought, government authorities
initiated a comanagement approach. Although some of the
regulations formulated under centralized management were
retained, others were changed to reflect management and
monitoring roles assigned to the newly introduced Beach
Village Committees. In some cases, these committees and
traditional local leaders have come into conflict over authority
to set and enforce rules (Kayambazinthu 1999, Njaya 2009).
Recently, the Lake Chilwa Basin Climate Change Adaptation
Program introduced participatory monitoring, which serves to
increase accountability of government and private sector
actors. Fishers use logbooks to record catch, sales, and
incomes, providing more detailed information than available
from government statistics. A preliminary assessment of these
records revealed that fishing effort on Lake Chilwa was
previously underestimated by a factor of three to four, and
suggested the number of people directly involved in the
fisheries value chain is also far greater than indicated by
official data. With this information in hand, fishers have
become more proactive in calling on government to improve
enforcement and to adjust management approaches in
response to the shifting resource status. With new information
tracking cash income from fish sales, fishers also became
motivated to lobby for new services, including mobile banking
at the fish landing beaches.
If such efforts succeed in strengthening fisheries
comanagement systems in Malawi, and if the competition with
traditional authorities is resolved, significant challenges will
still remain at the lake basin scale. One dimension involves
the interface between land, water, agriculture, and fisheries
management. Agriculture authorities, for example, have
promoted manual treadle pumps for irrigation to expand
cropping on the lakeshore and riverbanks, inadvertently
competing with efforts to protect critical aquatic habitats. So
far, few institutions have developed to manage trade-offs and
competition across sectors, such that poor users in particular
are left to seek strategies to cope and adapt as livelihood
opportunities shift. At the international scale, conflicts among
fishers and between fisheries authorities in the two countries
are frequent (Njaya 2007). Fishing restrictions in Mozambique
are less developed than in Malawi, so seine fishers, for
example, migrate to the Mozambican side of the lake during
the closed season when they are not allowed to fish in
Malawian waters. However, there is no joint committee or
other institutional arrangement to handle such disputes or to
undertake joint planning and management efforts, a significant
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gap in distribution of authority, and a challenge for future
initiatives in the lake basin.
Promoting networking and advocacy among coastal
communities in the Solomon Islands
The last case addresses challenges of improving coordination
and representation at a broad geographic scale, in a setting
with highly dispersed coastal communities. The population of
Solomon Islands resides predominantly in rural and coastal
areas, and is highly dependent on subsistence and small-scale
agriculture and fisheries for food security and livelihoods (Bell
et al. 2009). Situated within the coral triangle region of
exceptionally high marine biodiversity, the country attracts
global interest in the management and conservation of its
marine resources (Coral Triangle Initiative 2009). Most land
and nearshore marine areas are traditionally owned, and
constitutionally protected customary systems allow clans with
tenure to control resource access and use (Lane 2006).
National environmental and fisheries legislation also regulate
nearshore marine resource use; however, lack of capacity and
difficulties resolving state and traditional controls have limited
the application of centralized measures for nonexport fishing
activities in rural areas. Historically, rural communities
dependent on fisheries have had little voice in national
fisheries management and planning.
Over the last 15 years, communities and their partner agencies,
predominantly international NGOs, have established over 130
locally managed marine areas. The Solomon Islands Locally
Managed Marine Area (SILMMA) approach to comanagement
is notable for clarifying local resource management authority
by supporting state institutions to complement rather than
compete with customary management regimes. NGOs
typically facilitate the development of management
arrangements and resource use rules that are approved through
consultation with resource owners and the broader
community. Compliance is promoted by strengthening local
and traditional leadership, enforcement, and dispute resolution
systems. NGO and government members of SILMMA are
engaged in dialogue to develop legal reforms to support
comanagement, including measures to increase mutual
accountability between provincial and community levels.
Current draft legislation would, for example, decentralize
authority to provincial government agencies and formally
recognize community management plans in provincial
ordinances, as well as provide new formal avenues for local
representation and participation in the governance of
nearshore fisheries and marine resources (Govan et al. 2011).
The SILMMA network was established in 2003 by the
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and NGOs.
SILMMA network’s objective is to promote information
exchange, collaboration, and coordination across the
numerous government ministries, NGOs, and communities
involved in managing Solomon Islands’ marine resources
(Cohen et al. 2012). WorldFish has been a member since the
network’s establishment and has actively fostered the network
by cofacilitating and cofunding network activities. The
network promotes dialogue of community issues and
experiences particularly via multistakeholder workshops and
meetings with participation of community representatives
alongside NGO and government representatives.
Despite such efforts by SILMMA network members to
facilitate representation of community interests in higher
levels of governance, significant obstacles remain to enhance
stakeholder representation and downward accountability.
Community groups are often very reliant on financial,
technical, and logistical support received via their NGO
partners for management activities, and for engagement in the
SILMMA network. Without appropriate mechanisms to
ensure autonomy, community interests may be subordinated
to partner, donor, and government agendas. Community
representatives in the SILMMA network are selected at the
local level, generally from a local resource management
committee. This selection may be arbitrary, for example,
where people in positions of power become representatives
by default, and as a result, representatives may not be
answerable to all sectors of the community. In particular,
women’s representation on local resource management
committees, and their formal role in decision-making
processes, is often lacking (Hilly et al. 2012).
Although the SILMMA network has had some success in
bridging fisheries and environment sectors, engagement with
other sectors such as health, agriculture, and education has
been minimal to date. Therefore, improving sector-spanning
representation in decision making forums and horizontal
accountability among sectoral institutions remain serious
challenges. Bridging organizations like SILMMA have a role
to play in dialogue to highlight, for example, how
improvements in health and education services to remote
communities can contribute to improvements in capacity for
resource management, or how international trade policies
affect domestic food security and potential for climate change
adaptation. Playing such a role effectively, however, requires
significant organizational capacity to bring together the
sometimes competing agendas of different donors, initiatives,
agencies, and local communities. It also requires improvement
of communication channels to introduce local perspectives in
regional and global debates that will directly influence the
livelihoods of coastal communities.
LESSONS AND CHALLENGES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
These four case studies represent a diverse set of AAS in
riverine wetland, seasonal floodplain, lakeshore, and marine
environments, and in a spectrum of socio-political contexts.
With reference to the case studies, we illustrate how assessing
Ecology and Society 18(4): 59
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the governance dimensions of representation, power, and
accountability can yield practical insights into opportunities
for improving local livelihoods. We then extend the argument
to consider how shifts in governance relate to livelihood
resilience and institutional transformation.
Strengthening stakeholder representation
Building more inclusive stakeholder representation is critical
given the diversity of stakeholders involved in AAS and the
marginalization that many poor resource-dependent
households in these systems face (Allison et al. 2012). In the
Bangladesh case, coalitions of community-based organizations
played a key role in helping to lobby government for
community access to seasonal water bodies, and the
Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association provided
legal and administrative support. Some 250 community-based
organizations in the floodplain have since established a
federation, known as the Society for Water Resources
Management, which continues to advocate for community
tenure and management rights, and improvements in the
distribution of benefits derived from these water bodies
(Thompson et al. 2010, Sultana and Thompson 2011).
The example of village-led research networks in Cambodia’s
Stung Treng wetlands illustrates an earlier stage of supporting
community capacity to articulate local interests. Downstream
in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, where civil society groups are
more densely represented, efforts to strengthen a national
grassroots network of fisherfolk and increase their capacity to
collaborate and negotiate with government authorities have
recently helped to secure a formal transfer of access rights to
fishing communities and to resolve access disputes spanning
provincial boundaries (Ratner et al. 2011). Follow-on efforts
are now addressing competing uses of water and seasonal crop
agriculture in the flooded forest zone, and assessing
management options that balance interests in conservation and
economic development.
Bridging organizations (Berkes 2002) that help communicate
poor resource users voices in development decision making
and help mediate interests across sectors and geographic scales
are an especially important vehicle for improving equity in
stakeholder representation. In the Solomon Islands example,
a key challenge is increasing the influence of local resource
users in national and regional policy formulation. The
SILMMA network aids in this goal by providing a channel for
information from communities, including community
comanagement experiences, to be considered in national and
international policy arenas. The network also facilitates
forums for dialogue with national government agencies and
international NGOs, and provides logistical and financial
support to enable community members to participate. In recent
interviews of SILMMA members, two-thirds of respondents
felt that information provided by their organizations had
already influenced national or regional policies concerning
marine resource management. Mandates of SILMMA
members vary, however, between conservation of biodiversity
and fisheries management for livelihoods and food security,
and also between longer or shorter planning horizons.
Although network heterogeneity is a valuable characteristic
for responding to change and uncertainty (Folke et al. 2005),
in practice these differences also present challenges to
network-wide information exchange, learning, and collective
action (Cohen et al. 2012).
Governance challenges due to competing priorities are
magnified across scales. In the case of Cambodia, for example,
there is an intergovernmental institution in place to mediate
transboundary river basin management, the Mekong River
Commission. However, its very makeup means that local
stakeholders such as riverside villagers in Stung Treng rely
primarily on national government to represent their interests
on matters such as construction of mainstream dams upriver
in Laos. This illustrates the need for cross-scale interactions
that empower local user groups rather than extend control by
central government or large-scale economic actors (Adger et
al. 2005).
Redistributing authority
Measures that protect or equitably redistribute rights to access,
manage, and retain benefits from AAS are especially important
in areas where marginalized groups have seen those rights
eroded in the face of increased competition. In Bangladesh,
for example, community-based fish culture has enabled
improvements in income and nutrition for the landless poor
and women-headed households, two groups largely excluded
from participation in the prior system that enabled capture of
resource rights by local elites (Haque et al. 2011). In Stung
Treng, Cambodia, village members of the Salaphoum research
network face increasing pressure to balance longer term
conservation demands with improvements in access rights for
local users to meet more immediate food production needs.
Navigating these tensions is essential because livelihood
security and respect for basic human rights should be
understood as a precondition for participation in longer term
resource management efforts (Allison et al. 2012).
In some instances, clarifying tenure arrangements for resource
management can undermine cooperation between groups or
act as a catalyst for conflict within communities. This has been
documented in Solomon Islands, for example, in processes to
establish management areas or conservation zones
(McDougall 2005). The objectives of customary and state
resource management institutions also may not be aligned, and
these differences can present difficulties in forming hybrid
institutions for coastal management (Foale et al. 2011).
Traditional systems may also be inequitable and lack effective
mechanisms of downward and horizontal accountability, as
research in inland AAS in Sub-Saharan Africa has shown
(Béné et al. 2009).
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In building capacity to resolve disputes over tenure and
resource management authority, it is often useful to support
linkages between parallel institutions. Comparative research
on comanagement institutions in multiple lake and river
systems in Malawi, for example, suggests that where local
government and sectoral agencies collaborate with the
traditional chiefs, fisherfolk are able to access multiple
avenues of recourse in clarifying resource claims and resolving
disputes (Russell and Dobson 2011). In the Pacific, many
initiatives to establish marine protected areas have ignored or
sidelined local tenure and dispute resolution systems, while
the most successful efforts have instead acknowledged the
legitimacy of these local institutions, reinforcing their
authority in areas such as monitoring and enforcement (Ferse
et al. 2010).
Building accountability of decision makers
Robust mechanisms of accountability are especially important
at times when rights to access, use, and to deriving benefits
from natural resources are being reallocated or negotiated. In
the case of floodplain water bodies in Bangladesh, as
community-based organizations became more active in
advocating for community rights, and more effective in
communicating with local government, they were able to avert
elite capture in many locales. Similarly, in Cambodia a recent
wave of mobilization in response to tensions between largescale and small-scale users of fisheries and agricultural land
in the Tonle Sap floodplain culminated in a decision to end
the regime of commercial fishing concessions. As national
authorities assess options for future policy and regulatory
reform, continued engagement by civil society groups, close
monitoring by the media, and independent research are
important mechanisms to promote public understanding and
deliberation over the likely consequences of various policy
options (Ratner 2011).
Even where traditional management systems may be absent,
informal mechanisms of accountability are typically critical
alongside more formal mechanisms. Each of the four cases
summarized in this paper illustrate a range of tensions among
competing users of land, fisheries, water, and wetlands,
emphasizing the need for multiple routes to hold decision
makers accountable, in addition to formal court proceedings.
In the Lake Chilwa case, for example, support for participatory
monitoring and analysis of fisheries production trends at the
lake scale is influencing local stakeholders’ understanding of
policy and management options, bringing new voices into the
policy debate, and increasing public scrutiny of management
decisions. In the Cambodia case, decentralization reforms
have provided an opening for local communities to take part
in resource management planning alongside provincial and
local authorities. However, injecting concerns over food
security and livelihoods in broader development policy
decision making such as plans for hydropower dams remains
exceptionally difficult, despite increasing evidence of the risks
(Ziv et al. 2012).
Governance, livelihood resilience, and transformation
These case studies are intended to illustrate the viability of the
analytical framework in diverse settings and to sharpen
description of its key dimensions. In doing so, we have also
described the preliminary outcomes of action research. By
identifying critical obstacles and opportunities in the
governance context, researchers and development practitioners
can better support efforts to strengthen livelihood resilience,
and to transform the institutions that reinforce poor people’s
marginalization and vulnerability.
To make this connection between governance change and
social-ecological system outcomes more explicit, consider
several scenarios that can be drawn from the cases presented.
In Bangladesh’s floodplain, the case study showed how
addressing elite resource capture (a shift in distribution of
authority) and improving the responsiveness of local
authorities to community-based planning (an enhancement in
downward accountability) resulted in both increased
production and more equitable distribution of benefits,
spurring household investments in health and education.
Should similar changes be adopted at sufficient scale, these
could reasonably be evaluated as an increase in system
resilience, because they strengthen the ability of poor
households in particular to accommodate shocks and stresses.
In the case of Lake Chilwa, efforts that enable resource users
to have a stronger voice in lake basin planning (an
improvement in stakeholder representation) are showing some
initial promise that could lead to more clear and balanced
sharing of responsibilities for resource management
(distribution of authority) and improved services. If the local
demand for services to enable savings and credit is realized,
it could catalyze a range of new microenterprises that increase
people’s capacity for adaptation in the face of climate change.
Similarly, facilitation of a network in Solomon Islands for
dialogue between marine resource management actors who
operate across scales has provided a mechanism for local
concerns and actions to be considered in national policy
(enhanced stakeholder representation). Resulting legal
reforms are clarifying the complementary authority of
traditional and state institutions and strengthening
mechanisms for downward accountability, measures which
could also improve responsiveness to local needs, buttressing
capacity for adaptation to ecological, social, and economic
changes.
Last, to take the case of the Stung Treng wetlands in Cambodia,
efforts that strengthen community voices in resource planning
are helping build a broader constituency for conservation,
provided that it contributes to, rather than diminishes, local
Ecology and Society 18(4): 59
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livelihoods. If, over time, this is complemented by
improvements in local powers for enforcement (distribution
of authority), and if decentralization reforms make national
agencies more responsive to local priorities (strengthened
downward accountability), it is possible to envision a scenario
in which local communities’ depend much less on resource
exploitation and much more on new income opportunities
generated through ecotourism, with revenue reinvested in
protection. Should these changes in resource use patterns,
accountability, and distribution of authority become
sufficiently pronounced and lasting, it could be considered a
transformation in the social-ecological system at this local
scale. By improving resource management and reducing
conflict, such local transformations can contribute positively
to resilience at larger scales (Folke et al. 2010) as well as model
the sorts of transformations that may be needed at these scales
(Olsson et al. 2006).
resilience in complex SES. When such assessments involve
local stakeholders in ways that influence future programming
priorities of official aid agencies, NGOs, and other
development partners, this can help aid in the selection of
feasible actions, as well as improve downward accountability
of development initiatives to the communities they aim to
serve (Blagescu et al. 2005). The dynamic and unpredictable
challenges faced by fishers, farmers, and other rural resource
users highlights the central importance of building the capacity
of these communities to adapt in the face of future change, to
participate in enhancing social-ecological resilience, and to
proactively influence transformations in the institutions that
maintain poverty and marginalization. Collaborative efforts
to assess the governance context can help identify pathways
to change as well as build shared commitment to pursuing
these.
CONCLUSION
In many aquatic agricultural systems, local resource users are
witnessing increased competition from multiple stakeholders
at local to national and regional scales over rights to access
and use natural resources, land, water, wetlands, and fisheries,
essential to rural livelihoods. A key implication is the need to
strengthen governance to enable equitable decision making
amidst such competition. The simple analytical framework
developed in this paper aims to facilitate action research to
diagnose obstacles and opportunities for improving
governance in developing-country aquatic agricultural
systems (AAS).
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6043
The case studies we present illustrate each of the three
framework dimensions, and highlight the value of long-term
action research in gaining locally grounded insights. Our
intention here is not to establish generalizable conclusions
about the governance challenges in AAS more broadly, nor to
pinpoint general priorities for governance reform. Instead, we
have set out to demonstrate the practical utility of analysis
oriented according to this framework in helping to identify
pathways for change within a diversity of settings.
We have also shown that the framework can aid comparison
of the governance context for development of AAS across
countries and regions. Because the framework builds on a body
of empirical research in environmental governance addressing
a range of resource systems, with minor adaptations in the
guiding questions and examples the framework should also be
suitable for application in other agroecosystems such as
drylands, pastoral systems, and mountain watersheds. If we
can achieve greater consistency in the criteria used to evaluate
governance characteristics across such systems, it should aid
comparisons and accumulation of lessons about common
obstacles and pathways to change.
Last, a sound understanding of governance contexts is critical
to identifying opportunities for investment aimed at improving
Acknowledgments:
For critical feedback on an early draft of this article, the
authors would like to thank Neil Andrew, Boru Douthwaite,
Patrick Dugan, Daniel Jamu, Ranjitha Puskur, Anne-Marie
Schwarz, and especially Louisa Evans, as well as four
anonymous reviewers. This paper was supported by funding
from the CGIAR Research Program on Aquatic Agricultural
Systems and the CGIAR Research Program on Policies,
Institutions, and Markets. The analytical framework is
adapted from Ratner and Allison (2012). Case studies draw
on experience from partnerships supported by the Wetlands
Alliance Program (funded by the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency) in Cambodia, the
Community-Based Fish Culture in Irrigation Systems and
Seasonal Floodplains project (supported by the CGIAR
Challenge Program on Water and Food) in Bangladesh, and
the Lake Chilwa Basin Climate Change Adaptation Program
(funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in
Malawi, and funding from the Coral Reef Initiatives for the
Pacific and the Australian Centre for International
Agricultural Research (ACIAR) for research in Solomon
Islands. The authors alone are responsible for the opinions
expressed.
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